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Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,
on Thursday, 24 September 1981, at 3.5 p.m.

In the Chair: Mr. AGIOBU-KEMMER (Nigeria) Vice-President
later: Mr. XUTO (Thailand) President
later: Mr. COPITHORNE (Canada) Vice-President

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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980 (GC(XXV)/642, 642/Corr.1,
642/Corr.2) (continued)

1. Mr. ONYANGO (Kenya) thanked the Secretariat, and particularly the Director General, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, for the very fine and efficient services rendered by the Agency.

2. The Kenyan delegation fully endorsed the admission of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The heroic people of that country had for almost a decade fought against oppressive forces and had come out victorious. It was not easy to run a multi-racial society and Kenya had found from experience that it was best to turn an entirely new page in racial relationships, completely forgiving the past and acting without recrimination.

3. Developing countries were just starting on the nuclear road. In Kenya, radioisotopes were beginning to be used in agriculture, veterinary services, medicine and the non-destructive testing of materials. With the help of technical assistance from the Agency, the Laboratory for Application of Nuclear Sciences at the University of Nairobi was carrying out elemental analysis using automated nuclear techniques. Phase Two of the Nuclear Medicine Project had been completed, and the department in question was run entirely by local staff. The third phase, involving the introduction of two gamma cameras and a third cobalt-60 unit was starting. Training of nuclear physicists and engineers at post-graduate level had just begun. In the Nuclear Applications Laboratory, a Mössbauer spectrometer was soon to be installed, while a Van de Graaff accelerator was envisaged for 1983. The critical element in all those innovations was manpower training.

4. It was well known that the Agency's work could be broadly classified into promotional and regulatory activities. There could be little doubt that there was much more to be done in the field of promotion than in regulation. However, over the last few years the expenditure on safeguards, a regulatory function, had grown at a comparative rate which seemed to indicate that technical assistance, a promotional function, was taking a back seat. The financing of technical assistance was left to the mercy of benevolent richer nations willing to make voluntary contributions. That practice did not lend

itself to stable and predictable funding that would make long-term planning possible. Even the recently introduced indicative planning figures were not satisfactory as they still depended on voluntary contributions. The Kenyan delegation would welcome discussion on the question of including technical assistance in the Agency's Regular Budget.

5. In connection with the draft budget for 1982, it was difficult to resist the temptation of thinking that the near-zero growth had been achieved at the expense of promotional activities, and particularly of the technical assistance programme. The importance of the Agency safeguards regime should not of course be understated. The problem, however, was its size and rate of growth relative to the equally important promotional functions. In that regard, the Kenyan delegation also noted with concern the very low level of activities in Life Sciences and the Joint FAO/IAEA Division, which provided the scientific back-up to technical assistance.

6. Kenya was opposed to financing the International Plutonium Storage (IPS) study from the Regular Budget and to merging IPS and safeguards. The whole question of the financing of IPS needed to be fully discussed not only by the Board but also by the General Conference so that an acceptable solution could be found.

7. The question of the amendment of Article VI.A.2 had been on the agenda for many years. It was common knowledge that the regions of Africa and the Middle East and South Asia had representations of 21% and 23%, respectively, while the average regional representation on the Board was of the order of 33%. When Zimbabwe became a Member State the percentage representation of Africa would be reduced to 20%. The Kenyan delegation would request a modest increase of three seats for Africa, to give a representation of 32%.

8. It was gratifying to note that the Director General had recognized in his address the disparity within the Secretariat between the numbers of staff from developing and developed countries. That disparity was most pronounced in the higher, policy-making echelons. The sooner the position was rectified the better.

9. The Kenyan delegation believed that, if safeguards were to be applied at all, they had to be uniform and universal. In that connection, many Agency reports were biased in the sense that they mentioned installations in developing countries that were not safeguarded while saying nothing about the facilities that were not safeguarded in the developed countries and in Israel and South Africa.

10. Kenya believed in resolving international conflicts by peaceful means and strongly condemned the June attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities by Israel. It was prepared to support an appropriate resolution against Israel.

11. It was almost inconceivable that, in spite of many United Nations resolutions and of condemnation by nation after nation, the South African régime continued with its abhorrent practice of apartheid. The Kenyan delegation therefore supported the resolution prohibiting South Africa from participating in all meetings and all work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply.

12. A whole year had passed since the question of the election of a new Director General had first been raised. It was a thorny issue which required a great deal of wisdom, tact, good will, sincerity and accommodation. Both sides at the negotiating table would have to be honest and show a spirit of compromise so that an amicable solution could be found.

13. There was no cause for pessimism since all organizations experienced problems. The Agency had been formed with very noble objectives and on the whole had done extremely well. It would no doubt grow from strength to strength in the future so as to better serve the needs of all its Members.

14. Mr. SALAH (Jordan) paid tribute to the Director General for the wisdom and competence with which he had conducted the Agency's affairs over the past twenty years. He also wished to congratulate Zimbabwe on its acceptance for membership of the Agency.

15. The Israeli attack on the Tamuz reactor on 7 June 1981 underlined that country's determination to persist in its aggression against not only the Palestinian people, but also the whole Arab nation. Part and parcel of that aggressive policy was the construction in the early sixties of the nuclear reactor at Dimona in the Negev desert with the help of certain industrially advanced countries. Israel's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its rejection of any Agency control of the development of its nuclear programme were in themselves ample proof that the reactor was intended not for peaceful but for aggressive purposes. Despite that, Israel was attempting by force to deprive the countries in that area of their right to legitimate scientific progress. The Iraqi nuclear reactor had been built in compliance with international regulations and was subject to the control of the Agency, whose report on 12 June 1981 had acknowledged that fact and stated that the reactor was intended for peaceful purposes, thus refuting Israeli claims that a nuclear bomb was being prepared with the help of the reactor.

16. The attack had brought to light a number of facts which merited serious consideration. The first was that Israel possessed a nuclear reactor at Dimona but, thanks to the efforts of certain Powers, had not been required to account for it nor been put under pressure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United Nations must also shoulder some blame for not using all its moral influence to make Israel heed international treaties even though it lacked the executive power to bring that about. Secondly, the world community should look with the utmost concern at the dangerous international precedent set by that act of aggression. If a firm stand were not taken against such action, there would be a loss of confidence within the international community, countries would seek their own protection by means of force and the basis of international peace would be undermined. Thirdly, the credibility of the Agency's safeguards and its ability to oversee their effectiveness had been called into question by the attack. Israel's destruction of the reactor on the grounds that Agency control over it was inadequate had dealt a damaging blow to world confidence in the Agency.

