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President: Mr. COLOMBO (Italy)

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[**] GC(XXXI)/818.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document
GC(XXXI)/INF/246/Rev.3.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1986 (GC(XXXI)/800 and Corr.1) (continued)

1. Mr. ERNER (Turkey) said that the nuclear accidents which had occurred in 1979 and 1986 had drawn the attention of world public opinion to the Agency as an unparalleled international institution for promoting co-operation in the field of nuclear safety. The Agency enjoyed a confidence and credibility which had not been acquired easily. Its credibility it owed to all those who, in spite of great difficulties, had worked for the Agency's success by applying consistent policies in the areas of technical co-operation, safeguards and nuclear safety. He wished to pay tribute to those who had conceived the Agency in the 1940s and early 1950s, and also to the scientists, statesmen and diplomats who had foreseen long in advance the dangers inherent in nuclear energy, particularly when used without control. They had understood very well that the spreading of nuclear techniques and means of production could not be limited to one or two countries. Over the years, despite its limited financial resources, the Agency had acquired the reputation of an efficient organization providing its Member States with very useful services ranging from the transfer of knowledge to safeguards, and those Members were thus rightly proud of it.
2. In the past years, all countries had been obliged to reflect more deeply on the question of the safe operation of nuclear installations in general and of nuclear power plants in particular. Nuclear accidents with transboundary radiological consequences such as that at Chernobyl raised problems with multiple facets, economic, commercial, technical, political, administrative and legal, which called for international action and co-operation. The Agency should be commended for the work it had already done on the question of nuclear safety, and in particular on the NUSS programme, and the activities and publications following upon the Chernobyl accident had inspired a deserved confidence in the Agency, which had succeeded in creating a favourable atmosphere for effective international co-operation at the bilateral and multilateral level in the field of nuclear safety.
3. His country considered that the Agency was entitled to the unreserved support of its Members in its efforts to play a more comprehensive and effective role in the field of nuclear safety, because another accident like

that of Chernobyl would cause irreparable damage to nuclear power as a reliable source of energy which currently accounted for 15% of world electricity production. His Government would therefore fully support Agency activities aimed at improving nuclear safety at the international level, and it proposed that nuclear safety be made one of the Agency's objectives by an appropriate amendment of the Statute.

4. He congratulated the Agency on the speed and efficiency of its response to the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, which had revealed serious defects in the arrangements for international co-operation in such cases. Turkey had signed the conventions on early notification and emergency assistance, but it considered that those conventions did not cover all nuclear accidents with transboundary consequences, whatever the source of the accident. Moreover, they did not give sufficient attention to safety questions related to the design and operation of nuclear power plants, or to the establishment of emergency plans. It would be desirable to set up a system whereby all Member States, and in particular neighbouring States, could communicate to each other, under multilateral or bilateral arrangements, all data relating to the safety of existing and planned nuclear facilities.

5. Turning to the measures taken by Turkey as a result of the Chernobyl accident, he said that, in connection with the early notification convention, the establishment of an advance warning system consisting of 40 stations had been started in 1987, with the aim of detecting accidents with transboundary effects and taking efficient measurements of the radiation. Ten of those stations were to enter into service in 1987.

6. He wished to thank the Director General and the Secretariat for having managed, despite the immense workload imposed by the Chernobyl accident, to implement the bulk of the regular programme for 1986. In particular, his country regarded the technical assistance and co-operation programme as one of the main pillars of the Agency and was grateful for the assistance it received. It had already pledged its share of voluntary contributions and programme costs at the assessed levels. On the subject of budget growth, the Director General had been right to say that there must be some limit to zero growth. Otherwise there would be a danger of no longer being able to satisfy

the expectations of Member States, whether they be industrialized or developing countries, which would compromise the effectiveness and credibility of the Agency.

7. Turkey had maintained close relations with the Agency for thirty years. It had sat four times on the Board of Governors, had participated actively in all sessions of the General Conference and in other meetings, and had also contributed to the drafting of the two conventions adopted the previous year. It had taken the Agency's safety guides as a basis for its own national legislation, and it had signed and ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

8. In thirty years of technical co-operation with the Agency, Turkey had enjoyed the benefit of 302 fellowships, 27 individual scientific visits, 252 training courses, 24 study tours and - since 1973 - 32 projects, of which 22 had already been completed. A RAPAT team had visited Turkey the previous year, and the Agency had carried out technical missions and launched a co-ordinated research programme on the probabilistic evaluation of research reactor safety there.

9. Mr. KRSTIC (Yugoslavia), expressing his best wishes to the Agency on the occasion of its thirtieth anniversary, said that all those years had been a period of fruitful international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It would be difficult to say which was the greatest merit of the Agency. Since its establishment, it had contributed to the solution of numerous problems relating to the development of the various applications of nuclear science and technology. It had played an invaluable role in strengthening international co-operation for development. Under its auspices, various important international agreements had been signed, including the conventions adopted the previous year, which had become elements of the institutional framework of international relations.

10. It was only natural that the developing countries should wish to accelerate their economic growth and to acquire peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology. The establishment of the Agency had made progress in that direction possible. He commended the Agency on the implementation of the

programmes approved for 1986. His country had achieved useful results through its co-operation with the Agency, had benefited from considerable technical assistance and had itself arranged various training courses.

11. Thanking the Director General for his very comprehensive opening statement, he said it was easy to understand that the report of the Brundtland Commission had given no answer to many questions relating to primary energy production as a source of environmental deterioration. The problem was that there probably was no right answer and that nuclear power, as everyone knew, was itself possibly a non-answer, even if it did not, or not to any great extent, add to the pollution risks mentioned in the report.

