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President: Mr. KEBLÚŠEK (Czechoslovakia)
later: Mr. BRENNAN (Australia)

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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1982 (GC(XXVII)/684)

1. Mr. HENDERSON (United Kingdom) said he, too, was pleased to congratulate the People's Republic of China on its admission to the Agency, which had now become a truly universal organization. As a newcomer to the international nuclear scene, he wished to begin with some personal reflections on the positive aspects of the Agency. As an international organization entrusted with a mission of the highest importance for the welfare and peace of all, the Agency enjoyed an unparalleled reputation. It was run with the greatest efficiency, and the commitment of the staff and Member States to the Agency's cause was outstanding.
2. In some respects, however, there was a gulf between the Secretariat on the one hand and the Board of Governors and its various fora on the other. The problem was due not to a lack of communication (the Secretariat kept the Board and Members fully informed and endeavoured to take the Members' interests into consideration), but rather to differing perceptions of the Agency's role. The Agency was quite rightly regarded as a technical organization with a well-defined and important mission which it carried out most effectively. However, to judge by its deliberations, the Board seemed to be less given to directing and guiding the Agency's work than to parading irrelevant political hobby-horses. Those hobby-horses were paraded with great panache and in a general atmosphere of enormous goodwill and friendliness, but took up a great deal of time quite out of proportion to the Board's business. Beneath that friendly exterior there seemed to lurk an iron determination to score political points. In itself that was harmless enough, but there seemed to be a readiness to press political issues, even to the detriment of the quality of the Agency's work, its good standing and its impartiality.
3. He did not wish to imply that politics had no part in nuclear affairs. Quite the contrary, the issues raised by civil nuclear power - the fear of proliferation and the need for assurances of supply and public acceptability - were unavoidably political both in the national and the international sense, and the Agency was the appropriate forum for tackling the international political dimension of nuclear power. However, its capacity to deal effectively with such matters was bound to be seriously hampered if extraneous political considerations were allowed to interfere.

4. He proposed to state two simple and positive truths concerning that highly complicated subject. First, the Agency's membership had the mission of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and preventing the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices. The first objective could not be attained if the public had no confidence in the likelihood of success in the second. They were not competing aims but, rather, complementary ones of great importance to each Member State. Secondly, while the Agency pre-dated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the latter was the expression of collective world commitment to the Agency's objectives. In his Government's view, the nuclear community should build on the Agency and the NPT. Philosophical discussions as to the compatibility of the Agency and the NPT should not be allowed to inhibit the Agency's effectiveness or dissuade further States from acceding to the Treaty. Such discussions were invariably initiated by countries which failed to see beyond the question of how their own interests would be affected to the broader issue of the advantages gained by the international community as a whole. His Government's policy was to encourage accession to the Treaty just as it encouraged membership of the Agency, and he hoped that both would attract more adherents.

5. Without indulging in a lengthy catalogue of the United Kingdom's progress over the past year in its nuclear programme and policies, he wished to refer to one individual aspect of his country's nuclear policy in view of its importance and international scope. The United Kingdom had been among the countries which had pioneered the fast reactor for commercial application. As a result of its integrated fast reactor programme his country was able to proceed to full-scale commercialization when the time was ripe. However, a very substantial research and development effort was still needed. As the time when it would be possible to introduce the fast reactor on a commercial scale seemed to be receding, the United Kingdom had reached the conclusion that the best way forward was to seek collaboration with the European countries which were already co-operating successfully in that field. That decision

had been announced at the beginning of September and should make it possible to pool existing knowledge, optimize research programmes and co-ordinate the construction of further demonstration reactors, while at the same time making earlier economies of scale with regard to the fuel cycle.

6. With reference to the Director General's statement, he recalled the resolution, adopted in February at the meeting of the parties to the London Dumping Convention, on the suspension of sea disposal operations pending the outcome of a scientific review of their drawbacks and advantages. Because of its prominent role with regard to sea disposal, the United Kingdom felt it appropriate to clarify its position. It considered the disposal of low-level radioactive waste at sea to be a safe and environmentally acceptable method which was consistent with the international standards established in the London Dumping Convention and by international bodies such as the Agency. No authoritative scientific evidence had been adduced to show that sea disposal performed in accordance with those standards was unsafe. If such evidence were to emerge from the review, the United Kingdom would be prepared to suspend its disposal operations. In the meantime, it had been recognized by the delegates at the 1983 meeting of the parties to the Convention that the resolution on the suspension of disposal operations was not binding on members. Moreover, that resolution was not supported by the scientific evidence which would be necessary for the provisions of the Convention to be amended.

7. The Director General had also referred to the idea of setting up an international body to give guidance on nuclear safety philosophies and basic safety criteria. The concept of international and independently agreed safety criteria was an attractive one. But before setting out on that course it would be necessary to examine very carefully whether such a concept was practicable. He wondered what the mandate of such a body would be and assumed that, by analogy with the ICRP, the body envisaged would be a group of independent experts who would draw on the results of research carried out throughout the world on nuclear plant safety with a view to giving guidance on acceptable

levels of risk for various key plant characteristics. It would undoubtedly be neither possible nor desirable to go beyond such a mandate into the domain of regulatory philosophies, which were bound to vary widely according to the particular circumstances of each country. Even the establishment of a body to issue guidelines on acceptable levels of risk had its difficulties, and he doubted whether the analogy with the ICRP would, in fact, be helpful, given the considerable element of subjectivity and political judgement inherent in decisions regarding the safety of nuclear facilities. There was a serious risk that such a body would only be able to agree on guidelines reflecting the lowest common denominator of existing practices and that such guidelines would consequently earn minimum respect. Finally, the experts qualified to serve on such a committee would be certain to come from some part of the nuclear industry and might not, therefore, be seen as independent. In the light of those uncertainties, he feared that the ideal of a safety commission was an elusive one and that pursuit of it would bring more problems than benefits for the nuclear community. Having said all that, however, he strongly supported the safety initiatives taken under the Agency's auspices such as, for example, the International Incident Reporting System, the operational safety review teams mentioned by the Director General and the nuclear safety standards programme.

