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President: Mr. QUIHILLALT (Argentina)

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* GC(V)/171.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(V)/INF/42/Rev.3.

APPOINTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL (GC(V)/165, 173, 174 and 176)

1. ~~The~~ PRESIDENT drew attention to the fact that three of the documents before the Conference contained draft resolutions and suggested that the eleven-Power draft resolution (GC(V)/176) be considered first. If so required by the outcome of that discussion, the Conference would proceed to debate the three-Power draft resolution (GC(V)/173) and, again depending on the decision taken, would then proceed to the nine-Power draft resolution (GC(V)/174).

2. The procedure suggested by the President was adopted.

3. Mr. EL ANNABI (Tunisia) said that the Agency now had before it a very serious problem. There had been a deterioration in the spirit of co-operation within the Agency since 1957, when the present Director General had been appointed in an atmosphere of unanimity. Secure in that favorable background, his authority had not been contested during his term of office. Today, however, the authority of the new Director General was even being questioned in advance, and it would be desirable therefore for the question of his appointment to be reconsidered.

4. He wished to stress that Mr. Eklund's integrity and qualifications were not under discussion, and the purpose of the eleven-Power draft resolution was simply to ensure that the appointment of the new Director General rested on agreement between the three main groups of countries concerned. It was his sincere hope that the Board would be able to solve the problem by placing before the Conference a nomination meeting with universal approval.

5. Mr. PE KIN (Burma) emphasized that in supporting the eleven-Power draft resolution his delegation was pursuing no selfish interests. There had been allegations in unofficial circles that Burma's attitude was motivated by the fact that a candidate from the Eastern countries had not been appointed. Nothing could be further from the truth. The post of Director General was a key post and it was essential for the incumbent to have general support, in the interests not only of the Agency but of all its Members. His delegation yielded to none in its respect for Mr. Eklund's character and ability, but the fact remained that his nomination had not been accepted by one of the major atomic Powers and by a number of developing countries. Since the Agency's activities were primarily directed towards

helping the developing countries, that division of opinion was a prime consideration. It was also essential that, in appointing a Director General, the matter should be discussed in full beforehand, and he felt that in the present case sufficient consultation had not taken place. Burma therefore supported the eleven-Power draft resolution.

6. Mr. SMYTH (United States of America) recalled the history of the appointment of the new Director General. It had been known all along that a new Director General would have to be appointed in 1961, the statutory procedure being for the Board to make the appointment, subject to the approval of the Conference.^{1/} The Board's decision had been reached after exhaustive discussions and consultations, during which Mr. Eklund's high qualifications had clearly emerged, and which had revealed a strong measure of support for his candidature on the part of both developed and developing countries. The circumstances of the decision had been communicated to Mr. Eklund who, after mature reflection, had notified his acceptance to the Agency.

7. Mr. Eklund had for many years been a leading figure in the field of atomic energy and its peaceful uses, and had become well known to atomic energy authorities in many countries. While serving as Secretary General of the Second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,^{2/} his circle of acquaintances had been further extended. He was a distinguished citizen of a world-renowned non-aligned country and undoubtedly would carry out his responsibilities with efficiency and impartiality.

8. Regarding the eleven-Power draft resolution, he (Mr. Smyth) did not propose to comment on the obvious legal objections to the draft, and would merely point out that approval would constitute a clear disavowal of the Board's action in appointing Mr. Eklund. The Conference should now confirm the appointment if the Agency was not to flounder in a sea of indecision. He recalled the observations made by the delegate of the United States of America at a previous meeting^{3/}, and reiterated that the top posts in the Secretariat should not be regarded as being the perquisite of nationals of particular States or groups of States.

^{1/} Article VII.A. of the Statute.

^{2/} Held in Geneva from 1 to 13 September 1958.

^{3/} GC(V)/OR.50, paragraph 8 (17 - 18).

9. The United States therefore strongly supported the appointment of Mr. Eklund and opposed the eleven-Power draft resolution.

10. Mr. BANCORA (Argentina) said that Argentina was in the development stage and was situated in what was generally referred to as a developing area, and he was therefore happy to note the great importance ascribed to the interests of the developing countries at the present session of the Conference.

