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Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna, on Tuesday, 27 September 1977, at 10.20 a.m.

President: Mr. ETEMAD (Iran)

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\* A provisional version of this document was issued on 3 October 1977.

\*\* GC(XXI)/577.

## THE RECORD

### ELECTION OF OTHER OFFICERS AND APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE (continued[1])

1. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that as a result of the intensive consultations that had been held between representatives of the eight geographical regions regarding the composition of the General Committee, he believed that there would be no objections to the constitution of a General Committee composed of 17 members, namely the President, the eight Vice-Presidents, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and seven additional Members. To do that, it would be necessary, as at the preceding regular session, to suspend Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure so that seven Members instead of five could be elected. That would be an exceptional measure which could in no way constitute a precedent. He recalled that the representatives of the eight geographical regions all wanted a permanent solution to be found to the problem of the composition of the General Committee. He himself hoped that agreement would be reached on a satisfactory formula that could be applied at the next session, if possible within the framework of the present text of Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure.

2. He proposed that the delegates of the following States be elected as the Vice-Presidents of the General Conference: Federal Republic of Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, Peru, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. He proposed Mr. Roehnsch (German Democratic Republic) as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and, lastly, to make up the General Committee, he proposed the following Members: Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Hungary, Sudan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

● 3. The General Conference accepted the President's proposals. The General Committee was thus duly appointed.

### GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1976 (GC(XXI)/580) (continued)

4. Mr. HAUNSCHILD (Federal Republic of Germany), said that on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the IAEA, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany wished to express its gratitude to the Director General and his staff. He congratulated Mr. Eklund who had been directing the work of the Agency for the past 16 years with much devotion, a great sense of responsibility and a remarkable realism.

5. From the outset, the Agency had gained an excellent reputation, based on the quality of the

work it performed. It provided countries with the possibility of studying progress in nuclear research and technology. Under its technical assistance programme, it rendered enlightened help to the Third World. Through the Agency's work, the needs of those countries were better understood and other States could thus help them in many ways.

6. On the regulatory side, the Agency had achieved much in the field of radiation protection; the reactor safety standards, at present being prepared, also promised to become of fundamental importance.

7. The Agency's future work would be largely determined by the fact that it had been charged with applying control measures, called "safeguards", in particular under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[2]. That activity was essential, since only a universal organization was in a position to apply uniform standards and to act with the objectivity and authority necessary in such a highly political area.

8. The International Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle (the Salzburg Conference) organized by the Agency and held in May 1977 had helped considerably in enabling countries to understand each other's interests and viewpoints on the complex question of nuclear energy policy. That Conference had confirmed to the industrialized and to the developing countries alike that nuclear energy would be increasingly required to meet world demand for energy in spite of the wider use of conventional energy sources, in spite of the accelerated development of new forms of energy and in spite of all efforts to conserve energy. The Salzburg Conference had once again made it clear that only a few countries possessed both raw materials in sufficient quantities and the industrial capacity and know-how in the different sectors of nuclear technology. Intensive international co-operation was therefore necessary.

9. Outlining the main elements of the energy policy of the Federal Republic, he explained that top priority was accorded to all measures for saving energy; however, only limited relief could be expected from them. The use of new technologies, in particular solar energy, would only be able to meet a small percentage of the country's needs in the coming decade. For that reason the Federal Republic continued to depend on nuclear energy, and it considered that the present situation called for a moderate but sustained expansion of nuclear energy in the form of light-water reactors, which had proved their reliability.

10. As in other countries, the use of nuclear energy was a highly controversial topic in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government was trying to convince the population that that source of energy was necessary and could be

[1] See document GC(XXI)/OR.193, paras 1 and 2.

[2] Reproduced in document INFCIRC/140.

safely controlled. It was promoting a comprehensive programme of nuclear safety research in order to explore and enlarge the margins of safety of nuclear installations.

11. The development of advanced reactor systems continued. As to the high-temperature reactor, its utilization for the production of industrial heat was considered as the most important of its possibilities. Regarding the fast-breeder reactor, the efforts for developing and using it industrially in five western European countries had been combined on the basis of agreements concluded that summer by Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

12. The Federal Republic of Germany was now concentrating on the preparations for the establishment of a fuel cycle centre. It intended to combine, at one single site, the various stages of the fuel cycle: storage of irradiated fuel elements, reprocessing, treatment and concentration of radioactive waste, final disposal of that waste in salt formations and, finally, re-fabrication of the materials recovered into new fuel elements. By avoiding unnecessary transport, and by immediate recycling of plutonium, that concept offered effective protection against misuse of nuclear material.

13. Intensive and detailed studies had shown that a country like the Federal Republic of Germany, densely populated and lacking in raw materials, could not renounce reprocessing and the use of plutonium as fuel. Ecological considerations had led the authorities in the Federal Republic to demand proof of satisfactory arrangements for the disposal of spent fuel, before a licence to construct a nuclear power station was granted. The requirements for the rational use of raw materials and the independence of supply led to the same results.

14. The debate on international nuclear energy policy had a twofold aim: to satisfy the energy demands of a growing number of countries and to make the peaceful use of nuclear energy widely accessible; at the same time the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons had to be avoided.

15. The Federal Republic assumed that the proposal made by the United States of America for the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation project had the same double objective and that it placed equal weight on the two components thereof, namely promoting nuclear power and ensuring non-proliferation. The Government of the Federal Republic was therefore in favour of that project and was prepared to participate actively in it. The project should yield important results for the further development of nuclear energy. The task would be to compare the modifications and alternatives currently contemplated with the nuclear power strategies at present being pursued. However, the situation varied so greatly from one country to another that different countries might well arrive at different conclusions. Consequently, care should be taken not to adopt premature measures in the course of the programme. Like-

wise Governments should not be obliged to accept any specific results of the evaluation.

