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RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,
on Tuesday, 21 September 1982, at 10.10 a.m.

President: Mr. SIAZON (Philippines)
later: Mr. BRADY ROCHE (Chile)
later: Mr. SIAZON (Philippines)

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*/ A provisional version of this document was issued on 24 September 1982.

**/ GC(XXVI)/662.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION
(GC(XXVI)/662)

1. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that the General Committee, at its meeting the previous day, had authorized him to report on the results of its consideration of the agenda and the allocation of items for initial discussion. The General Committee recommended that the agenda should consist of all the items contained in the provisional agenda, as set out in document GC(XXVI)/662, that the items should be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in that document, and that, subject to the desirability of making the best use of the time available, the order in which the items were considered should be that indicated in the same document.

2. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

3. The PRESIDENT further informed the Conference that the General Committee had authorized him to report that it recommended fixing Friday, 24 September 1982, as the closing date of the twenty-sixth regular session and, exceptionally, because two major conferences of interest to General Conference delegates were scheduled to take place in September 1983, fixing Monday, 10 October 1983, as the opening date of the twenty-seventh regular session of the General Conference.

4. The recommendations of the General Committee were accepted.

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION FUND
FOR 1983

5. The PRESIDENT said that in June 1982 the Agency's Board of Governors had agreed to continue - for the years 1984, 1985 and 1986 - the practice of recommending indicative planning figures to serve in fixing targets for voluntary contributions to the Fund in order to provide for a certain degree of predictability as far as the targets for those years were concerned. With regard to 1983, however, for which year the Board had already recommended a target, it was important for the Secretariat to be able to make an early assessment of the total funds that would actually be available. Accordingly, all delegations in a position to do so were urged to notify the Secretariat,

before the end of the current session, of voluntary contributions to be made by their countries to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in 1983. He hoped that he would be able to report, towards the end of the current session, that a large percentage of the target figure for 1983 had been pledged.

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

6. Mr. BLIX (Director General), after expressing gratitude to President Kirchschräger and Members of the Austrian Government for honouring the Conference by their presence at the opening session, said that on 29 July it had been 25 years since the IAEA had come into existence. It was most fitting that the session of the General Conference which marked that twenty-fifth anniversary had been immediately preceded by a conference on the many years of accumulated nuclear power experience. The conference held the previous week had offered no striking new revelations but had given a serious and sober evaluation of where nuclear power now stood. The exuberant optimism of the 50s and 60s and the dark pessimism of the 70s had given way to a realistic assessment and analysis of the problems and potentials of nuclear energy, and there was no doubt that there was an important place for nuclear power in modern society. Nine per cent of the world's total electricity was now generated by nuclear power plants, and it was expected that nuclear power would provide 20 per cent of the world's electricity by the end of the decade, when it and other energy sources would be needed to relieve some of the pressures on oil supplies.

7. However, the fact remained that nuclear power today faced a number of serious problems, mainly stemming from adverse factors which could not be influenced by the utilities or by the nuclear industry itself. He had in mind the lower than anticipated growth rates for electricity consumption, resulting from the present world economic situation, the effect of extraordinarily high interest rates on the capital-intensive nuclear industry, and the climate of uncertainty created by delays and frequent changes of requirements in licensing processes.

8. There were, nevertheless, some factors which the nuclear community could influence, and they should be viewed by it as a challenge. When one examined that challenge one was bound to ask in what way the IAEA was at present being used and how it could be put to better use in the future. The Agency was an instrument where knowledge and experience could be pooled, where a division

of labour could be agreed on, and where guidelines, standards and conventions could be worked out. It was a channel for technical assistance in the applications of nuclear science and technology, including nuclear power. It was also an instrument offering States international safeguards - verifying the peaceful nature of their nuclear installations and thereby creating confidence.

9. The Agency was enjoined by its Statute to promote nuclear power. The lead and construction times for nuclear power plants needed to be reduced, so as to cut down costs, but without jeopardizing stringent safety requirements. In that context, it would be useful to have internationally agreed basic criteria for safety, testing and quality assurance, industrial standards and effective project management. The Agency was playing and would continue to play its role in those efforts.

10. The average availability factor for nuclear power plants, on the other hand, needed to be increased. Nuclear power plants in several countries had clearly shown that an availability factor of close to 80 per cent and sometimes higher was feasible; international exchange of information, including the supply of information to the Agency's Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) and evaluation of the data thus made available, could be of use in such endeavours.

11. Developing countries which were planning to embark on nuclear power programmes needed assistance. The Agency could help by advice on appropriate methods of assessing the merits of nuclear power in relation to other sources of energy. Once decisions to launch nuclear power programmes had been taken, the Agency could assist with advice regarding the development of the necessary infrastructure and the use of available manpower.

12. Research had to continue on the frontiers of technology; and in that connection the Board of Governors had approved a programme of study of the potential contribution of advanced reactors to the world energy supply. That study would include at least a preliminary consideration of later generations of power reactors and of fusion, in which the Agency had long played a significant role.

13. He now wished to turn to a subject that was basic to the Agency's ability to fulfil its statutory role of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and crucial to the issue of public acceptability - namely the subject

of safety. The Agency's growing involvement in that field had been marked in June by the publication of a review of nuclear safety for 1980-81. It was proposed in future to issue the review annually, and thus contribute to making the information available in that field less fragmentary and more reliable.

14. By mid-1982, almost 3000 reactor-years of operating experience had been accumulated by the more than 250 nuclear power plants operating in 23 countries. That experience showed, first, that nuclear power plants had been operating safely - there had been no accidents which had resulted in fatalities directly caused by radiation - and secondly, that even in a very serious accident, such as the one at Three Mile Island (TMI), the nuclear safety systems worked, even if there was still room for improvements in effectiveness.

15. For the general public the effect of TMI had been very different. It had been felt that the borderline of disaster had almost been reached and that next time it might be crossed. A rapid completion of the clean-up operation at TMI would mitigate the fears that had been aroused, and, even more importantly, a continuing good safety record in the industry at large would lead to greater acceptance of nuclear power.

16. The Statute authorized the Agency to establish standards of safety. That had been done and continued to be done with the emphasis now shifting from the development of norms to their implementation. One of the foundations of nuclear safety was the regular inspection of nuclear plants by national regulatory authorities. Should the Agency's nuclear safety missions be increased and operational safety review teams be offered as a regular service to States which so requested? That was already provided for in Agency-assisted operations, and was foreseen as a possibility in Article III.A.6 of the Statute.

17. A recent step which the Agency had taken, and one which had been recognized by the Nuclear Power Experience Conference as being very useful, was the organization of a world-wide system for reporting abnormal occurrences. The aim was to provide information about the causes of accidents and to arrange for international reviews of ways of avoiding them. That was an important project and he urged all concerned to assist in making it a success. One of the best ways of preventing accidents or of mitigating their

consequences was to make operators aware of incidents that had occurred at other facilities.

18. Co-operation could also be of great value in the area of safety research, and emergency planning was another area where new initiatives for international co-operation were being discussed within the Agency. A group of experts had recently submitted suggestions as to how emergency assistance between countries could be facilitated, one proposal being that a draft agreement might be developed which countries could utilize as a model for negotiating bilateral or regional agreements.

19. There was thus much to be done in pursuing the various safety initiatives already launched. Such an effort, leading to rigidly defined, internationally adopted standards and to advisory services in the relevant fields would in all likelihood increase public confidence in and acceptance of nuclear power. They might also facilitate international trade in nuclear installations and materials. There could, however, be certain drawbacks associated with rigid standards. For one thing it might be more difficult to agree on such standards than on mere recommendations, and for another there might be a risk that they would lag behind the progressing state of the art. Governments might wish to examine that approach to safety matters and the Secretariat would be ready to facilitate such an examination.

20. Hardly any aspect of nuclear power generation engaged the concern of the public more than waste disposal. It was understandable that waste products which would remain radioactive for thousands of years should evoke concern, even though they were isolated from the environment. But it was sometimes forgotten that most forms of energy generation produced wastes; nuclear waste was highly toxic, but was small in volume and could be contained; fossil fuels and wastes from them were today major pollutants of the atmosphere, the land and the seas.

21. In his view, public concern with radioactive waste had had the healthy effect of intensifying research and prompting a scientific response of very high quality. There was a broad consensus in the nuclear science and engineering community that adequate technical solutions were available today, so much so that nuclear energy should have a great environmental advantage over energy generated by coal and oil.

22. It was natural that the Agency should have been very much involved in the management of nuclear wastes. Through the pooling and exchange of information under Agency auspices broad agreement was being reached and guidelines on technical requirements regarding site selection, suitability of waste forms and so on would be published. The first phase of a programme on underground disposal would be completed by the end of 1984.

