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President: Mr. QUIHILLALT (Argentina)

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* GC(V)/171.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document
GC(V)/INF/42/Rev.3.

GENERAL DEBATE AND REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR 1960-61 (continued from the 55th meeting)

1. The PRESIDENT recalled that at the 55th meeting he had told the Conference that under item 11 of the agenda it had still to discuss the draft resolution in document GC(V)/175.^{1/} The delegation which had submitted that draft resolution had now informed him that it did not insist that the draft resolution be discussed and voted on; consequently there was no need to return to the item.

THE QUESTION OF A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE (GC(V)/182)

2. The PRESIDENT stated that the item was on the agenda in compliance with Article XVIII.B of the Statute. The relevant document was document GC(V)/182, which contained a draft resolution by six Member States. He asked the delegate of Iran to introduce the draft resolution.

3. Mr. AZAD (Iran) recalled that the Statute stipulated that the question of a general review of the Statute be placed on the agenda of the fifth regular session of the Conference for a decision as to when such a review should take place.

4. His Government thought it would be premature to undertake a general review as early as the sixth regular session, and considered that the whole question should be postponed for a further three years.

5. The Agency had been in existence for only four years and had had an operational program for only two years, so that it did not have sufficient experience to proceed to a full review at the moment. The draft resolution left the way open for amendments to parts of the Statute in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Statute. The Conference had had an example of such an amendment when the number of seats on the Board had been increased on the previous day.^{2/} Another reason for postponing the review of the Statute was to enable the new Director General to familiarize himself with the provisions and implications of the Statute, so that he would be in a better position to assess the question.

^{1/} GC(V)/OR.55, paragraph 44.

^{2/} GC(V)/OR.58, paragraph 64.

6. Mr. SMYTH (United States of America) said that his Government endorsed the views expressed by the delegate of Iran and would support the draft resolution. The draft resolution recognized the need of proceeding to a review of the Statute at an appropriate time, but implied that it would be too early to undertake that task in 1962.
7. Mr. MITRA (India) said his Government supported the draft resolution. It was very much in favor of a review of the Statute being undertaken at an appropriate time, but considered that it would be too early to do it at the sixth regular session. It would be far better to wait until there was a better spirit of mutual help and understanding between Member States.
8. The Agency was ostensibly a purely scientific organization, but it was generally recognized by now that such was not the case and that it was greatly influenced by non-scientific considerations. The United Nations, too, had decided not to proceed to a general review of its Charter in view of the international situation. The draft resolution would not prevent delegations or groups of delegations from asking for a review of certain parts of the Statute - only the general review would be postponed. His Government considered, indeed, that certain parts of the Statute needed immediate revision, especially Article VI.
9. The head of his delegation had pointed out during the general debate that the world had undergone great changes since the birth of the Agency; many new countries had joined the United Nations family and the pattern of membership had changed enormously.^{3/} Those changes should be reflected in the structure of the Agency, and the composition of the Board should be changed to take them into account. He had the impression that the members of the Board had been unanimously in favor of increasing the representation of Africa and Asia on the Board, but when the opportunity to bring about such an increase had arisen, no action had been taken. The results of a vote in the Board could always be predicted in advance, and he thought that was a regrettable state of affairs.
10. No satisfactory definition had been given of the areas referred to in Article VI of the Statute. That article also specified what categories of Member should be appointed to the Board, but it was clear that in making those

^{3/} GC(V)/OR.55, paragraph 32.

appointments the Board often acted contrary to the provisions of Article III.B.1, which laid down that the Agency should carry out its activities in such a way as to "promote peace and international co-operation". The United Nations Security Council had condemned certain countries for acting contrary to the canons of international peace and co-operation, and those very same countries were automatically represented on the Board under Article VI. That was a serious anomaly in the Statute and it had already been discussed by the Board.

11. He feared that little attention was paid to statements made at the Conference but he wanted to make it clear that feelings were being created and passions aroused which would one day recoil against those who had caused them.