8. With regard to nuclear supplies, the United Kingdom welcomed the recent progress made by the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), both in its search for mutually agreed principles of international co-operation and in the specific field of emergency and back-up mechanisms. The United Kingdom had supported the work of CAS from the outset and believed that, with the renewed commitment to resolving the problems facing the Committee, a general consensus would not be long in emerging.

9. The ideas expressed regarding small and medium power reactors were of interest and it seemed clear that a number of sellers were willing to supply the market if it could be shown that a market existed. The decision taken at a recent Agency meeting to recommend a study of the conditions prevailing in potential customer countries seemed to be a sensible approach. The cost estimates provided demonstrated that it was possible to organize the preliminary missions envisaged within the budget recommended by the Board for 1984.

10. He was convinced that, after the recent admission of the People's Republic of China, all the States Members of the Agency would be keen to reflect on the universal character which the Agency had acquired and to concentrate their attention on the practical, technical and scientific tasks which it could and must accomplish in order to improve the quality of life and standard of living of the whole of mankind.

Mr. Brennan (Australia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

11. Mr. KHAN (Pakistan) welcomed the admission of the People's Republic of China to the Agency, an historic event by virtue of which the Agency had become a truly universal organization. China would undoubtedly have a positive influence on the Agency's work and would be a great moral support for the developing countries.

12. The nature of the Agency's mission and the effectiveness of its work, thanks to the devotion of its staff and the quality of its leadership, lent the organization a certain prestige; its task now was to take imaginative new initiatives in order to stimulate the growth of nuclear power. Despite a temporary reprieve due to adjustments in the price of oil and the slowing down in economic growth, the basic situation had not changed, i.e. reserves of fossil fuel were still limited. The world energy situation continued to be precarious and energy imports weighed ever more heavily on the frail economies of the developing countries. In its 1983 report, the World Bank had laid particular emphasis on the urgent need to make major investments in the energy sectors of developing countries so that they could attain a minimum level of economic growth. In particular, it had pointed to the important role which nuclear power could play in reducing energy imports; over the next decade the World Bank planned to allocate some 53 000 million dollars exclusively to the development of nuclear power in the developing countries. Pakistan was convinced that nuclear power had reached a stage of technical maturity and economic viability at which it could play a prominent role in the production of electricity in a large number of highly populated developing countries where energy resources were insufficient.

13. According to the statistics, the share of nuclear energy in electricity production was expected in the near future to reach a level of 50% in some countries. However, global estimates of the growth of nuclear power capacity were constantly slipping below previous targets. The countries which, only 10 years before, had been leading the field and setting the pace for the rest of the world in the nuclear sphere were now finding that their nuclear industry was virtually paralysed, not because it had proved to be unprofitable, but as a result of other inhibiting factors. It was a paradoxical situation when, having for three decades concerned itself with the potential of nuclear power, the world was still unable to reap its benefits. The main reason for that development was the over-regulation of nuclear power, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the increasing constraints imposed by regulatory bodies in a number of advanced countries had lengthened construction periods, increased costs and introduced an element of uncertainty which had definitely discouraged public services and reactor vendors and had thus suffocated the nuclear industry. The regulatory bodies seemed to be excessively sensitive to the alarmist and unrealistic scenarios concocted by certain groups, scenarios which had not been borne out by the facts. While no industry was entirely free of risk, the nuclear industry had a safety record which was far better than that of conventional industries such as transport, mining and chemicals.

14. At an international level there seemed to be a parallel trend towards imposing increasing and arbitrary restrictions on the export of nuclear power plants as a result of the tendency to equate nuclear power with nuclear proliferation. A recent study conducted by prominent experts in nuclear technology and international relations in the nuclear sphere had concluded that nuclear power plants under safeguards constituted a slight or marginal risk of nuclear proliferation and that the idea that the development of nuclear power production for civil purposes would automatically lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons was not only groundless, but actually misleading. It should be recognized that nuclear proliferation, both vertical

and horizontal, was primarily a political problem, and an effort should be made to resolve the political issues involved rather than spending energy on erecting technical barriers and surrendering to the delusion that more restrictions on civil nuclear activities could eliminate the risk of proliferation. Such short-sighted measures would only serve to paralyse economic development throughout the world, exacerbate the existing energy crisis and create even greater insecurity and instability instead of promoting the cause of world peace and non-proliferation.

15. Pakistan supported all measures aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Agency, which was expected to play a leading role in stimulating economic development and strengthening world security. The need for such measures had been examined at the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions of the Agency's General Conference, which had in 1981 unanimously adopted important resolutions regarding the financing of technical assistance (GC(XXV)/RES/388), the staffing of the Agency's Secretariat (GC(XXV)/RES/386) and the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute (GC(XXV)/RES/389). Pakistan greatly regretted the lack of progress made over the past two years in the areas covered by those resolutions.

16. Pakistan had repeatedly drawn the Secretariat's attention to the increasing imbalance in the allocation of resources to the two pillars on which the organization was founded: technical assistance and safeguards. That imbalance undermined the Agency's credibility and effectiveness. A little more generosity on the part of the developed countries would undoubtedly help to convince the majority of the Agency's Members that the rich countries took as great an interest in the progress of the Agency's promotional activities as its regulatory functions. Pakistan supported the Agency's safeguards activities, but could not understand why they had been allowed to outpace its technical assistance programmes. The share of allocations to safeguards had increased from 10% in the 1970 budget to 30% in 1983 and 1984, while the funds allocated to technical assistance in the same period had remained static around the 20% mark. Pakistan appreciated the generous voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, but felt that, in accordance with resolution GC(XXV)/RES/388, it was necessary to seek ways and means of financing technical assistance from resources which

were as predictable and assured as those allocated to safeguards. By so doing, the Agency would demonstrate that it attached equal importance to the two activities. He agreed with the Director General that the Agency's promotional and regulatory activities were mutually reinforcing, but did not consider that its safeguards activities could be termed promotional or regarded as a form of technical assistance.

