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President: Mr. MANOUAN (Côte d'Ivoire)

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MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION (continued)

1. Mr. AERTS (Belgium) said that his country, which met 65% of its electricity needs from nuclear power, had paid special attention to safety at all stages of the process right from the beginning and had a positive record of nuclear power plant safety and availability.
2. When at the beginning of May its territory had been exposed to the radioactive cloud from an accident 2000 km away, the inhabitants of Belgium could not escape the concern felt in other countries in Europe. In that connection, his Government had identified three basic problems: (1) absence of organized information exchange at the international level; (2) inadequate international collaboration in respect of evaluation and establishment of standards concerning foodstuffs; (3) need for common safety criteria for all nuclear facilities. On 7 May Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Foreign Minister, had submitted a proposal to the European Community with a view to finding a specific solution to those problems.
3. The IAEA deserved to be commended for its efforts which had resulted, in a very short time, in the drafting of the two conventions, one on early notification and the other on emergency assistance. The authorities concerned in his country were in the process of working out a mechanism and an infrastructure to implement the objectives of those conventions. In that context, within its existing financial means, the Agency should play an active co-ordinating role and provide technical assistance.
4. Moreover, those conventions could serve as a model in other sectors which threatened the environment, for example, the chemical industry.
5. Belgium had been impressed by the report submitted by the Soviet Union at the Post-Accident Review Meeting held between 25 and 29 August, which contained valuable information on the magnitude of the accident and on measures taken to limit its consequences for the personnel and the population. The world community should benefit from the experience gained by the Soviet Union. In that connection, he urged the Agency to continue to disseminate data on the development of the situation inside and around the power plant and on measures taken. His Government had taken note of the thirteen points of action prepared as a result of that meeting.

6. The design of the Belgian reactors was too different from the Chernobyl reactor for any technical conclusions to be drawn from that accident at the current stage. However, the first lesson to be learnt concerned the combined importance of the quality of the machine and the quality of man.

7. The design of potentially dangerous facilities should allow for a margin of possible human errors and provide for means of coping therewith without harmful consequences. Furthermore, the technical and moral quality of operators should be regularly and rigorously reviewed.

8. The Agency had undeniably a leading role to play in the process of developing common equivalent quality criteria for man, equipment and procedures. The high safety and reliability level attained in Belgium was the result of the high sense of responsibility on the part of everyone and of exchange of operating experience with other countries having nuclear power plants of the same type.

9. The information on measures taken to limit the consequences for the population stressed the urgent need for a full set of means and for extensive co-ordination.

10. The new conventions offered the possibility of meeting that objective through international collaboration. However, a basic condition was the establishment of decision-making criteria in the form of universally applicable reference values. Action in that regard had already commenced both in the Agency and in the European Community, and the Chernobyl accident had given an impetus to intensifying and accelerating those efforts. International scientific co-operation should lead to a universal scientific basis and to an understanding of the particular problems of each Member State.

11. He urged the Agency to undertake a number of specific activities. The first related to the practical application of the conventions on notification and emergency assistance. In that connection, Belgium called upon all Member States to ratify them and the nuclear-weapon States to make a statement announcing their intention voluntarily to notify accidents not covered in Article 1 of the notification convention. Secondly, the Agency should continue to disseminate the experience gained by the USSR as a result of the Chernobyl accident. Thirdly, the Agency should try to secure a consensus on

safety objectives at nuclear facilities. Fourthly, it should regard as one of its future objectives the analysis of the causes and consequences of any human errors and of the means of eliminating them. Lastly, the Agency should develop a scientific basis for decision-making criteria and for examination of the problems of practical application.

12. Chernobyl had clearly shown that any nuclear accident concerned everyone, and that was true of accidents with the gravest consequences for public health and the environment and of all accidents in the context of evaluation of an energy policy.

13. Ms. RONBECK (Norway) said that the danger associated with nuclear power was the most important lesson to be drawn from the Chernobyl accident. It was the duty of all countries to do everything possible to prevent a new Chernobyl. The common goal must be a state of affairs where there was no need to implement the measures set out in the conventions before the Conference.

14. Her Government appreciated the speedy and efficient manner in which the Agency had responded to the challenges posed by the Chernobyl accident. In particular, the successful completion of two important international conventions in such a short time was a good omen for future co-operation in that field. Although her authorities considered that what fell within the scope of the conventions was covered in a satisfactory way, both conventions had their limitations: the question of advance preparedness, for example, was not tackled in the two conventions. It was to be hoped that such measures would be taken at the national level.

15. The two conventions were now ready for signature and she would sign both of them on behalf of her country. The conventions would be binding for Norway from the date of signature. She was concerned, however, that it had required a major accident to bring about such a co-operative effort. There were lessons to be learned from that which must not be overlooked in further work on economic, environmental and energy issues.

16. It was no longer possible to proceed from the premise that preventing pollution was too costly. Gradually the world had been forced to recognize the enormous costs of damage caused by pollution, whether nuclear or chemical,

national or transboundary. In almost every case, it was cheaper to prevent than to cure. The most stringent measures possible must therefore be taken to ensure the protection of human health and the environment.

17. Even more important than the agreements before the Conference was the improvement of safety standards for nuclear installations. The Agency and national safety authorities should embark upon a co-ordinated programme to establish stringent international requirements for the construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear facilities, applicable to new as well as existing installations. Shortcomings should be identified and effective improvements made so as to prevent the release of harmful nuclear substances to the environment.

18. The Chernobyl accident had also underlined the need for adequate international conventions concerning liability for the transboundary consequences of a nuclear accident. The existing conventions must be reviewed in order to assess whether they were adequate in the present situation or needed to be supplemented.

19. There was also a pressing need to clear up the jungle of different measurement units used. An international understanding on intervention limits should be established on the basis of medical knowledge for the protection of the population. In addition, more information was needed on the possible risks of genetic defects, which was a major source of public fear. The Agency and WHO should consult national safety and health authorities on those matters.

20. The Post-Accident Review Meeting held in August had been very useful in clarifying and analysing the accident and in giving an idea of the proportions of the disaster. The meeting had not provided answers to all questions relating to operational and control procedures, but it had clearly shown that safety could be considerably enhanced by improving such procedures. Improvements of that type would not be very costly and should therefore be implemented without delay.

