



International Atomic Energy Agency

GENERAL CONFERENCE

GC(XXIV)/OR.223
March 1981*

GENERAL Distr.
ENGLISH

TWENTY-FOURTH REGULAR SESSION: 22-26 SEPTEMBER 1980

RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna
on Wednesday, 24 September 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. HAUNSCHILD (Federal Republic of Germany)
later: Mr. ROSSI GUERRERO (Venezuela)
again: Mr. HAUNSCHILD (Federal Republic of Germany)

CONTENTS

<u>Item of the agenda**</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>
4 Arrangements for the Conference	1 - 4
(a) Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items for initial discussion	1 - 2
(b) Closing date of the session and opening date of the next session	3 - 4
6 General debate and annual report for 1979 (resumed)	5 - 94
Statements by the delegates of:	
Bangladesh	5 - 12
Mexico	13 - 32
Poland	33 - 43
Holy See	44 - 54
Hungary	55 - 65
Canada	66 - 72
Bulgaria	73 - 80
Romania	81 - 87
Iran	88 - 94

*/ A provisional version of this document was issued on 1 October 1980.

**/ GC(XXIV)/637.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION

1. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that the General Committee, at its meeting the previous day, had authorized him to report on the results of its consideration of the agenda and the allocation of items for initial discussion. The General Committee recommended that the agenda should consist of all the items contained in the provisional agenda, as set out in document GC(XXIV)/626, and that the items should be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in that document.

2. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

3. The PRESIDENT further informed the Conference that the General Committee had authorized him to report that it recommended fixing Friday, 26 September 1980, as the closing date of the twenty-fourth regular session and Monday, 21 September 1981, as the opening date of the twenty-fifth regular session of the General Conference.

4. The recommendations of the General Committee were accepted.

Mr. Rossi Guerrero (Venezuela) took the Chair.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1979 (resumed)

5. Mr. HOSSAIN (Bangladesh) said that Bangladesh believed in the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind and had signed the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1979. It had thereby fulfilled its obligations to the international community to ensure peace and friendship by limiting all sources of destruction and using nuclear energy exclusively for the prosperity of mankind. A positive step towards limiting nuclear armaments and other weapons of mass annihilation was the paramount need of the present day if an atmosphere of trust and amity was to be created, particularly among the less developed nations. Although, together with many other countries, Bangladesh had demonstrated its firm belief in disarmament by signing NPT, if the major Powers did not sincerely intend to apply the Treaty it would be totally ineffective. The major Powers would have to take positive steps to gradually reduce their production

of nuclear weapons until it stopped altogether; then the aim must be to destroy the existing nuclear arsenals. He also firmly believed that, to ensure peace, conventional arms should also be substantially reduced in a gradual, systematic way. He was disappointed at the unsuccessful ending of the Second NPT Review Conference and agreed with Dr. Eklund's suggestion that a comprehensive test ban treaty would help create confidence among non-nuclear countries by eliminating discriminatory elements in NPT.

6. While appreciating the efforts of the Secretariat in preparing the Agency's programme for 1981-86 and the budget for 1981, he was concerned about the shortfall in the Technical Assistance Fund, despite the Board's target of \$13 million for 1981. He therefore repeated Bangladesh's request to the Agency to take every measure to increase the amount of technical assistance for developing countries, so as not only to balance the increasing cost of safeguards but also to meet the real needs of those countries. The following points deserved emphasis:

- (i) The IAEA should approach UNDP, the UNCTSD Interim Fund, CIDA and other funding bodies for research and development in order to increase the sums available for technical assistance;
- (ii) A revolving fund might be provided by the Agency for developing countries to use for emergency purposes;
- (iii) Seminars and symposia should be organized in developing countries to ensure a greater number of local participants; and
- (iv) Technical manpower and funds within the developing countries should be better utilized, in accordance with the TCDC concept, by establishing appropriate relationships between them.

7. According to expert opinion, the cost of nuclear power was becoming increasingly competitive with conventional energy sources, as oil and other fossil fuels had gradually risen in price while the price of uranium and enrichment services had remained fairly stable. His country was accordingly interested in having a nuclear power programme which might eliminate the shortage of electricity in Bangladesh, and thus protect its industrialization plans. It was also mindful of the benefits that would yield in science and technology. The main problems facing Bangladesh and other developing countries were that (i) they needed small and medium-sized reactors, the manufacture of which was gradually

decreasing, and (ii) the initial investment cost of nuclear power plants was very high and increasing annually. His delegation appreciated the Agency's concern about those problems and urged it to seek a solution, possibly by encouraging manufacturers to supply small and medium-size reactors to the developing countries and convincing OPEC countries and the World Bank and other financing agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank, to provide special credits for the developing countries, thus enabling them to procure such reactors.

8. Bangladesh was negotiating the purchase of a small but commercial power reactor and was grateful to the Agency for helping it to evaluate the technical bids. It hoped that the Agency would continue to support it and to help in many ways, such as by training staff for the power reactor.

9. In order to embark upon nuclear power programmes, the developing countries would require help with respect to the entire nuclear fuel cycle. While congratulating the Agency on the successful conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), he urged that the various reports should be made available as early as possible: they would reflect the developing countries' needs and show them how to obtain the requisite nuclear fuel cycle services. He expressed strong support for the establishment of regional fuel cycle centres under international control and management. Bangladesh would support the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), which was perhaps one of the first practical results of INFCE.

