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[*] GC(XXXIII)/897.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXIII)/INF/274/Rev.2.

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ISRAELI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND THREAT (GC(XXXIII)/886, 887 and 895)

1. The PRESIDENT noted that the present item had been included in the agenda pursuant to resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/487 adopted by the General Conference the previous year.
2. Pursuant to operative paragraph 5 of that resolution, the Director General had submitted the report appended to document GC(XXXIII)/886, and pursuant to operative paragraph 6, the Conference had before it, in document GC(XXXIII)/887, a technical study on different modalities of the application of safeguards in the Middle East. Both of those documents had also been submitted to the Board of Governors. The Conference further had before it, in document GC(XXXIII)/895, a draft resolution which had been submitted by Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates and which would be introduced by the delegate of Morocco.
3. Mr. KABBAJ (Morocco) said that the aim of the Arab Member States in submitting the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/895 was to create a climate in all countries of the Middle East conducive to the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and nuclear power free of the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
4. It was clear from paragraph (a) of the preamble that the resolution applied to the Middle East only. In view of the exceptional circumstances prevailing in that region and the threat posed by Israeli nuclear armament, the Arab States hoped that delegations from all other regions would understand and support the resolution, too. It was well known that Israel was developing or had already developed medium-range ballistic missiles which could be fitted with nuclear warheads and aimed at areas neighbouring the Middle East region.
5. With regard to preambular paragraph (b) concerning the threat posed to peace and security in the area by Israel's growing nuclear capability, he noted that the great fear felt by the Arab countries on that score was also reflected in resolutions adopted in Fez and Casablanca and in the historic decision taken by the Palestine National Council in November 1988, when Palestine had expressed its willingness to strive for a just peace in the area

in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Israel's response to that decision had been to continue occupying Arab territories. Its refusal to submit all of its nuclear installations to Agency safeguards, its hinting at the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, and its rejection of efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute had led the area to the verge of armed confrontation.

6. Paragraph (c) had been prompted by the consideration that there were seven Arab countries in the African region and that any threat to that region as a whole would be matched or even surpassed by the threat to those particular Arab countries. Even if that were not so, the Arab peoples would still wish to show their solidarity with the peoples of the African continent in rejecting the threat posed by co-operation between Israel and South Africa in the nuclear field. The expansion of Israel's nuclear capability only served to deepen the concern aroused by such collaboration.

7. Paragraph (d) recalled Security Council resolution 487, adopted in 1981 by the body acknowledged throughout the international community as being primarily responsible for international peace and security. That resolution requested Israel to submit all its nuclear installations to the Agency's safeguards system. In the eight years which had since elapsed there had been no response from Israel - despite repeated international calls for such a response. He wondered how the permanent members of the Security Council, in full knowledge of their responsibilities under the United Nations Charter, could remain silent on the matter. Unless Israel accepted Security Council resolution 487 the aspirations of the Arab countries for peace, security and economic and social progress in the Middle East would remain mere dreams.

8. The operative part of the draft resolution not only called upon Israel to comply with the Security Council resolution already mentioned, but also requested the Agency to take practical steps towards solving the problem. In that regard, the recommendations contained in paragraph 75 of the technical study in document GC(XXXIII)/887, while not fully satisfying the Arab countries' desires, none the less offered countries in the region different modalities for applying IAEA safeguards. If those recommendations were

applied, all the nuclear installations in the Middle East, including Israeli ones, would be subject to Agency safeguards. If Israel wished to prove its good intentions towards the peoples of the area and its sincere desire for peace, it should announce its decision to submit all its installations to the Agency's safeguards system, and if the Member States participating in the present Conference wished to prove their concern about the nuclear threat in the Middle East and their desire to safeguard that region's prospects for peaceful development, they should support the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/895.

9. Some would say that the matter was a political one, outside the Agency's mandate, and not a proper subject of discussion by the General Conference. It should be remembered, however, that those advancing that argument were likely to be the very same people who had forced the Agency to take a political stand when it had been in their own interest.

10. In conclusion, he said that the sponsors of the draft resolution were convinced that, if approved, it would represent a significant contribution towards the peaceful development of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind. If the Conference decided to take a vote on the draft resolution, whether on parts of it or on the resolution in its entirety, the Arab States would prefer that vote to be by roll-call.

