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# General Conference

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FOURTH REGULAR SESSION

## OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,  
on Friday, 30 September 1960, at 3.15 p.m.

President: Mr. NADJAKOV (Bulgaria)

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\* GC(IV)/130.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document  
GC(IV)/INF/31/Rev.3.

## ELECTION OF MEMBERS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS (GC(IV)/118, 127)

1. The PRESIDENT invited the Conference to consider item 20 of the agenda relating to the election of Members to the Board of Governors. A report on that subject by the General Committee (GC(IV)/127) was before the Conference. In that report the General Committee informed the Conference that, under Rule 83 of the Rules of Procedure, it would have during its present session to elect to the Board five Members from two geographical areas: Africa and the Middle East, and South-East Asia and the Pacific, with due regard to equitable representation on the Board as a whole of the Members in the areas specified in Rule 83. He drew the Conference's attention to paragraph 3 of the General Committee's report, which listed the Members already designated by the Board or elected by the General Conference. Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure provided that the elections should be by secret ballot and that there should be no nominations.

2. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Masmajan (Monaco) and Mr. Humbert (Switzerland) acted as tellers.

3. The PRESIDENT invited the General Conference to elect a Member from the area "Africa and the Middle East".

4. A vote was taken by secret ballot.

The result of the vote was as follows:

<u>Number of ballot papers:</u>	64
<u>Invalid ballots:</u>	5
<u>Number of valid ballots:</u>	59
<u>Number of Members voting:</u>	59
<u>Required majority:</u>	30
<u>Number of votes obtained:</u>	
Iraq	54
Thailand	2
Tunisia	2
Turkey	1

5. Having obtained the required majority, Iraq was elected a Member of the Board of Governors.

6. The PRESIDENT invited the General Conference to elect a Member from the area "South-East Asia and the Pacific".

7. A vote was taken by secret ballot.

The result of the vote was as follows:

<u>Number of ballot papers:</u>	64
<u>Invalid ballots:</u>	13
<u>Number of valid ballots:</u>	51
<u>Number of Members voting:</u>	51
<u>Required majority:</u>	26
<u>Number of votes obtained:</u>	
Thailand	49
Burma	1
Viet-Nam	1

8. Having obtained the required majority, Thailand was elected a Member of the Board of Governors.

9. The PRESIDENT invited the General Conference to fill the three remaining elective places on the Board of Governors.

10. A vote was taken by secret ballot.

The result of the vote was as follows:

<u>Number of ballot papers:</u>	64
<u>Invalid ballots:</u>	3
<u>Number of valid ballots:</u>	61
<u>Number of Members voting:</u>	61
<u>Required majority:</u>	31
<u>Number of votes obtained:</u>	
Argentina	56
El Salvador	55
Federal Republic of Germany	47
Ghana	14
Cuba	4
Chile	1
Yugoslavia	1

11. Having obtained the required majority, Argentina, El Salvador and the Federal Republic of Germany were elected Members of the Board of Governors.

12. The PRESIDENT declared the election closed and thanked the tellers.

13. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia) said he wished to make a statement on the election that had just taken place.

14. Mr. FONTAINE (France), on a point of order, said that under Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure the presiding officer might not permit Members to explain their vote when the vote had been taken by secret ballot.

15. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia) said that he did not want to explain his vote, but to present a statement concerning the "floating" seats on the Board of Governors.

16. Mr. FONTAINE (France) said that such a statement would not be relevant or within the scope of item 20, the item under discussion. The Czechoslovak delegate could be permitted to make a statement on another agenda item or on a new item; in the latter case he should first ask for the inclusion of the new item in the agenda.

17. Mr. MICHAELS (United Kingdom) and Mr. da COSTA (Portugal) supported the French point of order.

18. Mr. NOVAKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) protested against the attempts to prevent the Czechoslovak delegate from speaking, and asked which Rule of the Rules of Procedure or Article of the Statute justified the election of the Federal Republic of Germany to a "floating" seat and the transfer of Spain from that seat to the one formerly occupied by the Netherlands.

19. The PRESIDENT decided that if the statement which the delegate of Czechoslovakia wished to make was a general one dealing with the election of Members to the Board of Governors, it was not covered by the provisions of Rule 74.

