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RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna, on Tuesday, 27 September 1977, at 3.20 p.m.

President: Mr. ETEMAD (Iran)

Item of the agenda**	Subject	Paragraphs
5	Arrangements for the Conference	1 - 3
	(a) Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items for initial discussion	1 - 2
	(b) Closing date of the session and opening date of the next session	3
6	Appointment of the Director General	4 - 9
7	General debate and annual report for 1976 (continued)	10 - 137
	Statements by the delegates of:	
	Norway	10 - 25
	India	26 - 39
	Argentina	40 - 53
	Malaysia	54 - 65
	Republic of Korea	66 - 75
	Belgium	76 - 90
	Yugoslavia	91 - 100
	Australia	101 - 114
	Nigeria	115 - 124
	Czechoslovakia	125 - 137

* A provisional version of this document was issued on 30 September 1977.

** GC(XXI)/591.

THE RECORD

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION (GC(XXI)/577 and 587)

1. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that the General Committee recommended that the agenda consist of all the items on the provisional agenda set forth in document GC(XXI)/577, with the deletion of item 4 (Applications for membership of the Agency), under which there was no business, and with the addition of the two items requested by the Board in document GC(XXI)/587; that items be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in document GC(XXI)/577 and that the additional item entitled "The Agency's budget for 1977" be discussed first in the Committee of the Whole and the additional item entitled "Appointment of the External Auditor" be discussed first in plenary, and that, in respect of the two additional items proposed by the Board, the time limit laid down in the last sentence of Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure be waived.

● 2. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

3. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that the General Committee recommended that it envisage bringing the session to a close on Friday afternoon. It would not be possible to make a firm recommendation to the Conference until a little later in the week, but he thought it desirable that the Conference have Friday afternoon in mind as a target. He urged all delegations to cooperate in trying to achieve the target.

APPOINTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL (GC(XXI)/578)

4. The PRESIDENT observed that, as stated in document GC(XXI)/578, in June the Board had appointed Mr. Sigvard Eklund to the post, to serve for a term of four years to run from 1 December 1977. Pursuant to Article VII, A of the Statute, the Board requested the Conference to approve the appointment and accordingly recommended adoption of the draft resolution set out in the document.

● 5. The draft resolution in document GC(XXI)/578 was adopted by acclamation.

● At the invitation of the President, Mr. Eklund entered the meeting.

6. The PRESIDENT informed Mr. Eklund that the Conference had approved his appointment to the post of Director General. He was pleased to

be the first to congratulate him, and invited him to take the oath of office.

7. Mr. EKLUND took the following oath:

"I solemnly swear to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to discharge these functions and to regulate my conduct with the interests of the Agency only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any Government or other authority external to the Agency."

8. The DIRECTOR GENERAL, having taken the oath, thanked the Conference for the confidence which it had shown in him by approving his appointment. To be the head of an international organization was a privilege and a challenge, and he would do his best to fulfil the Conference's expectations. However, his possibilities were limited, and he could do so only if Member States continued to give him the support which they had generously given him in the past; he very much hoped that they would, for the nature of the tasks now facing the Agency made such co-operation more vital than ever before.

9. Mr. MALU wa KALENGA (Zaire), congratulating the Director General on his re-appointment, emphasized his qualities as an organizer and a scientist. He was confident that the Director General would receive the full support of all Member States in the exercise of his important functions and he hoped that, in 1980, the Conference would have the opportunity to celebrate the Director General's twentieth year at the head of the Agency.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1976 (GC(XXI)/580) (continued[1])

10. Mr. ERIKSEN (Norway) said that Norway was more directly concerned with the regulatory than with the promotional side of the Agency's activities. In particular, it considered it important to provide the Agency with all the means necessary to accomplish its tasks in respect of safeguards. On the other hand, it realized that the regulatory and promotional aspects did not run counter to one another; both should be developed in harmony.

11. The target of \$7 million for voluntary contributions to the General Fund and the additional \$500 000, if agreed, were acceptable to the Norwegian Government. Subject to parliamentary approval, it would contribute to the General Fund in accordance with its agreed percentage.

[1] GC(XXI)/OR.194, paras 4-113 and 116-127.

12. In general, the Agency's programme was well balanced, and his Government supported it.

13. Norway had no power reactor programme, and since it had a rather limited nuclear energy research and development programme its scientific contributions to the Agency's programme would be restricted to certain areas. One of those areas was reactor fuel technology, in which it had experience in the fields covered by the International Working Group on Water Reactor Fuel Performance and Technology which might be of interest to the Agency.

14. Norway's experience in nuclear reactor control and instrumentation could probably also be made use of in the execution of the Agency's programme. Assistance might also be given in the revision of the manual of advisory material on the application of the IAEA transport regulations, drawing on Norway's experience in the international transport of nuclear fuels.

15. The coming into force in 1977 of the safeguards agreement in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[2] between IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the non-nuclear-weapon States Members of EURATOM[3] had been noted with satisfaction. It was hoped that that agreement would be fully implemented in 1978.

16. The preparation of reports by the Secretariat to the Board of Governors on the effectiveness of safeguards implementation was a worthwhile undertaking. It was hoped that those reports would lead to improvements in areas in which weaknesses in routines were appearing.

17. The statement in the annual report for 1976 (GC(XXI)/580) that there was no doubt that, provided sufficient resources could be employed, the Agency would be able effectively to safeguard the reprocessing and enrichment plants that were for the first time coming under safeguards had been noted with interest.

18. With regard to ensuring that the Agency had the necessary means to carry out its duties in safeguards, his Government was always ready to share with the Agency the experience it had obtained in running a small national safeguards system. It would be glad to co-operate with the Agency to the extent that the latter might want to make measurements, perform tests, etc. in Norway in order to improve the methods of safeguards.

19. The Norwegian Government had been alarmed at recent reports that South Africa was about to explode a nuclear device and had noted the South African Government's statement that that was not the case. It would feel more comfortable,

however, if South Africa would adhere to NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

20. The Agency had made an impressive contribution to the study of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres. His Government considered that work to be very important and fully supported it. Regional nuclear fuel cycle centres would contribute to non-proliferation by reducing the number of facilities to be safeguarded and by reducing the number of transports that had to be undertaken. Moreover, misuse of materials would be more difficult because of multinational ownership and control and such centres should make it possible to make efficient use of nuclear resources. Aspects of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres should also be evaluated in relation to the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) which was to be undertaken internationally at the invitation of the United States. In connection with the latter, participation by the IAEA and the making available for general use of the results of its work in those studies would be welcome.

21. It was highly desirable that some degree of harmonization in regulations concerning physical protection of nuclear materials and equipment in the various countries was achieved. A theft of nuclear materials in one country might have consequences in other countries. Norway was therefore in favour of an international convention on the physical protection of such materials. Such a convention might also facilitate trade in nuclear materials and in connection with international transport, in particular, might prove to be useful.

