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Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,  
on Tuesday, 24 September 1985, at 3.15 p.m.

President: Mr. HIREMATH (India)  
later: Mr. MANOUAN (Côte d'Ivoire)

## CONTENTS

| <u>Item of the<br/>agenda**</u> | <u>Paragraphs</u>   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| 7                               | General debate and annual report for<br>1984 (continued) <span style="float: right;">1 - 118</span>   |
|                                 | Statements by the delegates of:   |
|                                 | United Arab Emirates <span style="float: right;">1 - 8</span>   |
|                                 | Iraq <span style="float: right;">9 - 19</span>  |
|                                 | Holy See <span style="float: right;">20 - 27</span>   |
|                                 | Italy <span style="float: right;">28 - 45</span>  |
|                                 | Chile <span style="float: right;">46 - 56</span>  |
|                                 | Argentina <span style="float: right;">57 - 69</span>  |
|                                 | Brazil <span style="float: right;">70 - 78</span>   |
|                                 | Poland <span style="float: right;">79 - 89</span>   |
|                                 | Switzerland <span style="float: right;">90 - 100</span>   |
|                                 | Saudi Arabia <span style="float: right;">101 - 110</span>   |
|                                 | Reply by the delegate of Iraq <span style="float: right;">111 - 114</span>                            |
|                                 | Reply by the delegate of the<br>Islamic Republic of Iran <span style="float: right;">115 - 118</span> |

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\*\*/ GC(XXIX)/763.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document  
GC(XXIX)/INF/227/Rev.3.

## GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1984 (GC(XXIX)/748 and Corr.1) (continued)

1. Mr. AL-OWAIS (United Arab Emirates) said that the Director General's speech faithfully reflected the Agency's activities during the past year, as well as his untiring efforts in the service of the international community in the area of nuclear technology. His delegation thanked the Director General for his commendable unremitting efforts and for the interest which he showed in the affairs of Member States. His country set great store by the Agency's technical assistance programmes, which were designed to make nuclear techniques available to the whole of mankind without discrimination, and to use the atom as an instrument of peace and prosperity not as an instrument of destruction. The United Arab Emirates had benefited from the technical assistance programme during the past few years, and hoped to continue receiving the Agency's technical assistance, especially in the area of radioisotope applications, and particularly in hydrology, one of the main aims being to locate groundwater and ascertain the origins of its formation, its flow rate and recharge mechanisms as well as to determine rational utilization rates. In the area of nuclear medicine, his country had made great progress and several hospitals were using cobalt for diagnosis and treatment. His country was also following with interest the study and research programmes on small and medium power reactors. It was impatiently awaiting the time when new 50-100 MW power reactors would be developed, since they would be most suitable for small networks and isolated regions. It hoped that those carrying out research would endeavour to design reactors which were both simpler and more reliable. Lastly, efforts to standardize safety concepts and nuclear reactor requirements were extremely important and the present trend towards unifying safety concepts and objectives between States represented a very important step towards standardization of safety practices at the international level.

2. The world was developing in very complex circumstances resulting from a combination of political, technical and economic factors which caused concern to many nations, particularly when those factors were connected with atomic energy, the militarization of space and "star wars". Those problems were assuming global proportions and endangering not only small States or non-nuclear-weapon States, but the whole world.

3. The safeguards system developed by the Agency to support national safeguards programmes and to permit the peaceful use of nuclear energy deserved respect and encouragement. Such a safeguards system could only be effective if it had international legal support.
4. The hypothesis of an attack on a nuclear installation had been well and truly confirmed by Israel's attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981. That reactor had at the time been under construction and subject to the controls of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whereas the Israeli reactor remained outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty and outside the Agency's control. A no less serious danger existed in South Africa as a result of the arbitrary policies adopted by that State, which respected neither the decisions of the Agency nor the United Nations Charter. Such matters should not be regarded as outside the province of the Agency, inasmuch as it was a technical organization concerned with scientific research and studies on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy was itself a political weapon, and even if politics should not triumph over science, talking about the subject could help to clarify certain important problems where politics and technology were interrelated. His country joined other peace-loving countries which had, at the General Conference, requested the Agency to do everything in its power to compel Israel to observe international agreements and to refrain from attacking peaceful installations. His country was concerned about stability in the Middle East, which had been disrupted by the Israeli attack designed to implement that country's plans against the legitimate rights of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples.
5. The United Arab Emirates regretted the lack of any decision on an amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Agency's Statute concerning the representation of developing countries in Africa and the Middle East and South Asia - representation which was at present neither just nor fair. In view of the legitimacy of their claims, the failure to reach a decision could have an adverse effect on the Member States of those regions.
6. Finally, his country believed that the nuclear powers should bear the costs of safeguards. It was unjust to finance safeguards from the Agency's Regular Budget and that practice had a negative effect on the Agency's activities and on the technical assistance provided to developing countries which were in such need of it.

7. Recalling a proposal made by the delegate of Saudi Arabia at the twenty-seventh session of the General Conference to hold the Conference only every two years, he said he shared the belief that there was no need for it to take place every year. Considerable savings could thereby be made, both for the Agency and for developing countries, and the preparatory work of the Secretariat could be reduced. The resources saved as a result could be used more effectively for technical assistance.

8. In conclusion, he wished the General Conference every success and expressed his confidence in the future of the Agency's activities.

9. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said that the Agency had an important role to play in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in various areas, such as power production, medicine, agriculture and industry, by providing direct or indirect technical assistance in the form of advisory services, training and the exchange of information. However, in order to improve the effectiveness of those activities, it was necessary to increase mutual confidence between the Members of the Agency and their confidence in the various organs of the Agency. Such confidence could only exist if Member States felt that there was fairness in the provision of services, in the composition of the Board of Governors and in the staffing of the Secretariat.

10. For a long time, developing countries had been seeking to establish such confidence and had made three requests which the Board of Governors and the General Conference had been examining for several years without reaching an equitable solution. Those requests concerned the financing of technical assistance from the Regular Budget or other stable resources, so as not to have to rely on voluntary contributions - an arrangement which hampered many projects in the Agency's technical assistance programme and did not provide sufficient funds to implement footnote a/ projects; the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, to ensure equitable representation of countries from the areas of Africa and the Middle East and South Asia on the Board of Governors; and an increase in the number of staff from developing countries in the Agency's Secretariat. His delegation requested those delegates who were continuing to oppose a solution to those problems to show greater flexibility and understanding during the debates in the Committee of the Whole, in the interests of the Agency and of all Member States.

11. The precedent of a military attack against a safeguarded peaceful nuclear installation, suffered by the Tamuz reactor in Iraq, would inevitably be repeated unless the international community shouldered unequivocally its responsibilities with regard to such aggressive practices which violated the United Nations Charter and the sovereignty and basic rights of peoples. Such practices constituted a serious threat to the future of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and a flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of all peoples to benefit from scientific and technological progress, including peaceful nuclear technology, for their economic, agricultural and social development.

12. Since its act of aggression - which had been condemned - against the Iraqi nuclear installation, the Israeli régime had deliberately reiterated its threat to repeat its aggression whenever it decided unilaterally that a reactor represented a threat to Israel's security. It had refused and continued to refuse to recognize that the Agency's safeguards system was a useful international instrument to verify the peaceful nature of nuclear installations. Despite Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and the many resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Agency's General Conference, including resolutions GC(XXVII)/RES/409 (1983) and GC(XXVIII)/RES/425 (1984), Israel continued to act in defiance of the international community and insisted on remaining the sole judge of the peaceful nature of a nuclear installation, thereby giving itself a pretext to attack it.

13. Rather than submitting to those resolutions, Israel had repeated its threats on several occasions. On 21 March 1985 Ariel Sharon had again repeated threats in a Radio Israel broadcast, where he had made the following statement: "We are prepared to attack any atomic reactor that Iraq might build in the future". Sharon, the former Minister of Defence, who had planned and perpetrated the aggression against the Tamuz reactor in 1981, seemed to ignore the existence of a safeguards system and international standards to which his country's régime should be committed. He had thus expressed his

régime's contempt for international organizations and their basic functions. For his part, Israel's Ambassador to Canada, in explaining the reason why Israel had not acceded to NPT, had said on 4 December 1983:

"I am rather sceptical about the ability of the world organizations, nowadays dominated as they are by the Soviet block, by Third World countries and by the Arab countries, to provide that kind of impeccable objective supervision with which we would be comfortable".