23. Regarding the interim storage of spent fuel, some valuable suggestions were contained in a report recently submitted to him by an expert group. If the industrial authorities responsible for spent fuel management and the Governments of Member States found merit in the ideas advanced by the experts for co-operation on a national or international basis in matters of storage of spent fuel, they might wish to work out practical arrangements for that purpose. The Agency, could, if so desired, serve as the venue for the necessary contacts.

24. Turning to the subject of the exchange of nuclear technology, he observed that the search for an international consensus was still in progress. That matter was now before the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), and he hoped very much that CAS would be able to chart a course out of the present impasse. The issue tended to look like a North/South one, but in reality it was not thus limited. The question of the assurance of supply had arisen among industrially advanced countries as well.

25. That issue was not only a question of concern to the IAEA, but had also been raised at the NPT Review Conference in 1980 and at the General Assembly of the United Nations, which had decided to convene, at Geneva in 1983, a Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development.

26. In his view that Conference could be of great interest to many countries as offering an opportunity to assess realistically both the advantages and the problems associated with the introduction of nuclear power, and the relevance to them of a wide variety of other applications of nuclear science, e.g. in agriculture, medicine and industry. The main consideration having prompted the convening of the Conference, however, was undoubtedly how to achieve adequate assurance of supply with appropriate non-proliferation guarantees.

27. A full answer to that question had not yet been found by CAS, although some progress had been made. It had been said with some justification that for many States already having or planning small nuclear energy programmes it could hardly be economically sound to develop their own enrichment and reprocessing facilities. If that argument were advanced, however, logic would seem to require that equal emphasis be laid on the fact that building facilities to store and finally dispose of highly radioactive waste was, likewise, a very expensive undertaking for the operators of small nuclear programmes. What was really needed, therefore, for a small programme was guaranteed access to the whole gamut of fuel cycle services, including waste disposal.

28. With mountains of nuclear weapons in the hands of the great Powers, and conflicts in many places, the world was a very dangerous place. There was a growing feeling that nuclear disarmament measures were desperately needed and that vertical proliferation must not only be checked but reversed. There was also an awareness that the world would become even more dangerous than it was today if nuclear weapons spread further. A great many countries had concluded that it was in the interest of their security not to acquire nuclear weapons, and a large majority of them had given evidence of that conviction by committing themselves to a non-proliferation regime, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both.

29. The Agency was categorically committed, through decisions by its policy-making organs in conformity with its Statute, to assist in the effort to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. There was moreover a link between that role and the task of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear power, in the sense that any further spread of nuclear weapons or explosive capacity and a continued failure to take steps to reduce or freeze present nuclear arsenals would help to turn large segments of world public opinion against nuclear power.

30. Regrettably no headway had yet been made towards nuclear disarmament; yet, even so, non-proliferation efforts had been remarkably successful. Fundamental in that regard was the continued political determination of States, but the safeguards regime operated by the Agency contributed in a very important way by verifying compliance with the commitments made, thereby

creating a much-needed climate of confidence. Those operations might - indeed should - discourage possible violations by making the risk of detection too great. It was important, he felt, to put the purposes of safeguards in that order. States did not invite safeguards or accept them in order to be deterred from some possible inclination to divert fissionable material: they invited and accepted them because they wanted to create confidence. They thus had an interest in safeguards being sufficiently comprehensive to be fully credible. Merely cosmetic operations or rubber-stamping would not only discredit the Agency but would also fail to serve the interests of the State concerned - namely the establishment of confidence.

31. The world might well have arrived at a critical juncture for both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In the latter, progress had recently been made through the important accession to NPT of Egypt and Vietnam. The concept of nuclear-free zones on the Latin American model was also being discussed for other areas of the world, for example the Middle East. However, the commitment to non-proliferation and the acceptance of full-scope safeguards to verify such a commitment was still not universal. Safeguards were not without problems, but the more serious problems, which lay outside the Agency's competence, began where safeguards ended.

32. There were, however, problems which were the Agency's own, problems it had to cope with. In the past year safeguards operations had come in for a good deal of criticism - though mostly not from Member Governments. The irrelevance or exaggeration of many of the points made must not lead anyone to discard the comments wholesale. Safeguards operations had only existed on a substantial scale for some ten years and had expanded very fast during that period. It would be unreasonable to expect them to be perfect. It would also be most unwise to try to ascribe to them qualities which they were inherently incapable of having. They could not forecast the future policies of States, but only help to verify present activities. They could not physically prevent anything, only provide reports. Yet, they were a unique institution. For the first time in history sovereign States had invited an international organization to perform inspections on important installations in their territories. That task must be exercised with tact, but also with a thoroughness which would guarantee the requisite assurance.

33. Constructive criticism of safeguards must be welcomed, and the Agency itself was the first to examine the shortcomings and to suggest improvements. More manpower and more equipment were needed to handle the growing volume of work. One must also recognize that with the organization's growth it would have to be modified in order to cope most effectively with the tasks before it. Some proposals to that effect were already in the budget document, and more would be worked out in the coming year.

34. The Board of Governors had decided in February to undertake a review of various important aspects of the safeguards system. That was to be welcomed. So far, verification approaches had been developed for nuclear facility types and for individual facilities. However, as safeguards were concerned with the possibility of diversion by States rather than operators, it might be reasonable to put greater emphasis on the relationship between all the facilities of the entire fuel cycle in a given State. How to handle the safeguarding of large reprocessing and enrichment plants most satisfactorily was also a matter still awaiting solution.

35. Another issue to which the Board would wish to address itself was the transparency of safeguards operations. A balance must be found between the requirements of protecting commercial secrets and other confidential information and the benefits of responding to the interest of legislators, the media and other groups by pursuing an open information policy.

36. As safeguards techniques evolved and better equipment and methods became available, arrangements made between the Agency and the States concerned would need updating. Provided the proposed new techniques did not infringe commercial secrets or operational convenience, there should not be any conflict between the wishes of the Agency and the interests of States. Both would wish to have the most cost-effective modern methods available to achieve the purpose, namely, to provide confidence.

37. It was sometimes asked if the Agency's safeguards system could serve as a model in the broader field of arms control. A point to be noted, in that regard, was that safeguards were applied to peaceful installations - not arms - and that they were confined to identified installations and material. Those were limitations. Even so, they constituted very important evidence that verification in loco was a politically acceptable and viable method of creating

confidence. Furthermore, acceptability was not confined to non-nuclear-weapon States: three nuclear-weapon States were currently accepting the application of Agency safeguards to some of their facilities, and he had had the honour, in speaking for the Agency at the recent United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, to welcome the invitation of the Soviet Union to the Agency to apply safeguards to some peaceful Soviet nuclear installations. It was hoped that talks on those operations could start soon.

38. The Agency had no mandate to participate in negotiations regarding global or regional nuclear arms control. However, it did have a long tradition of readiness to provide services within its experience and competence in the context of international agreements. It had by now considerable technical experience in the operation of safeguards and could assist, if requested, when such operations were needed - for instance in the context of regional military denuclearization, or of a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons use.

39. The Agency was categorically committed under its Statute to assist the developing countries, and the attention given to those activities had increased over the past year. The question was whether they could be further expanded and improved.

40. The important role played by the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste deserved special mention: the fact that the Centre had recently received significantly increased financial and other support by the Italian Government gave cause for satisfaction.

41. Basic scientific training remained an important area of Agency assistance, and there was a broad spectrum of applications which had great usefulness for developing countries. A few concrete examples would suffice. First, electric power generation: for those developing countries which were seriously considering the introduction of nuclear power as a viable option, the Agency offered assistance and guidance in energy planning, site selection, safety regulations and manpower development. Food and agriculture was another sector in which a large part - some 20 per cent - of the Agency's assistance was given. Examples of that aid were to be found in isotope- and radiation-assisted work to maximize the biological fixation of atmospheric nitrogen in field crops.

42. Health and medicine accounted for another large part of the Agency's co-operation with developing countries. Nuclear techniques for the investigation and prevention of parasitic diseases prevalent in the developing world and for promoting and improving the treatment of cancer by radiation were still of primary importance.

43. The technical co-operation programme with developing countries had grown rapidly, particularly in the last five years. From what had been basically a training programme with a budget of little more than \$100 000 in 1958, the programme had now evolved into an operation for which some \$20-30 million a year were allocated, counting all sources of funds.

44. One could only welcome the fact that the Board of Governors had unanimously recommended the 1983 budget for technical co-operation and indicative figures for ensuing years.

