



International Atomic Energy Agency

# GENERAL CONFERENCE

GC

GC(XXVI)/OR.241

March 1983\*

GENERAL Distr.

ENGLISH

TWENTY-SIXTH REGULAR SESSION: 20-24 SEPTEMBER 1982

RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,  
on Wednesday, 22 September 1982, at 10.10 a.m.

President: Mr. SIAZON (Philippines)  
later: Mr. HAUNSCHILD (Federal  
Republic of Germany)

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\*/ A provisional version of this document was issued on 30 September 1982.

\*\*/ GC(XXVI)/674.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXVI)/INF/208/Rev.4.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1981 (GC(XXVI)/664) (continued)

1. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the entire 25-year history of the IAEA represented an example of successful co-operation between countries having differing social structures. He then re-quoted the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the message which the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, had addressed to the Conference participants and which had been read at the opening meeting.<sup>1/</sup>
2. It was essential to achieve an immediate reversal in the present international situation, namely a change from confrontation and the arms race to arms limitation and reduction, and to further development of co-operation between States. It was essential to place a barrier in the way of those circles which were seeking to cast the world back into the dangerous era of the "cold war". The Agency was one of the institutions which had its part to play in that noble aim.
3. In line with its overriding peace-loving policy, the Soviet Union was countering those dangers through application of the Programme of Peace for the 1980s adopted at the XXVith Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That programme envisaged a broad range of specific measures aimed at strengthening peace and international security, preventing nuclear war, promoting détente and finding ways of settling conflicts.
4. The Soviet Union was currently undertaking a whole series of fresh initiatives in the interests of peace. Guided by the desire to do everything in its power to divert the threat of nuclear war and indeed to exclude any possibility thereof from the life of man, the Soviet Union had taken a new step forward of exceptional importance - it had unilaterally declared that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The USSR was counting on other nuclear-weapon States to follow that example.
5. Many non-nuclear-weapon States were urging that, under the non-proliferation regime, not only they but also nuclear-weapon States should place their peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In a desire to meet the wishes of those countries, the USSR delegation had stated at the Second Special

Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament that it was prepared, as an act of good will, to place a part of its peaceful nuclear activities under Agency control. The USSR was ready to initiate negotiations with the IAEA with a view to concluding the appropriate agreements.

6. His country was convinced that strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime was in the interests equally of nuclear-weapon and of non-nuclear-weapon States, promoting - as such action did - the preservation of international peace and security. The non-proliferation regime was making a contribution to stabilizing contemporary international relations. It had created favourable conditions for broad international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, including under the auspices of the IAEA. The USSR was in favour of the further expansion of the Agency's role in that field.
7. His delegation noted with satisfaction the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime based on NPT. The accession of Viet Nam to the Treaty was a matter of great importance. His delegation trusted that other States would follow the example of Viet Nam and likewise accede.
8. It had to be remembered that at present there were about 50 States which had not acceded to NPT, including two nuclear-weapon States and several near-nuclear States. Great concern was evoked by the non-participation of countries located in crisis zones. Those countries included primarily Israel and the Republic of South Africa, which made no secret of their nuclear ambitions and were pursuing an aggressive, expansionist policy, terrible witness to which was in particular being borne by the present action of Israel in Lebanon.
9. One of the most important spheres of the IAEA's activities in ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was the application of the safeguards envisaged under the Statute, under NPT and under other international instruments. The Soviet delegation noted with satisfaction that in 1981, as previously, the Agency's Secretariat had found no indication of any diversion of nuclear materials or facilities placed under its control to the production of nuclear weapons, to other military purposes or to the fabrication of other nuclear explosive devices.

<sup>1/</sup> See GC(XXVI)/OR.238, para. 51.

10. However, as before, the IAEA was faced with important tasks as regards increasing still further the effectiveness of safeguards. Work must continue uninterruptedly on optimizing the Agency's safeguards system, making wider use of up-to-date computerized methods of safeguards data processing, particularly data obtained from inspectors, and better co-ordinating the scientific and technical programme of safeguards development. It was important for the Agency to concentrate its efforts on nuclear materials and facilities constituting the greatest threat as regards the capacity to manufacture nuclear explosive devices.

11. Increasing the effectiveness of safeguards was substantially dependent on the support which the Agency received from its Member States. The Soviet Union was actively participating in scientific and technical development work in connection with safeguards, and in the present USSR programme of scientific and technical support for IAEA safeguards more than ten leading research institutes all over the country were playing a leading role.

12. Ascribing as it did great importance to the further development of the safeguards system, the Soviet Union wished to announce the allocation of supplementary funds amounting to 2 million roubles in national currency, which were to be made available during the period 1983-1985 under the USSR's scientific and technical support programme for IAEA safeguards. In addition, 450 000 roubles were to be made available during the same period for the conduct of training courses and study tours for the benefit of staff working in the field of safeguards and control.

13. The technical co-operation programme occupied a special place in the IAEA's activities. His delegation was pleased to note that considerable progress had been made in furnishing technical assistance to developing countries, particularly during the last three years. The resources made available to the Agency's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in the form of voluntary and special contributions were increasing each year. The practice of giving indicative figures for the Fund had become established and was ensuring the necessary stability and predictability in an important branch of the Agency's activities.

14. Guided by its policy of technical co-operation with developing Member States, the Soviet Union had decided to increase its voluntary contribution to 1 700 000 roubles in national currency in 1983. The money would be used for training Agency fellows (mainly from the developing countries) in the USSR, making available the services of Soviet experts and providing for the purchase of Soviet equipment. Additional funds would be made available each year to Agency schemes for training nationals from developing countries.

15. The measures currently being undertaken by the Secretariat to evaluate the effectiveness of technical assistance were of great importance in the attempt further to improve efficiency.

16. Considerable attention was currently being given to the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply, which was concerned with developing recommendations for the possible establishment of an international system of assured nuclear supplies - a question to which many Member States attached great importance. Such a system could only be set up within the framework of a non-proliferation regime and should lead to a strengthening of that regime.

17. The Soviet Union consistently supported the Agency's scientific and technical programmes related to nuclear power and its fuel cycle, INIS, and the use of radioactive isotopes and radiation in industry, agriculture, science and medicine. Of particular importance was the work on nuclear and radiation safety.

18. The Soviet Union welcomed the Agency's work related to fusion. The successful activities of the INTOR group had led to the development of a conceptual design. The Soviet Union had taken the initiative in suggesting the development of a tokamak reactor on an international basis and believed that with the experience the working group had acquired it would be possible, as planned, to proceed to the technical design stage in 1983. Before that time, it would be necessary to have developed the organizational, legal and other bases for implementing the project.

19. Considerable importance had been attached in the Soviet Union to the Agency's Conference on Nuclear Power Experience. The Conference had acted as a forum for an exchange of information on operating experience and for demonstrating the positive effects of the application of Agency safeguards. The Agency should make an extensive analysis of the results of the Conference and take them into account in its programme.

20. The large number of papers by Soviet participants at the Conference had presented a comprehensive and detailed analysis of nuclear power experience in the Soviet Union and had described the Soviet development programme in the nuclear power field. The total installed nuclear power in the USSR at the beginning of 1982 was about 16 000 000 kW(e) and the production of electrical energy in 1981 had reached 86 thousand million kilowatt-hours.

