



International Atomic Energy Agency

# GENERAL CONFERENCE

GC (XXVII)/OR.248

January 1984\*

GENERAL Distr.

ENGLISH

TWENTY-SEVENTH REGULAR SESSION: 10-14 OCTOBER 1983

RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,  
on Monday, 10 October 1983, at 3.10 p.m.

President: Mr. KEBLŮŠEK (Czechoslovakia)

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\*/ A provisional version of this document was issued on 21 October 1983.

\*\*/ GC (XXVII)/683.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC (XXVII)/INF/215/Rev.4.

ELECTION OF THE VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE AND OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE; APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE

1. The PRESIDENT recalled that under Rules 34 and 40 of its Rules of Procedure the General Conference had to elect, on proposals of the President, eight Vice-Presidents, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and the five additional members of the General Committee. He proposed that the provisions of Rule 40, relating to the election of the additional members of the General Committee, be suspended and that instead a total of six additional members be elected.
2. He proposed that the delegates of the following Member States be elected as Vice-Presidents of the General Conference: Australia, India, Japan, Morocco, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela.
3. He further proposed Mr. Ajit Singh, the delegate of Malaysia, as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and the delegates of the following States as additional members of the General Committee: Egypt, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Iraq and Paraguay.
4. The General Conference accepted the President's proposals.
5. The General Committee was thus duly appointed.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1982 (GC(XXVII)/684) (continued)

6. Mr. CASTRO MADERO (Argentina) said he first wished to give the General Conference an account of developments in the Argentine nuclear programme over the last year.
7. With regard to the generation of electricity of nuclear origin, the Atucha I power station had produced 1 553 000 MWh in the first eight months of 1983. Although the load factor had been slightly lower than in previous years (79.6%), that had been due not to operating problems but to the fact that electricity generation by the major hydroelectric power stations had been exceptionally high as a result of very heavy rainfall. The availability factor of the nuclear power station for that period had been 92.3%.

8. The second nuclear power station, Embalse, had gone critical in March 1983, and had been connected to the grid the following month. Its power level had then been increased gradually, reaching 100% in September 1983.

9. Economic and financial difficulties had delayed other projects which had been planned, but none of the objectives had been abandoned. 27.5% of the construction work on the third nuclear power station, Atucha II, had been completed, which meant that it was eighteen months behind schedule. He recalled that the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), through the Argentine Nuclear Power Plant Company (ENACE) (of which it held 75% of the share capital) had been the architect engineer for Atucha II and was also supervising its construction. That nuclear power station, unlike the first two, was not being built on the basis of a turnkey contract. The feasibility study for a fourth nuclear power station was almost complete.

10. 75.4% of the building of the Arroyito heavy-water plant, with a design capacity of 250 tonnes a year and based on Swiss technology, had been completed and the plant was due to be completed at the end of 1985. The pilot heavy-water plant, built without foreign technical assistance, was to be finished by the end of 1984.

11. The fuel element fabrication plant inaugurated in 1982 and operated by a joint company with minority CNEA participation was providing a regular supply of fuel for the Atucha I power station. The CNEA had also developed, without foreign aid, fuel elements intended for the Embalse power station, where the first prototypes would be used in a few months' time. It was also continuing to develop fuel elements needed for Atucha II when it became operational. Thus, the fuel elements for Argentina's nuclear power stations would all be produced domestically. Another joint company was being formed to operate the plant manufacturing the special alloys for the Ezeiza atomic centre currently being built.

12. In November 1982 a production plant for sinterable uranium dioxide of nuclear grade had gone into operation: consequently, Argentina now possessed all the facilities for the front end of the fuel cycle.

13. With regard to the back end of the fuel cycle, work was continuing on the construction of a fuel reprocessing plant due to begin trial operation in 1985, and full-scale operation in 1986.

14. In the field of research and development, the RA-6 training and research reactor had gone into operation, at the Bariloche Atomic Centre, in October 1982; it was entirely of Argentine design and 95% of it had been built in Argentina. Construction of a 20-MeV tandem accelerator had also been completed and tests conducted had proved very satisfactory. The accelerator was due to begin operation at the end of the year.

15. Argentina had also been very active in the field of international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, at both the multilateral and the bilateral level.

16. Within the Agency, Argentina had, despite its financial difficulties, not only maintained but increased its involvement in the technical assistance and co-operation programme, through fellowships, training courses and missions by experts, without any imposed conditions or discrimination. Mention should also be made of the holding, in collaboration with the Agency, of the interregional course on radiological protection and nuclear safety, which had been attended by 18 fellows from Latin America and other areas. Argentina had, moreover, undertaken to organize in 1984, again in collaboration with the Agency, an interregional course on energy planning.