45. As of 31 July 1982, over 90 per cent of the target for 1981 had been met. For the current 1982 programme, only about 50 per cent of the pledges have been paid as of 31 July, and the total amount of pledges fell short of the 1982 target. He accordingly felt bound to utter an appeal for the payment of pledges made, and for the making of pledges which would enable the targets to be reached. An appeal was due not only to donor countries but also to recipient countries; as of 31 July 1982 more than \$1 million had been outstanding in their national currencies as assessed programme costs.

46. All Governments that had given extra-budgetary support to various projects deserved thanks. Since there was no longer a surplus of non-convertible currencies, it might also be in order to appeal to Members contributing such currencies to make additional contributions for extrabudgetary activities.

47. The technical co-operation programme was thus experiencing rapid growth, and the levels attained made a continuous examination of quality and orientation necessary. Better utilization of resources was in fact the aim of the Evaluation Unit to be established in 1983.

48. More joint discussion of the general orientation of the programme would be valuable. At its meetings in June the Board had expressed interest in a review of policies in the field of technical co-operation. That was a welcome initiative to keep a growing programme responsive to the interests of

recipients and donors. Even now, during the current session of the Conference, a seminar was to be arranged where ideas, comments and criticism could be advanced. As a basis for the discussion a Secretariat paper had been prepared pointing to significant policy questions - for example what the proportions of resources devoted respectively to expert services, manpower training and equipment should be, what balance should be sought between multi-year programmes and short-term activities, and whether a larger share of available resources should go to the least developed countries.

49. The Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA), which was celebrating its tenth anniversary in 1982, had been very successful, for instance in disseminating knowledge about industrial applications of radiation and isotope technology and about food irradiation. Should that pattern be emulated? The possibility of a second regional agreement was currently being discussed among some Latin American States. In a policy review, some thought might also be devoted to the idea of possibly "packaging projects" that could be preformulated or modularized to meet certain recurrent needs in developing countries.

50. Conference resolution GC(XXV)/RES/386 called for a substantial increase in the number of staff members drawn from developing areas at all levels, and particularly at the senior and policy-making levels. The reason for recruiting on as wide a geographical basis as possible, as demanded by the Statute, was, of course, to ensure that the Secretariat was enriched by the experience and knowledge that each Member State could offer.

51. There was a report before the Conference on the practical steps that had been taken to implement that resolution. It would be seen that, in the past year, three out of the four Directors appointed came from developing countries. One year was obviously not long enough for the results of the efforts undertaken to make themselves felt. What he had in mind in particular was a training programme for young graduates from developing countries as well as more thorough advertising of posts, especially in developing countries, in an effort to bring more candidates to the fore.

52. The Agency's staff was its most valuable asset. To maintain the high quality of staff which had contributed so much to the good reputation which the Agency generally enjoyed, he would continue to give paramount consideration -

as prescribed by the Statute - to professional excellence, trusting that Member States would continue to make available to the Agency the best of their qualified specialists.

53. The Agency had a vital role to play in connection with most of the major issues of current international importance: food and health, energy and disarmament. Inevitably, as it confronted some of those issues, the values and interests of Member States would sometimes differ and some controversy was accordingly to be expected. In a world where clashes and conflicts, exacerbated by deteriorating economic conditions, were unfortunately legion, it would be too much to expect no spill-over at all into the Agency's field of technical competence.

54. There was, however, no reason to regret that the Agency was deeply engaged in such matters. On the contrary, one should be gratified that in the Agency an instrument had been provided that could be used to tackle them. On the occasion of the Agency's 25th anniversary it was fitting to remember that it had taken a long time to build up that instrument. The best possible birthday present to the Agency - and the best tribute to those dedicated individuals who had participated in its founding, nurtured it in its beginnings and never lost their enthusiasm for its objectives - would be to preserve its reputation as a technical, objective body, to exercise patience and prudence in dealing with difficult issues, and to concentrate on those areas where the greatest contribution could be made.

55. In closing, he wished to pay tribute to the Austrian Government and to the City of Vienna for a quarter of a century of steadfast support for the Agency.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1981 (GC(XXVI)/664)

56. Mr. DAVIS (United States of America) said he wished to read a message from the President of the United States:

"The people of the United States join me in extending sincere congratulations on the occasion of the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA's record of achievements during its first quarter century stands as a model for other international organizations.

"Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the international community has faced the critical task of controlling the dangers of the atom while realizing its peaceful promise. The IAEA has played a vital part in this endeavour. Under its auspices, a growing number of countries have embarked on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in generating electricity, in medicine, in agriculture, and in other fields. Its safeguards system serves us all, allowing nations to demonstrate their commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and helping to prevent the further spread of nuclear explosives.

"A strong, effective Agency will be even more necessary to meet the challenges ahead. The United States is determined to work with other countries to assure that the Agency can successfully meet those challenges - from strengthening technical co-operation for sharing the benefits of nuclear energy to improving and strengthening the technical and institutional safeguards against its misuse. It is our profound hope that others will share this determination.

"It would be a tragedy for succeeding generations if we permit this organization to be weakened or undermined by political issues and concerns which are extraneous to the technical purposes for which the Agency was founded. It is essential that this organization continue to pursue its central purposes, and as long as it does, it will have the full support of the United States.

"As the Agency begins its second quarter century, it is time to rededicate ourselves to the goals set forth in the Agency Statute. This generation needs to ensure that the General Conference in the year 2007 will be able to look back with pride and satisfaction on the accomplishments of the IAEA as we are doing today."

57. The 80 founding members of the Agency had recognized that nuclear power posed special problems for Governments - problems which could only be tackled successfully within the framework of a unique international institution. The overwhelming power of nuclear energy had led them to devise novel approaches for bringing the world's nations together to seek agreement on the best and safest ways of developing the new energy source. They had envisaged an organization with a technical mission. Moreover, they had recognized that to exclude nations which met the Agency's rules for reasons not germane to the Agency's mission would seriously reduce the chances of achieving the important goals they envisaged. It was hoped that highly charged disputes over policy differences between Governments could be limited to within the framework of the Agency so that full attention could be given to the complex issues of science, technology, economics, and the international controls that arose in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They believed also that managing the new technology effectively would be a global issue, and that all

nations engaged in nuclear activities would participate in the work of the Agency.

58. In that regard, he welcomed and strongly supported the Director General's call to Member States to preserve its reputation as a technical and objective body and to concentrate on those areas where it could make the greatest contribution.

59. It was fitting that the 110 current Members should look back with pride and satisfaction on the unprecedented contributions that nuclear energy had made under the Agency. It had been a quarter century of impressive achievement, during which the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had developed from infancy to a mature industry making a significant contribution to energy supplies, economic well-being and human progress. Nuclear generated electricity - scarcely more than an idealistic dream 25 years before - now served millions of people, and research reactors were contributing to medicine, agriculture, industry and the growth of scientific knowledge.

60. He was especially proud of the technical and institutional contributions the United States had made. It had worked with other nations to establish the Agency and had been at the forefront of nuclear energy development. Since the Atoms for Peace programme had been established in 1954, more than 150 billion dollars has been invested in manufacturing facilities and power plants. The United States had been extensively involved in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and related technologies - enrichment, reprocessing, waste management, spent fuel handling and recovery, reactor safety, safeguards, and the research supporting those activities. Nearly 75 per cent of the nuclear reactors operating in 1982 either used United States equipment directly, or were based on United States supplied technology. His country had contracted to supply enrichment services to 137 power reactors in foreign countries and had provided training for thousands of nuclear scientists from around the world.

61. In 1983, the United States would host the International Conference on Waste Management. Many of the participants would have the opportunity to visit waste management research facilities and potential disposal sites under consideration by the United States.

62. The purposes of the Agency could be stated quite simply, in terms of the straightforward yet indispensable notion that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful uses and the undertaking of verifiable and good faith commitments to respect such uses were inseparable. It was from that idea that the Agency's objectives logically followed - to promote the use of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind while providing the maximum possible assurance, through safeguards and other means, against the diversion of nuclear material and equipment to non-peaceful uses. The simplicity of that central idea was the Agency's greatest strength. It was a tribute to the wisdom and vision of the founders of the Agency that their initial ideas had survived and remained the bedrock upon which the organization was built.

63. The twofold purpose remained the only basis on which Governments could proceed in order to achieve the twin objectives of peaceful nuclear energy development and non-proliferation. That was true notwithstanding the very real strains that over the years had challenged their collective will and ability to implement the basic concept of the Agency.

