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on Tuesday, 4 December 1979, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. SETHNA (India)

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STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATE OF NIGERIA

1. Mr. OMOLODUN (Nigeria), speaking on behalf of the countries of the Group of 77, questioned the validity of the credentials presented by the South African delegation and requested the President to bring the matter up for consideration.
2. The PRESIDENT said that since a point of order had been raised by the representative of Nigeria it was incumbent upon him to rule on it immediately in accordance with Rule 56 of the Rules of Procedure. Applying the terms of Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, the President stated that the delegate of South Africa would be seated provisionally with the same rights as other delegates until the General Committee, meeting as a credentials committee, had considered the matter raised by the delegate of Nigeria and had reported thereon to the General Conference for a decision.

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GENERAL FUND FOR 1980

3. The PRESIDENT recalled that the Board of Governors had recommended a sum of \$10.5 million as the target for voluntary contributions for 1980. Although that figure represented a considerable increase over 1979, it was still modest in face of the needs of the developing countries.
4. He therefore appealed to all countries, especially the industrialized nations and other affluent countries, to make an additional effort and to pledge, before the closing of the present session, contributions representing fractions of the target equal to or if possible greater than their shares of the assessed budget. By doing so they would re-emphasize the importance attached to technical assistance and enable the Secretariat to make an immediate start on implementing the Agency's technical assistance programme for 1980.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE GENERAL CONFERENCE

5. The PRESIDENT recalled that the agenda could not be adopted by the General Conference until after the meeting of the General Committee, which was to be held the next day. Since, however, it was laid down in Article V.E.4 of the Statute that "The General Conference shall: Consider the annual report of the Board", he suggested waiving the provisions of Article 42(a) of the Rules of Procedure, under which the General Committee should consider the provisional agenda at the beginning of each session of the General Conference, and going straight on to the general debate.

6. It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1978

7. Mr. SMITH (United States of America) read out the following message from the President of the United States of America.

"On behalf of the American people, I would like to send my best wishes to the participants in the IAEA's twenty-third General Conference.

"Nuclear power can be critical in the urgent efforts we must make - individually and jointly - to reduce our dependence on dwindling and sometimes insecure fossil fuel supplies. Our extensive co-operative and supply relationships with other countries are major elements in expanding the utilization of nuclear power.

"Our ability to derive its full benefits will depend upon greater public confidence that this important energy source is being developed and managed in a safe and effective manner. Misuse of the technology will gravely affect the security of all nations and it is vital that we intensify our joint efforts to halt the spread of nuclear explosives.

"Difficult challenges often provide great opportunities. By working together I believe we can fulfil the promise of the atom for a better and more peaceful world.

"The United States recognizes the central role that the IAEA is playing in these endeavours. We intend to continue providing strong support for the programmes of the Agency.

"It is my hope and the hope of the American people that as we enter the 1980s we can renew our efforts to pursue nuclear development in a harmonious and rewarding fashion."

8. The United States recognized the need for nuclear power and would meet its commitments in relation to peaceful nuclear co-operation. At the same time, there would be need for renewed efforts to meet the challenges facing the nuclear power industry, including public concern about safety, waste disposal, proliferation and assurance of supply.
9. Committed to improving reactor safety, his country recognized that reactor operators should be more highly trained, that regulatory agencies should be properly organized and that there was need for more effective response to emergencies. Although the Three Mile Island incident had brought to light certain shortcomings, it should not be seen as putting nuclear energy beyond the pale but rather as an encouragement to greater vigilance. His country would continue to share with the Agency and its Member States the results of the investigation still under way.

10. Radioactive waste disposal presented considerable social problems and joint efforts in that respect would have to be stepped up in order to convince the public of the feasibility of waste disposal in geological formations. With regard to the disposal of spent fuel, the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), in particular, should make for greater confidence. In that connection there was growing awareness that reprocessing was not essential and that other options existed.

11. There was growing apprehension that additional countries might acquire nuclear explosives and it was vital to ensure that that did not happen, in view of the serious impact on nuclear commerce as well as on international security and stability.