17. In addition, the Argentine Government had pledged a voluntary contribution in national currency equivalent to Argentina's calculated share of the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1984.

18. Within the Organization of American States (OAS), the Argentine Government had pursued its active support of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) by following up the offers it had made to it during the Commission's twelfth regular session in 1981. His country had also participated actively, at Havana in April, in the second regular meeting of the Group of Non-Aligned Co-ordinating Countries.

19. Argentina had also taken part in the work of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development.

He hoped that certain supplier countries would abandon their attempts to exploit that conference in order to strengthen their political, technological and trade monopoly in nuclear energy, under the pretext of avoiding horizontal proliferation, and that they would not deflect it from the aims with which it had been planned: to increase transparency in technological exchange and to guarantee security of supply in the nuclear field.

20. On a bilateral level, Argentina had co-operated with many countries, particularly in Latin America, under the 16 bilateral agreements to which it was party. It was encouraging to see, in particular, the progress made in building the Huarangal nuclear research centre, in which Argentina was collaborating with the Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute (IPEN) and which was due to be completed in 1985. He also welcomed the results of Argentina's co-operation with Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and the Federal Republic of Germany, which would be increased still further. Furthermore, the negotiation of four new co-operative agreements with countries in different geographical regions was well advanced.

21. Argentina, which was participating unreservedly in world-wide efforts to avoid both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation, believed that the best way of avoiding nuclear proliferation was to intensify international co-operation through technology transfer without discriminatory conditions and linked with safeguards on what was transferred. It also believed that the Agency's safeguards system was the appropriate means for ensuring non-proliferation. The transfer, under safeguards, of technology and material led naturally and smoothly to the establishment of a monitoring system which would gradually cover all facilities of countries with nuclear programmes and would also ensure the transparency necessary to guarantee the use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. All attempts to impose additional conditions unilaterally (for example, attempts to restrict the transfer of technology in certain areas, tendentiously called "sensitive areas", or to insist on "prior consent") introduced an aggravating note of discrimination. His country was convinced that the question of non-proliferation safeguards could not be divorced from that of the security of nuclear supplies.

22. A co-operation agreement with Chile had been ratified on 1 September 1983. The entry into force of that agreement and the satisfactory results of the assessment of co-operation between Argentina and Brazil belied all malicious rumours regarding an alleged nuclear arms race in the south of the continent.

23. Negotiations with the Secretariat to finalize a safeguards agreement under Article 13 of the Tlatelolco Treaty were continuing. The Argentine delegation was convinced that those negotiations could be concluded, provided that the principles which it stood for were duly respected.

24. He recalled that in 1982 the Board of Governors had unanimously approved a request by the Argentine Government that the Secretariat should look into the extent to which certain safeguards agreements concluded by the Agency were compatible with its Statute.

25. The Secretariat's study (GOV/INF/433), despite its superficial nature and its deficiencies, contained some significant points with regard to the Agency's safeguards system. It could be concluded from that study that although a safeguards agreement had to satisfy the Statute requirement regarding "the peaceful use of items while they are under safeguards", the other conditions, in particular those concerning the lifting of safeguards, their non-application and their duration, could legitimately be negotiated by States voluntarily submitting their facilities or nuclear material to the Agency's safeguards system; such States did not necessarily have to abide by the two model agreements in force (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 and INFCIRC/153), nor did they have to adhere to agreements based on offers of voluntary submission already concluded by the Agency with different nuclear Powers. Consequently, any State which decided in the future to submit its facilities or nuclear material to Agency safeguards on a voluntary basis would enjoy that right.

26. In the absence of any clear response by the Agency, the conclusion had to be drawn that the nuclear propulsion of warships constituted a permissible military application, compatible with the commitments of States as Members of the Agency. All States which used nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should draw the obvious conclusions.

27. Reviewing the Agency's activities since the previous session of the General Conference, he expressed his satisfaction at what had been done to make the most of limited technical co-operation resources: multi-year

programming, over-programming, the prior and subsequent evaluation of projects, the encouragement of co-operation between developing countries and of regional co-operation, and dynamic programming.

28. The maintaining in force of the Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules for the Provision of Technical Assistance by the Agency was to be deplored, as they imposed political conditions which were so unacceptable that some Member States with significant nuclear programmes had decided to stop requesting Agency assistance. The Argentine delegation also disapproved of the conditions imposed for the use of certain extrabudgetary funds for technical assistance, which it believed to constitute a violation of the spirit of the Statute. On the other hand, it welcomed the fact that during that year there had once again been no evidence of any failure by Member States to fulfil undertakings made to the Agency.