16. However, each national programme should be consistent with NPT, because that Treaty, to which more than 100 States had acceded, had to serve as the basis for all efforts made to attain the Agency's objective of preventing the misuse of nuclear energy. The forthcoming consultations should lead to arrangements which were multi-national, non-discriminatory and generally binding, so as to create an even more effective obstacle to proliferation.

17. It had to be recognized, however, that proliferation was first and foremost a political problem which had to be tackled by political means. Safeguards alone could not solve the problem. It was in that sense that Article IV of NPT envisaged world-wide co-operation and committed the developed countries to assist the others in their development.

18. The Federal Republic had always attached great importance to international co-operation. It saw the long-term transfer of nuclear technology as part of its effort to support the developing countries. For its part, it hoped, through that co-operation, to improve its supply of raw materials.

19. It was clear that nuclear technology imposed great moral obligations on all partners. The aim should be to get all countries to collaborate in measures to assure international non-proliferation.

20. As nuclear technology was already widely disseminated, a policy aimed at denying nuclear materials and technology to certain countries would increase rather than diminish the risk of uncontrolled activity in sensitive areas. Countries should therefore aim to open a dialogue, establish nuclear interdependence within the framework of adequate and equitable arrangements, work together in joint ventures and develop a climate of mutual trust.

21. In that context it had to be realized that the proposed international evaluation project would achieve its objectives only if the largest possible number of States participated. All interested countries, whether suppliers or recipients, should be able to take part in it. On those grounds alone it was obvious that the services of the Agency should be made use of in the project, for it included in its membership nearly all the countries with an interest in nuclear power. In that way it would also be possible to inform those Member States not actively taking part in the programme of its progress and results. The Agency, as an experienced and objective universal organization, was in the best position to handle that complex programme for the benefit of all Member States. The creation of a new organization would only lead to unnecessary delay; for all those reasons it was desirable for the Agency to provide the secretariat of the proposed evaluation project.

22. Furthermore the Agency possessed technical expertise in many fields, in particular on uranium resources, the characteristics of different types of reactors and radioactive waste disposal. In the safeguards sector the Agency had acquired considerable practical experience and its consistent efforts to develop more efficient techniques were to be commended. Quite recently the Agency had put forward a number of initiatives which deserved thorough examination, namely the Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centres Project, the study of an international system of plutonium management and the elaboration of a convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. Apart from secretariat services, the Agency was thus in a position to contribute in substance to many parts of the evaluation.

23. The fact that the Agency was well equipped to play an important role in implementing the evaluation programme testified anew to the wisdom of the authors of the Statute in providing for both promotional and regulatory functions. The essential thing was for a constant balance to be maintained between those two fields of activity. The Government of the Federal Republic would therefore continue to co-operate actively in both those fields.

24. As the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was the prerequisite for any international nuclear co-operation, the Federal Republic would support the Agency as the central body in a global safeguards system. Consequently, it had proposed to the Agency a joint programme for the technical development of safeguards, since new technical development would certainly bring about substantial improvements in the present safeguards system. The Federal Republic hoped that discussions on the work to be carried out jointly would begin in the near future.

25. The Agency's activities on the transfer of nuclear technology had already served to establish great confidence in its ability. It had successfully introduced nuclear techniques in nutrition and agriculture and thus made a valuable contribution to the battle against the world food shortage.

26. The Federal Republic had traditionally contributed in many ways to the Agency's technical assistance programme. In 1978 it would increase its contribution to the General Fund to more than \$580 000 and it would make additional voluntary contributions of more than \$1 million for experts, fellowships, conferences, training courses and joint projects.

27. In conclusion, he reiterated that his Government had every confidence in the Agency's future and would continue to support it actively in its important work.

28. Mr. MOROKHOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) made the following statement:[3]

[3] This statement is reproduced verbatim at the speaker's request under Rule 89(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference.

29. "Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on behalf of the Soviet delegation on your election to the high post of President of the General Conference.

30. "I have been accorded the great honour of reading out the text of a message to the participants in the twenty-first session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency from L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

31. "Allow me to make the message known to you:

'TO PARTICIPANTS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

'I should like to extend my cordial greetings to the participants of the twenty-first session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

'We understand the task faced by the Agency in promoting the extensive use of atomic energy for the maintenance of peace and for the health and well-being of the world's peoples because these objectives are dear to us.

'The Soviet Union is collaborating actively, and is ready to develop further collaboration, with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in particular within the framework of the Agency. Our country is making extensive use of the energy of the atom for creative purposes and is willing to share its rich experience and its scientific and technical knowledge in this field in the interest of further progress of mankind.

'While advocating the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Soviet Union is fully determined, together with other States, to strengthen the international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in every way. Everything possible must be done to ensure that the international exchange of nuclear technology, which in many countries will lead to the development of a scientific, technical and industrial potential in the nuclear sphere, does not become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

'We must not be blind to the fact that the forces in the world which would like to possess nuclear weapons as a means of threatening the people have not yet been eliminated. For this

reason the problem of placing a reliable barrier in the way of nuclear weapons proliferation and of preventing the danger of nuclear war is now acute as never before.

'The International Atomic Energy Agency has a major part to play in the solution of this extremely important problem and we express the hope that it will make every effort to ensure that the atom serves only the interests of peace.

'The Soviet Union, for its part, will continue to co-operate fully in the achievement of the noble objectives of this authoritative international organization.

'Permit me to wish the participants of the twenty-first session of the General Conference of the Agency every success in their important and responsible work.