11. The eleven-Power draft resolution stated that there had not been sufficient consultation with the developing countries on the matter of the appointment of a Director General, and he entirely agreed with that statement. The main desideratum, however, was that the Agency should function in such a way that the maximum advantages were made available to Member States; and that would be achieved by electing to the position of Director General the best qualified person available.

12. Narrowly chauvinistic views had, he believed, contributed materially to the difficulties of underdeveloped countries. If those countries themselves extended such views to the international field, the logical result, in the present case, would be an insistence that the Director General should be a national of an underdeveloped country. He himself did not subscribe to those views. In spite of some opposition by supporters of the way of thinking to which he had referred, Argentina had received aid from many quarters, irrespective of race, creed or social standing, and would be honored to receive the aid of any of the scientists present at the Conference in furthering the development of the country.

13. As the delegate of the United States of America had said, it had been known for four years that a new Director General would now have to be elected, and there had been ample time for a full exchange of ideas. Two candidates had been put forward for the post, one from a neutral and one from a less-developed country. He had nothing against the latter candidate, but after having personally studied the qualifications of both individuals he had come to the conclusion that Mr. Eklund was the more suitable. A similar conclusion had been reached by many other delegates.

14. He did not think that there were no suitable candidates for the post of Director General in the less-developed countries, and it would be a great source of satisfaction to him to see such a candidate appointed. The

probability was, however, that in a developing country any person with the high qualifications necessary for the post would be of more value at home. In such circumstances it seemed unlikely that agreement would be reached in a short time if it had not been reached in four years.

15. For all those reasons, and also because it would be most undesirable further to delay the issue, he was opposed to the eleven-Power draft resolution.

16. Mr. BRYNIELSSON (Sweden) said that it was clear from the debate that Mr. Eklund's qualifications and experience in atomic energy were well known to delegates. He had himself worked with Mr. Eklund for more than ten years. Since 1950 Mr. Eklund had been with the Atomic Energy Company of Sweden as head of the division of reactor development and as research director, in which capacities he had been in charge of 600 scientists. He was a thoroughly competent scientist, balanced and impartial in his views, and with wide experience in international nuclear science. The Swedish delegation therefore found him well qualified for the post of Director General, believed that the Board had appointed him in full accordance with the Statute, and would consequently vote against the eleven-Power draft resolution.

17. Mr. EMELYANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) regretted the attitude adopted by the United States delegate regarding the appointment of a Director General. That delegate had stated that numerous consultations had taken place on the subject, but the Soviet delegation maintained that there had been no such consultations.

18. In June, he (Mr. Emelyanov) had had a meeting in Vienna with Mr. Smyth, who had been interested in ascertaining the attitude of the Soviet delegation to the appointment of Mr. Eklund as Director General. That had been the sole meeting and the sole discussion with the United States delegation, which at that time had expressed confidence that Mr. Eklund would be appointed.

19. A considerable number of Members of the Agency, including the most important countries of Asia and Africa, countries receiving assistance, and the socialist countries, held the view that a representative of the Afro-Asian countries, unconnected with military blocs, should be appointed Director General. That opinion had also been made quite clear during discussion of the matter in the Board.

20. Eight of the 23 members of the Board had voted in favor of the candidate from Indonesia; they represented the following geographical areas: Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East, South Asia, South-east Asia and the Pacific and the Far East. That meant that more than one third of the Governors, from countries in five geographical areas, supported the principle that the post of Director General should be given to a representative of the neutralist Afro-Asian countries.

21. Nevertheless, the representatives of the Western Powers had decided to recommend Mr. Eklund for the post. If there was a desire for co-operation, the proper course would be to work out a solution of the problem which was acceptable to both sides. A Western nominee had already held the post of Director General for four years. What grounds were there for giving the post to another representative of the West for another four years?

22. In the discussions on the nomination of Mr. Eklund it had been stated that he was a representative of the neutral country Sweden, but the Swedish Government was not putting forward Mr. Eklund as a candidate for the post. If he was not a representative of Sweden, what did he represent? The United States and its military-political allies were asking for approval of the nomination. Mr. Eklund was a representative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and no amount of discussion could conceal the fact that he was backed by the aggressive forces of that bloc. If Mr. Eklund were in charge of the Agency, its work would be subordinated to the interests of NATO. Hence the Soviet delegation opposed his candidature.