64. It would have been surprising if all strains had been avoided. The world had not stood still. Given the political, economic and technological changes that had occurred, differences between Governments on questions relating to the central idea of an international agency, the interpretation of its obligations and the mechanisms by which they would be carried out had been inevitable.

65. Both supplier States and their customers had sometimes taken actions or adopted positions that had aggravated those strains. Thus, on the issue of access to nuclear energy, there had been disagreements over the export policies of the supplier States. Changes in those policies had created anxieties about the assurance of supply.

66. At the same time, apprehensions had also arisen about increasing proliferation risks associated with some nuclear exports or with some indigenous nuclear programmes. Such concerns had been inspired by the existence of significant unsafeguarded activities in some countries and by the presence of facilities and materials with weapons potential in regions of international tension.

67. In an organization as diverse as the Agency, and in an environment as dynamic as the nuclear energy field, Member States had to learn to cope with change and manage their differences without losing sight of the larger purposes that united them.

68. The various problems had occurred against the background of another unfavourable trend. There had been a decline of public confidence in nuclear energy and a dramatic slowdown in the growth of nuclear power. While the role of nuclear power was impressive compared to what it had been 25 years before, it was disappointing compared to expectations. Governments needed to reflect on the reasons for that trend and to consider its implications.

69. Despite those facts, it was clear that the opportunities for the use of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind were greater than ever. The long-term energy requirements of the world demanded the successful use of nuclear energy. At the same time it was essential that there be adequate world-wide safeguards and controls.

70. The essential task before them was to breathe new life into the basic objective of the Agency - the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within the framework of adequate safeguards and non-proliferation assurances - not by futilely attempting to ignore recent difficulties but by learning from history.

71. There were no easy solutions to their problems, but the United States Government would be an active and constructive participant in a collective Agency effort to reach a consensus on how to proceed.

72. Firstly, they must squarely face the fact that a public perception of weaknesses in the safeguards system, coupled with scepticism about the response by States if safeguards agreements were violated, would be disastrous for the expansion and development of international nuclear co-operation and for nuclear non-proliferation.

73. Secondly, they must commit themselves to continued improvements and reforms in the safeguards system. The United States supported the Director General's interest in the question of the transparency of the safeguards operation and encouraged increased transparency to the extent that it did not compromise the legitimate right to have commercial information protected.

Strengthening technical safeguards, however, was only part of the task. The political and institutional framework that supported safeguards was vital if public confidence was to be restored.

74. As President Reagan had stated, the United States would view any material violation of international safeguards agreements as having profound consequences for international order and bilateral relations. It was to be hoped that all nations with commitments to non-proliferation would also view such a violation as a matter of the greatest seriousness and would be willing to work with the United States in developing appropriate measures to ensure compliance.

75. Thirdly, the coverage of safeguards should be broadened, to include, for example, the acceptance of full-scope safeguards by those States that had not yet done so.

76. Fourthly, public understanding of what the safeguards system could and could not do must be improved. Exaggerated expectations as much as actual weaknesses of the system itself had contributed to public questioning of the Agency.

77. Fifthly, they must continue to strive for universal adherence to NPT, while recognizing possible regional solutions, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty, under which countries might be better able on their own to foster nuclear restraints.

78. Finally, to realize the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy while assuring that non-proliferation concerns were met, they must strive to reduce the motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons by improving regional and global security.

79. The importance of the Agency had never been more evident. As world events had reminded them only too often, the peaceful resolution of international conflicts sometimes remained more a hope than a reality. They had to master their differences and to address themselves urgently to the real task, namely, to take advantage of the promise of nuclear power for solving the world's energy problems within a framework that ensured its use for peaceful purposes alone. Only then would public acceptance be won - and justified.

80. It would indeed be a tragedy if, instead of addressing the great challenges before them, the Agency were to succumb to the extraneous pressures being brought to bear upon it. They must keep their eyes firmly fixed on the purposes that had brought them together and reject the temptation to inject into their proceedings unrelated issues and objectives. Nothing would more discredit the Agency and erode its essential support than for it to surrender to a spiraling process of politicization and to turn its back on its original ideals and principles. Among the most vital of those was the principle of universality of membership.

81. They were at a turning point. Either they would rededicate themselves to the vision of twenty-five years before and find the means to continue the success they had enjoyed or they would impose upon the Agency burdens that it could not bear. They should resolve now to take the first path and thus preserve the possibility of meeting again in another twenty-five years to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of a strong, vital and respected International Atomic Energy Agency. They must succeed for they were not likely to have a second chance.

82. Mr. HERVE (France) recalled that the Agency had been set up 25 years earlier with two closely related objectives - to promote the development of atomic energy as a contribution to world progress and to ensure that the purposes of that development were exclusively peaceful. With the world economic crisis becoming more serious and the international community having to face an energy challenge, his Government wished to speak out in favour of a balanced yet resolute development of nuclear energy in the world, and at the same time to bear witness to the fact that the Agency had not failed in its mission of ensuring the peaceful use of facilities and material.

83. The solution of the energy crisis which the world had been facing for some ten years called for voluntary, coherent measures at the national and international levels involving strict control over consumption and appropriate utilization of all available energy sources.

84. The uncertainties in oil production and the sharp fluctuations of oil prices had brought home to the world the fact that fossil fuel resources would

not last forever. Temporary slippage of prices associated with business conjuncture should not be allowed to hide the fact that the reasons for tension would remain long in the market. It was well-known that unemployment could be overcome only by a return to faster growth, which depended on the availability of sufficient and diversified energy sources at acceptable prices with security of supply. The developing countries confronted a difficult energy situation. The essential improvement in their living standards inevitably required greater energy consumption and thus increased access to the most flexible energy source, namely oil. In an interdependent world, the developed countries thus had the duty to control their own demand and to reduce as much as possible their use of imported oil, an objective which had been adopted by the heads of the most highly industrialized States at their summit meeting in Ottawa in 1981. In that spirit they had expressed the hope that the delay in nuclear energy development in their own countries would be rapidly overcome.

85. Nuclear energy in fact had a vital role to play because, together with coal, it represented a substitute for oil for large-scale needs. However, except in France, Japan and the USSR, the development of nuclear power programmes had slowed down a great deal; that had occurred, indeed, in many countries. Apart from the slowing down of growth in relation to the predictions made in the early 1970s, the reasons for the fate of nuclear power programmes were more political and emotional than technical or economic.

86. Nuclear power was an industrial fact: it was available. The reactors in operation accounted for about 10 per cent of the world's electricity production, which represented the equivalent of 180 million tons of oil; in 1981 they had accordingly saved that much oil. Around the year 2000 nuclear power could well account for a third of electricity production and thus meet 10 per cent of the world's primary energy demand.

87. The world had a vital need for stable and adequate energy sources. Those energy sources would have to cover a substantially increasing demand, if only because of population growth in the Third World and the essential rise in the standard of living there - even if the most favoured countries were reasonable enough to control their own consumption.

88. A solution could be found only if everyone made an effort. As for nuclear energy, he wished to appeal to the will of those who held political responsibility by citing the experience of France.

89. In order to meet its needs, France had to rely exclusively on its own efforts and its own technological resources. It had adopted, democratically but resolutely, a balanced energy programme supported by a long-term policy, according nuclear energy its due place.

90. That nuclear energy was safe, reliable and economical was borne out by the experience of operation of 272 reactors over more than 30 years, during which period there had been no accidents for nuclear reasons which had had deleterious effects on the environment.

91. In France, the existence of a standardized industrial programme permitted a number of positive assessments:

- (a) Nuclear power stations had a very satisfactory load factor of the order of two thirds;
- (b) With a relatively limited organizational and storage effort, France had been able to ensure five years of nuclear power plant operation without any uranium supply from outside;
- (c) It had therefore been able to rely on nuclear power to supply two fifths of its current electricity needs, and would cover about three quarters of its requirements with nuclear power at the end of the decade when the reactors under construction or planned were commissioned;
- (d) Thanks to that investment effort, and thanks also to advanced standardization and adherence to construction schedules, the cost of the kilowatt-hour supplied by Electricité de France to private individuals and industry was at present the cheapest in Europe, as had been emphasized by the International Union of Producers and Distributors of Electrical Energy (UNIPEDE).

92. Being aware that the use of nuclear power met with psychological hurdles, his country had decided on a series of measures designed to inform the public, to gain its confidence and to ensure responsible opinion.

93. It had to be admitted that the world economic situation was hardly favourable and that the electricity companies in many countries faced the prospect of limited consumption in economies beset with crisis; that situation offered little inducement to investment.

