



International Atomic Energy Agency

General Conference

Distr.
GENERAL
GC(IV)/OR.40
14 December 1960
ENGLISH

FOURTH REGULAR SESSION

OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE FORTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,
on Thursday, 22 September 1960, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. NADJAKOV (Bulgaria)

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* GC(IV)/130.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in
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GENERAL DEBATE AND REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR 1959-60
(GC(IV)/114, 126 and Corr.1) (continued from the 39th meeting)

1. Mr. OFTEDAL (Norway) joined with previous speakers in congratulating the President on his election. He also congratulated the Director General on the progress made by the Agency during the past year and hoped he and his staff would be given the necessary means to continue that progress.

2. His delegation was taking part with some reluctance in the general debate. General debates tended to cover many problems which were not immediately relevant, and the tasks that had to be faced were serious and important enough to require all the attention the Conference could devote to them. All were agreed that disarmament and the effective control of nuclear weapons were matters of fundamental importance for the world, but that and similar topics were not relevant to the present agenda. The Agency's two main objectives were clearly stated at the beginning of the Statute, i.e. to promote the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to ensure that in doing so, it did not further military purposes.

3. No action had so far been taken to ensure that the second objective would be attained. Now for the first time, a system of Agency safeguards^{1/} had been drawn up. It was not perfect but represented a compromise worked out by the methods characteristic of international co-operation. It represented a guide both for the Board and for nations requesting assistance. The small and less-developed countries especially would naturally wish to know in advance what Agency assistance implied for them; on the other hand, the Board also needed guidance in deciding, in specific cases, what safeguards should be applied. The Conference might be able to indicate ways in which the proposed system could be improved, but it would be failing in its duty if it did not now provide the Board with clear recommendations. His Government had agreed with the Government of the United States to enter into negotiations with a view to requesting the Agency to administer the safeguard provisions of the bilateral agreement between the two Governments, and he had been asked by the delegate of Denmark to announce that the Danish Government had made a similar arrangement with the United States Government.

^{1/} GC(IV)/108/Rev.1.

4. Slow but steady progress had been made towards achieving the Agency's other main objective - that of furthering the peaceful uses of atomic energy, but a point had been reached where further progress might be held up if no adequate safeguards machinery was available.
5. He wished to congratulate the Board and the Secretariat on the high quality of the work done on health and safety regulations. The method of using a panel of experts for the scientific work and of issuing regulations in the form of recommendations to Member States, which were requested to inform the Agency of any changes that were made and why, might very well become a pattern for the practical implementation of international regulations in the technical and scientific fields.
6. The same comments applied to the work done on liability and insurance problems connected with reactors and nuclear-propelled ships. The important role that regional agreements and organizations could play in settling such difficult technical and economic questions should be borne in mind. The Agency might investigate the possibility of arranging some system of mutual financial guarantees for small nations which were unable, individually, to provide the financial guarantees against possible nuclear hazards that were at present demanded. He personally believed experience would show that financial guarantees of the order of magnitude at present required were unnecessary.
7. His Government believed it was of fundamental importance to the whole world to build up expert technical knowledge in new States, and hoped that increasing emphasis would be laid on that aspect of the Agency's program. If they had the ability, students who had completed their preliminary training should be enabled to continue, taking up advanced training and research. For that purpose the Agency would need to have access to research and development facilities which could be utilized for long-term research projects; students could then take part in the planning and organization of experiments as well as in day-to-day laboratory work. The Norwegian Government had consequently decided to make available to the Agency, for a joint research program, a new zero-energy reactor which would be completed by the beginning of 1961. The United States had offered to give financial support to the scheme and to arrange that a fuel charge from the "Savannah" ship reactor would be available; in addition, two fuel charges would be made available by Norway. That would

provide the basis for a program of measurements which would have great scientific value and provide very useful advanced research experience. Definite proposals would be submitted to the Board in the very near future. It was to be hoped that similar facilities would be made available by other Member States. He assumed that the interesting proposal for advanced theoretical work made by the Pakistan delegation during the general debate^{2/} would be considered by the Board.

8. Mr. BILLIG (Poland) emphasized that, in assessing the work of the Agency during the current period and in planning its future program, it was necessary to realize that peaceful co-existence and disarmament were essential for the widest use of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind. Members must inquire whether the Agency was justifying the hopes of those who had set it up.

9. The Polish delegation was gratified that the Agency was continuing its work on the training of personnel and in particular its fellowship program. Young Polish specialists had for three years been using those fellowships to help them develop nuclear research in Poland. He thanked the host countries, and indicated that during 1960 Poland had itself been able to receive its first fellows.

