



International Atomic Energy Agency

General Conference

Distr.
GENERAL

GC(IV)/OR.42
3 January 1961

ENGLISH

FOURTH REGULAR SESSION

OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,
on Friday, 23 September 1960, at 3.10 p.m.

President: Mr. NADJAKOV (Bulgaria)

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* GC(IV)/130.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document
GC(IV)/INF/31/Rev.3.

WELCOME TO A NEW MEMBER -(CHILE)

1. The PRESIDENT announced that on 19 September 1960 the Government of Chile had deposited its instrument of ratification of the Statute with the depositary Government. Chile had thus become the 71st Member of the Agency. He was sure he was expressing the views of the Conference in welcoming the delegate of Chile on the first occasion he took part in its proceedings with full voting rights.

2. Mr. LEA-PLAZA (Chile) thanked the President and the General Conference for their words of welcome and assured them that his country was entering the Agency in the same spirit of collaboration and dedication to its objectives as so many of those present had manifested over the past three years.

GENERAL DEBATE AND REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR 1959-60 (GC(IV)/114, 126, 126/Corr.1, 131) (continued from the 41st meeting)

3. Mr. NAZIF (United Arab Republic) expressed his delegation's appreciation of the efforts undertaken by the Agency in promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The value of those efforts had been demonstrated during the first two years of its activities and the useful expansion of the program in the third year became quite evident when the annual report of the Board of Governors (GC(IV)/114) was examined. It was also clear from the Programme and Budget for 1961^{1/} that further valuable advances would be made in future.

4. The United Arab Republic believed in international co-operation provided that no unacceptable conditions were attached, and considered that it might be realized through bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as through international organizations. His own country's nuclear energy program had, in fact, been initiated by a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union, as a result of which a nuclear physics laboratory was now in operation and a 2 000 kW research reactor was nearing completion. Further co-operation, with Norway, had led to arrangements for the establishment of a laboratory for producing radioisotopes, now under construction, which would have an annual production capacity of 250 curies of various processed and non-processed isotopes. That output would meet the needs of the national radioisotope center, research institutes, hospitals and industrial organizations, and the effect would be to extend the applications of radioisotopes throughout the country.

^{1/} GC(IV)/116.

5. Those facilities formed the technical background which his Government had had in mind when, with the support of other Arab countries, it had requested the Agency to establish a regional radioisotope center in Cairo. The decision of the Board to endorse that request was deeply appreciated. The first regional course was to be organized by the Agency in Cairo in March 1961 and would be open to all countries to which the Governor from the United Arab Republic had referred in his statement at the 191st meeting of the Board. The second course would start in September 1961.
6. Other aspects of the national atomic energy establishment's program had been promoted in co-operation with various scientific and industrial organizations in Czechoslovakia, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia. The technical assistance granted by the Agency had also proved most beneficial to the program, particularly with regard to training, expert advice and equipment.
7. In return for the assistance received, his country would endeavor to extend the benefits of those facilities internationally; it welcomed scientists from all friendly nations, and in particular from the Middle Eastern and Afro-Asian countries.
8. To the present time the Agency's program had been mainly concerned with technical assistance and the exchange of information, and its major activities had been directed primarily to assisting the less-advanced countries. The receiving countries, being the first to benefit from the Agency, should make a positive contribution to its work by assisting in the formulation of Agency policy at succeeding sessions of the General Conference. It was the duty of the Conference to exercise the clear authority it enjoyed under Article V.D of the Statute. In other words, it should play a more important role in helping the Board to perform its functions by giving a clear indication of the desires of Member States as a whole.
9. Technical assistance, for example, was sometimes given to fill in the gaps between various projects already existing in a country. For less-developed countries, however, the aim should rather be to carry out specific projects. In either case more effective co-ordination was needed between the various divisions of the Secretariat concerned with technical assistance.

10. Gifts in kind should be freely encouraged and accepted, provided that no conditions were imposed. The generous gift made by the United States to the Agency in 1960^{2/} was a praiseworthy gesture, because it had solved a serious problem resulting from the lack of necessary funds.

11. It had become clear that the most important and critical issue before the Conference was the Agency safeguards system^{3/}. His Government had been, and still was, opposed to that system since it entertained serious doubts as to the wisdom and necessity of creating elaborate and complicated machinery which clearly could not avoid encroaching on the sovereign rights of States. His Government believed that the Conference should discuss the matter thoroughly before coming to a decision, since the safeguards system would have a vital bearing on the future activities of the Agency, in addition to its direct impact on Member States to which safeguards might be applied.