17. It was the duty of the international community to ensure that Israel sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and submit its nuclear reactors and research centres to international control in order to prevent their use for military purposes. The Jordanian delegation therefore recommended the suspension of Israel from the rights and privileges of membership in the Agency and urged all nations of the world to adopt a similar course until such time as Israel agreed to adhere to the provisions of the Agency's Statute.

18. Although a small country with limited resources, Jordan was making considerable economic progress. Contrary to the expectations of most, Jordan had no indigenous conventional sources of energy except recently explored oil shale deposits which could not yet be utilized because of limited world experience in that field. The average annual rate of increase in energy demand in recent years indicated the rapid pace of development but also gave rise to concern over the increasing cost of oil imports and resultant balance of payments difficulties.

19. His Government was fully aware that nuclear energy represented one of the solutions to the world energy problem but unfortunately his country could not install nuclear plants before the turn of the century unless demand for electrical power grew to such an extent that at least a small or medium-sized power reactor could be accommodated. However, Jordan realized the importance of making preparations for that era, and was therefore already recruiting and training the necessary manpower and establishing a regulatory infrastructure.

20. The Agency had an important role to play in helping the Third World achieve its objectives. He therefore expected the Agency to supply more technical assistance to those countries and to achieve an equitable balance between safeguards and technical assistance activities.

21. His country shared the view of other developing countries that they were under-represented at the policy-making levels in the Agency. Also, it favoured an amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute to increase the representation of the developing countries on the Board of Governors.

22. His delegation supported the Director General's call in his statement to the Conference for the enlargement of the scope of the additional protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 1949 and for urgent consideration to be given by the United Nations Committee on Disarmament to the general prohibition of military attacks on all nuclear establishments and not just nuclear power plants.

23. Jordan strongly urged the General Conference to amend, at its current session, Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference so as to make Arabic an official and working language of the Conference, in line with the situation in the United Nations and in several specialized agencies.

24. Mr. BARUTÇU (Turkey) said that, during the 24 years of the Agency's existence, many developments and changes had taken place, but none of them had ever so seriously overshadowed its affairs as the event which had taken place recently in the Middle East, namely, the premeditated attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre by Israel. Turkey had strongly condemned that act of aggression, which had been carried out by a country that refused to sign NPT and to subject its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards, against a party to NPT whose nuclear activities were wholly covered by the IAEA safeguards system. It was his delegation's hope that that unprecedented event, which had rightly attracted the attention and condemnation of the world community, would not constitute a precedent, and that all ways and means would be sought to remedy the damage done and to prevent the occurrence of a similar event in future.

25. The twenty-fifth regular session of the General Conference was thus starting under difficult circumstances. The agenda comprised virtually all the items that had become traditional, plus one concerning the matter he had just mentioned and one on the succession to the Agency's leadership. Despite seven months of continuous efforts it had not been possible so far to bring the last-named matter to a successful end. He believed that those efforts should continue during the General Conference in order to find a satisfactory solution among the possibilities that existed, including the continuation of the present leadership of the Agency.

26. Other items on the agenda indicated clearly that the IAEA was besieged with important issues, the solution of which was not possible owing to a lack of trust and understanding in the relations between the developed and the developing countries. The membership of the Agency had grown, and nuclear energy had emerged as one of the very few alternative sources of energy for a vast number of countries. It was therefore natural that the divergences of views among the groups of countries in the Agency had also grown along with those changes. That situation merely reflected the importance both developed and developing countries attached to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Turkey believed that, by persevering efforts, it would be possible to reconcile the differences of views that existed.

27. The impact of the oil crisis had been most damaging of all for the developing countries. In the past few years, for example, almost all Turkey's export earnings had had to be spent on oil imports. As a result, nuclear power had emerged as a very valuable alternative to conventional energy sources. However, so far only four developing countries had been able to make use of nuclear power, and that accounted for only 1% of the electricity generating capacity of all developing countries. His delegation believed that it was of the utmost importance that assistance should be accorded to those countries by the Agency and the developed world, without the risk of proliferation being incurred. NPT and the Agency's safeguards system provided the necessary assurances against that risk.

28. The transfer of technology for peaceful purposes should not therefore be hindered, and each country must be free in its options for nuclear fuel strategies. It was there that the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) came in. Supply assurances for nuclear material, equipment, technology and fuel cycle services and non-proliferation had become interrelated, and the relevant commercial transactions must be conducted on a basis of "consensus", with full participation by all countries having nuclear power and research and development programmes. The public media bore a heavy responsibility in avoiding the spread of unfounded fears, not only concerning the safety of nuclear plants but also concerning proliferation, which had a negative influence on international nuclear trade.

29. Turkey, having acceded to NPT, had also taken the next step, namely the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the Agency. It had been signed on 30 June 1981 and, upon ratification by the Turkish Government, had entered into force on 1 September 1981. Under the new Turkish administration, a code had been prepared for a complete reorganization of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission. A new long-term programme for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would shortly be implemented and a science and technology committee attached to the Prime Minister's office would be established as a policy-making and co-ordinating body.

30. He wished to express his delegation's satisfaction at the assurance given by the Director General regarding the adequate representation of the developing countries on the staff of the Agency, particularly at the senior level. He noted that as a very positive and welcome development in the Agency's staffing policy.

31. Turning to technical assistance he said his delegation believed that that activity was one of the main pillars of the Agency. Although the Agency had implemented its technical assistance programmes as efficiently as possible, the fact remained that those programmes had been on a scale much lower than that needed by the developing countries. It was most important that the promotional activities of the Agency should be properly balanced against its regulatory activities. It was equally important that technical assistance funds should be properly distributed among the various activities. In his opinion that was not always the case. However, Turkey greatly appreciated the assistance it had been receiving from the Agency and looked forward to increased technical assistance and co-operation.

32. In conclusion, he wished to inform the Conference that Turkey had already pledged its voluntary contribution for 1982 at the level corresponding to its rate of assessment.