10. Polish scientific workers and engineers had taken an active part in the proceedings of the specialized conferences, seminars and panels organized by the Agency. That part of the Agency's work was sound in principle, but there was a danger that too many such conferences might be held. Their number should be limited, and priority given to meetings on subjects which interested many countries and which could contribute to relatively early progress in nuclear research.

11. The Polish delegation was also pleased with the Agency's work on publications and the dissemination of information.

12. The contracts signed by the Agency with scientists in a number of countries, including Poland, represented a step forward in its efforts to develop nuclear research and the dissemination of results. At the same time, greater care should be taken in concluding contracts, as the subjects had sometimes been chosen without sufficient thought and planning.

^{2/} GC(IV)/OR.39, paragraphs 60 and 61.

13. In addition to its merits, the Agency's work also showed some grave defects. Far-reaching changes had taken place in the world since the establishment of the Agency, which had originally been set up to supply countries with fissionable materials. At that time some of the big atomic Powers had believed that their monopoly over such materials would continue, if not for ever, at least for a very long time. They had then proclaimed that the Agency's main task was to draft rules for safeguards and control. The Agency's Statute, however, gave it no authority for obtaining control over the development of atomic work in other countries and subordinating that work to itself.

14. Later, developments had taken a different course. Not only uranium but also reactors, accelerators and other installations essential to the development of nuclear physics and technology could now be obtained through bilateral trade agreements. Under such agreements, particularly with the Soviet Union, Poland had been able in a few years to carry out large-scale research and experimentation in a completely new field of science and technology. The aid of the Soviet Union and the close co-operation between the socialist countries, which exchanged experience and granted each other assistance, was a major contributory factor in the development of Polish nuclear technology. Poland was also expanding and consolidating its co-operation in atomic matters with many non-socialist countries.

15. The Polish delegation noted that, in the present changed circumstances, the Agency could not fulfill its original duty to supply fissionable materials, reactors and the like. The Polish representatives at the Conference and on the Board had more than once pointed out that the Agency was giving much attention to matters which were not of primary importance. One such subject, which had given rise to prolonged and heated disputes, was safeguards and control. Despite factual criticism and forceful arguments, certain countries continued to regard safeguards as a matter of paramount importance. A small number of States, unable to acquire control over others by means of direct bilateral relations with them, were attempting, by forcing the issue of safeguards, to obtain that control through the Agency. The over-emphasis on safeguards was directly harmful in the present circumstances, and was alienating from the Agency countries which needed its help. On the other hand, the Agency's assistance to needy countries would make sense only if provided under conditions more favorable than those obtainable under bilateral agreements.

16. Poland, which had ratified the Agency's Statute, was not opposed to safeguards in general. The point of safeguards was that fissionable materials should be used for peaceful purposes only, and be made available without conditions which violated the sovereignty of the receiving countries. Safeguards should depend on the actual project which the Agency was helping to execute, and be proportional to the amount of assistance granted. Otherwise an absurd situation would arise in which the Agency exercised control without giving assistance, instead of providing assistance subject to reasonable precautions.

17. The Polish delegation noted that the less-developed countries were not applying to the Agency for assistance in obtaining fissionable materials and reactors, as that type of aid from the Agency had ceased to be of vital importance. The enthusiasm which in 1956 and 1957 had accompanied plans for the development of atomic power had fallen off considerably, and less interest was now shown. Plans had been revised and repeatedly deferred, as a result of the technical difficulties which had arisen in actual practice and, above all, as a result of economic events, especially the opening of new and extensive coal and oil deposits and the great advances made in the production of conventional energy. The lower cost of power from conventional sources had postponed the time when the cost curves of nuclear and of conventional energy would intersect.

18. In many countries the most important current problems concerned the use of radioisotopes in industry, technology, agriculture, biology and medicine, the use of powerful sources of radiation, and the use of radiation chemistry. Solution of those problems could yield concrete results very quickly at relatively small technical and financial cost. But first it was necessary to train suitable staff and ensure a sufficiently high level of technical development.

19. Poland was drawing the appropriate conclusions. It had deferred the construction of its first atomic power station for a few years, and during the next five years, in addition to research and the training of scientific and technical personnel, it would concentrate on the application of isotopes and the development of radiation chemistry.

20. The most fundamental question for the present and future work of the Agency was assistance to the less-developed countries. That part of the Agency's work deserved close attention at a time when so much effort was being devoted

to costly measures of secondary importance. The technical assistance provided to the less-developed countries was unplanned and adventitious. Until a program on the lines of paragraph 19(e) of the Preparatory Commission's report had been drawn up, the Agency would make no progress. It could carry out considerable and even large-scale measures, but they would remain unrealistic until several practical and significant problems had been settled.