21. The nuclear power programme in the USSR involved the development of different types of power station in order to ensure the necessary reliability and stability. Particular attention was being given to the further development of fast reactors, which had been in operation for some time in the Soviet Union. The principal aim was to develop a standard breeder unit and to put it into mass production. The main efforts in that direction were concentrated on the solution of the complex problems of increasing the rate of production of plutonium and returning it to the fuel cycle so that it would eventually be possible to set up a nuclear power production scheme which was self-sufficient in fuel and would maintain the necessary rate of growth in generating capacity.

22. Nuclear power was also to be used for district heating purposes. A nuclear plant supplying heat and electrical energy to the residential area of Bilibino had been functioning since 1973. District heating stations were being built near Gorky and Voronezh. Similar stations were planned in the Kharkov, Volgograd and Minsk regions. Construction of the first large-scale nuclear district heating and electricity generating station using a WW(E)R-1000 reactor had started near Odessa.

23. The increasingly widespread distribution of nuclear power stations, the rate of their development, the increase in the power of individual units, the practice of siting nuclear power plants near regions of high population density - all those were factors which required special attention to be given to safety, to the disposal of high-level waste, to protection of the environment, to the problems of incorporating nuclear stations into grid systems and so on.

24. In terms of world history, 25 years was a short period of time but the Agency had already achieved considerable success. It had a high reputation throughout the world, as was evidenced, for example, by the constant increase in the number of Member States.

25. The main lines of the Agency's activities had now been established. As could be seen from the Director General's report and from the Agency's programme for 1983-88, those activities were concerned mainly with ensuring non-proliferation, providing technical assistance and carrying out programmes on nuclear and radiation safety. The Soviet Union was convinced that those areas would continue in the future to occupy a central place in the Agency's activities.

26. Mr. AL-KABBANI (Saudi Arabia) said that there was cause for satisfaction with the Agency's achievements over the preceding 25 years; since its Statute had entered into force, in July 1957, considerable progress had been made in a very wide range of promotional and regulatory activities. During that period its membership had grown from 54 in October 1957 to 110 in 1982. The size of the Board of Governors had also increased, from 23 in 1957 to 34 at present, and would increase further if the proposed amendment to Article VI of the Statute was approved. He emphasized that such an amendment was overdue, for it would ensure just and equitable representation of two regions, Africa and the Middle East and South Asia.

27. The Agency's draft Regular Budget for 1983 was US \$92 821 000, as compared to about US \$4 million in 1958. However, it was a matter of some concern that safeguards accounted for about 33.3% of the total resources of the Agency. Although his delegation supported safeguards and endorsed all measures designed

to consolidate non-proliferation it attached great importance to the promotional activities of the Agency for the benefit and welfare of the developing countries, and felt that there must be a balance between the promotional and regulatory activities. It was especially interested in expansion in the areas of nuclear power and technical assistance.

28. Nuclear power was one of the main and reliable sources for electricity production at present. As had been pointed out at the Conference on Nuclear Power Experience the preceding week, the current nuclear power capacity in the world was 200 000 MW(e), while more than 250 000 MW(e) would be added when the plants under construction were completed.

29. In spite of its rich oil resources Saudi Arabia was keenly interested in nuclear power as an alternate energy source, which could save precious and limited oil resources and make them available for more efficient and productive uses in fields such as petro-chemical industries and transport.

30. Although his country's policy in the field of energy was to meet the world's oil needs, it was of utmost importance that the industrialized countries should rationalize their oil consumption and develop alternative sources of energy.

31. The other area to which his delegation attached great importance was technical assistance. It was a matter of some satisfaction that the Board had two years ago decided to establish indicative planning figures for the target of voluntary contributions for three successive years. While that was a step in the right direction, it must be borne in mind that the sums available for technical assistance covered only a part of the technically sound projects submitted to the Agency by developing countries and that many projects - the so-called footnote-a/ projects - were left to be financed by additional donor countries. He recalled that, in keeping with its consistent policy of support for technical assistance, his country had donated US \$50 000 for such projects under the 1982 programme, in addition to the assessed amount of its voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for that year.

32. Turning to an extremely serious event, and one unprecedented in the history of the Agency, he said that the criminal attack by Israel on the Iraqi research reactor had been condemned by the Agency's Member States, the Board of Governors, the Director General and the United Nations and the Security Council. In spite of the lenient compromise resolution adopted at the preceding session of the General Conference (GC(XXV)/RES/381), Israel was still refusing to comply with the provisions of that resolution and challenging the international community. The General Conference had generously granted it an opportunity to comply. The time limit having expired, it was necessary that the General Conference take strong and appropriate action so as to deter and prevent such criminal acts and suspend Israel from membership of the Agency.

33. In conclusion, he expressed, on behalf of his delegation, the sincere hope that the coming years in the life of the Agency would enlarge and enhance the contribution of the use of the atom for peace to the prosperity and progress of all countries throughout the world.

34. Mr. VAN BARNEVELD KOOY (Netherlands), congratulating the Agency on its 25th anniversary, said that in the quarter of a century since its establishment the world had become aware not only of the advantages but also of the problems - and the dangers - of nuclear energy. As a result, there had been a considerable proliferation in the Agency's tasks. In that connection, he wished to pay a tribute to the Director General and the staff, who had inspired a sense of purpose both in the Agency itself and in its Member States. In particular, he commended the manner in which the new Director General had grasped the Agency's problems and introduced new ideas and fresh policies so that the Conference session could offer an opportunity for a genuine exchange of ideas.

35. The Conference on Nuclear Power Experience had provided important facts and figures about the possibilities and limitations of the use of nuclear energy in the years to come. It was hoped that the results would be of help to all those who were responsible for the continuous supply of energy in the world. His Government attached especial importance to the conditions under which nuclear energy was being used throughout the world.

36. Welcoming the results of the work of the Group of Experts on Nuclear Safety Co-operation and Mutual Emergency Assistance in Connection with Nuclear Accidents, he considered it important that attention should be given to the effects of such accidents across national boundaries. During discussion of the Group's report in the Board of Governors, the Netherlands had supported the idea of preparing an information circular containing guidelines for bilateral or regional agreements on the subject and stressed the need for practical implementation of such agreements. It would be in favour of a study of the feasibility of an international convention on the matter, including its legal and practical aspects.

37. He approved the Agency's initiative in organizing a world-wide system for reporting abnormal occurrences. It would certainly be valuable to learn from the experience of others so that mistakes could be avoided. Since the success of the system depended on how many Member States would be willing to participate, he hoped that all countries with operating nuclear facilities would respond.

38. It was advisable to implement a nuclear programme in close co-operation with other countries, as his country knew from its own experience of both international and multinational co-operation - for example, its participation in the URENCO project with the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany and in international meetings on waste management. He was gratified to note that the Director General was advocating a similar approach.

39. As regards technical assistance, the implementation of the technical and co-operation programme was satisfactory. The modified outline of the annual report on technical assistance<sup>2/</sup> had greatly contributed to the clarity of that document. His delegation also welcomed the greater attention being paid to the evaluation of projects.

40. The safeguards system had performed satisfactorily in spite of some regrettable cases. That served to show that, in order to be able to function, the safeguards system needed the strong support of all Member States.