33. Mr. LOPEZ RODRIGUEZ (Spain) said that in order to improve efficiency the Spanish Government had now separated the functions of nuclear research and development, on the one hand, and nuclear safety and radiological protection

on the other, and in April 1981 had set up a new body - the Nuclear Safety Council (CSN) - an independent organization which did not come under the central Spanish administration. One of its functions would be to advise on legislative matters within its field of competence.

34. As regards Spain's nuclear fuel cycle activities, the objectives and responsibilities of the National Uranium Company (ENUSA), which was responsible for uranium prospecting and uranium studies both inside and outside the country, had been defined by the Spanish administration.

35. The Nuclear Energy Board (JEN) had consequently been restructured and was now concentrating on nuclear research and development, basically for the purpose of providing technological support for the Nuclear Safety Council and the National Uranium Company.

36. In October 1980, the JEN had received permission to set up a second research centre, at Soria, and a licence had been granted at the same time for provisional operation of the first unit of the Almaraz power station, which had a pressurized light-water reactor (930 MW(e)). That meant that there was now a second generation of nuclear reactors in Spain, Almaraz I having gone critical during the present year.

37. In November and December 1980, licences for the construction of the Trillo II and Vandellós II power plants (pressurized light-water reactors), each with an output of 930 MW(e), had been issued.

38. At the present time the Spanish nuclear situation was as follows: four nuclear power plants in operation with a combined capacity of 2030 MW(e); eleven plants under construction with a total capacity of 10 535 MW(e); and three power plants, with a scheduled capacity of 3000 MW(e), which, when ready (1999), would bring Spain's installed nuclear capacity up to 15 565 MW(e). Estimates of uranium resources in Spain costing less than \$30 per pound of U_3O_8 amounted at the present time to 21 000 tonnes; in 1980 uranium production had reached 190 tonnes.

39. The National Uranium Company had applied for a licence to build a new ore concentrate plant, as a result of which its treatment capacity would be a million tonnes of ore a year. That would be a 700-tonne increase in the annual production of concentrate. In December 1980, the Company had been licensed to build a fuel element fabrication plant for light-water reactors, which was due to start production early in 1983.

40. The Spanish Government fully supported international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. In that connection it greatly commended the work done by the Agency in the delicate matter of translating the hopes placed in nuclear energy into reality. The stage of development reached by nuclear energy in the world appeared to justify consideration of certain specific questions relating to structure, programmes and procedure so that the Agency could take the necessary steps to discharge its functions more effectively in the future.

41. As regards, for example, adapting the size and composition of the Board of Governors to present conditions, without impairing its efficiency, both equitable representation and efficiency had to be carefully weighed up when contemplating any change in the structure or rules of procedure of the policy-making organs of the Agency. Also, maximum effort was needed to ensure that technical assistance to the developing countries took the form of appropriate technological co-operation and requisite economic measures as the use of nuclear energy in those countries gradually progressed.

42. In the field of bilateral co-operation, he wished to mention the additional nuclear co-operation agreement signed in December 1980 by the Governments of Spain and Colombia and the agreement concluded by Spain and Portugal on co-operation in the safety of nuclear power plants located near their common border; also, a protocol relating to nuclear safety had been signed by the JEN and the Portuguese Protection and Safety Board. In addition there was continuing co-operation between Spain and Ecuador for the construction of a nuclear research centre in the latter country, and between Spain and Mexico.

43. Furthermore, Spain was co-operating with a number of international organizations. For example, in the previous year an agreement had been concluded with EURATOM in the field of nuclear fusion and an Agency training course had been held in Madrid on the role of nuclear energy in national energy programmes. In October there was likewise to be a joint IAEA/NEA/WHO symposium on "The application of the dose limitation system in nuclear fuel cycle facilities and other radiation practices".

44. Reference should also be made to the recent signing by Spain and the Agency of safeguards agreements relating to four research establishments and one nuclear power plant; they had not been under safeguards before because of the complex nature of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Spain. All Spanish facilities of the type in question were now under international safeguards.

45. The decisions taken by the Government of Spain were designed to help create a climate of greater international trust, especially in the nuclear field. It was for that reason that the Spanish delegation resolutely condemned the attack by Israel on the Iraqi nuclear research centre in June as an act of violence against the basic principles of international law and a danger to world peace. Furthermore, the attack was a challenge to the authority of the Agency and to its credibility in the matter of safeguards. It was to be hoped that an event of such gravity would find due reflection in the work of the General Conference.

46. Mr. CARREIRA PICH (Portugal) congratulated Zimbabwe on its admission to the Agency.

47. A number of points in the annual report were worthy of comment, particularly the paradoxical situation existing in many countries whereby they recognized the limitations of their primary resources but did not have the will to prevent a slowing down in their nuclear programmes. The Agency should make every effort to reverse that situation, which was due largely to public opinion. Any initiative on the Agency's part which helped to make the most

sensitive aspects of nuclear energy, particularly the final disposal of radioactive wastes and the possibility of diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes, more acceptable to the public would be welcome.

48. With regard to technical assistance and training activities, the Agency's assistance to Portugal in the fields of uranium exploration, the planning of nuclear programme activities, nuclear safety and research had been most fruitful. Contact between Agency experts and Portuguese workers involved in the nuclear field was particularly beneficial.

49. Portugal's indigenous energy resources were poor and the country was therefore highly dependent on foreign imports - particularly oil, whose share of total imports had risen from about 4% in 1973 to 25% in 1980. In those circumstances, nuclear energy seemed a likely alternative for the future. The first national energy plan was currently being prepared and would, when finalized, define the nuclear component in the national grid. Until the results of that plan were known, activities connected with the installation of nuclear power plants would continue under the policy recently defined by the Minister for Industry and Energy in order to prepare the infrastructure and train the manpower required for a nuclear power programme. Uranium exploration and exploitation activities were also continuing. The same policy laid down guidelines on several points, including the provision of the public with information on several aspects relating to the production of electricity by nuclear power plants, the preparation of the administrative structures required for nuclear safety and the licensing and control of nuclear plants, site selection for nuclear power plants, the definition of electricity requirements for the next three decades and, finally, the participation of Portugal in international nuclear energy activities.