12. Yugoslavia had one nuclear power plant and several research reactors in service. A long-term socio-economic development plan was under preparation. In that context, earlier plans concerning the total energy production capacity, including nuclear, were being reviewed. Preliminary evaluations showed that the existing capacity plus that of the plants under construction would be sufficient to meet the needs up to the year 2000, provided that the energy was used more rationally and the equipment more efficiently. Thus, the decision to build a further nuclear power plant had been postponed not because of the omnipresent problems relating to the applications of nuclear energy, but rather because a new development strategy had been adopted.

13. Yugoslavia attached very great importance to fusion research and hoped to participate in the development work on any projects in that field.

14. It seemed that among the various peaceful uses of nuclear energy it was always the generation of electricity which attracted the most attention. That was perhaps natural, especially since that was the use which gave rise to the most controversies and which brought in the most money for the nuclear lobbies. Even so, the Agency must not neglect the other applications of nuclear techniques: in agriculture, medicine, industry or the many other fields which played an increasingly important role in the development of countries. Yugoslavia was satisfied with its co-operation with the Agency, which had enabled it to obtain good results, and it hoped that such co-operation would continue to be strengthened. During the present period of

vital importance for the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it was imperative to consolidate the Agency's programme and co-operation procedures in the interests of socio-economic development. The Agency could play a very important role in that context.

15. In conclusion, he said that in order to be crowned with success, the present session of the General Conference would have to give a new impetus to the Agency so that a solution could be found to all the current problems which came within its province.

16. Mr. NEGREIROS PORTELLA (Peru) said that the Agency's activities during the past thirty years had on the whole been fruitful and that his Government was particularly gratified at the success obtained in the field of international co-operation. Many thought that multilateralism was undergoing a crisis, but Peru believed it was approaching its maturity. Many thought they were on a road of confrontation, but Peru believed it to be one of agreement. The Agency had lived through such positive experience, and that was why his delegation was optimistic with regard to its work, one of the best expressions of understanding between peoples. There were various signs to show that such understanding reigned in the Agency: co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, commitments to nuclear safety, exchange of technology and scientific information, conventions on early notification and emergency assistance, and many others.

17. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to ignore the existence of certain discouraging and disappointing factors. Unfortunately, too many Agency Members were falling into disquieting contradictions. States had committed themselves to accelerating and increasing the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, but often they used it instead to increase uncertainty, discord and inequality and to continue the unrestrained and inhuman competition over the creation of devices for destruction. Thirty years previously, despite the serious political confrontations which had then existed, there had been no danger of conflicts at any moment leading to extremes that might jeopardize the very survival of the human race. That was now no longer the case, and he appealed to the countries concerned to respect the commitments which they had so far ignored,

but which nevertheless remained in force. It was time for the negotiations between the nuclear superpowers to lead to concrete results. There were also contradictions with regard to safeguards. While certain countries were asked to submit their nuclear facilities to safeguards, it was hoped that such measures would not be required of other countries. However, it was not too late to put the situation right and to make the most of difficult experiences.

18. The previous year, his delegation had informed the General Conference that Peru, despite its enormous economic and social difficulties, was successfully devoting its scarce economic resources to the basic sectors of its economy, among which the peaceful use of nuclear energy occupied an important place. With the same enthusiasm and interest, and on behalf of the democracy which existed in the country, Peru would continue to make the greatest efforts to achieve certain objectives in agriculture, medicine and industry, and in so doing it hoped to receive the valuable assistance of the Agency and other organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme.

19. Among other achievements, he mentioned the construction and outfitting of the Nuclear Research Centre at a total cost of US \$110 million; that had been carried out in collaboration with the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission, and Peru was receiving active assistance from the Agency in making the Centre operational. The Centre included a radioisotope production facility, which was to come into service by April 1988 at the latest, at the same time as the Centre itself. It also included a national radiation protection centre which would ensure that optimum safety levels were observed in accordance with the Agency's standards and that facilities were used properly, in particular radiographic equipment, thus contributing to the protection of the population against the hazards arising from the use of ionizing radiation.

20. In the training of technical personnel, Peru had continued to make use of the theoretical and practical training courses offered either by the Agency or by friendly governments or other regional sources of co-operation. A fourth class of nuclear engineers would soon be graduating from the Advanced Studies Centre and would go on to occupy posts in the Peruvian Nuclear Energy

Institute (IPEN) and the Nuclear Research Centre. In that connection, his delegation thanked the Agency for having enabled more than 38 scientists to receive training abroad in 1986.

21. Once the Nuclear Research Centre became operational, Peru would enter into a period of far more concrete activities. In the area of medical applications, the number of biomedical studies was to exceed 10 000 in 1987, with the help of the Arequipa and Trujillo centres. The National Agronomy University was continuing its work on obtaining precocious mutants of barley resistant to parasites and drought. It had played an important role in establishing the Institute for Nuclear Applications in Agriculture. The project for extracting uranium at Macusani continued to make progress, and it should be possible very soon to evaluate the uranium reserves, which were of the order of 5000 to 10 000 tonnes, more precisely. It would then be possible to launch a modular project, with low operating costs, for the extraction and treatment of the ore. In the field of industrial applications, the Agency had supported a project to provide IPEN with a multi-purpose irradiation facility and a liquid nitrogen production plant.

22. All those activities showed clearly that the Peruvian Government wished to continue resolutely to support the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international technical co-operation which, in the nuclear field, represented an ideal complement to the efforts made by the developing countries themselves. His Government therefore wished particularly to thank the Agency and its Director General, as well as the friendly Governments of Argentina, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, Italy and Finland.

23. Mr. COSTANZO (Uruguay) recalled that his country had a long-standing tradition where institutions were concerned and had been among the pioneers in the creation, organization and development of innumerable international institutions. At the beginning of the century, a great Uruguayan statesman had wondered, during an international conference at The Hague, why, if so many alliances could be concluded to wage war, it should not be possible to create an alliance for peace. For the Uruguayans, that

statesman's proposal had been the direct cause of the establishment of the League of Nations, the first attempt on a worldwide scale to settle differences between States peacefully.