L. Brezhnev'

32. "This year we are celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Agency's activities. It can be said with full conviction that over these years the International Atomic Energy Agency has become a recognized centre for the joint solution of scientific and technical problems involved in the peaceful use of atomic energy and for the provision of assistance to developing countries in that field. A particularly important part of the Agency's activities is concerned, and rightly so, with matters relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
33. "The problem of further strengthening the international regime of non-proliferation is more urgent today than ever before and directly related to the preservation of peace and security and to reducing the threat of nuclear war.
34. "Over the last few years many countries have speeded up their development of nuclear power, which is becoming one of the most important sources for meeting energy requirements in those countries; this has inevitably entailed an accumulation of large quantities of nuclear materials and, as a consequence, an increased risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
35. "In the opinion of the Soviet Union, an opinion which is shared by many States, the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be permitted to slow down the rate of development of nuclear power production in the world or to hold up the economic development of countries. Nevertheless, the development of nuclear power should go
- hand in hand with the strengthening of the regime of non-proliferation.
36. "All those who value the cause of peace should actively strive to make the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons a truly universal instrument of an international policy of non-proliferation embracing every single State. Unfortunately, not all nuclear-weapon States, and not all States with a significant nuclear potential either, have acceded to the Treaty, and some of them, for example the Republic of South Africa, are actually going against the Treaty by actively preparing to carry out nuclear tests.
37. "The South African authorities, stubbornly refusing to give up their policy of racial oppression and apartheid against the African population, are seeking by force of arms to halt the irreversible process of the liquidation of the colonial-racist system in South Africa. If nuclear weapons were to find their way into the hands of the racist régime of Pretoria, a direct threat to the security of the African States would be created and the nuclear threat to the whole of mankind would be increased. The dangerous intentions of the South African racists must be resolutely condemned.
38. "Nor is the Non-Proliferation Treaty further strengthened by the campaign for a new phase in the nuclear arms race conducted by certain circles in the West to the keynote of developing production of the so-called neutron bomb and other dangerous types of armament.
39. "A cause for legitimate concern is the way the non-nuclear States Members of EURATOM are delaying the practical application of Agency safeguards in those countries. At the Board of Governors' meeting of 23 September 1977, many Governors expressed deep apprehension in that regard. The Soviet delegation would like to stress once again the inadmissibility of further delay in applying Agency safeguards to the nuclear activities of those countries.
40. "In the course of its 20 years of existence the Agency has acquired considerable experience in safeguards activities. A system of legal procedures has been worked out, the Agency inspectorate has been built up, and safeguards methods and procedures have been worked out and introduced at many types of nuclear facility. At present the Agency is carrying out safeguards activities in many non-nuclear countries of the world.
41. "In the context of nuclear power development throughout the world and of expanding international trade in nuclear materials and equipment, problems of perfecting the

- Agency's activities in the matter of safeguards are assuming an increasingly prominent place among the measures designed to strengthen the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We regard effective Agency safeguards as one of the main preconditions for international co-operation on a broad scale in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
42. "The Agency is now entering a new phase in its safeguarding activities. The main feature of this phase is the sharp increase in the volume and complexity of the safeguards. For this reason the task of making maximum use of all the resources of the Agency's safeguards system has become a matter of extreme urgency.
43. "The system is based, as we know, on the principle of independent verification. The Agency should take full advantage of this right, irrespective of the extent to which accounting and control in certain States, or groups of States, has been developed. At the same time it is essential for all countries accepting Agency safeguards to set up and operate effective nuclear material accounting and control systems. The consistent application by the Agency and by countries of the provisions of the Agency's safeguards system is a guarantee of effective international control in the matter of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
44. "There is still urgent need for a radical improvement in the work of the Agency inspectorate. The Department of Safeguards has recently been reorganized and a second Division of Operations and a Safeguards Evaluation Section have been set up. In our opinion, this Section will have to play a leading part in improving the effectiveness of Agency safeguards. It is now important to consolidate the Department with highly qualified specialists and to raise the interrelationship between the Divisions and Sections of the Department to a qualitatively higher plane.
45. "There has likewise long been a need for a thorough analysis of the activities of the Agency's inspectorate, and also for the formulation of long-term and short-term plans for improving its activities. This would make it possible to find a sounder approach to the problem of determining the necessary manpower and financial resources and of activating, on a planned basis, the development of safeguards procedures and techniques, as well as of the instruments and equipment used for such activities, and of putting them into operational practice; this is particularly important at the present time when the Agency is beginning to apply safeguards at a number of major facilities that are "sensitive" from the standpoint of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Another item on the agenda is the formulation of effective model safeguards agreements.
46. "Because of the increased volume of safeguards activity on the part of the Agency, there has been a considerable upsurge in the volume of information which it is receiving. Until recently, insufficient attention was paid to the processing and analysis of the information. We believe that the establishment of a special Safeguards Information Treatment Unit in the Department of Safeguards and the development and effective introduction of an automated data processing system are, in principle, of great importance for the entire Agency safeguards system.
47. "In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, an urgent matter at the present time is the drafting, within the IAEA, of a universal international agreement on the physical protection of nuclear materials, equipment and transports.
48. "Attributing great importance to the Agency's safeguards activities, the USSR delegation wishes to announce that the Soviet Union has made a special contribution of 300 000 roubles, in its national currency, for the development of the technical aspects of safeguards in 1978. This contribution by the Soviet Union can be used, in particular, for inspectors' courses to be held at Novovoronezh nuclear power station, the development of technical safeguards methods at that station, and for Agency conferences and courses on safeguards to be held in the USSR.
49. "For its part, the Soviet Union is willing to continue assisting the Agency in the work of strengthening its safeguards system, which is so important for the cause of peace.
50. "We would like to stress particularly that States which are suppliers of nuclear materials, equipment and technology assume a special responsibility and that there is a need for strict safeguards to ensure that international co-operation in the matter of peaceful uses does not become a channel for the spread of nuclear weapons. This problem is not a commercial but a political one, involving considerations of security. As we know, a group of suppliers of nuclear materials, equipment and technology have worked out some guiding principles for nuclear exports. At the suppliers' conference held in London in September, agreement was reached that the Agency would be informed, through its Director General, of the policy pursued by the suppliers in safeguarding nuclear exports. The work on strengthening the measures for safeguarding exports will be continued. The Soviet Union, for its part,

will strive consistently for adoption of the principle of complete safeguarding as a condition for the supply of any materials, equipment or technology included in the agreed initial list.

