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PROVISIONAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center, Vienna,
on Tuesday, 22 September 1987, at 3.55 p.m.

President: Mr. COLOMBO (Italy)
later: Mr. AVENDAÑO (Ecuador)

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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document
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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1986 (continued) (GC(XXXI)/800 and Corr.1)

1. Mr. AMROLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) read out a message from the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Mirhossein Mousavi, to the International Atomic Energy Agency on its thirtieth anniversary:

"In accordance with Islamic thinking, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that science and technology are the common heritage of mankind and that all nations have the sovereign and inalienable right to choose, apply, develop and pursue their programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their needs, interests and priorities, provided that morality is taken into serious consideration as a determinant factor.

"It is regrettable that, today, access to vitally useful and universal knowledge, particularly regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, is monopolized by the great Powers, which prevent it from spreading to other countries.

"Not only has the triumphant march of science and technology that we are witnessing today not yet touched the lives of millions of people in the Third World, but the Earth is faced with the nightmarish threat to the survival of humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the escalation of the arms race. Once more, human life is being jeopardized by the fact that knowledge and science do not go hand in hand with virtue and morality.

"Specialized international organizations such as the IAEA are expected to provide the maximum amount of co-operation and assistance to developing countries in order to remove the aforementioned constraints and obstacles.

"Finally, I would like to express my sincere wishes for the IAEA's success in achieving its statutory objective, which is to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world."

2. The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran hoped that the General Conference would be successful and would promote international co-operation in order to eliminate the existing obstacles to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

3. Islam taught respect for friendly and peaceful relations between the followers of all religions, irrespective of race, nationality and colour. Islamic thinking did not recognize any geographical frontiers to knowledge and science, which it regarded as the common heritage of all mankind. However, Islam believed that there had to be some criterion for controlled knowledge

and science which was not to be found in the developed and advanced world: without morality or virtue, knowledge changed to become a weapon in the hands of rich and powerful forces.

4. The Agency was empowered to search everywhere in a poor Third World country to find one gram of uranium, but it was not entitled even to mention the arsenals of the superpowers specifically, and of course it had no right to inspect them. Furthermore, it was becoming increasingly difficult for Third World countries to develop their nuclear industry, and nuclear programmes in those countries could regularly be seen to fail, mainly as a result of the difficulties and barriers erected by the industrialized countries. The capitalist régimes created enormous obstacles to the transfer of technology to developing countries, even though more than two thirds of the fissionable materials available to the industrialized world belonged to Third World countries.

5. During the 17 years which had elapsed since the entry into force of the NPT, there had been tremendous proliferation of nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons tests, the deployment of nuclear arsenals in non-nuclear-weapon States and the militarization of space had increased sharply. The developing countries and the world as a whole were extremely concerned and very disappointed. Even more discouraging was the fact that the Agency's safeguards had not prevented or even reduced vertical and horizontal proliferation - mainly because nuclear installations in nuclear-weapon States and in countries which had not accepted internationally binding commitments, such as Israel and South Africa, were not fully covered by Agency safeguards.

6. The more the developing countries fulfilled their obligations under treaties such as NPT, the less they benefited from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) had not succeeded, after more than five years, in establishing an internationally acceptable system of assurances in that respect.

7. The Board of Governors was one of the main policy-making organs of the Agency. The composition of the Board was therefore a question of considerable interest to Member States. Although it was mentioned in the Agency's Statute,

the need for equitable representation of Member States on the Board of Governors was not fully reflected in Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, since the areas of Africa and of the Middle East and South Asia were both under-represented.

8. The inconsistency of the Statute and its unjust treatment of Member States had discouraged the developing countries in those two areas, particularly during the past decade in which resolutions calling for a prompt amendment had been repeatedly adopted but not implemented.

9. His country had participated constructively in the meetings of the informal working group established by the Board of Governors in accordance with General Conference resolution GC(XXX)/RES/467 in order to consider the revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole. As reflected in the report by the Chairman of that group (GOV/2309), almost all the participants believed that the article should be revised to ensure equitable geographical distribution. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran supported the majority which favoured giving first priority to the amendment of Article VI.A.2 before the Agency's credibility was further damaged.

10. The lack of any criteria to facilitate equitable representation of the Middle East and South Asia area and the ambition of one or two members of that area, had deprived other States, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, of a seat on the Board. That double under-representation was unjust and detrimental and needed to be given serious consideration.

11. On the basis of United Nations General Assembly resolution 32/50 and after a long preparation period, the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) had finally been held in Geneva from 23 March to 10 April 1987. His country had participated actively in the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference, and in the special Group of 77 Conference task force and in the Conference itself. It had not been possible to reach consensus on the main questions, namely universally acceptable principles of international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and means of promoting such co-operation. During the Conference, his country had submitted, in

document A/CONF.108/L.16, a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of terrorist and armed attacks against all nuclear installations". The Conference had not adopted that draft or any other owing to a lack of agreement on other important questions, particularly the principles just mentioned.

12. Nuclear safety had acquired a new international dimension after the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. It was essential to promote international co-operation for the exchange of experience, the preparation of safety standards, and the sharing of responsibility for safety between suppliers and recipients.

13. The Agency was expected to help developing countries establish the necessary national infrastructure to ensure the safe use of nuclear energy. The credibility and usefulness of an international organization such as the Agency depended on its objectives and its functions, and on its effectiveness in implementing in full the decisions and resolutions adopted by its Member States. The principle of universality could be applied only to Member States which were united by universally acceptable principles as well as by resolutions adopted by the international organization in question. The main political problems facing the Agency were: the violation of the spirit of the Agency's Statute and the persistent refusal to abide by its resolutions on the part of the Zionist and racist régimes of Israel and South Africa; the unbalanced representation of Member States on the Board of Governors and the non-implementation of the resolutions adopted on that subject during the past decade; the terrorist and military attacks and threats by Israel and Iraq against nuclear facilities; the impossibility of guaranteeing and predicting the level of the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund; and the application of the principle of zero growth to the Agency's promotional activities. Those obstacles had led to the politicization of the Agency and seriously jeopardized its credibility and the effectiveness of its promotional and regulatory functions. In order to eliminate those obstacles, his delegation proposed that the following measures be adopted: to suspend Israel and South Africa from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership in accordance with Article XIX.B of the Statute, bearing in mind the recommendation by the Board of Governors in document GC(XXXI)/807 and the fact

that the very existence of both régimes was unfounded and illegal; to amend Article VI.A.2 of the Statute immediately so as to correct the under-representation of the areas of Africa and of the Middle East and South Asia; to adopt without delay an international convention on the prohibition of terrorist and military attacks against all nuclear facilities; to finance the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund from the Regular Budget instead of from voluntary contributions; and to abolish the policy of zero growth for promotional activities.

14. In conclusion, summarizing the activities of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran during the past year, he said it had been very active in research and development, particularly in medicine and agriculture. The Gamma Irradiation Centre was, according to international experts including those from the Agency, the best Centre of its kind in the Middle East. Despite all the foreign pressure, it had been possible during the past year to examine all the foodstuffs exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran and to send back contaminated substances to the suppliers. Finally, his delegation wished to inform other countries that there was no place in the Islamic Republic of Iran for the storage of their contaminated materials.

15. Mr. SITZLACK (German Democratic Republic) expressed once again the sincere congratulations of his Government to the Agency which, during the 30 years of its existence, had made a considerable contribution to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

16. One of the Agency's activities which had developed significantly was technical co-operation. Whereas the Agency's technical assistance budget during its first year had been \$250 000, the target for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund had by now reached almost \$40 million. That increase in financial resources had been accompanied by a considerable improvement in quality as a result of new project formulas such as multi-year and regional projects, increased participation of technical Departments, systematic evaluation of project implementation and the more active role played by developing countries.