21. The first and most important step should be an overall plan based on the assistance needs of the less-developed countries. To execute such a plan over a number of years would require large financial resources. The Agency could find the funds even if it had to abandon some measures of doubtful value and reduce administrative expenditure. A large part of the Agency's regular budget went on administration, and a disproportionately small part on basic operational activities. The Secretariat should consider whether it could transfer funds from the regular budget to an overall plan involving an expansion of basic operations.

22. Thought should be given at once to methods of drafting an overall plan, by discussing methods of work and by securing the co-operation of representatives of the great Powers, atomic physicists and economists, and representatives of countries requiring assistance. The general development schemes in those countries must be taken into account, and collaboration with the United Nations and a number of specialized agencies was therefore indispensable. In the first place it seemed essential for the regional economic commissions to co-operate.

23. Despite difficulties, the Agency's activities could be extended immediately in those sectors where there were no divergencies or dissensions. Work should proceed on the instruction and training of specialists, since projects for the future use of atomic energy exceeded the capacity of trained staff in all countries. The possibility of setting up a regional network of training centers should be considered. For that purpose it would be possible to use the services of experts made available to the Agency by Member States. Hitherto those services had been insufficiently exploited. The Polish delegation was interested in the plan under consideration in the Secretariat for setting up a permanent center to train specialists in the use of isotopes for medical treatment and diagnosis through an institution specially established for that purpose.

If the Agency could concentrate on training specialists in atomic medicine, that particular problem would be largely solved in 10 to 15 years. Attention should also be given to setting up similar centers for training specialists in the use of isotopes in agriculture and industry. It would likewise be desirable to provide fellowships of longer duration, as they could be very important for countries without adequate higher educational establishments.

24. The Agency should also encourage the wide use of radioactive isotopes for technical purposes. Experience in many countries had shown that it was now possible to use radiation sources very successfully in industry and technology. The Agency's task was to collaborate in introducing them widely into the productive cycle.

25. Work on standardizing regulations for radiological protection should be accelerated, and the Agency should continue to provide the necessary apparatus and equipment.

26. The Conference on the Disposal of Radioactive Waste^{3/} had revealed differences of opinion about the discharge of waste into the sea. The Agency could and should help to speed up international collaboration to prevent dangerous contamination of water by radioactive waste.

27. The Agency also had an important role to play in co-ordinating large-scale international operations: for example the setting up of big accelerators, and research in plasma physics. After the third regular session of the General Conference, talks had been held with a view to the joint construction of a large accelerator; that question had been discussed recently from the scientific and technical angle at the Twelfth International Conference on High Energy Physics, organized by the University of Rochester in New York.

28. The Agency had already taken the first step towards international co-operation on thermonuclear fusion by setting up an editorial staff for a journal devoted to thermonuclear fusion and plasma physics. The Polish delegation wished the Agency success, and hoped that steps would be taken to co-ordinate efforts.

^{3/} Held at Monaco from 16 to 21 November 1959.

29. Discontinuance of the insane arms race, and total world disarmament, were necessary conditions for the relief of international tension. The first step along that road was cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Disarmament would at once reinforce confidence between nations, and produce economic conditions favorable to the Agency's aims.

30. The Polish delegation particularly shared the anxiety of other nations at the rebirth of militarism in a country which had twice plunged the world into war, and in which voices were again being raised in a call for arms, atomic weapons and rockets. The world was at the crossroads, but Poland believed that peace, and peaceful coexistence between nations, would triumph. The Polish Government, in its persistent struggle for the peaceful solution of all difficult international questions, had repeatedly made proposals for the solution of urgent disarmament problems. A rapid conclusion by the three great Powers of an agreement for the cessation of atomic weapons testing would be an historic step towards the end desired by the whole world - total disarmament - and would also permit unhampered development of the Agency and of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Poland was submitting a draft resolution on that subject^{4/} in the firm belief that all nations of the world would wish for its acceptance.

31. Mr. ZHMUDSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) supported the Polish draft resolution. The General Conference was meeting at a time when the attention of the whole world was being drawn to the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Once more the Soviet Union was bringing before that Assembly the most important question in contemporary international relations - disarmament. Soviet scientists, engineers and other workers on the peaceful investigation of cosmic space had been the first to put into orbit and bring back to earth a space ship containing test animals.