12. The Agency had already made considerable efforts to carry out the decision taken by the General Conference in 1959 to pursue its studies of nuclear power development^{4/}, and the results of the Secretariat's work and of the Conference on Small and Medium Power Reactors^{5/} represented a much appreciated contribution to knowledge on the subject. However, the work done by the Agency did not fully satisfy the urgent need to develop nuclear power or meet the requirements of the less-developed countries. It would thus be most desirable if the Agency could initiate and sponsor research projects which would provide clearer and more specific answers to some of the technological and economic problems involved, and disseminate the results in a form that could readily be taken as a basis for evaluating and studying specific projects.

13. Article XVIII of the Statute dealt with the procedure for amending the Statute by the General Conference, and referred in particular to the question of a general review at the fifth annual session, in 1961. It would therefore be appropriate to start work without delay on preparing for that review. The United Arab Republic delegation had a number of comments that might be taken into consideration when such preparatory work was being done.

^{2/} GC(IV)/OR.38, paragraph 28.

^{3/} GC(IV)/108/Rev.1.

^{4/} GC(III)/RES/57.

^{5/} Held at Vienna from 5 to 9 September 1960.

14. Some parts of the Statute should be changed, not only to meet the wishes of the majority of Member States, but also to correspond more closely with the facts of the current world situation. A case in point was Article VI, which dealt with the composition and functions of the Board of Governors. That Article should be amended in such a way as to facilitate the participation of new Member States, particularly those from Africa and Asia, in the work of the Board. It was impossible to acquiesce in a situation in which at least 15 countries occupied virtually permanent seats in the Board while Africa and the Middle East were represented by only one electoral seat.

15. Certain other Articles also required amendment. For instance, attention should be given to revising Articles XI, XII and XIV. As such revision would require a great deal of preparation, his delegation believed it would be advisable to adopt at the present session a resolution setting up a standing committee of the General Conference, composed of 15 States, to study the matter on behalf of all States Members of the Agency. The committee should be entrusted with the preparatory work that would have to precede the general review, and its terms of reference should be made suitably flexible so that it would be able freely to seek the views of all Members and to make appropriate comments thereon.

16. The program and budget for 1961 showed that the Board and the Secretariat had certain apprehensions about the Agency's financing. His own Government hoped that the situation would improve in the near future. If some of the European countries normally considered as major contributors to other international programs would raise their contributions to the Agency to the same level, the target established by the Board could be reached without difficulty. The United Arab Republic itself had already raised its contribution twice. As a further token of its support to the Agency his delegation would at the proper time declare its new contribution to the operational budget for 1961. It would be seen that once again it had decided to raise that contribution.

17. The Arab States had unanimously decided to support the candidature of Iraq for membership on the Board, in place of the United Arab Republic which was due to retire at the end of the Conference. The delegation of the United Arab Republic sincerely hoped that Iraq would be unanimously elected.

18. Mr. CEDERWALL (Sweden) said his Government found the Board's annual report encouraging as evidence of what could be achieved with caution and foresight. The Board had been fully justified in showing moderation and realism when framing the program and budget proposals now before the Conference. A general consolidation of the Agency's activities was surely the wisest course to adopt at present in view of the delay, as compared with earlier expectations, in the development of economic nuclear power.

19. The Swedish Government approved the general direction the Agency's work had taken, and evidence of that support could be found in the Swedish voluntary contribution to the General Fund for 1960, which was larger than that pledged for 1959 and rather more than that corresponding to its percentage share in the regular budget. The Swedish contribution for 1961 would not be less than in the present year, and he hoped that other delegates would be equally prepared to support the Agency's operational program. Without equal readiness on the part of all Member States, or at least a majority of them, the constitutional weakness of the Agency in regard to operational financing would again make itself felt. Indeed, whatever motives had led to the distinction between compulsory and voluntary contributions when the Agency had first been conceived, they had largely ceased to be relevant, in view of the fact that the Agency's operational activities had come to be mainly concerned with technical assistance. The Swedish Government believed that due weight should be given to those considerations when the general review of the Statute took place and that in the meantime Governments should take into account, when determining the level of their voluntary contributions, the fact that funds made available would be spent on technical assistance, the usefulness of which was recognized by everybody.