14. In the light of the Director General's report, which showed that Israel had not provided the assurances repeatedly requested by the General Conference and was persisting in its aggressive attitude and in its defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Conference, the Conference had no alternative but to take deterrent action and to implement its resolutions GC(XXVII)/RES/409 and GC(XXVIII)/RES/425. His delegation called upon the General Conference to assume its full responsibility as the organization whose task it was to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world and the application of safeguards and verification of the peaceful nature of nuclear activities. His delegation would not be influenced by any manoeuvres or attempts to divert the attention of the General Conference, including the letter circulated that morning by the delegate of Israel, which clearly reflected a lack of seriousness and goodwill and which resorted to prevarication and subterfuge rather than complying sincerely with the resolutions of the General Conference and assuming the duties and responsibilities incumbent upon everyone. His delegation believed that Israel's letter was an obvious attempt by certain States - headed by the United States of America, which habitually supported Israel and protected it in all circumstances - to justify their protection of that country and to endeavour to obstruct the General Conference and prevent it from fulfilling its duties.

15. The international community was once again deeply perturbed by the barbarous and inhumane practices adopted by the racist régime of South Africa against the indigenous population. Those practices were degrading and completely contrary to the rules of international law and human rights. The tragic situation in that region was the result of the policies and actions of

the racist régime, particularly its attempts to consolidate its racial hegemony, while persecuting its opponents, and its repeated acts of aggression against neighbouring States, not to mention its untiring efforts to strengthen its nuclear capabilities with a view to acquiring nuclear weapons. The available information and reports confirmed the existence of links between South Africa and Israel under a joint programme for the development of their nuclear capabilities under which the one exploited uranium illegally mined in Namibia and the other provided scientific and technological experience in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and nuclear warhead delivery systems. Strongly condemning such co-operation, his delegation called upon the General Conference to take steps to prevent it, since it would lead to a strengthening of the nuclear capabilities of those two countries. His delegation called upon those two countries to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons and to place all their nuclear facilities under Agency control.

16. The final statement of the Third NPT Review Conference, which it had been possible to publish despite unjust pressures and attempted blackmail to exploit the consensus approach, contained positive conclusions, but even so did not properly reflect the views of non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly developing countries. It did not take sufficient account of the concern of developing countries facing the increasing obstacles to the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology imposed by a certain number of exporting States. It did not respond forcefully enough to the deep concern expressed by developing countries with regard to the strengthening of the nuclear capabilities of the Tel Aviv and Pretoria régimes. It did not deal fully with the question of armed aggression against peaceful nuclear installations which had arisen after the Zionist attack on the Iraqi reactor. Furthermore, there was cause for concern because the terminology used in certain parts of the document was unrelated to that of the Treaty. For example, the expression "barriers to non-proliferation" was used instead of the word "safeguards" and terms such as "nuclear explosive capability" in relation to non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty. Moreover, the document did not express clearly enough the concern felt in the world at the failure of nuclear-weapon States to limit the arms race and to prevent it from being extended to outer space, and their failure to reach an agreement totally

prohibiting nuclear tests. In spite of those reservations, his delegation had not opposed the consensus since it was convinced of the role that NPT could play in disarmament and in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy if it were properly applied and if nuclear-weapon States and the exporting States which were party to the Treaty fully complied with their commitments in the same way as non-nuclear-weapon States which were party to the Treaty.

17. Despite propoganda campaigns and the armed aggression aimed at obstructing its peaceful nuclear programme, Iraq was continuing its programme alongside its efforts devoted to other aspects of development. As the President of Iraq had stated in his message to the twenty-sixth session of the General Conference, his country had established a wide-ranging development programme covering all economic, social and cultural aspects using scientific planning for the optimum exploitation of its resources. It attached particular importance to the development of scientific research, which it believed was indispensable for the transfer and development of the technology needed to implement his country's development programme.

18. One of the objectives of Iraq's development plans was to use nuclear energy for at least 10-15% of total power generation by the year 2000. The first contract for the selection of a site for the country's first nuclear power plant had been completed in 1985. The Agency had provided experts for that purpose and had trained Iraqi personnel in Vienna. His country was continuing its efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of isotopes for medical applications and hoped eventually to have a surplus of radioisotopes for export. The Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre had signed a research contract with the Agency and another similar contract had been extended. His country was contributing to all the activities of the Agency aimed at improving the services provided and strengthening international co-operation. In particular, it had participated in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) and in the UNCPICPUNE Preparatory Committee. His delegation attached great importance to the convening of that Conference on the date specified. Pursuant to resolution 32/50 of the United Nations General Assembly, the Conference should make it possible to formulate

practical methods of improving international co-operation in the area of nuclear energy and facilitating the free transfer of technology, as well as the supply of nuclear material equipment and services (needed particularly by the developing countries to implement their peaceful nuclear programmes for social and economic development). Convinced that the success of CAS would greatly contribute to that of the Conference, his delegation urged Member States participating in the work of CAS and of the Board of Governors to take steps which would help the Committee accomplish the tasks entrusted to it by the Board, so that it could implement its conclusions.

19. Since the beginning of the Iranian aggression in 1980, the Iranian authorities had not ceased shelling civilian centres in Iraq and in 1984 his Government had proposed that an agreement be concluded between the two countries, under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to refrain from shelling civilian centres. The Secretary-General had succeeded in persuading the Iranian authorities and an agreement had been concluded between the two countries on 12 June 1984 to put an end to the shelling of civilian zones. However, since that agreement did not provide for any guarantee preventing the use of those centres for military purposes, Iran had exploited the agreement by building up its forces and continuing its aggression against Iraq. When Iraq had shelled a military target in Ilam, Iran had responded with a warning to the inhabitants of Bassora to evacuate the city and had begun to shell it as well as other Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, instead of requesting the United Nations team to inspect the military target shelled by Iraq and had thereby violated the agreement concluded on 12 June 1984. Iraq had had no alternative but to respond to that aggression. Iran had shelled Baghdad at random with rockets and had exposed Iraqi nuclear facilities to real danger. Iraq, which had called for a cessation of hostilities and for peaceful resolution of the conflict, did not bear any responsibility for the victims and material damage caused to both parties by the Iranian aggression. It was the party that persisted with its aggression and which refused international mediation which bore the full responsibility not only for the victims and material damage but also for the threat posed to international peace and security.

20. Mr. CEIRANO (Holy See) expressed his delegation's conviction that all Members of the Agency should give priority to studying the problem of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon systems as a whole. The constant and threatening increase in the use of nuclear energy for military purposes had overshadowed all attempts which had been made to ensure the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The work of the Agency and other organizations had been disrupted by the fact that an increasing number of nations had the capacity and technological expertise needed to use nuclear energy for military rather than peaceful purposes. At the Third NPT Review Conference, which had been recently concluded in Geneva, the delegate of the Holy See had expressed the position of the Holy See in the following way:

"There must be a reversal of the trend of vertical proliferation. We feel that there is a moral link between the limitation of horizontal proliferation and the reversal of vertical proliferation. The nations in possession of nuclear power had the duty to fulfil their responsibilities as enunciated in Article VI of the Treaty. Without presuming to give suggestions of a technical order - which is outside the role of the Holy See - it must be remembered that there are many more weapons and weapon systems than are needed to ensure the security of all nations. Public opinion is aware of this fact and has already made its desire known and its position clear. The people want a reversal of the arms race. In this circumstance, this delegation reiterates the appeal of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to reverse the current trend in the arms race" (Osservatore Romano, 1 September 1985, page 2).

21. By contrast, programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be enhanced and the Agency should be given the necessary means to play its natural role in the establishment of such programmes, in their implementation and their co-ordination. In those programmes, emphasis should be given to the need to ensure that nuclear energy served man and his spiritual and material development. The extent of that contribution should be the standard by which to judge the quality of such programmes.

22. As a general rule, each country should decide for itself whether to develop nuclear energy and to what extent, always with regard to its own needs and resources. However, recourse to nuclear energy must, of course, safeguard the security of the individual and society as a whole, and take into account

ecological needs. For that reason, priority should be given to programmes concerned with radiation safety and protection which would enable developing countries to choose reasonable and safe solutions.