17. His country supported the Agency's technical co-operation activities by paying its share of the target for voluntary contributions as well as by providing equipment and material and endeavouring to train scientists from developing countries. Thus, 12 training courses and 16 study tours had already taken place in the German Democratic Republic and some 50 fellows from developing countries had received individual training. Moreover, his country had donated to the Agency a high-quality research microscope for the new agricultural facilities at Seibersdorf.

18. Turning to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, he confirmed his Government's position that nuclear energy had an extremely important role to play in solving energy problems, provided very high safety standards were observed. It had been clearly demonstrated at UNCPICPUNE that many countries held the same view. At the last meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), in approving the CMEA nuclear power plant construction programme up to the year 2000, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic had stressed that his country would continue to attach the highest priority to safety in the implementation of its nuclear power programme.

19. The period which had elapsed since the previous session of the General Conference had been marked by a number of important events, in particular the entry into force of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

20. In addition to the efforts it made to avoid any nuclear accident, his country, like others, had taken steps to comply with the requirements of those Conventions. Furthermore, in accordance with article 9 of the Early Notification Convention, bilateral agreements had been or would be concluded with neighbouring States.

21. Just as nuclear safety and radiation protection were an integral part of all nuclear activities, safeguards were inseparably associated with the use of nuclear materials. The credible assurance provided by Agency safeguards that States were respecting their non-proliferation commitments did much to help create a climate of mutual confidence between States. Thus, he welcomed

the fact that in 1986, as in previous years, nuclear material under Agency safeguards had been used for peaceful nuclear activities or had been otherwise adequately accounted for. His country had always endeavoured to provide maximum support for the Agency's safeguards system in view of its importance for international security. That was why it had organized eight training courses for newly recruited inspectors and two courses on safeguards for trainees from developing countries.

22. In future, those activities would be carried out under an official support programme for Agency safeguards. From 1988, his Government would provide services up to a value of 300 000 marks per year in support of the Agency's safeguards system.

23. The problems of the physical protection of nuclear materials were closely linked to the question of safeguards. Eight years after its adoption, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material had entered into force. That was a welcome development, but he hoped it would also be possible to reach an international agreement on the physical protection of nuclear facilities.

24. The future of mankind would depend to a large extent on developments in the field of nuclear energy, and in particular of nuclear weapons. The existing huge arsenals of nuclear weapons caused concern and mistrust between nations and constituted a serious threat to mankind.

25. At the meeting of their Political Consultative Committee in Berlin, the Warsaw Pact States had submitted a comprehensive programme aimed at promoting international agreements to halt the arms race and encourage disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, with the aim of achieving general and complete disarmament. His Government supported unreservedly the Soviet initiative to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The implementation of the Soviet proposals (refusal to use nuclear weapons first, cessation of nuclear weapons tests, establishment of nuclear-free zones, reduction of the number of nuclear weapons, and elimination of medium- and short-range missiles) would lay the foundations for a world free of nuclear weapons. His delegation therefore welcomed the agreement reached the previous week between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

26. In the 30 years of its existence, the Agency had achieved outstanding successes in both its promotional and its regulatory activities, thereby demonstrating its competence to deal with all questions related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Under its auspices, international co-operation had proved useful in solving common problems, and the Agency could continue to count on the active co-operation of the German Democratic Republic.

27. Mr. BATTAGLIA (Italy) said that, since the Chernobyl accident, there had been considerable progress in improving awareness of the role of safety in the exploitation of nuclear energy and in strengthening international co-operation in that area. That progress was demonstrated not only by the many initiatives taken within the Agency and elsewhere, but also by important facts which had been raised during technical and political discussions. Generally, there was now an awareness of the important role which the Agency had played and would continue to play in achieving two parallel goals: improved safety and closer international co-operation.

28. In that context, his Government believed that the Agency's increased responsibilities called for a strengthening of its policy-making organs; in particular, the Board of Governors should be made more representative by a revision of Article VI of the Statute. That was why Italy, together with Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, had submitted a proposal which would both enable a larger number of important countries to participate in the work of the Board and ensure more adequate geographical representation, while maintaining the existing delicate balance. At all events, Italy would continue to give its full support to the Agency so that it could play an increasing role in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

29. Among the initiatives already taken by the Agency, Italy regarded the adoption of the Convention on Early Notification and the Convention on Emergency Assistance as a remarkable success, even though it considered that the agreed wording of the former made it difficult to apply and restricted its scope. During the negotiations, his country had indicated a clear preference for a broader definition of nuclear accidents than that which had been finally adopted. It would have liked that definition to cover not only those

accidents which might be expected to have significant transboundary radiological consequences, but all significant nuclear accidents. His Government wished to stress the urgent need to arrive at a clear definition of the concept of a nuclear accident with significant radiological effects.

30. His country supported the Agency's NUSS programme, which was currently being revised. The technical delegations of all countries had recognized that the five Codes of Practice constituted a good international reference for nuclear safety. The safety codes would now have to be updated in the light of the latest experiences and he hoped that the revision process would be completed as soon as possible so that Member States could adapt their national legislation in that area. Italy would also welcome the establishment of a common system guaranteeing a satisfactory level of uniformity at the international level and was in favour of a formal commitment such as adherence to a multilateral convention.

31. Furthermore, his country supported the balanced development of co-ordinated research programmes at the international level in the area of safety and radiation protection. The decommissioning of nuclear power plants was a question worthy of particular interest, and his country was ready to make available its Garigliano nuclear power plant for the implementation of an international programme to study the different stages of the decommissioning process.

32. The direct support which the Agency could provide to Member States in evaluating power plant safety, particularly through the OSART and ASSET teams, was equally important; his country had submitted its Caorso nuclear power plant to review by an OSART team and could testify to the quality of that programme. Italy was convinced that if maximum use were made of those teams and if the main nuclear countries submitted their plants to them, they would do much to improve collective safety. The OSART mission had confirmed that the management system at the Caorso power plant was reliable and that the level of safety was satisfactory, as had already been established by the competent national authority. However, the plant had not been put back into operation because it was considered wise to await the completion of an improved emergency plan, the preparation of which was already well advanced.

33. With regard to the non-proliferation regime and the implementation of safeguards agreements, his country noted with satisfaction that the Safeguards Implementation Report for 1986 once again did not indicate any diversion of nuclear materials or equipment under safeguards. In that context, it was also very important that countries which had a military nuclear capability should voluntarily submit their power plants to the safeguards system with a view to improving the climate of confidence between signatories to the NPT, increasing the transparency of that system, and thereby encouraging other countries to accede to it, as Spain had recently done. His delegation reiterated that, while it was in favour of the full-scope safeguards envisaged by the Treaty, it considered it desirable that general acceptance thereof be obtained through persuasion and with the consent of each State.

34. His country had always attached great importance to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, which it regarded as a good way of initiating a lasting development process. It had concentrated its assistance on sectors such as agriculture, hydrology, medicine and training. Not only did it provide a large number of fellowships, it also made a substantial contribution to the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste which at present represented about 90% of the total resources allocated to the Centre.

35. In conclusion, his delegation recalled that the Chernobyl accident had had significant consequences on the energy plan which had already been approved by the Italian Parliament. The doubts and concerns raised by that accident had provided arguments to the section of public opinion which was calling for a review of Italy's nuclear programmes. Three referendums were to take place shortly on the abrogation of laws concerning the siting of power plants, financial contributions to local authorities, and the participation of the National Electricity Board (ENEL) in international programmes. Since the beginning of the debate sparked off by Chernobyl, his Government had tried to provide rational answers to public concerns and had linked, even more strictly than in the past, the development of energy sources, both nuclear and conventional, to maximum levels of safety for the population and the environment. The Agency could provide real assistance as an authoritative point of reference in such debates: there was an increased need for safety

and control which all countries should meet by strengthening their co-operation. It was obvious that the future growth of nuclear energy in many countries would depend to a considerable extent on the way in which the Agency reacted.

