



GC

International Atomic Energy Agency

GENERAL CONFERENCE

GC(XXII)/OR.200

February 1979*

GENERAL Distr.

ENGLISH

TWENTY-SECOND REGULAR SESSION: 18-22 SEPTEMBER 1978

RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDREDTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,
on Monday, 18 September 1978, at 10.50 a.m.

Temporary President: Mr. NABAVI NOURI (Iran)

President: Mr. MALU wa KALENGA (Zaire)

CONTENTS

<u>Item of the provisional agenda**</u>		<u>Paragraphs</u>
-	Opening of the session	1 - 3
-	Election of the President	4 - 16
2	Opening statements	17 - 59

*/ A provisional version of this document was issued on 20 September 1978.

**/ GC(XXII)/595.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXII)/INF/179/Rev.2.

OPENING OF THE SESSION

1. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT declared the twenty-second regular session of the General Conference open.

2. In accordance with Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure he invited the delegates to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation.

All present rose and stood in silence for one minute.

3. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT extended a welcome to all the participants, including in particular the representatives of the Austrian Government, the delegations of Member States, the representatives of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and the observers for inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations. As the delegate of Iran, he again expressed appreciation on his own and his country's behalf of the honour that had been done to Iran the previous year.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

4. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT invited nominations for the office of President of the Conference.

5. Mr. GHEZAL (Tunisia) nominated the delegate of Zaire, Mr. Malu wa Kalenga. Among other qualifications, Mr. Malu held the degrees of Master of Science from the University of California at Berkeley, in the United States, and Doctor in Applied Sciences from Louvain University, Belgium, as also qualifications in civil, electrical and electronic engineering from his home country.

6. In addition, he was Chairman of the Zaire Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the Kinshasa Regional Nuclear Studies Centre, member of the Scientific Council of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of the Scientific Council of the Trieste International Centre for Theoretical Physics, and adviser to the Director General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Furthermore, his lengthy association with the work of the Agency and its Board of Governors gave assurance of his capacity to conduct the proceedings with competence and wisdom.

7. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) and Mr. de CARVALHO (Brazil), the latter speaking also on behalf of the Latin American region, supported the nomination.

8. Mr. Malu wa Kalenga (Zaire) was elected President of the General Conference for its twenty-second regular session by acclamation.

Mr. Malu wa Kalenga (Zaire) took the Chair.

9. The PRESIDENT wished first to express the Conference's thanks to Mr. Nabavi Nouri of Iran for having undertaken the duties of Temporary President. He had just learned that an earthquake had taken place in Iran with victims in the thousands. He conveyed to the delegation of Iran the deep sympathy of all present on account of the disaster and assured him of the full moral support of all delegations.

10. On behalf of his country and its President, General Mobutu, he wholeheartedly thanked the delegates for the trust placed in him by his election to office. He was sure that he could count upon their help towards making the twenty-second session a most successful one.

11. The session was a special one for several reasons, one of them being the fact that ten years earlier the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)^{1/} had been opened for signature, an event constituting a decisive stage in the life of the Agency and, above all, in the development of peaceful nuclear activities throughout the world. For the first time in the history of mankind, 104 States, including three nuclear-weapon States, had reached agreement on participating in a widespread system of international inspection.

12. Despite the massive adherence to NPT, together with its practical expression in the negotiating of safeguards agreements with the Agency by practically all countries having a significant nuclear programme, it nevertheless had to be recognized that for some time past relations between States in the peaceful uses of atomic energy had been affected by a growing unease. Many States, in particular those belonging to the Third World, had the feeling that the three basic objectives of the Treaty, as set out in articles III, IV and VI, were not being pursued with the same vigour as before. Because of certain difficulties recently noted in regard to free access to modern techniques for the building of power reactors and to enriched fuel supplies, rightly or wrongly, doubts had arisen concerning the way in which certain Member States party to NPT were implementing articles IV and VI. Unless all the goodwill generated by NPT was to be lost, it was essential that a judicious balance should be preserved between the exigencies of control and of promotional

^{1/} Reproduced in document INFCIRC/140.

activities, specified in articles III and IV. In direct implementation of those articles, a balance should be sought between the safeguards and technical assistance programmes of the Agency; the Director General was to be commended for the efforts he had made in that direction.