10. It was gratifying to note the Agency's work to strengthen its regional research activities under the RCA. Bangladesh had been actively participating in all RCA projects since its inception in 1972. It had also agreed to take part in the RCA programme on applications of isotope and radiation technology

under the UNDP five-year industrial project. It strongly supported the continuation of such projects with enhanced financial contributions by the IAEA and developed countries. He welcomed the recent accession of Japan and Australia to the Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA). It was to be hoped that through greater co-operation within the framework of the RCA it would soon be possible to open an IAEA Asian Regional Centre.

11. Bangladesh was committed to the peaceful utilization of atomic energy in the economic development of the country. In addition to research and development activities in different branches of atomic energy, important developments had taken place during the past year. The Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Savar was to be Bangladesh's main nuclear research establishment. The work at different institutes had been progressing according to schedule. The building for the Irradiation and Pest Control Research Institute (IPCORI) had been completed and a ⁶⁰Co radiation source installed for pilot studies. The laboratory was now fully operational in the new campus. An IBM fast computer (4000 series) was scheduled to be installed at Savar by the end of 1980. Building work for the installation of a 3-MW Triga Mark-II research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Technology was to start in two or three months' time. Two new nuclear medicine centres, one at Sylhet and one at Dinajpur, were under construction and would be operational by the end of 1980. Finally, exploration for uranium and other heavy minerals along the country's shoreline was in progress; the necessary test drilling and pilot plant work had started. He was grateful to the IAEA and UNDP for their help in that respect.

12. His delegation hoped that the Agency would be willing to increase its technical assistance to Bangladesh, in keeping with the country's needs. Bangladesh, for its part, was prepared to renew its pledge to co-operate in all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He felt confident that, under the able guidance of the Director General, the Agency would continue successfully to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the interests of peace and prosperity throughout the world.

13. Mr. COSTA-ALONSO (Mexico) said that his country, which throughout its contemporary history had adopted a humanistic and anti-war approach, desired to co-operate in all activities promoting healthy international co-existence and eagerly participated in all international forums which pursued that noble aim. It had therefore firmly supported the principles of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations, of free self-determination of peoples, of peaceful solution of conflicts and of observance of international treaties.

14. The present time was characterized by insecurity and distrust. It was no wonder that much of the effort to dispel them ran up against despair and cynicism, for war had hitherto been an incurable disease and the prevailing peace was nothing but an armed truce during which raged numerous civil wars and local conflicts.

15. Mexico was fighting for the freedom and dignity of man and for social justice, because war was not caused exclusively by political differences or confrontation of economic interests but was also due to poverty, misery, fear and social injustice.

16. In spite of the considerable efforts made by many nations to remove suspicion, fear and mutual distrust as factors contributing to war, comprehensive development must be promoted so as to eliminate the climate which engendered violence - only such development would remove the sharp contrasts between wealth and misery

existing among nations and social classes. The pursuit of universal peace should go hand in hand with comprehensive development, making a reality of the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since peace meant comprehensive development and development meant peace, such development had to be the goal of human society and should take the form of achieving full freedom and dignity of man where social justice was concerned. In the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency, development referred specifically to the capacity to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in economic development which would promote comprehensive development.

17. President López Portillo of Mexico had pointed out that, if more rational and fairer international economic relations could not be established, the present peace was bound to end in war, which would probably be the last for mankind; addressing the United Nations General Assembly, he had called for a world energy plan to achieve more rational energy consumption and to ensure transition and access to new non-hydrocarbon sources. That implied creating an environment in which interested nations could without delay embark on developing nuclear power so as to reap its benefits in the post-oil era. His country would be striving for such a plan involving the development and use of alternative sources of energy.

18. It was worth mentioning that Mexico and Venezuela had prepared a regional co-operation project on energy in Central America, under which countries with abundant energy resources would share them under certain conditions with those lacking such resources.

19. Comprehensive development must be based on universal, rational and equitable use of the basic energy resources. Without the distribution of technology, material and equipment essential for such development, war in some form would be inevitable.

20. Mexico viewed with deep concern the growing deterioration in international co-operation, as evidenced by the failure of the Second Conference to Review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held at Geneva. It was indeed to be regretted that, during review of the operation of the only international instrument designed to prevent the military uses and to guarantee the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, the participating countries had been unable to agree on a solution reconciling the application of safeguards with assurances of nuclear supply for developing countries.

21. Developing countries had not been compensated for their unilateral and free renunciation of nuclear weapons, and wondered whether NPT had not become an obstacle to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially as countries not party to the Treaty had ample access to nuclear technology. It was indeed an irritating paradox that after being in existence for a decade the Treaty was unable to halt the nuclear arms race and to result in the destruction of the existing nuclear arsenal but had proved effective in hindering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He emphatically pointed to the failure to fulfil the two main obligations under the Treaty, namely the obligation to initiate disarmament and the obligation to supply peaceful nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States.

22. As had been recognized at the Second NPT Review Conference, progress had been achieved in several areas; for example the Agency's safeguards activities under Article III of NPT had developed satisfactorily, the number of safeguards agreements concluded with the Agency had increased and no diversions or anomalies had been discovered through the application of safeguards in the preceding five years. The progress in national systems of accounting and control, in safeguards techniques, instrumentation and data processing, and in the rationalization of Agency inspections was commendable.

23. However, the developing countries had expressed their unanimous opposition to the unilateral imposition of additional conditions of supervision and control, which were beyond the safeguards requirements under Article III of NPT and lay outside the scope of the Agency's safeguards system.