36. Mr. ABAZA (Egypt) said that the Agency was playing an increasingly important role as a forum for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that past crises, of which the most recent had been the Chernobyl accident, had shown that the Agency was able to deal with the situation. Thus, in 1986, the Agency had carried out remarkable work in the area of nuclear safety and radiation protection, the most notable result of which had been the ratification and entry in force, in a relatively short time, of the Convention on Early Notification and the Convention on Emergency Assistance. With the full co-operation of all its Member States, it had managed to a considerable extent to re-establish the confidence of international public opinion, which had been seriously shaken by the Chernobyl accident, as a result of which a number of States, including Egypt, had been led to review their nuclear power plans and programmes.

37. Despite the repercussions of the Chernobyl accident, nuclear power remained an important source of energy. Thus, in 1986, its share in world electricity production had increased by 8.9% over the previous year, representing more than 15% of world electricity production and, by the end of the century, that proportion was expected to increase still further to 20-22%. There was no doubt that the expansion of nuclear energy and the strengthening of its role as a factor in economic and social development would raise numerous problems for Member States and for the Agency, which should sustain the momentum gained following the Chernobyl accident by intensifying efforts to guarantee a maximum level of safety.

38. In that context, he welcomed the Agency's efforts to enable a maximum number of States to use that form of energy safely. Remarkable results had been obtained by the Senior Expert Group on Mechanisms to Assist Developing Countries in the Promotion and Financing of Nuclear Power Programmes. That Group, which had been set up following a proposal which Egypt had had the honour of making in the Board of Governors in February 1986, had drawn up,

after detailed discussions with the World Bank, recommendations which emphasized that the Agency had an important role to play in assisting developing countries in planning and implementing their nuclear power programmes. His delegation hoped that those recommendations would be adopted in full and that the Agency would take them into account in preparing its programmes, particularly those on financing, which was one of the main obstacles facing developing countries.

39. The Agency had participated actively in UNCPICPUNE, which had been held from 23 March to 10 April 1987 at Geneva; documents had been presented there dealing with various aspects of international co-operation, and different ways of strengthening it had been discussed. Despite the absence of agreement on universally acceptable principles of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on ways of strengthening that co-operation, there was no doubt that the Conference had been an important step forward.

40. His delegation considered that the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) was the appropriate forum for continuing the examination of principles of international co-operation within the Agency and urged that CAS should resume its work as soon as possible. He welcomed the efforts made by CAS since its establishment in 1980 and was pleased that it had been able to agree on measures to establish an emergency and back-up system and measures concerning the revision of nuclear material supply agreements from which countries could already benefit. It should be emphasized in that connection that the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy presupposed a stable, equitable and non-discriminatory supply of nuclear materials.

41. Egypt, as a developing country, attached great importance to the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities. It considered that the Agency and the advanced countries had a special responsibility to help developing countries to keep pace with technical developments and to take advantage of the considerable potential of nuclear energy, whether for agriculture, medicine, industry or energy production. The steady increase of recent years in the resources of the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund was very welcome, as was also the decision taken by the General Conference at its twenty-ninth session to increase those resources by 12% each year.

42. Egypt and the majority of developing countries had benefited from the assistance provided by the Agency in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, training and the transfer of advanced technology. Egypt was particularly interested in assistance activities which aimed to increase the number of qualified personnel able to implement peaceful nuclear programmes. It hoped that the Agency would provide it with increased assistance in that area in future.

43. Where the Regular Budget was concerned, it was essential to authorize an annual rate of increase for the promotional activities, since they were becoming increasingly important, particularly for the developing countries.

44. His delegation considered that the Agency's safeguards system made a significant contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore urged that it be strengthened. The system, as was well known, had serious gaps which were detrimental to its effectiveness, particularly in view of Israel's and South Africa's refusal to place all their nuclear facilities under safeguards in accordance with the many decisions taken by the Agency's General Conference and the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. The nuclear activities of those two States gave cause for serious concern in the international community in general, and in African and Arab countries in particular. Their nuclear facilities should be placed under Agency safeguards because that was essential for international peace and security.

45. In that connection, Egypt advocated the denuclearization of the Middle East and since 1984 had been proposing the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in that part of the world. The United Nations General Assembly had adopted several resolutions along those lines, the last of which had been unanimous. Egypt also considered that Africa should be declared a nuclear-free zone.

46. At its present session, the General Conference would examine the question of South Africa's nuclear capabilities in the light of the many resolutions adopted at previous sessions. Those resolutions had not provoked any reaction on the part of the racist régime in Pretoria, which persisted in its obstinacy and continued to defy international laws and practices, as well

as all the resolutions of the United Nations and the Agency. That situation was a source of permanent concern to African States, in view of the aggressive nature of the South African régime and the dubious aims of its nuclear activities, and seriously jeopardized peace and security in the region and in the world. In June, the Board of Governors had decided that it was necessary to take a firm stance with regard to that régime and had adopted a recommendation that the General Conference should suspend South Africa from the exercise of its rights and privileges as a Member State of the Agency in accordance with Article XIX.B of the Statute. His delegation joined delegations from African States in supporting the recommendation and urged Member States which had not yet done so to cease all forms of nuclear co-operation with the South African régime and, in particular, to cease all transfers of fissionable material and all transfers of technology that could contribute to the development of its nuclear weapon capability.

47. At its special session, the General Conference had referred to the Board of Governors several proposals submitted by a number of Member States so that the Board could examine them and submit a full report. Egypt had participated actively in the consideration of those proposals at the Board's meetings in December 1986 and February, June and September 1987 and wished now to reaffirm its position on them. First, it fully supported the proposals relating to the prohibition of armed attacks against nuclear facilities and to the sharing of nuclear-safety-related information submitted by Mexico on behalf of the Group of 77. The question of prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities had been examined in detail during previous sessions of the General Conference; it was now essential to adopt internationally binding measures to protect facilities from any armed attack or terrorist action, since the consequences of such attacks would not be restricted to the States on the territory of which the facility was located, but were likely to spread to other States and even other regions. In its resolutions, the United Nations General Assembly had emphasized on several occasions the need to strengthen international efforts aimed at concluding an international agreement prohibiting such attacks. That necessity had been underlined, on the basis of an Egyptian proposal, by the Third NPT Review Conference, too.

It had also been reaffirmed in resolutions of the Agency's General Conference. Thus, the time had come to take the necessary measures in conjunction with the other international institutions involved.

48. Secondly, Egypt supported the efforts made by the Agency, both individually and in co-operation with the other international organizations concerned, to discuss the co-ordination, planning and implementation of intervention measures in the case of radioactive contamination. It welcomed the efforts aimed at establishing intervention dose levels, particularly for foodstuffs. In that context, it believed that the establishment of international safety standards for the distribution of food products must be a matter of international responsibility. It was quite unacceptable that food products considered unfit for human or animal consumption in the industrialized world should be exported to the Third World. That was why Egypt was requesting the Agency, as well as the other international organizations concerned, to take measures at the international level to ban the export of such products.

49. Thirdly, Egypt endorsed the efforts to prepare a binding international instrument on international nuclear liability, and supported the Board's decision concerning the harmonization of the Vienna and Paris conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage, a question which should be followed up and examined attentively.

50. Egypt, convinced of the importance of nuclear energy, had set up a programme for the construction of power plants. After the Chernobyl accident, like many other States, it had been forced to review its programme in order to establish all the necessary safety guarantees. The Agency could undoubtedly provide considerable support and assistance to his country in that area so that it could use that important source of energy for its economic and social development.