22. The International Nuclear Information System (INIS) was developing in the right way. The usefulness of the INIS Atomindex had increased considerably with the inclusion of abstracts. It was very important that INIS member countries should be able to search the INIS data bases directly using dial-up telephone lines connecting their own terminals with the Agency's computer. Norway hoped to be connected as soon as possible to the planned experimental network.

23. Norway's opposition to the dumping of radioactive waste at sea had been stated on several occasions. The Agency had important responsibilities under the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention)[4]. For that reason, in particular, Norway supported the more active role that the Agency was now playing in the study of radioactive waste disposal.

24. Norway was, in principle, reluctant to see nuclear explosives used for peaceful purposes. Strict observation by the international body provided for in Article V of NPT during the carrying out of such explosions was important, in the first place to prevent proliferation of

[2] Reproduced in document INFCIRC/140.

[3] Reproduced in document INFCIRC/193 and Add.1. [4] Reproduced in document INFCIRC/205.

nuclear weapons, secondly to prevent nuclear-weapon States making use of such nuclear explosions with the intention of developing nuclear weapons, and thirdly to prevent nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE) constituting health or safety hazards to third countries.

25. Norway was therefore in favour of arrangements which gave the Agency a strong regulatory role in connection with PNEs, including explosions which were carried out under bilateral agreements between a nuclear-weapon State and a non-nuclear-weapon State. International arrangements in connection with PNEs must be designed so that the interests of third countries concerned were taken care of.

26. Mr. SETHNA (India) said that in the first two decades of its existence the Agency had grown significantly both in content and form, adding new and important dimensions to the scope of its activities and the sphere of its responsibilities.

27. The Agency's twentieth anniversary, which was being commemorated, provided an opportunity for reflection, an occasion for all present to reaffirm their faith in the organization and to rededicate themselves to the cause for which it had been created.

28. India had been engaged in the field of nuclear energy for over a quarter of a century. At the end of the Second World War, when most nations still looked upon atomic energy as a force for destruction, India had already been thinking in terms of harnessing atomic energy solely for economic development, and it had never deviated from its commitment to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In that spirit, his Government saluted the present occasion which marked the twentieth anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an instrument for promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy.

29. He noted that the study relating to the establishment of nuclear fuel cycle centres had been completed. However, his delegation could not but notice that techno-political considerations were now emerging that might influence the emphasis on that programme.

30. The work on safety codes and guides was progressing well. India had considerable experience on safety problems, which could be of use to other developing countries.

31. His delegation was happy to note that on the basis of the recommendations contained in the memorandum submitted by Member States of the Regional Co-operation Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (the RCA Agreement)[5] to the Director General at Rio de Janeiro in September 1976, the RCA had been continued for another period of five years from June 1977. In

[5] The text of the agreement is reproduced in document INFCIRC/167.

response to a suggestion by the Agency, India had drawn up a suggested plan of action for the period 1977-1982 for consideration by RCA members. His delegation recommended that a scientific meeting be held in the region as soon as possible to finalize the plan of action for the next five years. That would enable the Agency to assess the financial implications and find ways and means of making available adequate funds for implementing the plan.

32. The most important event in the Agency's programme in 1977 had been the International Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle (the Salzburg Conference) held in May. That Conference had contributed greatly to restoring the conviction that nuclear power was in fact necessary and an irreplaceable source of energy supply to mankind both in the short and the longer term, which stemmed from the recognition that nuclear energy would be indispensable to meet rapidly growing future world energy needs. There seemed to be no immediate and proven alternative to nuclear energy. Moreover, not only was nuclear power cheaper, safer and environmentally more favourable in many situations, but the impending crisis in energy resources also made it imperative to develop nuclear energy as a part of national programmes in many countries. That being the situation, the Agency could play a greater role in publicising more information on research and development in the field of nuclear waste disposal so as to allay unfounded fears and misgivings currently being voiced in certain quarters.

33. The provision of technical assistance to developing countries was a matter for concern. In that connection, the Director General, at Salzburg, had expressed disappointment at the failure to provide enough resources for technical assistance to developing countries.

34. The two major spheres of the Agency's responsibilities were the provision of technical assistance and the application of safeguards. Those two facets of its activities were equally important. In recent years, while the regulatory activity of the Agency had expanded greatly with budgetary provisions increasing from year to year, there was regrettably no evidence of recognition of the growing need for technical assistance. On the contrary, considering the prevailing inflationary trends and currency fluctuations, the Agency's technical assistance programme, even with a modest increase in voluntary contributions, had not shown any effective growth. It was essential that voluntary contributions should in real terms reflect an increase capable of meeting all technically feasible projects requested by the developing countries. The time had come for the problem of financing technical assistance to be resolved on a long-term basis, so that the issue did not have to be belaboured each year. Various suggestions were under study; meanwhile, for the coming year, the Board of Governors had recommended a target of \$7 million for voluntary contributions in cash with an appeal for a further sum of \$500 000. India would continue to support

the Agency's technical assistance programme to the best of its capacity. It had been providing fellowships and the services of experts to other developing countries through the Agency's technical assistance programme, besides providing facilities for scientific visits. In addition, his Government had recently agreed to implement a project in a developing country which the Agency had been unable to take up for lack of funds. His delegation was glad to announce a contribution of US \$60 000 in national currency to the General Fund for 1978, which was higher than his country's normal share. It hoped that the target for voluntary contributions would be fully realized and that the Agency would be able to gear up its operating machinery, eliminating impediments in its delivery capacity and unnecessary delays and bottlenecks in implementing its technical assistance programme.

35. In the past, he had had occasion to express concern about the tendency to apply restrictive policies in regard to the provision of technical assistance in the form of fellowships, scientific visits, etc. There was now an additional cause for concern as the application of safeguards was being extended to technical assistance involving transfer of technological information in the so-called "sensitive technological areas". His delegation was concerned lest that extension of safeguards hindered the development of nuclear programmes of developing countries and would like to be assured that that would in no way be the case. It was also necessary to ensure that the well-established principles relating to the provision of technical assistance were preserved and that there was no discrimination in any form in the provision of technical assistance to all countries.

36. His delegation noted that the Director General had constituted a Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to advise him on technical aspects of Agency safeguards. It was confident that that Group would concentrate on the important task of assessing the technical effectiveness of safeguards implementation within the scope of the present system and leave aside other issues.

37. India's nuclear fuel fabrication complex at Hyderabad had now entered its second year of full commercial production. The plant manufactured uranium oxide pellets and a wide variety of zirconium alloy products from local ores. The plant had delivered all the tubes and calandria tubes for one of the Madras reactors. The complex fabricated all the fuel elements needed for the Tarapur and Rajasthan plants. Those fuel assemblies were performing satisfactorily at full rated irradiation conditions.

38. The first commissioning run at the power reactor fuel reprocessing plant at Tarapur had been completed. The various systems were performing well and an initial campaign was currently being reprocessed. Expectation that fuel reprocessing costs, including waste management, would be much lower than the indicative

costs of such services in other countries had proved to be correct.

