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President: Mr. KEBLÚŠEK (Czechoslovakia)
later: Mr. SINGH (India)

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The composition of delegations attending the session is given
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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1982 (GC(XXVII)/684) (continued)

1. Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) said that one of the most important events connected with the present session of the Conference was the admission of the People's Republic of China to the Agency. His delegation welcomed China's membership, which would help to strengthen the Agency, and hoped that it would not be too long before China occupied the permanent seat on the Board of Governors to which it was entitled. China's joining the Agency created a situation that would inevitably lead to a revision of the provisions of the Statute governing the composition of the Board. As was known, those provisions had undergone various amendments in order to fit them in with the needs of different regional groups. In his delegation's opinion, the constitutional instrument of an international organization should not be the subject of partial adjustments intended to mould it to the requirements of the moment. Moreover, China's admission was further evidence of the fact that Article VI of the Statute did not meet present needs and that the time had come to consider the question of revising the Statute and correcting the deficiencies built into it. Perhaps the Board of Governors could take up that matter in the not too distant future.
2. His country attributed great importance to the three major priority areas to which the Agency's main activities were geared, namely, technical assistance and co-operation, safeguards and nuclear safety. They were of obvious importance to all countries and had to be considered on their merits in the light of their ultimate aims. In that respect he was not satisfied with the situation as it stood, in which more stress was being placed on one of those areas to the detriment on the others - especially technical assistance.
3. A matter of great concern for the developing countries was the imbalance at present existing between the resources assigned to regulatory and to promotional activities. The Agency's safeguards activities were absorbing roughly one third of the Regular Budget and those activities were growing out of all proportion, while the technical assistance and other promotional

activities were steadily declining. As a result of that situation, the developing countries had pressed for more active participation in the stages prior to the preparation of the Agency's budget, while it was in the process of being drafted by the Secretariat.

4. As far as the actual safeguards were concerned, Venezuela considered that the Agency's safeguards system was a very valuable instrument for preventing nuclear materials, equipment and facilities being used for military purposes and also for ensuring that the essential safety and protection standards were applied to them. The system was vitally important for international peace and security; it helped to restrain proliferation, though so far only in one direction. The Director General in his address had delineated another aspect of safeguards, namely the fact that it was possible for the Agency's safeguards system to be used to demonstrate that there could be an efficient verification system that was not excessively intrusive. It was hoped that the super Powers would take advantage of the experience gained by the Agency in operating its safeguards system in order to surmount the obstacle that the problem of verification always seemed to create during disarmament negotiations.

5. There was no doubt that the Agency's safeguards system was of benefit to all countries and that Member States should therefore assume their share of the burden of financing the system. That burden, however, had to be shared in an equitable manner. The cost of operating the system was related directly to the number of nuclear facilities placed under safeguards. It was not right, for instance, that a country with a small research reactor should have to pay more than countries which, in addition to a research reactor, possessed one or more nuclear plants for the generation of electricity. His delegation therefore believed that the sharing of the burden of funding the safeguards system should be contingent upon the degree of nuclear development of the countries concerned. Those countries which were only just starting out in the nuclear field or which had no nuclear development at all should only make a token payment, while countries which had a well-developed nuclear industry should bear the brunt of financing the system. The General Conference would be considering a draft resolution transmitted by the Board of Governors for consideration in connection with the financing of safeguards (GC(XXVII)/687).

The resolution proposed the extension of the arrangements currently in force for financing safeguards for one year, and the Board of Governors was requested to review the system in 1984. In view of the importance and implications of that matter, the Board of Governors should take up consideration of it as soon as possible. It might perhaps be appropriate for the General Conference to instruct the Chairman of the Board to enter into consultations with all interested Member States so as to ascertain the opinions prevailing on the best way of financing safeguards.

6. Venezuela likewise attributed great importance to the Agency's activities in promoting the study and application of nuclear techniques aimed at benefiting humanity as a whole - for example, techniques for use in food production, the purification of water, and the improvement of health. The report of the Board of Governors contained a detailed account of the Agency's activities in developing, disseminating and applying nuclear techniques in various areas. The Agency should continue that important work, and countries with advanced nuclear technology should make their latest discoveries available to the Agency and co-operate whenever necessary so that the relevant technology was placed at the disposal of the developing countries.

7. As far as technical assistance and co-operation were concerned, it was encouraging to see that in 1982 Agency activities in that field had continued to receive high priority and that the Agency had continued to serve as a clearing house for the transfer to developing countries of techniques related to the peaceful application of nuclear energy. His delegation supported the guidelines for the provision of technical assistance which had been defined by the Board during its technical co-operation policy review and which related to multi-year and multi-national programmes, both regional and sub-regional. The introduction of dynamic programming would also make it possible to utilize resources more effectively.

8. Although the Agency was to be commended for the efficient manner in which it was conducting its technical assistance activities, his delegation was perturbed to see that the funds available for those activities were strictly limited, despite the steady increase in the needs of the developing countries as a result of their economic and demographic growth. He therefore

shared the view of many States that, rather than zero growth in the budgets for technical co-operation, there should be a gradual increase in them in line with the growing needs of the developing countries.

9. His delegation endorsed the indicative planning figures already agreed upon, but it hoped that they would be supplemented by a system of financing technical assistance which ensured that the resources available matched the needs of the developing countries and that they were predictable and assured in the same way as the funds assigned to the safeguards system.

10. His delegation attributed particular importance to the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) and had been taking an active part in its meetings. It was encouraging to see that at its ninth session CAS had managed, for the first time, to make some progress. The headway was doubtless due to the fact that some of the countries which in the past had taken a more rigid stand on certain aspects of the matters discussed, for example principles of co-operation in the field of nuclear energy, and had shown themselves to be more flexible. If the same spirit of co-operation prevailed, more tangible progress could be expected in the future.