13. Furthermore, the Powers concerned should pursue negotiations with all necessary diligence in order to bring about weapons control and nuclear disarmament in compliance with the heart-felt wishes of the world community. The renunciation and discrimination inherent in NPT would continue to be accepted only if that condition was fulfilled.

14. At the present time nuclear activity affecting all stages of the fuel cycle was again being put in question. In particular, doubts were being expressed as to the political and economic wisdom of reprocessing and breeder operations. But despite all doubts, delays and questioning, it was by no means out of place to expect intensive recourse to nuclear power in the future. The problems linked with fuel reprocessing and plutonium recycling would of course have to be resolved satisfactorily. In that regard, his country subscribed to the idea of regional reprocessing and plutonium management centres, a scheme at present under study by the Agency. It was desirable that a general consensus in favour of that solution should emerge fairly soon, in order to remove present uncertainties and their possibly disturbing effects on the nuclear power market. Nuclear power might perhaps, through a form of internationalization, thus open the way to new co-operation between the North and the South by ensuring the stability in the energy market which a large majority in the world wanted.

15. Again, with regard to the fuel cycle, there remained the ever more pressing problem of handling and storing radioactive wastes. A complex series of inter-related questions concerning technologies, industrial development, and legal, administrative and financial matters needed to be resolved in order that the safety level required for the protection of mankind and of the environment might be assured. The fears engendered among the peoples of the world by the waste management problem constituted one of the major obstacles to further development of nuclear energy. All the reports and studies on that subject called unanimously for an international pilot demonstration project, and there the Agency could play the part of catalyst.

16. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the proceedings at the session would take place in the full spirit of frank collaboration which had always marked discussions in the Agency.

OPENING STATEMENTS

17. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said he was pleased to welcome Member States' delegations attending the session and also the dignitaries representing the host country and the representatives of the United Nations. He wished to take the opportunity to thank the Austrian Government for its unfailing assistance to the Agency.

18. The comments he was about to make departed from the traditional type of balance sheet concerning the past year's work and prospects for the future. It was essential at the present juncture to comment upon the status of nuclear energy in the world and to share with delegations some of his concerns about certain trends. He would, however, first refer to two important questions relating to the internal working of the Agency, namely the budget and the composition of the staff.

19. All were certainly aware of the very thorough debate which had taken place in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee and in the Board of Governors on the budget for 1979. After a series of reductions, the budget before the Conference still represented an increase of 27% over the 1978 budget. The three major reasons for that increase were: the move to the new headquarters - now scheduled to begin on 2 July 1979 - and the still largely unknown factor of operating costs for the last six months of 1979; the increase in the Agency's safeguards responsibilities, especially in consequence of the implementation of EURATOM safeguards; and, thirdly, inflation and the decline in the value of the dollar vis-à-vis the Austrian schilling. Regrettably, the portion of the budgetary increase devoted to technical programmes other than safeguards was minimal, representing only 2% over the 1978 budget.

20. The move to the Donaupark should lead to increased efficiency in the Agency's work, in that staff would no longer be located in five different premises throughout the city. It would constitute the ideal occasion for introducing organizational changes permitting better utilization of staff, and also for installing more modern office equipment. A study commissioned from a consultant firm on a number of those questions had brought useful suggestions

which should lead to increased efficiency. The move should also reduce the manning table for Maintenance and Operatives Service staff; redundant staff might be taken over either by the United Nations or by outside contractors. Those factors would help, over the next few years, to compensate for the heavy expenditures in 1979 and the as yet unknown operating costs for the Donaupark complex.

21. The staff increase suggested for 1979 was almost exclusively the consequence of increased responsibilities associated with NPT. For instance, the Safeguards Evaluation Section in the Department of Safeguards was having to be extended and strengthened in the face of those growing responsibilities. He was hopeful that increases in the staff of the Department of Safeguards would level off in the future partly as a result of the important role which national safeguards organizations would play in assisting the Agency's work in that field.