50. He recalled that the Portuguese Government had expressed its strong condemnation of the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities at the time because it constituted a violation of the principles of international law. That attack was an extremely serious step which contributed to the tension which already existed in the region.

Mr. Xuto (Thailand), President, took the Chair.

51. Mr. KABBANI (Saudi Arabia) said that the Agency was passing through an important phase in its history. Although many meetings had been held at the cost of much time and effort, the Board of Governors had failed to appoint a new Director General. The matter was being made difficult not only by differing views and conflicting interests, but also by the need to find an incumbent possessing the same high qualifications as the present one.

52. At its present session the General Conference was faced with an exceptionally critical and challenging situation owing to the unwarranted attack on the peaceful nuclear establishments of a country which was not only a State Member of the Agency but also one which had signed and ratified NPT. Iraq had complied with all its international commitments and had concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency. That criminal attack had been carried out by Israel, which had repeatedly refused to join NPT and was challenging the whole nuclear community and endangering world peace and security. Israel's criminal act had been an attack on the Agency's integrity and had undermined confidence in its safeguards.

53. It was high time to stop giving preferential treatment to one Member State which was disloyal to the international community and was motivated by previous grievances and sufferings, especially when that State had chosen to be governed by none other than the leader of the well-known terrorist organization Irgun Zvai Leumi, which in 1948 had annihilated the village of Der-Yassín killing 254 Palestinian citizens, mainly women and children. To continue closing one's eyes to Israel's crimes and the parallel crimes of its twin, the South African régime, was to give them the green light for continued atrocities and murders. The Saudi Arabian delegation therefore requested the Conference not only to condemn the act of aggression but to approve the suspension of Israel in accordance with the resolution put before it by the Board of Governors.

54. He wished to touch briefly on another important matter, namely, the confidentiality of safeguards information. Those countries which wanted all States to accede to NPT should refrain from accepting confidential information from citizens of theirs employed as Agency inspectors. It was satisfactory to know that the Director General had given instructions for an urgent in-depth review of the whole pattern of security and confidentiality of safeguards material and documentation. He trusted that the Board would be informed of the outcome of that review.

55. Two items on the agenda at the present session were of special concern to all States and to the developing countries in particular; one was "The financing of technical assistance" and the other was "Amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute". Regarding the amendment of Article VI.A.2, he believed the matter should not be pushed back and forth between the Board and the General Conference. The Board had repeatedly demonstrated that it was not able to submit a concrete recommendation. For the past five years the Board had merely transmitted the records of its deliberations on the matter to the Conference. As to the financing of technical assistance, he sincerely hoped that the matter would not suffer from the delaying tactics which were holding up a decision on amending Article VI.A.2.

56. Until recently Saudi Arabia had had very modest nuclear activities, supervised by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. However, a few months previously nuclear activities had become the responsibility of the National Centre for Science and Technology. He hoped to be able to announce, in the near future, the formulation of a programme for peaceful uses of the atom in the Kingdom, particularly in nuclear power generation. Saudi Arabia was following with great interest the development of nuclear power as an alternative energy source which would replace limited oil resources. He wished in conclusion to remind the Conference once again of Saudi Arabia's policy in the field of energy: while Saudi Arabia was doing its utmost to help industrial countries, it felt it to be the duty of those countries to conserve oil and to develop and use every other available source of energy.

57. Mr. BRADY ROCHE (Chile) recalled that at the twenty-third regular session of the Conference Chile had been elected to membership of the Board of Governors, an office which, during the past two years, had enabled it to maintain close contact with the Agency. He wished to take the opportunity of thanking the friendly countries which had assisted Chile in carrying out the important functions of that office.

58. The Chilean Government believed that the Agency should avoid politics, since it was an essentially technical organization and its activities should be directed at improving the technical capacity of all its Member States and ensuring observance of safety standards and safeguards by all of them without exception.

59. His delegation was deeply disturbed at the apparent impossibility of arriving at agreement on the appointment of a new Director General. It believed that the marked polarization in the position of the various groups of States was by no means beneficial to the Agency's future work.

60. The policy of the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission had always been to place emphasis on peaceful nuclear applications, and for that reason it was implementing programmes in such areas as health, agriculture, the study of water resources, and foodstuffs.

61. He now wished to present to the Conference a few remarks on the most relevant aspects of nuclear development in Chile. The Commission had entered upon a stage of internal reorganization, giving priority to nuclear safety and radiation protection, in connection with which work was actively proceeding on the drafting and introduction of legislation in those fields.

62. Studies connected with nuclear power had been postponed until 1985 because Chile had available other, renewable and non-renewable, energy sources which for the time being enabled it to meet its requirements. However, steps would be taken to keep abreast of developments elsewhere.

63. He particularly wished to express Chile's support for and confidence in the Agency's safeguards activities and other work such as technical assistance or, more properly, "technical co-operation", as the Director General had called it in his statement. It was also important not to forget the importance of training programmes, since technical co-operation could not be effective without a personnel infrastructure able to benefit from transfers of technology. In that context he repeated his country's offer to place at the disposal of Member States the infrastructure of the Chilean nuclear facilities, together with the skill of its scientists and technicians in training personnel from the developing countries.

64. Regarding safeguards, his delegation believed that bilateral agreements between various States and the Agency should be respected by both parties, and that any amendments thereto should also be negotiated bilaterally.

65. In conclusion he expressed the hope that the work now being planned would be implemented and reflected in new successes for the International Atomic Energy Agency.

66. Mr. OSMAN (Egypt) said that the 25th regular session of the General Conference represented a significant event for Egypt. It was the first session of the Conference to be held following Egypt's ratification of NPT, in February 1981, and the subsequent successful conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the Agency, which had been approved by the Board of Governors a few days previously.

67. He felt it his duty to explain briefly to the Conference the considerations which had prompted Egypt to ratify NPT almost 13 years after it has signed it, on 1 July 1968, the day it was opened for signature.

68. Egypt had been encouraged by the positive atmosphere created by the resolution adopted by consensus at the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly, upon Egypt's initiative, for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Egypt's ratification of NPT affirmed, in fact, its commitment to the establishment of such a zone. The

Egyptian delegation to the present, 36th session of the United Nations General Assembly would shortly submit a new plan for the speedy attainment of that objective.