24. In Latin America, the Tlatelolco Treaty had arisen from the same high aspirations, and Uruguay had granted it full support, largely on a moral plane, but enriched by its exemplary democratic experience; in addition, it had had the signal honour that one of its most representative personalities had been twice appointed General Secretary of OPANAL. The hopes of the countries which had founded the Agency had been little different: to master the terrifying forces of nuclear energy in order to place them at the service of the peaceful development of countries.

25. Uruguay had not rested content with advocating its rigorous conception of moral conduct by States in the international organizations: it had put it into practice. Peace was an indivisible set of measures which consisted both in containing the force of armies and in attempting to master nature, but it was also the consequence of a way of life, a moral conscience, and a balanced and equitable economic system.

26. The nuclear section was important in Uruguay and, despite the economic difficulties, multiple efforts were being deployed to provide the country with an organization corresponding perfectly to its objectives. The recent establishment of a Directorate of Nuclear Techniques under the Ministry of Industry and Energy was a specific example of the Uruguayan Government's aspirations. That organization's mandate was to apply the policies and plans worked out by the National Atomic Energy Commission, which had so far been in charge of activities in that sector and which would henceforth be responsible for advising the executive power in matters of policy and planning and for co-ordinating relations with the Agency.

27. His Government trusted that the support it had always given to the Agency would bear fruit in the near future, and it hoped that that collaboration would be intensified in those sectors which, like agriculture, could contribute to the economic and social development of the country. His Government approved without reservation of the ARCAL programme, in the conviction that it would achieve all its objectives. Uruguay also thanked the

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission for its collaboration and for the role it played in co-operation between the international organizations responsible for nuclear matters in the region.

28. As a small country with no nuclear potential, Uruguay nevertheless believed that it fulfilled a function by sharing the fruits of its efforts and aspirations; by its presence it bore moral witness to the imminent dangers represented by the uncontrolled forces of the atom. Uruguay would fight on all fronts in accordance with the law to preserve the safeguards and safety institutions offered by the Agency. In order to avoid the danger of total disaster, the small countries should join together in examining and solving problems, containing the forces of aggression, institutionalizing ever further the commitments to the defence of humanity, increasing awareness of dangers and constituting an example of what made progress possible. On the occasion of the Agency's thirtieth anniversary, Uruguay sent its best wishes that the Agency's moral strength would remain unassailed and inaccessible to any aspiration or tendency running counter to the interests of humanity.

29. Mr. HONG (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that his delegation was convinced that the Agency would continue, as in the past thirty years, to contribute effectively to the establishment of peace, the improvement of the people's lot and the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with the objectives and mandate assigned to it, and reiterated its congratulations on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Agency's foundation.

30. In 1986 the Agency had achieved many successes in all the fields with which it was traditionally concerned, in particular nuclear safety, radiation protection, nuclear power, the nuclear fuel cycle and technical co-operation. Since the first special session and the thirtieth regular session of the General Conference, Member States had taken greater interest in nuclear safety and radiation protection, and many countries had become parties to the conventions adopted during the special session. His delegation wished to express its deep gratitude to the Director General and the Secretariat for the preparation and implementation of the programmes on nuclear safety, radiation protection and technical co-operation, and hoped that the Agency would continue in the future to make every effort to improve matters in those areas.

31. At the present time, the nuclear question was not simply a scientific and technical one: it had acquired great importance through being linked with world peace and the very existence of humanity. Now that the danger of nuclear war seemed to be increasing, the peace-loving peoples demanded urgently that all international organizations, and in particular the Agency, take positive action to defend world peace and security and assure the happiness and prosperity of mankind. The Agency was contributing much to mankind's struggle for peace through its activities in the fields of safeguards and technical co-operation.

32. His country, aware of its great responsibility for the defence of world peace, was doing all it could to turn the Korean peninsula into a peaceful zone free of nuclear weapons, within the framework of efforts to achieve peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world. That aim had taken concrete form in the proposal for disarmament and creation of a peace zone made by his country's Government on 23 July 1986. His Government was making a point of using nuclear energy to further the country's prosperity and development and to promote the well-being of its population. In that context, it was very interested in co-operation with the Agency and in bilateral technical co-operation with other countries. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his conviction that the Agency would continue to enjoy increasing success in its endeavours to attain its objectives.

33. Mr. KASANDA (Zambia) said his Government was pleased that over the past thirty years the Agency had become an efficient driving force in strengthening co-operation and international understanding in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and was certain that the Agency would not fail to overcome the problems that would arise in the future. The considerable progress achieved would not have been possible without the devoted and indefatigable efforts of the Director General and his predecessors, and of the entire staff of the Agency.

34. He reiterated his country's firm commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the acknowledged possibilities which they offered for improving the quality of life for all people without any sort of discrimination. However, as a young developing country, Zambia still had a

long way to go to acquire the necessary technology in that area. It was therefore grateful to the Agency for the assistance it continued to provide, which had enabled Zambia to undertake important initiatives with regard to the use of radioisotopes in sectors such as agriculture, public health, natural resources and industry, to set up nuclear analysis laboratories and a multi-purpose irradiation facility which had aroused great interest among numerous users, and to press forward with the project to strengthen the country's capacity in the area of nuclear instrument maintenance and repair.

35. The Zambian Government also accorded great importance to the safe and effective use of nuclear techniques, and in particular to strengthening radiation protection services and to staff training in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. In that connection, he wished to transmit to the Agency his Government's thanks for the fellowships which had been granted to it and to announce that it intended in 1988 to launch a national training programme in that field.

36. His Government had noted with satisfaction the measures which the Agency had adopted as a consequence of the special session of the General Conference so as to restore confidence in the safe utilization of nuclear energy. Although Zambia did not have any nuclear facility, its Government was at present taking the necessary steps to accede to the conventions on early notification and emergency assistance in view of their value for mankind.