24. Mexico considered such measures to be unacceptable because, first, they were contrary to the principle of self-determination in the matter of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article IV of NPT; second, they cast doubts on the efficacy and sufficiency of the Agency's safeguards system and undermined its application; third, they had been introduced without consulting or informing the other States party to NPT; and lastly, they assumed that additional restrictions were needed to ensure that importing States complied with their undertakings, in spite of the hitherto scrupulous observance of those undertakings by the States concerned; besides, those restrictions were incompatible with the sovereign rights of States and their independence.

25. His country wished to reiterate its full adherence to the Agency's safeguards system, which was multilateral and non-discriminatory, and regarded as inconsistent with NPT any measure which, under the pretext of preventing horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, placed restrictions in addition to those accepted by States under NPT.

26. The lack of a consensus concerning the operation of NPT was not something unique, and it was closely related to the difficult negotiations and slow progress observed at the Agency in connection with the expansion and financing of technical assistance. The debate on the latter subject indicated the obstacles in the way of fulfilment of the obligations under Article IV of NPT.

27. It must be pointed out that the "inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes", under Article IV.1 of NPT, could not be respected if the responsibility for the exchange of material, equipment and information with the less advanced countries was evaded.

28. His delegation hoped that the international mechanisms created by the world community to promote collaboration in development would not fail and that the Agency would play its part in reversing the trend, noticeable in certain events, which was discouraging developing countries.

29. The Agency should not be reduced to a status where it sent experts to inspect rudimentary facilities, granted fellowships to train scientists from countries lacking nuclear facilities and got involved in triangular assistance in the use of radioisotopes. If the aforementioned adverse conditions were not remedied, the Agency would lose its credibility, so that its viability as the supreme body for multilateral co-operation in the nuclear field would be called into question.

30. Although his country continued to hope that historical vision and political will would be shown in strengthening those areas of activity where the developing countries needed substantial impetus for their nuclear programmes, it feared that action could not be expected in the near future and regretted that the rare opportunities for the Agency's fully carrying out its functions were being lost.

31. Recalling, in particular, the terms of reference of the committee established by the Board in June 1980 to consider and advise on assurances of nuclear supply, he wondered why such a body was required if what the developing countries needed was a true forum to negotiate agreements involving the parties and not learned analyses of the state of the nuclear fuel cycle in the world. Adoption of joint declarations and codes of conduct were not likely to lead to more effective and less discriminatory co-operation, for the impediments to the transfer of nuclear technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons were political matters.

32. The establishment of that committee ought to lead to a new stage in the Agency's life, where countries could obtain pledges of supplies on a reliable and long-term basis, and thus to pave the way for negotiations. Otherwise, he feared that it would only help in maintaining the status quo and not be a challenge to the political will of the parties in the prevailing atmosphere of distrust and tension.

33. Mr. WYRZYKOWSKI (Poland) recalled that at the twenty-third session of the General Conference, in New Delhi, the Polish delegation had emphasized the importance of the urgent entry into force of SALT II. It was to be regretted that no progress had been made since that time towards ratification of the Treaty, though Poland still hoped it would come into force in the near future.

34. Another event which had caused deep concern to the Polish nation was the NATO decision in December 1979 to deploy new types of nuclear missiles in western Europe. Such acts did not serve to strengthen the policy of détente and disarmament.

35. One of the main tasks currently facing mankind was to protect the world from the dangers of the arms race. In that connection, NPT played an important role by helping to limit the territorial extent of the problem. Such a stabilizing effect was particularly important at a time when numerous destructive factors were tending to increase international tensions. Poland appealed to the Governments of other countries to join in the efforts to stop the arms race - a race which was encouraging various Powers to acquire nuclear weapons.

36. The recent Review Conference in Geneva had reconfirmed the importance of the NPT and had stressed the necessity of achieving real progress in the fields of arms limitation and disarmament, of developing international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of strengthening the Agency's safeguards activities.

37. After long scientific and technical studies, Poland had started construction work on its first nuclear power plant, of 880 MW capacity (later to be increased to 1000 MW). The country was relatively rich in coal, producing more than 200 million tons of hard coal and 50 million tons of lignite a year. However, the Polish Government believed that coal was a valuable resource and should not simply be burnt for power and heat generation purposes. It therefore planned further rapid development of nuclear power stations and also the construction of nuclear generating plants for district heating purposes. It was important to emphasize the fact that the rapidly growing demand for energy could not be met with coal only: a balanced development of different energy sources, and particularly nuclear energy, had become economically and technically essential.

38. Poland was in favour of international scientific and technical co-operation between countries interested in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Non-nuclear-weapon States should have guaranteed access to scientific and technical achievements and the practical applications of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. The Polish delegation wished to emphasize the direct connection that existed between the creation of possibilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the strict observation of obligations concerning non-proliferation. The Agency had an important role to play in that connection.

39. The Polish delegation supported the idea of elaborating, under the aegis of the IAEA, principles for international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and it welcomed the setting up by the Board of Governors of the Committee on Assurances of Supply.

40. The further development of the Agency's safeguards system was a very important task. The work already started on improving the effectiveness of safeguards data verification should be continued. As a token of its high regard for the Agency's safeguards activities, Poland was supplying highly qualified specialists to work as inspectors.

41. As a country with a rich tradition and widely recognized scientific achievements in fundamental and applied atomic research, and a country which was just starting to implement its own nuclear power programme, Poland appreciated the importance of technical assistance. It had sought and would continue to seek Agency help in training its scientific personnel. It intended to share, to an increasing degree, its own experience with interested countries within the framework of the technical assistance programme.