21. Thus far she had mentioned only efforts to be made at the international level. National and regional efforts must also be intensified to reduce the risks and the consequences of a nuclear accident. In her country a Government commission was now evaluating the consequences for Norway of the Chernobyl

accident. It was also studying how national monitoring and contingency arrangements could be improved so as to be better equipped to meet any future emergency. As part of that effort, consideration was being given to the need for supplementing existing bilateral and regional agreements with new provisions or new agreements for improved monitoring, information, consultation and assistance. That need was being examined not only in relation to possible nuclear accidents but also to other major accidents with transboundary consequences.

22. The Nordic countries co-operated very closely in the atomic energy field. That co-operation was currently being expanded to include the continuous exchange of technical information on the operation of nuclear power plants as well as information relating to the planning of new installations. The reason for so doing was that the impact on health and the environment in other countries must be taken into account when examining different alternatives for meeting national energy demand. It was for the same reason that she supported the Danish proposal concerning international and vicinity co-operation. The Chernobyl accident had, however, also shown that wind and precipitation could cause serious radioactive contamination over a wide geographical area. Consequently, the safety of installations in countries that were not immediate neighbours of his country was also of great concern.

23. Finally, her delegation supported the proposal of the Soviet Union to involve the United Nations Environment Programme in efforts concerning the environmental aspects of the nuclear energy issue.

24. Mr. CHRISTENSEN (Denmark) noted with pleasure that the Conference had been presented with two draft international conventions on early notification and mutual assistance in the event of a nuclear accident, on which broad, though not complete, agreement had been achieved in less than a month. While the two conventions were undoubtedly necessary, their endorsement alone would not be nearly sufficient to restore confidence in the use of nuclear power. It was simply not enough for countries to agree on how to notify each other or to undertake to help each other after an accident had occurred.

25. As a representative of a country which used nuclear power only on a small scale and for scientific purposes, he insisted that work to establish internationally acceptable safety norms for nuclear plants be continued and that it produce tangible results as soon as possible. Accidents must be prevented by making nuclear plants safe. He therefore welcomed the Agency's decision to hold a meeting of experts in November with a view to developing the best possible international nuclear safety norms.

26. Denmark was prepared to accept the two conventions at the current session of the Conference. Its signature of the convention on early notification would not be subject to ratification but, because of domestic legislative procedure, the convention on mutual assistance could only be signed subject to ratification. The provisions of both conventions would, however, be respected pending their formal entry into force.

27. His delegation attached particular importance to the convention on early notification, and was gratified that it comprised almost all types of nuclear plant. It noted with satisfaction that the Danish proposal providing for bilateral agreements as a supplement to the provisions of the convention had been included, although a more concrete phrasing of the relevant paragraph would have been preferable. Also, the need to provide neighbouring countries with precise advance information on the design and safety of nuclear plants should have been more clearly emphasized. Only in that way could neighbouring countries establish an efficient emergency preparedness system. Denmark had already initiated bilateral negotiations with a number of countries in that connection. An agreement between Denmark and Sweden on notification and exchange of information would be signed in the near future. Since it was not possible in a large multinational forum to agree on all details which were important to relations between individual countries, bilateral agreements were a necessary supplement to the IAEA conventions. It ought to be possible, however, to provide certain guidelines on the content of such agreements.

28. Finally, he appealed to all countries participating in the Conference to approve the two draft conventions, to apply the conventions from the time of signature, to provide - on the basis of bilateral and multilateral arrangements between neighbouring countries - all necessary information of relevance to the safety of existing and planned nuclear activities, to hold

consultations, upon request, on safety standards in existing plants and on plans for new installations before taking a final decision, and to contribute to the elaboration of clear and effective rules on liability for compensation in the event of a nuclear accident.

29. Mr. BIRMINGHAM (Ireland), noting that the Post-Accident Review Meeting had provided valuable information on the Chernobyl accident and its immediate radiological effects, expressed the hope that the Soviet authorities would continue to supply information not only on the accident itself, but also on its long-term medical consequences. It was vital for the Soviet Union to carry out, in co-operation with WHO, epidemiological studies so that the world could learn a great deal more about low-dose effects.

30. The accident had affected many countries. To the Soviet Union, the country which had suffered the most, and to the families of the victims he extended the condolences of the Irish Government. Although some 2800 kilometres from Chernobyl, Ireland had been quite seriously affected by the accident. The public had been greatly disturbed to find that an accident so far away could lead to an increase in radioactivity and pose a threat to their health, the environment and the economy. As a result, the alienation of many sectors of Irish public opinion with respect to nuclear power had increased. Public anxiety was heightened by the proximity of many installations in neighbouring countries. One encouraging factor, however, was the way in which the international community, despite some initial hesitation, had taken steps since the accident to improve the standard of nuclear safety throughout the world.

31. His country had no plans to create a nuclear generating capacity. Other States did, however, and their decision to pursue nuclear power programmes would have implications for Ireland. An obligation was thus imposed on countries with nuclear programmes to act as good neighbours, which meant that they must implement their programmes in conformity with the highest possible levels of safety. It was essential for there to be an international mechanism for assuring other countries that national safety standards did not fall short of internationally agreed norms and that those safety standards were being fully observed. Such assurances could best be provided by international verification.

32. Even before the Chernobyl accident Ireland had proposed the formation of an international safety inspectorate. One of the main roles of that body would be to inspect national regulatory authorities in order to confirm the effectiveness of their regulatory activities. In that context he welcomed the suggestion of the United Kingdom delegation for the establishment of an Agency team to carry out peer reviews of regulatory systems and for the Agency to develop the skill and expertise to examine the quality of nuclear regulatory bodies.

33. Neighbouring States should have consultative rights enshrined in bilateral or regional agreements during the planning, construction and entire period of operation of all nuclear facilities which could give rise to significant transboundary releases. Such agreements should incorporate the right of a neighbouring State, if concerned at an incident or series of incidents involving a release of radioactivity, to demand that a prompt inspection of the type performed by IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs) be carried out on the plant and its operation.