23. The Soviet delegation could not agree that the post should be given to the Western Powers a second time. That would be a gross violation of the Statute. The Agency was not an estate in which the post of Director General could be handed on by right of succession from one representative of the West to another. Clearly the violation of the principle of equitable geographical distribution did not disturb the Western countries. In four years they had held not only the post of Director General but also three of the four posts of Deputy Director General. At the present time the United States was laying claim to one of those three posts, that recently vacated by Mr. Jolles of Switzerland. It thus intended to have a Deputy Director General who would fill the role of American prompter of Mr. Eklund, leaving the Afro-Asian countries still unrepresented in the higher ranks of the Agency.

24. In the McKinney report to the United States Joint Committee on Atomic Energy it was stated that the International Atomic Energy Agency had been established not only on the initiative but also with the active participation of the United States and that the United States had also taken full responsibility in the eyes of world public opinion for retaining a leading role in the Agency, having insisted on the appointment of an American national as the first Director General and on the acceptance of policies and a program drawn up by the United States.

25. It could be asked by what right the United States had claimed to reserve for itself the leadership in the affairs of the Agency. It had all the less right to do so at the present time, when great changes had taken place in the world. The number of independent States had been increased by the countries which had thrown off the yoke of colonialism in Asia and Africa. Their role in the international arena had grown greatly, but because of outworn customs they were not yet being allowed to take their rightful place in international life. The idea that the Afro-Asian countries were not able to provide suitable candidates for the post of Director General was a delusion; it led logically to a racialist theory of the superiority of some peoples over others.

26. Most of those present knew well that the Soviet Union, which had built an atomic ice-breaker, powerful particle accelerators and nuclear fusion devices, and which had launched space ships and sent its people into space, could find experts who had all the necessary qualities for directing the Agency. Such experts were also to be found among the scientists of other socialist countries. The proper and reasonable course would be that a single administrator, i.e. the Director General, should be replaced by a collective executive organ consisting, to an equal degree and with equal rights, of representatives of the three basic groups of countries. The acceptance of that principle would mark the end of the supremacy in international organizations of the United States and their allies in military blocs.

27. At the time of the establishment of the Agency, the candidature of the well-known Swedish scientist, Mr. Brynielsson, had been proposed for the post of Director General. It had been supported by the Soviet Union, France, India and the United States, but at the last moment the United States had gone back on the agreement and had put forward another candidate, Mr. Cole, a

United States national. Mr. Cole was an administrator and a lawyer by training. Four years later they were being told that in the position of Director General there should be not an administrator but a scientist, who was, incidentally, quite unfitted to have the direction of the Agency. It was desirable that the Director General should be a scientist but it was not essential, and at the present time it appeared to be difficult to agree upon a candidate from the ranks of the scientists.

28. It might have been possible to agree to a candidate who was not a scientist but who possessed the qualities of a good organizer and administrator.

29. For four years the Agency had been led by an administrator. No delegate had ever said in the general debate that the work of the Agency would have been more productive if the Director General had been a scientist instead of an administrator. The thesis that at the present time the Agency needed to be led by a scientist was being put forward not as a matter of principle but as one of expediency. It was being put forward in order to place the Afro-Asian countries in a difficult position and prevent them from aspiring to leadership. For the same reasons it was being suggested that Mr. Eklund was an eminent scientist. Nobody was denying that, but as far as was known he had worked in a highly restricted field of physics, which was of very little interest for the Agency's activities. One could rightly ask by what outstanding research Mr. Eklund had enriched science or what large-scale facility connected with the use of atomic energy had been constructed under his direction.

30. The Soviet delegation could not agree that Mr. Eklund had played a particularly important part in the organization of the Second Geneva Conference. That conference had been organized by the United Nations Scientific Advisory Committee, comprising scientists from seven countries, including the well-known French scientist, Professor Perrin.

31. Until recently, it had seemed to his delegation that Mr. Eklund realized that his work would be very difficult if he obtained the post of Director General only through the Western Powers' voting machine and without universal support. The Swedish newspaper "Stockholms Tidningen", dated 7 July 1961, had written that, before the vote was taken, Mr. Eklund had indicated that he would accept the appointment of Director General only on condition that he was elected unanimously by the Agency's Board of Governors.