17. Pakistan appreciated the efforts of the Director General to increase the representation of the developing countries on the staff of the Secretariat as indicated by the appointments made at the Director level. He wished to point out, however, that the overall increase in the representation of the developing countries on the Professional staff over the past two years had remained below 2%. Resolution GC(XXV)/RES/386 had requested the Director General to take the necessary action to bring about a substantial increase in the representation of the developing countries on the staff of the Secretariat with a view to redressing the existing imbalance by 1985. Clearly, 2% could not be regarded as a substantial increase, and it was to be hoped that a greater effort would be made in that regard. It was no longer a valid contention that there were not sufficient qualified candidates available from the developing countries, as a number of the latter had put forward excellent candidates and some of those countries with programmes which were almost 20 years old could now spare personnel who were widely experienced and highly qualified in areas of direct relevance to the Agency's programme.

18. The need to increase the representation of the developing countries, and more specifically the areas of Africa and of the Middle East and South Asia, which were especially under-represented on the Board of Governors, had been the subject of extensive discussions within the Agency over the past six years. Despite the reluctance of various Member States regarding increased representation of those or other areas, most of the Member States had, in conformity with resolution GC(XXV)/RES/361, agreed to a compromise formula providing for a modest increase in the representation of Africa and the Middle East. As long as those two regions were not equitably represented on the Board, the effectiveness of the latter would suffer. Any delay in rectifying that injustice would only serve to aggravate the frustration felt by the countries in those regions which were playing an increasingly active role in the Agency's work.

19. The Board had established the Committee on Assurances of Supply and had assigned it the crucial task of evolving universally acceptable standards for regulating peaceful nuclear trade throughout the world. The establishment of that Committee had represented tacit recognition of the fact that arbitrary guidelines set by supplier States without consulting recipient States could not be enforced or sustained. Pakistan therefore believed that it was in the interest of both supplier and recipient States that the work of CAS should succeed because its failure would mean a slow-down in nuclear trade and the development of various forms of individual action for supplying nuclear materials, equipment and services, which would be far more difficult to regulate. It was regrettable that CAS had been virtually deadlocked over the issue of defining the principles of international co-operation. Some flexibility had been shown during the latest series of discussions, which had resulted in the drafting of emergency back-up and revision mechanisms. It was to be hoped that that flexible attitude would grow stronger and lead to a genuine compromise on other important issues. It was in nobody's interest that reaching agreement in CAS should be delayed, because that would certainly postpone the time when the developing countries could benefit from nuclear energy and it would represent no gain for the advanced countries, since they could not sustain their monopoly in nuclear technology indefinitely. In fact, that monopoly was steadily decreasing. If an agreement was not reached fairly rapidly, many recipient States would be compelled to make the investments and efforts necessary for achieving greater self-sufficiency in key areas, and once they had gained the necessary technology at high cost they could not be expected to give it up. Pakistan deeply regretted the tendency of certain supplier States conveniently and arbitrarily to go back on their supply undertakings and commitments. It considered that irrevocable safeguards should be linked with equally irrevocable supply guarantees.

20. The Government of Pakistan had consistently supported the Agency's safeguards activities. It was convinced that the safeguards system was technically sound and adequate and it was gratified that there had not been a single instance of diversion of nuclear material from any facility under Agency safeguards. It was in favour of technical improvements in the safeguards system in

order to enhance its effectiveness and to reduce the overall costs, but it believed that the real strength of the Agency's safeguards lay not in so-called technical measures but in universal acceptance of the system. The fact should not be overlooked that the greatest deterrent to diversion was the political cost which any country would have to bear in the event of an attempted diversion. A disturbing tendency had been noted on the part of certain Member States to introduce arbitrary changes in the safeguards system as set out in document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the wording of which had been adopted by consensus. Pakistan was opposed to any unilateral modification of that system, which was fully in keeping with the Agency's Statute.

21. The Pakistan Government had expressed in no uncertain terms at meetings of the General Conference and the Board of Governors, its views on the Israeli attack on the peaceful nuclear centre in Iraq. It once again strongly condemned that premeditated, unwarranted and totally unjustified attack, which was in complete violation of accepted international principles, the Statute of the Agency and the Charter of the United Nations. That irresponsible attack had done irreparable damage to the cause of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The attack should not only be condemned wholeheartedly, but energetic measures should be taken to avoid a repetition of such acts in the future. In that connection, Pakistan welcomed the proposal for adopting an international convention which would prevent such irresponsible attacks in future. It strongly believed that any attack on a nuclear facility in times of peace was fraught with great danger and could have most serious consequences for world peace.

22. His Government had already submitted detailed comments to the Board on the programme and budget of the Agency for 1983-84. In general, it did not subscribe to the philosophy of zero growth in such essential areas as technical assistance, nuclear safety, nuclear power and nuclear applications in agriculture and medicine. In its opinion, there was still considerable room for further reductions in the administration budget. Furthermore, it wished to express its appreciation for the increased emphasis on nuclear safety, because the safety of civilian nuclear power facilities was and should continue to be above all

politics. It was necessary to avoid the occurrence of any incident in a peaceful nuclear facility, because that would be a serious setback for the nuclear energy programmes of all Member States. Pakistan approved projects for setting up safety review teams to increase the capabilities of individual countries to cope with nuclear accidents and for the development of safety codes and standards.