39. In conclusion, he wanted once again to stress the need for the Agency to give greater emphasis to its promotional activities, particularly the provision of technical assistance to developing countries. That was essential so as to accelerate and reinforce national efforts to harness nuclear technology for the improvement and betterment of their standards of living. The Agency had an important international responsibility in that respect, and he was confident that it would continue to meet its obligations with the sense of dedication it had always displayed. The Indian Government, on its part, pledged its continued support of and assistance to the Agency's activities.

40. Mr. CASTRO MADERO (Argentina) congratulated the President on his election, the Agency on its twentieth anniversary, and the Director General on the renewal of his appointment. At the previous session of the General Conference he had outlined the plans and objectives of the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA)[6], which had made much progress in the past year. The Atucha Nuclear Power Station had reached a capacity factor of over 87% in 1976; its nominal power had been increased by 8% to 370 MW(e). Atucha also served as a centre for training staff for future power stations. At the most recent meeting of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Committee, it had been offered as the regional training centre for Latin America.

41. The rate of construction of the country's second nuclear power station, at Río Tercero, Córdoba, had been stepped up after renegotiation of the relevant contracts. Some components - pressure vessel, steam generators and the turbo group base - would have been installed by the end of 1977, others were nearing completion in Europe. Local participation had been increased to over 50% of the total amount of work. Argentine engineers would make a considerable contribution towards the assembly of the plant.

42. Much had been done with respect to nuclear supplies. Uranium exploration in Argentina had been intensified, especially in Patagonia. The capacities of the uranium concentrate plants had been trebled, reaching a total of 150 tonnes per year, and the basic structure and infrastructure for an ore and manufacturing complex in the Sierra Pintada were nearing completion. A uranium dioxide factory would soon start operating with a capacity of 150 tonnes per year. Construction work had begun on a fuel element fabrication plant that was to satisfy the needs of the first three nuclear power plants; experience in fuel element fabrication had been acquired by the production of two Atucha-type complete fuel element prototypes, which were being tested in the Atucha power station. More such units could

[6] GC(XX)/OR.186, paras 73-77.

be built in the future. With the assistance of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, a high pressure and temperature loop for hydrodynamic and thermohydraulic tests on fuel elements had been installed; in addition, the plans for a laboratory for analysing irradiated fuel elements had been completed, and construction would begin in 1978. A pilot plant for Zircaloy tube fabrication would be completed in the course of 1977 and would gradually be expanded into an industrial plant. Finally, a technico-economic study had been made in order to contract abroad the construction of an industrial heavy water plant.

43. The consumption and production of radioisotopes had continued to increase, and had reached about 300 Ci per year, excluding high-activity sealed sources. The construction of a pilot high-activity cell for the fabrication of sealed cobalt-60 sources had been undertaken - from imported materials - until the Embalse Nuclear Power Station was completed. There had also been a considerable increase in the irradiation services provided by CNEA's gamma-irradiation plant at the Ezeiza Atomic Centre.

44. In nuclear safety and radiation protection Argentina had followed the Agency's recommendations and reorganized the activities which the CNEA had been carrying out in that sphere as the competent national authority since 1950. A regulatory control authority had been established which was independent of users or promoters of nuclear energy, consisting of an executive body and three advisory boards. Argentina had also hosted an Agency regional seminar on "Analysis of the Environmental Impact of the Nuclear Power Industry". In that connection Argentina hoped the Agency would intensify its provision of recommendations to national regulatory authorities. In particular, a common effort had to be made to implement the new recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Argentina was also interested in the Agency's nuclear safety guides.

45. A number of laboratories were working on reactor physics, nuclear physics, physical and chemical effects of radiation, biological effects and so on. A 20-MV tandem accelerator for heavy ions had been acquired, which would help not only to raise the standard of science in Argentina, but also to strengthen ties with the rest of the scientific world.

46. A university course in nuclear engineering was now available at the Bariloche Atomic Centre.

47. The Agency had provided much technical assistance in 1977; 21 experts had come to Argentina, and 15 fellowships and 6 scientific visits for Argentine experts had been granted. In addition, a further regional seminar would be held in Argentina in 1977.

48. Argentina was proud to be providing its neighbour Peru with a complete atomic centre; no such transaction had ever before taken place between developing countries.

49. Argentina viewed with concern the decline in the amount of technical assistance provided by the Agency, especially since that decline seemed likely to become more pronounced in the future, while safeguards were expanding disproportionately. In addition, some delays and difficulties had arisen in the recruitment of experts, the purchase of equipment and the use of non-convertible currency. The provision of technical assistance by the Agency was very important for many countries, and Argentina was supporting that effort to the best of its ability. Argentina had been in 1976 the fourth supplier of experts for the Agency's technical assistance programme.

50. Argentina noted with concern the tendency of the Agency towards exaggerated application of safeguards. The Agency provided its Members with information, e.g. bibliographies, which was no doubt used only for peaceful purposes but might be tendentiously misconstrued as furthering military purposes, and therefore triggering safeguards. If that absurd reasoning were carried too far, whole nations might be subjected to an unnecessary and irksome international supervision. But that was not just a hypothetical possibility: safeguards were already being applied to technical information, to certain so-called "critical" materials, and to conventional items of equipment used in connection with nuclear power or metallurgy. Although Argentina approved of the efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal nuclear-weapon proliferation, they should not be allowed to interfere with peaceful nuclear energy projects.

51. Argentina did not approve of the Agency's practice of accepting voluntary contributions made under the condition that they should be for the exclusive use of countries that had signed NPT. That was a discriminatory criterion, contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Agency's Statute.

52. There were also positive aspects of the Agency that Argentina wanted to point out connected with nuclear power and reactor programmes, training of personnel, nuclear safety, environmental protection, food and agriculture, biology and physics, and so on. INIS and the Agency's nuclear data services were also praiseworthy, as was the training of scientists from developing countries in the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste.

53. The Argentine delegation noted with satisfaction the increasing co-operation between the Agency and other United Nations organizations, the positive attitude of which to the Agency showed how valuable the development of nuclear energy was to the world.

54. Mr. SALLEH (Malaysia) said that Malaysia, like other developing Member States which now comprised two thirds of the membership of the Agency, was constrained to ask how much the activities of the Agency over the past 20 years had helped in accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, on the one

hand, and to security on the other. Those noble statutory objectives of the Agency were also very dear and close to the hearts of the Government and people of Malaysia. On the occasion of the Agency's twentieth anniversary, one could not but cast a second look at those fundamental objectives and utter the genuine hope that, in the organization's third decade, the pitfalls which had confronted it in the past would be circumvented and the true goals realized. Malaysia would join any international co-operative effort to strengthen the IAEA and NPT. So far, however, notwithstanding the wisdom of the founders of the Agency, the concise and clear language of Article II of the Statute and the equally clear and oft-quoted Article IV of NPT, to say nothing of the recommendations of the 1975 Review Conference of the Parties to NPT, one could only record, with sadness, that the hopes of the Agency's founders had not been realized to any significant degree.