32. When he had been in Moscow, Mr. Eklund had stated to him (Mr. Emelyanov) that he would accept the post only if his candidature were supported both by the United States and the USSR. It was now clear that Mr. Eklund had in no way obtained general support. That being so, how was one to interpret his words when, nevertheless, he had accepted the nomination as Director General?

33. The effectiveness and success of any candidate for the post would depend on the support and co-operation he received from all Members of the Agency. But Mr. Eklund was not concerned with that, he was only waiting for the moment when the voting machine went into action, in order to take up the post.

34. He wished to read from a letter which a compatriot of Mr. Eklund had sent him from Sweden. The letter stated that Mr. Eklund had been accused of handing over a Swedish atomic invention to a British national who had formerly worked at Harwell, and of wrongly dismissing the inventor himself. The subsequent investigation of the matter had been carried out by the police in secret. However, about a year later, so the letter concluded, it had been made known that it had been decided not to prosecute Mr. Eklund.

35. The above considerations proved that it was impossible to entrust the direction of the Agency to Mr. Eklund. All honest scientists who had striven to build up an international organization to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy would accept with regret a decision to appoint Mr. Eklund to the post of Director General. That would be a further obstacle to the development of scientific relations.

36. The Soviet Union had previously displayed great understanding and eagerness to co-operate in accepting a candidate from the United States, although it had found it difficult to do so, and it had always supported Mr. Cole in the performance of his duties as Director General. It would be commendable if the Western Powers now showed the same understanding and eagerness to co-operate by accepting a candidate from the Afro-Asian countries.

37. When the question had been before the Board, the Soviet delegation had supported the candidature of Mr. Sudjarwo. In doing so it had taken into account Mr. Sudjarwo's great desire to further the aims of the Agency and the fact that he was well acquainted with the Agency's history and also with the needs of the less-developed countries. The Soviet position remained

unchanged. Both the less-developed countries and the countries in the socialist camp were primarily interested in taking advantage of contemporary scientific and technical achievements in order to promote the economic development and prosperity of peoples. They wished to make use of all the achievements of science in the interests of peace and progress, and it was easier for them to determine what trends should be followed and what priorities observed. The representatives of the industrialized countries should share their knowledge and experience; that would be the most reasonable solution.

38. If the nomination already proposed was not acceptable, his delegation would propose that there should be further consultation with a view to finding another candidate from those countries. In the existing circumstances, his delegation considered that the only possible solution was to postpone discussion of the question and continue consultations with a view to finding an agreed candidate rather than one who had been imposed.

39. His delegation supported the eleven-Power draft resolution and was prepared to vote for it.

40. Mr. GOLDSCHMIDT (France) said that his delegation opposed the eleven-Power draft resolution because continuation of the discussion could only be harmful to the Agency. Periods of uncertainty were bad for work, they led to backstairs politics and in the present case had even led to production of a defamatory letter which had nothing to do with the business of the Conference, and the authenticity of which could not possibly be verified in time. It would be in no one's interest to extend the delay.

41. The delegations which had supported Mr. Eklund's nomination had been criticized for their failure to hold sufficiently full negotiations with other delegations. In that connection, he recalled that after the preceding session of the Conference the Indonesian delegation had put forward Mr. Sudjarwo for the post of Director General. Some of the countries that were now complaining bitterly about the lack of unanimity over the appointment had then promised their support for Mr. Sudjarwo without consulting either the other atomic Powers or certain countries of Africa and Asia which would have preferred a candidate who had been closely associated with the atomic energy commission of his own country.

42. It should be recalled that progress in atomic energy depended on teamwork, and a technical director in charge of research rarely had the time to undertake laboratory work himself, as all technicians engaged in administration knew only too well. Naturally that was the case of Mr. Eklund. However, Sweden, like the other Scandinavian countries, had offered fellowships to many applicants from less-developed countries, so that Mr. Eklund was well acquainted with their problems.

43. No one need be surprised that a large majority in the Board had voted for a man with so distinguished a record, and who was also a national of a country whose achievement lay between that of the Great Powers and of the developing countries. In those circumstances, Mr. Eklund was in an excellent position to serve and understand all Member States, regardless of their degree of development in the nuclear energy field.