12. The Indian delegation supported the draft resolution unreservedly, and regarded it as a serious attempt to deal with the question of the review of the Agency's Statute.

13. Mr. EMELYANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the question of a general review of the provisions of the Statute should be considered in the light of the Agency's operating experience and the changes that had taken place in the world situation.

14. What could one gather from the Agency's operating experience? At the present time the Agency's work consisted principally of the following activities: provision of a certain amount of technical assistance to Member States; organization of various international scientific and technical meetings; publication of reference material and information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy; award of fellowships to nationals of Member States; research contracts; and the determination of various kinds of international standards for the safe use of atomic energy. Such work was, of course, useful.

15. But the Agency had been set up for other purposes as well. Its main task was to co-operate in the wide use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The statement was often made that atomic energy was not economic. However, that was not the main reason for the hold-up in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The main reason was the armaments race, which was slowing down the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The peaceful utilization of atomic energy in the United States was being slowed down artificially. One

illustration was the sad story of the construction of the merchant ship "Savannah", which could easily have been completed by 1959 but had still not been launched.

16. The head of the Indian delegation had correctly stated that a hundred times as much was being spent on research into the military uses of atomic energy as on research into its peaceful uses.^{4/} If that situation continued, one could hardly expect that atomic energy would become economic in the near future, or that the Agency's duty "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world" would soon be fulfilled. The United States had made the wide use of atomic energy dependent on acceptance by receiving countries of the Agency's safeguards and control system.

17. As he had stated in the general debate, the group of Western countries which controlled the Agency was preventing the establishment of genuine international co-operation. Using their numerical majority, those countries would not allow five socialist countries to participate in the Agency's work. As everyone would recall, even the draft resolution inviting observers from those socialist countries to attend the Conference had been rejected by means of the voting machine. If co-operation were really desired and actions were guided by the principles of peaceful co-existence and co-operation instead of by likes and dislikes, the question of admitting those socialist countries which were still not Members of the Agency could easily be settled.

18. A new diktat had been imposed two days previously when the question had arisen of approving the Board's appointment to the post of Director General. Although Mr. Eklund's candidature had not been supported either by the socialist countries or by many Afro-Asian countries, the delegations of the United States and its allies had forced through Mr. Eklund's appointment.

19. The Western representatives liked to claim that they regarded the Agency as an important link between East and West. That was a lie! If they really desired to co-operate and to maintain the Agency as a link between East and West, they would not have thrust Mr. Eklund into the post of Director General. They intended to aggravate conditions in the Agency and to break that link, and the responsibility fell on their shoulders.

^{4/} GC(V)/OR.58, paragraph 22.

20. Turning to the question of a general review of the provisions of the Statute, he said that the Agency's operating experience clearly showed that in its present form the Statute gave a dominant position in the Agency to one group of States - the United States of America and countries bound to it by military and political treaties. That group acted against the interests of the two other groups of States - the socialist and the neutral countries. The situation would remain the same until the structure of the Agency's ruling bodies was radically changed. That structure should be rebuilt from top to bottom, beginning with the Board and ending with the Director General and the Secretariat, so that the three basic groups of countries were represented on an equal footing in all the Agency's organs.

21. Referring to the question of increasing the membership of the Board from 23 to 25 Members, he drew attention to the present state of the Board. Was the representation of geographical areas a just one? The area of North America was represented in the Board by the United States and Canada, in other words the representation was 100%. In all other areas representation was limited to from 14 to 50%. That alone was an example of injustice.

22. Could certain countries appointed to the Board from particular areas really represent the interests of States in those areas? For instance, it was well known that the policy of racial discrimination and apartheid pursued by a certain country represented on the Board was a flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental liberties. It had been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. The General Assembly, in a resolution adopted at its fifteenth session, had condemned that country for violating the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Despite serious warnings, the Government of that country continued to ignore United Nations decisions. Could that country really represent the countries of Africa and the Middle East?