29. As his delegation had told the Board of Governors, it was vital to increase the internal transparency of the safeguards system. To that end, it was necessary that the Members of the Agency and, in particular, the Board of Governors, be kept fully informed of the way in which the safeguards system operated. That condition was essential for the external transparency which had been called for by various Member States.

30. The Argentine delegation also felt that the Board of Governors should not simply "take note" of the considerations and opinions which the Secretariat submitted to it, but should, on the contrary, express its own opinion and lay down the rules by which the Secretariat should abide.

31. He re-emphasized the need to take steps to guarantee the confidentiality of information given to the Secretariat.

32. A positive note to be observed with regard to Agency safeguards was that several Member States had abandoned their stance of the past few years and no longer discriminated between safeguards inspectors according to whether or not their country of origin was party to a particular international treaty; regrettably, one Member State still maintained its negative attitude. Lastly, Argentina had agreed to open the Embalse nuclear power station to routine inspections, even before the conclusion of negotiations on subsidiary arrangements to the relevant safeguards agreement. It had also agreed to conditions for implementing a programme of tests for a containment and

surveillance system at that nuclear power station. Finally, it had voluntarily submitted to Agency safeguards 7088 kilograms of heavy water which it had acquired in 1972 without such conditions.

33. With regard to the final report of the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, he wished to recall the view already expressed by his delegation in the Board of Governors: the way in which the Group had worked and the results obtained were an obvious example of a badly designed project whose objectives had not been clearly defined. The large amount of money spent on it and the efforts made during four years had not yielded any positive results. That was why three interpretations of paragraph A.5 of Article XII of the Agency's Statute had been proposed. Yet it would not be difficult to establish an adequate mechanism for depositing surplus plutonium with the Agency and for returning it promptly for use when required. Argentina believed that only proposal B was practical, realistic and in line with the commitments made by Agency Members. In any case, it was legitimate to ask whether so much effort was justified in view of the small quantities of plutonium placed or likely to be placed under safeguards in the near future.

34. The work of the Expert Group on International Spent Fuel Management, on the other hand, deserved praise. The document submitted was clear and showed the efforts made to place the problem in its true perspective. The Expert Group had tried to define possible practical solutions. Since the question was important only in certain very specific cases, those practical solutions could, for technical and economic reasons, only be formulated in detail by those faced with the problem. The Agency could play a very useful role in gathering information, making recommendations and promoting dialogue between all those concerned.

35. The Agency's nuclear safety and radiological safety programme was remarkable. Implementation of the criteria set forth in the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection and in the relevant codes of practice and guides was of obvious interest in protecting the quality of life and eliminating non-quantifiable risks. Argentina was therefore convinced that all countries, whether developed or developing, should support those activities of the Agency. The proposal to formulate recommendations at the

international level regarding nuclear safety should be studied closely. In embarking on that new task, account should be taken of the experience gained in the neighbouring field of radiological protection. The results obtained in that respect by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), independently of any outside influence and bureaucratic hindrance, demonstrated the effectiveness of that approach.

36. The Agency had also undertaken to promote international co-operation in the event of emergencies. Such collaboration would be valuable but it was essential to be realistic; such collaboration could never be a substitute for sound national organization nor for the proper training of staff responsible for the operation of nuclear facilities. International co-operation could only serve as a back-up.

37. His delegation also wished to mention the very good results achieved in other areas of the Agency's activities, especially food and agriculture, biological and physical sciences, and the work of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics. In that connection he expressed his delegation's concern at the fact that some of those programmes, which were of a promotional nature, continued to dwindle in real terms when they were in fact a very useful form of technical assistance for developing countries. Whilst it was true that the Agency's budget had to be kept as tight as possible, it was the safeguards programme where economies should be made; it would be possible, for example, to abolish expenses incurred in applying safeguards to materials and facilities used for peaceful purposes in nuclear-weapon States. The present level of the promotional programmes which he had mentioned could then at least be maintained.