11. Another issue which called for comment was the staffing of the Agency's Secretariat. The General Conference had adopted two resolutions in the past requesting the Director General to take steps to remedy the imbalance between the number of staff members from developing countries and that of staff members from developed countries. Examination of the document submitted to the Conference in that connection (GC(XXVII)/694) showed that, although efforts had been made to remedy the imbalance, the situation was still rather unsatisfactory. The document showed, for example, that of 495 staff members holding senior posts in the Secretariat in 1982 only 78 came from developing countries, the number of staff members from developed countries being 417. The percentage for developing countries was thus hardly 15.7%. For September 1983, one year later, the number of staff members from developing countries was only 90 out of 516, or 17.4%, the figure for staff members from developed countries being 426. There had consequently been

an increase of only 1.7% in the percentage of staff members from developing countries and it was clearly necessary for the General Conference to call for new and vigorous corrective measures.

12. Lastly, his delegation wished to give a brief account of the modest but dynamic work that Venezuela had been engaged in on a regional and sub-regional level. Since 1981 it had been co-ordinating the activities of a group of Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) in the nuclear field and had launched a sub-regional atomic energy co-operation project with the Agency's assistance. The last meeting of the Andean Nuclear Energy Commissions had been held in Bogotá on 25 September, with Agency experts present. Programmes that would be put into effect as soon as authorized by the relevant bodies had been in the following area: radiological protection and nuclear safety, nuclear instrumentation, application of nuclear techniques to agriculture and stock-breeding, high radiation sources, and research reactors. Venezuela intended to step up its regional co-operation in the nuclear field so as to broaden the scope of the benefits to be gained from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for all countries in the sub-region.

13. Venezuela had had the distinction of presiding at the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC), whose objective it was to promote the use of nuclear techniques in Latin America, and would also be hosting the next Inter-American Nuclear Energy Conference, which was to be held from 9 to 15 January 1984. His delegation availed itself of the opportunity to invite the Director General of the IAEA to attend that conference.

14. In conclusion, Venezuela was continuing to develop its nuclear activities within an exclusively peaceful context and for broader application in various branches of the national economy so that the multiple uses of nuclear energy would be of benefit to the development and well-being of all concerned.

15. Mr. HAVEL (Czechoslovakia) said that the present session was being held in difficult circumstances at a time when international conflicts were taking place in a number of regions of the world and when there were various sources of international tension that had not been resolved. Commitments to vast programmes for the manufacture of armaments, especially nuclear armaments, were having ever-increasing political and economic consequences.

16. Since the last Conference session the Agency, which was deeply involved in nuclear non-proliferation, had passed through a difficult stage. A number of positive results had, however, been obtained through extensive and constructive consultations between representatives of groups of Member countries such as the socialist countries, the developed capitalist countries and the developing countries, and also through individual consultations between representatives of the different geographical regions.

17. First, his delegation wished to emphasize the importance of the work of the Agency, which was indeed irreplaceable, in the field of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That work was vital, and IAEA safeguards represented the first attempt ever made to monitor internationally compliance with obligations arising out of international treaties and other agreements; for that reason it was necessary for the safeguards system to be fully developed in the future. That system was unique and could serve - either as such or as a model - for verification of the implementation of important measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Agency's safeguards represented the first and, so far, the only international system under which sovereign States had decided to submit to inspection by an international organization. The fact that the most important nuclear-weapon States had also shown willingness to submit to IAEA inspection of a number of their peaceful nuclear facilities was extremely important.

18. On the assumption that the current level of scientific and technical knowledge and the practical experience so far accumulated in the world would enable any country with the necessary industrial base to produce nuclear

weapons, Czechoslovakia was gravely concerned by the fact that certain industrially developed countries had not yet joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In his view, the prevention of all types of proliferation of nuclear weapons was in the vital interests of all countries of the world.

19. In that connection, he wished to mention two extremely important international political meetings that had recently taken place in Prague, namely the January meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the signatories of the Warsaw Pact and the meeting of the World Assembly for Peace and Life Against Nuclear War, which had taken place from 21 to 26 June 1983 and in which over 3500 delegates from 132 countries had taken part; the latter meeting had been organized exclusively by individuals and groups interested in the preservation of peace throughout the world and had been concerned with problems which were of fundamental importance to the work of the United Nations as a whole, i.e. with the prevention of nuclear catastrophe and, to that end, with the utilization of all the resources of the United Nations. In the case of the Agency, that meant using all the means at its disposal by virtue of its existence as such and of its programme of activities in the cause of peace, security and disarmament and also organizing meetings aimed at improving mutual confidence between States.

20. None of the Agency's activities relating to international co-operation on the peaceful uses of atomic energy was separable from its efforts to bring about peace and understanding between nations. He was convinced that the Agency would continue to carry out successfully all the tasks incumbent upon it and would actively contribute to implementation of positive initiatives recently taken by the United Nations, including those relating to the preparation of the International Year of Peace planned for 1986.

21. Together with the other socialist countries, Czechoslovakia supported the admission of the People's Republic of China as an active Member of the Agency.

22. It had already become traditional for his country to pay considerable attention to individual specialized areas of the Agency's work, in particular, those of nuclear power and nuclear safety. In Czechoslovakia there were now two nuclear power stations in operation, and fourteen reactor units based on the Soviet 440 and 1000 megawatt WWER design were under construction. Czechoslovak factories were producing plant and instruments for complete sets of power station components of the WWER type which were destined not only for his country but also for export.