23. The time had come to make serious and concerted efforts to encourage international co-operation in the development of small and medium power reactors, which were of interest not only to the developing countries but also to the advanced countries. Among the co-operation activities of particular benefit were the activities under regional co-operation agreements and the outstanding work which was being done at the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste. Lastly, he wished to express his country's appreciation of the continuing improvements in the administration and financing of technical assistance and especially of the assistance which had been made available to Pakistan by the Agency under the technical co-operation programme.

24. Mr. AL-KABBANI (Saudi Arabia) said his country's delegation recognized the importance and necessity of extending the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and especially of increasing electric power generation so as to meet the increased demand for power in both the developing and the more advanced countries. The Agency could and should play an important role in that very vital area, and the Director General deserved congratulations for his efforts to promote the development of nuclear power, nuclear safety and activities in other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, including nuclear waste disposal. The Saudi delegation approved the Board's report to the General Conference (GC(XXVII)/684) and the objectives set in the budget for 1984 (GC(XXVII)/686).

25. Everyone realized that there was an urgent need for increasing the production of energy and of ensuring energy supplies to meet increasing demand, either by means of nuclear power or from renewable sources such as solar energy and wind energy. It was a fact that nuclear energy

occupied an important position among energy sources, especially because of the increase in the price of oil and the depletion of oil reserves. The developing countries were, for various reasons, still facing great difficulties in obtaining the technology, equipment and nuclear material which they needed. They believed that, in order to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation, the industrialized countries which exported nuclear equipment were creating technical, economic and commercial difficulties for countries which wanted to obtain nuclear facilities. The Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) had to solve problems and overcome considerable obstacles, and the fact that no solution had yet been found to those problems created a feeling of uncertainty among many of the developing countries which urgently needed energy for developing their industrial and economic resources. Saudi Arabia was paying careful attention to the discussions in CAS, the purpose of which was to establish principles that would ensure the supply of the required nuclear technology, material, equipment and services. It was to be hoped that those principles would help create an atmosphere of stability and confidence among exporting and importing countries.

26. In his statement to the General Conference, the Director General had proposed creating a high-level commission which would be responsible for safety in nuclear power plants and would establish universally acceptable standards and regulations that were comparable with the rules of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). While supporting the idea of the creation of such a commission, his country wished to stress that it should be institutionally independent and that its deliberations and recommendations should be based on scientific knowledge and experience, free of any political influence whatsoever. However, close scientific and technical co-operation between that commission and the Agency was necessary in view of the complementary nature of their activities.

27. The other important point in the Director General's statement concerned the risk of military attacks against nuclear installations, which could not fail to have adverse effects on the acceptance of nuclear energy by the public at large. To dissipate those fears it would be necessary to adopt constraining rules and standards, in the form of a convention or treaty. In that connection, the Saudi delegation welcomed the efforts of the Disarmament Committee. It also hoped that measures would be taken to prevent military attacks against civilian nuclear facilities, whether they were nuclear power plants, research reactors or fuel cycle facilities.

28. Under the Agency's draft budget for 1984 (GC(XXVII)/686) the expenditures for 1984 would increase overall by approximately 10% compared with 1983. The Saudi Government was in favour of zero real growth, as long as that was not to the detriment of the Agency's promotional activities. A brief examination of the draft budget showed that the increase in expenditure under the programme of safeguards in 1984 would be nearly ten times as great as the increase in expenditure for technical assistance and co-operation. Furthermore, serious cuts had been made in most of the Agency's promotional activities (nuclear power, life sciences, food and agriculture etc.).

29. The Saudi delegation attached particular importance to technical assistance and co-operation activities and requested the General Conference to approve the amount of US \$38 644 000 recommended by the Board. As that amount was not enough to finance the numerous projects requested by the developing countries, it hoped that the industrialized countries would provide more assistance for footnote a/ projects.

30. It was most regrettable that, in the present year once again, the Board was unable to reach agreement on the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, owing to the resistance of certain Member States for political reasons. The argument often put forward that increased membership of the Board would impair its efficiency was baseless. For more than six years Governors representing the countries of the Middle East and South Asia and of Africa had been requesting that their areas should be represented equitably on the Board. The

Saudi Arabian Government hoped that the Board and the General Conference would find a legal solution which would satisfy that request.

31. At the twenty-sixth session of the General Conference the Saudi Arabian delegation had submitted a number of suggestions concerning the Board and the General Conference. Among other things, it had proposed that the General Conference should meet only every second year. Unfortunately, the Secretariat did not appear to have made a detailed study of those proposals any more than it had of those put forward by the United Kingdom delegation at the same session.

32. More than two years before, the Israelis had destroyed the Iraqi nuclear research centre, a facility which was under Agency safeguards. Despite unanimous condemnation by the international community, Israel was continuing its policy of resorting to force and aggression, in disregard of international treaties and in violation of the principles of human rights and international law. It was necessary for the General Conference to take effective action to compel that State to respect international law and to abide by resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381 of the General Conference. Furthermore, although the Board had succeeded in preventing South Africa from occupying a seat on the Board, that country still participated in many technical and scientific meetings of the Agency. In keeping with the spirit of the decision, adopted at the twenty-third session of the General Conference, to reject the credentials of the South African delegation (GC(XXIII)/DEC/6), the Saudi Arabian delegation requested the General Conference to adopt a resolution recommending that the Secretariat not allow South Africa to participate in such meetings.

33. Mr. ALVES (Brazil) said that the Brazilian Government, anxious to assure the well-being of all its citizens through economic and social development, was pursuing the implementation of its nuclear programme despite the financial difficulties involved because it was convinced that energy production based on its own resources was essential for the country.