23. Belgium's place on the Board had now been taken by another colonial Power, despite the legal objections to its appointment that had been expressed in the Board. Under Article IV.B of the Statute, when a State was admitted to the Agency due consideration must be given to "its ability and willingness to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations"; but if the State, being a Member of the Agency, violated a decision

of the United Nations and the Security Council, what was to be done? The Agency's Statute allowed it to be designated automatically for membership of the Board. Was that right?

24. What was the present political structure of the Board? Out of its 23 members, 16 represented Western countries and their military and political allies. Three members of the Board represented the socialist countries, and four the non-aligned. With such a ratio on the Board, could the socialist and the neutral countries rely on their interests being given due consideration? Certainly not; and in fact their interests were not being considered. For example, all would remember that at the fourth session of the Conference there had been differences of opinion about safeguards. Naturally the views of receiving countries on that important matter affecting their interests differed from the views of countries insisting on safeguards. The United States, wishing at all costs to force through a system of safeguards, had put forward a draft resolution providing that the Board should take into account the views expressed in the Conference. Had the Board tried to consider the views of the different countries and find a generally acceptable solution? He must solemnly declare that no such effort had been made. The United States had started by proposing that a document concerning safeguards submitted earlier to the Conference be approved without change, and the Western majority in the Board had supported the proposal. Thus the document had been rubber-stamped.

25. The present procedure of constituting the Board on the basis of geographical areas and the level of development in the application of atomic energy which the various countries had attained had meant in practice that over two-thirds of the seats fell unfairly to the Western countries belonging to military and political pacts, which dictated to the others. Such an abuse of elementary democratic principles precluded normal international co-operation.

26. Characteristically, when the Board had discussed the increased representation of the "Africa and the Middle East" area, the Governor from Argentina had proposed that the "Latin America" area be given more seats. If the 20 Latin American countries, with a total population of about 200 million, needed five seats in the Board to defend their interests, as asserted by the Governor from Argentina, why should the 14 socialist countries with a population of over 1000 million - more than one-third of the world's population - have only three seats on the Board?

27. Surely it would be more just to change the Board's membership in such a way that the three groups of States were equally represented. That was the only method of preventing one group from dominating the others.

28. Through the arbitrary action of the Western countries, five socialist countries were at present not represented in the Agency. In addition, about 26 newly independent States, or States shortly to acquire independence, were not represented. If they were counted, about 1000 million people would be represented by each of the three groups of States; and it would be both reasonable and fair for the three to be equally represented on the Board, thus ensuring that no single group had a privileged position in the Agency and that the activities of the Agency and the Board would not damage the interests of any one of them.

29. Other factors in the Agency's structure which enabled the Western countries to dominate its work were the Director General and the Secretariat under him. Article VII of the Statute, providing for the appointment of one chief administrative officer, was unsatisfactory. His delegation therefore considered that that article should be reviewed so as to replace the Director General by a collective executive organ in which the three main groups of States would be represented on an equal footing and with equal rights.

30. What was the situation in the Secretariat? Out of 207 professional posts, 120 in all were concentrated in the hands of the Western Powers. Of 53 directorial and P.5 posts, 35 were held by nationals of the United States and its allies. The 18 directorial posts had been assigned so as to give a preponderant majority, namely 12, to the United States and the Western countries. The Philippines delegate had stated indignantly that the allocation of posts in the Agency was even worse than in the United Nations. The result of that abnormal situation was that the staff, recruited mainly from one side, particularly at the higher levels, was used to channel the Agency's work in important spheres in a way that suited the interests primarily of the United States and its allies.

31. The question of whether a general review of the Statute should be undertaken at the sixth regular session in 1962 ought to be decided at the present session. The Soviet Union held that international events and experience in the Agency demonstrated that the provisions of the Statute concerning the

structure of the Agency's main organs were obsolete and no longer accorded with the present balance of power in the world. Accordingly the Statute should be reviewed so as to give equal rights and conditions for collaboration to all three groups of States. His delegation was convinced that the majority of Member States would soon agree to the necessity of a review with that aim, and that its opinion would prevail.