23. Information published recently by the Agency had shown that even in the present difficult international circumstances there was still a keen interest in wider international contacts and integration which, where the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, in particular, nuclear power were concerned, took the form of valuable international co-operation which could make a significant contribution to further progress in that sphere. International co-operation was in fact a prerequisite for successful development in that field, since there were a number of problems which individual countries could not solve alone or which they would be far better able to solve by means of such multilateral co-operation.

24. Recently, the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) had made considerable progress in that sphere which had been greatly facilitated by close co-operation with the Soviet Union on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Some characteristic features of the policies of CMEA countries were mutual co-ordination of technical policy between the different countries involved, specialization and co-operation in the production of plant components for nuclear power stations - in which Czechoslovakia was playing an important part - and also the achievement of a significant degree of standardization in nuclear power station construction, which was being accompanied by efforts to increase the unit power of reactors. The conclusion, for the period up to 1990, of an agreement on co-operation and on the forthcoming establishment of a linked nuclear power system constituted a further important stage in nuclear power development in CMEA member countries. Moreover, during their many years of operation, nuclear power stations in those countries, had showed their high level of reliability and safety.

25. For those reasons Czechoslovakia attached considerable importance to the Agency's work on the further improvement of nuclear power stations, to its work on the development of standards as such and to all its other efforts aimed at the most extensive possible standardization on an international scale.

26. The most important question associated with the development of nuclear power and with the problem of nuclear safety was that of the treatment and disposal of radioactive wastes. In that connection, he welcomed the holding by the Agency of the International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management in the United States in May 1983. The results of the Conference had shown that the technology and plant for treating and disposing of all types of radioactive waste were now fully available and could operate safely and with the minimum effect on the environment in accordance with the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). However, relatively little attention was being paid to economic questions. At present, the main emphasis was being placed on the mastery of processes already developed, and advanced scientific research was being somewhat neglected. Even so, the subject matter of the Conference had included all aspects of the processing and disposal of radioactive wastes.

27. His delegation greatly welcomed the progress made over the last year in the further development of the International Nuclear Information System (INIS) and fully supported any moves which would enhance that unique international exchange system for information on nuclear science and technology.

28. Czechoslovakia was also in favour of every opportunity being provided for co-operation with the Agency on the uses of nuclear techniques not related to power generation.

29. Like other socialist countries, Czechoslovakia was unflagging in its support for the technical assistance programme and, in particular, the concept of multi-year projects.

30. In conclusion, he announced that for 1984 the Czechoslovak Government would again be increasing its voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance

and Co-operation Fund; in absolute terms that contribution would amount to 2.2 million Czechoslovak crowns in national currency. In addition, Czechoslovakia was making available through the Agency fellowships for post-graduate courses and training at institutes of higher education for experts from developing countries and was regularly organizing special IAEA courses and study tours.

31. Mr. BRENNAN (Australia), recalling that the confrontation which had occurred at the preceding session of the General Conference had come close to causing irreparable damage to the Agency, and to its capacity to fulfil its vital statutory responsibilities, said he was hopeful that Member States would be able to work together and uphold the Agency's reputation as an efficient and dedicated organization pursuing its statutory purposes, leaving any wider issues for the appropriate political organs of the United Nations.

32. Welcoming China's admission to membership of the Agency as a major event in the history of the Agency, Australia had noted with satisfaction China's assurance that it would abide by the provisions of the IAEA Statute, including those on safeguards. He looked forward to a greater involvement of China in the international nuclear dialogue, thereby strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, and to its full participation in all the Agency's programmes.

33. The new Australian Government would shortly announce the results of the wide-ranging reviews which it had undertaken, in response to public concern, in respect of the country's uranium, safeguards and related nuclear policies. In that connection, the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Hayden, had assured the Director General that there would be no diminution in Australia's full commitment to the Agency and that it would work for even more effective safeguards.

34. In July 1983, the HIFAR reactor operated by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) at Lucas Heights, near Sydney, had completed 25 years of safe operation, during which it had been used for materials testing, isotope production and the generation of neutron beams for research. The Commission's Argonaut-type reactor, Moata, was being used for a variety of research purposes.

35. Australia was continuing its nuclear research activities at significant levels. The AAEC and the Australian National University (ANU) were continuing their joint programme on the development of SYNROC for the immobilization of high-level radioactive waste. The SYNROC concept was being advanced as an Australian contribution to the development of international nuclear waste management strategies, and the programme aimed at providing an alternative method of high-level waste disposal. It had already been shown that the rate of leaching of radioactive species from SYNROC was very low and its chemical and radiation stability outstanding. Studies were now being concentrated on the fabrication of large sections which would be required in commercial applications and for the characterization of those materials. A non-radioactive demonstration plant would be commissioned in 1985.

36. Australia was also conducting research on a number of environmental topics including the transport of uranium and its daughter products in and around uranium ore deposits in the Northern Territory. During the past year the Australian Radiation Laboratory had been designated as one of four global reference laboratories for the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's intercalibration programme for the intercomparison of radon calibration facilities.

37. Australian researchers were collaborating extensively with the IAEA and with other countries in the region and elsewhere on such topics as fusion research, the production of radioisotopes, the development and manufacture of radiation sources, the application of isotopes and radiation in medicine, agriculture and industry, and the training and certification of staff. Much of that work was accomplished through or in association with the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes.

38. Australia continued to attach great importance to technical assistance and co-operation, both under the Agency's programmes and bilaterally, and recognized that the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme was being implemented efficiently on a sound and flexible basis. However, it was essential to ensure that the assistance provided by the Agency was consistent with the recipient countries' capacity to absorb and use the technology provided. In that connection, the Evaluation Unit set up recently in the Agency's Department of Technical Co-operation would be of great help. Australia supported the recommended target of US \$22.5 million for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in 1984 and expected to pay its

share in full. Its pledge of US \$351 500 for 1983 had already been fully discharged. He urged all other Member States to pledge and pay their shares promptly.