22. As for the dollar/Austrian shilling ratio, it had to be borne in mind that 76% of the Agency's expenditure was in Austrian schillings. As fluctuations in the currency market were completely beyond its control, the Agency could only react to the drop in spending power by effecting savings where possible, and by making provision for reserve funds in the budget and for supplementary budget requests. Clearly, that was unsatisfactory over the long term. As nearly all the organizations of the United Nations system shared the problem, the matter had been the subject of detailed study at an inter-agency level. One of the solutions suggested was that Member States might pay part of their contributions in the currency of the host country. He would recommend that suggestion for the Conference's consideration and would be interested to hear the views of Member States on the idea. Adoption of such a system would also result in a larger degree of parity among Member States in sharing the burden of the Agency's Regular Budget.

23. The Agency's Professional staff strength now stood at 508 persons, recruited from 65 countries. It included 26 regular posts at the Director or Deputy Director General level, recruited from 17 countries. A certain satisfaction regarding what had been achieved in that respect would not be out of place. At times, some criticism had been voiced regarding the composition and perhaps even the competence of the staff in the Safeguards Department, where at present 42 countries were represented. At times, the Secretariat was asked to consider factors which were not covered by the Agency's

Statute - for instance balance in numbers of staff as between developed and developing countries, or between geographical regions; language competence; and so on. For obvious reasons, it was not possible to fulfill all those requirements. The Secretariat was, however, doing its best to comply with what was stipulated in Article VII.D of the Statute, namely that it should "secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence and integrity", and that "Subject to this consideration, due regard shall be paid to the contributions of members to the Agency and to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible". Member States could assist by ensuring that vacancies were widely advertised in their countries and by recommending suitably qualified and experienced candidates, not restricted to Government organizations.

24. Coming to the main part of his statement to the status of nuclear energy, he directed attention to a slide showing the estimated production of electricity from nuclear power stations during the period 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978 in the countries with free market economies. All would agree, he was sure, that the figures represented a noteworthy outcome of twenty years of technological achievement.

25. The reactors in question had to be provided with fuel. In some cases the operating utilities wanted to reprocess the fuel for recycling of plutonium, and all that gave rise to a series of questions, many of which involved the Agency. During the 20-year period, no fatal accident involving radiation had occurred in the civilian power reactors. The load and operating factors had been satisfactory, especially in view of the tremendous technical development they represented, with single units now surpassing the 1000 MW level. Whereas in 1955 aggregate installed nuclear capacity in the world had been only 5 MW, and in 1967 10 000 MW, it was today 100 000 MW, with some 200 000 MW under construction or in the advanced stage of planning.

26. That extremely positive picture had to be balanced against the levelling off in orders for nuclear power plants in the past two years. So far in 1978 some 17 nuclear power plants were reported to be in various stages of negotiation in the free market economies, but very few firm orders had been placed. Admittedly, the recession which affected the economies of many major industrialized countries and the energy conservation measures required by higher fuel prices had led to a somewhat lower rate of increase in energy consumption. That trend in turn was also reflected in the decline of orders for conventional

power plants. Still, it had to be recognized that the use of nuclear energy for power production in many countries no longer represented as attractive a solution to their power problems as it had appeared to offer a few years ago. The uneasiness and uncertainty of governmental authorities was exemplified by the following statement, made by the Swedish Under-Secretary of State, at the opening of an IAEA meeting held in Stockholm two weeks previously:

"I believe, and millions of others believe, that there are still important problems associated with nuclear power which remain unsolved and that the worries consequently are well-founded and legitimate. For instance, I don't think there is anyone today who is not prepared to admit that the problems of the back-end of the fuel cycle have been neglected over the years and that satisfactory solutions still remain to be worked out. The link between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the risk for proliferation of nuclear weapons has emerged as a major issue. Many questions are asked about the true costs of nuclear power. And an issue which is increasingly discussed relates to the social impact of nuclear power".

27. The misguided hesitation expressed in that statement was striking against a background of heavy investment by industrialized countries in power reactors, enrichment facilities, reprocessing plants and fast breeder prototypes, allied with projections of electricity production indicating a growing need for nuclear power. At the Bonn summit held in July 1978, leaders of the Western world had declared that "the further development of nuclear energy is indispensable and the slippage in the execution of nuclear programmes must be reversed". He would endeavour to make a brief analysis of the main factors which had led to that situation.