55. On the contrary, one continued to see an upward spiral in both the nuclear and the conventional arms races; there had been no visible progress towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, nor indeed any encouraging signs at all in conventional and nuclear disarmament. That impasse threatened world peace and security and was, to the vast majority that had forsworn any intention of acquiring nuclear weapons by adhering to NPT, a source of anxiety. Thus, to the developing Member States of the Agency, both the fruits of the Statute and the provisions of NPT remained, unfortunately, a distant hope.

56. Concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons had caused people, perhaps unwittingly, to lose sight of the disastrous repercussions of poverty, hunger, malnutrition and disease. All that was nothing new, but it was the view of his Government that the significance of those facts must not be underrated, belittled or ignored.

57. It was true that a handful of nations had so far not found it opportune to accede to NPT. His delegation did not, however, share the view that NPT was a failure. All, but in particular the nuclear-weapon States party to NPT, should try to create a climate in which countries that had so far stood aside would find it attractive to accede to NPT. However that might be, his Government was happy to note that 102 Member States had become party to NPT and, moreover, that nearly all significant nuclear plants in countries not party to NPT were now covered by Agency safeguards. Obviously, NPT represented a broad international consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons. Given that wide consensus, the alarm in certain quarters about nuclear weapons proliferation had come to be suspected by developing Member States as an effort on the part of the industrialized countries to divert the attention of the Agency from its promotional functions, and thereby to deny the transfer of technology to developing countries, the majority of which were party to NPT.

58. Article IV of NPT lucidly and quite rightly affirmed that countries which had forsworn

nuclear weapons must not be denied their technological rights. It underscored in no uncertain terms the moral and political responsibility to ensure that the benefits of the atom were universally shared, due emphasis being given to the needs of the developing areas of the world. Unless the requisite transfer of technology and the strengthening of the Agency's promotional functions were given serious attention immediately, there would ensue just the kind of alienation that the international community had been trying so assiduously to avoid.

59. Lest it be forgotten or misunderstood, it was his delegation's view that the Agency's regulatory activities should naturally increase in step with the increase in the facilities and material that needed to be safeguarded. His Government was firmly committed to ensuring that that equally important arm of the Agency received the attention it deserved. The proliferation problem, in the opinion of his delegation, could be surmounted only if realism and courage were shown by all concerned. The measures explored at the recent Salzburg Conference, like the recommendations of the 1975 NPT Review Conference, deserved serious study and support. However, if those proposals were to bear fruit, international co-operation above all would be required. It could come about only if there was a genuine effort on the part of both industrialized and developing Member States to ensure that the promotional and regulatory activities of the Agency were given balanced and fair treatment.

60. So far that balance had certainly not come to pass. The Director General had himself demonstrated the stark disparity in the development of those two activities of the Agency since 1957. The Regular Budget had increased by a factor of 12; the budget for technical assistance had increased only threefold or so, and given the crippling effects of inflation that meant virtually a nil growth rate. The Agency's membership of 54 in 1957 had risen to 110 at present, and the needs of Members were accordingly greater. Could one really say that nuclear facilities and material had increased enough in 20 years to justify the present preoccupation with questions of safeguards?

61. It had been argued that the Regular Budget also covered areas involving promotional activities; while not denying that, one had to point out that, again, it had been the industrialized Member States that had profited most from such promotional activities. Only of late had those activities begun to trickle down to developing States. It was indeed disappointing to note that even such basic applications of radiations and isotopes as those in food and agriculture, life sciences and physical sciences had yet to become routine in developing countries. If that was true, what was one to think of nuclear research and training, to say nothing of nuclear power? All those promotional activities stemming from the Regular Budget had brought developing countries at best indirect benefits.

62. There was thus an urgent need to examine ways and means of overcoming those inequalities. The Conference should appeal to all, but in particular to the industrialized Member States, to display the political will needed to work out a mechanism which would ensure that the Agency was not perennially confronted by a lack of funds for its technical assistance programmes. His own Government was pleased to announce a pledge of US \$7000 to the General Fund for 1978, the full amount commensurate with its base rate of assessment.

63. He trusted that his delegation's frank comments on technical assistance would not be construed as meaning that Malaysia was not appreciative of the assistance granted by the Agency. On the contrary, it was that assistance, together with the noble objectives of the Statute and the provisions of NPT, that had prompted Malaysia to accord the Agency special importance among organizations in the United Nations family. Malaysia pledged unstinting support for the IAEA and its Statute.

64. He trusted that the omission in the Director General's statement of any specific reference to the RCA Agreement established in 1972 did not reflect the attitude of the IAEA towards that regional mechanism for co-operation. His delegation considered the RCA an important landmark in the Agency's recent past. To his Government, it represented an excellent framework for collaborative efforts, largely among developing and industrialized Member States of the Asian and Pacific region, in research, development and training in nuclear science and technology. The RCA offered tremendous scope for a valuable exchange of ideas and experience among scientists of the large geographic area involved, concerning the introduction of both nuclear research and power programmes for peaceful purposes. He would not want to miss the present opportunity of expressing a warm welcome to Australia upon its accession to the RCA. One could now look forward to other countries in the region, both developing and developed, joining that regional framework for nuclear collaboration. It was to be hoped that industrialized countries outside the region would also give material support to RCA.

65. Malaysia was greatly encouraged by witnessing the importance the IAEA attached to its statutory role of assisting developing Member States in securing supplies of nuclear material, equipment and facilities for their peaceful nuclear programmes. The Agency had recently endorsed a project in a fellow developing country of Latin America, and the Government of Malaysia had itself requested the conclusion of a project agreement for the transfer of a TRIGA Mark II research reactor and its fuel from the United States of America through the Agency to Malaysia. That agreement, he hoped, would be presented for the Board's approval in February 1978. Malaysia attached great importance to that project as it would mark the first instance in which a nuclear-weapon State had significantly assisted Malaysia,

also a party to NPT, with a major nuclear effort that would enable it to play a more significant role in nuclear research for the common good of mankind.

66. Mr. CHOI (Republic of Korea) said that the subject of atomic energy was no longer an esoteric one, for it had now become part of the day-to-day life of many countries, and that the demand for nuclear energy, particularly in areas where fossil fuels were in short supply, had taken on cardinal importance. Inasmuch as Korea represented a country where such needs were acutely felt, he wished to set forth some views on that subject.

67. First, international co-operation to ensure a stable supply of nuclear fuel had become imperative. The uneven distribution of resources around the globe, and the precariousness of procuring them when required, had led many countries to become increasingly concerned. In the absence of efforts based on international co-operation to secure such supplies, the gap between the haves and have-nots was growing ever wider. Among the projects which merited consideration was the establishment of an international nuclear fuel supply organization as a possible mechanism for bridging that gap.

68. Second, research and development in the field of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, particularly in the technologically advanced countries, should not be delayed or curtailed, but should rather be accelerated and expanded; furthermore, the gains derived from such activities should be disseminated efficiently and appropriately to those countries in need of them.