32. In the present era of intensive scientific and technical progress it was especially important that scientific achievement should be directed towards the conquest of nature for the good of mankind, and not towards preparation of the means of destroying everything attained by creative research, prolonged effort and the intense work of hundreds of millions of people. Scientific discoveries could be peacefully used on one condition only - complete and general disarmament. It was therefore perfectly natural and reasonable that the Soviet Union should contend for the peaceful coexistence of States irrespective of their form of government.

^{4/} Subsequently issued as document GC(IV)/131.

33. The Agency was bound to be concerned by the problem of prohibiting atomic weapons. Its work would not develop properly until the threat of atomic war had been eliminated. The use of nuclear weapons must be prohibited for all time; their production must be stopped, and stockpiles used only as fuel for nuclear power plants employed for peaceful purposes. The Agency's interest in that aim needed no emphasizing. Scientific achievements would not be devoted to the services of peace until nuclear weapons were prohibited and eliminated from the arsenals of all States. The absence of an agreement to abolish atomic weapon tests and to eliminate the weapons themselves was a serious obstacle to converting nuclear materials and scientific, technological and other resources from destructive to constructive purposes.

34. The use of various forms of energy had reached an unparalleled level of development. In the past twenty-five years as much power had been produced as in the whole of previous human history. Science and technology had now attained such a high level that, were it not for military expenditure, they could satisfy the needs of everybody living on the planet. It was therefore reasonable that the peoples of the world should try to master the latest and most important source of power as soon as possible. Only if the production and use of nuclear weapons were banned would boundless opportunities really open up for the peaceful use of nuclear power. The Agency should intervene actively to stop nuclear testing and prohibit nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The Ukrainian people and Government would fully support any proposal or effort directed towards peace and the permanent prohibition of such weapons. The Ukrainian atomic energy development program was devoted solely to peaceful uses, and Ukrainian scientific institutions and higher educational establishments were carrying out much research devoted to peaceful purposes.

35. His Government attached considerable significance to the Agency's activities. The Statute offered great opportunities, and public opinion throughout the world was justified in expecting that the Agency would help in the noble aim of using nuclear energy for the welfare of humanity. Equipment and specialized materials, however, were not enough without well-trained national specialists, and the Agency could do useful work in assisting individual countries in that respect. The Agency should also help the less-developed countries to draw up national

atomic energy programs, and assist them to choose the right ways of using that energy economically. Its experts should be guided, however, by the specialists of the countries where they worked.

36. The safeguards system submitted to the Conference was contrary to the spirit and scope of the Agency's assistance to its Member States. Agency safeguards were apparently to be attached to the materials such countries received. Because of their present technological and economic weakness, those countries would be unable for some years to develop nuclear weapons, still less to use fissionable materials and equipment supplied by the Agency for military purposes.

37. In the course of his speech, in which he had insisted on the adoption of the safeguards system^{5/}, the United States delegate had referred only to three research reactors and one medium-sized power reactor. He had not mentioned the fact that scores of other reactors in the United States would remain outside the safeguards system, including reactors having nothing to do with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. States that were just beginning work in nuclear energy would, however, at once come under control. The system was therefore one-sided, and would in fact lead not to unity but to disunity among countries. Agency safeguards would be effective only if nuclear weapons were prohibited, their production stopped and stockpiles destroyed.

38. The Ukrainian delegation had also examined carefully the Agency's program and budget for 1961^{6/}. The regular budget estimates amounted to \$6 168 000, an increase over 1960 of \$325 000. In preparing them, the Secretariat had not taken into account the requests of the Conference and the Board that any tendency towards budgetary increases should be checked. Almost three-fourths of the budget was devoted to general administrative costs, most of which were unproductive. The budget ought to be based on that of 1960. The Agency's present staff was quite sufficient to carry out the program for the coming as for the previous year. The Agency's main work should be to extend the use of radio-isotopes, train national specialists, set up improved types of reactor, and the like. The Agency's program should deal with important scientific problems, rather than with minor matters of no general interest or ambitious schemes outside the Agency's present scope.

^{5/} GC(IV)/OR.38, paragraphs 21 to 43.

^{6/} GC(IV)/116.

39. The Ukrainian Government regarded the Agency as one of the organs of international co-operation. The Ukraine would continue its active participation in the Agency's work, which it considered to be based on the principles of co-operation between all Members, aiming at the maintenance of peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.

40. Rising to a point of order, Mr. WERSHOF (Canada) declared that the draft resolution on disarmament submitted by the Polish delegation was out of order: not because of its substance, but because it introduced a new subject and therefore could not be examined under item 10 of the agenda. Under Rules 15 and 42 of the Rules of Procedure, it should be referred to the General Committee, which might recommend its inclusion as an additional agenda item.

41. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia) considered that the Polish draft resolution could be considered under item 10 of the agenda because it was relevant to the Agency's general activities.

42. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) supported the Canadian delegate.

43. Mr. NOVIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Soviet delegation fully supported the Polish draft resolution calling for the prohibition of atomic weapons tests. It could not agree with the objections raised by the Canadian delegation. There was nothing in the Rules of Procedure to prevent the Polish delegation from submitting the draft resolution. The Polish delegation was not suggesting that a special item dealing with the prohibition of atomic weapons tests be included in the agenda. It only wished to express a desire that the Great Powers now negotiating in Geneva on the prohibition of atomic weapons tests should speed up their talks and reach some agreement. The Soviet Union was ready to do everything in its power to reach that agreement as quickly as possible. If the United States and the United Kingdom were sincerely concerned to prohibit nuclear tests, there could be no grounds for objecting to the Polish proposal, which the Soviet delegation invited other delegations to support.

44. The PRESIDENT requested the Conference to postpone consideration of the question raised by the delegate of Canada and to continue the general debate.

45. Mr. LEE (China) congratulated the President on his election. His delegation had noted with satisfaction the program which the Agency had carried

out during the past year and also the efforts it was making to expand its activities in the future. His country was among the many to receive help from the Agency, which had so far provided the services of one health physicist and one nuclear physicist; a third expert would probably arrive early in 1961. The Agency had also granted his country twenty fellowships; so far, however, only twelve had been awarded, by a competitive examination.

46. Many more experts in atomic science were needed to accelerate work on the national nuclear program. However, his country did not rely entirely on the services of experts recruited from abroad; about fifteen young Chinese scientists, physicists and chemists had been sent to other countries to be trained in different aspects of nuclear science. Eight had already completed their studies and were now working at the Institute of Nuclear Science.

47. China urgently needed one or two experts in reactor operation, to work on its research reactor. A request to that effect had already been forwarded to the Agency, and his delegation hoped for immediate action. Installation of the reactor had been delayed by damage to the control panel during transport, but the reactor was expected to become critical in February 1961.

48. Requests for equipment had also been forwarded to the Agency. With the assistance of an Agency expert, the Chinese Atomic Energy Council had worked out a plan for establishing a national radiation protection service. His delegation hoped that the Agency would help to provide the necessary equipment. The Agency had heavy financial obligations, but the cost of fulfilling those requests would be small, and his Government would endeavor to play its part by discharging its financial obligations to the Agency.

49. It was gratifying to note that several research contracts had already been awarded. His country had made several recommendations for research contracts, and had offered the services of experts on the improvement of rice production, but had not yet received replies.

50. The bilateral agreement between the United States Government and his own on the peaceful use of atomic energy included special provisions dealing specifically with safeguards. The establishment of an effective safeguards system was an important aspect of the Agency's work, and its administration by the Agency was a logical step which would facilitate the smooth working of the system. His delegation supported the principles and procedures provisionally adopted by the Board.

51. China had applied radioisotopes in therapy, and in mutation experiments for the improvement of wheat, tea, sugar cane and rice. Training courses in the application and handling of radioisotopes had been initiated by the Institute of Nuclear Science. One of the Agency's mobile radioisotope laboratories would arrive in his country before the end of September 1960 and would remain for about five months.

52. The problem of developing nuclear power in his country had had to be postponed for several years because of an abundance of hydroelectric power, which was enough to meet the present power demand. However, nuclear power would become necessary in five to ten years to meet increasing demands.

53. Mr. BHABHA (India), after congratulating the President, observed that the atom's vast potentialities for war had been amply demonstrated. If the Agency had not been created in 1957, the need for it would have been even greater in the present year, since the world situation had still not improved and there was still too much emphasis on warlike uses.

54. There had been much misleading talk about the slowing down of programs for the development of atomic power because of insufficient advance in reactor technology. In fact remarkable progress had been achieved in reducing the cost of nuclear power. That progress could, however, have been much faster if the nations with large technical and industrial capacities had co-operated in solving the more difficult problems. The amount spent on peaceful atomic research was probably less than a hundredth part of that spent under the defense budgets of the world. His Government hoped that the nations concerned would speedily rectify that disequilibrium through a massive co-ordinated effort to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The delegation of India would explore with other delegations during the present Conference the possibilities of fulfilling that hope. Until such a decision had been taken and implemented, the Agency would not be able to play its full part.