12. His country realized how important it was to maintain confidence in nuclear supply agreements concluded with countries meeting non-proliferation conditions. The issue of export licences and the exercise of national controls should be subject to a stricter approach. To that end the United States was ready to work closely with other countries and to apply its laws along those lines. Consumer states also had responsibilities in that connection, since the way they used their technology could have an important effect on the actions of suppliers. His country was prepared to help other countries to prospect for and develop their natural uranium resources, and it was encouraging to see that according to one of INFCE's conclusions enrichment capacity would be sufficient to meet likely demand at least until the end of the century.

13. In view of the possibility of improving fuel utilization in thermal reactors, plutonium recycling appeared unnecessary, only marginally economic and imprudent for the time being from the standpoint of non-proliferation.

14. Although some countries were proceeding with breeder reactor research and development (for which reprocessing was required), he believed that there were reasons, from both the economic and non-proliferation points of view, for limiting the number of reprocessing plants to a few large-scale facilities and gearing reprocessing capacity to the short-term plutonium demand for research and development on advanced reactors; and it would become extremely important to ensure that the resultant plutonium was subject to rigorous international control.

15. In the United States it was thought that breeder reactors were likely to be economically viable only in those countries which had an advanced infrastructure and a distribution grid of suitable size. That did not mean that the use of breeders must be limited to certain countries at the expense of others, but there would be time, before selecting an advanced technology, to look at the various options and modernize the international non-proliferation arrangements.

16. The Agency would play an important part in meeting the challenges described. Accordingly, his Government strongly supported the Director General's proposal for an intensification of the Agency's efforts in nuclear safety and would continue to support the safeguards programme. The United States had contributed \$5.1 million to that programme in the current year and called upon other countries to increase their contributions too. Furthermore, States should design their nuclear facilities with the effective application of safeguards in mind.

17. Since the number of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had increased, it was hoped that the application of full-scope safeguards would become the norm for the international nuclear trade.

18. The Agency was to be congratulated on its role in the conclusion of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which should help to discourage diversion by terrorists or other sub-national groups.

19. Subject to approval by Congress, the United States would increase its voluntary contribution to the Agency's technical assistance activities in 1980, and was also planning to implement its special technical assistance programme which had been outlined at the recent session of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. His country considered that its co-operation under Article IV of NPT had been satisfactory, and it would continue to seek ways of meeting even more responsively the needs of the developing countries. It endorsed the Agency's study on spent fuel and was taking an active part in examining the question whether an international plutonium regime could reinforce existing non-proliferation measures.

20. The United States welcomed the Secretariat's contribution to ensuring the usefulness of INFCE and believed that the Agency would have an important part to play in the post-INFCE work. Since that activity did not foreshadow any major technical hitches, institutional measures providing sounder assurance in

respect of both supply and non-proliferation should be promptly adopted; the United States planned to follow that course in fact, in its legislation and in its policy.

21. With the conclusion of the work of INFCE, the remaining problem was to resolve residual differences and to move towards an even more effective non-proliferation regime, within the context of international co-operation, so that nuclear energy could fulfil the essential role destined for it in meeting the needs of many countries.

22. Mr. de CARVALHO (Brazil), having congratulated the President on his election and thanked the Indian Government for its hospitality, stressed the impact that the present energy crisis could have on the pursuit of economic development and improvement in the quality of life, more especially in the less affluent countries. It was only by means of research that alternative energy sources to replace oil could be found. The results already obtained by the industrialized countries were such as to make possible an immediate transfer of technology for the benefit of developing countries.

23. Countries now at the initial stage of economic development had need of far more energy than the industrialized countries. According to forecasts by the World Energy Conference, 2000 hexajoules would be required annually by the year 2020. By that time all hydroelectric resources would have been harnessed, oil production would have sharply declined and gas production would also have dropped off. Hence coal, nuclear energy and solar energy would have to meet two thirds of the world's requirements.

24. Since the construction of new facilities and the change in energy consumption patterns would require time, it was essential to draw up long-term programmes right away, especially in the nuclear sector. Indeed, nuclear reactors, particularly fast breeders and controlled fusion reactors, could provide a virtually inexhaustible source of energy.