37. It was gratifying to note that the Board of Governors had authorized, for 1988, an increase by 12% over 1987 in the financial resources available for technical assistance and co-operation. However, the financing of technical assistance was dependent upon voluntary contributions from Member States and was therefore not assured. Since the adoption of resolution GC(XXV)/RES/388 in 1981, there had been no progress in the search for a lasting solution. The system of indicative planning figures was merely a provisional arrangement. The adoption of a system of firm financing commitments by the General Conference would be an acceptable compromise. Meanwhile, his Government promised to pay an amount equivalent to its share of the target fixed by the Board of Governors for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1988.

38. With regard to safeguards implementation in 1986, he welcomed the Director General's statement that nuclear material under Agency safeguards in 1986 had remained in peaceful nuclear uses or had been duly accounted for.

39. Turning to the staffing of the Secretariat, he commended the Director General on the success of recent efforts to achieve a more equitable distribution of posts between all the geographical areas of the Agency. That distribution had compromised neither the efficiency nor the productivity of the Secretariat. The Director General should be encouraged to continue to take further specific measures in order to increase, pursuant to resolution GC(XXX)/RES/465, the number of staff members from developing countries, particularly in posts at the senior and policy-making levels.

40. The amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute was a question which had been on the agenda for ten years now, but the objective remained to ensure that the principle of equitable geographical representation embodied in the Statute was applied for all areas, including those of the Middle East and South Asia and of Africa. It was disappointing that after so many meetings the Board of Governors was still not able to advise the General Conference on the appropriate means of at last resolving that problem.

41. The region of the world of which Zambia was part - southern Africa - continued to be threatened by the nuclear capability of the racist régime in South Africa. Hundreds of black people were being murdered by the military forces of that régime, which was continuing the military occupation of Namibia and the exploitation of its resources, particularly uranium, in total disregard of the demands which had been addressed to it in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Agency's General Conference. The neighbouring countries were being either invaded or exposed to the threat of attacks by South Africa. The international community was fully aware of the danger which South Africa's nuclear capability represented for peace in the world in general and in Africa in particular. During the past ten years, his delegation had never ceased to support proposals aimed at compelling South Africa to comply with those resolutions of the General Assembly and the General Conference which demanded that it refrain from acquiring a nuclear capability for military purposes.

42. His delegation therefore accepted with great pleasure the categorical recommendation of the Board of Governors to suspend South Africa's rights and privileges as a Member of the Agency until it complied with the relevant resolutions of the General Conference and behaved in accordance with the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It had also taken note with satisfaction of the Director General's report and was not surprised to learn that South Africa had made proposals intended either to force the Agency to stop negotiations or to make a farce of any agreements in which those proposals might be incorporated. His Government would give due attention to that question and hoped that the progressive States would continue their efforts to persuade South Africa to comply with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Agency's General Conference.

43. Mr. KAMUNANWIRE (Uganda), after thanking the Agency for the work accomplished during the past thirty years, said that his country had no nuclear programme, but had nevertheless signed the NPT. It had recently rid itself of the scourge of civil war and political agitation. For two decades, his country had known neither peace nor stability, the two pre-conditions for any constructive development or progress. Uganda had thus missed numerous occasions to benefit from the advice and support of the Agency in the applications of nuclear energy.

44. With the return of peace, major reconstruction programmes had been launched. The task was enormous, and the problems to be solved were crushing. However, the determination which was being shown on the national level and the promise of assistance from friendly governments and organizations had caused hope to be reborn. Uganda intended to seek support and co-operation from Agency Member States in its efforts to derive more benefit from the applications of nuclear energy.

45. Over the years, a number of Ugandan nationals had received training in various fields through the Agency's assistance. Several research workers had also received financial support under Agency co-ordinated research programmes. Research policies were under review, and it was expected that scientific research efforts would be increased so as to to broaden their scope and to encourage Ugandan scientists scattered across the world to return to

their home country. Nuclear techniques would be used for research in fields such as plant selection and genetics, soil fertility and agricultural production, animal production and health, and the control of insects and other pests. Uganda had great need for assistance, both financial and technical, and it hoped that the Agency would be able to help it in seeking such assistance.

46. Uganda was forced to deal with the serious problem of trypanosomiasis. Many years of bad management and negligence had led to disruption of operations to control the tsetse fly and to an increased incidence of that disease in both humans and domestic animals. Encouraged by the results achieved in Nigeria, his country hoped to adopt the sterile insect technique as a complement to the existing methods for controlling the tsetse fly. It had recently prepared a pilot project for the Buvuma Islands in Lake Victoria. Financial assistance had been requested for that project through the Agency. He hoped that the project would be successful and that analogous projects could be set up in other parts of the country.

47. The establishment of a regional nuclear science centre whose function would be to strengthen national and regional scientific and technical capabilities had been under consideration since the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity had adopted a memorandum on the question at its forty-fourth session, held in Addis Ababa in 1986. Uganda sincerely wished to be host to that centre, but would need financial and technical support. It intended to request the Agency to take part in that project.

48. The Ugandan Cancer Institute recorded 1500 cases of cancer per year. The only available treatment was chemotherapy, which was generally expensive and ineffective. It had therefore been proposed to introduce radiotherapy. Moreover, it was intended to launch programmes for the radiosterilization of medical equipment. For those projects, Uganda planned to maintain constant liaison with the Agency, which it considered the main agent for the transfer of nuclear technology.

49. The Ugandan Government had decided to undertake, with the Agency's assistance, an inventory of the country's uranium resources and to interest governments and international companies in the establishment and development

of a national uranium mining industry. In the foreseeable future, Uganda would not require nuclear energy, since it had considerable hydroelectric potential which could be exploited both for internal needs and for export. Instead, it expected to be able to export uranium to earn foreign exchange for use in national development.