38. Mr. HAUNSCHILD (Federal Republic of Germany) said that since the previous session of the General Conference world nuclear energy production had made further headway and now accounted for 10% of the total production of electricity. Nuclear energy had thus demonstrated once again that, despite changing energy scenarios, it was capable of steadily being integrated into the world energy market. That trend could be expected to become more marked, and the Agency should pursue the successful efforts that it was making to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

39. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the construction of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle technology had made great advances, which was an indication, in some cases, of a reversion to the normal situation after a period of uncertainty and delay. In 1982, total nuclear generating capacity had reached 10 400 MW(e), with nuclear energy accounting for 17% of the total electricity produced. Twelve power plants were currently under construction and the installed nuclear capacity would pass the 24 000 MW(e) mark by 1990. The last three projects, launched in 1982, were based on a standardized design and a streamlined licensing procedure. Again, in 1982, the Government had decided, despite a considerable increase in cost, to continue building the 300-MW(e) prototype power stations with a high-temperature reactor (HTR) and a fast breeder after the possibilities that such reactors could offer in the long term had been thoroughly re-assessed. It had proved possible to adopt that decision in view of the fact that the manufacturing industry and the utilities had agreed to increase significantly their financial contribution, amounting now to 17% for the HTR and 28% for the fast breeder, thereby demonstrating their confidence in the future of those advanced reactor types.

40. The past year had also been marked by an upswing in European co-operation in breeder development. The close collaboration between industries, utilities and research centres in France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, which had been going on successfully for a number of years, would now be extended to cover the United Kingdom and thereby reinforced.

41. Headway had also been made in the nuclear fuel cycle. The first centrifuge enrichment plant of the trilateral enterprise URENCO was being built in the Federal Republic of Germany and a storage centre for spent fuel would start operation in the immediate future. Preparations for the construction of a reprocessing plant were advancing; the decision where to site it - in Bavaria or Lower Saxony - would be taken in 1984. The construction at Mol (Belgium) of a demonstration plant for the vitrification of high-level waste, based on a German design, was proceeding according to plan. The creation of nuclear waste depositories in a former iron ore mine and in a former salt mine was also progressing well.

42. His delegation welcomed the decision taken by the People's Republic of China to join the Agency; that step would reinforce the Agency's international role and universal status.

43. Turning to the Agency's activities, he recalled that, in the view of his country, the Agency's safeguards system was an essential element of non-proliferation policy. Despite occasional growing pains, the system was rapidly being adapted to handle the increasing number of nuclear facilities; the Board of Governors was currently discussing ways in which it could improve not only the effectiveness, but also the efficiency of safeguards. Since a large part of the Agency's inspection effort was spent in the Federal Republic of Germany, his country was in a position to contribute to the discussions by virtue of its practical experience in that field, which, just as in the case of other EURATOM Member States, involved co-operation between two independently international inspectorates.

44. It was heartening to see that in 1982 there had been no diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material. Furthermore, the conclusion of the "hexapartite" discussions regarding the proper safeguards approved for centrifuge enrichment plants had shown that the system could also cope with the complex problems raised by a full-scale nuclear fuel cycle. The Federal Republic of Germany welcomed, once again, the Soviet Union's intention to place some of its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards and he hoped that an agreement to that effect would shortly be concluded between the Soviet Union and the Agency.

45. Like some other Member States, his country had concluded an agreement with the Agency for the implementation of a safeguards support programme. In the same spirit it was conducting, together with the Agency, a programme for training experts from developing countries in the safeguards field.

46. The Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) had been meeting for three years; a great deal of time and effort was required to reach a consensus, but CAS, which was the only international forum with the task of formulating general rules to govern international nuclear co-operation, should keep up its efforts.

47. During the second International Conference on Technology Transfer, held in November 1982, he had been struck by the importance that developing countries attached to nuclear energy and to bilateral and multilateral co-operation in that field. On that occasion a large number of delegations had paid tribute to the Agency which, through its technical co-operation programme, had helped Member States to put their nuclear programmes into effect. For its part, his country was happy to see that the technical co-operation programme had been consolidated, streamlined and expanded. Considering the budgetary austerity prevailing at the present time in numerous Member States, an increase in 1983 of some 50% in the activities geared to the developing countries was quite remarkable. The Federal Republic of Germany, moreover, had been able to make a further contribution of some size to the Agency's programme. Subject to approval by Parliament, it was willing to continue its support by contributing to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund and by making additional aid available in the form of fellowships, experts and equipment, training courses, scientific meetings and co-ordinated research programmes. The proposal to undertake a study on small and medium power reactors was a good illustration of the way in which the Agency's experience and the know-how of its Member States could be pooled in order to benefit decision-makers, more especially in the developing countries.