23. Outside the area of power production, nuclear technology could and should be used for the benefit of all mankind in other fields such as agriculture, medicine, geology, scientific research and for progress in general. In those areas, appropriate investment should be encouraged, since it was possible - with a relatively modest capital input - to obtain relatively high returns. Therefore, special attention should be given to projects with such objectives.

24. To illustrate those ideas, the work being carried out in the area of waste management was very important for the present and future of the planet Earth. Progress in low- and intermediate-level waste management would be useful for all countries, while new fears about high-level waste seemed to respond to a concern for the safety of peoples and nations, which should never be forgotten. With regard to the use of available resources, international justice demanded that they should not be diverted to a few large projects carried out in a small number of countries, but should be used to promote a large number of small projects which were of benefit to a maximum number of people and were adapted to the social and economic conditions and the actual possibilities of many different countries. It was therefore important to keep in constant contact with the exigencies and realities at local level.

25. Believing that intermediate and appropriate technology was preferable to highly advanced technology and installations, his delegation was very interested in the results of research on small and medium power reactors. Collaboration of buyers, sellers and financial institutions in such projects would help the general development of societies which were only just beginning to develop their energy resources and to realise their potential. Finally, in the same perspective, note should be taken of the efforts to provide developing countries in particular with up-to-date information on the comparative economic and technical performances of nuclear and fossil-fuel power plants. Those activities, which enabled developing countries to choose and develop the energy systems most suited to their real needs, could be considered as some of the best work done by the Agency.

26. Given his special position as delegate of a founding Member of the Agency which endeavoured to play exclusively a moral role consistent with its proper mission he believed that two factors should be considered with regard to the delicate question of staff recruitment. On the one hand, there was the increasing number of Members of the Agency, which naturally led to the expression by a number of States of the desire that the staff of the Agency should reflect the geopolitical spectrum and, on the other hand, there was the fact that the Agency had always placed strong emphasis on the need to give priority to people with technical expertise, which had greatly contributed to the prestige and effectiveness of the Agency and its programme. While wishing for as wide a representation as possible among the Agency staff, his delegation was also very much in favour of maintaining the high technical standards which characterized the Agency's work. Therefore, it did not hesitate to recommend that the example of the past be followed, while remaining confident that, with the goodwill of all, it would be possible to respond to the situation without lowering the technical quality or the representative nature of the staff.

27. Since the Agency was endeavouring to develop its programmes and activities for the good of all nations and peoples, the real object of its work apart from the specific good results of any particular project, would be an increased spirit of co-operation and harmony between peoples and nations. In the message which he had addressed to the special session on disarmament, Pope John Paul II had described what ought to be the Agency's goal:

"The building of links among peoples means the rediscovery and reassertion of all the values that reinforce peace and that join people together in harmony. This also means the renewal of what is best in the heart of man, the heart that seeks the good of the other in friendship and love."

28. Mr. BORGA (Italy) observed that the current session of the General Conference was being held immediately after the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which had contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of that Treaty. The Italian Government welcomed that result because it considered NPT to be an achievement

essential for strengthening the security of all States and for promoting disarmament in the context of stability and international security. It also believed that in the interest of all countries of the world the effectiveness of NPT should be enhanced through scrupulous compliance with all the Treaty provisions, rigorous implementation of the non-proliferation goals, and accession of a growing number of States. In fact, the structure and the spirit of the Treaty were based on a specific balance and on reciprocal commitments.

29. It was in that context that IAEA activities must be seen as particularly important. On the occasion of that Review Conference the Italian Government had reaffirmed its full confidence in the safeguards system operated by the Agency in carrying out the tasks assigned it by the Treaty. Those were obviously essential tasks because the credibility of the system and a general confidence in the full compliance with the Treaty's provisions constituted the mainstay of the non-proliferation regime. In his Government's opinion, it was thus necessary to promote all measures likely to strengthen that credibility and confidence and consequently to promote new accessions to the Treaty. In that connection, it is essential to improve the effectiveness of the safeguards system without unduly adding to the burdens of Member States, many of which were experiencing budgetary austerity. Within that framework, two kinds of measures could be envisaged. First, an acceptable mechanism for financing safeguards should be established, and in that regard Italy wished to express its support for the new proposals which had been submitted by Belgium at the most recent series of meetings of the Board and the purpose of which was to promote greater equity. Second, the system of controls should be rationalized and improved through the use of new technologies, more effective utilization of the inspecting personnel, greater attention to the implementation of safeguards in sensitive plants and the development of faster accounting techniques.

30. He considered it very important that NPT Member States should participate directly in the efforts to rationalize and improve the safeguards system. In that spirit his country had recently proposed to the IAEA a support programme involving the development of measurement and control techniques for fuel reprocessing plants and mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants.

31. The Italian Government obviously supported full-scope safeguards under the Treaty and was in favour, in principle, of their generalized application. In fact, it would not seem appropriate that NPT countries, which had accepted commitments and burdens with a view to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, should be treated less favourably in the field of safeguards than countries which had not accepted the same commitments and burdens. However, in Italy's opinion, the application of full-scope safeguards should be promoted gradually and, possibly, by persuasion and not through imposition.

32. As to equity and non-discrimination, his Government believed that those needs could also be satisfied by the submission to IAEA safeguards of a greater number of peaceful nuclear facilities of the nuclear-weapon States. The recently concluded agreement between the Agency and the USSR was a step in the right direction. Italy hoped that in the future the nuclear-weapon States would gradually place all their peaceful facilities under IAEA safeguards, granting the Agency wide discretionary powers to select the most significant plants on which it would carry out verification.

33. He also noted with satisfaction that, according to the Safeguards Implementation Report for 1984, the Agency had not detected any anomaly which would have indicated the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or for any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device, or for purposes unknown.

34. Italy was convinced of the need to ensure wider and fuller implementation of Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in that connection, it had spared no effort to assure adequate technical co-operation with developing countries in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In fact, Italy had attached great importance to the Agency's role as a promoter of the various peaceful uses of nuclear energy and was a strong supporter of many of those activities. He shared the Director General's views concerning the increasing role which nuclear energy was bound to play in the overall energy production: the economic viability of nuclear power, its reliability, safety and excellent environmental record could not be ignored.

It was not by chance that in the preceding year, the total installed nuclear capacity had grown by 17%, the largest annual increase since the introduction of nuclear power in the early 1970s. It should also be recognized that full exploitation of that source of energy could not be made without developing advanced technologies, such as breeder and fusion technologies, which would in future ensure adequate and long-lasting energy sources.

35. Other applications of nuclear techniques, such as those in food and agriculture, medicine and industry, enjoyed his Government's full support, as had concretely been demonstrated by the sizable financial contributions which it had offered for a number of long-term programmes carried out by the Department for Research and Isotopes in the areas of animal productivity and pasture management, the sterile-insect technique and the application of isotope and geochemical techniques in geothermal resources exploration. Its total voluntary commitment in those areas - including a number of footnote-a/ projects - would amount to over US \$18 million in 1981-86. Even if it was not completely satisfied with the results achieved to date in some of those programmes, it was confident that the experience gained by the Secretariat would help in improving the results and in overcoming any shortcomings in the future. That was why, while Italy considered that the new approach endorsed a few years ago by the Board of Governors in the field of technical co-operation policy was worth pursuing, it was particularly interested not only in project evaluation - including field evaluation - but also in the preparation of projects and the continuous monitoring of their implementation.

36. As one of the major contributors to international co-operation activities, through extrabudgetary resources, Italy wished quite naturally to be assured that its financial efforts were producing maximum results. For the same reason, it was in favour of a periodic review of the Agency's policy in that field. In its opinion, a better integration of the technical co-operation activities with other programme areas in all phases of project implementation was still necessary. One of the major problems which most developing - as well as industrialized - countries continued to face was the financing of nuclear power. The approach which was currently contemplated by the Secretariat and had been mentioned by the Director General in his statement, namely the establishment of joint ventures between suppliers and

local utilities, was worth studying. He also recalled that his country financed a major part of the activities of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste, which was jointly managed by the IAEA and UNESCO, with an annual contribution of US \$3 million amounting to more than two thirds of the Centre's budget. The Italian Government had allotted an additional US \$4.5 million in 1985 for the extension of the Centre's activities with particular reference to the needs of the national centres located in developing countries.