25. However, there were at the present time a number of obstacles in the way of the development of nuclear energy. In the troubled climate created by the rapid evolution of society and technology, public opinion, swayed by the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, failed to grasp the difference between the peaceful and military applications of nuclear energy and tended to oppose them both.

Because of that opinion Governments were subjected to pressures and the utilities were forced to discontinue their nuclear programmes, which meant that the tremendous effort already made would have been wasted. The energy supply would therefore decline and social problems would thereby be made still worse.

26. Hence it was essential in all countries to keep the public informed and to explain to them in every possible way what nuclear energy really meant. The Agency could render very valuable assistance in that respect by organizing meetings and seminars, and would be well advised to launch an ambitious information campaign on the subject, to which it should accord just as much importance as to non-proliferation.

27. The Agency also had a vital part to play in technical assistance, where it could help the developing countries to make up for lost time. The funds available to it for that purpose were unfortunately too scant - they did not even amount to the cost of one power reactor. That fact indicated once again that there was an imbalance between the activities relating to technical assistance and safeguards, with the industrialized countries constantly assigning to safeguards an importance that was out of all proportion. The developing countries expected the Agency to help them to gain independence in the field of technology so that they need not rely any more on the industrialized countries. In order to do so the Agency would, among other things, have to expand its training programme, to which his Government attached great value.

28. Countries which decided to launch a nuclear power programme should take a number of factors into consideration when selecting the most appropriate fuel cycle, among them the comparative cost of different cycles, their balance of payments, capital and manpower resources, and their industrial infrastructure. Since the implementation of such programmes covered a number of years, those countries must also make long-term predictions. First and foremost, they should make an exact assessment of their uranium resources and, if necessary, gauge their degree of dependence on other countries. States requesting the Agency to help them with such evaluations or to assist them in exploiting their uranium reserves were steadily increasing in number. Hence the Agency had an important part to play in that field and was, furthermore, administering to an ever greater extent the funds allocated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to uranium prospecting and production projects.

29. Brazil possessed extensive energy resources. For the time being it still relied heavily on imported oil, but its hydro resources were immense and it was hoped that the country would shortly have an installed capacity of more than 200 000 MW. At the present time a 12 600 MW hydroelectric power plant was being constructed jointly with Paraguay at Itaipu. Brazil's uranium resources were likewise considerable, both because of the size of the national territory and the wide variety of uranium-bearing rocks. Brazil had therefore been carrying out prospecting on a vast scale since 1971, as a result of which 87 500 tons of assured reserves and 106 300 tons of probable reserves had been evaluated. Since the finds were multiplying rapidly, his country could henceforth be considered a uranium and thorium supplier.

30. As soon as countries had evaluated their resources, they could draw up plans for future power plants. The Agency had done a very good job in publishing codes of practice compiled by expert groups; they were readily usable by all Member States and would promote the transfer of technology. It was Brazil, in fact, which had urged the Agency to put out such guides and had taken part financially in the venture.

31. In 1978, a number of new nuclear power plants had been built, especially in Japan and France. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries had announced an expansion of their nuclear power programmes and the Republic of Korea had placed an order for two plants. That trend had not been followed, however, by the countries of North America and Europe as a whole. Brazil had increased its electricity production, which now stood at 122 000 million kWh. If the present trend was maintained, by the beginning of the next century the country would possess an installed capacity of more than 200 000 MW, although, for geographical and economic reasons, it would have to rely increasingly heavily on nuclear power. The first nuclear power plant, at Angra dos Reis, would shortly be put into service. The first unit was undergoing tests and two more units were being built.

32. He concluded by thanking the Secretariat for the fine work it had done in 1979, and expressed special appreciation to Mr. Bittencourt. The Agency would undoubtedly continue to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

33. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland), congratulating the President on his election and thanking the Indian Government for its hospitality, expressed satisfaction at the steady progress made by the Agency in its activities aimed at promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and guarding against the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, as reflected in the annual report for 1978. Ireland, which had been the first country to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in July 1968, was gratified to note that the number of States which had acceded to the Treaty continued to grow, although it was concerned at the increase in the number of States operating facilities which were not subject to the Agency's safeguards system.