34. Brazil's uranium reserves now amounted to over 330 000 tonnes of U_3O_8 . The country was in the process of achieving self-sufficiency in the matter of

uranium prospecting, mining and milling and yellow cake production. The construction of conversion and enrichment plants was well advanced and the first plant for the production of uranium hexafluoride and the first cascade of a jet-nozzle enrichment facility would go into operation in 1984. As the first phase of the commissioning of a fuel fabrication plant had been successfully completed, it had been possible to prepare the first reload for the Angra-I nuclear power reactor. The 626-MW Angra-I reactor would go into operation shortly. The construction of the 1300-MW Angra-II was proceeding satisfactorily and preliminary work at the site of Angra-III was to start in 1984. Thus, although financial difficulties had made necessary some adaptation of the original schedule, the Brazilian nuclear programme was going ahead in accordance with the objectives that had been set at the start.

35. With respect to the activities of the Agency, he had mixed feelings on the subject of safeguards. He appreciated the fact that no significant diversion of nuclear material had been observed thus far and that the provisions of agreements had been respected; he also supported the Agency's action in starting training programmes on safeguards for young specialists, an initiative which would enable Member States to participate more fully in the work of inspection. On the other hand, although the Brazilian delegation recognized the need for more funds for the Department of Safeguards as a consequence of the increase in the number and complexity of facilities to be inspected, analysis of the latest data indicated a disturbing imbalance between the increase in the number of facilities and the expenditures in manpower and equipment.

36. Brazil was very much interested in the nuclear safety activities of the Agency and strongly supported the development of an incident reporting system, which would promote better dissemination of information of use to the entire international community. It was also deeply interested in research on probabilistic methods of assessing reactor safety.

37. He was fully alive to the Agency's efforts to increase its capacity to provide technical assistance to the developing countries and its co-operation

with those countries. That was one of its foremost tasks and much remained to be done on that score. Brazil was fully prepared to receive trainees and to send to other developing countries experts on nuclear safety and radiation protection, as well as uranium prospecting, mining and processing. In 1983, Brazil was making a special effort to promote co-operation with other countries of Latin America in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In conclusion, he stressed that the Agency had a decisive role to play in the development of international co-operation in that sphere, in accordance with the spirit and letter of its Statute.

38. Mr. VAN BARNEVELD KOOY (Netherlands) said that, like the Director General, he believed that all the Agency's activities were in a broad sense promotional activities. Contrary to what some critics asserted, there was no inconsistency between the two types of activities: nuclear co-operation without safeguards would not be realistic and, conversely, the system of safeguards presupposed the existence of concrete forms of nuclear co-operation. The combination of those two aspects - promotion and prudence - was to be found in many other Agency activities. For example, its regulatory activities, which were important in themselves, also served to create the necessary confidence in international co-operation and public acceptance of nuclear energy. The Agency's role was not just to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as such; it also consisted in promoting international co-operation with a view to establishing the political, technical and social conditions which would ensure that such uses did not have harmful consequences. It was precisely because of that prudence in all its activities that the Agency deserved the unanimous support of all countries. It was in that perspective that the Netherlands welcomed the People's Republic of China as a new Member of the Agency.

39. In the Netherlands, as in many countries, nuclear energy had often been the subject of conflicting opinions, the depth and intensity of which had led the Netherlands Government to decide in June 1981 to organize a broad public

debate on the energy policy to be adopted for the 1990s. The results would be known at the end of 1983. Other important decisions had already been taken: for one thing, it had been decided to keep in operation the nuclear power plants at Borssele and Doodewaard, as a result of a thorough review carried out by independent experts of all the possible consequences of closing down those two plants. It had also been decided that the Netherlands would continue to participate in the Kalkar fast breeder project. In addition, the country was participating in the URENCO project, in co-operation with the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

40. In 1984, after completion of the public debate, decisions which were beginning to become urgent would be taken, since it would be necessary in the nineties to replace a number of conventional reactors, up to a total new capacity of 5-8000 MW. It was obvious that the problem of waste management would be an important element in the decision making. In a country as small and densely populated as the Netherlands, it was extremely difficult to find a suitable site for final disposal of nuclear waste. International co-operation in that matter was therefore essential. The Agency Conference on Radioactive Waste Management at Seattle (May 1983) had been very promising in that direction. The Netherlands also hoped that countries having better geological possibilities would consider bilateral co-operation in the matter of waste storage. In another area, it appeared that CAS, whose achievements thus far had been disappointing, had made slight progress at its last session and that there was justification for confidence in the future.

41. As regards the prevention of proliferation, the Director General had stated that the Agency's safeguards constituted an alarm system. That system had again stood the test during the past year in cases where it was not absolutely certain that nuclear material had been used for peaceful purposes only. The Netherlands delegation wished to congratulate the Director General, the Board of Governors and all parties concerned for the way in which those situations had been dealt with.

42. The Director General had looked at safeguards not only from the point of view of the suppliers but also from that of the receivers. Actually, it was in the interest of both to increase by means of safeguards the mutual confidence which would also favour international nuclear trade. As he (the Director General) had said, it was unjustified to conclude that technical assistance was mainly of interest to developing countries or that safeguards were mainly of importance to the industrialized countries. The safeguards system was of interest to all States Members of the Agency and industrialized countries and developing countries should continue to contribute to it.

43. His Government had submitted a draft facility attachment to the Agency the week before in connection with the gas centrifuge enrichment plants at Almelo. It expected that the final wording would be formulated soon.

44. The idea of an international plutonium storage system had made no progress since the appearance of the expert group's report. The Netherlands Government regretted that fact and hoped that the Board would soon take new steps in the matter.

45. It had been said that the Agency was not a police force and that it was not able to defend by force civil nuclear installations against attacks which might be made against them. Nevertheless, it seemed worth while to try to establish within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva a legal basis for an interdiction of attacks against safeguarded nuclear installations.

46. In spite of the shortcomings in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949, the Netherlands Government would take the necessary steps for ratifying it as soon as possible.

