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on Friday, 23 September 1960, at 10.40 a.m.

President: Mr. NADJAKOV (Bulgaria)

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* GC(IV)/130.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(IV)/INF/31/Rev.3.

GENERAL DEBATE AND REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR 1959-60 (GC(IV)/114, 126 and Corr.1, 131) (continued from the 40th meeting)

1. Mr. ESTEVEZ (Argentina) said that the Agency had emerged from its initial stage and was entering a period of growth. In many respects, its development had taken a turn which could not have been foreseen when the Statute was signed in 1956. Although it had not yet become the recognized broker in nuclear materials, its role in technical assistance was growing in importance.

2. Although not even mentioned in the Statute, technical assistance now had a privileged position amongst the Agency's practical activities, particularly in regard to the dissemination of knowledge about nuclear science. It was all the more to be regretted that, as the Director General had stressed in his statement[1/], the requisite funds were lacking.

3. Argentina was proud of having started a first-class training center for specialists in atomic energy; it had been placed at the disposal of the Agency which had already begun to use it.

4. In atomic matters, his country was wholeheartedly collaborating with the other American countries, giving them access to its technical installations and training centers and supplying the services of experts.

5. Argentina had faith in the Agency's future: with universal support it could become a major source of assistance to all countries. After occupying a seat on the Preparatory Commission and on the Board until the end of the third session of the General Conference, Argentina hoped to take its place on the Board again in order to participate more actively in the Agency's work and contribute to solving the many problems which confronted it.

6. Among the questions most important for the Agency's future now before the Conference, he gave pride of place to technical assistance. Argentina would do everything it could to ensure that the needs of countries requiring assistance were recognized and earnestly hoped Member States in a position to do so would provide the Agency with the resources to meet such needs when, and to the extent, necessary.

1/ GC(IV)/OR.36, paragraph 39.

7. His Government was very anxious to see practical effect given to the provisions of Article XII of the Statute (Agency safeguards). If the fundamental objectives laid down for the Agency in its Statute were to be achieved, the problem of safeguards must be faced resolutely and in a rational way. Argentina favored the adoption of principles and procedures which had been drawn up with technical considerations in mind.

8. His delegation welcomed Colombia and Chile, which had just ratified the Statute, and Ghana, whose admission had been approved at the beginning of the session[2/]. It hoped all the new States that had recently become Members of the United Nations would also join the Agency, which would help them in their first steps towards using atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

9. Mr. CUNHA (Brazil) briefly reviewed the Brazilian program for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. In addition to elementary courses on nuclear energy given as part of university teaching, the training program also included post-graduate courses on nuclear engineering, the agricultural uses of radioisotopes, electronics and the use of radioisotopes in medicine, biology and so on. For that program, Brazil already had a reactor - in operation at São Paulo since 1957 - and would soon have three more, which were at present under construction. Thanks to Agency assistance, a dosimetry laboratory had been opened at Rio de Janeiro.

10. Prospecting for uranium and thorium ore-bearing deposits was proceeding rapidly. The Poços de Caldas plant would go into operation in 1962 and process 10 000 tons of uraniferous ores annually. Among other industrial activities, he would mention the annual production of 150 tons of thorium oxide and the corresponding rare earths, the manufacture of beryllium oxide and artificial graphite, and the production of nuclearly pure uranium. The São Paulo reactor was producing radioisotopes for medical centers, where they were used on an ever-increasing scale for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. Various projects carried out with Agency assistance included the design of a 200 MW(e) nuclear power station, for which the Government expected to invite tenders in January 1961.

11. He noted with pleasure in the Board's report that the Agency had organized scientific meetings on various questions relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In future, more meetings might perhaps be held away from Agency headquarters; travel costs would then be more fairly shared, while participants could see at first hand the special problems of the areas visited.

2/ GC(IV)/OR.36, paragraphs 25 - 32.

12. The Director General and his staff were to be congratulated on the excellent results so far obtained. As the Director General had stated in his opening speech, the Agency and its Member States had arrived at a turning-point. It was excellent to make available the fellowships, information and equipment provided by States which were most advanced and most ready to co-operate, but if the Agency was really to do what the Statute intended, it must be able to establish its own program and satisfy the requests for assistance addressed to it. To that end, Member States must increase their voluntary contributions to the General Fund without attaching limitative conditions. His own Government would double the yearly contribution it had so far been making and, for 1961, pledge $30 000, which the Agency could use as it thought best.