55. Much of the Agency's work was still preparatory - for example, the drafting of regulations for the transport of radioactive materials, and discussions on nuclear-powered ships and radioactive waste disposal. All that was, of course, useful groundwork, and the Agency should also be congratulated on its progress in the fellowship program. A total of 218 candidates had been placed in 1958

and 377 in 1959, and the figure for 1960 was a shade higher. The benefiting countries had increased from 28 to about 40. The fellows were being trained in health physics; the production, handling and application of radioisotopes; geology; radioactive ore prospecting, mining and processing; the metallurgy of uranium, thorium, plutonium and zirconium; reactor physics, nuclear physics, nuclear chemistry and radiochemistry, and other subjects. India was also pleased to note that under the exchange program professors had been sent to some nine countries. The Agency must never forget the importance of scientific exchanges.

56. The Agency had also increased its technical and research assistance from \$448 516 in 1958 to \$600 000 for 1961. Additional technical knowledge at the present stage could help less-developed countries to advance their economies from a level below the desirable minimum standard to one just above it. The Board should bear that point in mind when considering technical assistance projects and awarding research contracts.

57. In paragraph 79 of the Preparatory Commission's report it was stated that the Agency "should study the need for establishing co-operatively financed regional training centers, bearing in mind the particular requirements of the countries of the region ... The Agency should, on the request of interested Member States, consider taking an active part in assisting them to plan, establish and/or operate such centers." India was pleased to note the Board's decision to endorse the request for a Middle Eastern regional radioisotope training center for the Arab countries, subject to the Director General's arranging a series of courses in Cairo and reporting to the Board on a draft project agreement.

58. He requested particulars of the precise stage of development of the headquarters laboratory and its facilities, and suggested that the Director General should circulate to all Member States a complete list of the equipment already installed at the laboratory and the type of work which it could undertake. Perhaps any additional facilities which would be available in the next six months or so could also be listed.

59. He drew attention to the agreement for co-operation in atomic energy matters between the United States and the Soviet Union Governments, because it seemed

that there had not yet been any dissemination of information through the Agency as a result of that agreement. His delegation hoped that some tangible results would soon be made known to all Member States through the Agency.

60. India was not, and never had been, against the principle of safeguards. It insisted, however, that any system of safeguards adopted by the Agency should conform to certain basic principles. The States most advanced in atomic energy, and therefore the main contributors to nuclear weapons production, would not be affected by any safeguards the Agency could impose. The burden must not fall on the industrially less-developed countries, which were in no position to create a nuclear weapons threat. Nor must it widen the gap between the industrialized and the less-developed countries and thus increase world tension. He regretted that the system proposed by the Agency satisfied none of those requirements.

61. India's achievements showed that it had the necessary scientific and technical knowledge to set up low-temperature reactors for the production of plutonium for military purposes. But it had no intention of doing so. Its aim was to use the atom for producing economic electric power, and plutonium for fuelling future reactors so that it could eventually base its power program on thorium. It could clearly now advance without help, though it was willing to co-operate with other countries. Its position on safeguards was therefore not affected by their probable impact on India; it held that they must apply equally to all countries.

62. India had never received a satisfactory answer to its grave doubts on the practical purposes of the system devised by the Agency. The main reason now given why the Agency should devise a system of safeguards was that it was necessary to show the world that such a system could work. He doubted very much whether that would serve any useful purpose, and thought that a false sense of security and complacency would result from adopting a system which would bring under safeguards only those national programs which were a long way from the capacities required for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. His delegation therefore believed that the establishment of a safeguards system was inherently part of the problem of nuclear disarmament. If the nuclear Powers were unwilling to accept effective safeguards, they could not expect other countries to accept them.

63. For all those reasons the Indian delegation urged the Conference not to approve at the present stage the draft safeguards submitted by the Board. Until the nuclear Powers had agreed on a general system of safeguards it would be more than adequate if the Agency, in assisting Member States, required accounting and inspection for all special fissionable materials supplied.
64. Nor should safeguards be attached to plant and equipment, since many components could be used not only for reactors but also for non-atomic industrial purposes. The impact of such safeguards would fall chiefly on the industrially less-developed countries, which could not produce such plant and equipment themselves, and only lightly on the industrially advanced countries. Even if plant and equipment were supplied under restrictive conditions and safeguards, there was nothing to prevent the recipient from duplicating them, and his ability to do so would be in direct proportion to his industrial development.
65. It was likewise inexpedient and impracticable to apply safeguards effectively to unprocessed source materials such as uranium and thorium concentrates or ores, of which there was great over-production, so that they were freely available on the commercial market. Many of the industrially less-advanced countries possessed sizeable deposits of those materials and, if onerous conditions were attached to their supply by the Agency, they would develop their own sources, even if it cost more. Supply should be subject at the very most to an undertaking by the recipient that the materials would be used only for peaceful purposes. India therefore urged the Conference to direct the Board to adopt an arrangement on those lines, while agreeing that the matter should be kept under review. The problem before the world was not to put a puppy into a cage in order to ensure that when it grew up it would not bite someone; the problem was how to cage the tiger of nuclear armament which now roamed the world.
66. His delegation was prepared to discuss that very important subject with other countries, and would submit a draft resolution on it^{1/}. The present principles and procedures were strongly opposed by a large section of potential receiving countries as well as by many others. To adopt them would therefore hamper the Agency's work.
67. All were aware of the difficulties, but he was convinced that all were aware also of the need to take every practical step to increase the value of the