20. The Swedish Government believed that the Agency's complex administrative machinery could gradually be simplified. The Conference and the Board should consider revising the Statute and their own procedure to allow them to meet less frequently, reduce their business to essential policy-making and conduct it with more despatch. The Secretariat's structure might perhaps be gradually better adjusted to its duties.

21. Among those duties, technical assistance would remain one of the most important. During the preceding twelve months the Swedish Government had made arrangements with the Agency for about 15 fellows to study in Sweden.

22. The Agency's regulatory work on nuclear insurance, handling of nuclear materials and waste disposal was an important advance towards establishing generally accepted rules.

23. Regional and bilateral collaboration was highly valuable in that it permitted countries at roughly the same stage of atomic energy development to share the costs and benefits of projects which they could not undertake alone, but which did not immediately interest the larger membership of a world organization. The members of a regional organization might be in urgent need of an international agreement on legal questions, but could not wait for the unavoidably slower processes in an international body. Regional and bilateral co-operation was no rival to world-wide efforts but, given a harmonious relationship, would actually promote them.

24. The problem of safeguards had, of course, a political background. Sweden had always supported efforts to agree on disarmament, and would, given proper controls, support a general ban on nuclear weapons. For those efforts the United Nations was the proper forum; the Agency was a technical organization with practical tasks, and its activities would be best promoted by avoiding political controversy. He therefore hoped that the draft resolution introduced by Poland (GC(IV)/131) calling for a nuclear tests ban would not be pressed. The control provisions in the Statute were binding on all Members; delivery of materials and equipment had begun, and rules on safeguards were needed. The Conference should encourage the Board to continue its efforts to draft safeguards provisions. The problems involved were new, and it was important to gain experience. Thus the application of safeguards would have to be adapted to the circumstances in each particular case. At first the rules would be provisional, and would have to be revised in the light of experience. The important thing was to make a start.

25. Mr. McCONE (United States of America), in response to statements on his country's policy, said the United States was party to about 44 bilateral agreements with about 42 countries. It was actively negotiating with most

of its bilateral partners to transfer the safeguards arrangements to the Agency as soon as the latter was prepared to administer them. Meanwhile all its partners were happy with the agreements, as their spokesmen had shown. The initiative of both sides would greatly benefit the countries and the Agency alike.

26. The data given at the 39th plenary meeting on the number and size of reactors and the quantity of uranium²³⁵ transferred by the United States under bilateral arrangements^{6/} were out of date. In fact, 764.3 kg of enriched uranium²³⁵ contained in fuel elements or in other forms had been delivered for all purposes under bilateral agreements, and firm requisitions for an additional 310.4 kg of contained enriched uranium²³⁵, to be delivered in the immediate future, were in United States hands. Of the amount actually delivered, 534 kg had been provided for 43 experimental, test or power reactors of capacity up to 60 000 kW.

27. In addition, the United States had delivered 1.2 kg of plutonium, 35.7 g of separated uranium²³⁵ and 364 tons of heavy water to other countries. Twenty-three test or research reactors were operable, and 26 more were under construction.

28. Since January 1949, moreover, 13 386 shipments of isotopes had been made to foreign countries, including 5 000 shipments to 36 less-advanced countries. In facilities of the Atomic Energy Commission 2 900 foreign scientists, including 1 200 from less-developed countries, had been trained in the United States. The United States had donated 78 technical libraries to foreign countries, including 35 to less-advanced countries.

29. Although the attendance of the chairman of any country's atomic energy commission at the General Conference required no explanation, it had been alleged that he himself had come to Vienna primarily to use his influence to secure favorable consideration of, and action on, the safeguards proposals. The United States Government was deeply interested in safeguards and would continue to support the Board's draft as an important initial step towards one of the Agency's most important objectives, but had absolutely no intention of imposing its will on a single Member of the Agency.

^{6/} GC(IV)/OR.39, paragraph 21.