32. The joint draft resolution on a general review of the Statute was based on assumptions diametrically opposed to those underlying his Government's view, which he had explained. The purpose of the draft resolution was wholly unacceptable and legally indefensible. It proposed that the question of a general review of the Statute be put in cold storage for three years; but the review procedure was laid down in the Statute itself, and no resolution purporting to change it could have any legal effect.

33. It was patently obvious that the joint draft resolution was at variance with the requirements of the Statute and would limit the rights of Member States. The draft resolution could not lawfully be discussed until Article XVIII had been amended.

34. The object of the draft resolution was clear. The world situation was changing rapidly. Socialist countries were playing a more important part, and newly independent countries were developing. Those changes affected the Agency's work. The United States and its Western supporters were therefore frightened of any review of the Statute and were trying to maintain the status quo in the Agency. For those reasons his delegation would vote against the joint draft resolution.

35. Mr. EL ANNABI (Tunisia) said that he found himself in a quandary over the six-Power draft resolution, which as it stood seemed to him superfluous. Moreover, paragraph 3 of the operative part nullified the effect of paragraph 1. If any hidden meaning underlay the proposals, he had failed to discern what it was.

36. Mr. HOCHSTRASSER (Switzerland) confirmed that the purpose of the draft resolution was to avoid premature discussion of the question of a general review of the Statute. However, the word "premature" being open to differing interpretations, some flexibility had been introduced in order that any action found necessary between now and the eighth regular session should not be ruled out.

37. If the proposal to deal with the matter at the eighth regular session did not meet with general approval, he was ready to consider an amendment substituting the seventh regular session. The main idea was to leave the incoming Director General time to familiarize himself with the Agency and its work and to gather material gradually for the general review. Secondly, it had been thought desirable to postpone a review to give time for the existing world tension to relax. As a co-sponsor, Switzerland would vote for the draft resolution.

38. Mr. NADJAKOV (Bulgaria) remarked that, since the time when the Agency's Statute had been adopted, changes had occurred both in international life and scientific evolution; the number of States possessing the secrets of the atom was steadily growing. Those changes could not be ignored. They must be reflected in the Agency's structure and that could be achieved only through a general review of the Statute.

39. The principle of universality in the Agency should take first place in the Statute, since it was an incontrovertible fact that today every State in the world was taking an active part in international life. That principle was closely linked with the principle of equitable representation - a contention that was supported by the fact that at its fourth regular session the Conference had deemed it necessary to recommend the Board to study the question of representation in its membership. The partial amendment that had been introduced into the Statute did not ensure full respect for that principle; a more radical change was needed.

40. The current composition of the Board did not properly reflect the three groups of countries represented in the Agency. Such an inequitable situation could not be allowed to continue and the three groups must be given equal representation on the Board.

41. The spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding demanded that the Agency should give every State, whether a Member or not, the opportunity to take part in scientific conferences and symposia so that all alike might benefit from progress in nuclear science.

42. Obviously, those were not the only problems calling for amendment of the Agency's Statute. The question of the safeguards provisions attaching to technical assistance also needed to be taken up. The present safeguards system

was too strict and might hamper the Agency's basic work. It was contrary to the principle of the national sovereignty of the applicant countries, and those countries would not be prepared to accept the strict control demanded.

43. He had by no means exhausted the instances in respect of which a change was called for in the Statute, but those he had mentioned were the main ones that militated against the development and effectiveness of the Agency. The Bulgarian delegation supported all the points made in that connection by the Soviet delegate.

44. The Bulgarian delegation considered that the terms of the six-Power draft resolution were contrary to the Statute and would therefore vote against it.