48. Nuclear safety should continue to play an important role in the Agency's activities. The presentation of the Nuclear Safety Review was now satisfactory and enabled the Agency to describe and explain its activities and to circulate information on programmes in Agency Member States and in international organizations. Furthermore, the gradual introduction of an incident reporting system was a step in the right direction; it should facilitate the reciprocal exchange of information. Close co-operation with the Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD), which itself possessed a reporting system, should make it possible to avoid duplication. With regard to the proposal to set up a new, high-level commission on nuclear safety, his delegation was not convinced - in view of the manifold existing international bodies and efforts in that field - that there was a real demand for such a new group.

49. Close international co-operation was essential if all countries were to benefit from the advantages of nuclear energy. At the same time, firm international commitments had been made as a guarantee to the international

community that nuclear energy would be used only for peaceful purposes. The Agency was playing a central role in the operation and development of that complex network and would only be able to discharge that function in a spirit of co-operation and mutual trust. The Federal Republic of Germany was sure that a spirit of that kind would prevail and it would continue to support the Secretariat in all its efforts to attain that goal.

50. Mr. RAMANNA (India) said he wished to associate himself with the ideas expressed by the Director General, who had identified several fields in which co-operation between Governments was necessary - for example, nuclear safety and the development of generic criteria for the safe disposal of wastes. International assurances against attacks on nuclear facilities in particular were a matter which the Agency could look into. The support given by India to the Agency's promotional activities in developing countries had taken the form of additional contributions for activities undertaken within the framework of the Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA) of particular interest to countries in the region of Asia and the Pacific. He had pleasure in announcing that his country would pay its full share - US \$81 000 - of the target fixed for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1984 in order to help ensure that the Secretariat had funds available for continuing its good work.

51. With regard to the admission of China to the Agency, the Indian representative at the plenary meeting of the conference on the Statute had pointed out that the Agency could not and should not ignore the existence of a quarter of the world's population; he welcomed China's membership, which would certainly serve to make the Agency a more representative body.

52. The adoption of the Agency's Statute and all that it implied could not be wished away or forgotten. As all were aware, India had taken an interest in the peaceful uses of atomic energy from the very beginning, long before most developing or even some developed countries. Nuclear energy represented for a country the size of India a prime method of meeting the energy needs of industry and the economy, which were rapidly expanding. The first unit of the Madras Atomic Power Project, indigenously designed and constructed, had gone into service in July 1982 and would shortly attain full power. Five

similar units were currently under construction. It was India's aim to have by the year 2000, nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 10 000 MW(e), or 10% of the country's total installed electricity-generating capacity. A thermal research reactor of 100 MW, entirely indigenous in design and construction, was to be put into service early next year. It would be used for basic and applied research work and the production of radioisotopes. A low-energy research reactor operating on uranium-233 and built under the thorium utilization programme would also be operational within a year. Fuel from the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station had been reprocessed in the presence of Agency inspectors and the system had operated satisfactorily. The fast breeder test reactor in Kalpakkam was expected to be ready next year. India thus possessed the industrial and technological base required to sustain and support the entire fuel cycle for all peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

53. The development of the national nuclear power programme had been positive despite the international climate. But India had been exposed more and more to regrettable restrictive and discriminatory policies pursued by major suppliers of nuclear material and equipment. Policies discriminating between countries seemed to have become common although they ran counter to the norms of international trade and behaviour. Nuclear technology and nuclear materials were being denied to countries with a proven record of self-restraint and dedication to the purely peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while countries - like South Africa - which were flouting all United Nations resolutions got all the support they wanted from a variety of countries.

54. His delegation was hard put to understand the restrictions imposed on his country, which had consciously decided to use nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes - a voluntary decision and commitment by which it was consistently abiding. Recent examples of retransfers showed that the supply of sensitive materials was possible when the political will was present. The discriminatory restrictions applied to certain countries had merely forced them to rely on themselves, even when such materials or technology were internationally available.

55. The Agency could not - and did not - remain insulated from the realities of international life. The voluntary renunciation by non-nuclear-weapon States of part of their sovereignty, as embodied in the safeguards agreements concluded with the Agency, had not in practice been matched by the nuclear

supplies and international co-operation promised in return. Many provisions of the Agency's Statute, such as Article IX, remained mere words. The Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) was trying, as best it could, to reach a consensus on principles of international co-operation which could serve as a basis for assuring nuclear supplies. It was within that context that the idea of a United Nations conference to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had attracted so much attention throughout the world. India hoped that that conference, held at a favourable moment, would indeed promote international co-operation, but it understood that efforts were being made, outside the Agency, to further restrict international co-operation and trade in the nuclear field.