47. The Netherlands welcomed the intention of the Agency to participate in the preparations for the Third NPT Review Conference. Such participation appeared to be indispensable, especially as regards Articles III and IV of the Treaty. Later, the Agency could even play a role, however modest, in the implementation of Article VI. It would surely be worth while to consider the possibility of using safeguards as a means of verifying an agreement designed to stop the production of fissionable material for nuclear warheads.

48. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said it was astonishing that a real public opinion campaign could still be carried on in connection with a subject that had been settled democratically by the General Conference at its twenty-sixth session, namely, the rejection of the credentials of the Israeli delegation. The fact that the campaign was orchestrated by the United States made it necessary for the Syrian delegation to speak out since, when a major Power made a mistake, it was mankind as a whole that was endangered.

49. At the twenty-sixth session of the General Conference, the question had been the subject of three votes: the first on the validity of Israel's credentials, requested by Iraq; the second on the interpretation given by the Legal Adviser, requested by the United States; and the third on the legality of the final decision and the acceptance of the credentials of all delegations, also requested by the United States. As the results of the votes had been unfavourable to it, the delegation of the United States, accompanied by some others, had withdrawn from the Conference. A number of questions arose in connection with the behaviour of the United States on that occasion. Was it appropriate for a country which wanted to be the champion of democracy to refuse to submit to the decisions of the majority as soon as they were contrary to its own? Why had the United States delegation not withdrawn after the first vote, thereby sparing the General Conference two votes? Would it have acted in the same way if the second vote had been favourable to Israel? Would the United States have shown the same zeal in defending Iraq after the Israeli attack against its nuclear reactor? If the United States delegation had wanted to protest against a decision of the General Conference, why had it not done so calmly, as at New Delhi in connection with the decision to reject the credentials of the South African delegation?

50. But the main question was whether Israel deserved to be defended with such ardour. Created by the United Nations, that State was one which at present was violating United Nations resolutions most systematically. It was the first State, after the United States, to make use of a nuclear explosion against another country, since the bombardment of a reactor could be compared with the explosion of a nuclear bomb. In the case of the United States, it was at least at war with Japan when it dropped its bomb on Hiroshima.

51. The General Conference could no longer tolerate Israel's obstinate refusal to comply with its resolutions. As far as Syria was concerned, living in permanent fear since the Israeli authorities had threatened all Arab States with the destruction of their nuclear facilities, it had for two years been looking for a site safe from Israeli attacks for the installation of its first research reactor. It was normal for the international community to impose sanctions on States which confronted the world with threats to safety, and it was hard to see why Israel should be exempt from the application of that principle.

52. The installation by the United States of 600 Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe represented another unjustifiable threat to a world in which international equilibrium and peaceful coexistence had prevailed for 20 years. The obstinacy of the United States in the matter of proliferation should be condemned by the international community, and in particular by the Agency. The escalation in which the United States was engaging deprived the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards system of any value, for it was quite evident that the danger lay in the present policy of the United States and not in that of small countries.

53. It was therefore necessary that the General Conference assume its role in full and denounce that policy of the United States: the future of humanity was at stake. The Syrian delegation proposed that the General Conference should issue an appeal to the leaders of the United States, inviting them to review their policies, and to the leaders of the USSR, urging them not to reply to the escalation by another escalation, and thereby eliminate the danger of war and thus guarantee peace, the supreme hope of mankind.

54. Dealing briefly with various activities of the Agency, he expressed the view that technical assistance, whose value for all countries was beyond doubt, was not receiving sufficient financial and administrative support. The funds allocated to the safeguards programme could be used to better advantage in the form of technical assistance. The Syrian delegation urged that the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste should receive increased support and be expanded in such a way that it could become an international institute for the teaching of physics, chemistry and mathematics, entitled to

issue diplomas, and provide scientific training for personnel from the developing countries; such a development would be particularly valuable at a time when the industrialized countries were limiting the access of students from developing countries to their universities. The Syrian delegation also asked that the Agency's laboratories should be expanded so that they could provide direct training for scientific staff from developing countries. It greatly regretted that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy had not been able to take place in 1983.

55. Lastly, the Syrian delegation wished to welcome the People's Republic of China, whose admission to the Agency represented an important event for the organization.

Mr. Keblůšek (Czechoslovakia) resumed the Chair.

56. Mr. SHASH (Egypt) welcomed the fact that the Agency now included the People's Republic of China among its Members. From the start, Egypt had attached great importance to the activities of the Agency; it had participated in the Conference on the Statute and had been among the first countries to accept the instrument under which the Agency was established; since then, it had devoted itself on every occasion to promoting the action of the Agency.

57. Since 1981, Egypt had embarked upon an ambitious nuclear power programme and, in that connection, had concluded co-operation agreements with France, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Belgium. It had undertaken a programme for the training of scientific staff in co-operation with the Agency and several friendly countries; moreover, having concerned itself since 1957 with nuclear problems, it already had an entire generation of specialists at its disposal.

58. Since the twenty-sixth session of the General Conference, an important step had been taken with respect to technical assistance, in that the Director General had prepared and circulated a document in which various suggestions concerning technical assistance policies were presented: in the Board of Governors, the Egyptian delegation had participated actively in the formulation of ideas and initiatives on the subject. In its resolution GC(XXV)/RES/388, the

General Conference had specified what should be the principles governing the financing of technical assistance. In that connection, he welcomed the fact that the Board had, in June 1981, recommended indicative planning figures for the period 1984-1986; those figures would make an important contribution to implementation of the provisions of that important resolution. It remained for the Board to seek ways of codifying that procedure so that it would be a reliable system and one which could enhance the credibility of technical assistance. He also wished to thank the countries which had contributed to the financing of footnote a/ agreements. At the same time, he noted with concern, in the Director General's report on the technical co-operation activities of the Agency, that the financial targets set for the financing of technical assistance projects and footnote a/ projects were not being attained; he appealed to all countries to make their contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund and hoped that those who were able to do so would contribute even more.