13. The question of safeguards was one of the most important the Conference was called upon to discuss. The principle of safeguards had been accepted by all Member States when they ratified the Statute but the manner of giving effect to it had given rise to lengthy discussions in the Board. The system now submitted to the Conference resulted from the combined efforts of the Secretariat, the Board and various technical, legal and administrative advisers; drawn up to the best of their knowledge and ability by men of goodwill, only in practice could its efficacity be tested. It might not be perfect, but it at least existed. The Brazilian delegation, which had taken an active part in the debates that led to its adoption, believed it had three main advantages: firstly, it allowed the Agency to put one of the most important provisions of the Statute into practice; secondly, it told Member States in advance what safeguards would apply to projects if Agency assistance was requested for them; thirdly, it would permit the Board to take decisions without prolonged discussions and without the risk of acting arbitrarily for lack of clear-cut procedures for applying safeguards.

14. Contrary to what certain States seemed to fear, the acceptance of safeguards and the inspections they involved was in no way inconsistent with national sovereignty. The Brazilian Government for its part considered that, in ratifying the Statute, it had agreed to the incorporation of the principle in its national legislation. As soon as the Conference authorized the Board to put the proposed system into operation and the Agency was ready to accept responsibility for it, his Government would arrange to hand over to the Agency the application of any safeguards provided for in its bilateral agreements.

15. The present generation must try to live up to the faith placed in it and respond adequately to the opportunities it was afforded of promoting the health, wellbeing and prosperity of all nations.

16. Sir Roger MAKINS (United Kingdom) congratulated the Secretariat on the admirable way in which it had administered the Agency program during the year that had elapsed since the third session. In most branches of activity it had been the first full year of normal operation, and a good start had been made.

17. The general outlook had changed in various ways since the Agency was set up, and there was now a better understanding of the amount of money and effort any atomic energy program, however modest, involved. Generally speaking, it appeared unlikely that nuclear power would become economically competitive even in the highly industrialized countries before the late 1960's.

18. In those circumstances, nuclear power programs drawn up a few years before had had to be revised. The United Kingdom Government had decided to slow down its own program, but still expected to have a total installed nuclear power capacity of 3 500 MW by the end of 1966, placing orders at the rate of one nuclear power station a year. New types of power reactor were being developed by the Atomic Energy Authority. In short, the United Kingdom, without excessive optimism or pessimism, maintained its faith in the future of nuclear power.

19. The fact that the period of discoveries and sensational developments seemed to have ended need not be discouraging. As pointed out in the excellent report on the development of nuclear power the Board had submitted to the Conference[3/], progress now depended on various important but unspectacular technical improvements.

20. The present period was one of consolidation. That did not imply stagnation. On the contrary, the respite would enable atomic energy authorities, Governments and international organizations to allay the fears to which the advent of the new atomic technology had given rise in the public mind. All peoples must consider the inevitable increase in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as something quite normal and natural; at the same time, the Agency, in its concern to guarantee adequate radiological protection, must intensively pursue its work on health and safety.

3/ GC(IV)/123.

21. As regards the Board's report, he considered that, so far as the activities from which all Member States would benefit were concerned, the Agency had two main tasks. It should facilitate the exchange of information and the spread of ideas, through its publications such as its admirable technical review series and also through the specialized scientific meetings which it organized and in which the United Kingdom took an active part.

22. The Agency also had an important part to play in working out international standards - safety, the handling and transport of radioactive materials, insurance and so on - required in connection with the growing exchange of nuclear equipment and materials, and in securing agreement on third-party liability for land-based and marine reactors.

23. His delegation supported the recommendations made in the study on the disposal of radioactive waste into the sea, drafted by the group of experts under the chairmanship of Mr. Bryniolsson.

24. It was also glad the Board had been able to put before the Conference a document setting out the principles and procedures of Agency safeguards[4/], which would enable the Agency to begin to discharge its safeguards responsibilities and be of assistance to States which were contemplating project agreements with the Agency. He knew that views on that document differed, but did not believe that the operation of Agency safeguards, in accordance with the Statute which had been accepted by all Member States, could infringe any country's sovereignty or independence.