50. Mr. IONESCU (Romania) commended the Agency on its efforts to develop international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to enhance its role for the benefit of Member States. The present session of the General Conference was taking place in a period of tense international relations resulting from the intensified arms race, in particular where nuclear weapons were concerned. The deterioration in the world economic situation, moreover, was affecting all countries, in particular the developing countries, and was causing an ever greater gap between rich and poor.

51. In the circumstances, his country attached primary importance to stopping the arms race and taking concrete disarmament measures, beginning with nuclear weapons, and to defending man's supreme right to peace, life and a free and dignified existence. At the same time, the realities of the modern world showed that the problems of economic development, and especially those relating to external debt and interest rates, could no longer be solved except through joint efforts and active co-operation by all States, whatever their size or social system.

52. Faced with the present period of deep transformation, humanity had to find new ways of thinking to resolve in a constructive way the complex problems of war and peace and of economic and social development of peoples. As the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Mr. Ceausescu, had declared, it was a paradoxical and intolerable situation that vast resources were wasted on the perfecting and multiplication of ever more effective means of destruction while many serious economic and social problems remained unresolved. Specific steps should therefore be taken without delay to use science and technology for exclusively peaceful purposes, to redirect scientific and technical research away from the military field and towards the solution of the serious social and economic problems posed by the under-development in which some two thirds of mankind lived, and jointly to find the

means whereby all countries and peoples could benefit, without hindrance and in full equality, from the latest achievements of the technical and scientific revolution.

53. Romania was in favour of eliminating underdevelopment and introducing a new international economic order and of extending the role of the United Nations and its daughter organizations, including the Agency, in solving the major problems which mankind faced. The Agency could and must make a greater contribution to the development of international co-operation and the transfer of nuclear technology, and it should help Member States, especially developing countries, with the safe use of nuclear power and the other applications of nuclear energy.

54. Romania commended the Agency on its efforts over the past thirty years to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and international co-operation in that area: during that period, the Agency had achieved important results with regard to nuclear power, safety, radiation protection, technical assistance and personnel training. However, the attempts made to channel the Agency's activities towards safeguards functions could not be ignored. While appreciating the results obtained in that respect, his country considered that the Agency should, in the coming years, pay increasing attention to assuring the right of all States to benefit fully from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

55. The primary objectives in the economic and social development of Romania were to make progress in the advanced sectors, to strengthen factors contributing to development, and to improve economic quality and efficiency. Nuclear energy used for peaceful purposes would increasingly contribute to meeting the growing energy needs of the national economy, to improving the standard and quality of life, and to introducing technical progress on a grand scale.

56. His delegation wished to stress that the Agency's programme for 1988 should reflect more appropriately the expanding role of the Agency and its contribution to the solution of certain major problems in priority areas such as nuclear power, nuclear applications in national economies, and technical assistance. Noting with satisfaction the Agency's achievements over the past

thirty years, the good co-operative relations between Romania and the Agency, and the particularly useful and fruitful activities of the previous year, he expressed his conviction that the Agency would in the future make even greater contributions to the development of international co-operation and further strengthen its role in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

57. Mr. ZANNAD (Tunisia) said that his delegation wished to pay tribute to the Director General and to the entire staff of the Secretariat on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Agency, which was considered one of the best run and most efficient organizations in the United Nations system.

58. Since its establishment, the Agency had played a central role in fostering international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy. The work it had accomplished in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy - whether it related to nuclear power planning, to the applications of isotope and radiation techniques, or to safeguards agreements - was considerable. The technical co-operation programme had allowed many countries to benefit from the advantages of nuclear techniques. For an increasing number of developing countries, the applications of nuclear techniques in health and medicine, food and agriculture, and hydrology were of vital importance for their socio-economic development.

59. The Third NPT Review Conference and the recent United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy had proved, however, that efforts at international co-operation in that area could not play their full and proper role except in a world free from fear of the destructive effects which the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons might bring. Fortunately, the thirtieth anniversary of the Agency was coinciding with the signature of an agreement between the United States of America and the Soviet Union aimed at a limited reduction of their nuclear missiles.

60. In 1986, the development of nuclear power had remained very uneven in the various regions of the world. The installed nuclear capacity of the developing countries had represented barely 3.7% of world nuclear power capacity. Tunisia believed that the Agency had a significant role to play in

that area. Like others, his delegation believed that the recommendations of the Senior Expert Group on the Promotion and Financing of Nuclear Power Programmes in Developing Countries should be used to prepare an action plan for the Agency in the years to come.

61. In spite of the obstacles due to the financing of nuclear installations and to infrastructural difficulties, Tunisia accorded primary importance to the improvement of human resources and the training of high-level personnel with a view to expanding the dimensions and prospects of scientific research and accelerating the mastering of nuclear techniques, particularly in agriculture, industry, medicine, geology and hydrology. The programme of technical co-operation with the Agency was giving Tunisia full satisfaction. In 1986, as in the preceding years, the technical assistance provided by the Agency had been extremely valuable in several areas, particularly in that of long-term nuclear power planning. For that reason, his delegation wished to express its gratitude to the Department of Technical Co-operation and the Secretariat and to underline once again that technical assistance should be based on predictable, assured and adequate resources within the Regular Budget of the Agency.

62. The post-Chernobyl period would probably be dominated by the acute problems of nuclear installation safety and radiation protection. By elucidating the conditions and causes for the Chernobyl accident, and by promoting the NUSS Codes and the exchange of information, the Agency had accomplished a considerable task for which it deserved praise. That achievement could be crowned by the preparation and adoption of an international convention prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities.

63. His country shared with other members of the Group of 77 the opinion that the Agency should strike a better balance between its statutory and promotional activities so as to preserve its credibility and its technical effectiveness and to conform fully with its Statute. For many years already, the developing countries had been pointing out that the financing of safeguards was absorbing increasing resources and thus jeopardizing the Agency's promotional activities. His delegation supported the Agency's safeguards system, of course, but it considered that the activities relating to nuclear power production and nuclear applications were equally important.