11. Mr. YASSIN (Sudan) expressed his delegation's regret that no progress had been made in persuading Israel to submit all its nuclear installations to safeguards. His delegation continued to believe that actions to stop the Israeli nuclear threat did indeed fall within the Agency's mandate, since they assisted the Agency in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy and facilitated the application of safeguards. The majority of countries in the Middle East, far from seeing the safeguards system as some kind of punishment, recognized its vital importance for the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Only Israel had failed to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to submit its nuclear installations to the safeguards system.

12. Since it was the international community's responsibility to promote the cause of non-proliferation, it was absolutely essential that the Agency be aware of the quantity and type of nuclear armaments in Israel's possession.

He therefore appealed to delegations to support the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/895.

13. Mr. SAMIEI (Islamic Republic of Iran) recalled that his delegation had supported the draft resolution from its conception. There could be no doubt that Israel represented the only threat in the area concerned. No other State in the Middle East region could even remotely match Israel's nuclear capabilities. As his delegation had stated on several occasions previously, Israel constituted a global threat and should be dealt with accordingly. The text of the resolution should reflect that fact.

14. His delegation therefore had certain reservations concerning the draft resolution in its present form, because it shifted the focus from the main issue, namely the serious threat posed by Israel's nuclear capabilities and the necessity of its submitting all its nuclear installations to Agency safeguards.

15. His delegation none the less fully supported the proposed resolution and considered that it represented the very least the Agency could do to counter the Israeli threat.

16. Mr. SAETI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that since Israel persisted in its refusal to abide by Security Council resolution 487, the present Conference should not only approve the draft resolution under consideration, but also adopt sanctions to dissuade Israel from its policy of extending its nuclear military installations, which constituted a threat to the security of the entire world, let alone the Middle East. Moreover, those States which provided Israel with assistance in that field should cease to do so until it had complied with Security Council resolution 487. The question of Israel's nuclear capabilities and threat should be retained on the agenda of the Agency's General Conference for its thirty-fourth regular session. The question was not a political one outside the Agency's mandate, since the issue at stake was not Israel's violation of human rights or its treatment of the Palestinian people, but its refusal to submit to Agency safeguards.

17. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said that introducing nuclear arms in the Middle East and pushing the region into the nuclear arms race would represent a threat to international security. Iraq had repeatedly urged Israel to

adhere to the NPT and to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons. It had also consistently asked the Agency to apply safeguards to all Israeli nuclear installations, thereby discharging its full responsibilities under its Statute and at the same time responding to Security Council resolution 487 and various resolutions adopted by the Agency's General Conference, including resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/487 of 1988.

18. His delegation considered that the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/895 was very balanced and should therefore be voted on as a whole - rather than paragraph by paragraph, which would weaken it dangerously and deprive it of its full meaning. The vote should be taken by roll-call, as requested by the delegate of Morocco. In fact, he would like any votes taken under the current item to be roll-call votes.

19. Mr. AL-NUWAISER (Saudia Arabia) associated himself with the remarks made by the delegate of Morocco and urged the Conference to adopt the draft resolution by consensus immediately.

20. Mr. KHAN (Pakistan) pointed out that all neighbouring States of Israel had placed their nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards; his delegation therefore supported the draft resolution.

21. Mr. ETTINGER (Israel) said that in view of the technical study on modalities of application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East submitted by the Director General in document GC(XXXIII)/887, his delegation would have expected the draft resolution to reflect a more positive attitude.

22. The draft resolution misrepresented Israel's policy towards nuclear non-proliferation and failed to recognize that Israel supported the principle of non-proliferation; indeed, it affirmed the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, along the lines of the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties, which was why it welcomed the fact that the Director General's technical study included the proposal that States of the region should base their safeguards agreements with the Agency on a nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement following the example of those two Treaties.

23. However, the sponsors of the draft resolution had ignored the Director General's recommendation and had made false accusations against his country. Allegations of co-operation between South Africa and Israel had been dismissed

as unsubstantiated speculation in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General contained in document A/36/431 of 18 September 1981. Israel had consistently denounced racism and apartheid at all times in all international forums and did not intend to co-operate with South Africa in the nuclear field.