69. Moreover, in view of the fact that Egypt had developed an ambitious scheme for the commissioning by the year 2000 of eight nuclear power plants with an approximate total capacity of 8000 MW(e), it had been realized that such a large-scale project could not be accomplished under present circumstances without the ratification of NPT, a step which would assure all nations of the peaceful orientation of Egypt's nuclear programme.

70. It gave him great pleasure to announce that an agreement between Egypt and the Federal Republic of Germany for co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been initialled in Cairo scarcely two weeks previously. It had been preceded by a similar agreement with France in March and another one with the United States in June. Each of those three major co-operation agreements provided for the building of nuclear power plants with an approximate total capacity of 2000 MW(e). Other agreements had also been reached with Sweden and the United Kingdom.

71. In an era marked by an intensive search for new and renewable sources of energy, investing in nuclear power was imperative for many nations, particularly developing ones. That was certainly the case with Egypt, where plans aimed at brining the nuclear share of total power generation to about 40% by the year 2000.

72. It had been that atmosphere of the need to invest in and rely upon nuclear energy for peaceful purposes which had motivated Egypt to join other interested nations in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). He looked forward with great hopes to the forthcoming round of discussions within CAS, in November 1981. He felt that the time had come to concentrate on the real issues, in order rapidly to reach equitable solutions which would provide receiving countries with assurances that their supply of nuclear material, equipment and services would not be interrupted under any circumstances.

73. For many developing countries of the world technical assistance was the prerequisite for developing and sustaining nuclear technology. The Agency's technical assistance programme was one of its most important activities, particularly for developing countries. His delegation therefore supported all efforts to expand and consolidate the provision of technical assistance and noted with satisfaction that the Board had established, in the previous years, indicative planning figures for the targets for voluntary contributions over a three-year period. While that action was a step in the right direction, the funds available for technical assistance were still nothing like enough to enable projects in many developing countries to be carried out. Egypt therefore hoped that ultimately technical assistance would be financed from the Regular Budget or by equally predictable and assured means. Following its consistent policy of support for technical assistance his Government had decided to maintain its voluntary contribution for 1982 at the same level as in previous years.

74. Closely related to the needs and the expanding activities of the developing countries in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was the matter of an equitable geographical redistribution of key posts in the Secretariat, as well as an improvement in the position of the under-represented regions, particularly Africa, on the Board of Governors.

75. All that the Agency had been doing over the years to promote peaceful nuclear activities on the one hand and to build up a reliable and credible system of safeguards on the other had received a severe blow as a result of the premeditated unprovoked Israeli attack on Iraq. Egypt had been impressed by the swift action taken by the Board of Governors on 12 June 1981, strongly condemning Israel and recommending that the General Conference consider all the implications of the Israeli aggression, including suspending the exercise by Israel of the privileges and rights of membership as well as suspending the provision of any assistance to Israel under Agency technical assistance programmes.

76. He hoped that the Conference would live up to the expectations of the Board of Governors on that issue.

77. The Israeli attack on the Iraqi peaceful atomic installation was the greatest challenge the Agency had ever faced. If the Agency was to continue to carry out its functions properly the Israeli attack, which had been virtually an attack on the integrity of the Agency, should not be allowed to go unpunished. He believed that the draft resolution now before the Conference corresponded to international legality as reflected both in the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 12 June 1981 and in United Nations Security Council resolution 487 unanimously adopted on 19 June 1981. Egypt therefore supported the draft resolution.

78. Trusting that the Conference would give full support to the introduction of Arabic as an official and working language of the Conference, he wished in conclusion to express on behalf of his delegation his sincere hopes that the present session of the General Conference would contribute to a renewal of the confidence and trust of the world community in the valuable and indispensable work of the Agency.

79. Mr. EILAM (Israel) said that one of the major issues dominating the present session of the General Conference was the military operation carried out by Israel in June. In view of the plethora of pejorative phrases used by certain delegations to describe the incident, it would be appropriate to recount the circumstances leading up to the decision by the Government of Israel to disable the inactive Tamuz-I reactor near Baghdad before its start-up.

80. The Iraqi delegate had sought to convince the General Conference that he represented a peaceful country which had been the innocent victim of a military attack. It was therefore necessary for the Israeli delegation to make known certain facts of the matter.

81. Iraq had been committed to the destruction of Israel ever since Israel had been established and had taken every opportunity to promote that objective. Iraq had actively participated in all the wars against Israel since 1948. Iraq had also rejected any proposal for direct or indirect negotiations with Israel.

82. Iraq had never accepted the United Nations Security Council resolution 242, which remained the only agreed basis for the peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict. Furthermore, Iraq considered itself the leader of the so-called rejectionist front. The Iraqi delegate had said in his speech that Israel had bombed the Tamuz complex in September 1980. He appeared to have forgotten that his country had initiated a year before, and was still waging, war with Iran. The truth was that the attack had been carried out and officially claimed by Iran. By distorting the truth, Iraq was trying to conceal the real reason why it had not requested at the time any action on behalf of the Agency against Iran. The real motive behind the present motion was to single out Israel as a target. The Iraqi delegate had kept from the present Conference technical data on the Iraqi nuclear programme. Those data would have tarnished the image of innocence that Iraq was trying to create. Many references had been made at the present Conference to the Board of Governors' resolution of June 1981. In that connection the Conference should recall that the Israeli representative had been prevented from speaking before the text of that resolution had been adopted. Israel's concern about the Iraqi nuclear programme had been shared in authoritative governmental and professional assessments throughout the world.

83. Israel's assessment of the Iraqi nuclear threat was as follows: in 1975 Iraq had extended its nuclear interests. After prolonged negotiations an agreement for nuclear co-operation had been signed by France and Iraq. During the negotiations preceding the agreement, the Iraqis had asked the French to supply them with a 500-MW(e) gas-graphite power reactor.

84. Graphite reactors were best suited for the production of plutonium. Dual-purpose gas-graphite power reactors were designed to produce both military plutonium and electricity. Power programmes based on that type of dual-purpose reactor, which had been implemented mainly in the United Kingdom and France, had been discontinued in the early 1970s, when it had become clear that the most efficient power reactors were those of the PWR and BWR types. The Iraqi request for a gas-graphite reactor in 1974-75 had therefore been highly suspicious, since a reactor of that kind could produce some 400 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually.