51. "1977 will rightly go down in history as a milestone in the advance of the Soviet people towards a Communist future. It is the year of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which opened up a new age in the history of mankind. It is the year of adoption of the new Soviet constitution, the constitution of a developed socialist State, embodying the historical experience of its struggle for freedom, democracy and peace on our planet.
52. "A factor of no mean importance in ensuring the progress of our socialist economy has been the part played, and still being played, by peaceful atomic science and engineering. History will impartially and rightly record the fact that the homeland of the peaceful atom was the Soviet Union. The start-up of the first nuclear power station in the world in the town of Obninsk near Moscow on 27 June 1954 laid the foundation of a great industrial revolution, the significance of which for mankind cannot be overstated. Not even a quarter of a century has passed since that memorable day, and yet there are now more than 180 nuclear power stations operating on our globe. The unit capacity of reactors has grown from 5000 to 1 million kW and their total world potential has exceeded 90 million kW. It would have taken about 100 years to have achieved that figure by means of conventional power production.
53. "Although the Soviet Union possesses adequate natural resources of conventional fuels, it is still developing nuclear power at a very fast rate.
54. "Whereas the production of electricity during the ninth Five-Year Plan (1970-75) increased overall by 40%, in the nuclear power stations it increased by a factor of seven. During the tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-80) the volume of nuclear power production further increased by a factor of almost five.
55. "At present, nuclear power stations which have either been built or are under construction in the USSR represent an overall capacity of more than 21 million kW(e).
56. "One of the main trends in the development of Soviet nuclear power production has been the construction of nuclear power stations with pressurized water reactors (VVER). Plants with pressurized water reactors having a capacity of 440 MW(e) (VVER-440) have shown that they can compete with fossil fuel stations in all regions of the European territory of the Soviet Union. The technical perfection and operational reliability of nuclear stations with VVER-440 reactors has enabled us to provide technical assistance for a number of foreign countries (German Democratic Republic, People's Republic of Bulgaria, Finland, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Hungary) in the development of their power production on the basis of nuclear power stations.
57. "The next step in the development of nuclear power production is the VVER reactor with a capacity of 1000 MW(e) (VVER-1000), the construction of which is being carried out for the fifth unit of the Novovoronezh nuclear power station.
58. "A great deal of attention is being given to the development of nuclear power stations based on uranium-graphite channel reactors. The accumulation of knowledge during the construction and operation of the first generation of these reactors has made it possible to begin designing a series-produced commercial channel reactor with a capacity of 1000 MW (RBMK-1000). The first such reactor attained rated power at the beginning of November 1974, and the second reactor at the Leningrad power station did so in January 1976. The first RBMK-1000 reactor at the Kursk nuclear power station started producing energy in December 1976.
59. "At present, new units containing RBMK reactors are being constructed at the Leningrad, Kursk, Chernobyl'sk and Smolensk nuclear power stations.
60. "As it has been found possible to boost the power of reactors of this type, it has also been possible to develop a design of more economic reactors having a unit capacity of 1500 MW. The construction of the first reactors of this capacity is being carried out at the Ignalina nuclear power station in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.
61. "A new step towards meeting future needs has been made with the development of a design for a sectional-unit uranium-graphite reactor of the channel type (RBMK-KP-2400) with an electricity-generating capacity of 2400 MW.
62. "In 1973 the BN-350 fast neutron reactor was put into service at the nuclear power station in the town of Shevchenko and the third unit of the Beolyarsk nuclear power station was built with a BN-600 reactor, thus providing a basis on which the next step in the development of fast neutron reactors can be made and on which problems relating to the nuclear fuel for future large-scale nuclear power facilities can be solved.
63. "Design work is already being done on a fast neutron reactor having an electrical

- capacity of 1600 MW (BN-1600) and with advanced technological and economic characteristics.
64. "In view of the need to replace fossil fuel by nuclear fuel in a branch of energy production such as that of low-potential heat for industrial and communal needs, work is being done in the Soviet Union on the construction of atomic stations for supplying heat, atomic plants for the production of electricity and heat, and also of reactors to meet the needs of the metallurgical and chemical industries.
65. "Noting the future programme for the development of atomic energy, the twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has drawn attention to the need of speeding up the construction, expansion and reconstruction of specialized plants for the production of reactors and their components. The 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution will be commemorated by the putting into service of the first basic workshops of the new gigantic industrial complex known as 'Atomash', designed for the series production of powerful atomic reactors for electricity generation. This complex will come into full operation during the present five-year period.
66. "When our industry is in possession of such a complex it will have been raised to a qualitatively new technical level. Its entry into service will make it possible to accelerate considerably fulfilment of the task set by the twenty-fifth Congress, according to which the development of nuclear power is to be accomplished ahead of schedule and the fuel and energy balances of the country are to be improved.
67. "In 1959 the Soviet Union constructed the first atomic-powered ice-breaker, called the 'Lenin'. The construction and operation of this vessel made it possible to acquire experience and to lay the necessary basis for building non-military vessels running on nuclear power.
68. "In 1975 the ice-breaker 'Arktika' went into service. The voyage of the 'Arktika' to the North Pole in August 1977 was an enormous step forward in the opening up of the north and gives an indication of the extent of scientific and technological progress in our country. In 1978 operation of the atomic ice-breaker 'Sibir' will begin.
69. "The construction and successful operation of powerful ice-breakers running on nuclear power is of great significance to the national economy. The use of atomic ice-breakers has made it possible to extend voyages considerably (up to eight months and more) and to plan the movements of
- ships on the North Sea route, thus opening up new possibilities for developing the wealth of the Soviet Arctic and for the economic growth of the northern regions of the Soviet Union.
70. "The Soviet Union is fully able to satisfy the need for enriched uranium arising out of the expansion of its national atomic energy programme and it also provides a number of countries, under mutually advantageous conditions, with enrichment services in connection with uranium to be used for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union remains ready to provide, at Soviet enrichment plants, services to other countries for the enrichment up to 5% of uranium-235 of uranium belonging to them, doing so strictly in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other agreements relating to the safeguarding of nuclear exports now in force.
71. "In connection with the matter just mentioned, the Soviet delegation would like to emphasize the significant contribution made to the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy by the Salzburg Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle organized by the Agency in May 1977 and to express its gratitude to the Secretariat of the Agency for holding the Conference at an opportune moment and for its efficient organization. The Conference showed that in various parts of the world there are different ways of approaching present and future problems; these can be explained to a large extent by the particular characteristics and economic needs of individual countries. The Soviet Union considers that discussions of the ways and means of developing nuclear power should be continued and will welcome further efforts to this end.
72. "The position of our country is that international co-operation is the proper way of solving environmental problems. Examples of this are provided by the co-operation of the States Members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in investigating the radioactivity of international waters such as the Danube river and the Baltic Sea and by the work of the Agency in connection with the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.
73. "The Soviet Union is paying great attention to the solution of long-term problems of research and development relating to thermonuclear power production and is carrying on a wide range of work to this end.
74. "The view of the Soviet Union is that the enormous task of mastering nuclear