30. Disarmament and cessation of nuclear tests, and the Polish draft resolution on that subject, were not appropriate subjects for discussion or action by the Conference. The disarmament question stood high on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly, and negotiations on cessation of nuclear tests would shortly be resumed at Geneva. The United States Government and the American people were fully committed to the objectives of disarmament. Only one day previously President Eisenhower had urged before the General Assembly active and immediate negotiations for guaranteed world-wide disarmament, and proposed that all production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes be stopped under appropriate verification procedures. Time and again the American people and their Government had urged that the efforts of mankind be spent not for war but on food, clothing, shelter, medicine and schools. The United States had stopped its test program almost two years previously when the nuclear test cessation negotiations had been started. Since it was an open country, everyone knew that since then it had conducted no such tests. The world could not tell what others, whose policy and tradition were to maintain a closed country, were doing.

31. The United States therefore felt it urgent that the negotiations should be consummated quickly, fairly and in accordance with the basic objectives stated by the Heads of Government. It sought implementation of Mr. Khrushchev's words of 23 April 1959 expressed in letters to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan: "It is my opinion that ... we are quite able to find a solution to the problem of discontinuing tests ... and to establish such controls as would guarantee strict observance of the Treaty". That solution, unfortunately, had not yet been reached. Nevertheless, a United States delegation would shortly be returning to Geneva to resume negotiations, in the fervent hope of agreement on the controls necessary to ensure observance of a treaty.

32. Speakers had asked to what extent the Agency had been informed of the results of the Soviet Union-United States exchange agreement announced to the Agency a year before. He had made extensive journeys through the Soviet Union as member of a mission comprising several other scientists, and the preliminary observations of the mission had been transmitted to the Agency. Reports of subsequent visits of United States scientists to the Soviet Union had also been made available, and his Government intended to keep the Agency fully informed of all future exchanges.

33. If the Agency was to succeed, its Member States must lay aside political matters not of direct concern to its activities and dedicate themselves to the problems which it had been created to solve. The United States delegation was fully prepared to work diligently and uninterruptedly to achieve the Agency's policies, objectives and programs.

34. Mr. EMBELIANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the United States delegate had brought forward a whole new set of figures revealing a significant increase in assistance granted through bilateral agreements. One could not help asking why all that work of assistance to other countries was being carried out not through the Agency, but by-passing it. The fact was that countries had good reasons for being nervous of accepting assistance through the Agency. The main one was fear of inspection. In the draft safeguards system submitted to the Conference, countries were in fact divided into two groups: inspecting countries, and countries subject to inspection. Safeguards, it had been said by certain delegates, should not create an atmosphere of distrust or suspicion. How was it possible, however, to talk of trust when certain countries were producing atomic weapons and refused to stop producing them, although they did not hesitate to point out the danger of such weapons being produced by other countries? What they were, in fact, proposing was that they should go on piling up atomic weapons and perfecting their production and design, while other countries were to give an assurance, not only that they would not produce such weapons, but that they would allow the first group of countries to inspect all their scientific and experimental plants and would publish all their scientific achievements and discoveries, since the "inspecting countries" could never be sure that such discoveries would not be useful for the continued improvement of their own military potential. It had been stated that the proposed system of safeguards was in accordance with the Statute. However, it was sufficient for any unprejudiced person to look at Article XII of the Statute to see that the system of safeguards which had been devised differed sharply from what was envisaged in the Statute. It did not relate to a single specific Agency project, whereas, according to the Statute, safeguards were to be linked to specific Agency projects. The safeguards proposed amounted in fact to a complicated, all-embracing system of control, which, like a spider, would ensnare in its web all science and all scientists. It thus presented a very real danger of slowing down scientific development as a whole. No one to whom science and his country's sovereignty were dear could ever agree to such a system of safeguards or control.

35. The Conference should adopt the Polish draft resolution. The widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful, progressive purposes could be achieved only if nuclear weapons were banned. During the disarmament negotiations, as soon as a disarmament agreement had been adumbrated and a generally acceptable form for such an agreement had been evolved, the Western Powers had in fact proceeded to wreck the chances of its coming about.

36. The PRESIDENT declared the general debate closed. He suggested that item 10 of the agenda be kept open to allow the General Conference to examine the Polish draft resolution at a further plenary meeting, without reference to any committee.

37. It was so decided.

OPENING DATE OF THE FIFTH REGULAR SESSION

38. The PRESIDENT reported that the General Committee had recommended that Tuesday, 26 September 1961, be fixed as the opening date of the fifth regular session of the General Conference.

39. The recommendation of the General Committee was adopted.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