34. His Government was disturbed to see that in some countries nuclear power plants were being operated beyond their original life expectancy without full and formal safety reviews based on current safety standards. Technical measures could be taken in many countries to improve the safety of existing reactors. In that connection he welcomed the undertaking given by the Soviet Union to effect technical and administrative improvements at RBMK reactors. The Agency should develop international guidelines for reviewing the safety of ageing plants.

35. Turning to the future, it was time to call a halt to the increasing size of reactors. As the Chernobyl accident had demonstrated, the potential for destruction was proportional to the size of the reactor. For safety reasons, priority should be given to the development of small- and medium-power reactors.

36. The existing nuclear liability conventions were intrinsically flawed and had only a limited number of signatories. The damage caused by the Chernobyl accident had demonstrated the importance of developing a regime of legally binding commitments on nuclear liability which was accepted by all Agency Member States.

37. Finally, he noted with regret that the early notification convention was marred by the inability of some nuclear-weapon States to accept that notification of all accidents with transboundary implications should be mandatory. The mutual assistance convention also had its defects, not least of which was its evasion of the issue of liability. Despite the limitations of those conventions, the Irish Government had empowered his delegation to sign both conventions, subject to ratification.

38. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) observed that the death of thousands of men, women and children within hours of the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had not raised any clamour for radiation protection because of the atmosphere of war and mutual killing prevailing at that time. But the Chernobyl accident, which had resulted in the death of only 33 persons, had spread great panic in parts of the world, especially in Europe. That was attributed to the condition of peace in the world and to the prosperity enjoyed by many human communities.

39. Whereas no lesson had been learnt from Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the military sphere, he wondered whether any would be drawn from the accident at a civil facility at Chernobyl. Although that accident had been exploited for political purposes, there were many favourable indications in support of protecting mankind from nuclear radiation, as was reflected in the two draft conventions now before the Conference. They represented a modest achievement in the face of the basic danger which continued to be posed by the use of nuclear energy as a destructive military means.

40. He appealed for efforts to save mankind from radiation without regard to political purposes and military interests. It was necessary to establish unconditional regulations and agreements for mankind as a whole and not for certain communities at the expense of others. The radiation danger should be perceived at the human level and people should help each other as living, conscious beings. In that connection, he commended the doctors who had rushed to the Soviet Union from the United States and other countries to help the Chernobyl victims. Their noble role could not be compared with the attitude of certain other people.

41. The Third World's appeal for international co-operation in the peaceful and safe uses of nuclear energy was a far-sighted one. At their request the United Nations had decided in early 1980 to convene a conference on strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy but unfortunately countries more advanced in the nuclear field had at that time prevented it from being held.

42. He urged that such a conference should be held without any hindrance within the objectives of that appeal without its being turned into a scientific event where learned papers were presented. In his view, that conference should strengthen co-operation, determine new ways of achieving it and create mutual understanding in support of the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy and of reduction of its harmful consequences in the event of radiation accidents.

43. Scientific and technological progress was sometimes accompanied by dangers and errors, not only in the nuclear field but also in all other fields. He could only hope that the international military and political tension would be defused in favour of scientific and technical co-operation in order to ensure greater safety and security. Instead of denouncing the SALT agreement, stronger and more advanced agreements should be concluded. Instead of thinking in terms of star wars and wars in outer space, it would be advisable to return to the humble earth and fight with the pen, or at least with the sword if one must kill. History would not forget those responsible for regarding life as a battlefield, nor would mankind forgive those who threatened it with extinction.

44. His delegation appreciated the Secretariat's initiative in following up the Chernobyl accident and in organizing the review of its causes and consequences. It should be commended for the safety measures taken and proposed to be taken to eliminate the harmful consequences of that or other accidents.

45. In conclusion, he expressed his support for the conventions on early notification and emergency assistance and wished to thank those whose labours had led to drafts enjoying a consensus, although his country would have liked the provision on notification to cover all accidents without exception. He

hoped that the Conference would give special consideration to the proposals to be submitted by the Group of 77 with a view to supplementing the scope and effectiveness of the two conventions in the interest of security from the nuclear danger.

46. Mr. TSEREN (Mongolia) said that nuclear energy now accounted for 15% of the world's total electricity production and, properly managed, would continue to be a very promising energy source in the future. However, the question of the safety of nuclear plants, and especially the human factor, posed a challenge to the world community. The Chernobyl accident had taught the world an important lesson about the need to further improve the safety of nuclear technology and to co-operate in a major effort to make it impossible for such an accident to be repeated. He wished to express again his Government's deep condolences to the Government and people of the Soviet Union.

47. The Conference had before it two draft conventions on early notification and emergency assistance in the event of a nuclear accident. The work done in drawing up those two important documents demonstrated that, given the political will, it was possible to reach agreement within a very short space of time on even the most delicate and complex safety questions. The objective and detailed information provided by the Soviet Union on the causes, development and consequences of the Chernobyl accident had made no small contribution to those successful efforts. The two conventions would be signed by his delegation at the appropriate time and ratified later.

48. Mongolia had traditionally supported the universality of international agreements aimed at ensuring peace and safety and strengthening trust between nations. He noted in that connection that his country had signed and ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

49. His delegation fully supported the programme proposed by the Soviet Union for the establishment of an international regime for the safe development of nuclear power and was in favour of an increased role for the IAEA and the United Nations Organization and its specialized agencies in implementing that programme. Serious consideration should be given to the grave dangers associated with the deliberate destruction of nuclear facilities and all forms of nuclear terrorism. The international community should act together to combat such threats.

50. The Chernobyl accident had shown the whole world what could happen when the energy of the atom got out of control and had reminded it of the dangers of nuclear war. At a time when there was keen interest in all nuclear questions, the Socialist countries had repeatedly demonstrated how the problems of modern-day life could be constructively and realistically tackled. The latest clear example of that was the decision by the Soviet Union to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests until 1 January 1987.

51. Mr. CASTILLO CONTOUX (Guatemala) extended his condolences to the Soviet Union for the loss of human life it had suffered as a result of the Chernobyl accident.

52. The spirit of international co-operation and solidarity manifested in the wake of the accident was extremely encouraging. A group of governmental experts had been convened by the Board of Governors to draw up agreements on early notification and assistance in the event of a nuclear accident. Within a very short period of time two conventions had been drafted and approved by consensus. His delegation was convinced that those conventions would help improve the safety of nuclear activities and strengthen international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy. He was pleased to announce, therefore, that his delegation was empowered to sign both conventions at the current special session.