45. Mr. MICHAELS (United Kingdom) thought that the question of the general review of the Statute had been needlessly complicated by the many irrelevant considerations that had been introduced into the discussion. All the Conference was being asked to do under the six-Power draft resolution was to decide in principle to defer a general review for several years. At the same time it was stipulated that the Board or the Conference could decide to undertake a review of individual provisions at an earlier date.

46. The discussion had shown that amendments were likely to be submitted to Article VI of the Statute in particular, and the United Kingdom might submit proposals for the revision of Article XIV. An elaborate statement had been made of the grounds on which it was claimed that Article VI should be amended. But now was not the time to consider the question in substance and accordingly he would not pursue the matter very far. However, in view of the many assertions that had been made, it was perhaps desirable to try to put the issue into perspective.

47. All would agree, he was sure, that the voting in the Conference had faithfully reflected the voting in the Board. In other words, from the standpoint of Conference decisions, the Board faithfully represented the balance of interests in the Conference. That being so, it could hardly be maintained that the balance of representation in the Board was wrong.

48. Under the Statute, the Conference was the Agency's supreme organ of authority. Nevertheless, there seemed to be some unwillingness on the part of certain representatives at the current session to accept the decisions that

had been made. In that respect, reference had been made to voting blocs of one kind or another. Whether or not such voting blocs existed was irrelevant. A refusal to accept the decisions of the Conference was in fact tantamount to denying the elementary principle of democracy, since the balance of votes in the Conference was surely a reflection of the democratic method of controlling the Agency's activities.

49. It had been contended that a change should be made in the balance of the Board for reasons that seemed unconnected with the relation between the Conference and the Board. In one case, reference had been made to the creation of 26 independent States that were not Members of the Agency. The decision whether or not to become Members of the Agency lay with those States themselves, and would no doubt depend on the degree of interest they took in atomic energy. If, on due reflection, many of them decided not to become Members of the Agency, the Conference could not take their existence into account.

50. A second and quite distinct argument had been advanced, to the effect that the Board should be based on the existence within the Agency of three so-called blocs. He had no desire to go into the misconceptions that underlay that highly simplified description of the world as it stood today. But he would emphasize the complete difference of principle between the two arguments: the assertion on the one hand that the Board should be based on regional representation and on the other that it should reflect the balance of the three blocs. Both principles had been advanced in the same statement, although logically they were quite incompatible.

51. The composition of the Board was a delicate amalgam of the interests represented in the Agency: technical, donor and recipient. If the general desire was for the Agency to develop further as a technical body, able to provide services and assistance to Member States, it should be in the interests of all to ensure that the States able to provide that help should have a somewhat larger voice, at least in the Board, than the straightforward principle of equal representation would call for. In fact, however, it seemed that a different assumption as to the purposes of the Agency underlay the discussion. If what was wanted was simply another political forum on the model of the United Nations, a different pattern of representation would follow. If, on the other hand, the Agency was to remain a technical body with competence in its

own sphere of work, the primary concern should be how best to ensure that it could perform its function and discharge its duties. In short, the United Nations, as a political forum, had a part to play in deciding issues of major political importance, including disarmament, whereas the Agency was concerned solely with issues affecting the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

52. Lastly, he expressed regret that in the course of the discussion - and not for the first time - motives had been attributed to certain countries, including his own, which as far as the United Kingdom was concerned had no existence in reality. He did not wish to comment on the misleading assertions or misrepresentations that had been made, beyond saying that they were almost entirely without foundation. Consultation and compromise were two terms that had frequently been used during the Conference. Consultation and compromise had to be a two-way process, and that process was not helped by frequent repetition of misleading descriptions of Member States, frequent misrepresentations or frequent scoring of debating points. He felt he might safely claim, on the basis of his lengthy experience of the Agency, that the Western side had tried hard to compromise on every possible occasion. Admittedly, compromise became difficult where there was a major clash of principle, but even in such cases the United Kingdom in particular had gone as far as possible, short of relinquishing its principles entirely, in attempting to meet opposing views. In the end, the working of the Agency would depend on the willingness of all Members to consult together and compromise. Assertions that due consultation had not been undertaken on particular issues, although perhaps due to misunderstanding, were simply not accurate. But consultation presupposed that the minds of those consulted were not closed, or that their positions were not immovable. Lacking those pre-conditions, consultation and compromise had no meaning.