39. After some years of careful planning the minerals sub-project of the RCA^{1/} regional industrial project was now fully operational. Australia's contribution to that project would be US \$345 000 during the current year. In August-September, Australia had hosted the first training course under sub-project 4(C) of the industrial project entitled "On-Stream Analysis and Control of Mineral Concentrators". The course had been attended by participants from the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Malaysia, India, the Republic of Korea and Bangladesh.

40. Australia had also been active in other areas of regional co-operation and made funds and expertise available for the RCA project on isotope hydrology and sedimentology. It had made a substantial contribution to the planning and establishment of special isotope hydrology and sedimentology laboratories in the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Scientists from those and other countries had been trained by Australian specialists in the techniques of measurement and interpretation.

41. Moreover, his country was providing direct bilateral assistance to Malaysia for the training of personnel from the Tun Ismail Atomic Research Centre (PUSPATI), together with consultancy services to the Centre. When that programme ended, in 1984, Australia would consider further possibilities of developing its nuclear technical assistance role in the Asian and Pacific region. Australia also operated a School of Nuclear Technology which, since its inception in 1964, had provided training - particularly in the area of isotope applications - to individuals from 32 countries and 138 overseas organizations.

42. It was participating actively in the technical programmes of the Agency. It considered the publications in the IAEA Safety Series to be among the Agency's most worthwhile achievements and would continue to make an active contribution to the further development and updating of the Safety Series documents.

^{1/} Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology.

43. Australia welcomed the increased programme emphasis to be given to safety standards for research reactors and fuel cycle facilities after the completion of the programme on nuclear safety standards for power plants (NUSS).

44. In Australia two more nuclear Codes of Practice had been finalized and approved in 1982. Those two, together with the 1980 Code of Practice, provided a basic framework within which the detailed control and regulation of uranium mining and milling operations in Australia could be developed.

45. The subject of radioactive waste management was of particular concern to his Government, since there were strong doubts about the long-term environmental effects of accumulated spent fuel and radioactive wastes, and about the adequacy of proposed methods of disposal of high-level wastes from the nuclear fuel cycle. It had noted, however, that the International Conference on Waste Management held at Seattle had reaffirmed that no further technological breakthroughs were required for the establishment of safe waste management systems, although further work needed to be done in order to establish internationally accepted criteria for safe disposal.

46. There was a particular need for highly complex scientific developments which were closely linked to the welfare, health and environmental protection of mankind to be made convincing and comprehensible to the public. International collaboration in the field of waste management, as the Seattle conference had demonstrated, would play an increasingly important part in the safe development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government would welcome urgent action by the Agency in following up that conference.

47. Australia recognized the need for prompt and significant progress in the development of international nuclear waste management strategies, and was sharing its experience in the management of tailings from the mining and milling of uranium with other countries, especially under programmes of the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency. Developments in the SYNROC programme were also being made known internationally.

48. In his statement, the Director General had quite rightly described the marine disposal of radioactive waste as a controversial subject. In international forums Australia had urged that the rights and concerns of all countries be taken into account, and had joined the consensus in the South Pacific Forum, which had adopted resolutions opposed to the dumping of all levels of radioactive waste in the Pacific. Australia was a signatory of, but not a party to, the

London Dumping Convention and had over the years participated in the development of standards under the Convention, which had contributed decisively to the protection of the marine environment. It was providing an expert consultant for the current technical study on the environmental impact of radioactive waste dumping at sea permitted under the Convention.

49. A major and vital activity of the Agency was the application of safeguards, including those under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Tlatelolco Treaty. He noted with considerable satisfaction that the number of NPT signatories was still increasing and that the provisions of the Treaty would now apply to all peaceful nuclear activities in the countries of the South East Asian and Pacific region, of which Australia was a part. Australia urged all States to adhere to NPT. It also welcomed the negotiations between the Agency and the Soviet Union in connection with the latter's voluntary offer to place part of its civil nuclear facilities under safeguards.

50. The Agency's Annual Report for 1982 had again indicated an increase in the level of assurance associated with implementation of safeguards. Such assurance was the heart of the IAEA safeguards system and constituted an essential political benefit to all Member States and the international community. It was encouraging to note that the Agency was again able to perform effective verification in the two cases where it had previously been unable to do so. Part of the difficulty in those two cases had been the absence of full-scope safeguards, and Australia continued to believe that the general acceptance of full-scope safeguards would greatly facilitate the Agency's safeguarding activities and enhance the degree of assurance involved.

51. Safeguards had to be not only effective but also efficient and adaptable to changing demands and technological developments. He agreed with the Director General that the cost of safeguards was very small in comparison with the value of the assurance which it provided and with the overall outlays involved in nuclear power production. Expert advice from SAGSI would continue to be valuable in that area.

52. Co-operation between the Agency and a group of Member States over the preceding few years had resulted in the development of a safeguards approach to commercial-scale centrifuge enrichment plants, with which activity Australia had been pleased to be directly associated. That hexapartite safeguards project

could serve as a model for other areas requiring new or updated safeguards approaches. Australia would continue to co-operate in such endeavours to enhance the international non-proliferation and safeguards regime.

53. It would continue to contribute extra-budgetary resources in 1983/84 to assist the Agency's safeguards capacity. Proposals had been prepared in consultation with the Secretariat, and new programme activities were envisaged.

54. Another co-operative activity of importance to international nuclear exchange in the future was the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply. The agreement on an IAEA system for an emergency and back-up mechanism was a noteworthy achievement, which would be of direct assistance to countries whose vital energy supplies might be unexpectedly affected by an emergency situation but which might not have access to commercially available, alternative supplies. When implemented, such a mechanism would provide additional security to consumer countries in the planning of their economic development. He hoped that further progress would be made for the benefit of all Member States.