20. There was no opposition to the President's decision.

21. The PRESIDENT invited the delegate of Czechoslovakia to make his statement.

22. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia) made the following statement:<sup>1/</sup>
- (a) "In connection with the just concluded election to the Board of Governors, I have the honor, on behalf of the delegation of the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to make the following statement and wish to request that in accordance with Article 92(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference it be entered in the records of our Conference.
- (b) "As is evident from document GC(IV)/127, the General Committee, dealing with the question of what geographical areas should under Article VI.A.3 of the Statute have their representatives elected in the Board of Governors, decided that Spain and Mexico, elected at the third General Conference on the so-called 'floating' seats, shall for the forthcoming period represent the area of Western Europe and Latin America, respectively. Inasmuch as the proposal to consider Spain and Mexico as the representatives of the geographical areas concerned is made in document GC(IV)/127, and inasmuch as no State of the given areas raised any protest, the delegations on whose behalf I speak assume that this is done with the approval of the Member States of the areas concerned, in our case the countries of Western Europe and Latin America.
- (c) "The delegations of the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics deem it necessary to declare that this practice can in no way influence the consensus of opinion embodied in document PC/OR.61, page 9 and document GC/I/OR.2, page 2 to the effect that each of the geographical areas as referred to in Article VI.A.3 of the Statute may be represented in the Board of Governors only by the State which has been approved by a majority of the member countries of a given area, which means that at no time in the future shall the area of Eastern Europe be represented by any State which has not received the approval of the majority of States of Eastern Europe."

GENERAL DEBATE AND REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR 1959-60  
(GC(IV)/114, 131, 148, 149/Rev.2) (continued from the 44th meeting)

23. The PRESIDENT recalled that at the 42nd plenary meeting the General Conference had decided to examine at a subsequent plenary meeting the draft resolution introduced by Poland (GC(IV)/131) and entitled "The participation of the Agency in international efforts to secure the prohibition of nuclear weapons"<sup>2/</sup>. He now invited comments on the Polish draft resolution.

<sup>1/</sup> This statement is reproduced verbatim at the speaker's request under Rule 92(b) of the Rules of Procedure.

<sup>2/</sup> GC(IV)/OR.42, paragraphs 36 and 37.

24. Mr. EMBELIANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that 1960 marked the fifth anniversary of the opening of negotiations between the atomic Powers on the banning of atomic and thermonuclear weapons tests.

25. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation had concluded in its report that nuclear experiments were highly dangerous to mankind. He quoted the following passage from the report:

"Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations."<sup>3/</sup>

26. Unfortunately, the negotiations on the banning of tests had so far been unsuccessful, although there were no objective reasons to prevent the conclusion of an agreement. The failure of the long negotiations was due to the unwillingness of the Western Powers to abandon the armaments race and the creation of new types of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

27. At the beginning of 1958 the United States and the United Kingdom had stated that there was no way of enforcing an agreement on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons tests. They had also stated that it would be perfectly possible to carry out atomic explosions in secret even after their prohibition. The Soviet Union had always considered that, at the present stage of science and technology, it was impossible to carry out secret underground explosions, and was still of that opinion. In an attempt to find a solution, a group of experts had been convened at Geneva in 1958 and had confirmed the view of the Soviet Union.

28. The recommendations drawn up by the experts on practical control methods had been approved by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the United States, on the grounds of alleged new data said to have been obtained during recent tests, had claimed that it was impossible to detect secret underground tests of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. After lengthy discussions, the United States had yielded a certain

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<sup>3/</sup> United Nations document A/3838, paragraph 54.

amount of ground by proposing to exclude from the agreement not the totality of underground explosions, but only those equal to or less than 20 000 tons of TNT.

29. Anxious to speed up the conclusion of the agreement, the Soviet Union had agreed to such low-power explosions being excluded and experiments with nuclear devices carried out in order to assist in drawing up detection methods. It had proposed that, while the experiments were going on and detection methods were being drawn up, the atomic Powers should not conduct low-power underground explosions. However, the United States and the United Kingdom had not accepted that proposal, with the result that the negotiations between the three atomic Powers on the banning of atomic and thermonuclear weapons had come to a standstill.