51. Egypt wanted an impetus to be given to its existing activities in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which related to the training of personnel, the transfer of technology and the improvement of local expertise to enable it to participate in reactor construction, radioactive waste management and quality assurance. Furthermore, Egypt was encouraging the use of nuclear power for the development of industry, medicine and agriculture and supporting national radiation protection programmes.

52. In conclusion, he wished to congratulate the Agency on its thirtieth anniversary, to commend it for its remarkable work and for the assistance it had provided to Egypt, and to emphasize that the Agency was a unique model of excellence and efficiency within the United Nations system.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION
(GC(XXXI)/799, Add.1 and 2)

53. The PRESIDENT announced that the General Committee had recommended that the General Conference include in its agenda all the items listed in the provisional agenda contained in document GC(XXXI)/799. With regard to the supplementary items proposed by Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic in documents GC(XXXI)/799/Add. 1 and 2, the delegations of those countries had agreed to merge them without materially changing their substance, and so the General Committee was recommending that the agenda include an item entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat".

54. The General Committee recommended further that the items be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in document GC(XXXI)/799, and that the item entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat" be discussed in plenary meeting.

55. It also recommended that the order in which the items appeared in document GC(XXXI)/799 be retained, the item entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat" being included immediately after the item entitled "General debate and annual report for 1986", and the other items being renumbered accordingly.

56. It was so decided.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION
(GC(XXXI)/799)

57. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had authorized him to inform the General Conference that it recommended fixing Friday, 25 September 1987, as the closing date of the thirty-first regular session and Monday, 19 September 1988, as the opening date of the thirty-second regular session of the General Conference, which would be held in Vienna.

58. It was so decided.

COMMUNICATION RECEIVED BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL FROM NICARAGUA
(GC(XXXI)/INF/253)

59. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee recommended to the General Conference that it accede to Nicaragua's request not to apply to it Article XIX.A of the Statute during the thirty-first regular session of the General Conference.

60. It was so decided

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1986 (resumed) (GC(XXXI)/800 and Corr.1)

61. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) wished, on the occasion of the Agency's thirtieth anniversary, to express his congratulations to the Agency's Secretariat, which had carried out excellent work under the guidance of three successive Directors General.

62. During the past thirty years, the Agency had succeeded in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy and in preventing the diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes. As a result, nuclear techniques were now widely used throughout the world - in medicine, biology and agriculture, for food preservation, in hydrology, industry and many other useful applications and, in addition, there were 397 power reactors in service. All the same, that period had also been marked by disappointments and setbacks, the most important of which had been the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, as well as the Israeli military attack against Iraq's Tamuz reactor.

63. The growth of nuclear power production had slowed down appreciably throughout the world. The annual report published by the Agency in 1974 had foreseen that, in the year 2000, there would be an installed nuclear capacity of 4.45×10^6 MW. That figure was 17 times higher than the actual nuclear capacity installed. The Agency's latest forecasts were lower by about 90% than the 1974 forecasts and by 45% than those of 1980. The reasons for that rapid decline were closely linked with factors such as safety, security, economy, waste management, radiological hazards and human failure. Moreover, the radiological consequences of Chernobyl and their political implications had seriously shaken confidence in nuclear power. Such confidence could not

be regained by hasty action or exaggerated reaction. The situation called for cool examination of what needed to be done to improve safety standards, taking into account the following considerations.

64. Nuclear power was an essential source of energy for the world in general and for developing countries in particular. That energy sector had problems of its own, however, and had suffered serious setbacks as a result of severe accidents.

65. The availability of fossil fuels and the current state of the oil market did not militate in favour of growth of nuclear power, even if safety standards were raised.

66. The public's hostility to nuclear power was the result of nuclear testing and the feverish arms race. It would therefore never be possible to regain public confidence entirely without a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests as a first definite step towards an ultimate stop to the nuclear arms race. It would not be possible really to guarantee safety and security until all nuclear weapons had been finally eliminated.

67. Any deliberate armed attack against a nuclear facility was a safety-related question. No safety measure could be complete without an international consensus on the prohibition of armed attacks against nuclear facilities.

68. Scientific and technical work should be conducted with a view to improving safety. The Agency should continue to intensify its activities in that field, and it should continue to receive from the principal energy-producing countries the support it needed to carry out all the approved activities efficiently.

69. It was not enough to take note of the results obtained by the Agency in the field of safety. The countries concerned should undertake, in one way or another, to implement the NUSS Codes, otherwise that type of activity would be little more than a theoretical exercise.

70. Nuclear safety was not an objective in itself, but an integral part of the technology of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. For that reason, it could not take on its full significance without a strengthening of

international co-operation aimed at loosening the restrictions imposed on the flow of material, equipment, technology, information and services within a framework of effective and acceptable non-proliferation arrangements.

71. His delegation regretted to note that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) had dashed the hopes which had been placed in it and that the considerable effort invested over the years in the preparatory work had come to nothing. The only positive conclusion of the Conference had perhaps been that the Agency should continue to play an important role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In Iraq's view, that conclusion had prevented the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) from directly falling victim to the Conference. He hoped that, thanks to concerted efforts on the part of Member States, CAS would be given a new start.

72. Since 1979, the General Conference had been considering the case of South Africa, in particular its racist policies and its nuclear capabilities. After some years of indecision, the Board of Governors had finally recommended that the General Conference suspend South Africa from the exercise of its rights and privileges of membership. His delegation urged all delegations participating in the General Conference to support that recommendation. Whatever might happen, Iraq would not bend to threats and pressures aimed at weakening its support for the just cause of the African people. Care must be taken to avoid a repetition of the manoeuvres which, at previous sessions of the General Conference, had prevented the necessary decisions being taken with regard to a similar régime, that of Israel, which occupied a place of its own among Member States. In the first place, it was the only régime which had been condemned for having committed the only known crime of deliberate armed aggression against a nuclear facility under international safeguards, namely the Tamuz reactor in Iraq. Secondly, it was the only régime of which the Security Council had demanded that it submit all its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards.

73. Israel was deploying, either alone or in collaboration with South Africa, a feverish activity in the non-peaceful utilizations of nuclear energy, and there was scarcely any doubt that it had acquired nuclear

weapons. Various sources throughout the world had confirmed that Israel had definitely resolved to provide itself with a nuclear arsenal. That policy had consisted not only in resorting to illegal means to obtain materials which could be used to produce nuclear weapons and in shrouding its main installations in the most absolute secrecy, but also in setting up a dangerous nuclear programme which was disturbing the Middle East and even the Soviet Union. The latest facet of that programme, according to revelations in the Sunday Times in October 1986, had been the deployment of Jericho-II intermediate-range missiles which could be equipped with nuclear warheads and were capable of hitting most Arab countries and the Soviet Union. That state of affairs had led the Soviet Union to warn Israel against the serious consequences which the deployment of those missiles could have for world peace and security. Israel was about to start a proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region and would bear full responsibility for all the dangerous repercussions which such proliferation would inevitably have for peace and security throughout the world. Iraq therefore urged the General Conference to exert all the necessary pressure on Israel to make it comply with the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly as well as by the General Conference itself. The least that could be done was to deprive Israel of every form of nuclear co-operation until it agreed to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards.

74. Despite the difficulties arising from the war which the Islamic Republic of Iran had forced upon it for seven years and the Israeli armed attack against its safeguarded nuclear reactor, Iraq was still resolved to develop and promote its programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The results obtained in 1986 by the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and by its scientists and engineers were set forth in detail in an annual report which was available on request. In that context, he thanked the Agency and its specialized Departments for the valuable assistance and services they had provided to his country, particularly in connection with two long-term projects. In addition, Iraq co-operated with the Agency in other fields (e.g. joint research contracts, establishment of radiation monitoring networks, food irradiation).

75. In conclusion, he took pleasure in announcing that his country had already signed the two Conventions on Early Notification and on Emergency Assistance, although it considered that the scope of those Conventions was too restricted.