28. The century preceding the Second World War had been called the golden age of engineering. During that period the Suez Canal had been inaugurated, the three-phase alternating current generator and the internal combustion engine had been invented, the first trans-Atlantic cables had been laid, and wireless communications had been started. During that period achievements in engineering had been based on progress in the pure and applied sciences. Both theoretical and experimental research on the propagation of electromagnetic waves had led to the development of telecommunications, the discovery of radioactivity had thrown new light on the structure of matter, and the invention of ammonia synthesis had played a decisive role in the development of the chemical industry in general and of fertilizers in particular. There had been a general belief that scientists and engineers had a great mission to perform; to make life more comfortable, with fewer anxieties and more possibilities for everyone. Scientists and engineers had worked with the feeling that they were contributing to the social and economic advancement of human society.

29. The spirit of that period had been characterized by the saying: "The difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer". During the past twenty-five years that confidence had waned and the belief in the benefits of technical development had changed in some quarters to a mistrust and a questioning of the necessity and usefulness of further applications of science and technology. Technology in itself was now regarded by large circles as a malevolent force.

30. In some countries, Governments, although elected in democratic ways, were being prevented by pressure groups from introducing major technological innovations. Just how widely the ideas of those groups were shared was unknown, but those who espoused them were adamant and vociferous; they had access to news media and they exercised considerable political influence, although referenda had shown consistently that those in favour of nuclear energy outnumbered those against by two to one.

31. The phenomenon was particularly evident in the highly industrialized affluent countries with market economies. The developing countries, with more than two thirds of the world's population, were still primarily concerned with how to gain access to modern technologies on the best terms and how to use technology to further their economic development and self-reliance. The countries with centrally planned economies also continued to regard science and technology as benevolent forces. In that context Lenin's remarks about the urgent need for electricity production and its importance for the advancement of society seemed apposite. Positive opinions of science and technology would no doubt also be put forward at the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, to be held in Vienna in August 1979.

32. The present opposition of some sectors of the public in affluent societies to nuclear power was only one aspect of the changed attitude towards science and technology in general. Although everybody wished to benefit from all the conveniences which electric energy made available, further development was considered unnecessary by certain groups. Very little thought was given to the means required to maintain the standard of living in the developed countries, not to mention what was needed to raise the standard of living in the developing countries. Very little thought was given, either, to the question of how to secure food and water for a population that would probably reach the 6000 million level by the end of the century. Using terms like "appropriate", "soft" or "intermediate" technology, to conceal the inadequacy of their proposals, those

wishful thinkers apparently wanted a world where the developing countries could make do with windmills while the developed would content themselves with zero growth, although continuing to enjoy the benefits of past industrial development. Small non-conventional energy sources might be the best solution to the problem of energy supply in small rural communities, but they could not turn the wheels of industrialization of a country.

33. In such a turmoil of unclear thinking, nuclear energy had become the symbol of the "hard" technology which those who did not believe in technical development were now so vigorously criticizing. There might be two explanations for that. One was that the consequences of a slow-down or halt in the planning and construction of nuclear power stations were not immediately felt. The difficulties would only appear six to ten years later in the form of a lack of electrical energy, for which the utilities and electricity boards would then be held responsible. Part of the difficulty lay in the different time-frames in which scientists or engineers, as opposed to politicians, operated. Surely, for instance, advocates of a decision to stop using artificial fertilizers, the greatest polluting agent of our surroundings, would never get much support because the consequences would be felt within a year's time and their responsibility for such a decision would still be fresh in the public mind.

34. Another reason why nuclear energy had become a scapegoat lay in the conscious or unconscious association in most people's minds between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. However, the first of the two arguments, the changed attitude towards science and technology, and the under-estimation of the importance of an assured energy supply for the whole economy, was surely the more important.

35. The lesson of the oil crisis in 1973 seemed to have been forgotten already. People must be brought to understand that without abundant cheap energy they would not be able to continue to enjoy their present privileges in the developed world; nor would they be able to assist in raising to a decent level the standard of living in the developing countries. During the preparation of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, the attitude of developing countries had been that they could accept the environmental consequences of industrialization, because poverty was the worst pollution.