85. France had halted the production of that type of reactor in the late 1960s, which had been the reason given by the French for not supplying one to Iraq.

86. The Iraqis had not accepted the alternative offer of a conventional nuclear power reactor (EWR or BWR) but had chosen an Osiris research reactor, a very advanced type with relatively high power.

87. Iraq had acquired all the nuclear facilities and expertise required for the development of nuclear weapons: (a) A high-power MTR specially designed for testing the influence of radiation on power reactor construction materials, Osiraq was suitable for the production of plutonium in significant quantities; (b) A fuel fabrication facility, which could produce large quantities of power-reactor-type fuel elements, although Iraq had no use for such elements in the conceivable future other than as uranium targets for the production of plutonium; (c) Equipment for separating plutonium from highly radioactive irradiated uranium; (d) Large quantities of natural uranium to assure an adequate supply of raw material for uranium target manufacturing.

88. The combination of those ingredients exposed the true nature of the Iraqi programme. It was clear that by 1985 Iraq would have been in possession of sufficient weapons-grade plutonium to produce at least one nuclear weapon device.

89. It had also become evident from the safeguards standpoint that the preference for Osiraq and supporting facilities was a premeditated attempt to exploit limitations on Agency safeguards on MTRs for the purpose of embarking on a nuclear weapons programme without risking detection: (a) Safeguards did not apply to research within the facility. In the case of research reactors, that meant that no clarification needed to be given to the inspector for any experiment conducted within the reactor, and only the inventory of the declared fuel had to be accounted for. In the case of a large-size MTR such as Osiraq, that limitation permitted the insertion of various targets including, for instance, undeclared natural uranium, for which the reactor operator was not accountable to the inspector; (b) That activity could be

obviated by removal of such uranium charges before inspections; (c) No television or photographic surveillance measures for monitoring in between inspection visits were provided for under the present safeguards approach for such MTRs; (d) Iraq had rejected inspection by the Agency in 1980 at the time when weapons-grade uranium had been stored there; (e) Uranium concentrates purchased by Iraq were not subject to safeguards. The conversion of concentrates to target quality UO_2 did not require any sophisticated equipment. It was within the capability of Iraq to reach that stage by utilizing the auxiliary facilities, which would remain outside the scope of safeguards as long as Iraq maintained that it was not processing plutonium or fabricating fuel in them; (f) Iraq had been in a position to proceed as far as it wished in its nuclear weapons programme and to exercise its right of withdrawal from NPT at three months' notice without fear of sanctions.

90. Over the years Israel had tried to deal with the threat diplomatically by appealing to Iraq's suppliers and urging other Governments to use their influence, but to no avail.

91. The military operation against Tamuz-I had been neither an attack on the IAEA nor an expression of no confidence in its safeguards system. Israel was highly appreciative of the Agency's efforts to discharge its duties loyally and effectively within the limits of the mandate defined by the international community. Israel believed that the Agency's mandate should be expanded, but that could be done only if all Member States recognized that its universality was the best guarantee of effectiveness.

92. Another issue raised at the present Conference was the question of adherence to NPT. A precondition for NPT was the existence of peace, which did not exist today in the Middle East. As the Director General had told the Conference, NPT should be regarded as based and nourished on mutual trust between the nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States and not on mistrust. Israel had studied various aspects of NPT in relation to the conditions prevailing in the Middle East and had concluded that the turbulent and constantly shifting conditions still prevailing there prevented the Treaty's implementation in good faith on the part of many of the States in the region.

93. Since 1974, Israel had been appealing to all States in the region to negotiate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone modelled on the Tlatelolco Treaty. The Government of Israel held that to be a promising way of removing further threats in the region. Israel had recently taken the initiative regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Israel had joined the consensus on the Egyptian initiative, after its own initiative had been rejected by the Arab countries. Israel considered that its initiatives deserved general support and would continue during the current session of the United Nations General Assembly to act in the same spirit. Any attempt to ostracize Israel by the Agency might tend to undermine Israel's faith in the Agency's preparedness to discharge its global and comprehensive mission. That might discourage Israel from seeking to develop its initiative for a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. Such a course would be as much out of keeping with the interests of the Agency and the world community as it would be out of keeping with the hopes and desires of the Government of Israel.

94. The Conference should urge the States in the Middle East to initiate, as soon as possible, direct negotiations for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

95. Mr. DHARMAWARDENA (Sri Lanka) said that he wished to begin by welcoming Zimbabwe to the Agency. Turning to the role of his country as a Member State, he recalled that in 1980, his Government had hosted a symposium on combination processes in food preservation and a meeting on legislative aspects of food irradiation sponsored by the Agency; towards the end of 1981, his country would be hosting a seminar on nuclear techniques in water management.

96. The need for nuclear techniques and nuclear power in Sri Lanka had become more evident as a result of accelerated growth in economic, agricultural and industrial activity. For the first ten years of its existence, the Sri Lankan Atomic Energy Authority had played only a promotional role in seeking IAEA assistance in the application of nuclear techniques on behalf of non-nuclear institutions. However, a nuclear programme which was based only on

non-nuclear institutions and foreign assistance could not be effective. Consequently, since 1980 scientists and technicians belonging to the Atomic Energy Authority were being trained in various aspects of nuclear science, and funds were being provided for peaceful nuclear activities. Also, the Authority's scientific and technical staff was being expanded. In 1980 bilateral co-operative agreements had been concluded with two countries. Those measures would promote the use of peaceful nuclear techniques and accelerate the development of Sri Lanka.

97. Hydroelectric power was the only source of energy in Sri Lanka, and a large fraction of his country's export earnings was committed to oil imports. Unprecedented growth in electricity demand over the previous three years combined with insufficient supplies of water to provide adequate hydroelectric power had resulted in power cuts which were detrimental to industrial growth. Gas turbines were being installed to increase the supply of electricity. In the medium term, his country would have to depend on imported coal, and in the long run it would be necessary to use the most economical forms of energy. In 1980 his Government had decided, in principle, that nuclear power would have to be used in the long term. Preparations, including training and the establishment of the necessary infrastructure, would have to begin without further delay, albeit in the face of some anti-nuclear protests.