41. His Government wished to reaffirm its warm endorsement of the efforts of the Director General to find satisfactory solutions to problems which were a source of grave concern and agreed with the latter that it was vital for the safeguards system to enjoy universal support. In that context, he welcomed the offer made by the Soviet Union at the United Nations General Assembly's second special session on disarmament to place a number of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

42. The Netherlands was satisfied with the progress, albeit slow, of the negotiations in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, which was the appropriate forum where the respective parties could discuss their interests, and hoped that the Committee would successfully accomplish its task.

43. Lastly, he expressed confidence that a common understanding would soon be reached in the Preparatory Committee of the Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to be held in August-September 1983.

44. Mr. GHEZAL (Tunisia) said that, in his opening statement, the Director General had summarized the situation of nuclear power in the world, had described the technical, political and psychological difficulties that it was encountering and had expressed his views on the means of overcoming the obstacles on the basis of the experience accumulated by the Agency during the 25 years of its existence.

45. Tunisia had noted with satisfaction and supported the enlargement of the Agency's responsibilities relating to the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear safety, emergency assistance, plutonium storage and the assurance of supplies.

46. Nuclear power had long ceased to be a luxury: it was a condition of economic and social development which no country could overlook. However, as the Director General had rightly pointed out, the nature of the problems involved differed depending on whether they related to the industrialized or the developing countries.

47. The energy needs of the developing countries would continue to grow in parallel with their economic development but only a small number of those countries had the industrial, financial and technological capacity to consider trying to use nuclear power. It was up to the industrialized countries to develop nuclear power so as to release part of the oil they consumed for the benefit of developing countries.

48. Every effort should be made to ensure to all countries access to nuclear technology, the certainty of contractual obligations being fulfilled and the guarantee of assured supplies of materials, equipment and services.

49. Tunisia attached a growing importance to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in agriculture, hydrology, industry and medicine. It was satisfied with the co-operation it maintained with the Agency in those fields. It had been happy to receive, in 1982, an important technical co-operation programming mission from the Agency.

50. Tunisia noted with satisfaction the growing interest of the Secretariat and Member States in studying the problems of evaluating technical co-operation and making the Agency's technical co-operation policies more transparent. It shared the feeling that it would be wise to strengthen the administrative and technical procedures used in evaluation and to try to make the Agency's basic promotional work altogether more coherent. A point to be stressed, however, was that that exercise must not lead to the application of new conditions to, or additional constraints on, technical assistance.

51. The admission of Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, to membership of the Agency was a source of deep satisfaction for Tunisia, which hoped in the near future to be able to welcome delegates of an independent Namibia and an independent Palestinian State as fully-fledged Members.

52. The entry of a new African country into the Agency's fold provided an occasion to stress the urgency of removing the injustice inherent in the inequitable representation of Africa on the Board of Governors. No doubt other African countries would be joining the Agency in the future, and the solution proposed

now in the draft amendment to Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, aimed at alleviating the serious under-representation of the areas of Africa and of the Middle East and South Asia, would logically cease to be a sufficient solution.

53. Tunisia had noted the effort made over the last few months to recruit more nationals of developing countries for responsible posts in the Secretariat. It hoped that the rate of recruitment would be accelerated so that the balance between North and South could be adjusted within the time-scale established by Conference resolution GC(XXV)/RES/386, adopted at the Conference's twenty-fifth session, on the basis of objective criteria regarding competence and equitable geographical distribution between the different regions.

54. In June 1981, Israeli military aircraft had bombed the Tamuz reactor in Iraq, a Member State of the Agency and a party to NPT, all of whose nuclear facilities and equipment were subject to Agency safeguards. The fallacious and arrogant allegations Israel had used in trying to justify that senseless and unprecedented act, which endangered the security and peace of the whole region, were familiar to all. The former Director General, Sigvard Eklund, had declared at the time that the Agency had not, since its founding, known such a serious problem as the one presented by the consequences of that event, adding that it was really the Agency's safeguards system that was under attack - a system which had never before been faulted. The fact was that Israel, on the pretext of warding off a potential danger, simply wished to establish itself as a gendarme for the region, arrogating to itself the right to deny to others all access to scientific and technological development and progress. Yet everyone knew it was Israel, not Iraq, that had developed a military nuclear capacity.

55. The Israeli attack had been condemned by the international community, and also, notably, by the Board of Governors and by the Conference, which had decided in resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381 to review at its twenty-sixth session the question of suspending Israel's rights and privileges of membership unless it complied with Security Council resolution 487 of 19 June 1981. However, as was its custom, Israel had ignored the Security Council resolution and the resolution of the General Conference. Accordingly, by deciding at its present session to suspend Israel's rights and privileges the General Conference would

be doing no more than acting in defence of the Agency and its credibility. Tunisia respected the principle of universality, but should that principle be extended to those who made a regular habit of trampling on the principles and objectives not only of the Agency but of the United Nations Charter?

56. The absence of any sanctions after Israel's aggression of 7 June 1981 had no doubt encouraged it to mark the anniversary by invading the Lebanon, there sowing systematic destruction and massacring tens of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians. Sanctions in response to the terrible slaughter in West Beirut were the responsibility of the Security Council, whereas defence of the Statute and credibility of the Agency fell within the General Conference's sphere of competence.

57. Mr. KELLY (United Kingdom) said he would start by responding to some of the points in the Director General's statement.

58. Firstly, on safety. Anyone who built and operated a nuclear installation was assuming responsibilities of world-wide import, whether he liked to acknowledge it or not. If there was an accident, it could have direct physical consequences in other countries. But even if the accident led to no casualties, the psychological consequences could be world-wide. Three Mile Island had caused delays and difficulties to nuclear power projects in a number of countries even though they were situated far from Pennsylvania and even though the reactors were of another design.

59. It was possible therefore to sympathize with the global approach that Dr. Blix took to safety questions and with his suggestion that there should be world-wide safety standards. In the last resort, each country would doubtless want to establish its own safety standards reflecting its own philosophy. Even so, it should be possible for the Agency to establish minimum standards or guidelines. Each country would then be able to claim, and hopefully would claim, that in establishing its national standards it had taken full account of the recommendations or minimal code established by the Agency. If such codes or

recommendations were to play a big part, they would need to be more specific than those so far adopted by the Agency and to be bought in large numbers by design organizations and regulatory bodies, which was not the case at present.

60. The Director General should be encouraged to develop his idea, and to put to the Board proposals for developing the Agency's standards and improving their distribution. The Agency should also provide a safety-mission service, though the budgetary implications would need to be referred to the Board.

61. On the questions of fuel services and waste management the Director General had shown a logical and comprehensive approach. If a world State had existed, it would certainly have made sense to centralize fuel services. Again, since the amount of long-lived waste so far produced was no more than some hundreds of cubic metres, there must be remote areas where such a volume could be buried without causing any danger or impeding any economic activity. However, it was impossible to name such areas because the Governments concerned objected. Populations were unwilling to accept atomic waste from another country in their territory, though their attitude about other types of waste was more relaxed. So, each individual country might have to establish national waste storage for some time to come.

62. However, fuel enrichment and reprocessing could be done internationally, and in the United Kingdom construction would shortly start on a new reprocessing plant with a capacity of 600 tonnes a year, of which a substantial portion would be available for foreign fuel.