44. In spring 1961 he had consulted some of his colleagues on the choice of Mr. Eklund for the post of Director General. Then, as now, he had heard only favorable comments. But some of them had not concealed the fact that their Governments had previously promised to support Mr. Sudjarwo. Consequently Mr. Eklund had always known that he would not have the support of all Member States, including one of the most advanced atomic Powers. He had therefore taken his decision in full knowledge of the facts, knowing the high personal esteem in which all delegations held him.

45. For the political reasons just described, Mr. Eklund could not have the unanimous support of all countries, and in particular that of the Soviet Union. But while the political climate could change rapidly - sometimes for the better - talent always remained. Disagreements arising in the Board from lack of unanimity over Mr. Eklund's appointment were hardly likely to interfere with his work more than similar disagreements had done in respect of Mr. Cole: for, in spite of the latter's unanimous election, there had been disagreements in his case also. In 1958 it had been the delegate of India who had proposed that Mr. Eklund should be elected Secretary-General of the second Geneva Conference, and the United Nations Scientific Advisory Committee had unanimously adopted the suggestion. Mr. Eklund's deputies at that conference, from Western and socialist countries respectively, had always praised his work, and a parallel task awaited him in the Agency.

46. France deeply regretted the disagreement which had arisen over the appointment of a man whom many delegates had never met. He felt sure that they would soon learn to value him if, as he hoped, common sense finally prevailed.

47. Mr. DIMITRIU (Romania) expressed his warm support for the eleven-Power draft resolution, and drew attention to the seriousness of the present problem and the heavy responsibility of both Board and Conference. All Member States had agreed that, in order to develop its activities, the Agency required certain positive conditions, including a Director General who could mobilize all efforts and all States in a joint effort to achieve the Agency's objectives. One of the most important of these objectives was the provision of effective assistance to the less-developed countries. Should the universal character of the Agency disappear, it would become the preserve of a small group of States pursuing their own interests only; in other words, a co-operative effort on behalf of the less-developed countries would be impossible. Unfortunately, the principle of universality had been abandoned by the Western Powers on the grounds that no suitable candidate for the post of Director General could be found in the whole vast geographical area of Asia and Africa. On these false premises, they had neglected to hold thorough consultations with the Afro-Asian countries. For those reasons, the Romanian delegation could not accept the candidate imposed by the West, and therefore supported the eleven-Power draft resolution.

48. Mr. NAKICENOVIC (Yugoslavia) said that during the four years of the Agency's existence his Government had offered its fullest support and co-operation, and was therefore highly dissatisfied at the difficulties that had arisen over the appointment of a new Director General. Yugoslavia disapproved of the failure to hold full negotiations earlier in the year, which had led to disagreement in the Board and finally to the present dispute at the Conference. The conflict threatened the Agency's whole future. Believing that the matter should be settled by general agreement, his Government had sponsored the eleven-Power draft resolution which would, he trusted, lead to a solution. Yugoslavia would not indulge in any recriminations concerning the past; its sole desire was to bridge the present gap, and iron out the difficulties which had arisen between the various groups of countries.

49. In arriving at a general solution, he believed that three main points should be taken into consideration. First, the principle of rotation should be interpreted in a comprehensive and consistent manner. Secondly, the appointment of the Director General should be preceded by wide consultations, which should include countries not represented on the Board, as the latter's present composition did not conform to the principle of equitable geographical distribution. Thirdly, wide agreement on the candidate was essential. The Agency could not work smoothly if the Director General was opposed by a large number of Member States. He therefore recommended adoption of the eleven-Power draft resolution.

50. Mr. NADJAKOV (Bulgaria) believed that the appointment of the Director General was one of the most important questions facing the Conference; the incumbent of the post was responsible for carrying out the Agency's entire policy and all its concrete activities. The appointment should therefore be unanimous, i.e. approved by all three groups existing in the world today - the Western countries, the socialist countries and the Afro-Asian group. A unanimous decision would be the best guarantee that the Director General would feel himself under a moral obligation to remain objective and independent in all his actions. Unanimity was necessary in an organization that included 76 Member States, with varied political and social structures, so that there would be no differences over its approach to basic problems. In addition, such unanimity would underline the spirit of co-operation essential to the Agency. He regretted that agreement had not been reached, but recalled that despite difficulties in 1957, a unanimous decision had been taken on the appointment of the present Director General^{4/}.