64. With regard to Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, his delegation regretted to note that Africa had since 1977 remained the region least equitably represented on the Board of Governors. Unfortunately, the absence of a consensus on the Board was holding up a solution to that important question with political implications. As long as the Board had not recommended a solution, the African States would not cease to denounce that unfair situation, which was damaging to the interests of Africa and its rights within the Agency. Tunisia hoped that a positive solution would emerge from the revision of Article VI as a whole.

65. The Director General had indicated that the Agency's discussions with South Africa had made hardly any progress, which was in no way surprising. The climate in South Africa was characterized by the intransigence of apartheid, which was a crime against humanity and a threat to international peace and security. During the past twelve months, world public opinion had witnessed a recrudescence of violence and repression against the people of South Africa, the continuation by the racist régime of the illegal occupation of Namibia, State terrorism and the effects of a policy of destabilization aimed against the African States. Recalling the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, and more particularly resolution 41/35B, his delegation supported the recommendation of the Board of Governors contained in document GC(XXXI)/807 and stressed that it was up to the General Conference, as the authority of last resort, to decide how such a recommendation could be implemented.

66. The question of the Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat came within the statutory competence of the Agency. It seemed worth recalling that, on 27 September 1985, the General Conference had adopted, by simple majority, a resolution submitted by the Scandinavian countries calling upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. That same resolution had reaffirmed that any attack against a peaceful nuclear facility subject to Agency safeguards would constitute a serious threat to the Agency's safeguards system. At a time when the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the problems of nuclear installation safety were of great concern to the entire international community, it was the General Conference's duty to take the necessary measures to implement the resolutions which it had itself adopted.

67. Ms. OLEMBO (Kenya) transmitted her country's most sincere best wishes to the Director General and the Secretariat on the occasion of the Agency's thirtieth anniversary. The impact of the Agency's work on promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was now being felt throughout the developing world, which had earlier stood aside from most nuclear activities.

68. The co-operation between Kenya and the Agency had been satisfactory for years. In 1986, nine projects had been financed by the Agency, of which several had been in the fields of nuclear medicine and radiation protection. Her country was very grateful to the Agency for that co-operation, being aware of the financial constraints to which the Agency was subject. With regard to training, Kenya continued to receive support from the Agency in the form of fellowships and courses. However, in 1987, Africa had enjoyed the benefit of only four courses under the technical co-operation programme, whereas Asia had had 19 and Latin America 22. Her delegation therefore hoped that the number of such courses would increase for the African region. There could be no transfer of technology without training courses, and Africa had urgent needs in that area.

69. Kenya fully supported the Agency in its attempts to strengthen nuclear safety at the national and international levels. It would soon be signing the conventions on early notification and emergency assistance. Moreover, it was in the course of working out with the Agency a safeguards agreement which it would also be signing soon.

70. Her delegation supported the principle of universality in the Agency. However, that principle must in no case serve to accommodate the racist régime of South Africa and its odious practices of apartheid and violation of the rights of man. Everyone knew that South Africa itself did not respect the principle of universality within its own boundaries. Why, therefore, did the western industrial nations constantly invoke that principle when the question of South Africa came up? It could scarcely be for any reason but to protect the oppressor rather than the people of that country. South Africa should revise its policies in accordance with the principles of the rights of man which it pretended to respect. With regard to South Africa's nuclear capabilities, her delegation hoped that their development would be halted

until the NPT entered into force for South Africa and all the facilities in that country were subject to Agency safeguards. South Africa apparently intended to sign the NPT: that would be a step in the right direction, and it was to be hoped that it would be followed by a full-scope safeguards agreement.

71. The Kenyan delegation wished to pay tribute to the people of South Africa for all the suffering they had endured in their quest for liberty. It hoped that the apartheid régime would one day be destroyed and replaced by a democratic government which would make nuclear energy serve peace. In the meantime, her delegation asked the General Conference to adopt the draft resolution on South Africa's nuclear capabilities submitted by the African group.

ISRAELI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND THREAT (GC(XXXI)/808, 811, 812, 813 and 825).

72. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said that Israel had for a long time been following a nuclear policy aimed at developing its nuclear capabilities for military purposes and thus had sought, by its own means or in collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa and other countries, to acquire what it needed to produce the necessary material to make nuclear weapons and explosive devices, together with the aircraft or missiles needed for delivery to their targets. Published reports and information demonstrated that Israel had the capability of producing nuclear weapons and that it had, with the help of its friends, effectively built up an arsenal in the greatest secrecy. It had made statements and leaked obscure and contradictory information in order to sow terror so that it could more easily pursue its aggressive and expansionist policies in the Arab region.

73. Israel's efforts to build up a nuclear weapons capability went back to the 1950s, when the administration of the late President Eisenhower had expressed its concern at Israel's progress in the nuclear field. Those efforts still continued, as was shown by the information which the Israeli technician, Mordecai Vanunu, had given to the Sunday Times in 1986 after leaving his job at the Dimona nuclear installations, and also by the testing of the Jericho-2 reactor. The effects of those efforts were being felt far beyond the Middle East, as far away as the Soviet Union, which had expressed its deep concern at those serious developments.

74. The information on Israel's nuclear capabilities and on the acquisition by Israel of a nuclear arsenal of 100 or even 200 nuclear warheads was well known and had come from different sources, including the two reports by the Secretary-General of the United Nations contained in documents A/36/431 and A/40/520, the discussions at the United Nations General Assembly some years previously, the records of Agency General Conference sessions - in particular those of the thirtieth regular session, the news leaked by the Central Intelligence Agency and published in a number of well-known newspapers such as the Times and the Washington Post, articles published by many newspapers and magazines such as Der Spiegel and the Soviet weekly New Times, and a variety of reports and books published by institutes for strategic studies such as those of Georgetown University, the Carnegie Institution and the Aumont Institute. It was equally useful to refer to statements by several Israeli personalities such as Yoval Niemann, by international personalities such as Paul Warnke, the former United States Deputy Secretary of State, and by United States arms experts like Tony Crossman, Richard Seal and many others.