30. The United States and the United Kingdom had placed two obstacles in the way of an agreement to halt the testing of atomic weapons. First, they had refused to commit themselves to ceasing underground tests of atomic weapons during the period required for carrying out experiments with nuclear devices and the ensuing period for drawing up methods of detecting low-power nuclear explosions. Secondly, they had refused to allow all the participants in the experiments to inspect the nuclear devices used.

31. Naturally, the prohibition of atomic weapons tests could not put a final stop to the armaments race, nor prevent an atomic world war. That would be possible only after the banning of atomic weapons, their withdrawal from State armaments and the destruction of all stocks. Only then would all nuclear material and all scientific and technical installations be employed for peaceful purposes.

32. With those considerations in mind, the Soviet delegation wholeheartedly supported the draft resolution submitted by Poland, which called upon the States at present engaged in negotiations at Geneva to discontinue nuclear weapons tests.

33. Certain delegates maintained that the General Conference was not the proper forum for discussing the banning of atomic and thermonuclear weapons

tests. That argument could not be sustained. The struggle for peace, disarmament and the safeguarding of humanity from the risk of contamination by radioactive fall-out was the noble aim towards which all organizations, whether national or international, and indeed all mankind, should strive.

34. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia) said that the Polish draft resolution was an expression and a proof of the ever-growing movement throughout the world, including the United States, in support of an immediate and lasting cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The opponents of the draft resolution seemed unaware that the banning of tests would prevent the production of new and increasingly destructive weapons, halt the rising level of environmental contamination and make it possible to devote new resources to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Moreover, the restoration of trust among nations would go a long way towards ending the armaments race, thus releasing new resources for improvement of living standards. The British economist Orr had estimated that, if every State would agree to cut its military expenses by only 10%, those resources would amount to 4 000 million pounds sterling in the first year alone. Mr. Siegbert Kahn had estimated that the armaments race cost annually 100 000 million dollars.

35. Only if an agreement on the cessation of nuclear explosions was concluded and nuclear weapons were completely prohibited could nuclear energy be fully harnessed in the service of peace. The Agency had been entrusted with the noble task of promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy which, to use the language of the Preparatory Commission's Report, "has been, in the years since the Second World War, the object and the symbol both of the highest hopes and of the deepest fears of mankind"<sup>4/</sup>.

36. It clearly followed from Article III.B.1 of the Statute that the Agency's work was closely related to the basic problem of international life - the problem of peace and security. The Agency should strive to further all agreements that would eliminate the use of nuclear energy for warlike purposes, in accordance with its Statute and within the framework of its close relationship

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<sup>4/</sup> GC.1/1, paragraph 1.

with the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. That was the fact ignored by those delegations, especially that of the United States, which held that the General Conference was not competent to consider and adopt the Polish draft resolution. In truth the draft resolution was based explicitly on Articles II and III.B.1, which were among the Statute's most relevant provisions. Moreover, that it fitted perfectly within the task entrusted to the Agency by the United Nations was clear from Article I, paragraph 1, of the agreement between the two organizations<sup>5/</sup>:

"The United Nations recognizes the International Atomic Energy Agency ... as the agency, under the aegis of the United Nations ..., responsible for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy in accordance with its Statute."

The opponents of the Polish draft resolution were apparently blind to the rare opportunity the Agency was being offered to demonstrate that it could fulfill its obligations.

37. The assertion that the Agency was a purely technical organization was a paradox. Many delegations had been obliged to recognize that safeguards were a political issue. Those same delegations were now apparently prepared to violate the provisions of Article IV.C of the Statute, which bound all Members of the Agency to "fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute".

38. The assertion that adoption of the Polish draft resolution would unfavorably affect the disarmament negotiations at Geneva was sheer nonsense. It was really a clumsy excuse by those who did not wish the negotiations to succeed. The draft resolution was supported by the Soviet Union, which was a participant in the negotiations and had declared scores of times that it wished for their success.