69. The build-up of complex nuclear industries by the developing countries raised many difficulties from both the economic and technical standpoint. It was necessary to find ways of bringing technologically developed and developing countries together in terms of sustainable collaboration. When discussing the need for the transfer of nuclear power generation technology to developing countries it was essential to stress the importance of including methods of quality assurance in such transfers, irrespective of the technology or system involved. If accidents occurred through lack of the requisite quality assurance, the consequences, both from the economic and safety standpoint, would be catastrophic for developing as well as developed countries. That was an area where Governments and international organizations could play complementary roles in planning and implementing activities.

70. The training of personnel for the proper operation of nuclear power plants and the associated quality assurance in developing countries could not be over-emphasized.

71. But such tasks required experience beyond the capabilities of developing countries; they needed in fact the appropriate action on the part of the developed countries, since the standardization of safety engineering and power reactor construction had also to be given consideration in

order to facilitate the transfer of such technology to the developing countries.

72. Third, it was necessary to improve the Agency's safeguards system so that it could deal with the ever-increasing work load more promptly. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be permitted to interfere with the peaceful application of nuclear energy, since its use was provided for under the terms of the Statute. That had been the Agency's mandate since its foundation and it should continue to be implemented.

73. With regard to the stage reached in the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the Republic of Korea, he said that the first nuclear power station had attained initial criticality in June 1977. Commercial operation of the power plant was scheduled for the end of the year. A second and third nuclear power plant were currently under construction.

74. Because of mounting difficulties in financing nuclear power projects with foreign credits, the localization of a substantial number of projects was considered desirable, which meant that future nuclear power projects would have to be implemented on a non-turn-key basis. The localization programme for nuclear power plants would be implemented more and more by the Korea Nuclear Engineering Service Inc., the only nuclear engineering firm in the country, with the participation of private industrial firms already producing, or about to start production of, equipment and supplies for both nuclear and non-nuclear power generation. Korea was implementing research and development programmes for fuel fabrication so as to improve its stable fuel supply and to back up its nuclear power programme.

75. With regard to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, more particularly among the developing countries, his Government was hosting a regional seminar, in conjunction with the Agency, on the economic and technical aspects of nuclear power with the emphasis on manpower development in Seoul in December 1977, which it was hoped that those developing Member States faced with the introduction of nuclear power technology would attend.

76. Mr. SMOLDEREN (Belgium), recalling that the Agency's two essential functions were to promote the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and to apply the safeguards necessary for preventing diversion, noted that doubts had recently been cast on the effectiveness of Agency safeguards and on the Agency's ability to detect in time a diversion of strategic nuclear materials. His delegation considered that there were no grounds for doubting the Agency's ability to perform its functions provided that all Member States really tried to strengthen its authority and effectiveness. That was why Belgium had always given the Agency its full support and would continue to do so.

77. Casting doubt on the effectiveness of Agency safeguards would nullify NPT and open the door to bilateral safeguards - that is to say, to anarchy

in international political and commercial relations in the nuclear field.

78. In the opinion of his delegation, the best way of preventing nuclear proliferation was still the full application of the provisions of NPT in the sense intended by its authors.

79. Admittedly, NPT discriminated between two categories of States and imposed initially certain constraints only on non-nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, 102 States had acceded to NPT and all action should be avoided which might discourage those countries which had not acceded from doing so or make the countries which had acceded regret their gesture of goodwill. His delegation therefore considered that the inequality to which NPT gave rise should not be accentuated, for it had been accepted only on a temporary basis. Stronger safeguards and the imposition of restriction would be accepted only in so far as they applied equally to all States.

80. It was essential to seek the best solutions to the question of nuclear fuel cycle development in order to meet the legitimate needs of the many States wishing to employ nuclear power; at the same time, it was essential to limit as far as possible the risks of proliferation and diversion - and those aims had to be pursued without granting a privileged status in respect of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy to those States which possessed nuclear weapons. In that connection, States where the use of nuclear power could be restricted owing to a favourable energy resources situation were not entitled to force a policy of restriction on less privileged States.

81. It was also essential to ensure that countries which had not acceded to NPT did not enjoy a more privileged position than those which had when they received technical assistance in the nuclear field or acquired nuclear equipment and materials in other ways. Hence, the supply of nuclear equipment and materials to such countries should be subject to conditions at least as strict as those applied in the case of countries party to NPT, and in particular to the condition that their entire nuclear fuel cycle be placed under Agency safeguards.

82. Clearly, countries which refused to accept safeguards on their entire nuclear fuel cycle might be suspected of wishing to maintain the option of developing - apart from the nuclear facilities subject to safeguards - nuclear facilities for military purposes.

83. Belgium was entitled to advocate safeguards on the entire nuclear fuel cycle as it had - long before signing NPT - established with its partners in the European Community a system of supra-national safeguards to which all non-military nuclear facilities within the Community, whether or not situated in a State possessing nuclear weapons, had been subject since 1958. Moreover, in February 1977, Belgium had agreed to the application of Agency safeguards in its territory pursuant to an agreement between the European

Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Agency under which the Agency would be able to verify independently the accuracy of the results of EURATOM's safeguards.

84. It was hoped that the drawing-up of subsidiary arrangements would be completed within the next few months. The process of drawing them up was taking rather a long time because the facilities and materials to be placed under Agency safeguards pursuant to the EURATOM-Agency agreement represented almost half of the facilities and materials to which the Agency would thenceforth be applying safeguards.

85. Turning to the promotional side of the Agency's work, he said that the Salzburg Conference held in May had yielded a large harvest of information which might be of great value in the months to come, especially during the INFCE Programme announced by President Carter.

86. With regard to technical assistance, he commended the Agency's efforts in promoting radioisotope applications and in training personnel required for the operation of research and power reactors. In that connection, he recalled that Belgium was very much involved in two ambitious projects in Africa - one in Zaire, under bilateral agreements concluded with the Kinshasa Nuclear Centre, and one in Nigeria, where great efforts were being made to eradicate the tsetse fly.

87. Belgium's voluntary contribution to the General Fund in 1977 was considerably in excess of the amount determined by application of the base rate of assessment. In 1978, his country would - if parliamentary approval was given - make a contribution of about B.Fr. 3 million to the General Fund; in addition, it would make available B.Fr. 2 million for the project in Nigeria and six Type II fellowships.

88. The Agency's twentieth anniversary was an occasion not only for satisfaction at the work accomplished in the past but also for hoping that the Agency would continue to carry out its important tasks with the sense of responsibility which it had displayed so far.

89. Like all human institutions, the Agency could be improved. In particular, there was scope for intensifying its promotional activities and for making better use of the resources put at its disposal.

90. The Agency was essentially a technical organization and, while due account should be taken of the need for equitable geographical representation, a balance should be maintained between those countries which had special responsibility in the field of nuclear technology and those which did not. Otherwise, the Agency would cease to be an important centre for decision-making in matters concerned with safeguards and the promotion of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

91. Mr. OSREDKAR (Yugoslavia) said it was the firm belief of the Yugoslav Government that the Agency's future activities would be directed more towards the ever-growing needs of the developing countries. That belief was based in part on the fruitful co-operation between Yugoslavia and the Agency in many areas of application of atomic energy and particularly in the field of nuclear power.