25. The European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) would itself administer the safeguards on the "Dragon" reactor which ENEA was building in the United Kingdom, but the regulations and procedures would be identical with those of the Agency. He noted with appreciation that the United States had decided to submit certain of its reactors to Agency safeguards.

26. As regards Agency activities of more particular concern to the less-developed countries, the United Kingdom supported the Board's recommendation to fix the 1961 target for voluntary contributions to the General Fund at $1.8 million. But it was not enough just to fix a target: it had to be reached - and that had not happened in 1959 and seemed unlikely to happen in 1960. That seriously hindered the development of Agency technical assistance. Before the Statute came up for revision, the Agency should carefully consider whether that important part of its activities could continue to be dependent on voluntary and hitherto irregular contributions.

4/ GC(IV)/108/Rev.1.

27. He welcomed the set of rules governing the grant of technical assistance by the Agency[5] which the Board had worked out and placed before the Conference; but to ensure sound administrative management, it was also necessary to have clear ideas about the purposes for which the limited resources available for technical assistance should be used. He had some suggestions to make in that connection. Firstly, the Agency should help the less-developed countries to extend their applications of radioisotopes by means of direct technical assistance projects and by organizing training courses for key staff. In 1958 the United Kingdom had offered six fellowships for Agency-sponsored research workers in the Atomic Energy Authority's irradiation laboratories, and it was again offering six fellowships on the same terms.

28. Secondly, to determine the nuclear power needs and potentialities of Member States, the Agency should assist them to carry out detailed local studies and provide realistic data on nuclear power costing. He welcomed the survey being made in Finland with Agency participation, and the establishment of the panel on nuclear power costs.

29. Thirdly, having awarded almost 1 000 fellowships and found places for more than 500 students, the Agency's fellowship program could be said to have progressed very satisfactorily; the United Kingdom had offered places for over a hundred. But he felt it would be unwise to divert too many scientists and engineers to nuclear activities at the expense of other more immediate needs. The Agency had recognized that risk and, as indicated in a recent report to the Economic and Social Council on its long-term program[6], it very wisely contemplated a levelling-off in the number of fellowships granted.

30. Fourthly, the Agency's functional laboratory could very usefully complement the work of national laboratories and he hoped Member States would take full advantage of its facilities.

31. He believed that the political tensions which had penetrated even to the Agency would gradually diminish. Great issues, such as disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, were being debated at New York and Geneva; they were not the concern of the Agency, which was a technical institution. However much Member States might be divided politically, they

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5/ GC(IV)/113.

6/ Issued as United Nations document E/33/46.

should be able to reach agreement on questions of research and on the means of improving nuclear technology. In the long run, the success of the Agency and the part it played in the international community would depend on its technical competence and on the impartiality and efficiency with which it was administered.

32. It had been said that the Agency had entered a period of consolidation. That would not cause it to lose sight of the spirit in which it had been founded. The objective which had been set for it had not changed, even though the road to that objective might be long and hard. The United Kingdom, which was firmly convinced that the Agency could attain that noble objective, would continue to give it full support.

33. Mr. da COSTA (Portugal) said that the Portuguese authorities had followed the Agency's development with satisfaction, particularly its technical assistance program, on which so much hope was placed. Portugal was glad to have been able to provide two experts for Agency missions, and expected to make further contributions to the execution of the technical assistance program in types of work for which it had qualified personnel available. In return, he hoped that an increasing number of Portuguese students would qualify for Agency fellowships.

34. Portugal was also greatly interested in the idea of placing research contracts with specialized institutions in Member States and hoped the Agency would expand that program, as it provided a relatively inexpensive means of developing the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes while at the same time increasing the Agency's prestige.

35. The Portuguese delegation welcomed the principles and procedures for the attachment and application of Agency safeguards, which the Board had provisionally approved after detailed study. It was particularly glad to see that the document included provisions under which simplified safeguards could be applied to most research reactors; under present conditions, they would be the only safeguards applicable to the nuclear activities of most Member States.

36. Portugal was considering arrangements under which the Agency would administer the safeguard provisions of the bilateral agreement it had concluded with the United States.

37. Mr. GANEV (Bulgaria) said that, in the exchange of scientific and technical information between Member States, the Agency had certainly achieved results during the past year. It had organized conferences, symposia and scientific meetings which had contributed to the more extensive use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and had helped to strengthen contacts and friendly relations between scientists working on atomic energy. It had drawn up regulations for the transport of radioactive materials, and draft conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage. The number of fellowships awarded had increased, and the exchange of specialists had been expanded.