56. The Agency's annual report for 1982 showed that 98% of the nuclear power plants of non-nuclear-weapon States were under Agency safeguards. It omitted to mention, however, that those facilities only represented a small proportion of all the nuclear plants existing in the world. Safeguards were applied under so-called "voluntary offer" agreements to the facilities of States which manufactured and deployed nuclear weapons. The nature of those safeguards and their application were limited. They were therefore meaningless and irrelevant to the prevention of the real and actual proliferation of nuclear weapons still carried out by those States. The nuclear-weapon States had in 1983 alone conducted over 30 nuclear tests. In one particular case six tests had taken place one after the other on the same day. One could only hope that the nuclear explosions involved were peaceful, and it would be useful if the experience thereby acquired could be shared on an international basis. As the Director General had said, Agency safeguards could play a part in preventing vertical proliferation, and the Indian delegation believed that the non-aligned countries should encourage him in those efforts. He would like to see signs of the same idealism in Secretariat documents such as the annual report and the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR). India, for its own part, had made known its views on those documents in the Board of Governors.

57. It should be recalled that, back in 1956, one of the founding fathers of the Agency, Dr. Homi Bhabha, had expressed certain apprehensions in the context of nuclear power promotion which, unfortunately, had proved to be justified. Some countries even believed that those apprehensions had been

increased by the haves, who wanted to continue controlling, even exploiting, the have-nots. Fissionable material might be the life-blood of a country's future economy and the withholding of such material by mechanisms such as those proposed for international plutonium storage and control could easily halt the economy of such a country and expose it to all manner of pressures.

58. Not to be overlooked in that regard was the fact that many Asian and African countries had gained the impression, during colonial rule, that the role assigned to them was simply one of providing raw materials; former colonial powers had felt that industrial production was beyond the capacity of those countries. Underestimating the capacity of countries was fraught with risks; there were several examples of countries once considered to be incapable which had been able to prove the opposite. If nuclear supplies were hampered by unduly onerous conditions, countries would be forced to develop their own capabilities and might be tempted to abandon their self-imposed restraints.

59. Referring in conclusion to a speech made by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, at the recent opening of the World Energy Conference in New Delhi, he recalled that Dr. Bhabha had pointed out, three decades previously, that India could not continue to remain dependent on the expansion of hydroelectric and thermal energy sources. He had initiated at that time a nuclear energy programme, but it had met with opposition from numerous countries which had claimed that his approach was an imprudent and impractical one. The opposition continued and the obstacles were considerable, but in the meantime India had learned to design, fabricate and build nuclear power plants by itself. India was turning to science as a way out of its economic backwardness and it would not give up any means that helped to achieve that aim. Its nuclear programme had no military objective; it was dictated by the needs of the country's development; it dealt with agriculture and medical applications of nuclear energy and was aimed at meeting the country's energy requirements. India was opposed to nuclear weapons and had none of its own.

60. Mr. PETROSYANTS (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the General Conference was meeting at a time when the international situation had clearly deteriorated and when the threat of a nuclear war with catastrophic consequences for all States had increased. The situation had become worse because those who sought to inflame the international atmosphere

in order to satisfy their ambitions had stepped up their activities. The arms race had now reached an unprecedented level as a result of the policy and actions of Western imperialist forces. Programmes for the production and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapons were being put into effect and military space systems able to strike targets both in space and on the ground had been developed. Activities aimed at the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles were being stepped up in Western Europe.

61. All the countries of the world were faced with a task of extreme urgency - to prevent a further deterioration of the international political climate, to avoid being dragged into a nuclear catastrophe, to check the unrestrained nuclear arms race and to bring the world back onto the path of détente. The proposals made by the Member States of the Warsaw Pact, the new and important Soviet initiatives put forward by Mr. Andropov, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the proposals made by the Soviet Union for the condemnation of nuclear war and the freezing of nuclear weapons, made at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, were aimed at dealing with those vitally important problems.

62. Another issue had given rise to a Soviet proposal in the United Nations: the Soviet Union had suggested that further efforts be made to diminish the threat of a nuclear war and to ensure the safe development of nuclear energy so as to prevent any attack on civil nuclear facilities. There was no doubt that the proposal was a timely one. According to data provided by the Agency, by the end of 1982 there were already 297 nuclear power plants in operation in the world, representing a total generating capacity of 175 GW, and the number of nuclear plants, research reactors and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities was on the increase. The destruction of such facilities, however, could have catastrophic consequences.