36. He was an advocate of nuclear energy, but at the same time he was in favour of making efforts to use and develop other promising sources of energy. An objective comparison must be made between energy options for the guidance of

decision-makers. Nothing had so far led him to change his conviction that nuclear energy would show up very well in such a comparison.

37. Regarding the second argument, the association between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, there had so far been no case where a country had gone about developing nuclear explosives by constructing a nuclear power plant. In the ten-year period from 1945 to 1954, three countries had developed nuclear explosives. Between 1955 and 1964, two other countries had done so, and between 1965 and 1974 only one country had. During that time the nuclear capacity in the world had grown from 5 MW in 1955 to 54 000 MW in 1974, in 19 countries. That alone indicated that there was no relationship between the expansion of nuclear power and the development of nuclear explosives.

38. More should be done, by the Agency as well, to face up to the critics of nuclear power and discover their reasons for opposing it. It was not a question of convincing anyone, but of helping them to see the problems of nuclear energy in the right perspective in relation to the problems inherent in alternative sources of energy.

39. In addition, there were other problems which an operator of a nuclear power station had to deal with. He was supposed to be able to satisfy the electricity needs of his customers. To do that he required fuel for his plant, and, in order to obtain fuel, he had to be able to give a credible assurance that his nuclear power plant was serving peaceful purposes only. Most producers of nuclear fuel now required that a customer must have acceded to NPT or otherwise have accepted full-scope Agency safeguards.

40. NPT had so far been ratified or acceded to by 104 countries. Non-nuclear-weapon States party to NPT promised not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and to accept Agency safeguards as a means of verifying their adherence to that commitment.

41. The Treaty represented the fundamental basis for all the deliberations connected with the proliferation problem. It was a solemn undertaking which, together with safeguards provisions, was the best achievable guarantee that peaceful nuclear development would not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

42. A country which had signed NPT and with which the Agency had concluded an agreement on the implementation of safeguards might nevertheless be subject to a number of other restrictions imposed by the supplying country as a condition

for delivery of nuclear fuel. Such conditions had been introduced by the United States of America through a non-proliferation act adopted in March 1978, the purpose of which was further to reduce the risk of proliferation. Although that was national legislation, it had wide-ranging implications and involved a new export control system. It also provided for a number of restrictive measures regarding reprocessing and re-transfer out of the receiving State which many States might find it difficult to accept. The practical consequences of such legislation would, of course, depend upon the way in which it was implemented. An important feature of the new legislation was the requirement that a country receiving nuclear material or equipment from the United States must be a party to NPT or must accept full-scope safeguards. If all supplier States were to adopt that policy, the non-proliferation regime would become universal and many problems would be eliminated.

43. Most of the enriched material used in some eighty light-water reactors outside the United States of America was imported from that country and, therefore, the new conditions which might be attached to deliveries of fuel and equipment would be the subject of careful study by the importing countries. As was always the case when access to a process or material was made difficult or denied, the imposition of restrictions initiated activities to circumvent them. In the nuclear field, where enrichment technology remained classified, that had resulted in the development of a number of new processes of uranium enrichment and even in the establishment of multinational undertakings. Serious problems might arise if the restrictions were felt to be too severe by the recipients.

44. Anxiety about the risk of nuclear proliferation had led to the raising of technical questions about the purpose of the Agency's safeguards system and to a number of new projects and studies.

45. The objective of safeguards as defined by the Board of Governors was "the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection". The question now under discussion was how soon a diversion would have to be detected in order to keep the risk of manufacture of a nuclear explosive to a minimum and what detection times were needed for different types and forms of nuclear material.

46. The purpose of the debate was certainly to strengthen the safeguards system. It had, however, serious implications for certain technical activities, e.g. reprocessing, bulk handling facilities for fuel element production, and breeder

reactors, which would not make it easier for utilities to choose nuclear power as an attractive alternative to conventional power.

47. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which had been launched on the initiative of the United States of America in October 1977 and in which 53 countries and four international organizations were participating, had as its chief aim to minimize the danger of proliferation without jeopardizing the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in recognition of the need to make nuclear energy widely available. That work was financed from a special fund to which 29 countries had voluntarily contributed. The amount of material already assembled was impressive; some 400 reports and papers totalling 8000 pages had been produced.