fusion can be most effectively achieved on the basis of broad international co-operation, a start towards which was made by Academician I. V. Kurchatov, the founder of the Soviet nuclear industry.

75. "We wish to express our willingness to continue to participate actively in the joint solution of this enormous scientific, technological and economic problem.
76. "Mr. President, the Soviet Union will continue to support the IAEA in the development of such important branches of its work as safeguards, nuclear power and its fuel cycle, controlled nuclear fusion, the International Nuclear Information System (INIS) and also other important problems coming under the Agency's programme.
77. "The Soviet Union pays a great deal of attention to the provision of technical assistance to developing Member States of the Agency and supplies those countries, on the basis of Secretariat requests, with equipment and materials financed from its voluntary contributions to the technical assistance fund; it also trains national staff.
78. "Between 1969 and 1976, of the total amount of voluntary contributions made by the USSR (2.8 million roubles paid in its national currency), the Agency has already used over 2 million roubles.
79. "Out of this contribution the USSR has provided 15 scientific visits for specialists from developing countries working on various aspects of nuclear science and technology.
80. "Since 1977, annual three-month courses on the application of nuclear techniques to agriculture have been organized at the Timiryazev All-Union Agricultural Academy in Moscow. It is planned to organize similar courses from 1978 to 1979 at the Novovoronezh nuclear power station on the operation of water-cooled, water-moderated reactors. The organization in Moscow of annual courses on the application of nuclear techniques to medicine is under consideration. The first scientific and technical safeguards tour for specialists from developing countries has been organized and is now proceeding successfully; it involves a visit to a number of nuclear facilities in the Soviet Union.
81. "The Soviet delegation has been empowered by its Government to announce an increase in the voluntary contribution of the USSR to the IAEA technical assistance fund for 1978 to 650 000 roubles, payable in the national currency and designed in the first place for the provision of assistance to developing countries that are parties to NPT. This contribution may be used for purchasing Soviet equipment, instruments and materials and also for Agency study tours and scientific visits to the USSR in the context of technical assistance.
82. "The effective combination of technical assistance and the measures necessary for safeguarding it will help consolidate the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore will ensure fuller implementation of the Agency's tasks under its Statute and the provisions of NPT.
83. "Mr. President, in summing up my statement I should say that the development of broadly based international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy is not possible without a number of steps being taken to ensure international peace and to strengthen the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These steps include increasing the number of countries acceding to NPT, improving the effectiveness of the Agency's international safeguards system, applying strict safeguards to nuclear exports (including the extension of safeguards to all the nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States which are importers), instituting an effective system for protecting nuclear materials and facilities and developing a system of fast and co-ordinated action to be taken by States in case any country does not fulfil its obligations and thereby creates a danger of nuclear weapons proliferating.
84. "The Soviet Union considers that if there is goodwill and determination on the part of States, these tasks can be fulfilled successfully and, in this way, favourable conditions for the development of mankind can be created under conditions of lasting peace and universal security.
85. "Allow me, in conclusion, to wish our organization continuing success in the task of developing uses of nuclear energy with the aim of furthering peace, health and prosperity throughout the world."
86. Mr. KHAN (Pakistan) said that the history of the Agency over the preceding twenty years was, in a sense, the history of development of nuclear energy in the world. The Agency's establishment had raised great hopes but the initial optimism had diminished and some scepticism had recently been voiced about the role of atomic energy in the world. The transition from early euphoria to present-day realism was due in a way to the growing maturity of atomic energy. In that regard, Pakistan had full faith in the unlimited potential of nuclear energy in both the medium and the long term and was convinced that the Agency had a vital role to play in the world.
87. He recalled that during the preceding few months three major conferences had been held - one at Persepolis on the transfer of nuclear technology, another at Salzburg on nuclear power and its fuel cycle, and the World Energy

Conference at Istanbul. The results of those conferences had clearly shown that there was no practical substitute for nuclear power in the foreseeable future. Nuclear energy had become an essential ingredient of economic life, and its economic benefits should be accessible to all, provided that it was employed strictly for peaceful purposes.

88. Several key issues were associated with the future role of atomic energy, namely the energy crisis, transfer of technology and nuclear proliferation. There was no doubt that the world was facing an energy crisis which not only endangered the prosperity of the industrialized countries but also threatened the economic growth of the developing countries. That crisis had worsened because of the absence of a global policy and wastage of energy in the industrialized countries. As a result the developing countries, constituting 64% of the world population, were left with less than 14% of energy resources, which was inadequate for their economic development. Unless the industrialized countries adopted a global policy of equitable sharing of energy resources and reduced their oil requirements, there was no hope of restoring the balance.