38. His delegation did not believe, however, that the Agency had accomplished all it might have since its establishment, and that was not due solely to the fact that certain conditions or possibilities had been lacking.

39. Some disquieting trends had developed within the Agency; he was thinking particularly of a policy which had the effect of restricting the Agency's work on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and preventing the pooling of the efforts of all interested States and organizations.

40. The Director General had stated that the Agency's work during the past three years had been one of innovation and exploration.[7] The Bulgarian delegation considered that stage to be over: it was time for the Agency to use its entire resources in order to meet its main responsibilities, above all by assisting the less-developed countries effectively.

41. The Agency had spent much time drafting safeguards to prevent the improper diversion of nuclear materials. The resulting very complicated system had given rise to objections from several States - including Bulgaria - because the proposed control would apply only to the insignificant amount of materials that were supplied through the Agency.

42. The Board's report stated that the production of fissionable materials was appreciably in excess of requirements. Certain States had accumulated large reserves of nuclear materials, unlimited quantities of which could be obtained through bilateral agreements. The complicated system of safeguards, the application of which entailed an infringement of the sovereign rights of the receiving States and considerable expenditure, would encourage many countries to have recourse to bilateral agreements. The Agency was thus itself erecting

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7/ GC(IV)/OR.36, paragraph 36.

obstacles to the fulfillment of one of its most important functions. The proposed safeguards would do nothing to restrict the production of nuclear weapons - that could be done only by complete and universal disarmament. Hence, the development and adoption of a complicated system of safeguards was in no way justified; for the time being, it would suffice to ensure that the relevant provisions of the Statute were respected.

43. His delegation believed the subject-matter of research contracts and the way in which they were allocated both needed reconsideration, and other means should be adopted for promoting scientific research. At the present time it would appear more sensible to provide funds for extending research in the less-developed countries, by establishing radioisotope centers, providing laboratory equipment, giving technical assistance to scientific institutions, and so on. That would offer a more effective way of raising the level of scientific research in those countries and increasing the number of specialists.

44. It was to be noted that the Agency's attitude towards certain States and organizations had not always been equitable. For example, it had given technical assistance to South Korea, to South Viet-Nam and to the Chiang Kai-shek clique, while discriminating against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and other States.

45. The People's Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Korea and other countries which were doing scientific work on the peaceful uses of atomic energy were not yet represented in the Agency. The Agency would markedly strengthen its authority by admitting those States to membership and by granting consultative status to the World Federation of Trade Unions.

46. In the future as in the past, Bulgaria would give its fullest support to the Agency in order to assist it to attain its objectives.

47. Mr. EL ANNABI (Tunisia) said he was happy to note the marked progress made by the Agency during the year 1959-60. The increase in the number of fellowships, the many conferences and symposia held, the publication of various manuals and the solution of many problems were all items on the credit side. However, it should try to supply Member States with larger quantities of equipment and uranium^{235}. Hitherto, the supply of equipment had been linked with the sending of experts; the Agency should not forget that some countries had the experts they needed but lacked the necessary equipment to carry out their programs.

48. The system of safeguards approved by the Board complicated the supplying of enriched uranium to Member States. The proposed measures ignored the fact that it was the donor States and not the receiving States which could use uranium for military purposes. In suggesting in 1953 that the Agency be established President Eisenhower had pointed out that, as a result, stocks of fissionable materials accumulated for military purposes would become available for economic development. Countries that were developing hesitated to apply to the Agency for their uranium purchases because the price asked was too high. That problem would be solved only when the Agency allowed for the fact that, because of the cost of amortization, the per caloric price of uranium could not be calculated in the same way as the per calorie price of coal.

49. Substantial progress had been made in regard to atomic energy in Tunisia. The Government had from its own resources constructed one laboratory for medical applications of radioisotopes and another for the analysis of radioactive dust and rainwater. In collaboration with the World Meteorological Organization it had set up a center for the study of radiation, particularly solar radiation. With the aid of an expert and of equipment supplied by the Agency it had established a center for agricultural applications of radioisotopes and had started a program of practical research on water and fertilizer circuits in the soil.