48. Interest in and support for INFCE were encouraging. Nuclear power was entering a new phase where more countries were planning to construct fuel cycle facilities in addition to power stations. That development would affect safeguards and international supply agreements and would have environmental and economic implications; review and planning would be necessary so that the basis for a stable international regime for nuclear energy might be established. An international consensus should be achieved on the basis of non-discriminatory access and self-restraint by all concerned. Only such an international consensus could eventually lead to more harmonious relations between suppliers and recipients of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.

49. The results of INFCE should provide a timely input to the Second Review Conference of the Parties to NPT, to be held in 1980. While an international consensus on some aspects of the control articles would be crucial to the future successful implementation of the Treaty, it must be remembered that for the majority of countries attending the Conference the implementation of Article IV, concerned with international co-operation, and of Article VI, on disarmament, was the most important question.

50. Non-nuclear-weapon States understandably desired a clear-cut commitment on the supply of nuclear materials. While they had accepted Agency safeguards, in the elaboration of which they had been able to participate and the implementation of which they controlled through the Board of Governors, they were very much concerned about unilateral restrictions and uncertainties in international supply contracts. The case-by-case approach should be replaced by internationally accepted principles.

51. Proliferation was a political problem to be dealt with by political, not technical means. Rather than denying sensitive technologies on a selective basis, a serious effort should be made to set up joint regional or international ventures

under Agency safeguards, in which any interested country could participate. Regional fuel cycle centres and international plutonium storage sites should be given priority consideration. Countries should be encouraged to accept full fuel cycle safeguards and then given full access to peaceful nuclear technology. The Agency should continue to improve its safeguards system and benefit from the experience gained.

52. After the INFCE Final Conference and the Second NPT Review Conference, both to be held in 1980, the Agency planned to organize a second major conference on nuclear energy and its fuel cycle in 1981 or 1982. An international conference had also been suggested by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

53. Another question to which considerable attention had been given during the past few years was the physical protection of nuclear materials against misuse by sub-national groups. Progress had been made on a draft International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities. Plutonium storage was another matter which was being studied both by Member States and by the Secretariat.

54. It was most unfortunate that all the measures taken to control the peaceful fuel cycle tended to distract attention from the real threat to peace represented by the existing nuclear weapons arsenals that continued to grow steadily.

55. The situation of the nuclear power industry was a paradoxical one. On the one hand, the rising price of oil and other fuels had made nuclear plants even more economical; the operating reactors, currently representing some 1600 reactor years, had an unparalleled safety record and had shown good reliability; the environmental impact was much smaller than that of conventional power stations. On the other hand, the electric power utilities had to be able to plan ahead. It was an industry subject to a great deal of governmental regulation and, in most countries, dependent on supplies from abroad. The industry needed what it had had in the 1960s - confidence in clear governmental policies and in the availability of fuel and services from other countries where necessary; confidence that sites could be found and plants built without interminable and expensive legal complications.

56. Many of those problems were national, and each State had to cope with its particular difficulties. Other problems were international, and there the Agency should assume a more active role.

57. It was his firm opinion that the Agency's technical assistance programme formed a cornerstone of the Agency's work. From everything he had said it would be clear how much importance he attached to NPT, especially to its universal acceptance. But what was said in Article IV of the Treaty about mutual assistance required not only goodwill from the affluent countries, but also financial support.

58. As chief administrative officer of the Agency he had no right formally to propose a target for voluntary contributions to the technical assistance programme. However, considering that the average cost of a single nuclear power plant was of the order of \$1000 million and the suggested target for technical assistance was \$8.5 million, the least he could do was to make an appeal to all Member States to be generous in supporting the technical assistance programme.

59. Mr. HYVARINEN (Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disarmament) read a message from Mr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations. In his message, Mr. Waldheim sent his best wishes for a successful session of the General Conference and stated that, in an era of technological progress, the importance of nuclear energy as a vehicle of economic and social development was evident. Nuclear energy could be of the greatest benefit to mankind, but it could also be destructive. The International Atomic Energy Agency had a most important role to play, both in making nuclear energy accessible to nations for their development and in applying safeguards against its misuse.

The meeting rose at 12 o'clock noon.