53. Guatemala, a developing and oil-importing country, had been severely hit by the energy crises of 1973, 1979 and 1983 and by the resulting jump in oil prices, which had adversely affected the balance of payments and the economy in general. It had embarked upon a programme to replace its existing power plants by developing its own hydroelectric and other resources with the result that, as of 1986, his country had achieved self-sufficiency in electricity generation.

54. It was essential to establish a world energy balance which took into account the legitimate interests of developing and developed countries and of energy-importing and -exporting nations within a new world economic order. It was vital in that connection for the General Conference to recognize the right

of all countries to develop and exploit nuclear energy in order to meet increasing demand for electricity. Not least through the efforts of the Agency, nuclear energy was contributing to the economic and social progress of developing countries, including Guatemala, in the fields of medicine, industry, food and agriculture.

55. Finally, his delegation associated itself with those which had expressed their support for the continued use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under conditions of improved safety and greater international co-operation.

56. Mr. UTCHANAH (Mauritius) said that nuclear power was a source of energy which was destined to stay and even to expand, as all countries sought to provide a stable supply of electricity in order to meet the just aspirations of their people for higher living standards.

57. It was unfortunate that it was only after the Chernobyl accident that the international community had woken up to the fact that nuclear radiation did not recognize man-made frontiers, but the lesson had now been learnt. He commended the Soviet authorities for their positive action and in particular for their willingness to discuss at length various issues connected with the accident. In the nuclear safety field, however, there was no room for complacency. The current special session should be considered the first stage in a permanent dialogue between Member States and the Agency aimed at disseminating information on nuclear accidents, radioactive levels, safety control procedures and other topics.

58. His Government attached great importance to the two draft conventions that had been submitted to the Conference. They clearly reflected the desire of Member States for improved nuclear accident reporting and safety standards. He was confident that the implementation of the conventions would lead to greater international co-operation in the nuclear safety field and thus to a safer world.

59. Mr. ALVES (Brazil) said that the year 1986 had been marked by the most severe reactor accident ever to have occurred in the history of nuclear

energy. Its environmental impact and the initial uncertainties concerning the precise causes and consequences of the accident had contributed to creating an emotional climate unfavourable to nuclear energy.

60. More general uncertainty had given rise to an increasing fear among the populations living in the vicinity of nuclear installations with respect to the degree of safety thereof, and even though the safety measures applied in the nuclear industry were more rigid than those in industry in general, the fact that a severe accident had occurred made action to restore the image of nuclear energy imperative.

61. A series of such measures and initiatives was therefore being taken still further to improve nuclear safety. While action was being taken individually, by each country, and on a multilateral, regional and bilateral basis, it had to be kept in mind that the ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety rested with the State concerned.

62. In Brazil, as in many other countries, the Chernobyl accident had raised numerous political, scientific, technical and organizational questions. Nevertheless, Brazil remained convinced that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were important factors for the future of its economy and for the well-being of its people. In order to examine the implications of the Chernobyl accident, the Brazilian Government had established a special committee composed of representatives of the academic world and of the scientific and industrial sectors not directly involved in the nuclear programme, together with professional workers responsible for the execution of that programme.

63. That committee recommended that nuclear safety decisions should be taken at Presidential level. It further proposed that ample information should be given to the public on the environmental impacts of a nuclear accident, and that the machinery for the protection of the population in the event of a nuclear accident should be continuously improved, however improbable such an accident might be.

64. Brazil had always given full support to the activities undertaken by the Agency in the area of nuclear safety. In that connection he wished to

mention the support lent by his Government to the establishment of Radiation Protection Advisory Teams (RAPATs), to the implementation of the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme, to the establishment of the Incident Reporting System (IRS), and to the progress of the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme.

65. The Agency should also look at its long-term role as a central repository and focal point of exchange of information, not only on safety matters but in the entire realm of nuclear energy. To accomplish that task, the Agency needed to ensure that all types of information would be provided in a simple and direct way to Member States, not only in the context of its regular operations but also in response to emergency situations.

66. Brazil had taken an active part in the drafting of the conventions now before the Conference. With regard to the convention on early notification, Brazil had repeatedly declared its strong preference for an obligation to notify nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies of all kinds, with transboundary effects. Even so, Brazil considered the convention, as well as that on mutual assistance, to be an important and promising step towards strengthening international co-operation, and was gratified that both texts assigned an active role to the Agency. He was therefore authorized by his Government to sign both conventions ad referendum of the Brazilian Congress.

67. Brazil's efforts in the field in question were not limited to the multilateral sector. In November 1985 the Brazilian and Argentine Presidents had met at Foz do Iguaçu and signed a joint statement on bilateral nuclear co-operation. In the same spirit of co-operation, during the Brazilian President's visit to Buenos Aires in July 1986, a Protocol had been signed on early notification and mutual assistance in case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.

68. In conclusion he wished to stress once more that his Government, in order to promote social and economic development, remained fully committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under conditions of safety and security.

69. Mr. SHASH (Egypt) said that the special session of the General Conference was being held at a time when there were increasing fears in the public's mind about the dangers of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially for power production.

70. The world community was expecting that the results of the Conference would restore confidence in the peaceful nuclear option as a means to economic and social development. Its convening as well as the measures taken and to be taken must therefore be welcomed.

71. As the Director General had rightly pointed out, nuclear power would continue to be an important source of energy. There were 374 power reactors in operation in the world, including 64 in the developing countries, which accounted for 14.9% of the total world electricity production. Considering that 157 plants were under construction in developing countries, the share of nuclear power in electricity generation was to rise to 20% in 1990.

72. Therefore, while there was no longer any doubt about the importance of nuclear power, its continued expansion was connected, as a consequence of the Chernobyl and earlier accidents, with the adoption of the most stringent safety measures.

73. The Agency had been making laudable efforts in that field since 1958, which were reflected in its guidelines for mutual emergency assistance (INFCIRC/310) issued in 1984 and those for reportable events etc. (INFCIRC/321) issued in 1985. Those documents formed the principal basis for the conventions on early notification and mutual assistance.