42. Poland approved the figure of \$13 million agreed for technical assistance and was ready to contribute its assessed amount. It believed that contributions to the Fund should continue to be voluntary and to be paid in local currencies.

43. The Agency could not avoid the economic problems affecting the rest of the world. For the first time in the Agency's history, the budget showed zero growth in real terms. The Director General was to be congratulated for tailoring the budget to the economic situation of the Member States. It was unlikely that the difficult situation would improve in the near future, so the present financial policy should be continued. That would require from the Director General and the Secretariat a more rigorous selection of those programmes which would enable the Agency to carry on its statutory tasks, especially the development of the safeguards system, and nuclear safety and technical assistance activities, without a significant increase in the budget. The phasing out of certain programmes would enable staff to be redirected to new tasks. A critical analysis should be made in order to eliminate programmes which, as a result of developments in atomic science, had become of secondary importance. The Scientific Advisory Committee should extend its activity in that direction. However, the Polish delegation wished to state that it considered the proposed programme of Agency activities to be constructive and justified and the draft budget to be acceptable.

44. Mr. PERESSIN (Holy See), after congratulating the President on his election, said that the statement he wished to make related to the work of the Agency but was based on the anthropological and social principles which were inspired by faith and which had been stressed by His Holiness Pope John Paul II in his addresses to the United Nations on 2 October 1979 and to UNESCO on 2 June 1980.

45. In an increasingly complex world that demanded scientific and technical expertise which staggered the minds and imaginations of most persons, men and women of science and those who held political positions of responsibility must be ever more sensitive to the impact which scientific advance and political decisions had on the lives of citizens. There were many forces that could be used, and at times had been used, to reduce the human personality, to control whole peoples and to bring about in man a sense of alienation from his true destiny. That possibility should not be forgotten at the Agency's General Conference. It was, therefore, incumbent upon all who shared such responsibility or who had such expertise to be conscious of the roles they played and of the goals to be set for that important aspect of human life. Pope John Paul had made that very point in his address to UNESCO.

46. The spectre of past abuses of science still haunted people today, and the potential for misuse of scientific advances for the production of nuclear weapons or to render them more sophisticated added to the apprehension of many people. Conscious of that, all Member States had the task of guaranteeing, first of all, that the nuclear material under their jurisdiction was employed exclusively for the benefit of mankind. Member States also needed to inform people truthfully and honestly of the meaning, purpose and implications of the options which stemmed from an assembly such as the Agency's General Conference.

47. The threat of destruction through the use of nuclear warheads had brought about a grave situation that was contrary to the well-being of humanity. It was necessary to ask whether it was certain that the upsetting of the delicate balance upon which international relationships rested would not lead to a war in which recourse would be had to nuclear arms without hesitation. Nuclear arms, of whatever power or type, were becoming more and more effective every year, and they were becoming a part of the arsenals of a growing number of

countries. It was necessary to consider whether the use of nuclear arms, even for purposes of national defence or in limited conflicts, might not inevitably lead to escalation, resulting in a destruction that mankind could never envisage or accept.

48. Unfortunately, the current political situation did not give reassurance where progress towards nuclear disarmament was concerned, and the plea made by the Pope for a systematic and mutual reduction in armaments had not alerted those responsible to a degree sufficient to reassure a world that had justified reservations about the situation.

49. The responsibility of the General Conference was thus a grave one. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy must clearly be separate from the use of nuclear materials for destruction. The attitude of everyone involved must be that of scientists or statesmen dedicated to a task in the service of man's life. To that end, a change in outlook and mentality was required in order to pursue united efforts to secure the common good through mutual co-operation. Peoples and nations must share a common outlook and attitude that looked to the defence of humanity, that sought to build the necessary structures, and that went hand in hand with a willingness to work together for the common good of all, while giving up the selfish short-term interest of a few.

50. With that positive vision of hope for the common good must be linked a political will, which was the key to its achievement, and only those responsible in their respective nations could bring it about.

51. His delegation considered that the initiatives of the Agency merited encouragement, and that the more the Agency added to knowledge of how nuclear materials could be applied for the good of humanity, the more it would make beneficial options available to those who needed and wanted them and the more it would contribute to the strengthening of the forces of life for the well-being of all. The world could not renounce the atom. But it must ensure that it be used for the good of all. His delegation wished to commend those programmes of the Agency that did that. The possibility of food conservation by irradiation, the various breakthroughs in medicine and genetic research, the programme on marine biology, those and many others should be the source of a sense of pride and accomplishment on the part of this Agency.

52. All those programmes, however, must always be carried out in accordance with the needs of all Member States and not merely as a function of their power and influence.

The Agency and its Member States were committed to the principle of equity by the Statute of the IAEA. The well-being of present and future generations in industrialized countries could not be achieved at the cost of the well-being of present and future generations in the developing countries. The Agency could do much in that respect by keeping those responsible informed of what was available and by assisting those with fewer resources to use such information for planning their own futures in an appropriate way.

53. In 1980 the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) had completed its three years of work. The Agency had played an indispensable part in all the studies that had culminated in INFCE's reports. For experts and for political leaders those reports would, it was hoped, show means of improving the assurance of nuclear supply while minimizing the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It might, however, be possible for the Agency to simplify some of that and similar material and to begin a programme that would make essential information more readily available to the public, which needed it. The Agency had prepared a number of fine documents about safety and about preparedness in case of emergencies or accidents, which might be helpful as a means of deepening the understanding of the public. A well-informed public was a necessity and the Agency had an obligation to contribute to sound, well-presented and comprehensible information at the proper levels for people everywhere.