Mr. Avendaño (Ecuador) took the Chair.

76. Mr. ZANGGER (Switzerland), speaking first on behalf of the delegations of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, expressed gratitude to the Agency for the excellent work it had accomplished through its unceasing activities over the past 30 years, during which it had shown itself worthy of the confidence which States had always placed in it. In the implementation of safeguards, the co-ordination of safety and radiation protection and the provision of assistance to developing countries, the Agency was more than ever playing a central and unique role.

77. Continuing on behalf of the Swiss delegation only, he said that the consequences of the events at Chernobyl continued to dominate the nuclear power scene, both in Switzerland and in the Agency. However, the discussion phase was gradually being superseded by a phase of concrete action and decision-taking.

78. Those concrete actions related primarily to the field of safety. The detailed examination of the supplementary safety programme carried out in November 1986 by an expert group had certainly been extremely useful. His delegation would be in favour of repeating that exercise at appropriate intervals.

79. The review of documents should be continued permanently in order to define the safety standards which every nuclear facility operator must meet. However, his delegation would wish the respective roles of the NUSS documents on the one hand, and the documents and views put forward by INSAG on the other, to be more clearly defined.

80. With regard to the Agency's work in connection with the operation of nuclear facilities, his delegation considered that the Incident Reporting System (IRS) and the Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs) contributed much to safety.

81. Turning to the question of liability for damage caused by nuclear accidents, he said that his country supported all efforts which might improve the present situation. It gave high priority to the Agency's co-operative effort with the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD aimed at preparing a joint protocol to harmonize the Paris and Vienna Conventions. None the less, it seemed appropriate also to examine questions relating to international liability for damage resulting from a nuclear accident.

82. A point which Switzerland had particularly at heart was the co-ordination of the Agency's activities with those of other international organizations. It was important to be sure that the initiatives launched, particularly in the field of radiation protection, did not overlap. The joint project between the Agency, WHO and UNEP on the evaluation and management of risks from power and industrial systems was a good example in that respect.

83. On the subject of radiation protection, he recalled that Switzerland had launched an initiative with WHO aimed at the international harmonization of radiation protection measures in the case of a nuclear accident which might lead to decisive progress if it found sufficiently wide support among the governments and organizations concerned.

84. As to the other main activities of the Agency, both technical assistance and co-operation and safeguards had received much financial support. The safeguards budget was now showing a tendency towards stabilization, but it should in no case take second place to technical co-operation and assistance, because public acceptance of nuclear power depended greatly on the effectiveness and credibility of safeguards.

85. With regard to the budget as a whole, his country adhered firmly to the principle of zero real growth. That principle, however, should be applied with some flexibility in order to allow the Agency to deal with unexpected developments such as those of 1986. His delegation was convinced that it would be possible to carry out the supplementary safety programme within the constraints of zero growth, apart from a slight overrun to make due allowance for commitments undertaken during the special session of the General Conference.

86. In order to achieve that aim, it would be necessary to concentrate on the three mainstays of the Agency's activities, namely safety, technical assistance and co-operation, and safeguards. Before undertaking any work outside those fields, a detailed cost-benefit analysis should be carried out by the Agency. A dynamic equilibrium between those three mainstay activities was essential for the proper operation of the Agency.

87. As to the Agency's cash-flow crisis, he understood the very serious economic difficulties of a large number of countries in the Third World, but he nevertheless deplored the extremely late payments by many Member States. That failure to respect obligations in public international law not only jeopardized the execution of approved programmes and budgets and the credibility of the Agency, but also established an undesirable precedent for other international organizations.

88. Turning to his own country's policy on nuclear energy, he recalled that, on the bilateral level, Switzerland had signed a co-operation agreement with the People's Republic of China and an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany on the harmonization of civil liability systems in the event of a nuclear accident.

89. The approval procedures for the peaceful use of plutonium foreseen by the laws of certain nuclear material supplier countries continued to trouble the Swiss authorities. There remained much to be done to render those procedures more predictable and practical, in view of the large quantities of separated plutonium which would exist in many countries in the 1990s.

90. On the internal level, an expert group had been entrusted with examining various scenarios including the abandonment of nuclear power. Those scenarios would serve as a basis for judgement on two popular initiatives, the one demanding a ten-year moratorium on the construction of any new nuclear facilities, the other a final shutdown of all existing nuclear power plants by the end of their lifetime at the latest. In addition, the Swiss Government was preparing a draft constitutional article to extend the public powers' competence in the field of energy policy. A total revision of the law on the peaceful use of atomic energy and on radiation protection was at present under

preparation, and a programme aimed at improving certain aspects of radiation protection and information as well as public warning mechanisms was already largely under way.

91. The Swiss Government had recently proposed to Parliament the ratification of the two conventions adopted in September 1986 by the General Conference at its special session. With regard to the Convention on Early Notification, Switzerland hoped that the question of the notification threshold would soon be settled. His Government, for its part, had decided that the Agency and Switzerland's neighbouring countries would be informed of any nuclear accident at the same time as the Swiss cantons. It would be desirable for all Members of the Agency to adopt analogous procedures. Finally, he indicated that the five operating nuclear power plants were contributing about 40% of electricity production in Switzerland, that their safety records were good, and that their reactors had achieved an average availability of 82.7%. In the older plants, substantial safety-related modifications had been undertaken. Where research was concerned, he announced that the two existing institutions - the Federal Institute for Reactor Research and the Nuclear Research Institute - would be merged with, it was hoped, synergistic effects.

92. Mr. AAMODT (Norway) said that, subject to parliamentary approval, his delegation supported the Agency's draft budget for 1988 as submitted by the Board. It also supported the target of US \$38 million for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund (TACF) in 1988, and he was pleased to announce that Norway had pledged to pay its share of that target.

93. His delegation had already, on several occasions, stressed that a certain balance must be maintained between the regulatory and promotional functions of the Agency. Over the past years, appreciable growth had been seen in the technical assistance supplied by the Agency, particularly from TACF resources. His delegation had supported that expansion, but there had been no analogous increase on the regulatory side. After the Chernobyl accident, the Agency had somewhat expanded its safety-related activities

through the supplementary nuclear safety programme. His delegation welcomed the increase foreseen under that heading in the draft Regular Budget for 1988. Given the Agency's important role in re-establishing confidence in nuclear safety, he considered that the proportion of resources devoted to nuclear safety and radiation protection should be kept roughly at the present level for several years.

94. It was of fundamental importance for all countries to have a reliable safeguards system. Although the Department of Safeguards might probably be able to make further rationalization efforts, there was no doubt that the quantities of nuclear material and the number and complexity of new facilities under safeguards would continue to increase and that, for several years already, the Department had been facing serious budgetary constraints. His delegation wished to underline that the safeguards budget must correspond to a level of activity sufficient to maintain the reliability and credibility of the system.

95. He congratulated the Director General and the Secretariat on the flexibility they had shown after the Chernobyl accident. The Agency appeared to have accomplished its main tasks for 1986 and carried out its normal programme while at the same time absorbing that totally unforeseen extra work-load.

96. His delegation attached considerable importance to the Agency's co-ordination efforts in the fields of nuclear power and the fuel cycle. The exchange of experience through publications, symposia, etc. was useful to all Member States. In that context, he wished also to mention the INIS system, which was working extremely well.

97. The growth rate of technical assistance had been very high, showing clearly that the present financing system gave good results and that there was no need to modify it for the time being. He hoped that the use of a two-year programme cycle would allow better utilization of the available resources and would lighten the Secretariat's work-load. At present there seemed to be too many small projects; increasing the proportion of regional and interregional multi-year projects would also ease the Secretariat's task.