63. As regards waste management, a step forward had been made in the United Kingdom. A body involving private industry, the publicly owned nuclear industry and the Government had been established to develop, build and manage disposal facilities for intermediate-level waste, and later to take over responsibility for marine disposal of low-level waste.

64. Safeguards represented another area of global responsibility. The efficient functioning of the safeguards system would help to divorce the concept of nuclear power from that of nuclear weapons. Conversely, there were few things which would damage the prospects for nuclear power more than a breakdown of the safeguards system, or the diversion to military ends of nuclear material committed to peaceful use.

65. In safeguards, as in the areas of reactor design and safety, it was important to move with the times - to utilize up-to-date equipment and a sophisticated approach to the strategy of monitoring. It was no good adopting a mechanical approach. The Agency should be in a position to make the most confident possible assessment, based not only on inspections but also on the deployment of modern equipment, as to whether diversion had taken place. It needed the means to develop modern monitoring techniques and Member States should be ready to allow such techniques to be deployed.

66. There had been some improvements in the organization of the General Conference. For example, the President's initial address had been directed towards topical Agency issues. The Director General, by circulating his speech in advance, had sought to focus attention on points of a technical character. The delegates had been invited to keep their remarks short. The discussion between ministers had provided a top-level political view of nuclear power prospects; and ideas were to be invited on the further improvement of the technical assistance and co-operation programme.

67. Those changes, which made for a more business-like conference, were welcome but it would be possible to go further in the same direction. For example, the rest of the Director General's speech would have been more useful if it had been available earlier. There was room to simplify the ritualistic, almost liturgical, character which sometimes marked the proceedings. Was it really necessary for chairmen to be thanked and praised by speakers from each of the Agency's regions? Would it not be possible for such statements simply to be published in the record? Or could not a spokesman be selected by lot to speak on behalf of all the regions? Perhaps something could be done about the General Debate, during which the room was sometimes almost empty?

68. In the 1960s the General Conference had attracted the attention of numerous heads of atomic energy commissions and senior administration personnel. People of comparable standing had taken part in the work of the Board of Governors, and discussion in the General Conference and the Board had related occasionally to technical issues. That was less the case today because the Agency had taken on a more political character - which was a threat to its proper role.

69. Obviously, the many countries that made up the Agency had very different outlooks. They came from the North, the South, the East and the West; some supplied material and components, others bought them; and there were racial antagonisms. It was thus all too easy to identify topical political differences and to allow them to dominate the debates. Yet, in doing so, they risked destroying the Agency, either by tearing it apart on some particularly thorny issue or, perhaps more probably, by making the meetings so tedious that no-one with major responsibilities for atomic energy would find it worth his while attending.

70. He was not the British Foreign Secretary but simply a nuclear administrator. If he said anything about political issues he would be speaking on advice from the Foreign Office or even reading out the text of a Foreign Office telegram. He would be contributing nothing from the area where he had a certain knowledge and enjoyed a certain authority. Many of his colleagues were in a similar position and it followed that at the end of the day they would not have settled any major political issue. That would be done elsewhere.

71. In the Agency, Member States' representatives had their own vocation - to discuss and decide on atomic issues, and there was no shortage of such issues needing attention. Apart from the Agency, there was no organization available to tackle those issues on a global basis. Certainly such technical work could not be done in a Committee of the General Assembly.

72. Atomic energy had arrived at just the moment when mankind needed a new energy source; it could bring enormous benefits. At the same time it had no less a potential to bring mankind untold misery. Whether it would work for good or evil would depend in part on how well the Agency fulfilled the task it had been given.

73. Mr. GEORGE (Australia), recalling that the present session of the General Conference marked the 25th anniversary of the Agency read the following message of congratulations which the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to Director General Blix:

"On behalf of the Australian Government I extend warm congratulations on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Australia values highly the important contribution which the Agency has made to international peace and prosperity through the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the framework of an effective international non-proliferation and safeguards regime. In the years ahead, Australia will be concerned to see that the Agency maintains the high standards of its professional contribution in the promotional, technical assistance and regulatory fields. Australia has particular international responsibilities as a major supplier of nuclear fuel. We will continue to attach the greatest importance to Australia's role in the Agency and to making constructive contributions to the discharge by the Agency of its responsibilities".

74. Data provided by representatives of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency at the very recent Conference on Nuclear Power Experience underlined Australia's place as a major source of uranium. According to the latest OECD statistics, Australia possessed approximately 17% of the Western world's low-cost reasonably-assured resources of uranium recoverable at costs below US \$80/kg  $U_3O_8$ . However, when account was taken of the recent reduction in the figure given for the United States' low-cost reasonably assured resources, Australia's share rose to some 19%, and his country emerged as a leading world source. That figure did not include the resources of the deposit at Olympic Dam (Roxby Downs), where definite ore reserves could not be established until further intensive drilling was completed, but which on preliminary ore grade estimates might prove to be Australia's largest deposit.

75. Progress had been made in the negotiation of bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements. Those with EURATOM and Japan, which had entered into force in 1982, were of particular significance, given the size and importance of the peaceful nuclear activities of the countries in question. The Australian network of bilateral nuclear safeguards and co-operation agreements now covered the major part of the international fuel cycle, and provided assurances of supply within an effective non-proliferation regime. Australia's bilateral agreements were also significant for the detail in which were delineated the conditions governing sensitive processes and international transfers, thereby ensuring predictability of operation. He believed that those agreements represented important general principles of international nuclear co-operation which were shared by other major suppliers and consumers alike.

76. In the field of environmental protection, two nuclear codes of practice had been drafted and were soon to be tabled in the Australian Parliament. They were the Code of Practice for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Substances (1982) and the Code of Practice on the Management of Radioactive Waste from the Mining and Milling of Radioactive Ores (1982). Those codes were consistent with guidelines developed by the IAEA, and the Australian authorities had found IAEA work in those areas to be of particular assistance.

77. The pre-feasibility study report by the Uranium Enrichment Group of Australia (UEGA) for the establishment of a commercial uranium enrichment industry in Australia had been put before the Australian Parliament on 26 November 1981. A second report from UEGA was due to be completed later in 1982.

78. There had also been developments in the field of nuclear research in Australia. The collaborative research programme conducted by the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) on the development of SYNROC for the immobilization of high-level radioactive waste had continued during 1982. In addition to the funds already committed by the AAEC, the Government had approved during the present year the allocation of \$230 000 for an evaluation of the containment properties of SYNROC using radioactive materials, and just over \$1 million for assisting the AAEC in building a non-radioactive pilot plant to demonstrate all steps in the production of full-scale SYNROC-filled canisters and to commence related testing procedures.

79. Nuclear research in Australia was focused on the uranium fuel cycle, in keeping with the country's position as a major producer and exporter of uranium. The environmental impact of the uranium mining and milling industry was also given special emphasis. Australia participated in international studies through the IAEA and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency on the long-term management of uranium mill tailings.

80. His delegation agreed with the Director General that the Conference on Nuclear Power Experience had proved to be a timely stock-taking exercise for the world nuclear industry. While the achievements of nuclear energy had been substantial, it had to be recognized that, world-wide, the nuclear industry was

facing a difficult future, at least in the short term. Apart from recession-governed economic difficulties, the problem of public acceptance of nuclear power and the wastes it generated, and continuing public concern about its safety aspects, remained major issues affecting the industry. Australia stood ready to assist the Agency in meeting effectively the challenges of the future.