74. The Chernobyl accident had afflicted many people, and he expressed his deep sympathy for the victims and to the Soviet Government and people.

75. That accident had again emphasized the importance of achieving the highest degree of nuclear safety through effective international co-operation, and showed that such co-operation was of vital interest to all States. It was natural for the Agency to be the pivot for co-operation in view of its facilities and accumulated experience. It had taken a number of immediate steps, including the expansion of its nuclear safety programme and preparation

of the two draft conventions, and in particular by convening the Post-Accident Review Meeting, which had provided a unique opportunity to some 500 experts to draw lessons from the Chernobyl accident.

76. The Egyptian delegation commended the results of that meeting contained in document GOV/2264 and in particular its recommendations, which should guide the Agency's future nuclear safety programmes. He endorsed in particular the recommendations dealing with the human aspects and the man-machine interface, training of experienced personnel through intensified courses, strengthening of the Agency's activities on accident analysis and on overall evaluation of nuclear safety and quality assurance in nuclear power plant operation, expansion of the Agency's Incident Reporting System (IRS), the convening of a conference on the interaction between reactor design and the operator with emphasis on the safety-related design features, and preparation of additional guidelines about interventional levels of contamination. He fully supported the recommendation that the Agency should provide special assistance on request, particularly to countries with limited resources.

77. The cost of those important nuclear safety programmes might be financed from special voluntary contributions and not at the expense of the technical assistance programmes considered to be of vital importance to developing countries.

78. While commending the work of that group and also that of the Secretariat and INSAG, he wished to express his appreciation of the Soviet Government's co-operation in making a success of that meeting.

79. The drafting of the conventions on early notification and emergency assistance by the governmental expert group in four weeks was an important step in crystallizing international obligations, the urgent need for which had been emphasized by events. The conventions would contribute to restoring the confidence of the world public in that important source of energy. As to the contents of those draft conventions, he wished to reiterate Egypt's views. Firstly, notification should cover all nuclear accidents. In that connection he had noted with pleasure the undertakings by nuclear-weapon States about voluntary notification of all such accidents.

80. Secondly, there was no clear obligation on the part of the Agency in Article 5, dealing with its functions, in the convention on mutual assistance. While the introductory part referred to the States parties "requesting" the Agency, it did not clearly state whether the Agency had any obligation to respond to that request. In his view, the General Conference should emphasize the Agency's principal role in all fields of nuclear safety and in the implementation of the provisions of the conventions.

81. Thirdly, the convention on assistance did not contain sufficient provisions for making available emergency facilities within the Agency's framework, including equipment and personnel to be sent rapidly to handle nuclear accidents especially in developing countries lacking such facilities. The recommendations of the Post-Accident Review Meeting referred to the importance of that aspect.

82. Fourthly, the conventions had no provisions for reservations. Since the law of international treaties stipulated that any reservations about any international agreement should not be in conflict with the subject or purposes of that agreement, the Conference must be clear about the provisions of the conventions containing their subjects and purposes, on which no reservations were permitted.

83. Moreover, he suggested that thought be given now to the question of a conference, to be organized by the Agency, to review those treaties after three or four years. By that time the Member States would have gained sufficient experience about aspects that might need refining in the light of implementation.

84. The proposed measures referred to by the Director General in his opening statement were fully consistent with the needs of the situation. Egypt supported those measures and in particular the development of international nuclear safety standards, safer designs, uniform international standards for radiation level measurement and protection and binding international arrangements to protect nuclear facilities from all armed attacks.

85. His delegation also supported the need for an international early warning system. In that connection, the Agency should assist the local and

regional efforts, especially of developing countries, to establish stations for continuous monitoring of background radiation by providing advanced equipment and also training facilities. Egypt had initiated co-operation at the regional level in the field of radiation monitoring and radiation protection measures, and a meeting had been held in Jordan in July with the participation of the Arab and other countries and the Agency. He hoped that the Agency would support the recommendations of that meeting.

86. He stressed the importance of measures to reduce the probability of nuclear accidents and was in favour of increasing the effectiveness of OSART missions, the advisory group on radiation protection, the Incident Reporting System (IRS) and INSAG.

87. The Conference had a great responsibility for restoring public confidence in nuclear power as an important source of energy in the context of a national and international regime based, first of all, on accident prevention measures. He had no doubt that many States would be inspired by the conclusions of the present session in reviewing their nuclear programmes.

88. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said that Iraq had been among the first developing countries to take an interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the actual needs of the country and in proportion to the availability of the necessary equipment and trained personnel. In 1974, as a first step towards utilizing nuclear power as an important source of energy, the Iraqi Government had taken a decision to build a medium-sized nuclear power plant and had initiated studies for the implementation of the project. However, the programme had been delayed by a series of events occurring in the late 1970s and later, namely the Three Mile Island accident in the USA and its implications for nuclear safety standards, the Iraq-Iran war, with its gigantic human and economic losses, and the Zionist armed aggression on Iraq's nuclear installations on 7 June 1981, with all the extremely serious effects that that had had, not only on the norms of international conduct as laid down in the United Nations Charter and by international law, but also on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on the concepts of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, finally, on the credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency itself.

89. Despite the enormity of those events, work on the nuclear power programme in Iraq had only slowed down, and had never completely stopped. The progress of that programme indicated the great importance the Iraqi Government attached to the atom as a vital and reliable source of energy, for which there was a growing demand in the world in general and in the developing countries in particular; hence, Iraq's great concern at the Chernobyl accident and its probable effects on the growth and development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in the field of generating electric power. His Government had therefore participated in most of the international meetings and conferences held in connection with the accident, the most important of which had been those sponsored by the Agency, and which had led to a number of conclusions, including the following:

1. Although the Chernobyl accident had been described as the most dangerous nuclear accident yet known, and had been ascribed to design faults, to human error or to both, its effects remained far less dangerous than those of a deliberate and premeditated act of aggression, the time and place for which were carefully chosen so as to inflict the greatest damage possible. The Israeli armed attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations was a historically unique example of the grave consequences that such an atrocity could lead to, if it were to be repeated;