89. That meant that during the following two decades the countries of the Third World would have to acquire the basic technology of nuclear power. It was unfortunate that certain industrialized countries were following, in the name of non-proliferation, a calculated policy of placing embargoes on the sharing of nuclear technology with the Third World. History showed that such embargoes had quite the opposite effect to that intended. He agreed with the Director General that there was no way of stopping the spread of nuclear technology. Negotiations offered the best hope of preventing its misuse because proliferation was essentially a political problem, which must be resolved politically.

90. There were no restrictions on the transfer of resources from the Third World to the industrialized countries. There should likewise be no restrictions on the flow of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in the opposite direction. Technology should be a common heritage of all mankind and no country or group of countries should have a monopoly. A deliberate policy of denial could worsen the already unsatisfactory relationship between North and South, which situation must be avoided at all costs.

91. Pakistan attached the highest importance to the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons and to the reduction and eventual elimination of the entire nuclear arsenal. The Super Powers should set an example by concluding, without delay, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, thereby promoting the cause of non-proliferation. It would also be desirable, in his opinion, to create an international climate for nuclear disarmament by providing the non-nuclear-weapon States with an assurance of security against nuclear threats.

92. In the interest of strengthening the non-proliferation regime, it was necessary to generate a climate of confidence among the supplier and the recipient States. It was therefore important that the supplier States should honour their existing agreements, and the sanctity of international treaties, which represented the very corner-stone of the concept of non-proliferation, must be preserved.

93. Pakistan was therefore in favour of a dialogue between the supplier and the recipient States with a view to establishing internationally acceptable norms to regulate the supply and use of nuclear technology, equipment, materials and services. An attempt by any group unilaterally to impose its conditions on others could not achieve the desired results. His country hoped that a dialogue would be instituted soon, possibly under the auspices of the Agency.

94. At the last meeting of the Board, Pakistan had supported the Agency's participation in the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation (INFCE) proposed by the United States. In its view, the Agency's participation in such a study should take place without any prior commitments and without affecting the 1978 and other programmes of the Agency which had been duly considered and approved by the Board. He considered that the INFCE study would be productive only if it aimed at an objective evaluation of the technical and economic aspects of the various nuclear fuel cycle alternatives.

95. As regards Article VI of the Statute, his country had co-sponsored a proposal to amend that Article in order to rectify the serious imbalance which affected the representative character of the Board. It was essential that the Board's membership be based on fair geographical distribution. The regions of Africa and the Middle East and South Asia, with a total of 41 Members, had only nine seats on the Board or a representation of 22%, whereas the remaining six regions had 25 seats or a representation of 36.7%. There was thus an obvious imbalance. The situation was all the more surprising because the countries of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia represented not only a sizable proportion of the world population but also were the world's foremost suppliers of oil and uranium. Many of those countries had embarked upon ambitious programmes for the development of nuclear energy and were making important contributions to the Agency's work. It was therefore in the best interests of the Agency that those two regions should be given their due share of representation on the Board.

96. As regards his country's programmes, Pakistan was deeply committed to the peaceful development and application of nuclear energy for the economic advancement and welfare of its people. The new Government in Pakistan was pursuing the speedy implementation of the national nuclear energy programme and would honour all existing agreements and contracts. There was a national consensus regarding the early completion

of the reprocessing plant currently under construction with the co-operation of France; the plant had been placed under the most strict Agency safeguards, approved by the Board of Governors in 1976.

97. As an energy-deficient country, Pakistan was implementing a comprehensive programme of nuclear energy development for peaceful purposes. The Karachi Nuclear Power Plant had just entered its fifth year of commercial operation. In co-operation with Agency experts, Pakistan was planning to install further nuclear power plants; it was envisaged that, by the end of the century, two thirds of the country's electricity needs would be met through nuclear power.

98. Special emphasis was being placed on the search for uranium in Pakistan, where vast areas potentially containing substantial reserves of uranium had been delineated. Given the current world-wide uranium supply difficulties, Pakistan was prepared to consider all offers of technical and economic co-operation in the exploitation of those potential reserves for peaceful purposes. Pakistan had established two training centres to meet its growing need for technical manpower - the Nuclear Power Training Centre at Karachi and the Centre for Nuclear Studies at Islamabad; it would be possible to train 200-300 technicians a year at the two Centres. In June, 170 scientists from 25 countries had participated in an "International Summer College on Physics and Contemporary Needs" at Nathiagali; his country was grateful for the co-operation of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in helping to organize it.

99. As regards the Agency's programme, Pakistan considered that parity should be maintained between the promotional and the regulatory activities of the Agency. His country noted with concern that safeguards expenditure had increased while the resources allocated to technical assistance had decreased or remained the same in terms of purchasing power, despite the rapid growth in the nuclear programmes of the developing countries. The widening gap between the funds for safeguards and those for technical assistance was creating a serious imbalance in the Agency's overall programme.

100. The Pakistan delegation fully supported the expansion of the Agency's nuclear power programmes and of its activities relating to safety and waste disposal. It particularly appreciated the efforts which the Agency was making with regard to the training of manpower for nuclear power plants and to the preparation of guides and safety codes.

101. Turning to technical assistance, he said that Pakistan was against any attempts to impose safeguards in connection with the granting of fellowships and with scientific visits, which were unlikely to represent substantial contributions in sensitive areas. The performance of the Agency over the past three years had been reviewed by the Director General. Pakistan would continue

to co-operate with the Agency and strongly supported the re-election of the Director General so that he could guide the Agency through the difficult period ahead.