54. Two years earlier, in a message to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, Pope Paul VI had said that disarmament, a new world order, and development were three obligations that were inseparably bound together and which, by their very nature, presupposed a renewal in public outlook. All three of those concerns demanded renewed effort on the part of the Agency, which must further disarmament and co-operate in every effort to end the threat of nuclear warfare. The Agency must collaborate with others towards a new world order by ensuring that advances in nuclear science and technology were made available in appropriate ways, on an equitable basis and without self-interest, to all peoples and nations according to their needs. In that way, the Agency would find itself committed to the development of all peoples, whereby it would be possible to build the common future of the human race and construct a great and lasting house of peace.

55. Mr. OSZTROVSZKI (Hungary), after congratulating the President on his election, observed that the development of nuclear power was playing a major part in the economic life, and even in the everyday political life, of many countries. Unfortunately, mankind had first become aware of the tremendous energy available from the atomic nucleus through its destructive power. The examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki served to demonstrate that everything should be done to prevent nuclear power from being used for military purposes and to halt the nuclear and strategic arms race. At the same time, all steps should be taken to hasten the continuation of disarmament talks since a peaceful atmosphere was a precondition for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

56. Hungary had concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and was fully satisfying the conditions attached thereto. His country was deeply appreciative of the Agency's work in connection with NPT. Although the number of States party to NPT now exceeded 110, some 40 countries had yet to sign the Treaty, the importance of which had been endorsed by the Second Review Conference held recently in Geneva.

57. No satisfactory response had yet been made to the just demands of non-nuclear-weapon States for firm and reliable international assurances that they would not be threatened with the use of nuclear weapons. Disarmament was such an important issue that every possible opportunity should be taken to advance talks on that subject. He hoped that the SALT-II Treaty would be ratified in the near future and that the third stage of the SALT negotiations could then commence. He also hoped that the Madrid conference on security and co-operation would give fresh impetus to European and international détente and that a decision would be taken to convene a conference on military détente and disarmament. His Government was firmly convinced that the most complex and delicate issues could be resolved in a peaceful and mutually acceptable manner by negotiation.

58. The peaceful applications of nuclear power were playing a greater and greater part in the economic development of Hungary. According to the statistics for the previous year, approximately 300 laboratories and other facilities were using radioisotopes and nuclear techniques: of those users, about one third were in the health care sector, slightly more than one third in the industrial sector and the remainder in the agricultural sector. Energy supply was a major issue in Hungary. In the years to come, nuclear power stations would become an increasingly important source of energy alongside coal-fired power stations. The construction of the first nuclear power plant, near Paks, was proceeding apace with the assistance of

Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The pressure vessel of the first WWR 440-MW reactor had been delivered to the site, and installation work had begun. The fuel for that reactor was scheduled for delivery by the end of 1980 and would naturally be subject to Agency safeguards. The construction and operation of nuclear power plants in Hungary would reflect the Agency's safety standards and recommendations, to be translated into Hungarian for the benefit of the personnel concerned.

59. Under a long-term programme of co-operation and specialization in nuclear engineering within CMEA, Hungary had undertaken to organize the manufacture and further development of equipment for the steam supply system of nuclear power plants, systems for handling fuel elements and reactor repair and maintenance equipment.

60. In 1980 the Hungarian State Assembly had adopted a law governing the utilization of atomic energy and, in particular, banning its use for the purposes of producing nuclear weapons or other means of mass destruction. The law stipulated that nuclear power and related scientific research and development should be directed towards the benefit of society as a whole. Under the provisions of that law, materials, devices, equipment and systems relating to the application of nuclear power were classified as State property. The law also stated that nuclear power should not be used to the detriment of human life or health, nor should it affect the living conditions of present and future generations or harm the environment.

61. Under the expert guidance of its Director General, the Agency was playing a leading role in the field of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. At its present stage of development, his country enjoyed a two-way link with the Agency and participated in the work of the Agency's governing bodies as well as in various technical committees and expert groups.

62. His country was pleased to note that the voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund in 1979 had been put to effective use and that the Agency was reporting still greater success in the utilization of non-convertible currencies. Effective use of the Technical Assistance Fund was of the greatest value in the case of large-scale projects covering the supply of equipment and the provision of fellowships and expert services. The Agency's experts should not only provide highly skilled services but should also be fully briefed on the special features of the recipient country and seek to develop its potential accordingly.

63. Cognizant of the great value of technical assistance, Hungary would continue to grant fellowships to candidates from developing countries and seek to place highly qualified experts at the Agency's disposal. In 1981 the Government would make a voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance Fund of one million forints, a sum exceeding Hungary's share of the target set by the Board.

64. With regard to the Agency's system of safeguards, to which the Second NPT Review Conference had attached great importance, he was pleased to note that no safeguards violations had been detected during the past year. However, the scope and effectiveness of safeguards should be amplified by providing the inspectorate with the appropriate support and equipment and by ensuring that Member States nominated skilled experts for this work.

65. The Hungarian delegation fully supported the decision by the Board of Governors to set up a Committee on Assurances of Supply and was ready to play an active part in its work.

Mr. Haunschild (Federal Republic of Germany) resumed the Chair.