81. Support for the important non-proliferation role of the Agency remained a matter of the highest priority for Australia. The establishment of the Agency and the acceptance by Member States of its Statute and system of safeguards were milestones in the effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapons and at the same time to promote peaceful nuclear co-operation. The role of the Agency had been enhanced by the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which continued to be the major international instrument on non-proliferation and the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

82. Australia welcomed the very recent offer by a fourth nuclear-weapon State to enter into an agreement with the Agency for the voluntary application of safeguards on its territory. He looked forward to the early conclusion of that agreement and to learning further details of the nuclear facilities to be covered by it.

83. At the same time it had to be recognized that a small minority of States with nuclear programmes had decided to stand aside from NPT. The Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs had referred to that situation in his address to the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament.

84. Australia looked forward to the time when NPT would attract universal adherence.

85. A change in the present situation would require a change in the way in which half a dozen or so countries regarded their security and other interests. Over the past decade a number of countries had found it possible to change their way of looking at things and accede to NPT. Australia hoped that the few countries still outside the system would come to perceive the security benefits and the other advantages which flowed from acceptance of NPT.

86. Turning to the safeguards section of the annual report for 1981, he noted with concern that the Agency was not in a position, pending implementation of certain technical measures, to discharge fully its verification responsibilities in respect of certain reactors where independent verification of fresh fuel was not possible. That was the first time that the Agency had been unable to give a categorical assurance about all the facilities it safeguarded. In that connection he endorsed the Director General's comments concerning the need to update safeguards arrangements so as to make the best use of cost-effective modern methods.

87. In its efforts to rectify the situation described in the Annual Report for 1981, the Agency had the full and continuing support of Australia. His delegation noted with concern that unsafeguarded facilities, some of which involved sensitive technologies, continued to exist in a small number of non-nuclear-weapon States. The States concerned had not yet accepted legally binding commitments to apply safeguards to those facilities, and their continued operation outside the scope of international safeguards was harmful to the role of the Agency and to public appreciation of the effectiveness of that role. A desire to assist the Agency further in ensuring the effectiveness of its safeguards activities had led Australia in 1980 to enter into a bilateral programme of assistance. That programme, involving expenditure of \$541 000 in extra-budgetary resources over three years, was now well under way.

88. Work being conducted under the Australian programme of assistance involved a number of research projects on safeguards technology and methodology for enrichment plants and research into field equipment for inspectors. Under the research projects on enrichment plant safeguards, technical material had been submitted to the Agency concerning possible safeguards approaches for centrifuge enrichment plants, and computer programs for a multi-channel analyser system for non-destructive assay work had been made available. The services of a cost-free expert were being offered to assist in the development and implementation of procedures to eliminate inspector error in operating measurement instruments. A gas-phase monitor had been developed, with encouraging results in field tests, for measuring levels of enrichment in centrifuge enrichment plants.

89. His Government shared the views of the Director General on the importance of informed, constructive criticism concerning the Agency's safeguards system, and had noted his comments concerning the non-secret nature of the safeguards operation. There was of course a correlation between an informed public, public confidence and constructive criticism. However it was also clear that certain information had to be protected if the Agency was to go on performing its safeguards function with the requisite thoroughness and with the full confidence of Member States.

90. Concluding his remarks on safeguards, he wished to refer to suggestions that had been made for a thorough reappraisal of the Agency's safeguards system. The system was designed to be a dynamic one, capable of responding to changed circumstances and technological developments, and it must remain so. The Board of Governors would start a review of the system at its meetings in February 1983. His delegation would have considerable reservations, however, about that review developing into a full reappraisal of the system itself. The overriding purpose of the review by the Board, so he believed, should be that the effective discharge by the Agency and Member States of their safeguards responsibilities was maintained.

91. He had taken note of the Director General's plan to reorganize the Department of Safeguards. He believed that the allocation of work among three operational Divisions would be more equitable and would enhance confidence that Agency safeguards were being applied effectively within the limits of the resources available.

92. Australia also attached great importance to the Agency's role in the field of technical assistance and co-operation, and was pleased that the technical assistance and co-operation programme continued to expand. The indicative planning figures for 1984-86 agreed on at the June 1982 Board meetings reflected the serious resolve of Member States to increase their contributions to that important area of the Agency's work. The figures represented a positive response to the desire of the General Conference, expressed at its previous session, to see technical assistance activities financed by means of predictable and assured resources.

93. Australia expected to meet in full its assessed contribution to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1983. Its 1982 obligations thereunder had been discharged. In addition to its contribution to the Fund, Australia had allocated \$60 000 in 1982 for use under the Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA) and had continued its US \$345 000 programme of bilateral assistance to Malaysia for the training of personnel from the Tun Ismail Atomic Research Centre (PUSPATI) and for the provision of consultancy services to the Centre. Australia's contribution to the RCA and its programme of assistance to PUSPATI underlined its continuing commitment to nuclear technical assistance in the region in question.

94. Australia's involvement in the RCA project on isotope hydrology and sedimentology had continued during 1982 with positive results. A major project review meeting was scheduled to be held in Australia in November. Moreover, in March 1982 Australia had announced that it would participate in the RCA UNDP-assisted project on the industrial application of isotopes and radiation technology. His Government would allocate \$655 000 over a five-year period to that project.

95. The decision by the Australian Government to support the project reflected the importance it attached to the RCA as an effective instrument in the social, technological and economic development of countries in the Asian region. During 1982, Australia had participated in celebrating the RCA's tenth anniversary. Commitment to the RCA remained the main component of Australia's extra-budgetary contributions to the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities.

96. He now wished to turn briefly to a number of other important activities of the Agency. His Government welcomed the work of the Agency in the field of nuclear safety - which was justifiably accorded priority status alongside safeguards and technical assistance. The IAEA was playing a vital role in the development of international safety standards. His Government welcomed and would participate in the Agency's other activities in that field, including the organization of a world-wide system for reporting abnormal occurrences and

emergency planning. The suggestion made by the Director General in his statement concerning the Agency's contribution to the further internationalization of nuclear safety measures merited careful consideration.

97. The development of multinational arrangements dealing with specific aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle could make a valuable contribution to both non-proliferation and international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The attention given to assurances of supply, international plutonium storage and international spent fuel management demonstrated that the Agency had been prepared to address relevant issues as the nuclear industry expanded. It had always been an integral part of Australia's non-proliferation policy to contribute actively and constructively to the development of such arrangements.

98. The Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage would shortly present its report, on the basis of which further action in that important domain could be considered.

99. In the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), it was important that Member States should work together in order to develop principles and practices which not only satisfied sound non-proliferation standards but also encouraged the proper development of national nuclear programmes and promoted international co-operation. The work being done by CAS would also be valuable for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development to be held in 1983.

100. Finally, he wished to pay tribute to the work and dedication of the Director General who, in his first year of office, had done much to inspire and encourage the adoption of new approaches to the problems which confronted the Agency. Of particular value had been Dr. Blix's energetic promotion of the Agency's role and activities, largely through speaking engagements and a vigorous overseas travel programme.