98. Since Chernobyl, the Agency had considerably expanded its safety activities, in particular by very quickly setting up an effective and well-balanced supplementary safety programme; his delegation welcomed those activities and particularly approved of the trend towards intensifying assistance to national regulatory organizations.

99. A remarkable achievement of the Agency had been the preparation of the NUSS Codes, which must now be revised and kept up to date. The aim must be to attain nuclear safety standards which were as high as possible in all countries. The NUSS Codes were useful as models, and Member States should be encouraged to accept them voluntarily as minimum standards, as the Director General had suggested in his opening statement.

100. It seemed that human error had been one of the principal causes of the Chernobyl accident. In that case, as in earlier accidents, the operators' training had proved deficient. The Agency should encourage national regulatory authorities and electricity producers to improve the training of nuclear power plant operating personnel. In that context, an international mechanism for the accreditation of operator training programmes could be useful. According to experience gained in Norway with the OECD Halden reactor project, such accidents could apparently be prevented by the appropriate use of computers at the man-machine interface.

101. The Chernobyl accident had brought serious consequences for Norway, where vast stretches of land had been contaminated by radioactive fallout. It had been necessary to undertake a detailed study of the course of the accident and on the way in which the Norwegian authorities had reacted, and to present proposals for improving the state of preparedness. The Government had set up several committees, in particular an interministerial committee of senior officials which was to recommend the measures to be taken if such an accident occurred.

102. His delegation welcomed the entry into force of the two conventions prepared by the Agency. Norway had been a party to both conventions for a year already.

103. As a supplement to the Convention on Early Notification, Norway had concluded bilateral agreements on that subject with Finland, the German Democratic Republic and Sweden, and it was negotiating analogous agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

104. Negotiations had also been started with a view to updating the 1963 Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement between the Nordic countries in order to make the provisions of that agreement compatible with those of the Convention on Emergency Assistance.

105. Like several other countries, Norway was concerned about the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea. It was gratified by the extension of the moratorium on such action and considered that in future the sea dumping of radioactive wastes of whatever type should be avoided.

106. The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development would be officially presented to the United Nations during the current session of the General Assembly by Mrs. Brundtland, Chairman of the Commission and Prime Minister of Norway. After its examination by the General Assembly, that report would be submitted to the various bodies and organizations of the United Nations system and to other international organizations, and Norway hoped it would lead to extensive discussions of principle which would contribute to modifying the policies and programmes of those organizations.

107. His country considered it very important to ensure that the victims of a nuclear accident received appropriate financial reimbursement. The present liability system was not satisfactory and should be improved. The most urgent task seemed to be to harmonize the Paris and Vienna Conventions so as to give them the largest possible geographical scope of application. In that connection, his delegation fully supported the work aimed at preparing a joint protocol to the Paris and Vienna Conventions, and it hoped that such a protocol would induce a larger number of countries to accede to the Vienna Convention.

108. His delegation had noted with satisfaction that in 1986, as in earlier years, the Secretariat had not detected any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material - or the misuse of facilities or material subject to safeguards.

109. Norway was pleased to learn that Colombia, Malawi, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Yemen Arab Republic had become parties to NPT in 1986. It also noted with satisfaction the conclusion of a full-scope safeguards agreement between Albania and the Agency. On the other hand, it regretted that the negotiations on safeguards between South Africa and the Agency had made no progress. Nevertheless, his delegation did not support the proposal to suspend South Africa from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership in the Agency. For his Government, the principle of universality of international organizations was of fundamental importance.

110. Mr. KANGAI (Zimbabwe) said that his country was determined to co-operate fully with the Agency, which played a vital role in attempting to halt the nuclear arms race and promoting nuclear safety and the peaceful use of radioisotopes. He noted with pleasure that the Agency had achieved considerable success in carrying out its objectives, and Zimbabwe was gratified at the increased importance which it accorded to safety-related work. As Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, Zimbabwe was resolutely against the pursuit of the arms race by the great Powers and against the unimaginable consequences which would result from the deliberate use of nuclear weapons. The fact that the effects of a nuclear war would extend well beyond the frontiers of the belligerents gave mankind the moral right to protest against the nuclear policies of the great nuclear Powers. Zimbabwe felt that the considerable sums which were devoted to nuclear weapons research and development could serve to mitigate many of the problems which humanity faced. It was absurd that people should starve while billions of dollars were spent on weapons of mass destruction. His country appealed to the Soviet Union and the United States to show a spirit of compromise in their arms reduction talks and welcomed the agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missiles which had recently been announced. That was an extremely important step in the right direction, and it was to be hoped that it would be followed by the complete abolition of such weapons.

111. Zimbabwe was directly threatened by the civil and military nuclear facilities of South Africa, and its fundamental opposition to the policy of apartheid in South Africa automatically made it the target for unprovoked attacks by that racist and hostile neighbour. His country was extremely

concerned to see that South Africa had not submitted its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards. The South African Government, it was true, had signed and ratified the Convention on Early Notification and the Convention on Emergency Assistance, but the declaration attached to its instrument of ratification indicated clearly that it was not prepared to recognize the authority of the United Nations Council for Namibia. That attitude could be motivated only by sinister purposes, and it was hard to see why South Africa should continue to be a Member of the Agency when it showed such disregard for the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Agency's General Conference. That was why it was important to support the recommendation of the Board of Governors immediately to suspend South Africa from its rights of membership.

112. Zimbabwe noted with pleasure the spreading awareness within the Agency of the importance of technical assistance, particularly for the developing countries. Although it had only recently been admitted to the Agency, Zimbabwe had already obtained certain benefits.

113. His country had a number of laws on the import, handling and use of radioisotopes, but there were some loopholes, especially where waste disposal was concerned. Attempts were being made to remedy that situation with the Agency's assistance. Radiation protection was a high-priority area for Zimbabwe, and a manpower training programme in that field was being conducted with the Agency's assistance, the objective being to be able to hold such courses locally.

114. The possibility of receiving assistance from the Agency had been welcomed enthusiastically throughout the country, and numerous requests for assistance had been submitted in various fields. It was also hoped that a national standards laboratory would be established, which was of particular importance because Zimbabwe already had a nuclear medicine centre.

115. Mr. MARAVALL (Spain) said that his country welcomed the success achieved by the Agency in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and maintaining the non-proliferation regime, activities which were mainstays of the Agency and contributed to the economic and social development of the international community.

116. In Spain, the development of the nuclear industry had made it possible to achieve an acceptable degree of energy diversification and autonomy, to acquire the technological basis for building a nuclear power plant with a national component approaching 90%, and thus to transfer experience to other countries.

117. Spain believed that nuclear energy could help to resolve the energy problems of developing countries and to improve the standard of life in those countries through its applications in medicine, agriculture and industry. Spain was prepared to collaborate in that direction by providing the necessary technical assistance. Moreover, it had always respected the Agency's principles, regarding both non-proliferation and technical assistance, in its nuclear programmes.

118. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remained one of the principal concerns of the Spanish Government. In that connection, he informed the General Conference that his Government had decided to accede to the NPT. In fact, the Treaty had already been ratified by the Congress of Deputies and was shortly to be ratified by the Senate before being countersigned by the King of Spain.

119. Turning to nuclear safety, he said that an OSART mission would be carried out at his Government's request in November and December 1987 at the Almaraz nuclear power plant. His country believed that such missions could contribute to the gradual harmonization of operating practices in different countries, as they would permit an exchange of knowledge and experience between nuclear power plant operating personnel which could not but improve nuclear safety in the world.

120. He recalled that Spain was in favour of the harmonization, by a joint protocol, of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, as it believed that to be the most effective way of applying both instruments simultaneously. However, no legal instrument could be effective if it was not widely accepted, and in that respect, he recalled that the General Conference, in its resolution GC(XXVIII)/RES/431, had expressed the hope that Member States would give consideration to adhering to the Vienna Convention.