51. During the Board's discussions, the socialist countries and the Afro-Asian group had supported a candidate from the Afro-Asian area, which would be one of the Agency's most important areas of activity. However, the Western countries had sponsored and imposed Mr. Eklund instead. It was no criticism of Mr. Eklund personally to state that delegates knew no more than that he was a Swedish scientist and had been Secretary-General of the second Geneva Conference. Those facts had been stressed by his sponsors, who had claimed them to be the sole requirements for the post of Director General.

^{4/} GC.1(S)/OR.6, paragraph 9.

52. The Bulgarian delegation considered that in the interests of equality the post should not be occupied once again by a Western candidate. Mr. Cole was a representative of the United States, and it could well be argued that he should be replaced by a representative of the Soviet Union. Although a suitable candidate could have been found in the Soviet Union, no such proposal had been made, as the socialist countries believed that changes in international life made it essential to appoint a candidate from the developing countries in order to ensure that assistance was administered in a way compatible with their dignity and national sovereignty. He therefore supported the candidate from the Afro-Asian group. That person had been rejected by the West, although, during unofficial conversations, the view had been advanced that the nomination of a scientist from the Afro-Asian group might have been acceptable.

53. That showed, so he believed, that the procedure followed by the Board had been wrong. The Board should first have considered whether it wanted a scientist or a statesman, and then decided from what group of countries he should come. Only afterwards should the group concerned have been asked to propose a candidate. Had that been done, a unanimous decision could have been reached.

54. In fact, the appointment of Mr. Eklund had not been a co-operative decision, but a diktat imposed by the United States on the other two groups. The appointment did not reflect the real world situation, and did not satisfy Member States. It was contrary to the interests of the Agency, to its future development, even to its very existence. In an effort to right that deplorable situation, a group of Afro-Asian countries had presented the eleven-Power draft resolution, which Bulgaria fully supported.

55. Mr. BRYNIELSSON (Sweden) said that he felt it necessary to reply to only one of the points made by the Soviet delegate concerning Mr. Eklund: the letter alleging that Mr. Eklund had been accused of transmitting atomic secrets to another country. He could state that the matter had been thoroughly investigated by the Swedish legal authorities and the charge had been found to be utterly groundless.

56. He reiterated his delegation's support for Mr. Eklund's nomination.

57. Mr. BHABHA (India) said that his delegation had spared no effort to avert the deplorable situation which had arisen but the inflexible attitude adopted by Mr. Eklund's supporters apparently made it impossible to find a via media or even to reach agreement on postponing a decision.

58. He had a high regard for Mr. Eklund's qualifications but it was patently clear that a Director General of the Agency must enjoy the confidence of the atomically most advanced countries; otherwise effective co-operation within the Agency would become impossible. The sponsors of the eleven-Power draft resolution, representing countries from different parts of the world, had been prompted to submit their proposal because of the strong opposition to Mr. Eklund's candidature.

59. The contention that adequate consultations had taken place prior to the Board's decision was not borne out by the facts, nor had there been a proper discussion of the qualifications that candidates for the post ought to possess - as would be the normal procedure at the national level for selecting, say, a vice-chancellor of a university. His own delegation had been consistently of the opinion that it was desirable for the Director General to be a scientist, but that was far from being the sole requisite and there might be others of varying importance.

60. He had already suggested in the general debate that it would be appropriate for the next Director General to come from a country where economic and social conditions were different from those found in the United States,^{5/} but at that juncture had expressed no views as to whether he should be chosen from Asia, Africa or Latin America.

61. When the matter had been discussed informally by members of the Scientific Advisory Committee, Mr. Emelyanov had made it plain that Mr. Eklund would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union. In the Board, the Governor from India had voted for the candidate from Indonesia and, because there were no objections on personal grounds to Mr. Eklund, had abstained from the vote on the latter's nomination. In reply to a letter from Mr. Eklund, he (Mr. Bhabha) had felt obliged as a friend to tell Mr. Eklund of what had transpired and the situation as he saw it, and to inform him that India would be unable to support him, because of the strong opposition by certain important countries and in the interest of the smooth working of the Agency.

^{5/} GC(V)/OR.55, paragraph 31.