55. In a major foreign policy speech on 7 July 1983 the Australian Foreign Minister had underlined his Government's commitment to "making a continuing strong effort in the whole endeavour to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to uphold and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty". Australia was committed to contributing in the fullest manner possible to the success of the Third NPT Review Conference and was concerned that all aspects of the Treaty, including the undertakings of Members under Articles III and IV, and VI and VII, should receive full and adequate attention. It was strongly in favour of disarmament and arms control in general and had recently appointed its first Ambassador for Disarmament. Its efforts would be directed towards achieving practical progress, for example on the comprehensive test ban proposal which Australia was again jointly sponsoring at the current session of the UN General Assembly.

56. The Agency had an important role in that context because of its responsibilities for the application of NPT safeguards and because its safeguards system could serve as a model for international verification systems for arms control.

57. In conclusion, he wished to associate himself with the Director General's comments on a number of administrative aspects of the Agency's work. The efficient operation of the Agency was due not only to the positive contribution of the Director General himself but also to the high level of competence and dedication of the staff of the Secretariat. While the performance of the Agency's tasks depended largely on the political will of its Member States, an important factor was the working spirit of the Secretariat. He had no doubt that the Director General was aware of the importance of assuring that motivation within the Secretariat remained high. Moreover, it ought to be remembered that, while the Secretariat had a responsibility to serve with loyalty the Member States, it also had a right to expect in return that Member States would, in conformity with the Statute, permit it to perform its tasks without external influence.

58. The IAEA had spent an eventful and productive year. However, in the coming years more demands would certainly be made on it. Every effort should be made to ensure that the organization's reputation and its capacity to play its unique role were maintained. Australia, for its part, would do its best to sustain the Agency's independent and vital contribution to international confidence, development and security through the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under an effective international non-proliferation and safeguards regime.

59. Mr. SITZLACK (German Democratic Republic), referring to the admission of the People's Republic of China as a new Member of the Agency, said that the accession of the world's most populous nation was an important step towards the universality of the Agency.

60. One of the most urgent of challenges mankind was facing was to preserve peace and prevent nuclear war. All the Agency's activities were geared to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and it had an important role to play in preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States and in strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Socialist States were doing everything to halt the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament on the basis of equality and equal security, as was

reflected in the important peace proposals contained in the Prague Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty States of January 1983. Their aim was that Europe, and indeed the world, should be made free of nuclear weapons and that nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the noble objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

61. In the present disquieting situation, the progress made through international co-operation within the Agency, as outlined in the Director General's statement and in the documents before the Conference, was all the more impressive. His country highly valued the Agency's role in the development of co-operation between States with different social orders and hoped its significant contribution to the implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence would continue to be promoted.

62. Although overall progress in nuclear energy utilization had slowed down in recent years, considerable increases in electricity generation from nuclear power were envisaged in a number of countries, in particular those that were Members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. One reason for that lay in the advantages ensuing from the use of a standardized nuclear power plant design in several countries, which resulted in the multiplication of experience, the facilitation of information exchange and the acceleration of the process of continual improvement. The latter process covered all aspects of design, construction and operation and was aimed at ensuring the continuous safe operation of nuclear power plants. No other branch in the history of industry had ever invested as much effort in safety as the nuclear industry, and the Agency had always played a constructive role in achieving high safety standards. The Agency's activities in that area were a basic requirement for maintaining and further developing those standards and should accordingly be expanded.

63. Since the possibility of non-peaceful use of nuclear energy was the greatest threat mankind had ever faced, the Agency's safeguards efforts to verify that peaceful nuclear materials were not diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons were of particular significance. As a Party to NPT and a non-nuclear-weapon State, his country maintained that the submission

of all nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards in no way impaired the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; on the contrary, the conditions of international nuclear co-operation would be much more favourable if the misuse of nuclear energy could be ruled out. Universal adherence to NPT and a further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime were therefore indispensable.

64. Despite the need for further improvement of the Agency's safeguards system, however, his country considered it a viable and effective instrument and therefore agreed with the Director General that it might be used as a model for the verification of nuclear disarmament measures.

65. Technical assistance and co-operation was one of the Agency's major tasks, and the corresponding programme had increased considerably over the years. Though its volume and financing continued to be points of debate, it had to be acknowledged that greater predictability and stability of the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund had been achieved by introducing indicative planning figures. According to the report on the Agency's technical co-operation activities in 1982, that year had been a particularly successful one. His country appreciated the Agency's efforts to increase the effectiveness of technical co-operation by striving for greater flexibility in the use of available resources, such as non-convertible currencies, introducing multi-year projects and establishing an Evaluation Unit.

66. The German Democratic Republic regularly contributed its share to the target for voluntary contributions and provided training facilities for scientists from developing countries; during the past ten years, eight training courses had been conducted and 13 study tours organized. His country's total contributions had increased sixfold during that period.

67. However, with regard to technical co-operation with certain countries he was constrained to reaffirm his country's repeatedly expressed reservations.

68. In spite of the enormous technological development of mankind, great difficulties - such as protecting the environment, meeting the growing energy needs, distributing natural resources and food reserves, improving education and controlling diseases - remained to be solved; those problems were of

particular importance for the developing countries, and could not be solved unless peace was preserved and the nuclear threat averted. Through its endeavours to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, the Agency contributed to the achievement of that objective, but it needed the active co-operation of all Member States to fulfil its mission.