66. Mr. COPITHORNE (Canada) said that two events of importance to the work of the Agency had taken place since the previous session of the Conference: the INFCE Final Plenary and the Second NPT Review Conference. Both had stressed the importance of the Agency's contribution towards meeting the energy needs of the world. The Canadian Government was committed to expanding the use of nuclear power by facilitating the marketing efforts of its nuclear industry, and there were signs in Canada and elsewhere that the recent slow-down in the advance of nuclear power might be at an end. Canada currently had more than 5000 MW(e) of installed nuclear generating capacity and another 9000 MW were committed or under construction. In addition to meeting its own requirements Canada had exported some 6000 tons of uranium in 1979. Canadian CANDU reactors were being built in a number of countries, including Argentina, the Republic of Korea and Romania, and several others were seriously considering that proven technology. As a major exporter of nuclear material and technology, Canada wished to promote the further development of nuclear commerce on a predictable and secure basis.

67. A vital element in the expansion of international nuclear commerce was an environment which minimized the risk of nuclear proliferation and, in particular, of any possibility that nuclear exports might be used for nuclear explosive purposes. Perhaps the most important single result of the work of INFCE had been its assertion of the general principle that assurances of supply and assurances of

non-proliferation were complementary. Moreover, both consumer and supplier countries recognized the important relationship between supply and demand, but that relationship could only function efficiently in the non-proliferation framework which governed nuclear commerce. That would be the subject of discussion in the newly established Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), which would continue the work of INFCE. Canada hoped that the spirit of co-operation and understanding achieved in INFCE would prevail in the new committee; the valuable work done in Committee II at the recent NPT Review Conference had reinforced Canada's conviction that consumer and supplier countries could reach a consensus on the main aspects of CAS's work.

68. The Agency's safeguards were a key element in the international non-proliferation regime. It was gratifying that the Agency had been able to conclude again in 1979 that nuclear material under Agency safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. For Canada, as for many other countries, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear explosive capability was fundamental to the future of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Agency safeguards played a key role in providing the assurances required for public support of nuclear energy. However, as new technologies emerged safeguards technologies would have to develop as well. The Canadian safeguards support programme, begun in co-operation with the Agency in 1977, had led to the development of special safeguards equipment which should enable the Agency to reach its conclusions concerning safeguards with a greater degree of confidence. The effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards activities was commendable, particularly in view of the budgetary and manpower constraints placed upon it. Canada strongly supported efforts by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to increase the cost effectiveness of safeguards operations. The Agency had recently opened its first permanently staffed safeguards field office in Toronto; that was expected to contribute to the more efficient utilization of Agency resources.

69. Canada also remained committed to the technical assistance activities of the Agency and had joined the consensus in the Board of Governors which, through the introduction of the concept of indicative planning figures, had projected a steady increase in the voluntary fund for technical assistance to the end of 1983. The target for voluntary contributions envisaged for 1983 - \$19 million - compared strikingly with the 1980 figure of \$10.5 million.

70. Since the Three Mile Island accident, the international community had become more sensitive to the question of nuclear safety in spite of the extraordinarily good safety record of the nuclear industry. Although responsibility for safety was primarily a national problem, the international implications of an accident of any magnitude might be dramatic. Canada welcomed the expansion of the NUSS programme and the Agency's improved ability to provide assistance in general questions of safety and of the environment and in emergencies to countries developing their own nuclear programmes. The Conference on Current Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues to be held in Stockholm was also a worthy initiative. Other multilateral and regional efforts on safety matters should be encouraged. In the North American region, Canada and the United States were continuing discussions to develop a co-ordinated nuclear emergency information and response system. Within Canada, increased research and development efforts were being devoted to the disposal of high-level radioactive wastes and the long-term management of uranium mine tailings. As in many countries, that was an important element in establishing public confidence in nuclear power.

71. A further international measure of considerable value was the conclusion of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which Canada had just signed. That Convention, which was intended to diminish the chance of theft or forcible seizure, would contribute to reducing the risk of horizontal proliferation.

72. The zero real growth budget for 1981 placed before the Conference had Canada's full support. In providing for limited real growth in the high-priority programmes of safeguards, technical assistance and nuclear safety, while setting aside additional funds to meet the considerably increased operating costs at the Agency's Permanent Headquarters, the Director General had been obliged to make decisions involving reductions in some less important activities. Such decisions were never easy, and had proven especially difficult for international organizations. Unfortunately, the foreseeable future would bring continued severe restraint on the budgets of all international organizations. In the case of the Agency that would mean an even more thorough revision of priorities, with further reduction and possibly even elimination of some lower-priority activities. It would also mean that other expenses, especially those related to the occupancy of the Vienna International Centre, would have to be closely scrutinized by the Board of Governors. All those measures would be necessary if the Agency was to have the financial means to continue its vital programmes at a credible level.

73. Mr. PANDEV (Bulgaria) said that the twenty-fourth session of the General Conference was taking place at a time of increased international tension. It was thus more imperative than ever that the international organizations concerned with peace, security and disarmament should be strengthened. The Agency, one of whose functions was to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, was one such organization. As had been confirmed by all the States participating in the Second NPT Review Conference, the Agency's role could only increase in the future. Although the Conference had not worked out a final document with specific recommendations for the Agency, all the participants had once again reiterated their adherence to the Treaty and its principles, considering it to be an important means of promoting co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while providing comprehensive guarantees against the diversion of nuclear material for purposes forbidden by the Treaty. Agency safeguards had also received the support of all delegations. His country paid close attention to the implementation of safeguards and made every effort to help improve methods and techniques. Ensuring non-proliferation would not hamper the development of peaceful nuclear activities - on the contrary, safeguards alone could promote wide-scale international co-operation. That co-operation was of particular interest to his country as it had developed a successful peaceful nuclear programme.