102. Although not all the dreams of the past 20 years about atomic energy had been realized, it was to be hoped that during the next two decades the Agency would succeed in promoting world wide the peaceful uses of the atom. He was confident that there would be a resurgence of nuclear power in the 1980s. Nuclear energy would become the mainstay of electric power systems in the world and render it possible to avoid a worsening of the energy crisis as advanced and breeder reactors became a commercial reality. Concern about environmental hazards would be allayed through further improvements in nuclear technology. The developing countries would no doubt become the main users of nuclear energy, which would help them in their development. Pakistan was convinced that the threat of nuclear proliferation could be contained through a collective decision of all nations to abolish nuclear weapons in the interests of mankind's survival - and the Agency would undoubtedly play a key role in bringing that about.

103. Mr. de CARVALHO (Brazil) congratulated the President on his election and wished him success in the fulfilment of his complex duties.

104. Recalling the almost unanimous opinion that oil production would start to decline between 1980 and 2000, with a consequent energy shortage, he emphasized the need to seek major substitutes without delay. The years up to 1985 would be critical ones, during which serious decisions would have to be taken with a view to reducing energy demand and establishing new forms of energy production. In the period up to the end of the century it was necessary to intensify international co-operation in the seeking, development and demonstration of new energy sources and in energy conservation so that the world ceased to depend largely on oil.

105. In the growth/no-growth debate it should not be forgotten that the least advanced countries had the most to lose in a no-growth situation. Developing countries needed to increase their energy production in order to satisfy their energy needs and obtain for their people a standard of living equivalent to that in industrial countries.

106. Brazil, which had been host to the General Conference in 1976, was striving to achieve a rapid transition; it was hoped that the country's electricity-generating capacity would be almost 90 000 MW(e) by 1990, with 10% of it nuclear, and some 280 000 MW(e) by the year 2000, with about 40% of it nuclear. During the next 20 years, an interconnected grid on a nationwide scale would gradually be established; maximum possible use would be made of the hydro potential of the Amazon region and nuclear power generation near centres of high consumption would be developed. As fossil fuels would probably not suffice for electricity generation, priority would obviously

have to be given to nuclear power, which would play a supplementary role before ultimately becoming the country's main energy source.

107. In its nuclear programme, Brazil was paying particular attention to safeguards and physical protection. It was extremely grateful to the Agency for the training in safeguards and manpower development which it had provided for Brazilian personnel. His country's nuclear programme was being put into effect at an accelerated pace, with full implementation of the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany.

108. Brazil was perfectly aware that its nuclear programme could not be implemented without technical assistance from outside. As the availability of qualified manpower was one of the conditions of success, top priority had been given to training. It was expected that the major UNDP project of which the execution had been entrusted to the Agency would usefully complement the training efforts being made at the national level. In that connection he welcomed the Agency's decision to introduce courses for future nuclear power project personnel into its training programme. The importance of qualified manpower for success in the transfer of complex nuclear technology had been demonstrated at a number of conferences, and the Agency's Secretariat had responded quickly. Efforts were being made to integrate nuclear power training programmes into a coherent manpower development programme; those efforts deserved support and should include many of the on-going assistance programmes.

109. The Brazilian authorities had been following closely the progress of the NUSS programme and believed that the four codes of practice which had already been issued would be of considerable value to all Member States. The NUSS programme should continue at an accelerated pace and should receive higher priority. In view of the great need for uranium in the future, it was gratifying to note that five members of the Secretariat were now concerned full-time with the field of activity extending from uranium geology to ore processing, and he therefore hoped that the Division of Nuclear Power and Reactors would be able to help all Member States - and especially those which were developing countries - in that area.

110. The Agency now had over 87 inspectors, and also more than 2000 remote-controlled cameras for monitoring 315 nuclear facilities throughout the world. Nuclear materials were strictly accounted for and it was possible to detect any diversion for the purpose of fabricating nuclear weapons. Brazil was aware of the need to prevent environmental damage which might be caused by the nuclear facilities being installed on its territory; it was therefore engaged in establishing systems to ensure adequate radiation protection, nuclear safety, physical protection and nuclear materials accounting and control. Moreover, new regulations - such as those in the bill on liability recently submitted to the Brazilian Congress - were being introduced. Some provisions were already in force - for

example, those relating to the registration of all nuclear materials in Government and private possession, the obtaining of authorization for the possession and transfer of nuclear materials and for the construction and operation of nuclear facilities, radiation protection and the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

111. By the end of 1975, the year in which the agreement between Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany had been signed, four joint ventures had already been established. The foundation of joint companies for the fabrication of fuel assemblies and for the erection of a fuel reprocessing plant was also planned. The first Brazilian nuclear power plant, which represented a pioneer effort, was under construction and expected to start operating in 1978; it would serve as the basis for a gigantic programme of nuclear technology transfer and implantation covering engineering, fuel, heavy components, generating systems, electric systems, re-processing, etc.

112. His country firmly believed that the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy required safeguards and physical protection systems which would prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear materials by individuals or groups in or outside Brazil. It had already complied with the Agency's recommendations concerning safety and environmental protection and undertaken not to perform any act which ran counter to the Agency's objectives. The trilateral safeguards agreement concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil and the Agency could be considered the most complete safeguards agreement ever signed under the Agency's aegis.

113. He emphasized in conclusion that Brazil was a peaceful country which was living in harmony with all its neighbours, maintaining close and cordial relations with them and always ready to co-operate with them in promoting and maintaining peace. The Brazilian Government had great confidence in the Agency and its ability to ensure nuclear peace and would continue to support it actively, especially in the field of safeguards.

#### POINT OF ORDER

114. Mr. RODRIGUEZ CRUZ (Cuba) said that, on a point of order, he wished to enter a protest on behalf of the Latin American Group because the General Committee had been elected without the participation of that Group since the latter had been meeting in another meeting room at the time of the election. During the 15 years he had been representing the Cuban Government in the Agency agreements of importance, such as the election of the General Committee, had never been arrived at without the participation of all regional groups. What made the agreement in question even less acceptable to the Latin American Group was the fact that the Latin American area had been the only one with only two representatives on the Committee whereas the other regional groups had three.