92. The Conference agenda included several items of a delicate nature whose solution would require mutual understanding and co-operation. As always, there was the question of how to use the resources available to the Agency for the various tasks coming under its responsibility. Although it considered the annual report for 1976 and the budget for 1978 to be acceptable, his Government wanted to urge the Agency to achieve a better balance between its promotional and its safeguards activities. It also believed that the promotional activities, particularly technical assistance, should be intensified in the case of the transfer of nuclear power technology in accordance with the national programmes of developing countries.

93. One very important item on the agenda was the proposed amendment of the Agency's Statute, with which he fully agreed. Although his Government's views on the subject had been presented several times, he wished to reiterate that there was an urgent need for a systematic assessment of how the Agency had adapted to the changing world and to the needs of its Members. Some of the ideas incorporated in the Agency's Statute had not materialized and the reasons why they had not should be studied. Measures should be taken to ensure that the Agency would conform to the desires and needs of the majority of its Members.

94. The international problems of nuclear energy in general, and of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in particular, had recently become more acute. Nuclear technology was still the privilege of a small group of countries which, for historical and other reasons, maintained their monopoly.

95. The growing need for new sources of energy in countries not possessing nuclear technology imposed the need for the transfer of nuclear technology. Such a transfer was not a simple matter, but it was of enormous importance to the developing countries. He was aware of the risks involved in the expansion of nuclear technology and believed that no country should be able to use nuclear technology without assuming a clearly defined responsibility to the whole of mankind and without adequate international monitoring.

96. Yugoslavia had been among the first countries to ratify NPT and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage[7]. A large number of developing countries had signed NPT and assumed all the obligations under it in

[7] Reproduced in Legal Series No. 2 (STI/PUB/54).

the firm belief that the nuclear Powers also would fulfil their obligations. Unfortunately, however, the nuclear-weapon States, while still discussing their obligations regarding the cessation of the nuclear arms race, were improving and creating new nuclear weapons. At the same time there was a marked tendency towards extending safeguards even into the area of education, so to speak.

97. Yugoslavia considered that additional efforts should be made to find new ways of helping those countries which were in need of nuclear energy as an energy source. They should be enabled to take care of all phases of the fuel cycle when the need arose. That meant long-term planning of nuclear fuel supplies and processing, an extremely important consideration for developing countries which had limited resources for their own development. Like other countries, Yugoslavia believed that solutions to problems related to the nuclear fuel cycle needed to be solved on a broad international scale and on the basis of equal rights. In accordance with the obligations assumed by the non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia would support and participate in activities contributing to such solutions, including those which would help developing countries to gain access to materials and fuel cycle technologies under normal commercial conditions.

98. The concept of safeguards should not be limited, as at present, to preventing possible diversion for military purposes; it should also protect the right of all nations to secure their peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to ensure that they were not left without fuel one day. Safeguards of that kind could be created only by the joint efforts of nations which were willing to cooperate without any attempt to establish domination. It was only logical that such efforts should be supported by the Agency since they were fully in keeping with its statutory responsibilities and objectives.

99. It was in that connection that Yugoslavia had proposed, at the 20th regular session of the General Conference, that the Secretariat should initiate an exploratory study of the economic, financial, technical, political and organizational problems involved in the possible formation of an international nuclear fuel cycle pool, [8] Unfortunately, in spite of many favourable reactions to the proposal, the idea had not been given due attention by the Secretariat, which had, at the same time, been engaged in certain significant and high-level - but for the developing countries perhaps less urgent - studies on the same subject.

100. His delegation was confident that co-operation between Yugoslavia and the Agency would continue to develop successfully. He wished to express his country's appreciation for the assistance provided by the Director General and the Secretariat when certain supply problems

arose in connection with the first Yugoslav nuclear power plant.

101. Mr. GEORGE (Australia) said, in connection with the anniversary year, that Australia considered that the purposes and responsibilities of the Agency were more profoundly significant to humanity than ever before and that it pledged itself anew to assisting the Agency in its vital task of solving the world's energy needs, eliminating the risks of nuclear proliferation and providing technical assistance to the developing countries.

102. Australia had recently announced very important decisions concerning the development of its uranium resources and the strengthening of non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards regimes. The decisions had followed very detailed and careful consideration by the Australian Government of a major public inquiry into Australian uranium development, namely, the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry.

103. The Inquiry had first been commissioned in April 1975 and had taken over 13 000 pages of evidence from more than 300 witnesses. It had presented two reports to the Government. The first report dealt with generic issues and was presented on 18 October 1976. The second and final report dealt largely with site-specific environmental issues relating to mining and milling operations and was presented on 17 May 1977. The last few years had seen increased public debate on the question of uranium development in Australia and there had been an intensification of that debate both in the parliament and in the public at large following receipt of the first report.

104. The Australian Government's decision to proceed with the further development of the country's uranium resources had been announced in comprehensive statements to the Australian parliament by the Prime Minister and the ministers responsible for the administration of Australian policy on 25 August 1977. The decision had been based on four fundamental considerations:

- (1) The need to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation;
- (2) The need to supply essential sources of energy to an energy-deficient world;
- (3) The need to protect effectively the environment in which mining development would take place; and
- (4) The need to ensure that proper provision was made for the welfare and interests of the aboriginal people and of all other people living in the Alligator Rivers area and working on uranium development projects.

105. The first two issues had played a very large part in the Government's decision. In his statement to parliament on 25 August, the Australian

[8] See document GC(XX)/OR.189, paras 13 and 14.

Prime Minister had emphasized that the Government's decision had been taken with a deep sense of international responsibility, with a wish to strengthen Australia's voice in the moves against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and with a realization of the obligation to provide energy to an energy-deficient world. Commercial considerations had not been the dominant motive: in themselves, they would not have been sufficient.

106. On the subject of non-proliferation the Ranger Inquiry had reached the conclusion that at present Australia should not commit itself to withholding its uranium supplies for all time and that it should follow the course which was considered to be the most effective and most practical one for bringing about a favourable response to the proliferation problem on the part of other States. The Government had given the most careful attention to the question of nuclear non-proliferation before coming to its decision to proceed with further uranium development.

107. The Australian Government realized that nuclear energy was the only readily available alternative that most countries had to meet their essential need for electric energy in the wake of the oil crisis. It was aware that nearly 200 nuclear power units were already in operation in 20 countries around the world and that a very considerable number of units were under construction, on order or planned, and it clearly understood that very substantial quantities of uranium were required to fuel those nuclear power units. It knew that there was a need for nuclear energy in a number of countries poorly endowed with fossil fuels, that the nuclear industry was growing throughout the world and that there was widespread concern about whether uranium would be available to satisfy those needs. It was also alive to the fact that, because of their concern about uranium supplies, some countries were turning to those nuclear technologies involving reprocessing and the fast breeder reactor which would achieve a more effective use of available uranium but would increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.