59. One of the positive aspects of the Agency's activities since the last session had been the work performed by CAS and, in particular, the review of emergency and back-up mechanisms by that body. He hoped that, at its February session, the Board would follow up that useful work. CAS had also achieved useful results with respect to international co-operation procedures in matters relating to nuclear energy: some aspects were already the subject of a consensus, while the points of disagreement had been circumscribed. It was to be hoped that the Committee would continue its activities, which were of benefit to all.

60. The measures taken by the Director General to implement resolution GC(XXV)/RES/386 concerning the increase in the number of staff members from developing regions was a step in the right direction, and action along those lines should be continued; experience showed that the developing countries were capable of making the highest skills available to the Agency.

61. In other respects, the picture for the past year gave cause for concern. In particular, the Agency could not perform its role in matters of non-proliferation unless the safeguards system enjoyed full confidence: in that respect, it was the duty of Member States to respect the Statute and relevant resolutions. That was why the Board and the General Conference, at its twenty-fifth session, had condemned the aggression of Israel against the Iraqi nuclear research reactor in 1981. It was well known that Iraq was a Member of the Agency and a party to NPT, and that its nuclear facilities were under Agency safeguards. It could therefore be stated that the aggression in question had been directed against the Agency itself and against its system of safeguards. The international community had unanimously called on Israel to cease threatening the nuclear facilities of neighbouring countries and, on several occasions, it had called on that country to place its own facilities under Agency safeguards. Confronted with the persistent refusal of Israel to take those demands into account, the General Conference had the duty of taking the necessary decisions to ensure that the action of the Agency was not frustrated, otherwise the credibility and role of the organization and its system of safeguards would be called into question. Similarly, South Africa was carrying on its nuclear activities without any controls, thereby constituting a permanent threat to neighbouring countries. The United Nations General Assembly had on numerous occasions demanded that the activities of South Africa in the nuclear sphere should be placed under the control of the Agency, and it had urged all international organizations to cease giving any assistance whatever to South Africa; it was therefore urgent to put a stop to the participation of that country in technical working groups of the Agency.

62. Non-proliferation was one of the main concerns of the international community, and Egypt had been one of the first countries to advocate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and Africa; it had lent its full support to resolution A/35/147 of the General Assembly and was following very attentively the work of the expert group on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, areas in which the Agency was expected to play a leading role.

63. Another subject of concern was the under-representation of Africa and of the Middle East and South Asia in the Board of Governors; only 21% of the African Member States were represented there, although for other regions the proportion varied from 31.2 to 38.9%. Such a state of affairs was contrary to the principles applied in all the international organizations and to the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly; the General Conference had already called upon the Board to remedy the situation but thus far to no avail. It was therefore the duty of the General Conference to adopt a suitable resolution which could put an end to a situation which had lasted too long.

64. In future, the Agency would have to assume increasingly broad responsibilities and might have to perform new duties. Nuclear energy was becoming an increasingly important matter and many countries were now using it for peaceful purposes - in particular, a large number of developing countries which had formulated or were in the process of formulating their own nuclear power programmes. The Agency's activities relating to technical assistance and co-operation and to safeguards would necessarily assume greater proportions. It was now an accepted fact that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were an inalienable right of all States, which were free to decide on their national priorities within the framework of the safeguards system. At the same time, the international community unanimously condemned the nuclear arms race and horizontal and vertical proliferation. As the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the nuclear arms race were two matters which were of increasing concern to the international community, the number of conferences, treaties and organizations dealing with those problems was increasing, but the Agency would have to continue playing the role of a catalyst in international action in those areas.

65. Certain activities of the Agency were of such a nature as to reinforce its credit and effectiveness. That was the case, for example, with the launching of the research project on small and medium power reactors; Egypt intended to concern itself closely with that matter. The Agency's activities relating to the safety of nuclear power plants was also very important and he fully endorsed them. The Director General's suggestion for the establishment of a high-level international commission on nuclear safety warranted favourable

consideration. Similarly, the Agency's work on international co-operation in emergency situations deserved support, and the safeguards system should be strengthened in step with the development of the nuclear industry.

66. Egypt had participated actively in the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Social and Economic Development; it regretted that the Preparatory Committee had not been able to reach agreement on a draft agenda, and it would continue to support the efforts to ensure the success of that Conference. The Egyptian delegation likewise attached great importance to the next NPT Review Conference; Article IV of NPT conferred an extremely important mandate on the Agency, assigning it the duty of giving concrete form to the principle of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and of actively promoting the transfer of technology in that area. The Agency was also the body which the international community had called upon to ensure that that source of energy was not diverted for military purposes. That was an indication of the importance of its role and of the importance of the experience which it had gained in the efforts expended at the international level to put an end to the arms race and to create de-nuclearized zones. In that respect, the time appeared to have arrived for all Member States to demonstrate a constructive spirit and to undertake the drafting of a convention on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

67. On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Agency the General Conference had asked the Board of Governors to make a review of the Agency's activities: he (Mr. Shash) wished to thank the Board for its preliminary report and he hoped that that task could be carried to a successful conclusion at an early date.

68. Mr. OSZTROVSZKY (Hungary) noted with regret that the international situation had become still worse since the last session of the General Conference. Not only had there been no cessation of armed conflicts but new ones had developed. The arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, had intensified. The forces which wanted to upset the balance that had been established in the world were trying to place nuclear energy in the service of destruction rather than of economic well-being and social progress. When

efforts to solve disputed international questions began with the adoption of measures leading to confrontation instead of with the elaboration of measures acceptable to all concerned, the aggravation of the international situation could not fail to have a negative effect on the possibilities of co-operation and on the work of the international organizations - whether of the political type or essentially technical in nature. An apolitical Agency was an attractive idea, but everyone knew that an improvement in the international climate and the strengthening of confidence among States were indispensable conditions for success in the work of the Agency.