37. Italy actively supported the Agency's initiatives in the field of nuclear trade and, in particular, the activities of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), the purpose of which was to establish mechanisms for assuring supplies and at the same time guaranteeing non-proliferation. Assurance of supplies and free access to scientific information and to new achievements in technology were the basic conditions for extensive and fair development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for the gradual extension of economic benefits thereof.

38. The General Conference had often devoted a very large part of its time to the discussion of problems which, in his view, belonged more appropriately to the province of other, international forums. It was true, however, that the general international situation also affected, to some extent, the Agency's work and activities. In that context, it seemed fair to say that the international climate, though still characterized by uncertainties and tensions, had been showing signs of improvement since the preceding year. In particular, his Government viewed the start of negotiations between the United States and the USSR on nuclear and space weapons as an event of great political significance. It could certainly be hoped, therefore, that the dialogue and the summit meeting to be held in November would contribute to a gradual relaxation of tensions and to the progress of the disarmament process in all its aspects. The Italian Government, which had actively worked in the past to promote and facilitate disarmament negotiations in all bilateral and multilateral forums, intended to continue striving for effective progress. As to the political problems which had been the subject of the Agency's attention

in the past, he considered that the organization's universality should be safeguarded as much as possible and that exclusion of any State or any development affecting the rights and privileges of Member States would also negatively affect the extent to which the duties and commitments were fulfilled.

39. Italy attached especial importance to the question of representation on the Board of Governors. In that context, it was necessary to bear in mind not only the principle of just geographical distribution but also other criteria such as the States' experience in the nuclear sector, their technological advancement and their financial contributions to the Agency's programmes. In his opinion, it was legitimate that a country which contributed large resources to the Agency's activities should participate in a more significant and permanent way in the management and in the taking of major decisions by its policy-making bodies. While Italy was willing to make in the future, as it had in the past, a large financial contribution to the Agency, it could not remain indifferent to the management of that contribution. The generally recognized associative rule, according to which the major financial backers should have a voice in the promotion of the fundamental activities, ought also to be applied to the Agency. On the basis of those principles, his delegation was in favour of a general review of Article VI of the Statute in order to achieve a more equitable and more balanced representation through a limited increase of the Board's membership. In that spirit, Italy had sponsored, together with Belgium and Sweden, the proposal submitted by Spain on that issue, which seemed also to respond to the need for maintaining the Board's effectiveness.

40. He wished briefly to dwell on the situation of nuclear power production and on the most recent development in the nuclear field in Italy. Nuclear power production in 1984 had amounted to 6900 million kWh, representing a 19% increase over the 5800 million kWh produced in 1983. The construction of two 1000 MW(e) BWR units was going ahead and the siting studies for a number of pressurized-water reactors (PWR) had been undertaken or completed. As for the scheduled startup of the nuclear power stations which were now under construction or were planned in Italy, a review of the status of

implementation of the 1981 national energy plan showed that the objectives set at that time were still valid and must be pursued with utmost determination. In 1984, the Italian Atomic Energy Authority (ENEA) had placed emphasis on a truly modern industrial policy for Italy. Italian industry had considerably expanded its resources for the design and construction of nuclear power plants under the national energy plan and for activities connected with the nuclear fuel cycle. As for international relations, greater attention had been given to co-operation with developing countries, which had been carried either directly or through the ENEA's technical support to co-operation programmes financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the ENEA's role as the regulatory and supervisory authority had been further strengthened.

41. In the nuclear field the noteworthy developments included: the completion of the mechanical assembly of the 40 MW(e) CIRENE reactor; progress in the construction of the PEC fast reactor (fuel element test reactor); continuation of activities in the field of controlled nuclear fusion as part of a European Community co-operative effort; lastly, research on fast breeders had continued under a co-operation programme involving all public utility companies and the competent agencies. An important step in that connection was the conclusion in January 1984 by Belgium, France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom of a co-operation agreement to be followed by a number of specific operational agreements.

42. The ENEA fifth five-year plan (1985-1989) now under discussion in the Senate provided not only for the continuation of the activities under the previous plan but also for some innovations. Thus, the work on thermal reactors would be oriented mainly towards fostering greater involvement of Italian industry, including small- and medium-sized firms, in the construction of PWR power plants. As to fast breeder reactors, the ENEA's activities would be focused on the completion of the PEC reactor and on further improvement of the capabilities of the national nuclear industry with a view to increasing Italian participation in the construction of European fast reactors and to facilitating the introduction of those reactors in Italy.

43. As regards the fuel cycle, the fifth five-year plan set three primary objectives for the ENEA. First, it was to maintain a modest level of research and development activity in areas where the market was not likely to require any further industrial activity for some time to come, for example uranium isotopic enrichment. Second, it should focus its efforts on developing activities in those areas of the fuel cycle which were deemed to be decisive, namely spent fuel reprocessing, radioactive waste management and the production of mixed-oxide fuel, and on expanding research and development work on safeguards in order to establish favourable conditions for industry in Italy and more extensive international co-operation. Lastly, Italy's participation in a co-operative European fuel reprocessing programme should be enhanced.

44. In the area of controlled nuclear fusion, the plan called for continuation of the work carried out under the joint European programme. As for alternative energy sources, the main emphasis could be placed on photovoltaic cells, bio-mass and, to a lesser degree, on wind power. With regard to energy conservation, the ENEA would continue to strive for the full implementation of the law of 1983. In the area of environmental protection, it would step up its activities with the prime objective of locating a domestic site for the temporary storage and final disposal of low-level radioactive waste.

45. In conclusion, he hoped that his statement had highlighted two points of paramount importance to his country. The first was that Italy continued to attach great importance to nuclear energy and to its vital role for the future of mankind, essentially as an adequate and economical source of energy. The second point was his country's continued commitment to and confidence in the IAEA, and it intended to offer the Agency, as in the past, its full technical and financial co-operation.

46. Mr. BRADY ROCHE (Chile) wished, first of all, to express his country's gratitude to the Director General, Mr. Blix, for his visit to Chile in October 1984 at the Chilean Government's invitation, on which occasion the Director General had had an opportunity to be informed in detail of Chile's

nuclear programme, of its achievements and of the various national programmes on social and economic development. The visit had stimulated an exchange of practical ideas about the various nuclear projects and programmes which were in progress in Chile.

47. In October a co-ordination meeting had been held to discuss the prospects of radioisotope production in Latin America. The recommendations and conclusions of that meeting had been transmitted to the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission, which had sponsored the meeting, and a copy of the report had been sent to the Agency.

48. He recalled that his country had agreed to participate in the development of the ARCAL programme (Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America). Chile viewed that programme as an effective tool for strengthening regional co-operation in the nuclear field. It was confident that with time the number of participating countries would increase, since all Latin American States would benefit from the exchange of experience which would result from joint work. His delegation had no doubt that the document prepared at the second ARCAL technical planning and co-ordinating meeting, held in July in Quito, would be examined positively in the various capitals, and in particular by the developed countries, with a view to finding the financial resources essential for the different ARCAL projects and programmes.

49. As to nuclear safety and radiological protection, the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CChEN) was continuing to prepare the various technical regulations, standards and guides to supplement the nuclear safety law enacted in 1984. A great impetus had been given to the Chilean radioisotope and radiation application programme, in which universities, scientific and technological institutes and organizations in the production sector were participating actively. In the matter of reactor conversion, the CChEN had carried out a series of activities in order to permit the use of medium- and low-enriched fuel in its two reactors.

50. During the preceding year Chile had co-sponsored a number of regional events intended to improve manpower training in the Latin American area, and

had in particular hosted an Agency workshop on technical co-operation practice and procedures. It had also recently organized, in collaboration with the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission, a course in X-ray fluorescence. Moreover it had, with great interest, attended IAEA meetings dealing with new developments in the area of small and medium power reactors, which were of great importance to developing countries.