75. The policy of successive Israeli régimes in the nuclear field had been not only to seek to acquire nuclear weapons, but also to make every effort and use every means to ensure that the Israeli entity remained the sole nuclear Power capable of imposing its terroristic, aggressive and expansionist policies in the region. The declared Israeli policy, as expressed by many Israeli officials, was to launch attacks on and to sabotage peaceful nuclear installations which Israel regarded as constituting a grave threat to its nuclear hegemony in the region: all those actions were only part of the Israeli nuclear armaments policy. It was in pursuance of that futile policy that the Israelis had planned and executed their armed aggression against the Iraqi nuclear facilities on 7 June 1981 and that the Zionist leaders had reiterated their determination to repeat their aggression against nuclear facilities which, in their opinion, endangered Israel or jeopardized its image as the sole nuclear Power in the region.

76. The policy of armed attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities, which was an integral part of the Israeli nuclear armaments policy, was in reality a policy of aggression against the Agency, its objectives and its safeguards system, as had been recognized in General Conference resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381

adopted in 1981. It was therefore the duty of the General Conference to deal with the subject of Israeli nuclear armaments and capabilities as constituting a serious threat not only to peace and security, but also to the Agency, its functions and its safeguards system, and to the peaceful uses of atomic energy in general.

77. The draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXI)/825 recalled in its preamble the most important resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly and of the Agency's General Conference concerning the nuclear armament of Israel and calling upon Israel to place all of its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. The preamble referred also to the United Nations resolutions condemning the co-operation between the two racist régimes in Pretoria and Tel Aviv in building up their nuclear capabilities, thus creating a serious threat to security and peace in Africa and the Middle East.

78. As to the most important operative paragraphs, the first was a reaffirmation of the demand made in an earlier General Conference resolution that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. Unless Israel - which was the only country in the region to have major nuclear facilities capable of producing materials for nuclear explosives - renounced nuclear weapons and accepted the safeguards system, the call for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East would be meaningless and would remain a mere political card played by Israel to disguise its real intentions and actions with regard to nuclear weapons. That call had been made by the Security Council in response to a unique and unprecedented act of aggression.

79. Operative paragraph 2 requested the Director General and the Board of Governors to give due consideration to the United Nations General Assembly resolutions by taking steps, within the Agency's mandate, to implement the relevant provisions of those resolutions. It was the moral responsibility of the Agency, as a member of the United Nations family, to attach the greatest importance to Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. In that regard, the Agency should consider the suspension of all scientific or technical co-operation with Israel which could enhance its military nuclear capabilities. In operative paragraph 3, the Director General

was requested to report to the Board of Governors and to the following session of the General Conference on the Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat.

80. The subject of Israel's nuclear capabilities and threat was very important; it had a direct bearing on security and peace in the Middle East and also had implications for the Agency, its objectives, its safeguards system and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such an important matter must be dealt with by correctly applying the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference. The decisions of the General Conference which required a two-thirds majority were listed clearly and unequivocally in its Rules of Procedure. The Conference should not depart from those Rules under any circumstances; otherwise its credibility and that of its resolutions would be gradually eroded.

81. Lastly, his delegation requested that the vote on that draft resolution, or on any other proposal under the present item, be taken by roll-call.

82. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) recalled that the United Nations Security Council, the highest international authority concerned with world peace, had in a historic decision singled out Israel and called upon it to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. The Council had never taken such a decision with regard to any other State, but Israel constituted a threat to the Middle East as well as to world peace. That threat had several characteristics. First, from its recent history it was clear that Israel was an aggressive State which was constantly waging wars, which annexed territories by force, and which was still occupying the lands it had acquired from previous wars. Second, it did not comply with the United Nations resolutions adopted in that regard, whereas it should have been the first State in the world to respect those resolutions, having itself been created by a resolution of that body.

83. Two bombs had been sufficient to put an end to the Second World War, and Israel would not need to use more than four or five bombs against the neighbouring Arab capitals which it considered a threat to its security. It might therefore be asked why Israel needed to have such a large number of

nuclear bombs. The Syrian Arab Republic believed that Israel's ambitions extended beyond the boundaries of the Middle East, and history would prove that to be so if no measures were taken before the expected disaster.

84. On many occasions, Israeli officials had declared that they had a long arm, and they had actually demonstrated the truth of that claim by launching an attack against Baghdad and another against Tunis, not to mention their repeated attacks against the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. Their arm had also reached as far as Latin America, but he did not wish to dwell on that particular event, which had been just as much an aggression against sovereignty as war was. More recently they had carried out operations in England and Italy: the kidnapping of Vanunu was still fresh in everyone's mind. Nor had France escaped their activities when they had attacked installations and hijacked ships not belonging to them in violation of French sovereignty.

85. In those circumstances, his country felt a real danger from the Israeli military nuclear capabilities. The 1973 war, although fought with conventional weapons, had left its mark on most countries of the world. So one could well imagine what would be the repercussions of a nuclear war in the same region. As everyone knew, an industrial accident which had taken place in 1986 - the Chernobyl accident - had alarmed the whole world. What then would be the result of an explosion of nuclear weapons?

86. The Middle East had a problem of which all were aware, which had not as yet been resolved and which had led to several wars. Efforts were still being made in the region to maintain a military balance. If Israel persisted in pursuing its military nuclear policy, a certain measure would have to be taken in a certain way in order to maintain a military nuclear balance such that Israel did not dominate the region of the Middle East.