39. Western scientists did not refrain from comment on political questions such as the banning of nuclear weapons tests. In the April 1960 issue of the United States magazine "Foreign Affairs" Professor Dyson, of Princeton and Cornell Universities, had called upon the United States to continue exploration of nuclear weapons technology, including tests, until a reliable international

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<sup>5/</sup> INFCLRC/11.

control system had been established. Mr. Leo Szilard, in an article published in the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" for February 1960 entitled "How to Live with the Bomb", had stated that he saw no reason why the tests should be stopped. Mr. I. I. Rabi, in the August 1960 issue of the magazine "The Atlantic", had stated that a minority of scientists laid their hopes for peace, paradoxically enough, in a mutuality of terror which would immobilize all aggressive impulses in the nations of the world. He had added that

"With sufficient effort, atomically advanced nations would in time possess stores of atomic weapons so cheap and so plentiful that they could overcome the resistance of less advanced nations with the same ease with which the Spaniards conquered Peru".

40. It was thus clear that certain influential circles in the United States did not hesitate to resist cessation of nuclear tests. Mr. Jay Orear, Chairman of the Disarmament Committee of the Federation of American Scientists, was therefore right when he wrote that under such conditions nuclear war would become inevitable.

41. In conclusion he urged all delegations to vote for the Polish draft resolution, which was an important step towards genuine international co-operation for the purpose of bestowing on all mankind the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

42. Mr. WERSHOF (Canada) made the following statement:<sup>6/</sup>

- (a) "I wish to speak briefly on the draft resolution which was introduced by Poland in the course of the general debate, and to introduce the motion and procedural proposal (GC(IV)/148) submitted jointly by my own and other Governments.
- (b) "It is a matter of public record that the Canadian Government is ready and anxious to make its full contribution towards early and effective action on disarmament. By the same token the Canadian Government is vitally interested in the success of the three-Power negotiations which are currently in progress in Geneva with the object of bringing about a cessation of nuclear tests. As the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs put it in his statement to the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 16 August 1960, Canada, in common with other nations, looks upon progress in these matters 'as a means of increasing international security, reducing international tension and easing the heavy burdens which preparations for defence have placed on all nations'.

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<sup>6/</sup> This statement is reproduced verbatim at the speaker's request under Rule 92(b) of the Rules of Procedure.

- (c) "It is because we are serious in our desire to see agreement reached on the matters covered in the Polish draft resolution that we are opposed to discussing them in bodies such as this General Conference which are functionally not qualified to discuss them in such a way as to contribute to their solution. We are particularly opposed to dealing with these matters in this forum at a time when the leaders of many nations have come together in the General Assembly of the United Nations to explore further the avenues along which progress towards disarmament is most likely to be reached quickly and effectively.
- (d) "You will recall that a resolution similar to that submitted by Poland this year was submitted by the delegation of Czechoslovakia to the General Conference in 1959<sup>7/</sup>. At that time the General Conference decided that it would not be desirable to adopt a substantive resolution on the matters raised in the Czechoslovak draft resolution.<sup>8/</sup> The Canadian delegation believes that the decision taken by the Conference last year was the right decision and that we should take a decision in similar terms this year. That is why we have co-sponsored and now introduce the motion set forth in paragraph 1 of document GC(IV)/148, and why we urge all those who are genuinely interested in early progress on disarmament and the cessation of nuclear tests to join with us in supporting that motion and also the procedural proposal relating to priority in voting which is set forth in paragraph 2 of that document. I will read the motion and the procedural proposal:

1. Motion: The General Conference notes that the matters raised in the preamble and operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution in document GC(IV)/131 continue to be under active discussion in other more appropriate international forums and that it would be premature to consider undertaking the study envisaged in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, and decides that it is not, in these circumstances, desirable to adopt any substantive resolution on these matters.
2. Procedural proposal under Rule 77 of the Rules of Procedure: That the General Conference decide that the motion contained in paragraph 1 above should be put to the vote before the draft resolution contained in document GC(IV)/131.

It will be noted that the five sponsors are the five Western members of the ten-Power Disarmament Conference which was for some time in session in Geneva.

- (e) "I ask for a roll-call vote on the procedural proposal and on the motion which I have introduced."

43. Mr. MELLER-CONRAD (Poland) asked what was so dangerous and explosive in his delegation's draft resolution as to justify the motion submitted in respect of it by a group of Atlantic countries. The Polish draft resolution

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<sup>7/</sup> GC(III)/89 and Add.1.