^{1/} Subsequently issued as document GC(IV)/COM.2/27.

Agency's work. Unfortunately the hopes of several years ago had not been fully realized. One cause was beyond the control of the Agency, and the Conference could only exhort the nuclear Powers to come quickly to agreements which would ensure that all nuclear materials and facilities were applied to peaceful purposes. The other cause could be remedied by calling on Member States to increase their efforts generally, and to combine their powerful forces for the solution of important technical problems.

68. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia) said his delegation welcomed the Polish draft resolution. Its adoption would not only help the Agency, as the body primarily responsible for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; it would also respond to the urgent need to achieve without delay the cessation once and for all of nuclear weapons tests.

69. The period under discussion represented the Agency's third year, so that the criteria by which its work should be judged must be more rigorous than those applied at previous sessions of the Conference.

70. His delegation could not but regret that the Agency had failed in one of its responsibilities under the Statute, namely to assist the less-developed countries in the use of atomic energy to accelerate the growth of their national economics and obtain better living standards. On the contrary, there was a growing tendency to divert attention to problems which were of interest only to certain advanced countries.

71. Genuine international co-operation within the Agency was being sacrificed to egotistical political interests. Discrimination against the People's Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic and some other States could not but impair the principle of universality. The same applied to the constant refusal to grant the World Federation of Trade Unions the consultative status freely granted to less important trade union organizations. Although the General Conference at its third regular session had recommended that the matter should be reconsidered,^{8/} the Board had persisted in its discriminatory policy, thereby excluding the constructive participation and assistance of 95 million working people. The vote in the Board represented an abuse of the voting machinery by the United States, which would prejudice the Agency's standing and the cause of international co-operation.

^{8/} GC(III)/RES/47.

72. Previous discussions on safeguards likewise gave good grounds for apprehension. It would be in the interests of the less-developed countries to accept only such safeguards as met the criteria suggested by the delegate of India, i.e. that they should be consistent with the national dignity of every State to which they were made applicable, be universally applied, and take account of the fact that atomic energy had become an absolute necessity for the peaceful development and prosperity of many countries. In their present form, Agency safeguards were drastic for those countries which least represented a danger to peace and were technically and economically incapable of misusing atomic energy for military purposes, while they hardly affected at all States which had no compunction in endangering world peace by deliberately impeding the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and on nuclear disarmament.

73. Since the Agency had been established, fissionable materials had become freely available on the world market, no safeguards being attached by the supplying State. Some States insisted on safeguards, which offered a means of maintaining their own superior position and of exercising control over the countries to which they granted assistance. The Soviet Union, however, was supplying fissionable materials and nuclear equipment to less-developed countries without attaching safeguards and without reserving any supervisory rights. The proposed safeguards system was accordingly anachronistic and the relevant provisions of the Statute must be interpreted in the light of the real situation.

74. The regular budget continued to increase. Disproportionately high amounts had been allocated to projects that had not received proper examination nor been properly planned and co-ordinated. Substantially more than had been indicated in the information originally supplied was being spent on laboratories which had not so far proved of any real benefit to most Member States.

75. Technical assistance to the less-developed countries should be increased. A new form of technical assistance was represented by radioisotope training centers, where personnel from the less-developed countries would be trained at far lower than the normal cost; it was a scheme which merited further extension.

76. Some of the scientific conferences and meetings organized by the Agency had been of real value, more particularly those dealing with urgent problems

relating to the practical applications of atomic energy in the less-developed countries. The Agency had also gone a long way towards becoming an international center for the exchange of scientific information. Its scientific and technical publications went to show that, properly directed, the Agency might play an important role in accelerating the development of atomic techniques and technology while at the same time strengthening its own international authority. The library was rendering valuable services, and the draft regulations that had been elaborated, such as those governing the transport of radioactive materials, had been favorably received and much appreciated. A positive contribution had also been made by fellowship programs and the exchange of experts and scientists.