87. However, although such a balance between the two superpowers might have led to peace, as some claimed, it would not guarantee peace in the Middle East because it would in that case be quite different in nature. The United States and the Soviet Union had emerged from a major world war in which they had been on the same side, and so their nuclear and military balance had led to the present situation. No war had broken out between them because neither side

had attacked the territory of the other or occupied part of it. A nuclear and military balance, were it ever to exist in the Middle East, would be completely different from that between the two superpowers because the region had been the scene of recent wars and there were still occupied lands and other after-effects. The picture in the Middle East would be different and so would be the result. He hoped, therefore, that the Member States participating in the Conference would recognize that danger and co-operate in seeking ways and means of averting it. He was raising that matter not because it was a political one, but because it posed a real danger to the region and was related to one of the objectives of the Agency, namely to prevent the use of the atom for purposes of war and destruction.

88. His delegation considered that, although the first four operative paragraphs of the draft resolution did not offer a sufficient solution for eliminating that danger, they could help the Conference to see it and try to reduce it. That would be only the beginning of the road towards solving the problem. The Syrian Arab Republic was willing to co-operate with delegations to the Conference that would support the draft resolution in order to arrive the following year at a better and more effective resolution aimed at eliminating that danger, which was the first mankind had faced since the inception of the Agency. That was the reason for the inclusion in the draft resolution of the fifth operative paragraph, which was intended to allow the subject to be discussed again in 1988 in co-operation with all peace-loving Member States with a view to eliminating the possibility of any form of nuclear war.

89. The information provided by the Israeli technician Vanunu to the Sunday Times and authenticated by scientists in Europe, together with the action that Israel had taken against Vanunu, proved that the information supplied by him was true and reflected the status of Israel's military nuclear capabilities.

90. He joined the delegate of Iraq in expressing the hope that participants in the Conference would deal objectively with the matter, without political wrangling, and that, recognizing the danger looming over the region, they would take a positive stand on the draft resolution.

91. Mr. KENNEDY (United States of America) said that the General Conference should decisively reject the draft resolution before it - for many reasons, some general, arising from the overall effect of the measure, and others specific, arising from its particular provisions.

92. Of the general reasons, the first was that the draft resolution was highly political and did not belong in the Agency's sphere. The matters which it raised could not be resolved within the Agency, and their further consideration would only damage the Agency's role as a technical agency devoted to nuclear safety, safeguards and technical co-operation.

93. Secondly, it was a repetitive issue which had been considered and definitively dealt with at many past sessions of the General Conference. Keeping it on the agenda in perpetuity merely burdened the Conference with unproductive matters. Furthermore, since two resolutions on the subject were already on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, he wondered whether it was necessary to consider the matter at the General Conference as well.

94. Thirdly, the draft resolution was discriminatory. It singled out one nation for treatment and demands which were not addressed to other countries in a similar situation.

95. Fourthly, the draft resolution was divisive. The debate on the issue would continue to polarize the Agency's membership at a time when a positive image of the Agency was badly needed in order to reassure public opinion that world nuclear affairs were being conducted in a unified and responsible manner.

96. Moreover, the draft resolution was objectionable for specific reasons. Its very title was highly troubling. It necessarily implied that Israel was making some unspecified "nuclear threat", which was a serious matter. In resolution GC(XXIX)/RES/443 adopted in 1985, the General Conference had determined conclusively that Israel had committed itself not to attack nuclear facilities in Iraq or to attack other countries in the region. Thus, to include such a provision was false and misleading and specifically contradicted past findings of the General Conference.

97. The resolution's other preambular paragraphs demonstrated that the issue was stale and repetitious. No new evidence was offered to support any further action by the General Conference. Preambular paragraph (g) recited allegations of co-operation between Israel and South Africa which had been repeatedly denied by Israel and which had not been substantiated by any credible evidence.

98. Operative paragraph 1 was redundant. It merely duplicated the call which the Security Council had addressed to Israel in 1981 to accept safeguards on its nuclear facilities. The Agency had no power to implement that resolution. It was for the Security Council itself, under the Charter, to monitor such implementation.

99. Operative paragraph 2 requested the Director General to "consider implementation" of two United Nations General Assembly resolutions. It was not clear which aspects of the measures he was supposed to consider, or indeed, what such consideration would consist in. More significantly, the resolution would involve the Agency's Secretariat in an ambiguous and unprofitable review of past General Assembly resolutions, drawing Agency resources away from more important tasks.

100. Furthermore, operative paragraph 2 was especially confusing and harmful on the issue of scientific co-operation with Israel, which was dealt with in the General Assembly resolutions. Under those resolutions, the Agency was to suspend any co-operation with Israel which could "contribute to its nuclear capabilities". As a matter of principle and under its Statute, the Agency did not engage in any such co-operation with any Member State. Thus, it was unclear why the Director General should be asked to consider implementing a provision which was manifestly meaningless.

101. Operative paragraph 3 merely sought to keep the issue alive by requesting the Director General to report to the Board of Governors. The matter had been considered exhaustively by United Nations bodies and by the Agency, and no new report was needed. He understood that a revised study was soon to be issued by the General Assembly. It would be a misuse of the Agency's time and resources during a period of budgetary stringency to compel it to produce yet another inconclusive report on the subject.

102. Operative paragraph 4 was superfluous. Under Article III of the Statute, the Secretariat was required to submit reports on its activities to the General Assembly of the United Nations, and such reports were submitted each year with the approval of the Agency's Board and General Conference. The proposed provision was thus unnecessary.

103. Operative paragraph 5 was objectionable because it clearly indicated the intention of the sponsors to keep the matter perpetually on the agenda of the General Conference. That was an abuse of the Agency's procedures and diverted Member States' attention from the real work of the Agency. Such an "automatic" provision was bad for the Agency and for its Member States, and discredited the Agency in world public opinion.

104. For those many reasons, the United States delegation urged that the draft resolution be rejected and that the Agency be allowed to return to its important business in the areas of safety, safeguards and technical assistance.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.