It was worth noting that the quarters that reacted most vehemently to the Chernobyl accident, and were the first to take the initiative in calling for the adoption of practical measures at international level in response to it, were indeed the selfsame quarters that had tried in various ways, and unfortunately not without success, to prevent the IAEA from adopting clear punitive measures with a view to preventing a repetition of the Israeli armed aggression against peaceful nuclear installations, whether in Iraq or elsewhere. The stand taken by those States had, furthermore, undermined the IAEA's credibility and had been seriously detrimental to the Agency's ability to carry out its duties under its Statute; much more than the present conventions would be needed to restore that credibility;

2. Radiation hazards originated from accidents involving any nuclear installation, whether designed for peaceful or for non-peaceful purposes. That meant that full safety and security could not be achieved unless measures to guard against nuclear accidents also covered military nuclear installations;
3. Iraq fully supported any internationally agreed measures to upgrade safety and security at nuclear installations. It also appreciated the need for early warning of nuclear accidents and for international co-operation to ensure control over and to mitigate the damaging effects of those accidents. In all such international agreements and measures, however, the principle of the sovereignty of States must be fully observed and strictly complied with. Accidents must not be exploited in international political conflicts as a pretext for criticizing this or that State or its scientific and technical capabilities;
4. Iraq therefore called for the conclusion of an international agreement to protect nuclear facilities against deliberate armed aggression. Nuclear warfare, as more than one expert had pointed out, could actually be triggered by using a conventional weapon to destroy a nuclear facility. Even if such an attack did not lead to war, it could undoubtedly cause radiation damage and create hazards as dangerous as those produced by nuclear explosions.

90. Iraq believed that, within the framework of the above concepts, the Agency had a vital role to play in upgrading the safety of the operation of nuclear facilities to a degree even higher than that currently attained. It also believed that the Agency had a further role to play in convincing the public that the probability of accidents in such facilities was far lower than that depicted in certain other quarters. In any case, nuclear power must continue to be regarded as an important source of energy, for which demand could be expected to increase with the growth and development of human communities in the modern world.

91. Regarding the role of the Agency in that respect, he wished to make the following points:

1. In spite of the great effort put forth in recent years by the Agency and its Secretariat in the field of safety, still more work of that kind was required to reach agreement on the minimum safety standards to be adopted in various nuclear installations. It went without saying that various issues had to be taken into account in that connection, including the need to refrain from any attempt to influence decision-making by a State as to the type and design of the facility it might choose to install, so long as the designs met the required safety conditions. Economic aspects should also be considered with a view to preventing any further rise in the already high cost of nuclear power plants;
 2. The Agency should extend further assistance to its Member States in developing their radiation protection systems, and provide the equipment and training needed for that purpose;
 3. The Agency should also intensify its training activities in the nuclear safety and radiation protection fields and should improve the quality and content of the relevant programmes;
 4. An effort should be made to facilitate the flow and exchange of information among States, and to turn the Agency into a centre capable of providing all the information required to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
92. The industrially and technologically developed countries should realize that pursuing their present policies of obstructing the transfer of technology and nuclear information to the developing countries, on the one hand, and of limiting the training opportunities open to the citizens of those countries, on the other, would continue to pose a serious obstacle to the safe utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The lesson to be learnt at the present juncture was that more effort must be made to prevent nuclear mishaps than to handle their consequences. That, however, could not be satisfactorily achieved unless the developed countries agreed to lift the increasing restrictions on scientific and technological exchange, imposed under such pretexts as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

93. The damage wrought by the Chernobyl accident, including the death of some of the personnel on the site, was only one reminder of what the atom was capable of doing if allowed to get out of control, and was a further grave warning to the Great Powers in general, and to the two Super Powers in particular, that something must be done to put an end to the nuclear arms race and to achieve a total ban on nuclear tests.

94. In conclusion, his delegation commended the Director General and all the Secretariat departments concerned for the excellent work they had done in regard to the Chernobyl accident. His delegation wished also to express its deepest sympathy to the families of the victims of the accident and to the people of the Soviet Union. It admired and respected the way in which the Chernobyl accident had been handled by the Soviet authorities and people.

95. Mr. PELEG (Israel), expressing Israel's deepest sympathies to the Soviet people on the great human tragedy they had experienced, said that the rapid action taken to draw up positive proposals had in an extremely short time made it possible to consider the adoption of measures capable of meeting public concerns.

96. Israel was following with great interest all developments in the complex world energy situation, including the continuous attempts to promote alternative sources of supply. One major development had been the maturing of atomic energy in the industrialized States and its growing application in many developing countries. The peaceful uses of atomic energy were of vital importance to the well-being of the international community and to the general rise in living standards, but that situation could change in the post-Chernobyl accident era. It was therefore important that the accident should not deter the international community from continuing to produce an increasing share of electricity from nuclear power, and that lessons should be learnt in order to identify the technical and other measures necessary both to prevent such accidents and to deal with them, should the need arise. To that end, the contribution made by the Soviet experts in the Post-Accident Review Meeting had been of great importance.

97. Effective international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety was essential for enhancing the capability to cope with emergencies and to minimize the consequences of a nuclear accident. Indeed, the recent overwhelming interest and participation in an effort to achieve international co-operation were clear evidence of the vital nature of the issues at stake, and he referred to the Agency's active and central role in that area. The consensus reached by the governmental experts on the texts of the two draft conventions was a clear expression of the great importance attached by all the participating countries to issues of nuclear safety involving possible transboundary effects.

98. Finally, Israel was already on record for its support for the principle of mutual emergency assistance in the event of nuclear accidents. The scope of its assistance had been published in 1980 in document IAEA-TECDOC-237 entitled "Mutual Emergency Assistance for Radiation Accidents". It had supported the convening of the governmental meeting which had drafted the proposals for the two international conventions and had participated in its deliberations. It supported as a matter of principle the aims of those conventions, and would adhere to them upon their opening for signature.

99. Mr. KOLYCHAN (Byelorussian SSR) said his country had recently embarked on a long-range programme of nuclear power plant construction. However, in the light of its own experience, it had come to realize the vital importance of practical international action to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants and facilities of the entire fuel cycle. For that reason particular importance attached to the proposals of Mr. M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for the establishment of an international system for the safe development of nuclear power - proposals which had already met with wide approval throughout the world.