53. In conclusion, he recapitulated the aims of the six-Power draft resolution and said that the United Kingdom would vote in its favor.

54. Mr. EL ANNABI (Tunisia) said that he would vote against the draft resolution because he considered that it would need considerable re-drafting. Paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the preamble should be deleted. Paragraph 1 of the operative part should be amended to conform with the procedure laid down in the Statute. Paragraph 2 should request the Director

General to place the question on the provisional agenda of the next regular session of the Conference. Paragraph 3 should be deleted. Such re-drafting would preserve the right of the Conference to consider the question of a general review of the Statute in any year it wished.

55. Mr. NACVALAC (Czechoslovakia) said that the stipulation in Article XVIII.B of the Statute that the question of the review of its provisions should be raised five years after the establishment of the Agency was a sound one. It was already clear that many of the provisions needed amending. The world situation had greatly changed since the Statute had been drawn up, and in any case many of its provisions had been adopted against the wishes of certain Member States.

56. To illustrate his contention, he would point out that the composition of the Board no longer reflected world forces. Article VI therefore needed revision. Article XII on safeguards had been drawn up when it had been thought that the Agency would become a major distributor of fissionable materials; but the United States had used that article to put through a control and inspection system which would hamper atomic energy development and to which the developing countries strongly objected. More generally, the Board had been given too great authority, including that of the power to appoint the Director General.

57. For those and many other reasons, a review of the Statute was essential and urgent. The Czechoslovak delegation would therefore vote against the draft resolution.

58. Mr. MITRA (India) said that he had taken some part in the drafting of paragraph 3 of the operative part of the draft resolution, in the hope that that paragraph would make it possible for Article VI of the Statute to be amended. Many delegations, including his own, felt strongly that the composition of the Board, which was governed by that article, required extensive revision.

59. He could not think, on the other hand, that the atmosphere in the Agency was at present propitious for a review of the Statute as a whole.

60. He wished to refer briefly to certain statements which he felt had been, in part at least, directed against his own delegation, and to certain comments which had been made. It had been said that it was wrong to talk about

"voting machines". He remained convinced, however, that less than due weight was being given to the opinions of a large number of delegations, including his own. For example, the Conference had not been prepared to appoint even one African representative to the Board. It had been said that a somewhat larger voice in the councils of the Agency should be given to those who supplied technical assistance than to those who received it. However, many nations, including his own, were both providers and recipients of technical assistance. It had been said that the composition of the Board was a technical and not a political matter. But there were political considerations which guided the Conference in making decisions regarding Article VI.A.2.

61. Mr. BORISEVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Agency's Statute had been drafted before sufficient experience of international co-operation in atomic energy had been acquired. The authors of the Statute had been fully aware of that fact, and had provided in Article XVIII.B for its general review at the sixth session of the Conference. He asked why, despite that perfectly clear provision, certain countries insisted that the Agency's Statute should not be reviewed at the said sixth session. There could be only one answer: the United States and its allies liked to have undivided control of the Agency, which was to a great extent consolidated by the present Statute. From their point of view it was better not to review the Statute at all, or at least to postpone the review for three years.

62. Events had proved that a number of the Statute's provisions were unsatisfactory. To take only one example, the composition of the Board was now altogether unsuitable. The matter had been discussed at length at previous meetings, and his delegation had clearly stated that the Board's structure must be exhaustively reconsidered so as to bring it into line with the radical changes that had taken place in the world. The structure of the Secretariat also called for considerable modification. The provision in Article VII of the Statute that the Secretariat should be headed by a single administrator elected by simple majority enabled the Western countries to push their candidates for the important post of Director General. That was demonstrated by the fact that a few days previously Mr. Eklund's nomination had been forced through in the face of considerable opposition.