101. Mr. NIMPUNO (Indonesia) said that in the present year the Agency was celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary. During those 25 years, nuclear technology had made many great advances. To take the field of energy production as an example, while there had been only three power reactors in 1957, in 1982 there were 277 in operation. Similar progress had also been made in other fields of application, although developments had been less spectacular and certainly less controversial. It was disconcerting, however, that during the 25 years of promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the progress made lagged far behind the non-peaceful development. It was his opinion that in the coming years the IAEA, and the entire nuclear community, should make greater efforts to restrain the non-peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

102. More than half of the present world community consisted of developing countries. Those countries placed great emphasis on the social and economic development of their peoples. Nevertheless, not all of them had the resources and technology necessary to implement their development programmes. Hence, the developing countries were particularly interested in international co-operation activities, which were regarded as an indispensable contribution to their development endeavours. At the same time, however, the industrialized countries also needed to develop themselves further. Hence the present world was one of interdependency, a fact which even the most advanced industrialized countries had to admit. The IAEA was a forum where international co-operation and interaction could be promoted, in particular in the field of nuclear technology. It was that special role of the IAEA which should be expanded in the years to come. While admittedly much had been achieved, there was still much more to be done. The technical co-operation programmes required greater and more secure resources. The fact that the Board of Governors had recommended increasing indicative planning figures for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund was a general acknowledgement that the Fund was inadequate. That fact was also seen from the number of technical co-operation requests which could not be approved by the Secretariat through lack of funds. From the various

documents supplied by the Secretariat it was clear that about a quarter of the requests made by Member States for 1983 could not be met - a figure which was high and should be seriously considered by the General Conference at its present session.

103. There were two Agency activities in the realm of technical assistance which were particularly beneficial to the developing countries. One was the work of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in Trieste, through which scientists from developing countries had received training and knowledge in various branches of physics; the second was the Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA), through which the countries concerned received assistance and, more important, learned to work together in solving their common problems.

104. Technical co-operation activities were interactions between States and the other parties involved. It was obvious that those participating in such activities had to show mutual trust, good faith and respect, and that the rules of the game governing them had to be based on that spirit. It was not proper, therefore, if conditions were applied solely to the recipients; the other parties also had a part to play in making the co-operative efforts harmonious and fruitful.

105. There was another aspect of the Agency's activities that was causing great concern. During the past two or three years, the Agency's system of safeguards, its second main function, had been challenged on several occasions. During the previous Conference session, Member States had nevertheless restated their confidence in the system and it was to be hoped that at its present session the Conference would do the same. As stated in the Statute, safeguards were designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control were not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. Unfortunately, that objective was still overshadowed by the negative aspects of the utilization of nuclear energy on account of the inability of countries to reach agreement on how to do away with nuclear weapons. It was his delegation's conviction that the act of non-nuclear-weapon States in joining NPT should be reciprocated by nuclear-weapon States in implementing Article VI of NPT. The safeguards system was the only way to avert the

risk of nuclear destruction. He appealed to all concerned to see to it that the whole world was free from nuclear fear and that nuclear energy was known to mankind only through its benefits.

106. In the coming years there would be some difficult and serious problems. Among them were the constant demand of the developing countries for the transfer of nuclear technology, the storage of plutonium and radioactive waste management - including, in particular, spent fuel storage. He was confident that the burden of solving those problems could be successfully overcome by international co-operation based on good will and mutual trust.

107. Mr. HOSSAIN (Bangladesh) said that in the 25 years of its existence the Agency had established itself as a professional international organization of the highest competence and as a forum for scientific co-operation between developed and developing countries. It was to be hoped that, with the participation and co-operation of Member States, it would be able to assume new and wider responsibilities in the future and to foster international co-operation in an effective transfer of nuclear science and technology to the developing countries.

108. It was unfortunate for the developing countries that only \$4.38 million of the \$34.2 million Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund were included in the Regular Budget. In view of the importance of technical assistance for the developing countries, a greater proportion of the funds available for technical assistance should be placed under the Regular Budget so as to make them more predictable. In addition, attempts should be made to obtain financing for large-scale, multi-year and, perhaps, multi-country projects from outside sources.

109. Bangladesh had for a long time been trying to install its first nuclear power plant, the need for which had been established by a number of feasibility studies in which the Agency had rendered valuable assistance. Unfortunately, those efforts had been unavailing so far, as it had not been possible to raise the initial capital required, although reactor manufacturers willing to sell

small and medium power reactors existed and the costs of nuclear power had been found to be competitive. Perhaps confidence might be generated among financial entrepreneurs if the Agency were to sponsor the construction of an International Demonstration Reactor (IDR) in the small and medium power reactor range in a developing Member State.

110. An IDR with special warranties from the supplier and with the financial risks distributed among a number of parties could help both to demonstrate reliability and to obtain financing for such a plant. That might be a joint venture of the IAEA, the lending agencies, the country supplying the reactor and the recipient Member State. It should not, however, be regarded as the Agency's entry into the nuclear power market, but the Agency could study issues such as efficient management of nuclear power projects, manpower development, etc. The Agency might also convene a meeting of international financing organizations, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the OPEC Fund, and of interested private financing agencies and manufacturers, exporters and prospective buyers of small and medium power reactors. If those proposals were adopted, the concept and economics of an IDR could be tested under the conditions prevailing in developing Member States, the IAEA could act as a catalyst in arranging financing and management for reactors in developing Member States, and the North-South dialogue on the transfer of technology would be effectively implemented under the auspices of an international organization evolving mechanisms for nuclear technology transfer.

111. If the Agency were to succeed in setting up an IDR as a model international venture, combining technology with trade, it would not only be paving a way for developing countries to counter the energy crisis with a modern and proven technology, it would also be bringing the developed and developing countries together in a joint effort to maximize the benefits of the atom. The reactor could be used as an experimental station for developing better safety standards and safeguards measures, and could thus play an important role in the advancement of non-proliferation, a cherished aim of the IAEA and a common goal of all mankind.

112. Bangladesh was willing to provide the site, manpower and other infra-structural facilities for such a reactor. As an oil-importing developing country and signatory of NPT with a certain amount of technical manpower, Bangladesh was eminently suitable to serve as a site for it. If the IDR were to be built in Bangladesh, the facility would be made available for on-the-job training and for the dissemination of information to other Member States desiring access to the facility.

113. The Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) for the Far East and South East Asia and the Pacific had now existed for ten years, and Bangladesh had participated in all the RCA projects and in the recently established UNDP project on the industrial application of radioisotopes and radiation technology. Bangladesh strongly supported the continuation of those projects with increased contributions from the Agency and donor countries. Sufficient collaborative work had now taken place in the Asian region for the IAEA to consider setting up a regional office and a regional research centre in Asia. The latter might start with a programme on food preservation by radiation and a training institute in the field of electronics. The review meeting of the RCA co-ordinated research programme on the repair and maintenance of electronic equipment was to be held in Dacca from 29 November to 3 December 1982, and Bangladesh renewed its invitation to the Agency and to the RCA Governments to hold the fifth RCA Working Group meeting in Dacca in the first half of 1983.