69. The Hungarian Government wished to emphasize the particularly important role of the Agency in reducing international tension, as a consequence of the obligations arising under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Broader use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was not possible unless a situation of peace prevailed and unless the non-proliferation regime and the Agency's safeguards system were strictly respected.

70. It was a disturbing fact that certain States possessing the technical and economic means to manufacture weapons and carry out nuclear explosions - among them Israel and South Africa, which were conducting a policy of open aggression condemned by the United Nations and the Agency - had not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

71. The experience of Hungary in the development of nuclear science and industry showed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Agency's safeguards, by strengthening the spirit of co-operation among countries, contributed to the transfer of nuclear know-how and technology and promoted the development of international nuclear trade. Consequently, the Hungarian Government held to the view that international nuclear trade could be conducted only within the framework of the non-proliferation regime.

72. The previous year had been an important one in the history of power production in Hungary, for in December 1982 the first unit of the nuclear power plant at Paks had been linked up with the grid. Since then the reactor had been operating stably and reliably. In nine months of operation it had produced over 1500 million kWh of electricity. An external dosimetry

system provided for permanent radiological surveillance of the environment out to 30 km from the plant, and so far during the reactor's operation radioactive releases had been below not only the permissible limits but also the design levels. The main supplier of equipment was the Soviet Union, but the other socialist countries had, within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), participated in the equipping of the plant: the reactor had been built in Czechoslovakia, most of the heat exchangers had come from Poland, the reactor hall crane from the German Democratic Republic and so on. Hungary itself had supplied 40% of all the equipment, in particular the reloading machine, the special water purification installation, the pumping station and a 220-MW generator. The Hungarian specialists had been trained in the Soviet Union, where they had studied problems of operation and the prevention of a wide variety of accident situations.

73. In the present year Hungary was reviewing the first half of its five-year plan of scientific and technical activities directed towards further increasing the operational safety of nuclear power plants. It had been found that those activities were helping to improve the accuracy of checks on the technical condition of equipment and to detect processes which could lead to accidents. Mention might be made of an automated system for the diagnosis of equipment, a computer program for analysing stresses on the reactor vessel and research on structural materials. It was planned, for the future, to supplement deterministic safety analysers by analysing the risks associated with the introduction of nuclear energy in Hungary, and the Agency's experience would be drawn upon for that purpose.

74. To ensure the success of scientific and technical activities it was essential to renew the experimental basis continuously. To that end, Hungary would in the near future reconstruct its one research reactor, which had already been in operation for over 25 years and which had been used for research and isotope production. The power of the reactor would be increased from 5 to 20 MW in the process.

75. Considerable work was being done on thermonuclear fusion. A tokamak facility built with the help of the Soviet Union was enabling Hungarian specialists to study such questions as plasma diagnostics, non-linear phenomena in plasma, the behaviour of first-wall structural materials, and the development of an automatic system for controlling the main and auxiliary system of tokamak facilities.

76. As regards the uses of nuclear energy in other scientific and technical areas, the scintillation gamma cameras developed by Hungary were yielding satisfactory results and their quality was in keeping with the highest world standards.

77. Hungary was carrying on important research work to meet the needs of its medical institutes for radiopharmaceutical products. Among recent developments in connection with radioimmunology kits, the most notable one had to do with prostaglandins, two new kits having been developed in the past year for use in that area.

78. The Hungarian Government thought very highly of the Agency's activities in pursuit of its objectives under the Statute. In addition to the system of safeguards, technical assistance was of particular importance, and Hungary took pleasure in noting that the funds allocated for that purpose were growing steadily and that resources in non-convertible currencies, including the voluntary contributions of Hungary, were being used effectively. The fellowships which Hungary made available to the Agency every year were likewise being utilized in their entirety. Also, Hungary was organizing scientific and training activities together with the Agency on a regular basis.

79. Among the specialized programmes of the Agency, Hungary attached particular importance to those relating to nuclear power and to nuclear safety. It noted with satisfaction that the International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience organized by the Agency in 1982 had proved clearly that nuclear power was safe and economic. It noted that in 1982 nuclear power plants had supplied 10% of the electricity produced in the world and that 21 new nuclear power plants had been linked with the grids in 12 countries, one of which was Hungary.

80. Hungary placed high value on the Agency's activities in the field of radioactive waste management and considered that those activities should be intensified, since a solution of the waste management problem would contribute to the growth of nuclear power in general.

81. The Hungarian delegation attached great importance to the work done by the Agency on revising the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection and on safety standards for nuclear power plants, and to the continuing work on the establishment of an international incident reporting system and on the evaluation of risks in the nuclear fuel cycle.

82. Hungary welcomed the activities of the Agency in the area of technical documentation services, among which mention should be made of INIS, which was particularly useful for the developing countries and the moderately developed countries. It urged all participating countries to increase their support of INIS.

83. Good results had been obtained in work connected with increasing agricultural production, in environmental protection activities and in the radiation preservation of food and medical products. The Hungarian delegation considered that the Secretariat should intensify its activities relating to research reactors and the industrial uses of nuclear techniques.

84. The Hungarian delegation approved the Agency's annual report for 1982. Aware of the importance of the Agency's programme of technical assistance and co-operation, it wished to inform the General Conference that in 1984 Hungary would make a voluntary contribution of 2.4 million forints to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund.

85. Mr. FRALEY (United States of America), using his right of reply under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure, regretted that in his statement the representative of Syria had touched on questions of a purely political nature unrelated to the general debate. The unjustified accusations of Syria against the United States of America, far from advancing the work of the General Conference, would serve only to undermine the actions of the Agency.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.