63. His delegation denied completely that the Agency had not gained enough experience to review the Statute. Quite enough had happened to prove that one group of States was dictating to the Agency and that that practice must be stopped.

64. Clear proof of that fact was furnished by the six-Power draft resolution proposing that a general review of the Statute be postponed until the eighth regular session of the Conference, despite the explicit procedure laid down in the Statute, which had been mentioned by the delegates of the Soviet Union and Tunisia. The draft resolution was too arbitrary, and it might well be asked why its authors had chosen the eighth session: they might just as well have proposed postponement until the tenth, thirteenth or any other session.

65. The draft resolution was wholly unacceptable because it sought to tie the hands of Member States and to preserve the abnormal situation which had arisen in the Agency. Its authors had not made the slightest effort to justify it properly, and had simply stated that the Agency had been in operation less than five years. The Statute did not specify how long the Agency should have been in operation, but clearly laid down the session at which the review should take place. The argument of the authors of the draft resolution that the new Director General would need three years to study the Statute could not be taken seriously. It might well be asked what sort of a man would need three years to study the Statute. And just when could he be expected to apply it?

66. The Byelorussian delegation opposed the draft resolution.

67. Mr. BAUM (Yugoslavia), while not favoring an immediate review of the Statute as a whole, thought that amendments to Article VI were essential. The criteria for choosing the membership of the Board were quite out of date. The number of elected members should be increased. He could not support the draft resolution because it did not give sufficient scope for an amendment to Article VI.

68. Mr. BREW (Ghana) could not see that paragraph 3 of the operative part of the draft resolution had much point when read in conjunction with Article XVIII.B of the Statute. Surely the eventual general review of the provisions of the Statute would in any case be bound to concentrate on certain individual provisions.

69. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia), on a point of order, said that the word "thereafter" in the last sentence of Article XVIII.B clearly meant "at any subsequent session". That being so, paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution was in conflict with Article XVIII.B and must be considered as an amendment to it. But Rule 101 of the Conference's Rules of Procedure laid down certain conditions to govern the submission of such amendments, which had not been complied with in the present case. Paragraph 1 was therefore out of order.

70. The PRESIDENT took it that the delegate of Czechoslovakia meant to imply that the draft resolution was contrary to the spirit of the Statute. The Conference would have to decide that point by adopting or rejecting the draft resolution, which he would therefore put to the vote.

71. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia), on a point of order, said he had understood the President to say that paragraph 1 of the draft resolution was an amendment to the Statute. In that case, Article XVIII.C applied and a two-thirds majority would be required.

72. Mr. EL ANNABI (Tunisia) agreed that the draft resolution appeared to be an amendment to the Statute. He thought that the re-drafting of it which he had proposed in his previous speech would get over the difficulty.

73. Mr. AMMOUN (Lebanon) pointed out that the procedure for adopting an amendment to the Statute included consideration of observations submitted by the Board. He did not, however, think it was the intention of the drafters of the resolution to amend the Statute. He supported the re-drafting suggested by the delegate of Tunisia.

74. The PRESIDENT said that the draft resolution had not been submitted as an amendment to the Statute. He could not himself say whether it was one or not.

75. Mr. WERSHOF (Canada) considered that the draft resolution was not an amendment to the Statute. He thought, furthermore, that there had been some misunderstanding about the significance of paragraph 1 of its operative part. There could be no doubt that Article XVIII.B of the Statute permitted the question of a general review of the Statute to be put on the agenda of the

Conference in any year. The draft resolution merely said that that question should be put on the agenda of the eighth regular session. The effect of the re-drafting proposed by the delegate of Tunisia appeared to be that the question should be put on the agenda of the sixth session of the Conference rather than of the eighth session.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.