114. Bangladesh regarded the peaceful utilization of atomic energy as a stimulus for the economic and social development of the country, and had therefore signed NPT and a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) near Dacca was progressing as scheduled. A 3-MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor was under construction and was expected to be critical by the end of 1983. Bangladesh was grateful to the Agency for sending two staff members to examine the requirements for using the research reactor for purposes such as isotope production and hoped the Agency and other countries would extend all possible help to Bangladesh's atomic energy research and development programme. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission had carried out research and

applications work in the field of atomic energy and an International Workshop on Monsoon Dynamics had been held at Dacca from 11 January to 19 February 1982 under the auspices of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, and the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, with financial support from the United Nations Interim Fund for Science and Technology Development. The Workshop had been attended by 90 scientists from 21 countries.

115. Mr. SOWINSKI (Poland) said that it was a pleasure for him to welcome a new Member of the Agency - Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia. On the occasion of the Agency's twenty-fifth anniversary, he also wished to extend hearty congratulations in the name of the Polish Government and delegation to the Director General, Dr. Hans Blix, and to the Director General Emeritus, Dr. Sigvard Eklund.

116. The Polish Government attached great importance to the Agency's work in safeguards, nuclear safety and radiological protection and technical co-operation. It wished the Director General and the Secretariat further success in achieving the main goals of the Agency, namely to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the safe development and expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all mankind.

117. The realization of those lofty goals would be possible only in conditions of peace and détente: the arms race must be halted and the threat of nuclear war banished. It would be brought closer, beyond any doubt, if the familiar initiative of the Soviet Union at the second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament - where the USSR had declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons - were followed by all. If all nuclear Powers made a similar undertaking, the road would be clear for the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

118. The Polish Government, which was vitally interested in securing a durable peace in Europe and the whole world, attached particular importance to the Agency's work in safeguards, notably the safeguards required by NPT. It noted with satisfaction that the Secretariat, as in past years, had detected no diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material subject to safeguards

for non-peaceful purposes. Poland had taken an active part in preparing NPT and indeed in all aspects of the Agency's work touching on the technical and administrative problems associated with the implementation of the Treaty. It approved of the steps taken so far by the Agency's Department of Safeguards and at the same time felt that further efforts would be necessary to ensure optimum utilization of the available inspectorate and other specialists so that the inspection programmes could be fully implemented. The Board's determination to perform in 1983 a detailed analysis of the organizational and technical aspects of safeguards as a whole - and of ways of providing fuller information on the aims, functions and achievements of the safeguards system - was most welcome. Poland hoped that the non-nuclear-weapon States which had not yet acceded to NPT and placed their nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards would soon do so, thereby ensuring the universality of the safeguards system. In that connection the Soviet Union's willingness to submit its nuclear facilities to safeguards, announced at the present session of the Conference, deserved gratitude.

119. Poland was keenly interested in the Agency's work in the nuclear power field, and especially in its achievements in the area of nuclear safety. During the year construction work had begun on Poland's first nuclear power station. The decision to build it, taken in a time of serious economic difficulties, was justified primarily by the prospect of basing the development of electric power generation during the 1990s on nuclear power plants. Given the cost of mining and transporting coal, and also the problems of environmental protection, Poland could not count on continuing to use coal-fired stations to satisfy the increasing demand for electric power.

120. The basic requirements for nuclear power reactor safety elaborated under the NUSS programme would be extremely useful to Poland as it proceeded on the path of nuclear power development. The work done by the Agency to improve co-operation in nuclear safety matters and to arrange for mutual assistance in the event of nuclear accidents was also useful.

121. In the fields of radiological safety and the safe transport of radioactive materials, the Agency's recommendations, constantly brought up to date in accordance with the latest ICRP proposals, provided a basis for the development of national regulations. It was highly desirable that the work related to those fields be given wider publicity.

122. Poland had a strong interest in the Agency's activities connected with international co-operation and technical assistance. It made extensive use itself of nuclear methods in industry, medicine and agriculture and was grateful for the Agency's help in those fields. A favourable climate for co-operation had been created by the excellent work of the Secretariat. Poland was doing everything to ensure that its own experience would be transferred to the benefit of developing countries. It was also taking steps to see that all equipment it received from the Agency was put to the most effective use.

123. In view of the considerable increase - from US \$7 million in 1978 to \$19 million in 1983 - in the funds available for technical assistance, there were good grounds for raising the requirements regarding the economic advisability of projects.

124. The Polish Government endorsed the Agency's report for 1981 and also the Agency's programme for 1983-88 and budget for 1983. It supported the idea of maintaining the Agency's budget at a constant level. The necessary expansion of some activities, especially in the safeguards area, should be achieved by improving administration, making more effective use of staff and introducing economies in administrative expenses.

125. Poland pledged an amount of 12 million zlotys for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in 1983 - more than twice the sum contributed in national currency in 1982. It was prepared to make available an extra ten fellowships at Polish institutions for scientists from developing countries.

126. He congratulated the Director General on his work during his first year of office. It was to be hoped that under his leadership the Agency would carry out its important and responsible role in a difficult period of history.

127. Mr. ROSENZWEIG-DIAZ (Mexico) said that in Mexico's view the quest for peace must inevitably be centred in the international organizations, particularly the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It believed firmly in the need to strengthen those organizations and to seek within them the greatest possible efficiency, enhancing their prestige and ensuring that their principles were upheld.

128. Mexico wished to extend a cordial welcome to Namibia, which as a producer of uranium was a particularly valuable addition to the membership of the Agency. It must be remembered that Namibia was at present under the direct tutelage of the United Nations, inasmuch as its territory was illegally occupied by the armed forces of South Africa, a country which persisted in violating the United Nations Charter, numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and even the judgements of the International Court of Justice.

129. The Agency's twenty-fifth anniversary provided a good occasion to stress once again the inalienable right of all Member States - a right enshrined in Article II of the Statute and Article IV of NPT - to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in order to promote their scientific, economic and technological development.

130. In his statement the Director General had pointed out that after the early years of untrammelled enthusiasm for the development of nuclear energy around 1960, there had ensued a period of relative discouragement which had meant retrenchment and a certain imbalance in the process of generalizing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Given the ambivalent character of nuclear energy - the destructive power of which could so easily take over from its peaceful uses - one had to accept that an element of good will was indispensable.

131. Mexico's judgement of the Agency's first quarter of a century had two sides, one positive, the other marked by disappointment. On the one hand the Agency had achieved a great deal in the various spheres of its competence: technical assistance, safeguards and nuclear safety. By and large the annual report presented in document GC(XXVI)/664 contained proof of the Agency's

accomplishments, which had been achieved in some instances despite rigorous budgetary limitations. Nevertheless, his delegation felt bound to make the observation that, 25 years after the Agency's establishment and 12 years after the entry into force of NPT, no efforts had succeeded in halting the armaments race, nor in preventing the use of nuclear energy for military purposes by certain industrialized countries.

132. The Government of Mexico had strongly condemned the military attack by one Member State, whose nuclear facilities were not subject to Agency safeguards, on the nuclear research centre of another Member, whose facilities had always been satisfactorily safeguarded. That military action, apart from threatening the security and peace of the region in question, had been an unmistakable display of contempt for the safeguards system and for NPT, and had thus borne serious prejudice to progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

133. Within the Agency various matters were at present being considered which held particular interest for the developing countries and which would have to be resolved in appropriate ways if the Agency was to continue to work effectively. They included adequate representation of developing countries in the Secretariat, the definition of technical assistance objectives and the financing of technical assistance, a further modification of the Board's composition (Article VI of the Statute), the achievement of positive results in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, and clear definition of the Agency's role in the United Nations for the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

134. The developing countries had for some time been in a position to offer highly qualified personnel for senior technical and administrative posts in the Secretariat. In that connection his delegation had taken note of the Director General's reports in documents GC(XXVI)/668 and 672, but it believed that further efforts should be made to find a solution to the problem as quickly as possible, due importance being accorded to the recruitment of staff on as broad a geographical basis as possible.