34. The annual report indicated a substantial rise in the volume of technical assistance provided by the Agency to developing countries, and he was pleased to announce that his country would make a voluntary contribution of US \$16 800 to the General Fund in 1980.

35. The report and the Director General's statement had rightly drawn attention to the problems facing the nuclear industry, which were undoubtedly due in large measure to the growth of public misgivings about the safety of nuclear power plants. Although ensuring nuclear safety was essentially the responsibility of national authorities, the Agency could play an important part in that regard by preparing codes of practice and safety guides and through its training, advisory, research and information programmes.

36. The problem of the disposal of radioactive waste was causing increasing concern all over the world and Ireland was especially anxious about disposal in the marine environment. It welcomed the Agency's activities in that important area and, in particular, the preparation of definitions and recommendations relating to dumping in the sea under the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention)^{1/}.

37. His delegation commended the progress of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which had set an example in international co-operation and to which the Agency's Secretariat had made a valuable contribution. The final report of INFCE would undoubtedly be very useful to the NPT Review Conference to be held in 1980.

38. The Irish delegation had noted with satisfaction the successful conclusion of negotiations for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which should facilitate international co-operation in dealing with problems which might arise from hazardous nuclear materials.

^{1/} The text of the Convention is reproduced in document INFCE/205.

39. Ireland, which imported more than 80% of the energy it required, recognized the need to diversify its sources of energy and had in 1973 approved in principle the construction of a 600-MW nuclear power station, although a final decision was yet to be taken. The Irish Government intended to establish a special tribunal which would hold a public enquiry on all aspects of the proposal.

40. Since becoming a Member of the Agency in 1970 Ireland had benefited greatly from the Agency's services, especially as it was interested in the applications of nuclear techniques in industry, agriculture, health and other areas. In order that Ireland, for its part, might better contribute to the Agency's work, it had decided to be a candidate for membership of the Board of Governors.

41. Mr. HAUNSCHILD (Federal Republic of Germany) extended his congratulations to the President on his election and expressed his gratitude to the latter as well as to the Indian Government for their generous hospitality in New Delhi. He observed that without further expansion of nuclear power in the decades to come, it would be difficult to ensure economic growth and a higher employment rate. Stringent measures to save energy and the development of other energy sources could not replace the contribution which nuclear power offered in the context of the growing demand for energy.

42. Nevertheless, nuclear programmes had continued to decrease in the past few years because the nuclear safety issue had become the subject of a public debate, and it was for Governments and the international organizations to re-establish, by way of frank and complete information, national and international confidence in nuclear energy, without which the vast potential of nuclear power could not be fully realized.

43. In the Federal Republic the nuclear debate had become more objective thanks to a review of safety measures in nuclear power stations, which had shown no need for immediate corrective action, and to the report on a comprehensive risk assessment undertaken at the request of the Federal Government, which had arrived at similar conclusions for conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany as the Rasmussen study had arrived at. As to the end phase of the fuel cycle, thorough discussions between the Federal Government and the State Governments had resolved certain differences of opinion between the former and the State Government responsible for licensing the proposed fuel cycle centre, reconfirming the integrated concept comprising the reprocessing of spent fuel and the conditioning and disposal of waste.

44. During the preceding year the Agency had demonstrated its ability to adjust itself to new demands as, for example, the need for intensified discussion of reactor safety. The Three Mile Island incident had had repercussions in the Agency; reactions of Member States and discussions in the Board of Governors had shown that activities in the field of nuclear safety should be accorded a higher priority. In letters to the Director General and to the Heads of Government of all Member States represented on the Board of Governors, his Government had emphasized that the Agency, as a world body, should play a basic role in the international co-ordination of all matters relating to the safety of nuclear power plants and had called upon the Agency to enlarge the scope of its activities in that area considerably. The Federal Republic welcomed the Agency's plans to expand the nuclear safety standards (NUSS) programme to a substantial extent, to make intensified use of safety missions, to hold international meetings on the subject and to prepare a roster of safety experts. Like other Governments, the Federal Republic was willing to provide additional financial support so that a larger nuclear safety programme could be included in the Regular Budget. It was also willing to make experts available for implementing that programme as speedily as possible.