69. Mr. BARREDA (Peru) said that he wished to join previous speakers in expressing satisfaction at the fact that the People's Republic of China had become a Member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The membership of such a country, whose population made up virtually a quarter of mankind, did much to confer universality on the Agency. Peru held the firm hope that, with the contributions that could be made by a country of such ancient tradition, the Agency would find itself strengthened in its moral force, in its role as a promoter of peace on earth, and in the contributions it could make towards fostering the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

70. Peru's nuclear programme had seen fruitful developments since the last session of the General Conference. Construction on the Nuclear Research Centre had made good progress with the valuable support of Argentina: the buildings intended for radiological protection, the medical services, the isotope production plant and the auxiliary laboratories and services had been completed. Moreover, 90% of the work on the building which was to accommodate the 10-MW research reactor had been performed; 75% of the equipment and components had been manufactured or purchased; and the hot cells of the isotope production plant were in course of being assembled and tested. It was hoped that the reactor and the other installations of the Nuclear Research Centre would undergo tests in 1985. At the headquarters of the Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute (IPEN) in Lima, the civil engineering work for the premises which were to accommodate the 14-MeV fast neutron accelerator of the SAMES J-25 type supplied by the Agency had been completed. In addition, in November 1983 the pilot biology and nuclear medicine centre at the new Hospital for Neoplastic Diseases in Lima was to be opened and would immediately become available for nuclear medicine training, research and treatment.

71. In the past year, 760 man-months of training had been given to a total of 267 Professionals and technicians in various nuclear disciplines.

72. The IPEN had continued its uranium resource evaluation and exploration programme and in the last year had identified a large uraniferous district covering the whole of what were known as the "Volcanicos-Macusani", which had an approximate area of 600 km² and were located on the Titicaca Plateau in the Department of Puno.

73. Finally, as regards the nuclear power programme, efforts aimed at the conclusion in the current year of the first pre-feasibility study were being redoubled, and that study was to be followed by a preliminary site evaluation study. The Agency was providing Peru with valuable technical and professional support in the first stage of its nuclear plan.

74. Since the last Conference session there had been an important debate on safeguards in the Board of Governors which his Government had followed with particular interest. He agreed with the Director General that safeguards could not provide a cast-iron guarantee against all non-peaceful uses of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards, but that they nevertheless represented the best means at the disposal of the international community for the creation of an atmosphere of confidence which should foster both extensive international nuclear trade and the widespread introduction of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, depending on the levels of social and economic development of different nations.

75. Intimately linked with that topic were the activities of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), which had made gratifying progress. However, in order to be effective, progress needed to be made on all the topics figuring in the mandate given to CAS by the Board in 1980.

76. The Board had been right to decide to proceed with a review of the Agency's technical co-operation policy at regular intervals, and he believed that it was necessary to maintain a suitable balance between technical co-operation and safeguards. In that connection, his delegation wished to

thank the Governments of Finland, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany for the contributions they had recently made towards Peruvian nuclear development. In addition, the Agency's efforts to foster regional co-operation agreements were greatly appreciated.

77. His delegation had been interested to hear the Director General's comments on the possible use of the experience accumulated by the Agency in the field of safeguards within the framework of the undertakings made by the nuclear-weapon States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was to be hoped that, at the Third NPT Review Conference, scheduled for 1985, those States would bear the Director General's comments in mind since it should not be forgotten that undertakings relating to horizontal non-proliferation, which entailed a genuine transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, were closely linked to undertakings aimed at the reduction and, in the long term, at the elimination of the nuclear arsenals which had the power to destroy humanity. In that connection, he wished to reiterate Peruvian statements made in the appropriate United Nations bodies to the effect that all methods of verifying disarmament agreements should be explored and that, when the time came, those which were found appropriate should be utilized, without any of them being necessarily excluded.

78. Finally, Peru was convinced that the international community should make every possible effort to create a climate of confidence in the nuclear sphere. Otherwise it would be difficult to make progress with the cause of world peace and with the establishment of a new and just international order.

79. Mr. GLADAKIS (Greece) began by welcoming the accession of the People's Republic of China to the Agency, which he was convinced would contribute greatly to the Agency's efforts to further the welfare of all peoples and the maintenance of peace.

80. Every year the General Conference met to review and assess the Agency's achievements and to declare its almost unanimous devotion to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

81. His country was a firm believer in the potential of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity and therefore watched developments in nuclear weapons proliferation with increasing concern. The recent efforts of the Greek Government to alleviate the tension which seriously threatened peace, and its support of nuclear disarmament, were well known. For those reasons his country strongly commended the Agency on its efforts to enhance the credibility of the safeguards system and to build up the necessary confidence for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. The verification experience of the Agency was such that it could well be of use in the disarmament context.

82. In that connection, his Government welcomed the statement in the Agency's safeguards report that no anomaly had been detected which would indicate a diversion of significant amounts of safeguarded nuclear materials, but it was unfortunate that the Agency had been unable to draw such conclusions in the case of two nuclear power plants.

83. The signing of NPT by Viet Nam in June 1982, which had brought the total number of States parties to the Treaty to 119, had been an encouraging step forward, but grave concern had been caused by the insistence of two Member States to pursue policies and activities which did not inspire any sense of security. Only if those two Member States renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and placed all their nuclear activities under international safeguards would the Agency's safeguards system become wholly credible and contribute fully to peace and stability.

84. The safeguards system, although very important, could not by itself realize the high potential of nuclear energy for prosperity. It must be supplemented by other activities, particularly in the field of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. In that context his Government welcomed the Nuclear Safety Review for 1982. The good safety record of commercial nuclear power plants, the insignificant radiation exposure of the public

due to effluents from nuclear reactors, and the consistent decrease of the dose to the public per unit of energy produced were certainly encouraging facts. Continuous efforts to enhance safety levels and guarantee a safe contribution of nuclear power to the world's increasing energy demands were necessary.