98. Sri Lanka was party to the regional co-operative agreement between countries in the region of Asia and the Pacific (RCA) and a strong advocate of the principle of regional co-operation. The large amount of support received from UNDP for RCA activities demonstrated the success achieved by those countries in nuclear co-operation.

99. The military attack on a nuclear facility under Agency safeguards was a matter of grave concern, and it was necessary to ensure that similar raids did not occur again. His delegation endorsed the views expressed by the Director General on that matter.

100. His delegation wished to record its deep appreciation of the effective manner in which Dr. Eklund had directed the activities of the Agency during a difficult year. Finally, his country would contribute its share of the voluntary contributions for 1982.

Mr. Copithorne (Canada), Vice-President, took the Chair.

101. Mr. THAM (Sweden) said it was only two months since the conclusion of a major event in the energy field - the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, held in Nairobi. The main achievement of the Conference had been the highlighting of a major challenge, namely the transition from an era of inexpensive oil to one characterized by higher prices, greater efficiency in energy use and more diverse energy sources. The effects of that transition would be different for developing and developed countries. Indeed, the energy issue was closely related to certain other issues of disputation between North and South.

102. The Nairobi Conference had clearly stated that all energy sources must contribute to the move away from excessive oil consumption. It had devoted considerable time to some energy sources but had omitted any mention of nuclear energy. It was clear, however, that nuclear energy would in fact form an important part of the world's energy balance.

103. In that connection, the Agency had a very important role to play as the primary international organization for co-operation in the nuclear field and it could make a special contribution in a number of areas.

104. One area had to do with industrial and administrative infrastructures. Nuclear energy required advanced technology, not only in reactors but also in ancillary installations, and made great demands of a legal, administrative and social nature. National supervisory bodies with high technical expertise had to be set up and educational systems had to be adapted. That constituted an important field of activity for technical assistance. The Agency must be capable of rendering such assistance in the planning and implementation of

nuclear power programmes. On the other hand it should not become simply a promoter of nuclear energy in all circumstances. No country should embark on nuclear energy before it had made a thorough analysis of the options available.

105. Nuclear energy also posed other challenges. Its credibility depended heavily on its safety record. While responsibility for safety was primarily a national concern, there were also international implications. Sweden welcomed the expanding work that the Agency was doing in that field and welcomed the Director General's announcement at the June meeting of the Board that he intended to report annually on major developments. Since the last session of the General Conference, it had had the pleasure of hosting an important Agency meeting on the subject of power plant safety.

106. A further development, which had so far only been the subject of preliminary discussions, was the proposal for an international convention to facilitate the provision of emergency assistance in the event of a civil nuclear accident. Sweden had already established such a system with its Nordic neighbours. Something similar, but on a wider international scale, would help to increase confidence in the safety of nuclear power.

107. The prospects for nuclear power also depended on confidence that supplies, services and other forms of international co-operation could be expected to remain predictable. Equally important, there must be confidence that trade in the nuclear field would not lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons or the fear of such proliferation.

108. Pending the establishment of such a system of international co-operation, a number of helpful steps could and should be taken. They included an agreed safeguards system, agreed levels of physical protection and agreed mechanisms for the management of spent fuel and separated plutonium. In that connection the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) and the Expert Groups on International Plutonium Storage (IPS) and International Spent Fuel Management (ISFM) were important. Progress in the substantive work of those

bodies was one of the essential prerequisites for a successful outcome of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, to be held in 1983.

109. During the previous year there had been encouraging developments in the policies of some supplier Governments. There were, however, also signs of certain actions which could prove disastrous to the objective of improved security of supply and predictability in nuclear co-operation. They included possible actions by some non-nuclear-weapon States in the direction of nuclear explosive capability. Such actions would indeed drastically reduce confidence in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

110. The public, the media and political leaders not specially acquainted with nuclear matters generally knew only of the safeguards role of the Agency, and indeed it was true that no other intergovernmental organization played that particular role. A further reason why safeguards stood out to so many people was the trust that they had been able to generate. Doubts about the acceptability of nuclear energy had many times been allayed by reference to the fact that Agency safeguards were applied. The effectiveness of those safeguards depended not only on their scope but also on their ability to detect diversion of fissile material. It was a continuing challenge to the Agency's staff to adapt the techniques to new technologies.

111. A very disturbing incident during 1981 had been the unjustified Israeli bombing of the Iraqi reactor. The Swedish Government strongly condemned that attack as a flagrant violation of international law.

112. At the United Nations Conference in Nairobi, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, Mr. Edward Seaga, had put great emphasis on the fact that the present pace of technological development, while offering the promise of breakthroughs in the use of new and renewable resources, was still not sufficiently rapid. At the same time, many existing technologies did not have sufficient exposure to the markets of the developing world. He had proposed that in order to remedy the situation an international research and development centre should be created within an existing organization such as the IAEA. That interesting proposal should be given further attention.

113. Mr. PETROU (Greece), paying a tribute to the Director General, said that it was under Dr. Eklund's direction that the Agency had maintained its crucial role in the nuclear co-operation field and gained universal respect.

114. The twenty-fifth session of the General Conference was taking place in an atmosphere of worsening energy crisis, as was reflected in the Agency's report for 1980.

115. Energy was vital for all countries, and food production, environmental conditions, quality of life, economic survival in general and thus, to a certain extent, political independence were closely connected with the assurance of energy supply. New energy sources alternative to coal and oil, which involved technical, physical and political problems, were essential. The United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy held in Nairobi in August had underlined the need for alternative sources and called for further action within the framework of the United Nations.

116. Greece, which was largely dependent on imported oil, considered it very important to develop new technology and to diversify its energy sources. Apart from exploiting water power and lignite, Greece had embarked on establishing the infrastructure for a more systematic use of geothermal, solar and wind energy. However, Greece attached an increasing importance to nuclear energy, for nuclear power had a vital role in meeting future energy requirements.

117. In June, the economic summit held in Ottawa had resolved to encourage greater public acceptance of nuclear energy and respond to public concerns about safety, health, nuclear waste management and non-proliferation, in which connection the role of the Agency was crucial. Besides, the Agency must continue and intensify its activities aimed at maintaining international confidence in nuclear power, while providing Governments with objective advice and recommendations, and assist them in general in restoring public confidence in their nuclear energy policies.