<sup>8/</sup> GC(III)/OR.35, paragraph 32.

contained nothing that was not fully lawful, nothing that was even faintly objectionable. The entire world demanded cessation of nuclear tests. To go against the current would be political suicide, though that prospect did not seem to deter the Atlantic countries from resorting to the low procedural tricks of provincial lawyers in order to "guillotine" the Polish draft resolution. The General Conference, which had just elected to the Board a militarist and revanchiste country like the Federal Republic of Germany, was bound to adopt the draft resolution if it did not want to see the Agency's prestige founder.

44. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) recalled that his delegation had already specified, in reply to certain statements, the position of the United States on disarmament and on the Polish draft resolution<sup>9/</sup>. As had been repeatedly made clear by President Eisenhower, the United States was fully committed to the objectives of disarmament. At the same time the United States Government was convinced that the entire question of disarmament, including the questions raised in the Polish draft resolution, were not appropriate nor constructive subjects for discussion and action by the General Conference. The introduction of political problems into the business of the Conference was deplorable and could only disrupt its useful substantive work. For these reasons the United States, in common with four other Member States, had submitted their motion and procedural proposal, under which the Conference would decide not to adopt any substantive resolution relating to the matters raised in the Polish draft resolution.

45. At the third regular session Czechoslovakia had submitted a draft resolution similar to the present Polish one; the General Conference had then by an overwhelming majority voted for a motion to the same effect as the present 5-Power one. The United States urged the Conference to follow that wise precedent.

46. A few days previously, President Eisenhower had stated before the General Assembly of the United Nations that international control of atomic energy and general and complete disarmament could no more be accomplished by rhetoric than could the economic development of newly-independent countries; that both those immense tasks called for serious, painstaking, costly, laborious and non-propaganda approaches. It was in the same spirit that the United States

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<sup>9/</sup> GC(IV)/OR.42, paragraphs 30, 31 and 33.

delegation urged the General Conference to accept the 5-Power motion as the most appropriate way of disposing of a political matter which could only disrupt the useful technical work of the Agency.

47. Mr. ZHMUDSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the ending of nuclear tests and the prevention of an atomic war was an intensely serious problem which preoccupied hundreds of millions of human beings. None could deny that the question had two aspects: legal and moral.

48. Although the Agency was not directly responsible for solving the problem of maintaining and strengthening peace, it was bound by its Statute to submit to the competent organs of the United Nations suggestions for the maintenance of peace and security in the world. Any action taken for the purpose of reducing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy would make it easier for the Agency to discharge its essential task. That was the object of the Polish draft resolution, which called on the Agency to submit to the United Nations an appeal in full conformity with the Statute.

49. As a scientist, he had been very surprised at the statement of the United States delegate that the text under discussion was something other than an appeal by the Agency to the United Nations<sup>10/</sup>. The Ukrainian delegation no longer knew what to believe: the United States delegate either did not understand those matters or was pretending not to understand them. The Agency was the international organization which, more than any other, ought to appeal to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Security Council or any other United Nations organ when there was a danger to peace. During the general debate the United States delegate had stated that the Agency was not called upon to solve the question of a ban on nuclear tests and should therefore not appeal to the United Nations.<sup>10/</sup> His attitude was contrary to the most elementary rules of logic; one might as well give up the attempt to settle any question in international organizations, since their decisions were taken only as a result of exchanges of opinions and in a spirit of compromise, and not by the representative of a single State. If the Agency adopted the principle proclaimed by the delegates of the United States and Canada, it would have to maintain a strange neutrality in the present case. In reality the attitude of those two countries was a serious obstacle to the maintenance of peace.

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<sup>10/</sup> GC(IV)/OR.42, paragraph 30.

50. The present question, however, also had a moral aspect. The scientists and diplomats participating in the General Conference had a moral responsibility towards their own peoples. Before speaking against peace or turning the cold shoulder to it in an international tribunal, it was therefore necessary to weigh one's words carefully.