94. He felt bound to stress once again that the developed countries possessing nuclear technology should make up for the delay they had experienced and reflect the need for world solidarity in their own efforts. World solidarity meant among other things that nuclear power must have its due share in their long-term investment plans; and their efforts should be geared to the long term, for undue delay would mean that ten years or more would be required before the necessary facilities could be sited, built and commissioned.

95. Although nuclear power was already a source of energy in developing countries, the pace of development was moderate, in keeping with their technical and financial requirements. However, it was necessary even now to prepare for the future, and in that context the development of medium-size units for limited electricity distribution networks should not be neglected.

96. Referring to the Agency's role in limiting the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, he pointed out that the use of nuclear power in industrialized countries and its appearance in developing countries necessarily entailed a wealth of commerce, including the export of reactors, the sale of materials, fuel and services, transfers of technology and training programmes. However, those exchanges could take place only if the international community was assured that there would be no diversion for military purposes. That was one of the reasons why the Agency had been established, and there should be no ambiguity regarding the Agency's role. The Agency's safeguards system was a unique example of a verification system under which Member States opened installations on their territory for inspection. The aim of the system was essentially to build confidence. However, the Agency was not an international police force, but rendered a service to the world community through the acceptance of safeguards by its Member States.

97. The purposes of safeguards were threefold: firstly, to detect rapidly the diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes; secondly, to dissuade Member States from engaging in diversion by virtue of the risk of detection; thirdly, to provide an alarm system in the event that a Member State violated its commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The dissuasive power and, in sum, the efficiency of the system were directly proportional to the credibility of safeguards and the degree of assurance, and the Agency was duty-bound to demonstrate that credibility.

98. Agency safeguards had so far fully met their objectives and were proving reliable. There was, however, also room for improvement since safeguards had to be constantly adjusted to advances in technology and applied to a growing number and variety of installations. His delegation therefore welcomed the detailed discussion of safeguards which had been scheduled for the series of Board meetings in February 1983. The time had come to ponder over the very concept of the safeguards strategy which should keep pace with the technical development of the countries concerned and not consist merely in applying mathematical criteria to each installation. Similarly, the scope of safeguards could be usefully enlarged in some cases, technical resources improved, full use made of the inspection procedures provided for in the relevant agreements and a greater degree of transparency introduced into safeguards activities and reports.

99. The work of the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage (IPS) should be considered in the same context. The development of techniques for reprocessing spent fuel highlighted the obvious need to introduce a scheme for the international storage of excess plutonium under the control of the Agency. The practical means of implementing the relevant provisions of the Statute should be considered at an early date.

100. The recent history of international nuclear relations, marked as it had been by confrontation, had highlighted the degree to which stability or at least predictability in the conditions imposed by suppliers was essential to the development of nuclear power. That development required large-scale investment and involved long periods of time. Calling into question the political rules and conditions originally laid down could only disrupt the normal course of events and might drive certain nations to undertake costly attempts at self-sufficiency. Stability or predictability in supplier conditions was thus an important factor from the point of view of non-proliferation, too. The Agency had an important role to play in that area and was in fact conducting discussions on those topics.

101. The Agency had helped to open up nuclear development in the Third World through its excellent technical assistance and co-operation policies. That programme had gradually grown, the funds available for it having quadrupled in the last decade. The Agency's work in that field was particularly

important and should be constantly promoted, especially the aspect of manpower training.

102. There were, however, other areas which the Agency could usefully explore, namely non-energy-related uses of nuclear techniques. Those could substantially benefit the poorest developing countries. Initiatives aimed at promoting the use of food irradiation in the most deprived regions would be particularly useful in helping to overcome problems of storage and distribution. The Agency might consider conducting experimental projects in that field and might also attempt to encourage the large-scale use of radioisotopes in agriculture.

103. The Agency had fulfilled well its role as an effective controlling body which was essential to substantial international nuclear trade. The Agency was in a position to adapt to increasing trade, and to the growing number and diversity of nuclear facilities. The credibility acquired by the Agency was one of the guarantees of and conditions for an expansion of nuclear trade and must be preserved. It was therefore essential that the politicization which had occasionally marked the work of the Board of Governors in recent years should now give way to a more relaxed climate which would be more likely to assure the international community that the Agency would always continue to fulfil its tasks effectively.

104. Mr. PEŠIĆ (Yugoslavia) said that he took great pleasure in welcoming to the Conference the new Member of the Agency - Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia.

105. Twenty-five years had passed since the establishment of the IAEA. Since then there had been many opportunities of reviewing its activities. Both praise of the Agency's achievements and criticism of particular aspects of its programmes and organization had been motivated by the desire to improve the Agency's work so that it might be more successful in rising to the challenges posed by current developments and carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the international community.

106. On the whole, the Agency had not always been sufficiently prompt and effective in adjusting itself to the changing times, with unfavourable effects, primarily for the developing countries. Nevertheless, its performance had been as successful as the often opposing interests of Member States permitted, and

there were ample reasons for satisfaction with what the Agency had achieved in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

107. The current session of the General Conference and the Agency's twenty-fifth anniversary were taking place in an extremely unfavourable international situation which was adversely affecting the developing countries in particular. It was the task of Member States and of the Agency to make decisive efforts to remedy that situation, the effects of which were unfortunately strongly felt in the specific field of international co-operation because of the numerous contradictions inherent in that field. Those contradictions were, at present, as serious as they could possibly be. The prospects of resolving many important issues and problems which should have been dealt with long ago were dim. But it was precisely in such unfavourable international conditions that the Agency should play a responsible and appropriate role in promoting and stimulating co-operation and in establishing mutual trust and confidence in the possibility of safe application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, all of which was in the interest of both developed and developing countries. Both groups of countries should therefore work together towards establishing mutual confidence and enabling the Agency to discharge its tasks in a more equitable and balanced manner in the future for the benefit of all concerned.

108. It was disturbing that optimism and pessimism should alternate so frequently in the important field of international relations and co-operation. It was highly important to achieve stable relations and co-operation because of many basically long-term implications inherent in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The availability of conventional energy sources was such as to leave no room for hesitation. In spite of everything, nuclear energy was the only reliable energy alternative for many countries, a fact that should be understood both within the Agency and outside it.

109. The current session of the General Conference was the last before the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the preparations for which had not been progressing satisfactorily. The failure of the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference had shown that States did not all aspire to the same objectives. As a result, special responsibility devolved

upon the participants in the forthcoming third meeting of the Preparatory Committee, which was to take place in Vienna in late October and early November 1982. All States members of the Preparatory Committee should invest maximum efforts to make up for lost time so that the Conference itself was not jeopardized. Obviously the Conference was not being convened for its own sake, but with a view to finding solutions and possible ways and means for promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Agency should contribute both directly and indirectly to the Conference and to the preparations for it; the Agency's role was clearly defined by the relevant United Nations resolutions, and the Preparatory Committee was responsible for the implementation of that role. However, it was worth considering what the Agency's role in the development and promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be after the Conference, since it was impossible to discuss the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without, at the same time, examining the activities and role of the Agency.

110. The Agency's annual report for 1981 indicated that only one country had joined the countries having operating nuclear powerplants in 1981. On the other hand, 18 new reactors had been put into operation in countries already possessing nuclear capacities. That was not in line with the optimistic forecasts made at previous times, but the reasons for the temporary slowing-down in the construction of new nuclear power plants were well known. The report, however, emphasized that a further steady and accelerated increase in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was indispensable for the future economic and social well-being of countries.

111. The report also showed that the number of countries which had accepted NPT and Agency safeguards had increased. That was a good sign, but it should be remembered that the developing countries could not merely assume obligations; they had a right to expect a more equitable share in the development and use of nuclear energy. It was a cause for concern that significant nuclear installations remained outside the Agency's system and free of any other form of international control in Israel and South Africa, whose régimes were characterized by an unprecedented aggressiveness.

112. The agenda for the present session also included other major issues, some of which had unfortunately been on the agenda for a long time, hampering the General Conference's work and forcing it constantly to seek fresh arguments. Those issues included the amendment of Article VI of the Statute, the financing of technical assistance, the inadequate balance between promotional and regulatory activities, and the inadequate staffing structure of the Agency. Since the reasons why those issues had not been solved were not misunderstanding or lack of arguments on the part of the developing countries, there was no need to repeat the old arguments or to present new ones in support of the developing countries' demands. It was in the interest of the Agency and all its Member States to find solutions to those problems as soon as possible.

113. Like many other countries, Yugoslavia was forced to turn to nuclear energy, and therefore attached exceptional importance to all questions related to the development and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the elimination of the problems standing in the way of the development of international co-operation in that field. Yugoslavia pledged its full support for the Agency's activities, and in particular for those aimed at assisting the developing countries to accelerate their development programmes and the use of nuclear energy in meeting acute and urgent energy needs. Co-operation between the Agency and Yugoslavia in the past had been diverse, fruitful and mutually beneficial, and efforts would be continued to ensure that that co-operation was enriched and further developed in the future.