100. The use of nuclear energy, above all in power production, is one of the real, objectively indispensable prerequisites for the development of the present-day world economy. More than 370 nuclear power plant units are operating in the world today, their unit power and the complexity of systems and aggregates are increasing - a fact which doubtless gives rise to some degree of risk. For those reasons, ensuring safety in nuclear power

production should be a universal international obligation of each State individually and all States together. The leading role in setting up an international system for the safe development of nuclear power should be assigned to the Agency, with the participation of other international organizations.

101. The basis of such a system should be a co-ordinated set of measures taking the fullest possible account of the experience already accumulated in the world on all aspects of the problem, including international legal enactments and measures of an organizational and technical nature as well as scientific and technical programmes on nuclear safety, radiation protection and other measures.

102. In establishing reliable conditions for the safe development of nuclear power, it was important to arrive step by step at solutions to a number of problems. In the first place, it was necessary, on the basis of appropriate conventions, to set up effective and efficient systems, with a wide coverage of States, for rapid notification in the event of any nuclear accidents involving the escape of radioactivity and the threat of its transport beyond borders, and also for the immediate provision of assistance in the event of nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies.

103. He noted with satisfaction the dispatch with which the Director General and the Secretariat had prepared the drafts of the conventions in question, which instruments his delegation was empowered to sign. It was to be hoped that all States engaging in nuclear activities would declare their readiness to give immediate notification in the event of an accident accompanied by a release of radioactivity.

104. Of no less importance in bringing about an international system for the safe development of nuclear power was a set of problems associated with the creation of conditions for precluding accidents. Future expansion of the Agency's activity and of interaction and co-operation in matters of nuclear safety should, in his country's opinion, proceed in that direction.

105. His delegation supported proposals for:

- the organization of a system for the timely provision of comprehensive information about the causes of accidents, an analysis thereof by experts and the formulation of recommendations for State Members of the Agency to enable them to take operational account thereof in their practical activities. Accumulated world experience in ensuring nuclear safety would be used for the benefit of Member States. To that end, the information system covering incidents at nuclear power plants should be considerably expanded;
- standardization of permissible levels of accidental concentrations of radionuclides and of local radioactive contamination adopted in various States and the elaboration of minimum requirements in respect of nuclear safety;
- creation of an international data bank on radiation background levels;
- establishment of a reliable system of measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials, atomic industrial facilities and electric power plants, and for the prevention of nuclear terrorism in any form, including attacks on nuclear facilities.

106. The world community would doubtless also derive tremendous benefit from the development, under the sponsorship of the Agency, of a new generation of power reactors (based on thermal and fast neutrons) with a higher level of safety, on the basis of experience gained in the area of nuclear power generation. It was to be hoped that the proposal made would meet with the understanding of Member States.

107. In that connection, emphasis should be placed on the proposition often put forward here that nowadays nuclear safety was determined first and foremost not by the structural features of a reactor power plant but by the intellectual and professional level of the interaction between man and machine, bearing in mind the extreme complexity and speed of the interrelated physical and thermohydraulic processes in modern nuclear power plants.

108. By way of supplementing the information already provided to delegates in the statements by the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR,

together with that supplied at the Agency's meeting of experts in August, he wished to report briefly on some of the measures taken in the Byelorussian SSR during the period following the accident at the Chernobyl power plant.

109. During the first few days, there had been an evacuation of population from a 30-kilometre zone in the southern part of the Gomel district, including children who had been accommodated for the entire summer at young pioneer camps, sanatoriums and rest houses in the northern and central districts of the Republic and beyond its borders. All the inhabitants of the region, and even those who had been exposed only briefly to background radiation, had undergone medical examinations. No cases of radiation sickness had been recorded in Byelorussia. All those measures had been carried out at the expense of the Government. All in all, 3960 well-constructed country-type houses with the outbuildings needed by farmers had been built for and occupied by the evacuees from the southern part of the Gomel district (about 30 000 persons) to the northern regions. Hundreds of kilometres of asphalted road and water mains had been provided. The Government had allotted over 100 million roubles for that purpose. The evacuees had been paid full compensation for all abandoned property; the new houses had been supplied free of charge and substantial one-time benefits had been paid. All persons able to work had been employed in their specialized fields. The same conditions had also been made available to evacuees who had expressed the wish to settle in other parts of the Republic.

110. The Chernobyl accident had been a very costly lesson which should serve all mankind as one more frightening warning, and the world community was drawing the appropriate conclusions. Joint work on a planetary scale was now absolutely essential. But any form of safety became meaningless if the principal danger was not eliminated, i.e. the possibility not of random but of deliberate destruction during a nuclear conflict. For that reason, the Soviet Union, having proposed a system for the safe development of nuclear power, was advocating new initiatives aimed at freeing our planet from nuclear weapons, discontinuing nuclear explosions and opposing the development of new systems of mass destruction. The decision of the Soviet Government to prolong its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing was extremely important. His

delegation considered the liberation of humanity from an impending nuclear catastrophe to be one of the principal tasks of the international co-operation of social forces and international organizations.

111. Mr. MOSAR (Commission of the European Communities) said that the European Community was following with great interest the work of the special session of the General Conference. That interest was understandable in view of the large number of nuclear facilities in several countries of the European Community, the high percentage (at present 34%) of nuclear energy in the Community's overall energy balance and the fact that public opinion was extremely sensitive.

112. Each country engaged in a nuclear power programme was obviously responsible for the steps taken to ensure the safety of its facilities and to protect the health of its populations and the environment. Nevertheless, as the accident at Chernobyl had demonstrated, those aspects also had an international dimension. The Agency's important role in that area had been recognized by the Heads of State and Government of the Community at their meeting on 27 June, at which they had stressed the importance of co-ordinating efforts both through the Agency and within the Community.

113. The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group's (INSAG's) remarkable report on the analysis of the Chernobyl accident provided valuable information about the origins and development of the accident. The lessons to be learnt would be very useful although the accident had occurred in a different type of reactor to those in the Community.

114. The Community expected to be able to make a useful contribution to the implementation of most of the actions proposed in the Agency's draft nuclear safety and radiological protection programme. In the light of the special session, the Community might decide to give more emphasis to certain research topics in the programmes which it was implementing.