50. The Government was at present planning the creation of a new university to accommodate 4 000 students, and had decided to grant 3 000 scholarships. France had made 400 scholarships available to Tunisian students, and some hundred more had been granted by the United States and other countries. Certain States had agreed to provide buildings and scientific equipment for the university. Tunisia was appealing to all its friends to help in equipping the university laboratories. Each donor country would have its name inscribed on one of the university halls.

51. During the period covered by the Board's report Tunisia had been visited by three expert missions, including a preliminary assistance mission which had recommended that assistance in connection with the use of radioisotopes be provided, and a mission sent to study the question of establishing a radio-isotope center in the Middle East. Because of the potential advantages to sister peoples in the Middle East, Tunisia did not oppose the proposal to establish a center in Cairo but, in the absence of a direct air service with Cairo and because the normal language of scientific communication was different - English in the Middle East, French in Tunisia - could itself scarcely hope to benefit from the center.

52. On behalf of his delegation he proposed Iraq for the seat assigned to Africa and the Middle East in the elections to the Board. He recalled that 1960 was the year of Africa, and the question of a wider African representation on the Board should be reviewed. He welcomed the presence of the delegate of Ghana at the Conference, and congratulated him on his country's admission to the Agency.

53. Mr. DIAH (Indonesia) said he did not intend to review the achievements of the Agency since its establishment, but he noted with satisfaction that, in spite of all the difficulties experienced during its first years, it was now shaping well. As a Member of the Board, Indonesia had taken part in drawing up the program and budget for 1961 and in drafting the Board's annual report; hence his delegation had no important comments to make on that subject, but would nevertheless like to express an opinion on various aspects of the Agency's work.

54. In view of the limited resources available it had once been considered that technical assistance given by the Agency in the form of equipment and supplies should be kept to a minimum. His delegation noted with satisfaction that there had been some change in that attitude. It was now apparently understood that it was extremely difficult to carry out nuclear research without having a considerable amount of specialized equipment, and he was glad the Board had recognized that equipment was more important in atomic energy than in most other fields, and that a developing country embarking on an atomic energy program - as Indonesia was - had to make substantial investments. His delegation therefore warmly welcomed the Board's decision to follow, in a somewhat more flexible way, the general procedures governing the provision of equipment under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance[8/].

55. It was a matter for satisfaction that the fellowship program had been extended so as to utilize the full amount of the funds made available. There was no denying the value of that program, particularly for the less-developed countries which it did much to help in attaining the objectives they set themselves in connection with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He was happy to express his Government's gratitude to Member States which had offered Type II fellowships. The procedure for awarding fellowships might be more expeditious, however, and the screening of candidates less stringent, since they had already been selected by their Governments.

8/ GC(IV)/113, Annex, paragraph 5.

56. His delegation unreservedly approved the holding of scientific meetings; they provided an effective means of spreading technical knowledge. They might nevertheless be held with advantage more frequently in Asia since, for financial reasons, it was often difficult for the Governments of Asian States to send participants to distant countries. The Indonesian delegation had accordingly been glad to learn that symposia were to be held at Bombay and Bangkok by the end of the year; it hoped that future symposia in Asia would be held still further east. Indonesia would itself be happy to act as host to a future scientific meeting.

57. His delegation also noted with satisfaction that a number of regional inter-governmental organizations interested in various aspects of the peaceful uses of atomic energy were co-operating closely with the Agency. That co-operation would greatly help the Agency in attaining its objectives. The Agency should co-operate, not only with certain organizations, but with all organizations whose work was related to its own; in particular, it should be less stringent in granting consultative status and study the possibility of admitting the organizations whose requests had been refused.

58. For Indonesia, the principle of universality was not just an empty phrase, and it was ready to collaborate with all States and with all organizations to achieve the noble aim represented by "atoms for peace". Realizing the importance of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, Indonesia had embarked upon an atomic energy program and would gratefully accept any assistance. With United States help, the Government had begun to construct buildings to house the Triga Mark II research reactor which was to be supplied under a bilateral agreement and, it was hoped, would be operating by the end of 1961. Under another project, a sub-critical assembly supplied to Indonesia under a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union was being installed and would go into operation by the end of 1960; another, type IRT-1000 research reactor, was to be received from the Soviet Union under the same bilateral agreement, and would go into service in 1963. Under a further project to be carried out with United States aid a laboratory would be built near Djakarta. Finally, the Agency was to place a mobile radioisotope laboratory at the disposal of the Government for a period of six months.