77. As in previous years, Czechoslovakia was again offering the Agency the services of ten consultants and experts, and fifteen fellowships for students and scientific workers from the less-developed countries. Scientific and technical publications and scientific films had also been offered. In October 1960, the Agency symposium on the chemical effects of nuclear transformations, at which more than 150 scientists were expected, would be held in Prague and his Government was also prepared to organize a second Agency symposium.

78. The Agency still had at its disposal the Czechoslovak contribution to the General Fund, originally amounting to 200 000 Czech crowns, to be used in the form of deliveries of technical equipment and apparatus. In view of that, he had been surprised at the Director General's statement that he had only \$40 000 available for technical assistance for a six-month period^{2/}: the unused Czechoslovak contribution amounted to more than half that sum. He hoped such contributions would be more promptly utilized in the coming year.

79. His Government would continue consistently to help the Agency achieve its original objectives and to assist in eliminating shortcomings in the firm belief that, in the future, the positive elements would prevail.

80. Mr. THIRRING (Austria) joined with previous speakers in congratulating the President on his election. The Austrian delegation had noted the Board's annual report and had listened to the comments made on it during the general debate with great interest. The Austrian people had always supported the view, on which the Agency was based, that atomic energy should be utilized to increase the prosperity of mankind.

^{2/} GC(IV)/OR.36, paragraph 31.

81. Austria had been gratified to see the special mention made in the report of assistance given to the Agency by the Austrian authorities (GC(IV)/114, paragraphs 31 and 32) and wished to assure the Conference that his country would continue to provide assistance to the best of its ability.
82. Austria was also grateful to the Agency for the fellowships and technical assistance that it had provided.
83. It might be of interest to mention Austria's own nuclear energy program and, in particular, the joint program for nuclear studies organized by the Institute of Theoretical Physics of the University of Vienna and the Austrian Society for the Study of Atomic Energy, which was international both in teaching staff and students. The Agency had agreed to invite two guest professors each year to lecture and do research at the Institute. If the program developed as planned, there was good reason to suppose that in the course of time Vienna would become a center of international research in theoretical and fundamental nuclear physics.
84. Preparatory work had also been done on drafting laws and regulations, especially with regard to radiation protection and third-party liability.
85. The Austrian universities' reactor in Vienna was nearing completion and the Seibersdorf reactor was to come into operation during the present session. An invitation to attend the opening ceremony had been extended to all delegations and he hoped that as many delegates as possible would accept. The two centers had been established with the assistance of the United States Government on the basis of bilateral agreements which had operated to the entire satisfaction of both parties.
86. The Austrian authorities were at present investigating ways in which arrangements could be made to enable increased numbers of students from less-developed countries to attend Austrian institutions.
87. His delegation had been very happy to vote for the admission of Ghana, and hoped that the new African States would participate fully in the work of the Agency.
88. Mr. de ERICE (Spain) congratulated the President on his election. Spain was confident that the present session of the General Conference would be

characterized by a spirit of peace and co-operation. While the existence of differing or opposing political views was unavoidable, and perhaps even necessary, such differences should not be allowed to hinder the settlement of important practical issues or threaten the co-existence and collaboration that formed the very foundation of any international organization. He, personally, held an optimistic view and had no doubt that the Member States represented would not fail to meet their responsibilities.

89. His delegation had heard with pleasure of the United States' intention to apply Agency safeguards to certain bilateral agreements.

90. It was gratifying to see that the number of fellowships would be increased; Spain would like to see more of its own scientists and technicians going abroad in order to keep in touch with developments which were taking place in various countries.

91. The draft international regulations on the transport of radioactive materials and on waste disposal were specially welcome. In the latter connection, the Government of Monaco was particularly to be congratulated for its generous offer of facilities. The Director General might perhaps consider preparing a registration system for the various methods of disposing of radioactive waste - especially into international waters - and the question of standardizing the applicable levels and measurements; otherwise, international recommendations might be difficult to apply.

92. The Agency was also doing very useful work on health and safety.

93. It was regrettable that an atmosphere of mistrust had heretofore surrounded the discussions on safeguards. The essential criteria were that safeguards should be both as specific and as flexible as possible; bilateral agreements so far concluded might offer very useful guidance.

94. The Agency should approach all international bodies with which it had common interests - not only those within the United Nations family - with a view to concluding relationship arrangements, avoiding duplication and allocating major responsibilities. The results of such discussions could later be submitted for consideration to the Board.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.