45. Referring to the conclusions of the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, which had pointed out the need for improvements in technology transfer to developing countries, he emphasized that with its long experience in providing technical assistance, the Agency set an excellent example of how technology transfer could be organized and promoted through specific projects. His country also noted with satisfaction that the Regular Budget included many programmes of interest to the developing countries. The Agency had in that respect gained a good reputation within the United Nations system, as was evident from the fact that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had channelled considerable funds through the Agency. The Federal Republic welcomed the increase in the total amount earmarked for technical assistance activities and would make a voluntary contribution corresponding to its base rate of assessment, as well as other contributions in the form of fellowships, services of experts, training courses and scientific conferences and programmes of particular interest to developing countries. Its total voluntary contribution in 1980 would amount to about US \$2 million.

46. The Agency's activities aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy had developed remarkably in recent years. Apart from safeguards, which remained the centre-piece of the Agency's work in that area, it had developed new activities which strengthened its role as a forum for international debate on a wide range of questions concerning nuclear energy. In that context, the conclusion of the discussions on a Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was to be commended.

47. The Safeguards Implementation Report for 1978, which marked a noticeable improvement both in presentation and in content, gave a clear exposition of the Agency's activities relating to the practical application of safeguards. He also noted with satisfaction that the Agency had intensified its studies on the particular problems posed by the application of safeguards to sensitive facilities such as reprocessing plants, mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants and enrichment facilities. Many aspects such as a proper relationship between accountancy methods on the one hand and containment and surveillance on the other still needed to be studied in detail. The Government of the Federal Republic had agreed with the Agency on a safeguards support programme which was making satisfactory progress.

48. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) formed the principal basis for the Agency's work in the area of safeguards. Although NPT was not universal, 108 non-nuclear-weapon States and three nuclear-weapon States had become parties to it and the list of States acceding to the Treaty was growing steadily. Efforts should be made to create the political conditions which would make adherence to the Treaty or to its major principles both possible and attractive. The second NPT Review Conference, to be held in 1980, should provide an occasion for establishing among the parties a solid common basis of understanding on the major elements of the Treaty in order to motivate other States to join and to avoid impairing the consensus reached in the late 1960s.

49. The Federal Republic attached great importance to the fact that three nuclear-weapon States - the United States, the United Kingdom and France - had taken steps to subject their non-military uses of nuclear energy to the Agency's safeguards. It called upon the Soviet Union, one of the depositaries of the Treaty, to follow their example. Inspections in those States would provide valuable experience for Agency inspectors and would increase international confidence; also, they would reduce the impression of discrimination in peaceful nuclear activities - discrimination that was not inherent in the principles of non-proliferation.

50. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) was to be completed in a few months, and he wished to make a few preliminary observations on its outcome. The Evaluation, involving some 60 States and five international organizations as participants, had contributed to improving mutual understanding among States with different political, economic and social structures and to making the international debate more objective and less ideological than before. Many

of the developing countries, and in particular those which had already embarked on a nuclear programme, had actively participated in the dialogue. Among the many results achieved by INFCE two could be singled out, namely that the nuclear option was essential to meet the world's growing energy needs and that there was no uniform criterion which could be applied in deciding for or against a particular fuel cycle in a given State or region.

51. He observed, as he had done at the preceding session of the Conference, that it would be desirable to determine a set of co-ordinated measures enjoying a wide consensus which could be submitted at the end of the Evaluation to Governments for their decision. A new world-wide consensus on nuclear energy and non-proliferation could be achieved in a "modular" way on the basis of the INFCE results. In that regard a variety of practical measures were already under discussion: further development of Agency safeguards, which had been discussed intensively at INFCE meetings and was being pursued vigorously by the Agency; international storage of excess plutonium, which was under study by an Agency expert group; and international co-operation in spent fuel management, which was being investigated by another group under the auspices of the Agency. There were other areas identified by INFCE where it now seemed to be necessary to move from the stage of study to that of technical development and demonstration, for example the use of low-enriched fuel for research reactors and modifications of reprocessing technologies. In discussing new technical solutions which would make it possible to use nuclear energy to satisfy demand while minimizing proliferation risks, one had not only to satisfy oneself that those solutions were technically feasible but also to demonstrate to users that they conformed to their needs.