108. Australia possessed 20% of the Western world's known reserves of low-cost uranium. In view of that fact, the Government realized that Australia was in a special position to influence, and had a corresponding moral responsibility to maximize, protection against nuclear weapons proliferation by responding to the needs of many countries for adequate assurances of uranium supplies. By taking the decision to export uranium, the Australian Government believed it could slow down the movement towards the use of plutonium as a nuclear fuel and lessen the attendant increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation. Australia would work vigorously at the international level for a regime providing the best solutions to the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.

109. Australia was dedicated to the improvement and strengthening of nuclear safeguards and, following the presentation of the first Ranger

Inquiry report in October 1976, it had entered into consultations with major consumers and suppliers around the world and with the Agency in regard to the safeguards which should be applied to further exports of Australian uranium. The result was the elaboration of a comprehensive and stringent policy of nuclear safeguards based on four essential elements: first, NPT (which in the Australian view was the most important international non-proliferation instrument and the one on which any safeguards policy must be based); second, bilateral agreements between Australia and uranium-importing countries; third, the central role of IAEA safeguards; and fourth, Australian participation in multilateral efforts to strengthen safeguards and the non-proliferation regime.

110. The Government had carefully considered a number of international efforts in which it might participate, exert its influence or lend its support: for example, INFCE, preparation of a draft convention on physical security, development of a common approach to sanctions and achievement of the widest possible consensus amongst both nuclear supplier countries and nuclear importing countries on the controls to apply to the world nuclear industry. It had concluded that Australia's ability to influence those developments would depend to a great extent on whether or not it was a major supplier and producer of uranium. Only in that role could it have a voice in the achievement of improved international safeguards and control.

111. In view of the importance which Australia attached to NPT, its safeguards policy was designed to further the goal of universal accession to that instrument. It realized that the Treaty brought with it obligations under Article IV. The country's policy offered tangible benefits, namely, access to Australian uranium, to those countries which did not have nuclear weapons and which had been willing to renounce nuclear weapons by becoming parties to the Treaty. The policy also offered countries which were not now parties incentives for acceding to it.

112. He had already mentioned the Australian Government's recognition of the important role of Agency-administered safeguards. That role was central not only to Australia's own policy but also to the international non-proliferation regime. In announcing the Government's safeguards policy, the Prime Minister had said that an effort would be made to determine whether there were specific areas in which Australia could usefully reinforce the Agency's capacity to apply increasingly effective safeguards. Preliminary discussions on the matter had been held in June. The Australian delegation would be holding further consultations on the subject with the Secretariat during the present session of the General Conference.

113. Australia also attached major importance to the activities of the Agency in the provision of technical assistance for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and would be meeting

in full its assessed contribution, both to the General Fund and to the special appeal.

114. The Government had also decided to accede, as a donor country, to the Asian Regional Co-operative Agreement of the Agency. Under that Agreement, Australia would provide assistance of various types to particular projects in developing countries which were members. It was to be hoped that that action would encourage other developed countries in the region to become members and induce developed countries elsewhere to lend their financial support.

115. Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria) said that some Members of the Agency had lamented that the decisions taken at Rio de Janeiro had begun the process of the politicization of the Agency, but he wondered how an international organization whose membership was open only to States could be apolitical. What had happened to the Agency over the past year was a matter for congratulation, for the Agency was getting into step with its sister organizations in the United Nations family, rather than for an anxious wringing of hands. The process of adjustment had not been accompanied by the trauma that had been forecast; rather, the Agency had become a more responsive organization as could be seen from the record of the successive meetings of the Board of Governors since the last session of the General Conference.

116. That process of adjustment must continue, for it was a process whose ultimate result could only be an open organization with which all its Members could identify closely. Democratization of the IAEA was in keeping with its principal objective which, as set forth in Article II of its Statute, was "to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". During the general debate many speakers had spoken of the need to ensure that the benefit of nuclear technology should not continue to be limited to a few industrialized countries. His delegation fully shared that view. That had indeed been its chief motivation in seeking to obtain a better hearing for the voice of the developing countries within the Agency. It was not enough to express pious hopes for greater benefit for the underprivileged Members of the Agency; it would be more productive if all accepted the basic tenet that each Member or group of Members of the Agency was the best advocate of how the maximum benefit could be obtained from its membership.

117. When Nigeria joined other Member States to propose an amendment to the Statute of the Agency to give a few more seats to two grossly under-represented regions, it had been its aim to make the Agency grant to those two regions adequate representation for more advantageous participation. The sovereign equality of States enshrined in Article IV of the Statute was not meant to be an empty form of words to which Members paid lip service; it was meant rather to be one of the cardinal principles with which the Agency was expected to comply. Therefore, even if Nigeria did not belong to one of the two grossly under-

represented regions, his delegation would still have enthusiastically supported the proposal to amend Article VI. On the occasion of the Agency's twentieth anniversary, he hoped that the Conference would present it with an appropriate gift in the form of a resolution which would achieve a more equitable representation on the Board of Governors.

118. The potentials of nuclear technology for filling the energy gap, which would become increasingly obvious as more and more countries were industrialized, had been recognized. Being an oil-producing country, Nigeria was interested in the promotion of increased use of nuclear energy to generate power. Petroleum in its natural form was too precious a resource for the world to continue using it in the wasteful manner of the past. For one thing it was non-renewable, which was a matter of concern to the oil-producing countries. For another, it could form the basis of countless products which would contribute more to the quality of human life than its use to generate power for which alternative sources could be found.

119. The development and wider use of nuclear technology was, however, being inhibited by two developments which had recently been assuming alarming proportions. One of those developments was the organized opposition of citizens, spear-headed by environmentalists, who were concerned about the danger of accident and the consequent disaster. The Nigerian delegation thought that a certain amount of exaggeration might be responsible for the growing organized opposition. The safety record of nuclear power plants did not seem to justify the campaign against their wider use. His delegation also thought that the Agency should assume a more dynamic role in the dissemination of more accurate information on nuclear power, thus promoting greater public understanding. Otherwise, if the present campaign resulted in retarding research and growth in the field of nuclear technology, the consequences would perhaps be felt more severely in developing countries, which might have few alternative sources of energy.

120. The other development which might inhibit wider use of nuclear technology was the increasing stringency being exercised by suppliers with regard to the transfer of nuclear equipment. Nigeria was a party to NPT and therefore accepted the basic provisions of the Treaty. It considered that the denial of technology and equipment for peaceful uses of nuclear energy was itself inconsistent with undertakings given by nuclear-weapon States in NPT. Subject to reasonable safeguards, it believed that there should not be any attempt to inhibit the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the developing countries.