59. He was happy to note the increased volume of information disseminated, but much remained to be done. For the man in the street the atom was still linked with the idea of destruction and fear and it must be one of the Agency's main objects to dissipate that prejudice and show the masses that atomic energy could also be used for peaceful purposes. That was the idea behind an Indonesian proposal[9], which the Board had approved in a slightly modified form, requesting the Secretariat to give effect to it.

60. Safeguards were another important aspect of the Agency's work. Indonesia's position on that subject was well known and he would not elaborate on it. He wished to state, however, that while not opposed to safeguards, his Government considered that the application of the proposed system should not hamper the execution of national programs and should not divide the Member States into two groups, one controlling the other.

61. The Agency's staffing policy had certainly improved, but was still not in full conformity with the provisions of Article VII.D of the Statute, particularly as far as senior officials were concerned. It was to be hoped that the Director General would continue his efforts to improve the system of recruiting staff and fully satisfy the conditions laid down in Article VII.D.

62. Mr. PAVLUCHENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) agreed that the Agency had done useful work. For example, it had supplied research equipment and sent experts to several Member States, provided an increasing number of fellowships for the less-developed countries and organized very successful large-scale scientific conferences, e.g. the Conference on the Application of Large Radiation Sources in Industry and especially to Chemical Processes[10], and the Conference on Radioisotopes in Physical Sciences and Industry[11].

63. His delegation nevertheless considered that the Agency's work should be substantially improved. The Agency's influence on the development of atomic energy and its use for peaceful purposes was still insignificant. The main obstacle to an expansion of the Agency's activities was the fact that atomic energy was still being used for military purposes. By reason of the continuous manufacture of destructive weapons such as atomic and thermonuclear

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9/ GC(III)/73, paragraph 249.

10/ Warsaw, 8 to 12 September 1959.

11/ Copenhagen, 6 to 17 September 1960.

bombs and intercontinental rockets, disarmament had become the most urgent contemporary problem, and nothing would more greatly assist the Agency's work than a ban on nuclear weapons, and general disarmament.

64. The Agency could and should contribute to general disarmament and to the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests; he welcomed the Polish draft resolution (GC(IV)/131) and hoped it would be approved by all delegations.

65. Scientists working on the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes knew the efforts and resources that were required to develop great discoveries and exploit them for the benefit of mankind. Only wide international co-operation could place the power of the atom at the service of peace, progress and the prosperity of nations; but the attitude of certain countries - particularly the United States - which sought to continue the cold war, was most prejudicial to the Agency's principle of universality.

66. The "factors retarding the development of the Agency's work in regard to the supply of nuclear fuel" mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Board's report did not justify the fact that only very inadequate supplies of nuclear materials and atomic equipment had been supplied to Member States. Countries which needed fissionable materials managed to obtain them outside the Agency. In reality, attempts were being made to give the Agency increasingly broad supervisory functions, involving Agency interference in the internal affairs of the States which needed fissionable materials.

67. The proposed system of safeguards would give no control over countries which intended to have nuclear armaments. An attempt was being made to establish through the Agency a control system which could not prevent the appearance of nuclear weapons in countries that did not yet have them, and could thus in no way contribute to solving the disarmament problem.

68. The countries which most strongly urged the establishment of that system were precisely those which would doubtless not be subject to any control - especially the United States, whose declaration of willingness to submit four of its reactors to Agency safeguards was mere window-dressing.

69. A main defect in the Agency was the complete absence of proper planning. The subjects of contracts were not systematically chosen but selected in a random manner, at the Secretariat's discretion and without the Board being kept informed of the results. That procedure should be radically altered: the Board should approve the subjects, and keep itself informed of the results.

70. There was a further defect: the abilities of the staff were not being used as they should be. Of course, it might in some cases be necessary to call in experts to solve certain scientific and technical problems. Very often, however, the Agency consulted experts when there was no need to do so. There was no justification for employing a large number of paid consultants when the Agency could draw on the services of consultants who had been placed at its disposal free of charge.

71. Broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was vital, and the Agency could do much to promote it. With the goodwill of all States, such co-operation would open up exceptional prospects and make it possible to harness the atom to the service of all mankind.