51. The war had transformed entire cities and villages of the Ukraine and other countries into heaps of rubble. It had taken millions of victims everywhere. One could not, one had no right to, forget the past; the most sacred moral duty was to use every available means for preventing a destructive atomic war. He was personally acquainted with the horrors of war: two irremovable bomb splinters were a physical reminder to him of the moral duty to fight for world peace. The Ukrainian delegation would bend every effort and use every possible means to ensure that the way of peace was not chosen too late. It was convinced that history would condemn those who sought by procedural maneuvers to prevent others from making their contribution to the cause of international peace and security. All those who understood the deep meaning and true development of social progress in the world should give proof, not merely by words but also by deeds, that they belonged to the camp of peace and were prepared to fulfill their sacred duty towards humanity.

52. Mr. LALL (India) said that the first question was whether the Polish draft resolution really came within the Agency's functions. In arguing that it did not, the Canadian delegate had cited the rejection of the Czechoslovak draft resolution at the third regular session. But since then, as was indicated in paragraph (a) of the Polish draft resolution, a new development had occurred which deprived that precedent of all validity, namely the unanimous adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of a resolution on the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. The decision for the discontinuance of those tests was therefore now part of United Nations policy. If the Agency wished "to conduct its activities ... in conformity with the policies of the United Nations" (Article III.B.1 of the Statute) it should, as indicated in the very title of the Polish draft resolution, participate in international efforts to secure the prohibition of nuclear weapons. That prohibition would be of real importance to the Agency, for it would much increase the amounts of nuclear material available for peaceful purposes.

53. He did not see how the sponsors of the 5-Power motion could refuse to re-affirm a principle to which they had subscribed in the General Assembly, where the resolution he had mentioned had been adopted unanimously. Their attitude was all the more surprising since the Polish draft resolution was a mere exhortation, placing no blame or praise on anyone in connection with disarmament.

54. The 5-Power motion asked the General Conference to note that the matters raised in the preamble and in paragraph 1 of the Polish draft resolution were already under discussion in other international forums. The greater part of those provisions, however, merely restated clauses of the Statute. Certainly the question of nuclear tests was on the agenda for the current session of the General Assembly - it had been placed there, incidentally, at India's request - , but how could the Statute of the Agency be discussed in other international bodies?

55. It should not be forgotten that the Agency was not a specialized agency as defined in Article 57 of the United Nations Charter. At the Conference on the Statute the Western Powers had tried without success to make it a purely technical organization. It was the only member of the United Nations family required to forward reports directly to the General Assembly, precisely because its functions were closely connected with the problem of international peace. It would be most appropriate if its next report to the United Nations, and if necessary a special report, could show that it had re-affirmed the policy of a nuclear test ban.

56. The Indian delegation would therefore vote for the Polish draft resolution, and appealed to the sponsors of the 5-Power motion to reconsider their position and not to prevent the Conference from adopting that resolution, which was in no way a propaganda maneuver.

57. Mr. PAVLUCHENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said he could not recognize the validity of any of the procedural means by which certain delegations were attempting to prove that the draft resolution had no direct bearing on the Agency's activities. The Conference could make no better effort to achieve the Agency's noble aims than to appeal to the States at present negotiating on the discontinuance of nuclear tests to conclude an agreement for that purpose as soon as possible. A settlement of that question would help to make the Agency's activities more fruitful.

58. At its fourteenth session the United Nations General Assembly had unanimously adopted two extremely important resolutions: Resolution 1378 on general and complete disarmament, and Resolution 1402 on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. It was therefore impossible, without violating the provisions of Article III of the Statute, to assert that the Polish draft resolution had no bearing on the basic problems raised by the Agency's present and future activities.

59. The frightful destructive force of contemporary weapons, the unprecedented speed of the armaments race and the accumulation by States of huge stocks of mass-destruction weapons threatened the future of mankind. For that reason, the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests would mark a first step towards a solution of the entire disarmament problem.

60. The immediate cessation of nuclear weapons tests would also affect the very distant future, by eliminating the threat to mankind constituted by the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

61. For all those reasons the Byelorussian delegation considered it desirable and appropriate that the General Conference should adopt the draft resolution submitted by Poland. The prohibition of nuclear weapons would free the immense material, scientific and technical resources at present used for the production of means of mass destruction and make them available for the production of material goods, thus offering the Agency great opportunities for future activity.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.