121. Over the years, and with the active encouragement of suppliers of nuclear materials, the safeguards operations of the Agency had grown phenomenally. The Director General had himself said that safeguards which had begun in one Division of the Secretariat had grown into a Department of four Divisions. While the Nigerian delegation realized that the responsibility

for safeguards given to the Agency under NPT was in part responsible for that growth, it regretted that the promotional activities of the Agency had not grown simultaneously. That imbalance had been to the disadvantage of the greater part of the Agency's membership. In the introduction to his annual report for 1976, the Director General stated quite rightly that for the great majority of the Agency's developing Member States application of nuclear science and techniques in food and agriculture, medicine and development of water resources represented the main, if not the only, tangible benefits that could be achieved at the present time from the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Yet it was in those same areas of the Agency's programmes where development was rather slow in terms of resources to meet the ever-growing needs. The peaceful battle that had to be waged annually in the Board of Governors over the target for the voluntary contributions to the General Fund was an indication of the different ways two groups of Agency Members saw the fulfilment of its dual mandate. Given the general support the regulatory activities of the Agency had received, there could be no justification for the conscious effort to limit the resources available for its promotional duties. The annual budget of the Agency had increased from \$4 million in 1958 to a proposed \$51 million in 1978, which was more than a twelvefold increase. In the same period, however, the General Fund, which was for technical assistance, had increased from \$1.5 million to only the \$7 million proposed for 1978, which was only a fivefold increase. Considering the number of countries amongst which that rather small amount was shared, perhaps greater understanding of his delegation's pre-occupation about a greater increase in the rate of growth of the technical assistance fund would be forthcoming.

122. After congratulating the Director General and his staff on their accomplishments in the past year and noting with appreciation their enthusiasm for the promotion of the Agency's functions in areas of interest to developing countries, he said that the Nigerian delegation had always considered that the Agency's Secretariat could play a dynamic role, even within the resources available to it, in stimulating interest in developing countries in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Occasional visits by the Director General and his lieutenants to developing countries would certainly have the same beneficial effects as their regular visits to developed countries. In that connection, Nigeria had been happy to play host that year to one of the Deputy Directors General. His visit had provided him with an opportunity to see something of the developing nuclear programme in Nigeria, and had provided Nigeria with an opportunity to benefit from the wealth of his experience and advice.

123. In the year since the twentieth session of the General Conference, Nigeria had continued to make steady progress in the development of its programme of peaceful uses of nuclear technology. An agreement between the Agency, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and Nigeria had

been signed three months previously for a large-scale project for suppressing tsetse fly by the sterile-insect technique. That was the first project involving a wide-scale use of that technique and it was hoped that the results would be of world-wide benefit. His delegation wished to express its appreciation to those Member States of the Agency which had agreed to contribute funds to the project.

124. With regard to Resolution GC(XX)/RES/336 concerning the designation of Members to the Board of Governors, his delegation noted with considerable satisfaction that the Board of Governors, alive to its responsibility to rid the executive organ of the Agency of the cancer in its body politic, had taken the only wise course. It had designated another African country in place of South Africa, which had curiously managed to cling to that African seat for so long. It was a happy coincidence that the Agency was celebrating its twentieth anniversary with a considerably improved image, having dissociated itself from apartheid. If South Africa would not behave like the rest of the world, then it should be isolated from the rest of the world.

125. Mr. BARABAS (Czechoslovakia) said that the Agency, during the twenty years of its existence, had undoubtedly become the most important specialized organization within the United Nations system and that its activities were connected above all with the maintenance of world peace.

126. The Agency's twentieth anniversary was being celebrated in the same year as the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and the peace-loving forces in the world - including his own country - were taking major steps in the interests of a further strengthening of international détente. In that connection he wished to emphasize that the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, which derived naturally from the foundations of the socialist system, had begun to be translated into reality sixty years before by the Soviet people.

127. Despite certain setbacks, developments since the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe[9] had in general been positive. However, it was necessary to continue with efforts to strengthen security and co-operation, and to extend such efforts beyond Europe to the other continents of the world. The champions of peace and disarmament had recently been confronted with a new, extremely important task - to avert the threat of the production of new types of weapons of mass destruction. If that threat was not averted, the process of political détente would not go very far.

128. The Agency was continuing to play an important role in connection not only with techno-

[9] Opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973, continued at Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975 and concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975.

logical developments and multilateral scientific and technical co-operation in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy but also with efforts to ensure that nuclear energy served exclusively peaceful purposes. As one of the founder Members of the Agency, his country had over the past twenty years always supported it in its responsible and difficult work.

129. In that connection he emphasized the importance of the Agency for the implementation of NPT through the application of its safeguards on the basis of agreements concluded between the Agency and individual Member States. With the development of the peaceful application of nuclear technology - and especially with the development of nuclear power generation - there was clearly a growing risk that nuclear technology would come to be used in non-peaceful areas. He appealed to the Secretariat and to Member States to do everything necessary to stop any such development.

130. Although 102 Member States had acceded to NPT, satisfactory progress had not yet been made in negotiations with the non-nuclear-weapon countries of EURATOM and with Japan concerning safeguards inspections; his delegation attached particular importance to the principle of independent verification by the Agency through inspections at nuclear facilities in those countries.

131. His country considered NPT one of the main instruments for averting a nuclear war and accordingly believed strongly in the idea of the universality of NPT and in the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

132. Of the positive steps taken within the Secretariat during the past year in the field of safeguards, he was particularly pleased to note the significant improvements in the automatic processing of safeguards information and also a large number of organizational measures which would no doubt greatly raise the quality of the work done in the Department of Safeguards.

133. The Agency was also playing an important role in the field of PNEs, and the Board had recently received a report from its Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Although the legal and economic aspects of PNEs had undergone thorough examination, his delegation recommended that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group be extended so that it might complete its examination of questions such as the radiological and seismic safety aspects of PNEs.

134. The Salzburg Conference held in May had shown that nuclear power generation was the only technically feasible and economically acceptable alternative to the use of fossil fuels and that its safety record over the past twenty years had been excellent; it had also highlighted the need for broader international co-operation in the nuclear field. An important feature of the Conference had undoubtedly been the stress placed on the political aspects of the development of nuclear power generation in discussions concerning nuclear safety, the physical protection of nuclear materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

135. His delegation fully supported the programme proposed for 1978, especially in so far as it related to safeguards, nuclear power generation, nuclear safety and INIS.

136. Emphasizing the importance of the Agency's role in the field of technical assistance, he said that Czechoslovakia - like the other countries of the socialist community - attached great importance to the efforts of developing countries to achieve economic and technical growth and fully supported them in their struggle against neo-colonialism. Given the progressive tendencies in those countries, they undoubtedly also saw in the policy of détente the basis for realizing their wishes in the field of economic and social development. With that in mind, Czechoslovakia had always done everything it could to co-operate with the Agency in implementing its technical assistance programme - by making financial contributions, by accepting fellows for training, by hosting technical meetings and by making available the services of experts. In line with its past policy, his Government had decided to increase its voluntary contribution to the General Fund by 20% - to 300 000 korunas - in 1978; in the light of past experience, he was sure that the money would be put to good use. In addition, it proposed to offer in 1978 five long-term and four one-year fellowships for study in Czechoslovakia and to contribute to three one-year fellowships financed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

137. In conclusion, he emphasized the significance of the agreement between the Agency and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), in the implementation of which several important steps had been taken during the past year.

- The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