114. Mr. HAUNSCHILD (Federal Republic of Germany) noted that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Agency was being celebrated that year. Those 25 years embraced practically the whole development of the peaceful use of the atom from the early beginnings to the present situation where there were more than 500 power reactors in operation or under construction. It was probably the first time in history that a new energy source had been introduced on such a wide scale in such a short time and it was certainly the first time that an international organization had accompanied, helped and monitored the utilization of a new energy source with the wide backing of the international community.

The Agency had played an essential role in the introduction of nuclear energy by facilitating the exchange of scientific and technical expertise, by implementing a dynamic technical co-operation programme, and by administering a safeguards system recognized as a decisive element in the international non-proliferation effort. He thanked the Agency and its dedicated staff for their great efforts over the years and their achievements.

115. Since national nuclear programmes had been widely discussed at the International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience held in Vienna the previous week, he could restrict himself to a brief description of the situation in his country. Generally speaking, nuclear energy had regained momentum. In the past ten years, nuclear power capacity had grown steadily, albeit less rapidly than expected, up to the present level of 10 000 MW(e). In 1981, 14.3% of electricity was generated by nuclear means. After several years of delays, two nuclear power plants had received construction licences in 1982. They were the first of a series of technically identical plants of 1300 MW(e) which would be licensed under a streamlined convoy concept. The installed capacity was to rise to approximately 23 000 MW(e) in 1990 and about 37 000 MW(e) in the year 2000. Progress had also been recorded in all areas of the nuclear fuel cycle. Construction work had started on the first enrichment plant at a German site in co-operation with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The construction of a first intermediate storage facility for spent fuel had also begun. The licensing procedures for the construction of two reprocessing plants at different sites were under way. The first steps had also been taken to license a repository for low- and medium-level radioactive wastes in a former iron ore mine. Good progress had been made in the investigation of the Gorleben salt dome for the storage of all classes of waste, particularly high-level wastes.

116. In the 1980s, industry was expected to assume greater responsibility, including financial responsibility, for fuel cycle services and the development of advanced reactors. Indeed, earlier that year, 12 major utilities had agreed to contribute a sum of DM 1 billion to meet the rising costs of the country's prototype fast breeder reactor. Other countries might also be interested to know that a new law required utilities to pay the investment costs of waste disposal facilities in advance.

117. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the fundamental principles of his country's policy. It had renounced the possession of nuclear arms nearly 30 years previously, had joined EURATOM with the first full-scope safeguards regime, and was one of the original Members of the Agency. It had vigorously and continuously supported the Agency's contribution to international non-proliferation efforts, the global Non-Proliferation Treaty and the regional systems of Tlatelolco and EURATOM. Ninety-eight per cent of the nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States were now covered by Agency safeguards. Further political effort was called for, however, to make the system fully comprehensive both in scope and in time.

118. In order to be acceptable, safeguards should be applied without discrimination. Accordingly, his Government had always stressed the desirability of nuclear-weapon States accepting safeguards in respect of their civilian nuclear activities. The recent announcement that the Soviet Union was prepared to put part of its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards was, therefore, a positive development following the example set by the United Kingdom, the United States and France, and he looked forward to the early conclusion of an agreement. He trusted that the practical experience of safeguards gained by all parties in connection with his country's verification system would help to increase the political acceptability, technical development and efficiency of safeguards.

119. Since 1981, the Agency's safeguards system had been at the centre of a lively international discussion in which some parties had questioned its effectiveness and credibility. His Government did not share those doubts and felt that the safeguards system had performed well. Adverse criticism was, to a large extent, the result of misconceptions. The objective of safeguards was not physically to prevent the diversion of nuclear material, but rather to detect and deter it. The system assumed that States declared their installations and materials, and therefore did not permit searches for undeclared activities. It provided assurance that States were complying with their

international obligations, assumed voluntarily, but could not indicate the future intentions of Governments. Despite its inherent limitations, the system performed an indispensable function in the world-wide non-proliferation regime. It was without precedent that international inspections were admitted by sovereign States.

120. His Government also supported the technical improvement of the system and had therefore arranged for a safeguards support programme. The reliability of and confidence in safeguards could and must be improved, as must the cost/benefit ratio. He hoped that the Board would be able to reach early agreement on those questions.

121. Nineteen eighty-two had seen further progress in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). He welcomed the fact that a consensus was within sight on the question of the principles of nuclear supplies and the corresponding non-proliferation commitments. It was to be hoped that CAS would provide useful input for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to be held in Geneva the following year.

122. The Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage (IPS) would soon be bringing its deliberations to a close. While there was general agreement that IPS might improve the non-proliferation system, differences still remained on basic issues. IPS would only make a meaningful contribution to the non-proliferation system if it were generally accepted. Rights and obligations under IPS must thus be balanced and take into account the other non-proliferation undertakings of the participating States.

123. The Agency's efforts in the field of nuclear safety were one of its essential tasks. A good safety record was of primary importance to the preservation of the political and social basis required for the full utilization of nuclear energy. The Agency had played a very constructive role by fostering the international exchange of expertise and experience and by providing expert advice to Member States. In that connection, he welcomed the recent meetings on safety research in Moscow and Prague which had provided an excellent opportunity for a first discussion of national programmes. His delegation also welcomed the first annual report on nuclear safety.

124. His Government fully recognized the value of the technical co-operation programme and welcomed the increase of about 25% in its funding between 1981 and 1982. The programme deserved its good reputation. Individual projects were generally well planned, thoroughly discussed with the States concerned and well executed. It was on those grounds alone that the considerable increases in the target for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund could be defended and indicative planning figures introduced, despite severe budgetary constraints both at home and internationally. The basic structure and the methods of financing the programme were satisfactory. As in past years, his Government was prepared to pledge its full share of the target for voluntary contributions and to provide additional resources for fellowships, experts and equipment, scientific meetings and co-ordinated research programmes. Subject to parliamentary appropriations, his country's total voluntary contributions in 1983 would amount to about US \$2.8 million. Of special note among the new projects was a hydrology programme in Latin America for which his Government would make available DM 1 million.

125. Mr. ALWAN (Iraq) welcomed Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, as a Member of the Agency. The decision made by the Conference that same morning would contribute to the struggle of the Namibian people to attain freedom and independence. It would also be seen by other oppressed peoples, notably the Arab people of Palestine, as a sign of hope that the world community was coming to recognize their right to self-determination and independence. As far as the Agency's work was concerned, the admission of Namibia was another reminder of the continuously increasing majority of Members from the developing world and highlighted the need to increase the representation of those Member States on the Board of Governors. Expressing his strong support for the proposal to amend Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, he urged the General Conference to take positive action on that issue which had been much delayed.

126. While the needs of developing countries in respect of various peaceful applications of atomic energy were increasing, so were the obstacles hindering the transfer of nuclear technology. Besides the distinction already being made between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, equally clear distinctions were being made between non-nuclear-weapon States themselves. Those distinctions were not related to NPT, but were rather the results of basically discriminatory policies. Attempts were being made to show that the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to developing non-aligned countries represented the only real threat to the non-proliferation regime. That disturbing development was already resulting in increasing difficulties for the work of the Agency, for example in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and in that of the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage. It was his view that it was up to each State to decide on the scope of its own peaceful utilization of nuclear energy under internationally agreed safeguards.

127. Although concern over the issue of proliferation was shared by all, it should not be translated into a policy of denial and discrimination, especially when such a policy was directed against developing countries committed to non-proliferation through NPT or equivalent measures. At the same time, the dangers of proliferation were being overlooked where aggressive racist regimes such as those of Israel and South Africa were involved, in spite of the increasing body of evidence that those two States had already developed nuclear capabilities. It was a matter of regret that the repeated calls by the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and the General Conference to all States to cease co-operating with those two regimes in any way that would encourage their aggressiveness and increase their nuclear capabilities were not being complied with by all States. It was all the more regrettable that the United States, which professed such concern over human rights and nuclear proliferation, was emerging as the sole defender of Israel's criminal acts. The barbarous slaughter of thousands of Arab people in Lebanon had been caused by the Israelis using American-made weapons.