51. He expressed the hope that the deliberations of the General Conference would be translated into concrete action. He noted with satisfaction, as had been pointed out in the Director General's statement, that a number of new activities had been initiated without additional financial resources, indicating that the funds allocated had been used rationally and that the Agency's staff had worked with optimum efficiency.

52. As far as the international situation in the field of nuclear co-operation was concerned, he wished to recall his country's permanent and unreserved commitment to the utilization of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, which meant that it condemned its use for any other purposes. The principles on which Chile's development in the nuclear sphere was based were guided by those considerations, and it was also for that reason that his country had accepted the Agency's safeguards system. The application of safeguards depended on the sovereign will of each State. He considered safeguards preferable to other ways of reaffirming the peaceful purpose of nuclear activities, and in particular to instruments such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) and the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

53. There were certain aspects of NPT which could not be described as positive. One was its discriminatory spirit: it made no reference to vertical proliferation and concentrated exclusively on horizontal proliferation. Another negative feature of NPT was its failure to come to grips with the principle of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the Treaty did not seem to fulfil the objective of transferring know-how and technology in the nuclear field to the countries which needed them. Lastly, Chile was not

satisfied with the success of what had been called the spirit of NPT, nor with the legal instrument itself, because it consecrated in law, so to speak, the world imbalance in the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful or non-peaceful purposes. The success of NPT should not be judged only by the number of signatory countries but by the extent to which those countries benefited effectively from the scientific knowledge necessary to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

54. The work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) bore witness to the difficult process of reconciling the different points of view. He was concerned to note the downgrading of the importance of IAEA safeguards as a factor which was sufficient in itself for reconciling the assurances of non-proliferation and the concomitant assurances of supply. Chile considered the existing safeguards system a reliable means of ensuring nuclear non-proliferation.

55. His delegation was sceptical about the supposed advantages of the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In his opinion, it was based on a philosophy contrary to the postulates which his country had always defended in relation to self-determination in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, since it sought to place under strict control, and thereby make less accessible, the nuclear material essential to developing countries for their peaceful nuclear progress. At the same time, the nuclear material which the Great Powers used for military purposes would remain outside the control of the Convention, which meant that vertical proliferation could continue, with consequent dangers for world peace and security. He considered that those additional controls were difficult to accept and that they would also contribute to undermining Member States' confidence in the Agency's safeguards system.

56. Lastly, referring to voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1986, he recalled Chile's oft-repeated position that the technical assistance and co-operation activities should be financed increasingly from the Agency's Regular Budget. For that purpose, the policy of zero growth which the Agency had adopted for its budget should be

revised. Nevertheless, he wished to announce his country's willingness to contribute its full share to the Fund for 1986. In that connection, he appealed to Member States which were in arrears with the payment of their contributions to bring their accounts up to date and to some other States to make contributions representing their share of the indicative target figures.

57. Mr. CONSTANTINI (Argentina) said that his country's difficult economic situation had forced his Government to reduce public expenditure drastically. Consequently, in the current financial year, there had been severe budgetary restraints which had considerably slowed down the progress of work under the Argentine nuclear programme and had resulted in setting priorities oriented towards the real needs of the immediate future.

58. However, the Argentine President, Mr. Raoul Alfonsin, had repeatedly reaffirmed his Government's firm resolve to continue to develop the country's technological capabilities in the nuclear field and to implement its nuclear programme with a view to attaining self-sufficiency and freedom of decision, which were its main objectives. For that reason, it had accorded priority to manpower training, and to activities required for completing the nuclear fuel cycle and for the production of basic materials needed to sustain the country's chosen nuclear power generation technology.

59. In Argentina nuclear power had continued to grow in importance; the Atucha I and the Embalse nuclear power plants had accounted for 11.4% of the total electricity produced in 1984, so that Argentina occupied the fourteenth place in the world in that regard. As for other applications of nuclear energy, Argentina had placed fresh emphasis on the production of radioisotopes and certain radionuclides needed for its nuclear medicine programme, as well as on radioisotope applications in agriculture, veterinary medicine and industry - areas in which a number of important projects were being planned which would make it possible to meet ever-increasing national and regional needs.

60. Since the last session of the General Conference his country had been very active in international co-operation. At the multilateral level and especially within the framework of the Agency, Argentina had maintained and even intensified, despite its economic difficulties, its participation in the

Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme, as was shown by the large number of Argentine experts made available to the Agency and by the holding, in collaboration with the Agency, of four courses in Argentina which dealt, respectively, with radiological protection and nuclear safety, the training of instructors in radioimmunoassay data processing, power planning in developing countries with emphasis on nuclear power, and quality assurance.

61. Also within the Agency's framework, Argentina had started contributing actively to the ARCAL programme, to which it would be offering its full support. That programme could truly serve as the prime mover of regional integration in Latin America in a field which was vital for the development and well-being of peoples, so that the Secretariat should give it as much financial support as possible. The interest of the countries of the region in the ARCAL programme had been demonstrated at the recent planning meeting held in August at Quito, where the participating countries had to the best of their abilities, multiplied their offers of collaboration and contributions in what had appeared to be a demonstration of their sense of responsibility and solidarity. In that connection, he wished to announce that, as in the preceding years, Argentina would make a contribution in national currency to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1986.

62. Within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS), his country had continued to support the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) and had given effect to the offers it had made at the thirteenth regular session held in January 1984. Thus, it had organized at Buenos Aires in October 1984 a regional seminar on the applications of nuclear energy in veterinary medicine and animal production, which had been attended by eminent specialists from Latin America. An OAS-sponsored course on metallurgy and technology of materials had been held for the fifth time in Argentina. A number of regional courses on the technology of research reactor fuel elements, on radioisotope methodology for radioimmunoassay and on the application of radioisotopes in veterinary medicine and biochemistry, as well as a workshop-seminar on instrumentation and quality control in nuclear medicine, had also been held.

63. In the bilateral area, Argentina had concluded with friendly nations all over the world 17 co-operation agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the last of them with China. Two more agreements were to be concluded shortly. He wished specifically to mention the initiation of co-operation with the Soviet Union, the intensification of collaboration with India and the strengthening of co-operative links with Algeria. Moreover, Argentina had continued its fruitful co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany and France in addition to maintaining its traditional relations with the Latin American countries.

64. His country was always willing to establish and strengthen co-operation with all nations in the world on the basis of legal equality and mutual respect. It was convinced of the need for making available to the peoples of the world the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without restrictions based on equivocal non-proliferation justifications, but subject to the requirement, and acceptance, of adequate safeguards ensuring that the nuclear technology, facilities and material transferred would be used only for peaceful purposes. In that regard, Argentina considered the Agency's safeguards system to be the appropriate means of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Any other additional requirement, such as restrictions on the transfer of technology in areas which were tendentiously termed sensitive, could only be suspected of concealing the intention of preserving political and commercial supremacy.

65. Argentina continued its firm support for world efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in both the vertical and horizontal direction. Therefore, his Government, jointly with the Governments of five other States from all over the world which shared its concern for world peace, had issued the New Delhi Declaration, whose objectives fully coincided with those of the Agency. On that occasion, President Alfonsin had expressed the hope that the Great Powers would unequivocally demonstrate to mankind in that very year that they shared his concern by promoting and implementing immediately effective measures which should eliminate, once and for all, the danger of a nuclear holocaust. There would then be grounds for believing that mankind had finally begun to win the battle for life.

66. With regard to technical assistance, he again noted with appreciation the Secretariat's efforts to obtain better results with chronically insufficient resources. However, he wished to stress, as Argentina already had pointed out at the meetings of the Board of Governors, that the implementation level attained was not as satisfactory as could be desired, and urged the Secretariat to redouble its efforts in that direction. He wished likewise to express his dissatisfaction with the conditions imposed on the use of certain extrabudgetary funds, which violated the spirit of the Statute, and with the continued application of the Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance by the Agency, since the latter imposed conditions which his delegation considered arbitrary.