115. With regard to the two draft conventions submitted for approval by the special session, the Community welcomed the insertion of a clause which enabled it to accede to them. The Community was also willing to participate

in the work of the group of experts to be convened in November to study measures to improve international co-operation, to study the problems raised by nuclear safety and to improve nuclear safety standards.

116. Immediately after the Chernobyl accident, the Community had considered and adopted on 10 June an outline programme of measures to be taken relating to the protection of health and the environment, the safety of nuclear facilities, the procedures to be followed in the event of a crisis and research.

117. It was worth recalling that one of the chapters of the EURATOM Treaty was devoted to radiological protection and that for 30 years the Community had had laws - which applied to all its Member States - covering the establishment of basic standards for the protection of the health of the population and workers against the dangers of ionizing radiation; verification of the correct application of those basic standards in Member States; monitoring of radioactivity in the environment by means of a network of facilities set up in the whole Community designed to establish a system of continuous monitoring of the radioactivity levels in the atmosphere, water and the earth; formulation of an official opinion regarding all planned releases of radioactive effluent likely to lead to radioactive contamination of the water, earth or air space of another Member State; and lastly the issue of directives to Member States requesting them, in the event of an emergency, to take the necessary steps, within a specific time limit, to avoid exceeding the limits established by the basic standards.

118. The Commission had just analysed the application status of those provisions. That analysis had demonstrated the need to re-examine to what extent it was necessary to adopt Community directives on the basic standards relating to the protection of the health of the population and workers against the dangers of ionizing radiation. The analysis also demonstrated the need to complement those provisions by establishing general levels of tolerance to radioactive contamination of products to be applied in the Community in order to avoid the difficulties which arose after the Chernobyl accident.

119. The Commission believed that it was essential to contribute, within the Community, to the dissemination of reliable information in order to avoid

incoherences or contradictions in the assessment of the situation. The Commission had decided to set up a permanent conference on health protection in the nuclear era in response to the need to make the debate in that area more objective.

120. With regard to the safety of facilities and their safe operation, the Commission was studying the possibility of furthering the process of standardizing safety guides and requirements. A proposal for improving the efficiency of the exchange and joint analysis of information on incidents occurring in nuclear facilities and for adopting an obligatory Community declaration system was also being studied.

121. The Commission's work in the field of nuclear energy was based on the dual conviction that the utilization of nuclear energy was only acceptable under optimum conditions of safety and protection of health and the environment and that the European Community would be exposed to very serious economic and political dangers if the use of nuclear energy were called in question.

122. The adoption by the Council of Ministers of the overall energy objectives for 1995 proposed by the Commission confirmed that Member States wished to pursue the main guidelines of their energy policies. In continuing its activities to ensure the highest degree of nuclear safety, the European Community would take account of the work of the special session.

123. Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO (Mexico) said that his Government supported the Agency's call to strengthen the mechanisms for international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radiological protection. His delegation had confidence in, and offered its support to, international organizations which, like the Agency, provided a suitable means for agreeing on criteria, proposals and actions in an atmosphere of understanding and co-operation transcending national frontiers and political systems. In the light of the above, Mexico was actively participating in the emergency programme approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency immediately after the regrettable accident at Chernobyl, and his delegation was certain that the warning provided by that tragedy would give rise to guidelines for the safer development of peaceful

nuclear energy. His delegation noted with satisfaction that there was a high degree of consensus on the criteria for a collective approach to that type of problem, as there was regarding the important role which the Agency had to play in achieving the desired operational safety.

124. Encouraging results were being achieved in co-operation with other Member States; despite the lack of time, a nuclear safety and radiological protection programme and two draft conventions had resulted; those, in the opinion of the Mexican delegation, represented the start of a necessary and continued effort which demonstrated that humanity was united in the face of disasters which could threaten its future as a species.

125. Certain positive results had been achieved during that initial stage, but it was to be regretted that there had also been an absence of political will to make compromises of a more concrete nature. That had been the case for specific wordings which, for the sake of consensus and despite repeated efforts, could not be included in the draft conventions put to the special session.

126. Mexico, along with the great majority of the countries represented at that session, would have preferred the scope of the convention on early notification of a nuclear accident to have included all kinds of nuclear installation, as the tragic consequences of an accident in one of the peaceful uses of the atom emphasized even more the dangers involved in military use; for that reason, the Government of Mexico joined with other friendly countries in continuing to put forward concrete proposals to achieve a moratorium - it was to be hoped, a definitive moratorium - in the arms race which would involve, first of all, an end to nuclear-weapon tests. Nevertheless, his delegation welcomed the major declarations made at the special session by the nuclear powers in which they undertook to provide additional notification of accidents other than those specified in Article 1 of the convention on early notification.

127. In noting the above, the Mexican delegation considered that such declarations were an integral part of the compromise reached, and that the States which would be party to the convention should thus act in conformity

with its aims; although voluntary, the act of notification should be both timely and contain the necessary information to prevent, or, where appropriate, minimize effectively and in time the damage from transboundary releases of radiation. In that regard, the Agency's mechanisms designed for other kinds of nuclear accident must operate freely; those included consultations and the information needed for it to achieve the goals of the convention. It was his delegation's firm belief that no national safety measure should justify endangering third parties.

128. The Mexican delegation also welcomed the convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, which was also a springboard for future actions on the basis of a firmer and more balanced compromise, as the - as yet unsigned - convention suffered, in the opinion of the Mexican delegation, from the fundamental imbalance of offering a series of guarantees and safeguards to the assisting State while much less interest was given to the State affected. Such a situation was more serious still when the assisting State was the same as that in which the release of radiation had occurred. It was a matter for concern that the affected State might also be held responsible for all the damage suffered or caused by the State providing it with assistance.

129. Subsequent actions would be the result of the confidence in and support for the role and objectives of the Agency, namely, its ability to impel its Members to joint action. However, the way forward would be fraught with difficulty if the priorities entailed by the interests of the developing countries, in benefiting from scientific and technological advances in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, were lost from sight or discounted.

130. Mexico would ratify both conventions and would continue to participate actively in reviewing, revising and applying the Agency's expanded nuclear safety and radiological protection programme.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.