115. The PRESIDENT recalled that, when the consultations had ended the previous day, he had announced that the present meeting would begin at 10 a.m. The obvious presumption had been that item 3 would be taken up first; it had therefore rested with groups desirous of holding additional consultations to meet earlier in the morning.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1976 (GC(XXI)/580) (continued)

116. Mr. CARTER (Canada) considered that the Agency's twentieth anniversary offered an appropriate time for assessing its accomplishments to date and for giving thought to how its effectiveness might be enhanced. The Agency's role was to promote nuclear energy while restricting its use to peaceful purposes only.

117. In the mid-1940s Canada had possessed the means to produce nuclear weapons but had opted for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since that time, it had applied itself to action for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to contributing to the efforts made by other countries to meet their peaceful energy requirements.

118. It was not easy to reconcile efforts to prevent proliferation and world-wide production of peaceful nuclear power. The difficulties involved had led many countries to join together to establish the International Atomic Energy Agency, develop a safeguards system and negotiate NPT. And in the late 1950s, the gift by Canada of a significant quantity of uranium to the Agency for use for peaceful purposes had become the first transaction subject to international safeguards.

119. Well aware of its dual function of control and promotion, the Agency had sought to maintain a balance between the two types of activity, by developing inspection and verification procedures and furnishing its Member States with nuclear know-how, experience and technical assistance. That had not been an easy task, for some countries had been more interested in securing access to knowledge and experience than in opening their facilities to international inspection and verification. Others, again, had preferred to hold on to the economic advantage deriving from their advanced nuclear knowledge and know-how.

120. As countries worked together in the late 1950s and early 1960s to develop an international system of nuclear safeguards and a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it had become evident, first, that there was need for a greater awareness in the international community of the dangers posed by the increasing use of nuclear energy, and, second, that safeguards could not be enforced single-handedly but would have to be applied under an international system. As a result of the energy crisis, it had become even more evident, first, that nuclear power would provide a major incremental source of energy;

second, that large amounts of plutonium would be available in spent fuel; and, third, that the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons would thus be greater. A number of countries had therefore taken action, individually and collectively, to lay the groundwork without delay for the required system of international safeguards.

121. Thus, Canada had proceeded to take a number of steps at the national level and, in collaboration with other countries, at the international level. At the national level it had attached new conditions to the sale of Canadian technology, equipment and material. In 1976 it had decided to suspend nuclear shipments to countries which declined to accept those conditions. That decision had been taken with the utmost reluctance, for the countries affected were ones with which Canada had very close ties and whose economic development it had no desire to hold back. It would therefore proceed with dispatch in endeavouring to find a remedy for that situation.

122. Furthermore, moved by a regard for justice, the Canadian Government had decided in 1976 that adherence to NPT or acceptance of full-scope safeguards would from that time onwards be required of States recipients of Canadian nuclear supplies; that action had been designed essentially to promote the universality of NPT and to remove the disadvantage affecting States party to the Treaty. At the international level, Canada had likewise joined with other countries in action to strengthen the application of safeguards. In concert with other nuclear supplier countries, it was proposing that exports of sensitive technology should be subject to a more stringent safeguards system. There was no intent, however, to set up a group consisting of supplier countries only; the participation of other countries would be welcomed. Canada had always been opposed to discrimination of any kind and it was the first to accept the same commitments and constraints that it sought to impose on others. Under NPT, Canada had accepted full-scope safeguards on all its nuclear facilities.

123. Recently, Canada had agreed to participate in the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme. It shared the view that, when transition to a "plutonium economy" was under consideration, there was need for study of all fuel cycle operations, together with their separate implications and the anticipated consequences of their adoption. It was gratifying that a large number of the Member States of the Agency had agreed to attend the meeting on that matter to be held in October and that the Agency had decided to take an active part in the discussions.

124. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a matter of very great interest to his country. Its concern was not actuated by material considerations, for it had an almost fully indigenous nuclear technology and its own sources of uranium. In fact, it could be more advantageous for Canada, as an exporter of

nuclear technology and materials, to take a stand against safeguards instead of promoting their application. It was, however, convinced that safeguards were definitely needed and that they should be applied to everyone in the same way and not to the detriment of countries that had not yet achieved independence in the nuclear field. Canada firmly believed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was avoidable, provided that every country subscribing to NPT would honour its obligations. A global system and strict nuclear safeguards, applied by the IAEA, would be the best guarantee against proliferation and Canada was committed to the establishment of such a system.

125. Before closing his remarks, he had a few comments to make on some of the current issues before the General Conference. First, the Special Safeguards Implementation Report recently discussed in the Board of Governors had been communicated to Member States. A number of problem areas were cited in the report in relation to light-water reactors, on-load-fuelled reactors, and bulk handling facilities. His Government was prepared to provide assistance to the Agency in money and personnel to assist in the further development of a system of safeguards for on-load-fuelled reactors.

126. Secondly, the Agency was to be commended for its efforts in inviting all the Member States to attend the meeting to be held in October for the purpose of drafting a convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials. It was to be hoped that all the countries represented at the General Conference would participate in the meeting, for the important subject to be dealt with was an integral part of the non-proliferation system. Thirdly, he was pleased to announce that, as in the past, his Government would be making a voluntary contribution to the General Fund; it was ready to agree on a target of \$7 million in that regard. Lastly, the Agency should not allow itself to be engulfed by matters likely to cause divisions among its Members, and the Members should make every endeavour to create a more positive spirit within the Agency.

127. In conclusion, he emphasized that the two or three years ahead would be important in so far as an effective non-proliferation regime was concerned. For its part, Canada was sustained by the belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was avoidable, provided that all States truly so desired.

- The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.