67. With respect to the other great responsibility of the Agency, namely the application of safeguards, his delegation noted with satisfaction that in 1984 again there had been no failure to comply with the undertakings made by Member States, and that, consequently, the Agency was able to assure that there had been no diversion of safeguarded material for non-peaceful purposes. He also commended the Secretariat for responding to the repeated requests made by several Member States, including Argentina, at the meetings of the Board that the internal transparency of the safeguards system be improved. It must be recognized that Argentina was now receiving better information, which would help in the continuous improvement of the methods of safeguards measurement, verification and control. He also appreciated the Secretariat's efforts to improve safeguards equipment and to make more efficient use of the inspectorate staff. However, much remained to be done in the latter respect, as Argentina had observed at the meetings of the Board held in June. On the same subject, he wished to point out that during the preceding year his country had continued to implement, jointly with the Agency, a programme designed to test a containment and surveillance system for the Embalse nuclear power plant. However, the results obtained to date could not be regarded as very promising.

68. As for the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), Argentina's well-known stand was that assurances of non-proliferation and those relating to the provision of technology and the other inputs needed for developing a peaceful nuclear programme should be inseparable. In that

connection, Argentina felt, as it had observed at the meetings of the Board, that the efforts of the preceding few years were beginning to bear fruit. There was now a simple, clear and comprehensive working document. However, that document was not the final expression of a consensus since it lacked certain elements needed for maintaining the delicate balance between the different interpretations of various facets of the problem which the parties could quite legitimately have. He was none the less optimistic that, if the will to compromise persisted, a reasonable balance between the different points of view could finally be arrived at.

69. In conclusion, he wished once more to express his satisfaction at the very positive results of the Agency's technical programmes, and in particular its programme on radiological protection and nuclear safety, under which the Secretariat had prepared for the information of the Board the excellent report entitled Nuclear Safety Review, 1984. Those promotional programmes were a form of assistance of great usefulness to developing countries; it was therefore unacceptable that such programmes should be restricted in order to maintain zero growth in the Agency's budget. The latter objective should be met by optimizing the costs of the safeguards programme through more efficient use of the equipment and manpower available.

Mr. Manouan (Côte d'Ivoire) took the Chair.

70. Mr. ALVES (Brazil) recalled that, since the 1984 session of the General Conference, Brazil had made renewed efforts to implement its programme on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy despite the economic and financial constraints which had dramatically affected the level of investment, particularly in developing countries. It was true that those countries were bearing the brunt of the current malfunctioning of the world economy. The overall scarcity of financial resources had limited their various development programmes, including the nuclear ones. Brazil was no exception to the rule, but, despite its problems, remained convinced that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were important not only for the future of its economy, but also for the well-being of its population.

71. As far as nuclear power generation was concerned, Brazil's first nuclear power plant, Angra I, had already been connected to the grid and was providing most of the electricity required by the Centre South Region of the country. Brazil's second nuclear power plant, Angra II, was being completed. Opportunity costs, which were increasingly favouring the use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity, would determine the pace of the programme.

72. The application of nuclear techniques in medicine, industry and agriculture had been emphasized, given the results which could be obtained in the short term both in the social and the economic areas. There were now 1090 medical centres throughout Brazil which were making use of nuclear techniques for diagnosis and therapy. Brazil had also recently completed its basic legal procedures for food irradiation. It was hoped that those techniques would reduce the amount of food losses caused by difficulties in storage and long-distance transport coupled with the climatic conditions prevailing in the country.

73. Brazil had not deviated from its long-standing policy of firmly supporting the activities of the Agency. The Statute of the Agency gave the guidelines for those activities, and compliance with it provided the necessary non-discriminatory basis for international co-operation. As a developing country, Brazil naturally considered the Agency's technical assistance programme as an important tool for its own development. In that connection, he wished to announce that Brazil's voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund would be maintained at the level of previous years. It was to be stressed that the technical assistance provided by the Agency had contributed to Brazil's achievements, particularly in radiation protection, dosimetry and nuclear safety. The excellent rate of implementation of the Agency's technical assistance projects in Brazil had played an important role in that respect, and had encouraged the Brazilian Government to submit a project of special significance and scope for the Amazon region: that project, recently approved, would assist the Brazilian Government to carry through its studies on the effects of changing land use on the ecology and climate of the Amazon region. Nevertheless, some aspects of the situation

in Brazil, a tropical developing country, rendered it necessary to adapt some of the techniques received. The resulting knowledge and experience would benefit other developing countries through the Agency's technical assistance programme.

74. Brazil had endeavoured as far as possible to give favourable responses to fellowship requests channelled through the Agency. Since September 1984 it had thus awarded 18 fellowships to trainees from other developing countries. Also, two interregional courses had been held in Brazil, one on dosimetry and the other on prospecting for uranium deposits and evaluating reserves. Brazil had also provided cost-free expert services for Agency technical assistance projects in other developing countries. That co-operation had been fruitful, as the increasing requests for Brazilian experts showed, and Brazil was anxious to continue and even to enhance it. With regard to regional co-ordination of Agency co-operation activities, the establishment and the setting in motion of the institutional mechanisms of the ARCAL programme were completely satisfactory, and Brazil supported the programme, taking into consideration the recommendations approved at the Quito meeting. As to the Agency's technical co-operation activities as a whole, it was apposite to take note of the increase of 22.4% in the resources provided in 1984 compared to the previous year, and of the increase in extrabudgetary funds, although the persistent reduction in UNDP contributions must be regretted.

75. In the area of nuclear safety, an activity to which Brazil had long given and would always continue to give firm support, his delegation considered laudable some recent initiatives undertaken by the Agency, such as the radiation protection advisory teams, the Incident Reporting System and the continuing progress of the Nuclear Safety Standards Programme. On the subject of the operational safety review teams, he stressed the excellent results of the August 1985 mission to the Angra I nuclear power plant. According to UNSCEAR assessments, the medical uses of radiation were the major source of collective exposure. Brazil consequently appreciated the Agency's support for the Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory system, which played a fundamental role in the control of exposure levels.

76. The Agency was to be congratulated on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the International Nuclear Information Systems (INIS), in which Brazil had participated from the beginning. INIS had proved the usefulness for all countries, developing and industrialized alike, of the information exchanges conducted by it; that activity, which should continue, was one of the most important tasks assigned to the Agency.

77. The Brazilian Government was currently endeavouring to improve its national nuclear material control and accounting system to bring it as close as possible to the Agency's system. The Division of Safeguards of the National Nuclear Energy Commission had recently established a safeguards laboratory, designed with the help of the Agency's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, with which it would co-operate. As a result of the Brazilian authorities' efforts and of the co-operation between the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the new Brazilian laboratory, it had been possible to carry out measurements on all fuel assemblies at the Resende Fuel Fabrication Plant. A second project was being prepared in order to measure the irradiated fuel to be discharged from the Angra I power reactor. At the same time, a project in the area of safeguards had been agreed between Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany; its objective was to harmonize measurement methodologies and to compare the results obtained in Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Agency. In that respect, it was to be pointed out that Brazil had concluded an agreement with the Agency concerning two facility attachments to the Subsidiary Arrangements set forth in document INFCIRC/237.

78. Brazil had confidence in the Agency's activities in disseminating nuclear technology; the universal and non-discriminatory dissemination of the benefits resulting from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had in the past assured the Agency's credibility and would continue to do so in future.

79. Mr. SOWINSKI (Poland) noted that the Agency's activities were convincing proof of the necessity for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The principle co-ordination centre for such co-operation was the Agency, whose efficiency and authority resulted particularly from the competence of its management, its personnel and its experts. In that respect, the Secretariat was to be commended on its rational use of the resources placed at its disposal.

80. Strengthening the regime of non-proliferation had an essential place in endeavours to build peace and confidence in the world. In that connection he welcomed the agreement concluded by the Soviet Union to submit certain of its nuclear installations to Agency safeguards, which was a proof of the universality of NPT. He was further gratified that the first inspection on USSR territory had taken place very shortly after the agreement had been concluded.

81. He pointed out that the General Conference was meeting when the whole world's attention was directed towards the problems of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation which had been brought out at the Third NPT Review Conference. His delegation was gratified to note the positive results of that Conference, which had recommended that negotiations be started towards concluding a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests. The adoption by the USSR of a moratorium on tests was a very important initiative of which full advantage should be taken. The Agency played a predominant role in efforts to maintain and strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

82. The Polish delegation had examined with interest the Secretariat's report on the application of safeguards in 1984, which demonstrated that the Agency's safeguards system had been strengthened and that inspection activities had been concentrated on the most important tasks. Many problems remained to be resolved, but the fact that the Secretariat was transmitting a list of those problems to Member States was very encouraging. It appeared more and more evident that the existence of an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime was of paramount importance for international security and for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For that reason, the Polish delegation believed that the excellent progress made in the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) was an important step towards ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

83. He noted that a very serious problem remained to be resolved in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, namely the physical protection of nuclear materials to remove the risk of any illegal use of those materials. In 1983, Poland had ratified the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and hoped that the process of ratification by Member States would continue and accelerate.