63. It was clear that genuine international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy could only develop in circumstances likely to prevent a nuclear war, to limit the arms race, especially in the case of nuclear weapons, and to re-create and reinforce mutual trust among States. The Agency, for its part, would have to help find a constructive solution to those problems.

64. He was happy to note that the main concern of the Agency was still the aim of fruitful co-operation between States in the sphere of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For its part, the Soviet Union would continue to do everything in its power to maintain a normal working atmosphere within the Agency so that the responsibilities incumbent upon it could be successfully discharged.

65. His delegation was in favour of strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, which could not be a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and highly appreciated the part played by the Agency in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Agency would have to be successful in the conduct of its non-proliferation activities if it wished to fulfil its mission of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Member States.

66. The Soviet Union assigned great importance to the Agency's safeguards system - a basic area of Agency activities promoting the non-proliferation regime. With the development of nuclear activities throughout the world and the emergence in a large number of countries of new fuel cycle facilities, it was essential to continue developing the whole of the Agency's safeguards system in order to make it more effective and to see that inspection efforts provided full coverage of the nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States. There was need to further improve the organization of the Department of Safeguards - and especially to pay greater attention to inspection activities, to make better use of equipment and personnel, to optimize the choice of inspection goals, and to ensure improved co-ordination in safeguards support activities. In view of the Agency's limited resources, it should focus its efforts on the "sensitive" stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.

67. Anxious to improve the authority and credibility of the Agency and its safeguards system, the Soviet Union had offered, as a gesture of goodwill, to place under Agency safeguards part of its peaceful nuclear activities - namely, a number of nuclear power plants and research reactors. Two rounds of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Agency had already taken place, in a very constructive atmosphere. The Soviet Union's decision would help to improve the effectiveness of Agency safeguards and to build up trust between States.

68. The Soviet Union was continuing its programme of support for Agency safeguards - in the past year, the support work of Soviet scientific organizations and research institutes had been worth about one million roubles. It had presented the Agency with 500 kg of heavy water for research in the safeguards field. Each year Agency specialists underwent training at Soviet nuclear facilities.

69. The Soviet Union was also actively supporting other Agency activities related to non-proliferation. It was taking part, for example, in the conceptual studies of international and regional nuclear fuel cycle centres, especially international storage facilities for plutonium and irradiated fuel. That useful work should continue with a view to achieving a consensus on practical arrangements.

70. His delegation commended the Agency on its efforts in connection with the drafting of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which was now open for signature, and hoped that the Convention would enter into force soon, since its application would help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. States which had not yet ratified the Convention should do so without delay, especially States which were engaged in the international transport of nuclear materials or through whose territory such transport was effected.

71. In the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), his country was advocating an international system of assured supplies which would be co-ordinated with non-proliferation efforts. The Committee had made some headway at its last session, an agreement having been concluded on the Agency's role in implementing an emergency and back-up mechanism. He hoped that the Committee would be successful in discharging the functions assigned to it.

72. The General Conference was meeting at a time when a large number of Member States of the Agency were making preparations for the NPT Review Conference scheduled for 1985. He hoped that the Agency would once again assist with the preparations and the holding of that important meeting, the success of which would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and help to improve the effectiveness of the Agency's activities.

73. The Agency Secretariat had recently started on a new task - the preparation of the draft programme for 1985-1990. His country was convinced that the Secretariat should be guided in its work by the need to devise programmes presenting the greatest value to Member States.

74. The main scientific and technical activities of the Agency were keyed to problems connected with the development of nuclear energy. The importance of those activities was increasing with the increasingly important role being played by nuclear energy in the present world. The problems concerned were extremely varied, relating as they did to the technology of power reactors, the use of low-temperature heat from nuclear plants, the economics of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle, the technology of reactor fuel fabrication, spent fuel management, and the handling and disposal of radioactive wastes.

75. The Soviet Union supported the work of the Agency in those fields, the International Nuclear Information System (INIS) and the co-operation encouraged by the Agency in the field of nuclear data. Those activities were of great importance not only for the development of nuclear power, but also for other peaceful uses of nuclear energy in all Member States.

76. The Soviet Union actively supported the Agency's activities in the area of nuclear fusion. As was known, it was the Soviet Union which had taken the initiative in the case of the INTOR project. The INTOR working group had completed the conceptual design phase and a report on that phase had been prepared. The important results obtained fully justified the efforts devoted by the participating countries and by the Agency to the INTOR project. The work could now be stepped up and, more important, future deadlines and phases could be defined more clearly. His country was convinced that thermonuclear fusion would take its rightful place in the Agency's new programme.