121. Outlining Spain's achievements in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy since the thirtieth session of the General Conference in 1986, he said that the nuclear power situation in Spain on 1 January 1987 had been the following: eight power plants with a total gross capacity of 5815 MW had been in service, and two power plants with a total gross capacity of 2023 MW had been under construction. In 1986, Spain's nuclear power output had reached 37 457 GWh, which meant an increase by 33.6% over 1985, and the share of nuclear power in the total electrical output had increased to 30.9%, as against 23.4% in 1985. Spain's production of uranium concentrate had been 254 tonnes, or an increase by 7% over 1985, and the quantities of natural and enriched uranium forecast had been delivered, representing an increase by 16% over 1985. In nuclear fuel fabrication, the new plant at Juzbado, which had been taken into service in 1985, had reached its normal production rate. The country's uranium reserves were currently estimated at 32 917 tonnes of U_3O_8 .

122. The first general plan for radioactive waste management had been prepared in 1986. It would have to be approved each year by the Government on the basis of the proposals of a public enterprise which dealt with such questions. The total volume of waste to be managed was estimated at roughly 270 000 m³ of low- and medium-level waste and about 6000 tonnes of spent fuel. The strategy adopted for the spent fuel was temporary storage on-site followed by centralized intermediate storage while awaiting the availability of a final disposal site in a deep geological formation, which was expected for the first quarter of the next century. The total cost of waste management was estimated at about 750 000 million pesetas (constant 1986) and was to be financed by the establishments producing the waste.

123. Nuclear research in Spain was conducted partly by the electricity companies, which were mostly private enterprises, and partly by a public body, CIEMAT, whose activities were divided between three fields: nuclear technology, radiation and environmental protection, and basic research. Where the last-named was concerned, Spain was working on an important research project on fusion energy financed partly by the Commission of the European Communities.

124. Research and development work in the fields of nuclear power and radiation protection related mainly to the operation of Spain's nuclear power plants.

125. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his country's wish to co-operate with the Agency, whose efforts to spread the peaceful uses of nuclear energy deserved support from all countries, and announced that Spain's laboratories and nuclear research installations were open for collaboration with all countries.

126. Mr. van GORKOM (Netherlands) said that during the past thirty years Member States had benefited greatly from the promotional and regulatory activities of the Agency and that the scientific and technical exchanges achieved through expert meetings at the Agency and through its publications had been of considerable value to them. Without the Agency's safeguards system, international peaceful nuclear co-operation between States would have been practically impossible, without its nuclear safety programmes such co-operation would scarcely have been responsible, and without its technical co-operation programmes the peaceful applications of nuclear energy would have remained out of reach of many countries. By its Statute and its role in the application of NPT, the Agency had contributed to the preservation of world peace.

127. Mankind had discovered, developed and shared the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, but it had also become more aware in many countries of its risks and dangers, particularly after the Chernobyl accident. Governments were making efforts to keep those risks within acceptable limits by updating their nuclear safety programmes and improving their non-proliferation strategies and their nuclear waste management practices.

128. The public should be kept fully informed of all those activities, and also of the remaining hazards as compared with those inherent in other technologies. That was a permanent challenge for both governments and the Agency.

129. After reiterating his Government's support for the Agency and its Statute, he said that the Netherlands were firmly convinced that the Agency should not involve itself in political problems which had no direct bearing on

its mandate. It was in the nature of a United Nations organization that all countries could be full members, whatever their political, economic or social system. In the particular case of the Agency, it was essential that the countries which had a direct interest in nuclear energy should participate in its work. If they were excluded therefrom, in one way or another, it was certain that the Agency's usefulness would diminish. That was why the Netherlands opposed any proposal aimed at suspending any country whatsoever from the exercise of its rights of membership.

130. During the preceding year, the Chernobyl accident had drawn attention to the potential hazards of nuclear energy and had aroused considerable interest in nuclear power plant safety. Although the radioactivity had diminished since then, as had to a great extent the initial anxiety, the fact remained that reactor safety and radiation protection deserved constant attention. His Government supported the priority attached to those areas in the Agency's programme.

131. In the Netherlands, the accident had prompted the launching of studies on the safety of existing power plants, particularly in those areas where lessons could be drawn from Chernobyl: reactivity accidents, human behaviour, containment response in a severe accident, fire protection, etc. His country welcomed the Agency's initiative to convene or sponsor meetings at which various subjects relating to safety could be discussed by experts and supported its role in the exchange of information on safety-significant incidents which had occurred in nuclear power plants throughout the world. In close collaboration with NEA/OECD, the Agency could help Member States to draw lessons from the incidents reported to the IRS, a system whose potential was not as yet being fully utilized.

132. His country was satisfied with the OSART and NUSS programmes. It regretted that proposals to have the NUSS Codes accepted as internationally binding nuclear safety standards had not so far received sufficient support. Every State should accept the Codes as minimum standards and notify the Agency that it undertook to respect them. Further steps should be taken in that direction.

133. His country welcomed the Agency's efforts to update the Codes of Practice and would provide its full contribution towards the publication of revised Codes in summer 1988; those Codes would then serve as a basis for his country to promulgate its own regulations and guidelines. The Agency should continue helping Member States to incorporate the NUSS documents in their national regulations. The Netherlands attached great importance to the question of a document on safety principles for nuclear power plants.

134. The Netherlands Government was gratified at the progress achieved so far in perfecting international nuclear liability arrangements. It should be possible in the coming months to draft a joint protocol to the Paris/Brussels and Vienna conventions on international civil liability in the nuclear field; that protocol could then be adopted at a diplomatic conference in the second half of 1988. In that context, the question of State liability for nuclear accidents with transboundary consequences should be examined carefully.

135. Following the Chernobyl accident, his country had undertaken to review thoroughly its policy of expansion in the nuclear power sector. That review related not only to the safety of the two existing nuclear power plants, but also to the role of the source term in the evaluation of serious accidents. The consequences that might arise from such accidents for public health, the environment and the economy would be analysed so that definite conclusions could be reached as to the hazards they represented for the public and for society. On the basis of those studies and on that of advice from external experts, the Government would, probably by early 1989, make a decision on whether or not to build further nuclear power plants in the Netherlands and, if so, where. Since an additional production capacity of 6000 MW was required in the public sector by the year 2000, difficult decisions would have to be taken during the two years to come.

136. His country agreed with the Director General that it was desirable to co-operate regionally in establishing waste storage facilities, particularly for the final disposal of nuclear wastes, and it considered that his suggestion concerning the possibility of supplier countries taking back their waste deserved careful scrutiny.

137. The Almelo enrichment plant had obtained, in March 1987, authorization to increase its capacity from 1000 to 3500 tonnes so that it could comply with its contractual obligations; that showed the success of Urenco's marketing efforts and the role which the Almelo plant played within the tripartite co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.

138. The fact that various negotiations on disarmament and associated on-site verification provisions seemed to be leading to concrete results gave new importance to the Agency's safeguards system. In that context, the agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons was an important stage in the arms control negotiations between East and West.

139. His delegation noted with satisfaction that, according to the safeguards statement contained in the annual report, the Agency had again not detected any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material. In the foreseeable future, the number of nuclear facilities under safeguards would continue to grow. However, the budget for 1988 was no higher than that for 1987, apart from the 0.6% increase for the supplementary nuclear safety and radiation protection programme, and that tendency would probably continue in the coming years. Growing verification responsibilities raised a serious problem in the context of zero budget growth, and the Netherlands fully shared the concerns expressed by the Director General.

140. His country would maintain and, if possible, strengthen its support for the Agency's technical assistance projects, in particular those on the use of radioisotopes in agriculture, food preservation and medicine. In 1987, the Netherlands Minister of Development Co-operation had decided to study the possibility of encouraging the use of food irradiation techniques in certain developing countries.