72. Mr. SINACEUR (Morocco) considered that the Agency had made great progress with its programs and the tasks assigned to it under the Statute, chief among which was the provision of technical assistance to the less-developed countries.

73. Morocco, which was not an atomic Power, expected much of the Agency. It had as yet no central authority responsible for atomic energy programs, but the various ministries were greatly interested in the application of nuclear energy in their own spheres. It particularly appreciated the preliminary assistance missions sent to atomically less-developed countries and, at the request of the Government, the Agency had sent two to Morocco. One had gone to study the possibilities of extracting uranium from the natural phosphates of which Morocco was a big producer. The expert concerned had reported that the technical aspects were favorable but, because of the world over-production of uranium, the lack of markets and present prices, the economic prospects were not very encouraging. He considered that Morocco's future needs would be better served by continuing to prospect, since the mineral resources were such that deposits of uranium and other important nuclear minerals might be found. The Government did not entirely agree with some passages of the expert's report but fully endorsed his conclusions, and would probably ask the Agency to supply the necessary prospecting equipment.

74. The other mission had been concerned with other aspects of the peaceful uses of atomic energy: training, agriculture, medicine, electricity, and nuclear raw materials. Morocco realized that, in present circumstances,

nuclear power offered it little. It was so short of qualified staff that the construction of a nuclear power station of its own, and the development of the medical applications of atomic energy, were out of the question. The Government nevertheless endorsed the mission's recommendations and intended, in two large medical centers, to introduce the use of unsealed sources for diagnosis and therapy, and sealed sources for radiotherapy. For that purpose, it would request the Agency to contribute by awarding fellowships in the specialized training of medical and para-medical staff, and by providing the services of experts and some equipment. It had also asked the Agency, under the Revised Standard Technical Assistance Agreement, to send an expert for six months with the necessary equipment for studying soil water content - neutron or gamma-ray emitting probes would be very useful for the purpose.

75. For educational purposes, the nuclear sciences were not yet treated as separate subjects in Morocco, but received some attention in the physics and chemistry courses of science faculties.

76. Morocco found difficulty in satisfying Agency conditions for the award of fellowships for advanced training and, to overcome the difficulty, was requesting the Agency to grant long-term fellowships.

77. As the mission had noted, Morocco - although its laboratories were otherwise fully equipped - was not equipped for the special analysis of nuclear materials, and was therefore asking the Agency to send an expert in analytical methods for one month to advise the staff and recommend equipment for the geological laboratory. It then intended to ask the Agency for another expert for six months, and for some equipment.

78. The country's conventional power resources were such that it did not at present need to have recourse to nuclear power, which would have no economic interest for it for another ten years. But in view of the present price of coal, and the fact that its sources of hydro-electric power might become exhausted, it had an interest meanwhile in keeping up with new developments in nuclear power generation.

79. Those were the modest aims Morocco hoped to achieve with Agency assistance.

80. A number of young nations, in Africa in particular, had become independent during the year. They were now Members of the United Nations and would certainly apply for membership of the Agency; it was to be hoped that the

year of Africa in the United Nations would be followed by an "African year" in the Agency. The question of Africa's representation on the Board would then arise. He agreed with the delegate of Tunisia and others who had already mentioned the problem that it might perhaps be dealt with by revising the Statute. However, account must be taken even now of the fact that several African States were already Members of the Agency, and others would be shortly; pending the revision of the Statute, one of the "floating" seats on the Board should be reserved for a representative of the African continent.

81. At the third session of the General Conference the Moroccan delegation had raised a question which some delegates had considered to be outside the Agency's terms of reference: nuclear tests in the Sahara.[12/] He did not wish to start a controversy and disturb the serenity of the present debate. He felt bound to state, however, that Morocco still regarded the question as being within the Agency's competence and relevant to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. One of the Agency's objectives was to safeguard the health of mankind and protect it against ionizing radiations. The problem remained, for the country concerned, despite the United Nations General Assembly resolution calling on it to cease nuclear tests in the Sahara, continued to flout the wishes of the African countries and ignore the resolution, and was now preparing an underground atomic bomb test in the Sahara. Morocco felt bound to protest vehemently, not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of all countries of the African continent, and amicably urged the country concerned to abandon its project.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

12/ GC(III)/OR.30, paragraphs 39 and 40.