85. Although Greece gave priority to domestic energy sources, primarily hydroelectric power and lignite, it considered that nuclear power had many potential advantages if appropriate measures were taken.

86. During the International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience in 1982 it had been concluded that nuclear power could not be successfully introduced in a country without a strong infrastructure. Greece was paying serious attention to that conclusion: although it had deferred the nuclear option for the time being, it was putting much effort into developing a competent infrastructure, particularly where manpower was concerned.

87. The Agency's role in those matters was crucial, and Greece strongly supported its services and assistance in relation to nuclear power plant safety and the preparation of guidelines and reports, as well as the missions and assistance to national regulatory bodies in implementing those safety guidelines. His country was both a donor and a recipient of technical assistance, and it greatly appreciated the Agency's assistance, particularly in uranium exploration and the development of radiopharmaceuticals.

88. In concluding, he reiterated his Government's will to continue to support the Agency's activities: Greece had already pledged to meet in full its calculated voluntary contribution of \$90 000 to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1984.

89. Mr. OFSTAD (Norway) said his delegation welcomed the People's Republic of China to membership of the IAEA and hoped that it would involve itself in all aspects of the IAEA's activities in accordance with the Statute of the Agency. He attached great importance to the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme, and was pleased to observe that it was continuing to expand, owing largely to the substantial increase in the target for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund over the past few years.

Since there were numerous fields of application of nuclear energy and since many developing countries were Members of the IAEA, it might be tempting to spread out resources over too many projects. However, he believed that in the long run it would pay to concentrate on relatively large projects spanning a number of years.

90. His delegation considered that nuclear safety was one of the most essential tasks of the Agency, together with safeguards and technical assistance. The IAEA had played a very constructive role in the development of international safety standards, as well as in the exchange and supply of expertise and experience in the safety field. Norway supported the trend towards more direct Agency participation in safety work, through advisory missions and through helping national regulatory bodies to implement the numerous safety guidelines which had been developed.

91. A fair balance should be maintained between the promotional and regulatory roles of the Agency. Despite budgetary problems in Member States, it was essential that the Agency should have increased resources allocated to safeguards, so that verification operations could be performed with assurance despite the increase in the number of facilities to be inspected.

92. His delegation could accept the draft budget for 1984 and could also accept, subject to parliamentary approval, the target proposal for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1984. He favoured an increase in the technical assistance and co-operation programme, but pointed out that public acceptance of nuclear energy was difficult to obtain in many countries, including Norway; without a reliable safeguards system, it would hardly be feasible to support a technical assistance programme of any kind.

93. He noted with satisfaction that in 1982, as in previous years, the Secretariat had not detected any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material, or the misuse of facilities or equipment subject to safeguards under certain agreements. Assurance that diversion did not take place played a very decisive role where public acceptance of nuclear energy was concerned. In his view, current

safeguards by the Agency gave adequate assurance, but that view was not necessarily shared by the public at large. Although the Agency had undertaken in its safeguards agreements to protect confidential information acquired in the performance of its functions, it was highly desirable that more information should be published about the operation of safeguards.

94. In years to come the number of nuclear facilities and amounts of safeguarded materials would increase, which would place a heavier burden on the Secretariat. In order to maintain the reliability of the system consideration should be given to ways in which the Agency could make better use of its manpower and material resources. The characteristics of the fuel cycle of each State should be taken into account more fully when designing cost-effective safeguards approaches.

95. In order to find a long-lasting solution for the financing of safeguards, further discussions were needed. In the meantime he found the proposal in document GC(XXVII)/687 an acceptable compromise.

96. The Director General had on several occasions expressed concern about the problems caused for the Secretariat by having proposed safeguards inspectors rejected by Member States. In principle, safeguards inspectors should be recruited from as many Member States as possible, but the nationality of the inspector was much less important than his technical competence. Less qualified inspectors would make inspections longer and more costly and would mean that there was less chance of discovering attempted diversions. Moreover, such inspectors would hardly be likely to obtain the full co-operation of the operators and of the systems of the various States for accounting for and controlling nuclear material. As a country with a modest but long-standing nuclear programme, Norway had from time to time suggested suitable and well-qualified candidates for posts as IAEA inspectors, as well as for other posts in the Secretariat, in order to achieve reasonable geographical distribution. Norway assessed, as far as practicable, the technical competence of proposed inspectors, but accepted Agency inspectors regardless of nationality. The Secretariat could not fulfil its safeguards duties if it could not make full use of the inspector corps. Moreover, it was to be assumed that the full loyalty of an inspector was due to the Agency during the period of his appointment.

97. The report of the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage represented a useful contribution to that important subject, and dealt also with assurances of supply and non-proliferation. He was disappointed that it had not been possible to reach full agreement in the Group, although a large measure of agreement had been reached on a number of issues.

98. Any further nuclear proliferation would prove highly detrimental to current efforts to promote international co-operation and security of supply in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He wished to stress the importance of acceptance by all importing countries of full-scope IAEA safeguards on their present and future nuclear activities. World-wide acceptance of effective non-proliferation measures would increase the security of all States, promote predictability of supply for peaceful non-explosive uses of nuclear energy, and enhance international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

99. Norway was pleased to note that several States had concluded safeguards agreements pursuant to NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty during 1982. However, by the end of 1982 there had still been 38 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to NPT without a safeguards agreement. He strongly urged those States to conclude such agreements as soon as possible. His delegation welcomed the negotiations between the Agency and the Soviet Union regarding the application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear installations in that country.

100. Up to the middle of 1982 CAS had made some progress, but during the current year progress had been slow. That was not unexpected, since CAS was engaged in a very difficult exercise from which there would be no easy results. The work should continue with patience and without undue pessimism.