74. The Agency's promotional role continued to expand and its many activities were reflected in the annual report. Of special note were the Agency's activities in assisting Member States to utilize nuclear energy and its efforts to improve safeguards. The Agency's positive technical assistance programme was also to be commended, as was the creation of guidelines and rules on nuclear safety and protection of the environment, which were of considerable help to countries compiling their own national documents.

75. His country valued highly the results of INFCE, which it felt should be the subject of further study, and had thus decided to take part in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply. The programme for 1981 to 1986 was well in keeping with the Agency's role in promoting nuclear power as a means of meeting energy needs. The programme reflected the problems involved in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. More attention should be paid, however, to questions relating to nuclear heating-and-power plants and heat supply plants. His delegation supported the programme for 1981-1986 and the budget for 1981.

76. Because of the great value of the Agency's technical assistance programme, his country had regularly and willingly made its contribution to the Technical Assistance Fund, and it would again contribute its share in 1981. His delegation supported the view that technical assistance should be voluntary and could not agree with those delegations who wished that it be financed from the Regular Budget.

77. For reasons of economy and the conservation of natural resources, his country had adopted a comprehensive programme of nuclear power expansion. Two units with reactors of 440-MW(e) capacity each had been in operation in Bulgaria from 1974 and 1975 respectively. In 1979 they had produced 20 000 million kilowatt hours of nuclear electrical power or 18% of the country's total electricity. A third unit with a capacity of 440 MW(e) was to come into operation in 1980 and a fourth unit of the same capacity was to begin operating in 1981. That would complete the second stage of the construction of the Kozloduy nuclear power station.

78. The third stage had begun in 1980 and provided for the construction of two units with water-cooled, water-moderated reactors of 1000 MW(e) capacity each. The first of those reactors was planned to begin operation in 1984 and the second after 1985. A further two units of similar capacity were planned to be completed by 1990. Thus, by 1990, the installed capacity of nuclear power plants would reach 4760 MW(e) and the electrical power produced by them would be about 45% of total electricity production. The experience gathered in recent years from operating the Kozloduy station and the high reliability of plant equipment were the basis of the stable overall operation of the units. The average utilization of capacity between two refuelling operations was about 93% and had reached 97% for one reactor in 1979. The expansion of nuclear power in his country was accompanied by the increasingly widespread use of nuclear methods and radiation technology. A whole range of short-lived radioactive isotopes had been produced for use in medicine, industry and agriculture. Various radioisotope instruments for controlling and automating technological processes had been developed in scientific institutes and laboratories. The irradiation of seed before sowing had been carried out on an industrial scale in the agricultural sphere, and a Centre for Isotope Utilization had been established in Sofia in accordance with UNDP guidelines and with the active support of the Agency.

79. The expansion of nuclear power in Bulgaria depended also on finding solutions to problems of nuclear safety and environmental protection. For that reason, the

regulatory functions of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy had been widened by a State Act in 1980 with the aim of ensuring the safety of nuclear constructions. Agency recommendations had been widely used when drawing up the documents.

80. The success achieved in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy in his country was the result of mobilizing internal resources, of international co-operation within the CMEA, of bilateral co-operation - mainly with the Soviet Union - and of co-operation with the IAEA. His country took active part in a long-term programme of co-operation aimed at meeting the requirements of CMEA Member States for the principal types of energy, fuel and raw materials. His country had, as a result, signed two particularly important CMEA agreements on co-operation regarding scientific research and experience and design work on the problems of power plants with water-cooled, water-moderated 1000-MW(e) capacity reactors, and of large-capacity fast-neutron reactors. It was also on the point of signing a CMEA agreement on the development of nuclear heating and power plants and nuclear heat supply plants. The results of that project would help to resolve problems relating to the production of industrial steam and steam for district heating requirements. His country also contributed to the development of scientific and technical co-operation within the IAEA and took an active part in the Agency's research programme, scientific meetings and the INIS programme.

81. Mr. GROZA (Romania) noted that the present session of the General Conference was taking place in a period characterized by extremely dangerous tensions on the international scene, by military expenditures amounting to \$500 000 million and by an arms race (including nuclear weapons) which was capable of destroying civilization and all humanity. For that reason his country strongly advocated a policy of détente and the solution of all disputes by political means. The responsibility of the Conference was all the greater in that its current session followed closely on the Second NPT Review Conference, the results of which had been far from satisfactory as far as the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the development of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy were concerned. Romania had carried out all its obligations as a party to NPT and believed that all the parties, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, should take the necessary steps to discharge their commitments under the Treaty.

82. In his delegation's opinion the present session, the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and the other meetings scheduled for the near future

represented opportunities for promoting genuine and effective co-operation as well as unhindered access to the achievements of nuclear science and technology, and also for reinforcing the Agency's role in the solution of the major economic, technical and scientific problems of the present day. The ideas put forward by the Group of 77 and other countries at the Second NPT Review Conference warranted careful attention. More than ever it was essential that the developing countries should be enabled to participate in international co-operation and exchanges and that they should receive guarantees concerning the transfer of nuclear technologies, materials and facilities so that they could benefit from those things on an equal footing, in accordance with the Agency's Statute and with the provisions of NPT. The elimination of the phenomenon of underdevelopment and the creation of a new international economic order should be the goals. The imposition of monopolies in nuclear technology on the grounds that its extension would lead to nuclear arms proliferation was unacceptable.