84. He emphasized the Agency's acknowledged pre-eminent role in the matter of nuclear safety; it was true that the essential goal of international co-operation was to prevent any risk to the population and to persons occupationally exposed to radiation. Poland had used the Agency's nuclear safety norms to elaborate a law on safety in the utilization of nuclear energy. The systematic accumulation and analysis of data on nuclear plant operation facilitated the sharing of experience, which was directly useful for Member States and enabled the safety and reliability of nuclear installations to be improved.

85. The Incident Reporting System, to which 17 Member States had adhered, was of paramount importance for countries whose nuclear power generation programmes were just beginning. The Polish Parliament had just approved a programme to develop nuclear power generation under which the total installed capacity of nuclear power stations in the country would reach 8000 MW(e) in the year 2000. Despite major economic difficulties, Poland was obliged to develop its nuclear power generation industry because of the very high level of pollution suffered by some regions of the country through the use of coal and lignite in producing electrical and thermal energy. To that end, Poland was relying on close collaboration with the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries, as well as on the assistance and experience of the Agency.

86. His delegation congratulated the Agency on its nuclear energy activities under the technical assistance and co-operation programme, particularly in the matter of promoting sophisticated methods for improving harvests, reducing food losses and combating parasites. The results obtained in these areas were of particular interest to Poland, whose fundamental concern was that of ensuring self-sufficiency in food production. In order to achieve that end, Poland had to use nuclear techniques and create the necessary conditions for applying the scientific results obtained over the past 20 years by the FAO/IAEA Joint Division, in particular those concerning the preservation of agricultural products. Poland planned to set up between 1985 and 1989 two centres provided with large radiation sources. It was planning to use electron accelerators, which had many advantages in use and which were more economical than other sources.

87. He hoped that the Agency's assistance and co-operation would enable practical results to be obtained rapidly in applying those nuclear techniques. Poland, for its part, was prepared to place at the disposition of the Member States concerned the centres which it had set up for training experts and for exchanging information and experimental data. It was willing to play a very active part in implementing the Agency's programme in that area, and was also interested in extending the work on agricultural biotechnology carried out at Seibersdorf. Poland was also prepared to participate in that work as far as it was able; it had in fact already provided the Agency with Polish-made equipment for setting up a new laboratory. The effectiveness of that co-operation resided primarily in the exchange of scientific, technical and economic information, the International Nuclear Information System and in public information work. Those were of particular interest to Poland, but naturally did not exhaust all the possibilities for co-operation between Poland and the Agency. Those matters had been studied during the latest visit to Poland by the Director General and the Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and Safety.

88. Poland was currently constructing its first nuclear power plant, but had wide experience in the operation and use of research reactors. The EWA pool-type reactor, constructed in 1958 with Soviet assistance, had been converted by Polish experts, while the 30 MW MARIA reactor had been designed and built in Poland; Poland's research reactor experience could, in collaboration with the Agency, benefit developing countries. Poland was, moreover, prepared to run courses on research reactor operation, reactor technology and isotope and radiopharmaceutical production techniques.

89. He announced that the Polish Government would be contributing the equivalent of US \$213 000 in national currency to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, an amount fully commensurate with its share of the assessed budget. Poland was, moreover, prepared to grant ten fellowships to candidates from developing countries so that they could study in Polish research centres.

90. Mr. ZANGGER (Switzerland), speaking on behalf of his own country and of Liechtenstein, stated that the Agency, with its responsibilities, must be considered the driving force behind the peaceful utilization of nuclear

energy on a world scale; the work of all its departments was of equal importance, and the Agency played a prime role in international technical co-operation and in the creation of a climate of confidence between States.

91. International nuclear co-operation was particularly useful for small countries, and the Swiss Government had recently submitted to Parliament four proposals on the subject, relating to the ratification of a nuclear co-operation agreement with Egypt, signature and ratification of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, ratification of the recent amendment of the Agency's Statute and, finally, the amendment of Swiss legislation on the import and export of nuclear materials.

92. Three important events had taken place in Switzerland in the nuclear field. Firstly, towards the end of 1984, the Leibstadt power station, with a 940 MW(e) boiling-water reactor, had been commissioned. The total nuclear capacity of the country had thus reached 2.8 GW(e) and the nuclear contribution to overall electricity production would rise to approximately 40%. Secondly, in February 1985, the EDRA national radioactive waste storage company had submitted a report which showed that in Switzerland radioactive wastes could be eliminated in a lasting and secure manner by final storage. Finally, in March 1985, Parliament had approved the general licence for the Kaiseraugst plant: the next step would be the construction licence to be provided by the Swiss Government, and the plant was expected to be commissioned in 1995.

93. Moreover, nuclear district heating systems had been installed using the Beznau station, and steps were being taken to identify sites for low- and medium-level wastes in the Alps and to store a reserve stock of enriched uranium at the Federal Institute for Reactor Research at Würenlingen. The Beznau station, Mühleberg and Gösgen plants had functioned with almost no technical problems, thus giving a high level of availability. Availability from Swiss reactors as a whole had been, moreover, among the best in the world in 1984, having reached 89%.

94. In research and development, Switzerland was continuing the activities it had undertaken more than 12 years previously on high-temperature reactors. The main parties concerned, apart from the authorities, were the machine construction industry and engineering design offices. Also, the Federal Institute for Reactor Research had contributed very actively to that work and had carried out studies, in co-operation with industry, on small reactors (10-50 MW(th)) for district heating; a test installation could be developed in a few years. The Institute had also launched a physics programme for advanced pressurized-water systems, and also a development programme for nuclear fuel in the form of mixed uranium and plutonium carbide or oxide microspheres. It was also carrying out major studies on nuclear safety, and an appreciable fraction of that work was being done as part of international projects.

95. In thermonuclear fusion, work was continuing on tokamaks and on plasma heating, stability and confinement theory. That work, and also Switzerland's participation in the Joint European Torus (JET) project, were part of the collaboration between Switzerland and EURATOM; studies on plasma-wall interactions were being carried out using the International Energy Agency's "TEXTOR" experimental tokamak. A high-current proton ring accelerator was being used to study the mechanical behaviour under irradiation of the primary wall of a fusion reactor. In the field of superconductivity, Switzerland had in 1984 delivered one of the six giant coils for the "Large Coil Task" programme, carried out in the United States under the aegis of the International Energy Agency.

96. The report showed that in 1984 world nuclear capacity had increased substantially from 190 to 220 GW(e). However, a period of stagnation was setting in, and should first and foremost be devoted to work on technical standardization, the simplification of licensing procedures, increasing plant availability and research into new nuclear applications and technologies. Switzerland considered the Agency's activities very useful, and his delegation emphasized particularly the importance of the NUSS programme, at present nearing completion, and of the nuclear heating programme, which it felt should have a place among the Agency's future priorities.

97. Eight meetings of experts or consultants would have taken place in Switzerland during the period 1984-1986. In addition, preparations were being made for the International Symposium on the Packaging and Transport of Radioactive Materials (PATRAM), to be held at Davos in June 1986. Organizing four or five events of that kind each year was a major effort for a small country such as Switzerland; to which must be added its participation in other Agency meetings, as Switzerland had been represented in 1984 at 12 symposia or seminars and at 38 meetings of technical committees or working groups. He therefore hoped the Agency would do all in its power to reduce the number of meetings, regrouping them by priority sectors as required.

98. The quantity of nuclear material under Agency safeguards had increased, and progress had been made in applying safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States. The Agency's activities in the field of safeguards had enabled useful experience of verification procedures to be acquired, which could be used in implementing future agreements on disarmament. It was, however, cause for concern that some non-nuclear-weapon countries were operating installations which were important from the point of view of safeguards, but not subject to them. For that reason, nuclear co-operation with those countries was considered to present a risk of nuclear-weapon proliferation; it was therefore imperative, in the interests of non-proliferation and co-operation, that those countries should show a spirit of solidarity and submit all their nuclear activities to safeguards.