135. There were two main questions that had to be dealt with in connection with technical assistance, namely the definition of objectives and the problem of financing. With regard to the first, it would be useful to study the priorities to be assigned to different sectors, the most cost-effective scale of projects,

the balance between large and small projects, integration of otherwise inoperative projects into coherent project complexes, and the possibilities offered by training centres.

136. As to the financing of technical assistance, Mexico believed that the criterion for growth should not be based on a comparison with figures for past years but on the actual requirements of Member States and the availability of funds for financing them. If that criterion was applied, it had to be said that the growth of technical assistance was still inadequate. The indicative planning figures for 1984-86 established by the Board in June represented an absolute minimum, in view of the growth of activity and the introduction of new programmes in keeping with economic development and population growth. Those who made voluntary contributions would have to bear in mind certain hard facts, notably the static tendency of contributions in kind, the depletion of UNDP funds and the falling-off of promotional activities financed from the Regular Budget.

137. Although the extrabudgetary funds used to finance "footnote-a/" projects had increased over the last few years, they constituted an unpredictable source of revenue. Mexico thought it would be better if the donor countries could include those amounts in their voluntary contributions right from the start so as to enhance the predictability of the system of indicative planning figures.

138. The question of amending Article VI of the Statute should be given further consideration by the Board, with a view to increasing the size of that body in a reasonable and equitable manner while respecting the criterion of technological advancement and leaving the Board's efficiency unimpaired.

139. Mexico was keenly interested in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply because of its profound concern regarding secure supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and of fuel cycle services. There had undoubtedly been progress in the Committee, but concrete results ought to be achieved in the very near future. In Working Group 1, CAS had made progress which indicated that, given the requisite political will among the participants, the study of the principles of international co-operation could be completed in a relatively short time. Interest in non-proliferation must not be used as a pretext for preventing States from acquiring and developing nuclear technology, nor for imposing conditions on them incompatible with their independence and sovereign rights.

140. The Agency should have a fundamental role to play in the scientific aspects of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and the appointment of a man of the standing of Mr. Mehta as Secretary of the Conference was most welcome. It was to be hoped that the Preparatory Committee would approve the all-important agenda for the Conference in October.

141. Finally, Mexico wished to reiterate to the Director General and the Secretariat its gratitude for the efforts which had led to such significant achievements, even in the face of severe difficulties.

142. Mr. HAVEL (Czechoslovakia) said his delegation had listened with great interest to the statement made the day before by the Director General and fully supported the measures proposed for further improving the Agency's activities, particularly as related to furthering nuclear disarmament, nuclear power development and nuclear safety.

143. The Agency had an exceptionally important part to play in the fundamental matter of reducing international tension and preserving world peace. That fact was all the more vital in view of the complicated international situation prevailing at the present time. It was essential to continue all efforts to solve international conflicts by peaceful means. Hence the initiative taken by the Soviet Union in that connection at the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, more particularly the statement that the Soviet Union would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, acquired exceptional importance.

144. The Agency's role devolving from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was a highly responsible one. His delegation was opposed to the efforts made by some of the non-nuclear-weapon countries to acquire nuclear weapons. All measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, to reinforce the system of safeguards and to condemn any attempts to weaken safeguards had the consistent support of his delegation. Like the other countries of the Socialist camp, Czechoslovakia firmly believed that only if the non-proliferation regime and the Agency safeguards system were strictly observed

was it possible to further develop nuclear power production for peaceful purposes, and in that connection his country was devoting maximum attention to the provision of technical assistance to developing countries on the basis of the present system of voluntary contributions for the financing of the technical assistance and co-operation programme. He was opposed on principle to the tendency to free international trade in nuclear technology aimed at gaining access to such technology beyond the bounds of the non-proliferation regime.

145. In view of the importance of nuclear disarmament, the aggressive policy being pursued by Israel, especially the recent events in Lebanon, was cause for major concern.

146. While supporting all the Agency's individual specialized programmes, his delegation attributed particular significance to the nuclear power and nuclear safety programmes. Mention should be made in that connection of the Conference on Nuclear Power Experience, which had been held in Vienna the week before and had shown clearly that the present trends in the use of nuclear energy for power production purposes were entirely valid.

147. The results of that conference would have a marked effect, as well, on the lines along which future Agency activities developed in those two spheres of application. A number of speakers at that conference had provided valuable information on the integrated programme being implemented by Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in the domain of nuclear power. Czechoslovakia, which was both a manufacturer and an exporter of WWER reactors, was also constructing and operating power stations of the WWER type. That trend, which would lead to the rational use of power resources, was an effective way of improving the national economy of all the countries concerned, while at the same time protecting the environment. In 1981, nuclear energy accounted for 7.1% of Czechoslovakia's electricity production.

148. As part of the functions of the international economic association of Member States of CMEA, known as "Interatomenergo", important documents of a regulatory nature were being compiled, together with design and construction

requirements for nuclear power stations. That work reflected the consistent approach adopted by the CMEA countries to dealing with problems of nuclear safety. Czechoslovakia had also taken part, from the very outset, in work relating to the Agency's nuclear safety programmes. It had to be mentioned in that context that, as stated during the round table discussion held on 20 September, in connection with the present Conference session, Czechoslovakia had had talks with Austrian representatives on the general problems of nuclear power stations in operation and under construction, and especially those sited near the frontiers of neighbouring countries. The frank and fruitful discussions had resulted in the drafting of agreements which, it was hoped, would be signed in the near future.

149. With regard to the Agency's programme for 1983-88 and budget for 1983, the proposed figures were basically acceptable, and the Secretariat's proposal to adjust the final cost estimates during the first half of the coming year on the basis of the dollar/schilling exchange rate established for all United Nations organizations was welcome. Nevertheless, the Secretariat was urged to make every effort to avoid non-productive expenditure and to strive for maximum savings in the use of funds.

150. Czechoslovakia attached great importance to technical co-operation and assistance and two particular aspects of it: the first was the use of multi-year large-scale projects and the second was the principle that in such areas as medicine, agriculture and the food industry technical assistance should be given predominantly to the group of economically least developed countries. His delegation endorsed the adoption of indicative planning figures for the targets for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in 1984-86. Czechoslovakia would be paying in full its pledged voluntary contribution to the Fund.

151. A number of important items on the agenda for the present session would be discussed in more detail by the individual committees; one such was the question of amending Article VI.A.2. of the Agency's Statute. In that connection he wished to point out that his country's stand had already been

made clear on a number of occasions, namely that it was essential, above all, to preserve the existing balance in the composition of the Board of Governors so as not to impair its effectiveness. Furthermore, at its twenty-fifth session the General Conference had adopted a resolution (GC(XXV)/RES/386) on increasing the number of Secretariat staff members at all levels from the developing countries, which had been discussed in the intervening period at a number of meetings of the Board. The measures already adopted in that respect could be considered full implementation of the resolution in question.

The meeting rose at 1.13 p.m.