52. Lastly, he wished to underline the importance of assured fuel supplies for industrialized and developing countries alike. In that respect, INFCE had evolved the interesting concept of back-up arrangements in the event of interruptions in fuel supply. That concept, and also the proposal to establish a technological centre to promote technology transfer to developing countries, deserved to be studied.

53. The Federal Republic considered that, as soon as INFCE finished its work, its results should be studied in a systematic manner. Because of its experience, its mandate and its universality, the Agency was well equipped to tackle that task in co-operation with national programmes and international and regional

organizations. However, the Agency alone could bring together all countries interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and provide a platform where all views could be expressed.

54. An early discussion of those issues could also help in the preparation of the second NPT Review Conference and widen the scope of the next major Salzburg-type conference of the Agency.

55. In conclusion, he wished to thank the Director General and his staff for the excellent work they had done in the preceding year and assured them of his country's continued support.

56. Mr. PRIBICEVIC (Yugoslavia), congratulating the President on his election, said that Mr. Sethna, who represented a non-aligned country and the host Government, would undoubtedly contribute to the success of the present session of the General Conference.

57. International political and economic relations were going through a difficult phase. The economic situation of the developing countries was worsening. The energy crisis seemed to show that nuclear power alone could satisfy the demand of an increasing number of countries whose economic and social development was at stake.

58. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons was causing great concern. Under the pretext of wishing to stress the proliferation of nuclear weapons, certain countries were imposing restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology, especially to a number of developing countries which simply could not do without nuclear power. Such restrictions on technology transfer were contrary to the Statute and to NPT.

59. The non-aligned countries had stressed, particularly at the Havana Conference, the importance of nuclear power and denounced those restrictions, declaring that all countries had the right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They had condemned the monopolistic attitude of some countries which were attempting to solve nuclear problems in a closed circle, ignoring the world community, and had urged that an international conference be held within the United Nations system to promote international co-operation in the nuclear field.

60. The Yugoslav Government firmly believed that the problems of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and those of safeguards could be solved only by political means. Conferences like those held at Persepolis and Salzburg were useful, and

it was satisfying to know that when the next international conference on nuclear energy was convened it would be held under the auspices of the United Nations - an arrangement that would make it possible to take account of the aspirations of the developing countries and strengthen international confidence.

61. During the preceding year the Agency had successfully carried out its tasks in spite of difficult circumstances; it had even strengthened its role. His Government wished to express its gratitude for the assistance it had received in connection with the construction of the first nuclear power station in Yugoslavia. He hoped that the Agency would continue to provide assistance. Yugoslavia had launched an extensive nuclear programme which could be implemented only in a stable international climate with reliable supplies of fuel and equipment.

62. There were several problems which required to be solved at the present session. First, the lack of balance between promotional and safeguards activities could not satisfy the developing countries and would prevent the Agency from fulfilling its role. Technical assistance should be based on long-term planning and should be financed fully from the Regular Budget; and no distinction should be made between countries which had signed and countries which had not signed NPT. Second, Yugoslavia attached great importance to the amendment of Article VI of the Statute with a view to adapting it to present needs. Third, his country urged that in seeking a solution to the problem of plutonium and spent fuel storage, the Agency should take into account the right of States to assured supplies of fuel and equipment; in that regard it supported the Director General's proposal. Fourth, the Yugoslav Government would like the Agency to be involved actively in the NPT Review Conference in order to ensure a free transfer of technology, which was being threatened by certain countries who identified nuclear power development with proliferation.

63. In conclusion, he expressed satisfaction at the collaboration between his country and the Agency and hoped that Yugoslavia would be accorded membership of the Board.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.