83. The Romanian delegation approved the annual report for 1979, of which it had made a careful study. Particular mention should be made of the Agency's programmes in nuclear power, nuclear safety, environmental protection, controlled thermonuclear fusion, and applications of radiation and radioisotopes. It wished to reiterate the value of the technical assistance programme and the need for maintaining a reasonable balance between allocations for technical assistance and promotion of the use of nuclear techniques - the main task of the Agency - and the resources intended for its control function.

84. His delegation considered that, on the whole, the Agency's programme for 1981-1986 was in keeping with trends in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with proposals that had been made by Member States and with the priorities which those States had assigned to nuclear power, research of major interest and applications of economic and social interest. However, it was absolutely essential that the Agency should try to extend and improve its technical assistance activities substantially in the period ahead. The consensus reached recently on funds for financing technical assistance during the next three years represented a minimum in that connection. The increasing attention being paid to financial problems and to measures designed to achieve economies and improve efficiency was a welcome development. His country also wished to express its appreciation for the contribution which the Agency had made to INFCE and for its help in the drafting of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

85. As regards Romania's own nuclear programme, in accordance with the directives adopted by the 12th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party on technical development up to the year 2000, the programme for the construction of nuclear power plants would be making rapid progress. Its implementation would have substantial support from other programmes, such as those concerned with nuclear physics, nuclear materials and fuels, machine and equipment construction, electronics and electrical engineering, and radiation protection. Those programmes were predicated on the need to ensure energy sources for the country's social and economic progress and to achieve independence in fuel and energy supplies. The power plant construction programme called for the provision of an installed electrical capacity of 660 MW(e) in 1985, about 4000 MW(e) in 1990 and around 10 000 MW(e) in the year 2000. In support of that programme, scientific research and engineering would contribute to speedier mastery - on the basis of an original concept - of the fabrication of equipment and the production of fuel and moderator.

86. The construction of the first Romanian nuclear power station had been started in 1979 and the plant was expected to be commissioned late in 1985. During 1979 Romanian scientists had obtained significant results in the solution of problems connected with energy, nuclear technology, heavy ion physics, relativistic nuclear physics, solid state physics and the physics of surfaces with a view to producing new materials with special properties, new stable and radioactive isotopes, radioactive sources and radiopharmaceuticals. Good results had been obtained with lasers and at plasma facilities. Progress had also been made in developing peaceful applications of nuclear energy in industry, agriculture and biology.

87. In conclusion, he wished to express his appreciation to the Agency for its fruitful collaboration and support in the work of several Romanian institutes. At the same time, he had to point out that, because of the limited resources available to the Agency, it had been able to satisfy only part of the Romanian requests. As both a socialist and a developing country, Romania intended to contribute to the Technical Assistance Fund and at the same time to derive benefits from the very important activities that it financed.

88. Mr. SAHABI (Iran) said that the Iranian Government, by the mandates of the constitution and the facilities of the legal apparatus, was fully committed to its

programmes for research and development in science and technology, which were geared to the various industrial needs of the country. Within that context, Iran was studying and pursuing the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. He wished to state in that connection that the Iranian Government fully supported the balanced activities of the IAEA.

89. Iran had one of the richest proven reserves of oil - 60 billion barrels - and about $14 \times 10^{12} \text{ m}^3$ of natural gas, whose combined total could last well beyond the end of the next century. It was committed, however, to conservation of its fossil fuel resources as far as was possible, and in addition was pursuing a policy of diversification of energy sources.

90. The Iranian concept of development programmes for the utilization of nuclear energy would be based on locally acquired or developed experience and would entail as well the sharing of resources with other interested countries.

91. With regard to the Iranian Government's position regarding cancellation of the nuclear power plants in Iran, it had to be explained that an ill-conceived and executed nuclear energy programme had been inherited from the past and that its continuation would have meant total dependence on foreign suppliers. Such dependence would have encompassed planning, licensing, construction of the nuclear steam supply system, fuel, enrichment services, training, operation, maintenance, reprocessing, and various other aspects. The cost of generating electricity would have ended up by being several times higher than the comparable cost in the supplier countries. Furthermore, several significant factors, including the extent of local uranium reserves, the regionally high seismic and geodynamic activities, waste management, transmission line problems, and national grid size, had either received only perfunctory attention, or had been overlooked altogether.

92. The Iranian Government could not approve the continuation of a project which, in terms of issues involving national sovereignty, safety, economy, and technical considerations, would compromise all acceptable standards. The nuclear power project had run counter to the very fabric and the spirit of Iran's revolutionary ideals, and had therefore been cancelled.

93. Iran believed that the IAEA, in addition to its extensive activities in the realm of safeguards and non-proliferation, should also devote considerable effort to protecting the safety-related, economic and technical interests of some of the developing countries. Without sounding too pessimistic, it had to be stated that accidents similar to the one at Three Mile Island could become catastrophic in the extreme in a developing country lacking access to trained personnel, regulatory agencies and technical infrastructures.

94. In conclusion, the Iranian Government wished to express its appreciation to the Agency's Department of Technical Assistance for the provision of expert services in connection with the radioisotope production and control programme in Iran. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was also grateful for the award of research contracts in plasma physics and in the area of trace elements in human nutrition and bio-environmental systems. The Atomic Energy Organization was also embarking on two new development projects in the coming years: the radiosterilization of medical products, and core conversion of nuclear research reactors from HEU to LEU, and it was hoped that the Agency could provide assistance in the form of fellowships and/or expert services for initiation of the programmes in question.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.