118. The Agency's safeguards were an indispensable basis for a system of confidence-building measures, which could be strengthened by the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage and by activities in the field of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management.

119. An effective safeguards system which would not hamper nuclear trade was essential within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was the cornerstone of the international nuclear order.

120. Greece, which had been among the first countries to sign and ratify NPT, welcomed the ratification of the Treaty by Egypt and Turkey and urged the States which had not acceded to the Treaty to do so without delay.

121. Since it was difficult to stop a country from switching from a peaceful to a military nuclear programme if it had the political will to do so, non-proliferation was a political and not a technical problem. That explained the difficulties being faced by the existing non-proliferation regime.

122. Greece was particularly gratified to learn from the Agency's report on safeguards that no anomaly had been detected which would indicate diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material.

123. Recalling the President's observation that the safeguards system was one of the two main pillars of the Agency and thus of its credibility, he considered that any action which was detrimental to the credibility of the system and of the Agency undermined the confidence needed, both internationally and nationally, for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes - that is, for its development as an alternative energy source - and must be condemned.

124. That was one of the reasons why the Greek Government had immediately condemned the attack by Israel on the Iraqi nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981 as a clear and unacceptable violation of international law, and shared the misgivings expressed by the Director General about the consequences of the

attack. The statement by the delegate of the United Kingdom on behalf of all States Members of the European Community on the subject also reflected Greece's concern. He hoped that the Conference would adopt a decision which would strike a balance between the condemnation of such acts and the desirability of maintaining the universality of the Agency.

125. A basic prerequisite for the development of national nuclear programmes was security of supply. In that connection it was encouraging to note the wide participation by Member States in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), which underlined the interest in and the need for predictable and reliable supplies for large investments in nuclear programmes. Greece had supported the establishment of CAS and was a member of it.

126. He hoped that the work of CAS would be accelerated and substantial issues would be tackled in a balanced way so as to lead not only to a better understanding but also to concrete results.

127. Greece supported the continuation of the discussions on international plutonium storage and considered that the comprehensive proposal submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany provided a useful basis for further discussions, which could lead to a potential international plutonium storage regime. It also hoped that the discussions on spent fuel management would yield positive results.

128. His country strongly supported the work of the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme, which was of help to the Greek nuclear programme and to the Nuclear Regulatory Service.

129. Although preparatory planning and site selection had suffered some delay, Greece's electricity requirements were expected to be met partially from nuclear power by 1990 so that, with further diversification of primary energy sources and production from oil wells, the burden of oil imports would be alleviated.

130. Within the framework of safety-building measures Greece would particularly welcome an agreement or a code of conduct covering trans-frontier problems of nuclear safety.

131. It was also in favour of continuing the Agency's programmes on the use of radioisotopes and radiation techniques.

132. His Government strongly supported the Agency's technical assistance programme, the financing of which must be equitable and fair and permit its expansion on a predictable basis. It was heartening to note that the technical assistance budget for 1981 showed a real growth, as compared to a zero growth in the Regular Budget.

133. The Greek Government welcomed the indicative planning figure for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund for 1983, and had already pledged to pay \$56 000 to the Fund in 1982 in line with its base rate of assessment.

134. Greece was a donor and a recipient of technical assistance, and it greatly appreciated the Agency's assistance in uranium exploration around the Strimon basin in the Serres area in northern Greece, where reasonably assured reserves of 4000 t of U_3O_8 and estimated additional reserves of 10 000 t of U_3O_8 had so far been discovered.

135. More equitable representation of the different areas on the Board and wider distribution of senior posts in the Secretariat would help the Board to reach consensus solutions. However, it was not advisable to link those questions to the appointment of a new Director General, which concerned all Members of the Agency. A new Director General must be appointed on the basis of his competence, objectivity, personality and experience only and any appointment process which might appear to undermine a priori his credibility and, thus, the prestige of the Agency must be avoided.

136. Mr. AL-KHATER (Qatar) said that Qatar took an active interest in the work of the Agency and in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. His Government believed that it was the inalienable right of each nation to develop its programme for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in accordance with its circumstances and needs. The development of nuclear power was particularly urgent in the developing countries since, as had been pointed out by the Director General on several occasions, in the long run it was the safest and most economical form of power generation; his country took a particular interest in it for generating electricity and for desalination.

137. However, the developing countries with nuclear power programmes had to invest heavily in them and should be assured of supplies on a long-term basis. In that connection he welcomed the establishment of the Committee on Assurances of Supply.

138. His country favoured the cause of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and had always supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Unfortunately, that noble objective had not been met so far because of the intransigence of Israel. Not only did Israel refuse to accede to NPT and to place its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards, but it had also created a very dangerous precedent by carrying out an unprovoked and unwarranted military attack against the Iraqi nuclear research centre on 7 June 1981.

139. Clearly Israel was bent on denying the right of certain Member States of the Agency to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to further their scientific, technological and economic development. It had attacked Iraq despite the fact that Iraq had fully subscribed to the Agency's safeguards system and was a party to NPT. Apart from the implications of the Israeli action for the Arab countries and the fact that it endangered security and peace in the Middle East, it had done serious damage to the Agency's

safeguards regime by undermining its credibility, and had harmed the cause of non-proliferation. The Israeli action had been overwhelmingly condemned by the Board of Governors and by the Security Council of the United Nations. For those reasons he strongly urged the Conference to expel Israel from the Agency for its criminal action against another Member State.

140. Turning to the activities of the Agency, he expressed his delegation's support of those activities; however, it was necessary to strike a balance between regulatory and promotional activities, with more attention being paid to technical assistance.

141. It was his delegation's view that technical assistance should be financed from the Regular Budget to ensure predictable and assured resources for an activity which was of crucial importance to the developing countries.

142. Over the past four years, the General Conference and the Board had been considering the question of the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute; however, no solution had yet been achieved. In that connection he called for an appropriate increase in the representation of Africa and of the Middle East and South Asia, which were under-represented.

143. Qatar fully supported the draft resolution submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the amendment of Rule 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference in order to introduce Arabic as an official and working language of the General Conference.

144. Finally, Qatar fully supported the holding in 1983, after suitable preparation, of a United Nations conference for the promotion of international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The meeting rose at 5.58 p.m.