62. The question at issue was not Mr. Eklund's suitability or the fact that he came from Sweden, with which India had the most friendly relations, but that agreement must be reached on a candidate acceptable to both sides. For that reason he strongly urged the Conference to adopt the eleven-Power draft resolution so that the nomination might be reconsidered by the Board.

63. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia) said that the Czechoslovak delegation was opposed to Mr. Eklund's nomination, and doubted whether his supporters could ignore the strong opposition it had provoked if they wished the Agency to continue as a truly international organization and not one under the complete control of the United States and its allies. The present complications could have been avoided if the Western Powers, which were solely responsible for them, had made the slightest attempt to co-operate with the other groups of States. If the United States were genuinely anxious to foster the kind of international co-operation for which the Agency had been created, it ought to give full consideration to the views of individual countries as well as to those of groups and recognize the changes that had taken place during the past few years with the emergence of new sovereign States. Asian and African countries were no longer under colonial domination and the many new States had every right to just representation in the Secretariat.

64. The Agency would succeed in fulfilling its tasks only if it were to narrow the gap between the advanced and the developing countries, and no other Director General would be as well fitted to understand the developing countries' needs as would one of their own nationals.

65. The assertion that Mr. Eklund was a candidate from a non-aligned country had been disproved by the discussion, from which it was clear that he was a United States candidate, nor were his scientific qualifications a decisive factor, since there were many men of similar caliber in other countries. Again, his work as Secretary-General at the second Geneva Conference had been of a specialized nature and could hardly be advanced as a reason for appointing him.

66. The appointment of a man from one of the scientifically advanced countries would be in direct conflict with the principle of equitable geographical distribution, particularly in view of the fact that it was proposed to

appoint a United States national as one of the Deputy Directors General, which would result in all but one of the most senior posts in the Secretariat being held by men from Western countries.

67. The Board's proposed nomination quite overlooked the claims of the less-developed countries, in particular the Afro-Asian group, and his delegation was emphatically opposed to further strengthening the position of Western countries at the expense of the less advanced.

68. The Western Powers, particularly the United States, had adopted an extraordinary attitude. They had strongly opposed the matter being discussed by the Board in September instead of June, which would have given enough time for negotiation and thus for finding a reasonable solution. Instead, at the instigation of those countries, an issue of such vital importance had been decided by the Board at its June meetings in one day. The Agency should not countenance violation of the principle followed in the United Nations that no one group of States must enforce its will at the expense of others.

69. Declaring his support for the eleven-Power draft resolution, he said that his delegation would oppose any candidate not representing the less advanced countries. The Governor from Czechoslovakia had already criticized the inadequate representation of the Afro-Asian group in the Board, and the Czechoslovak delegation could certainly not countenance the same thing in the Secretariat.

70. Mr. EL ANNABI (Tunisia) observed, in connection with the statement that a large majority in the Board had favored a Western candidate, that the privileged position enjoyed by that majority was due to the provisions of the Statute. The criteria which had inspired those provisions had now altered radically and, though the special claims of the technologically advanced countries must be recognized, there was no longer any justification for their permanently wielding an overriding authority. It was now universally recognized in international bodies that there existed three main groups of countries, agreement between which was necessary on all major issues.

71. The Agency's first Director General had come from the Western group and it was therefore right for the next Director General to come from one of the other two groups. The Eastern group had not put forward a candidate, and it was therefore for the uncommitted countries to do so. In order to honor the principle of equitable geographical distribution as laid down in the Statute, the Director General, his deputies and indeed the Secretariat should be chosen in rotation from among the three groups.

72. The Director General of only one specialized agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, came from a developing country. It was fortunate that the Argentine Government had not itself followed the advice of its delegate to developing countries that they keep their highly qualified scientists at home. Such a practice would have been prejudicial to the quality of the Argentine delegation at the present Conference and, if generally adopted, would place an excessive burden on the more advanced countries.

73. Mr. Eklund's personal qualifications were not in doubt, and he had shown proof of great scruple in stating to the press that he would need wide support. It was regrettable that for political reasons his name had been put forward without first making certain of the support of all three groups of countries, support which was essential if the Agency's work was not to be paralyzed. It went without saying that a candidate from the Eastern group who was unacceptable to the West and to the developing countries would have had no more chance of success.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.