99. The Agency was an authority of primary importance for developing a global co-operation regime, within which supplies could be assured more predictably and over a longer term, taking into account mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation. At present CAS was primarily responsible for that task; in its current work, it seemed that it had defined, in a balanced manner, the requirements for both security of supply and for non-proliferation. If the members of CAS maintained a constructive attitude, approval of the principles being elaborated should be possible. During the discussions of the Committee, the idea had been put forward that it might be possible to move on to a permanent study of the nuclear supply situation.

That study might be considered, to a certain degree, to be the counterpart of the Agency's work concerning assurances of non-proliferation, and would enable abnormal supply situations to be avoided or to be corrected if they arose.

100. He was very gratified by the results of the Third NPT Review Conference and hoped that the provisions adopted in the Final Document would be observed, and would thus facilitate the developments of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

101. Mr. KATTAN (Saudi Arabia) recalled that the Agency's mandate was to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with the goal of bringing happiness and prosperity to humanity. It was therefore for the General Conference, on the one hand, to consider the work accomplished up to the present time, and, on the other, to prepare for the future by taking all steps likely to develop its activities and raise efficiency. Its responsibility under the Statute was also to condemn acts contrary to the goals of peace and prosperity which it had set itself, and prevent a recurrence of such acts where they did arise.

102. He supported the Secretariat's efforts to improve the presentation of the budget and hoped that they would continue. In that respect, he particularly welcomed the consultations between the Secretariat and Member States.

103. The technical assistance programme, whose importance no longer required proof, must be a subject of particular attention for the Secretariat, particularly in the matter of planning multi-year programmes and following up their implementation.

104. Concerning the increase in the number of Professional staff from Third World countries in conformity with resolution GC(XXV)/RES/386, particularly in senior and policy-making posts, Saudi Arabia shared the Director General's opinion that the Agency's policy on the subject should be based first and foremost on applying the criterion of competence. From that point of view, activities aimed at training experts from developing countries were particularly useful, and it was his firm belief that they should continue.

105. In 1984, world nuclear production of electricity had increased by 17% and no less than 34 power reactors in 13 countries had been linked to the grid. Moreover, the production costs of energy from conventional sources were tending to increase relative to the cost of electricity from nuclear sources. The Agency was therefore encouraging research into small and medium power reactors suited to the economies and distribution networks of developing countries, with a view to promoting the introduction of power reactors in those countries. Saudi Arabia was awaiting the results of that research with interest, as the development of such reactors would most likely give a fresh boost to the peaceful nuclear industry and would thus be in the interest of suppliers themselves.

106. With regard to nuclear safety, the developed countries and the Secretariat should strive ceaselessly to find technologically and ecologically reliable solutions for the final storage of wastes. In that respect, he wished to reaffirm that the marine environment should never be considered as a repository for high-level wastes. In addition, given the exorbitant cost for small countries of acquiring power reactors, it would be in their interest, as the Director General had suggested, to conclude agreements with suppliers aimed at setting up joint enterprises for the construction and operation of power stations.

107. It had become apparent at the Third NPT Review Conference that some of the articles of the Treaty must be amended if it was to become acceptable to all. Moreover, it seemed that the moment had arrived to consider what progress had been made in the disarmament negotiations: it was in fact high time that tangible results were obtained.

108. As the Director General had emphasized at the NPT Review Conference, nuclear power was less likely to gain wide acceptance if there were no agreement on the matter of the threat of armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations; it would be necessary to adopt a legal instrument, acceptable to all countries, which formally prohibited such attacks. Nevertheless, it was essential that no new restrictions should thereby be applied to the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies – restrictions which some might use as a pretext for applying even more rigorous conditions than before to such transfers.

109. As to the need for prohibiting military attacks against peaceful nuclear installations, delegates would recall that Israel was the only State so far to have carried out such an attack. Israel, and South Africa also, were driven by belligerent designs; they refused to abide by the safeguards regime and were attempting in every way to develop their nuclear capacities for purposes of domination and aggression. On that subject, it was known that only recently an American company had delivered to Israel a timing device which it could use for its nuclear weapons; that country had moreover purchased uranium from two European countries with ulterior motives which were certainly not peaceful. Only adherence to NPT gave proof of the peaceful intent of a country's nuclear programme.

110. With regard to the technical assistance programme, delegates would recall that under the terms of resolution GC(XXV)/RES/388 the Board of Governors had been requested to take steps to ensure that technical assistance would be funded through the Regular Budget or through other comparably predictable and assured resources. It was in fact unthinkable that the current situation should continue; technical assistance was one of the most important activities of the Agency and it was absolutely normal that it should be funded through the Regular Budget, which would guarantee its continuity and expansion.

111. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq), in answer to a statement made at the previous plenary session, stated that in his earlier speech he had demonstrated that Iran was responsible for continuing the war. That country had rejected all peace initiatives, including those of the non-aligned countries and of the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference. It had also refused those of Iraq and insisted on continuing the war. Under such circumstances, Iran alone bore the responsibility for all the consequences of that war.

112. As to the allusion to the Bushehr site, he drew the attention of the General Conference to the letter dated 12 March 1985, which the Resident Representative of Iraq had had distributed through the Agency. As the Director General of the Agency had made clear before the Board of Governors on 19 February 1985, the Bushehr site contained no nuclear material, had no facility attachment and was not subject to Agency safeguards; therefore, it could not qualify as a "nuclear facility".

113. Iraq had always affirmed its undertaking not to attack peaceful nuclear installations, particularly those subject to the Agency's safeguards, and had also urged all States to reach an agreement to that effect. Iraq had, moreover, repeatedly rejected and refuted Iran's groundless allegations. It had not attacked the Bushehr plant, although it was located near the port of Bushehr, which fell within the zone of military operations as defined by Iraq. It was also evident that the only solution to that problem and to all the other problems emanating from the aggressive war waged by Iran against Iraq, lay in putting an end to that war, so that the two countries might live in peace.

114. It was to be noted that every time an international forum discussed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear research centre, Iran reiterated its allegations and unfounded accusations. Iraq would not allow itself to be influenced by those manoeuvres and would not alter its basic position; Iraq and Iran alone had been the victim of both Israeli and Iranian aggression. On that subject, he referred delegates to an article published in the International Herald Tribune that very day.

115. Mr. ASADI (Islamic Republic of Iran), in exercise of the right of reply, returned to the Iraqi delegate's allegations concerning attacks on civilian areas. Apart from the fact that those allegations were completely groundless, they were totally out of context and were irrelevant to the discussions. It was his opinion that the President ought to have called that delegate to order and requested him to keep to the subject under discussion.

116. The Iraqi delegate had resorted to that hypocritical manoeuvre in order to divert the attention of the General Conference away from the question at issue, namely, that of the armed attacks perpetrated by his country against the Bushehr nuclear power plant and against the Tehran nuclear research centre. In that respect, documents GOV/INF/471 and Add.1, GOV/INF/472 and GOV/INF/480 sufficed to support Iran's position concerning the Iraqi military attacks against Iranian nuclear installations. He called anew upon the Agency to dispatch a fact-finding mission to enquire into the matter and to prepare a report.

117. Despite his delegation's reluctance to raise the subject, it was bound to remind the General Conference that it had been established, as United Nations documents showed, that the Iraqi régime had taken the initiative in attacking civilian areas during the war which it had imposed since September 1980 on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Concerning the undertaking concluded with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 12 June 1984, he referred the General Conference to Security Council document S/16897 of 16 January 1985, which clearly established that the said undertaking had been violated by the Iraqi régime. Finally, he cited the statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 2 July 1985, in which the Secretary-General had particularly deplored Iraq's announcement that that country would resume military attacks against civilian areas in Iran.

118. Although the Iraqi delegation feigned ignorance, the international community was well aware of the blatant and continued violations of international law and conventions committed by its régime. His delegation left it to the General Conference to judge whether it was fitting for Iraq to make before it its hypocritical pleas for a travesty of peace.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