77. More stress would have to be given in the Agency's draft programme to forecasting the development of nuclear power generation and defining its optimal structure. There was a need to analyse the extent to which it was possible to improve the technical and economic characteristics of nuclear power plants, to develop reactors on the basis of new physical and technological concepts, and to introduce new techniques for utilizing nuclear energy sources.

78. Among the Agency's scientific and technical programmes the one relating to the safety of nuclear facilities, more especially power plants, was particularly significant. He favoured the establishment within the Agency of a system for reporting incidents that occurred at nuclear power plants. It would enable international experience in the operation of nuclear power plants to be analysed and utilized in a more effective manner.

79. The technical assistance and co-operation programme occupied a special place in the Agency's activities. The Soviet Union considered it of great importance and believed that its main objectives were to assist in training national specialists and in promoting scientific research in developing countries. The Agency's activities in that area responded to those objectives. The practice of fixing a target for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, established in accordance with decisions taken by the General Conference, provided for a considerable planned increase in the resources. Special contributions were also becoming more and more important. In view of the importance of such activities for developing Member States, the Soviet Union wished to confirm its agreement to the target for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1984 being set at \$22.5 million, on the assumption, of course, that the principle of voluntary contributions in national currency remained unchanged. In line with the policy that it still pursued in the matter of co-operation with developing countries, the Soviet Union had decided to raise its voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1984 to 1.9 million roubles. Those resources would be used to finance the supply of equipment and instrumentation and also for training courses and study tours in the USSR. In 1984 and 1985 the Soviet Union would also earmark 1 million roubles for financing footnote a/ projects. That should be regarded as a form of additional assistance, through the Agency, to non-nuclear-weapon States party to NPT. Furthermore, his country would be providing 140 000 roubles in 1984 and 1985 for individual training for specialists from developing countries.

80. At the Agency's Conference on Nuclear Power Experience in 1982 detailed reports had been given on the status of, and outlook for, the development of nuclear energy in the USSR; during the brief period that had elapsed since then, however, the Soviet nuclear industry had made further progress. The installed capacity of nuclear power plants had risen by 13%. New units

were under construction at 20 sites and the first unit of the Ignalinsk power station, which - with a capacity of 1500 MW(e) - would be the biggest reactor in the world, was just about to be completed. The total electricity output of the country in 1985, i.e. by the end of the eleventh Five-Year Plan for economic development, would rise to 1 555 000 million kWh/a, of which 220 000 million kWh (about 14%) would be accounted for by nuclear energy; the percentage for the European part of the country would be as high as 20%. The rate at which nuclear power plants were being commissioned was already 2.5 times higher than for fossil fuel power stations. Between now and 1985 the pace would be stepped up even more and almost all (98%) of the increase in electricity demand in the European part of the USSR would be met by nuclear energy. The commonest reactors in the Soviet Union were thermal PWRs and uranium-graphite pressure tube reactors. It should be noted that the Soviet Union was the only country in the world where three power plants with fast reactors (BOR-60, BN-350 and BN-600) were in operation. The BN-600 plant was at present the biggest in the world, having a fast neutron reactor with a capacity of 600 000 kW(e).

81. Long-term plans for the construction of nuclear power plants intended for district heating had been drawn up. The construction of the two first pilot plants, at Gorky and Voronezh, was actively under way. According to general estimates, nuclear plants were safer than plants using fossil fuels. At the 1982 Conference in Vienna, representatives of countries operating nuclear power plants built with the aid of the Soviet Union had confirmed in their reports the reliability and safety of such plants. His country had set up a State Committee for the supervision of safety in the nuclear power industry, with the task of maintaining the existing level of safety at a time of expansion in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

82. Within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) the socialist countries were putting into effect an ambitious programme for the construction of nuclear power plants, based on an unprecedented degree of international co-operation in the production of equipment, components and instrumentation.

83. The Soviet Union was continuing to promote the use of nuclear techniques in various branches of the national economy and science. It was happy to share its knowledge and experience in that field with all interested countries, particularly through the Agency's technical assistance programme.

84. The Soviet Union welcomed the admission of the People's Republic of China to the Agency and hoped that, by taking an active part in the Agency's activities in accordance with the high principles of the Statute, China would help the Agency to discharge its functions in an effective manner.

85. In conclusion, the Soviet delegation wished to join other delegations which had expressed appreciation of the Agency's annual report for 1982. He was sure that the Agency would remain a reliable instrument in the service of the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while continuing to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The meeting rose at 5.5 p.m.