128. There was an urgent need for building mutual confidence with a view to establishing an internationally accepted safeguards system effective enough to ensure the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Certain practical steps in that direction were not unfeasible. Such steps were: first, for the nuclear-weapon States to make some tangible progress with the cessation of the arms race through more intensive efforts, since the world was waiting to be convinced that nuclear disarmament was not merely a conventional provision of international treaties, but rather a goal attainable within a defined period; secondly, until that goal was attained, for the non-nuclear-weapon States to receive positive assurances in respect of nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail; thirdly, an immediate halt to all types of assistance to and co-operation in the nuclear field with the regimes of Israel and South Africa, a move which could be further enhanced if certain States were to release all information in their possession regarding the nuclear armaments of those two countries; and fourthly, more willingness on the part of the Agency and other international organizations concerned to defend the right of all nations to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

129. On 7 June 1981, the Iraqi nuclear research centre had been attacked by Israeli planes. The Tamuz research reactor had been destroyed and several civilians killed and injured. That military attack had been condemned as an act of aggression which had threatened international peace and security. It had also been condemned as a brutal infringement of the right of peoples to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Moreover, it had been considered an attack on the Agency and its safeguards system which had greatly harmed confidence in that system. Those conclusions had been reached by individuals, Governments and international organizations after careful consideration of the aggression, in various resolutions and statements by the Board of Governors, the General Conference, the Director General of the Agency, the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary-General, the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and Committee on Human Rights, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

130. On 26 September 1981 the General Conference had decided, in resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381, that the Israeli act of aggression against the safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installations constituted an attack against the Agency and its safeguards regime, which was the foundation of NPT. It had further decided to consider, at its twenty-sixth regular session, the suspension of Israel from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership if by that time Israel had not complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 487. Although resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381 reflected the conviction of the great majority of Member States that Israel had sought through its military aggression to destroy the Agency, its Statute and its safeguards regime, the General Conference had decided to give Israel another year in which to comply with Security Council resolution 487. It was, however, instructive to examine resolution 487 and to see what steps had been taken by Israel to comply with it.

131. First, operative paragraph 2 called upon Israel to refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof. Israel had not complied with that call, nor had it withdrawn its threat to destroy the Iraqi reactor if it were rebuilt. Moreover, Israel had continued its policy of aggression and arrogance. It had sponsored the publication of several documents, books and articles depicting its criminal aggression as an act of self-defence which would strengthen peace and security in the region and enhance the safeguards regime of the Agency in spite of the fact that such hypocritical contentions had been rejected by all international organizations concerned. In addition, during the past 12 months, the Israeli aggressor had committed very serious crimes, including the following: the annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights; the occupation of vast territories in Lebanon and the massacre of tens of thousands of Arab civilians there; the destruction of the cities of Beirut, Sidon and Tyre; the murder of Palestinian leaders in some European countries; the destruction of United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) camps sheltering tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees; continued threats against those co-operating with Iraq; and now further criminal acts in Lebanon.

132. Operative paragraph 5 of the same resolution called upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. No such development had taken place. Instead, Israel continued to intensify its clandestine activities with a view to extending its nuclear capabilities even further.

133. According to operative paragraph 6, Iraq was entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it had suffered, responsibility for which had been acknowledged by Israel. Israel had, however, blatantly refused all redress. The list of Israel's criminal acts was growing longer every day, and it had acted deliberately to undermine the Agency and the very principles on which the Agency was founded. In his view any country which was considered by the United Nations General Assembly not to be a peace-loving State and which acted wilfully against the Statute of the Agency could not be qualified as a Member of the Agency. Such a country did not comply with the requirements for membership as set forth in Article IV.C of the Statute.

134. Mr. SETHNA (India) declared that he wished to extend a warm welcome to the Namibian delegation represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia. He noted that the IAEA had thus brought its practice into line with that of the rest of the United Nations system. India had co-sponsored the resolution in the United Nations General Assembly which had specifically requested the IAEA to grant full membership to Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia.

135. The admission of Namibia strengthened the proposal before the present session of the General Conference for amending Article VI.A.2 of the Statute. Each year the General Conference adopted a resolution on the subject, and each year the Board of Governors failed to achieve a consensus. The amendment of Article VI.A.2 implied an expansion of the Board, and there was a lack of consensus on the ways and means of attaining that objective rather than on the basic objective of the resolution itself.

136. An important item for consideration at the present session related to the unprovoked Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear facilities at Tamuz. His country's unambiguous and total condemnation of that attack had been clearly expressed at various international gatherings and meetings. He regretted that some had attempted to question the efficacy of IAEA safeguards and sought to divert attention from the aggression by introducing extraneous proposals for so-called full-scope safeguards, the NPT, and so forth.

137. The present session of the General Conference marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the IAEA. It was a fitting occasion for all Member States to reaffirm their faith in the Agency and its objectives. Unfortunately, in recent years attempts had been made to undermine those objectives by introducing certain concepts and issues that were, and must always remain, extraneous to the Statute. Recent developments had made it abundantly clear that, in more ways than one, the IAEA stood at a crossroads.

138. As a founding Member of the Agency, India had always maintained that the primary function of the Agency was to promote the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and that the regulatory role it had assumed was only of a secondary nature. It was appropriate for the Agency to pause and reflect on how it should again give primacy to its first responsibility and not be misled into attaching exaggerated importance to its regulatory responsibility. At the previous session of the General Conference there had been a glimmer of hope with the adoption by consensus of certain resolutions on basic issues, such as correcting the imbalance between the promotional and regulatory functions of the IAEA and changing the composition of the Board. All those attending the present session must ensure that those resolutions were implemented faithfully and expeditiously.

139. His country had consistently expressed its dismay at the lack of progress in checking the nuclear arms race. While the goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament continued to elude the international community, fresh efforts were being made to impede the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

140. It was generally realized that the Second Special United Nations Session on Disarmament had failed. Nevertheless, it was still hoped that all forms of nuclear weapons would one day be removed from the face of the earth. In her message to the Second Special Session on Disarmament, the Indian Prime Minister had enunciated a five-point concrete programme of action. The second point, which had special relevance to the Agency, was that, as a first step towards the eventual cutting of existing stockpiles, there must be a freeze on nuclear weapons, providing for the total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons, combined with a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

141. A freeze on nuclear weapons must necessarily consist of two inseparable elements, namely a complete cessation of manufacture of nuclear weapons and a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such combined action would mean that all nuclear facilities in all countries would become peaceful, and in that event nuclear-weapon States could have no pretext for excluding their nuclear installations from the international safeguards which they were presently asking the non-nuclear-weapon States to accept in the name of so-called full-scope safeguards. Only in that event could an effective and economical IAEA safeguards system be devised on the basis of objective, scientific and non-discriminatory criteria.

142. He had been pleased to note from the statement by the Director General that the IAEA could exercise its verification capability to ensure a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. He hoped that the forthcoming review of safeguards would be firmly based on the Statute and would not be influenced by any extraneous elements.

143. His Government had always attached special importance to the technical assistance programme. However, his country had been obliged not to avail itself of its undoubted benefits in view of the extraneous and inequitable conditions of the Revised Guiding Principles. As a demonstration of his country's continuing assistance to other developing countries, his Government had pledged its share, amounting to \$115 900, of the target for voluntary contributions in 1983.

In addition, India would continue to make 12 fellowships available to developing countries. Pending a consensus on the financing of technical assistance from the Regular Budget, he supported the target of US \$19 million for 1983.

144. He noted that the portion of the annual report dealing with safeguards tended to present a discriminatory picture in its treatment of certain Member States not party to the NPT. His delegation had voiced its concern even while the report was in preparation, and some portions had been amended to a certain extent. Nevertheless, distortions remained, particularly in the presentation of safeguarded and unsafeguarded facilities in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. His Government had repeatedly pointed out that the application of safeguards only to certain pre-selected facilities in the nuclear-weapon States served no purpose and was a total waste of the Agency's meagre resources. As long as nuclear weapon activities in nuclear-weapon States continued unabated and unchecked, such formal offers for the application of safeguards could have little or no meaning. On the contrary, by permitting the removal of safeguarded material, such arrangements tended to legitimize the non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy in those nuclear-weapon States.

145. With regard to the international plutonium storage (IPS) study, his authorities had consistently maintained that fissionable material produced in a country should be at the disposal of that country, which alone had the right to decide whether it wished to go ahead with a particular use of that material or not. That was an important point since no external agency could be given authority or powers to interfere in the economic development and life of a Member State. The objective of the IPS scheme should be to discourage States from stock-piling plutonium in excess of their needs. The provisions of the proposed voluntary scheme should be made attractive enough for States to be encouraged to participate in it, and they should be applied equally and without discrimination. The application of present safeguards procedures should ensure that plutonium was not diverted from peaceful uses.