141. Mr. JAMALUDDIN (Malaysia), announced that his country would continue to support the Agency, which had emerged unscathed from the challenges it had been forced to take up in accomplishing its functions and tasks.

142. Although they were highly specialized fields, nuclear science and technology did not differ fundamentally from other human activities, contrary to what many people still thought. In fact, the atom had entered daily life. It played an important role in public affairs, and the nuclear debate had acquired a world dimension. Scientists must therefore resist the temptation to retreat behind the supposed neutrality of science, especially in the case of nuclear science, which was complex in that the technological problems were linked with problems of a moral, economic and social nature.

143. Malaysia believed in the principle of equality of States in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, but that doctrine unfortunately conflicted with political realities.

144. Among the main controversial aspects of nuclear energy, it seemed worth mentioning the relationship between that form of energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the problems inherent in the long-term management of nuclear waste and in nuclear terrorism and sabotage. The question of nuclear disarmament was a responsibility of all nations, for the world must ensure its own survival. Unfortunately, many economies were at present heavily dependent on military expenditure and economic considerations seemed to override questions of survival.

145. His delegation considered it more important to reduce international tension, in particular by guaranteeing adequate resources for all countries, than to adopt policies which could only marginally delay their ability to acquire nuclear weapons. The world needed energy and would continue to need it.

146. The Agency had a role to play in that context. Malaysia recognized that the Agency had contributed much to making nuclear energy serve peace, health and prosperity in the world, particularly in the developing countries, through its technical assistance and co-operation programmes.

147. It was gratifying that, after the accident at Chernobyl, the Agency and its Member States had immediately taken measures to restore the public's confidence in nuclear energy. His country in that context welcomed the adoption of the Convention on Early Notification and the Convention on Emergency Assistance, which it had recently signed.

148. There was no doubt that nuclear safety and radiation protection were of concern to all countries. In that connection, his country considered it extremely important to have very high standards of safety. In addition, it was necessary to co-operate internationally to protect nuclear facilities against any armed attack or act of terrorism. Malaysia shared the general view that the Agency could carry out technical studies on the radiological consequences that might arise from such attacks. That would rapidly lead to an international agreement to prohibit armed attacks or to prevent terrorist acts against nuclear facilities.

149. As a nuclear accident anywhere was a nuclear accident everywhere, all States had a moral obligation to communicate to others any information which might reduce the risk of accidents in nuclear installations. In that context, it was important to share information not only on the consequences of accidents, but also on the means of avoiding them. The Agency certainly had a role to play in that area.

150. The contamination of foodstuffs was one of the serious consequences of any nuclear accident, in both the short and the long term. It was unfortunate that certain strongly contaminated foodstuffs had been exported to countries lacking adequate facilities and resources for monitoring them. Strict control of radioactivity levels in foodstuffs was of primordial importance. Past experience had shown that intervention dose levels varied considerably from one country to the next. An effort at harmonization was therefore necessary. The Agency should give priority to the examination of that question in co-operation with international organizations such as FAO and WHO.

151. Malaysia supported the Agency's efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but deplored the fact that it had not been possible to conclude an agreement on universally acceptable principles for international co-operation in that area and on the appropriate means for promoting such co-operation. That was all the more deplorable for Malaysia in view of its policy of industrialization on the basis of science and technology.

152. His country realized that the speed of technological evolution had brought about changes in modern society which were no less profound than those of the industrial revolution. Those changes offered great challenges and

opportunities, in the field of nuclear energy as in others. Efforts to increase technological autonomy must be supported by international co-operation. Those who bore political responsibility should also keep abreast of the latest technical means for satisfying long-standing needs. It was only quite recently that Malaysia had embarked upon the applications of nuclear science and technology and, in particular, on the industrial applications of radiation and radioisotopes, and the assimilation of those modern techniques by industry and agriculture was under way. The Agency had supplied positive support through projects responding to national needs, and Malaysia would continue to support those projects. Fifteen years previously, it had launched a co-ordinated effort to promote the uses of nuclear energy by establishing a specialized centre whose task was to prepare long-term programmes for the development and utilization of that form of energy. In that endeavour, it had received considerable assistance from the Agency in the form of expert services, training courses, technical assistance and research contracts. In return, it had hosted a number of seminars and workshops organized by the Agency.

153. Questions relating to the acceptance of nuclear energy were of great importance in a democracy. In particular, opposition to nuclear weapons could turn into opposition to anything nuclear. In order to safeguard the applications of nuclear science and technology, the Malaysian Parliament had in 1984 passed a law on nuclear energy licensing to the preparation of which the Agency had contributed much.

154. Finally, Malaysia noted that the nuclear field was a subject of major concern throughout the world. However, it appeared more and more clear that the risks inherent in nuclear energy did not constitute the principal problem. On the contrary, it seemed that the fears inspired by that form of energy resided less in the risks which were peculiar to it than in the advantages which could be drawn from it.

155. Malaysia preached observance of the Agency's principles where the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were concerned. It was hostile to any effort aimed at establishing standards contrary to the established principles. Any group which sought to substitute its own needs for universal ones deserved

condemnation in the same way as any country or government which flagrantly violated universal standards. Finally, it was important to restore confidence between the nuclear-weapon States, for their lack of mutual understanding indicated a much deeper disagreement on the question whether the nuclear option constituted a brief interlude in the history of mankind or whether, on the contrary, it was an important source of energy in the long term.

156. Mr. CONSTELNA (Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission - IANEC) said that since 1959 IANEC had served as a forum for discussing co-operation between national bodies responsible for nuclear matters in Latin America and the Caribbean. The work of IANEC had essentially consisted in promoting the techniques for the peaceful use of nuclear energy by means of courses, seminars and round tables, for which it had drawn upon the technical competence of the principal centres in the region. Special attention had been accorded to the use of radioisotopes in agriculture, industry and hydrology at centres in Argentina, Chile and Colombia. It was worth pointing out also the results of an evaluation of geological formations favourable to the presence of uranium in the Andes, which had been carried out for the regional programme of evaluation of uranium-bearing regions by the Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute in collaboration with the Nuclear Energy Commissions of Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

157. Recently, a great impetus had been given to scientific and technical information on nuclear matters by patronizing the services of the Brazilian Nuclear Information Centre.

158. At present, after a short period of retrenchment, the activities of IANEC were gathering momentum again. The Consultative Committee's task was to determine the specific needs of the region with regard to nuclear applications, particularly in the areas of agriculture, industry, public health, nuclear safety and radiation protection, spreading of nuclear techniques and training in those techniques, and nuclear information. The Consultative Committee would soon be studying technical reports in which the principal fields of interest would be better defined and, at the next regular session, a programme would be adopted on the basis of the established priorities.

159. Given the importance attached to studies of the nuclear legislation and regulations of countries in the region, the Commission was also about to relaunch the work of its Legal Committee.

160. With regard to nuclear information, there were plans to use telecommunications services to expand the assistance offered by the Brazilian Nuclear Information Centre.

161. In view of that question's importance for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, it had been decided to conduct a comparative study of the legislation in force concerning food irradiation and to establish a collection of standards for the licensing of irradiation facilities and procedures. The Executive Secretariat had been requested to carry out a study aimed at preparing a general model for licensing standards which could be made available as an indicative model to national bodies responsible for nuclear matters.

162. That summary description of IANEC's activities was intended to help intensify co-operation between IANEC and the Agency; such co-operation had occurred on many occasions in the past and had recently taken the form of joint organization of activities under the ARCAL programme.

163. The members of IANEC were firmly resolved to collaborate very closely with the organizations which were active in the nuclear field, and more especially with the Agency, not only because of the experience and knowledge which the Agency had accumulated, but also because it was thought that, in Latin America and the Caribbean, IANEC's experience might help the Agency to provide Member States of both organizations with services for which they had a direct need.

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.