101. He regretted that it had not been possible to hold the PUNE conference that year as scheduled. The Agency should play a major role in PUNE when, as was to be hoped, it was held at some later date.

102. The IAEA was a very useful tool in its areas of competence within the nuclear energy field, such as technical assistance and co-operation, safeguards, safety, and information exchange. It had been shown on several occasions

that difficult problems could be solved within the IAEA by patient work and by keeping to the technical facts. Other international organizations could learn from the IAEA in that respect. However, it was unfortunate that over the past few years certain political issues had entered into the work of the General Conference. Regrettably, that also appeared to be the case as regards the Board of Governors.

103. It was vital, in the common interest, to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives and thereby to reduce the risk of nuclear war. It was of equal importance to have an efficient and reliable multilateral safeguards system, making possible the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It was the firm view of his Government that the IAEA played a vital role in achieving both those aims. He therefore considered it essential that the IAEA be preserved as a viable and effective organization, and that its integrity as a specialized technical agency be ensured. Political tensions must not be allowed to interfere with the proceedings of such an important international organization, and thus undermine its substantive mission.

104. His Government attached great importance to the principle of universality in international organizations, and believed that that principle should be strictly adhered to.

105. Mr. GHAZALI bin Hj. Abd. RAHMAN (Malaysia) expressed his appreciation to the Director General and his staff for their dedication and for the invaluable services they had rendered to development and to international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He wished to congratulate the People's Republic of China on becoming a Member of the Agency.

106. Malaysia considered nuclear energy and technology to be an integral part of nation-building. At its present stage of development in the area of science in general and nuclear science in particular, the question that faced it was how to plan ahead so as to ensure that the needs of both science and nuclear science were met in the best possible way, and that they did the maximum amount of good and the minimum amount of harm. Nuclear science, the scope of which ranged from technology to morality, from development economics to global stewardship, needed to be viewed in an overall perspective, and that should be the ultimate goal of the Agency. Past events had not, however, contributed towards the creation of such an overall perspective.

107. In the past, nuclear science and its related technology had been seen as different entities, but modern man was concerned about the relations between nuclear science and the rest of society. Unfortunately for some, the concept of the IAEA was based on the premise that nuclear energy was a strictly technical subject, to be studied by natural scientists and engineers. As a corollary to that assumption it was held that others, such as social scientists, should not study that energy but only its implications, or its effects on society at large. The Agency's existence and purpose had thus been reduced to no more than a search for technical knowledge, and as a result, knowledge of nuclear energy had become a tool for the manipulation of the world. However, there was now greater awareness of man's social and moral responsibilities in that connection. It should be realized that nuclear energy had become as much a social concept as a technical and scientific one.

108. If it was accepted that nuclear energy was a social concept, it should also be accepted as a topic of controversy, since in all societies, except primitive and rigidly controlled ones, social concepts were controversial. Nuclear power had been embedded in controversy since its first application in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Controversy surrounded the need for nuclear power development, the siting of plants, the disposal of nuclear wastes, the ethical issues raised by nuclear power, and the nature of the future society for which new sources of energy would be needed. It was a complex subject in which technological problems were combined with economic, social, moral and political problems that cut across international and domestic boundaries. Unfortunately some of those problems arose from the conflicting nuclear policies of major nuclear States, and from incompatible world-views on nuclear matters. Most crucial were the problems arising from a series of unilateral political actions by certain States, such as denial of technology, unequal or discriminatory treatment of Member States, stringent nuclear export regulations and, above all, inconsistent nuclear policies. The same could be said of such issues as access and assurances of supply. Such tendencies might prove to be detrimental to the development of nuclear power, which was vital for the survival of mankind. There should not be a system of double standards in which certain nations assumed that they were superior, and prevented others from pursuing their legitimate national interests.

109. Concern had also arisen in regard to proliferation risks, despite the various discussions held to resolve the problem. Progress achieved had been minimal; the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), for example, had been slow and laborious. The PUNE Preparatory Committee had suffered a similar fate, and had repeatedly failed to reach agreement, resulting in the postponement of PUNE itself. However, all was not lost. It was to be hoped that those problems would be resolved in good time, or at least before the Third NPT Review Conference, which was scheduled to take place in 1985. It was vital to find solutions to those problems before the Conference in order to avoid disappointment similar to that of the Second NPT Review Conference in 1980.

110. The troubles of the modern world had reached the point where they threatened fundamental freedom and international peace. Vast funds were being made available for research in order to improve armaments, resulting in the manufacture of new generations of nuclear weapons which were more precise, more accurate and more devastating. Those developments contradicted both the letter and spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

111. Malaysia believed that NPT, together with the Agency's safeguards system, offered the only possibility of evolving a totally new international system of arms control. It was encouraging to note that initial steps had been taken by some major nuclear-weapon States in volunteering to make some of their civil nuclear installations subject to the Agency's safeguards. He hoped that eventually those countries would gain useful experience in the application of safeguards on a voluntary basis, and that the time would come when the scope of the safeguards system would be extended to cover military installations as well. When that was done, a system of arms control verification would be created which would be superior to any systems that had been suggested so far. Nevertheless, Malaysia still wished to reaffirm the validity of the Treaty, and would continue to support and observe it.

112. The Agency's work should be for the benefit of all mankind, and not for a favoured few or for any predetermined category of countries. The ultimate goal should be the development and betterment of all peoples, and the safeguarding of the right to an honourable life, free from hunger, poverty and disease. The

chief role of the IAEA should be to ensure that means of livelihood are assured to all living beings.

113. In conclusion, he was pleased to have been authorized by his Government to pledge a voluntary contribution towards the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1984 to the sum of US \$20 250.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