146. The IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience and similar activities provided the necessary impetus for the promotion of, and co-operation in, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He hoped that the Agency would continue to convene appropriate conferences at regular intervals, so that all Member States were given the opportunity to exchange experience in the primary use of nuclear energy.

147. He wished to commend the Agency's efforts with regard to manpower development in countries embarking on nuclear power programmes and hoped that the Agency would expand its efforts to assist Member States in running their power stations in a safe and efficient manner.

148. The Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA) could also contribute significantly to the ability of developing countries in his region to utilize atomic energy for peaceful purposes. His authorities reiterated their commitment to the goals of the RCA and would continue to participate with vigour and enthusiasm.

149. The coming year might see the convening of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Given the objectives of that conference, the Agency must make an important and significant contribution towards its success. Equally, the holding of such a conference should provide an opportunity for an appraisal and for specific measures to improve the role of the United Nations system as a whole, and of the IAEA in particular, in fostering international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

150. Mr. CASTRO MADERO (Argentina), after welcoming Namibia as a Member of the Agency, said that he would continue with the custom of informing the General Conference about developments in the Argentine nuclear programme over the last year.

151. Where nuclear power generation was concerned, the Atucha I power station had in the first half of 1982 produced one million five hundred thousand MWh with a load factor reaching 97.7% of its rated capacity. The load factor during 1981 had been 90.2%.

152. Present world economic and financial difficulties had also affected the Argentine nuclear programme, the rate of expansion of which had had to be reduced although the objectives remained the same. Nevertheless, assembly of the Embalse nuclear power station had been finished and 90% of the commissioning work on the conventional part and 20% of such work on the nuclear part had been completed. The reactor was to go critical in early 1983.

153. Construction work was continuing on the third Argentine nuclear power station, the entry into service of which had been postponed by approximately one year. Contracting for that Argentine power station represented a departure from the traditional turnkey approach since only part of the services and supplies had been contracted abroad; the architect-engineer work and the contracting of services and supplies of national origin were the responsibility of the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) through the Argentine Nuclear Power Station Company (ENACE S.A.).

154. With the participation of national engineering and other industrial companies the CNEA had begun a feasibility study for a fourth Argentine nuclear power station, the first stage of which was to be completed by the second half of 1983.

155. The entry into operation of the industrial heavy-water plant with a rated capacity of 250 tonnes per year, for which 50% of the civil engineering work had been completed, had been postponed by one year and was scheduled for late 1984.

156. With regard to the fuel cycle, during the current year work on two facilities had begun, namely the fuel element fabrication plant, which was to have sufficient capacity to meet the needs of Argentina's first three nuclear power stations and the experimental high-pressure loop, constructed with the valuable co-operation of the Federal Republic of Germany, for testing fuel elements in temperature, pressure and flow conditions similar to operating conditions in a nuclear power station, which would in the future be extended for testing different primary-circuit components. In addition, at the end of the present year a production plant for sinterable uranium dioxide of nuclear purity was to be put into operation.

157. Where the back end of the fuel cycle was concerned, construction work was continuing - albeit at a slower rate for the reasons mentioned - on a reprocessing plant, and a study had begun on the site selected among 200 others for the construction of a high-level waste repository.

158. The CNEA was also continuing with its various research and development activities including the installation of a 20-MeV heavy-ion tandem accelerator, which could begin operation during the next year, and the construction of an RA-6 research and teaching reactor, which was to begin in the next few days at the Bariloche Atomic Centre.

159. Moreover, mining of the Los Gigantes uranium deposit in the province of Cordoba had begun and the corresponding concentrate production plant had been finished. Together with the two existing plants it would supply the nuclear programme with approximately 250 tonnes of U_3O_8 per year.

160. Since the previous Conference session Argentina had been very active with regard to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Where multilateral co-operation was concerned, in particular within the framework of the IAEA, his Government had intensified its involvement with the technical assistance and co-operation programme. Aware of the insufficiency of the funds available for that programme, it had increased to the maximum possible extent its contribution in terms of fellowships, places on training courses and missions of Argentine experts upon request by the Agency, in all cases without any political conditions or discrimination.

161. Particular mention should be made in that context of the holding each year in Spanish of a regular nine-month course in co-operation with the Agency on radiation protection and nuclear safety, designed for the Latin American region but open to candidates from all countries.

162. Argentina had continued to comply with the undertakings arising out of the offers made in 1979, 1980 and 1981 to take on the cost of implementing seven projects requested by Latin American countries for which no funds had been available from the Agency. Moreover, he pledged a voluntary contribution in national currency amounting to Argentina's assessed share to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1983.

163. His Government had continued to provide active support to the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission and had implemented the offers it had made during the Commission's XIIth ordinary meeting held at La Paz in September 1981. He also wished to mention Argentina's active participation in the meeting held in Havana in March 1982 by the group of non-aligned co-ordinating countries in the sphere of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

164. Turning to bilateral co-operation, he emphasized the beneficial results of joint activities with various countries in the Latin American region, in particular Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay, with which co-operation continued to intensify. It was producing the expected benefits owing to mutual confidence and common objectives in respect of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Welcome developments in that connection had been the progress made in the construction of the Huarangal nuclear research centre, which was being carried out with the Republic of Peru, and the exchange of goods and services agreed with Brazil.

165. He announced with satisfaction the signature in Vienna, during the present session of the General Conference, of a co-operation agreement with Yugoslavia, a country with which Argentina had many common interests in the nuclear field.

166. In view of the magnificent display of solidarity by the Latin American community in connection with Argentina's sovereign rights over the Falkland Islands, his Government would continue to put special emphasis on co-operation with the Latin American region. It remained prepared, however to co-operate closely with all other well-disposed nations throughout the world which were also prepared to co-operate on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

167. In line with its principles in respect of the transfer of nuclear materials and technology, Argentina had signed a further safeguards agreement with the Agency, whereby it was voluntarily submitting to safeguards nuclear materials to be supplied from the Soviet Union. That agreement, when considered together with the eleven others in force with the Agency, represented yet another link in the network of undertakings that Argentina had made, thereby reaffirming its adherence to the cause of both horizontal and vertical non-proliferation.

168. Nevertheless it was to be regretted that apparently it was only non-nuclear-weapon States which were complying with such undertakings, since certain nuclear-weapon States, which had arrogated the role of champions of non-proliferation, did not balk at the military use of nuclear energy in order to defend their interests - and that with the acquiescence of other nuclear Powers. They appeared not to be concerned about the negative consequences which that would have for non-proliferation nor that such action would undermine the very basis of the Agency. The recent use of nuclear submarines in the conflict in the south Atlantic had demonstrated that lack of concern. In his view, non-nuclear-weapon States could only conclude that policies supposedly designed to prevent proliferation were in fact only aimed at maintaining in perpetuity the political, military and economic supremacy of a few to the detriment of the many.

169. At the meetings of the Board in June, Argentina had asked the Agency to express its opinion on the use of nuclear submarines by a nuclear Power against a country which had voluntarily espoused the cause of non-proliferation. The Agency could not remain indifferent to that action if it did not wish to encourage its repetition against all countries - especially developing ones - which had decided to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, and if it was not to condone a morally unacceptable situation.

170. His Government wished - and its wish had been acceded to in the Board by consensus - a study to be made which would have not only moral but also legal implications. That study related to the determination of the degree of compatibility between certain safeguards agreements concluded by the Agency and its own Statute. The Statute laid down that materials, equipment and facilities subjected to safeguards should not be used in such a way as to contribute to military purposes. Agreements drawn up on the basis of the Agency's safeguards system, in accordance with document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, also contained that undertaking. However, agreements concluded between Member States and the Agency in connection with NPT on the basis of document INFCIRC/153 contained an undertaking in that regard only to the effect that such materials should not be diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The use of such materials for certain military purposes would thus theoretically be permitted under such agreements.

171. The situation in relation to undertakings made in agreements based on voluntary offers was even worse since in those cases certain States were in effect permitted to take nuclear materials out of safeguards in order to use them in military activities supposedly for reasons of national security.

172. The Statute did not distinguish between different types of military use but simply proscribed the use of materials, equipment or facilities under safeguards for any military purpose.

173. The Argentine Government hoped that the Agency would make a statement in that connection and would in the near future take appropriate action to rule out any breach of its Statute. Meanwhile it reserved certain rights for the future in relation to military uses deemed to be non-proscribed - in no sense did it reserve rights in respect of nuclear weapons, however, since Argentina had espoused the cause of their total and permanent banning under effective international control. Nor did its reservations affect compliance with undertakings made in the context of the IAEA, which the Argentine Government would continue to comply with strictly.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