24. In General Conference resolution GC(XXIX)/RES/443, the General Conference had acknowledged that statements by Israel contained "undertakings on behalf of their [the Israeli] Government in response to resolution GC(XXVIII)/RES/425", thereby accepting Israel's statements on the inviolability of nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes. All the same, that issue had been unnecessarily revived in preambular paragraph (d) of the draft resolution now before the Conference.

25. In operative paragraph 1 of that draft resolution, Israel was called upon to submit all its nuclear installations to Agency safeguards. However, the conclusion of safeguards agreements was a voluntary matter, as provided for in Article III.A.5 of the Statute and as recognized in the technical study. There were many States which were not party to NPT and not subject to full-scope safeguards, and it was therefore unjustifiable to single out Israel.

26. Operative paragraph 2 introduced proposals which would involve the Agency taking the initiative in the conclusion of safeguards agreements, thereby disregarding the statutory principle that safeguards were a matter for the voluntary decision of States.

27. United Nations General Assembly resolution 43/65, which had been adopted without a vote, inter alia requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to submit that study to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session in 1990. The involvement of the Agency at the present stage could complicate that study and would also be tantamount to prejudging the outcome of negotiations between States on the modalities of establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone. Upon completion of the United Nations study, the technical study contained in document GC(XXXIII)/887 could serve as an

important guide to the States of the Middle East in agreeing on safeguards procedures for the zone. The Agency could then play a role at the request of all States concerned, but only as a measure supplementary to mutual arrangements agreed upon by the members of the zone.

28. Israel urged all States in the region to start free and direct negotiations to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. His delegation could not accept a procedure whereby Israel alone was called upon to accept full-scope safeguards. Furthermore, it considered that it would be inappropriate to include the present item again in the agenda for the next session, since it was extraneous to the Agency's real work and discriminatory against Israel, and Member States were weary of the repetitive debates on the subject since 1981. He therefore appealed to all delegations to reject the draft resolution.

29. Ms. TALLAWY (Egypt) said that her delegation's views had already been made known in discussions which had taken place in the Board of Governors. There could be no doubt that the question of Israeli nuclear capabilities was one which should be examined by the Agency, since Israel had attacked a nuclear reactor devoted to peaceful purposes which was under Agency safeguards.

30. Other States in the region had shown their willingness to comply with the NPT and were therefore seriously concerned at Israel's refusal to do so. Although it was true that the decision to accede to the NPT was a matter of national sovereignty, special considerations applied in Israel's case.

31. Member States should note the positive aspects of the draft resolution, which was very modest and objective. As the representative of Iran had pointed out it had been drafted in such a way as to avoid any attack on Israel, so as to ensure that it received the greatest possible acceptance.

32. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was not a prerequisite for placing Israel's nuclear facilities under safeguards. The Director General's technical study listed six modalities for the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East. The fact that Israel was trying to isolate just one of those modalities and attempting to impose it on the other countries in the region made it seem unlikely that Israel really wanted to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

33. With regard to the question of heavy water, Israel's position was in flagrant violation of international law and her delegation could not accept that such negotiations should go on for more than thirty years. It was to be hoped that safeguards would be applied in the case of Israel's heavy water, otherwise Egypt would be forced to make other proposals for a solution to that problem, such as to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice.

34. Mr. KENNEDY (United States of America) said that his delegation opposed the draft resolution because the matters addressed in it were of a political nature and lay beyond the Agency's mandate and competence. For example, operative paragraph 2 referred to "the situation in the area of the Middle East", which was clearly a political question which the Director General of the Agency had no mandate to deal with.

35. Preambular paragraphs (b) and (d) referred to an Israeli threat to peace and security in the area, in total disregard of statements made to the Director General by the Government of Israel according to which it had no intention to threaten countries in or outside the region of the Middle East. The General Conference had itself accepted those statements. Furthermore, preambular paragraph (c) expressed concern about co-operation between Israel and South Africa in the nuclear field, even though both Israel and South Africa had denied those allegations.

36. Operative paragraph 1 called upon Israel to submit all its nuclear installations to Agency safeguards. Whilst the United States delegation continued to urge all non-nuclear-weapon States to place all their nuclear activities under Agency safeguards, it could not countenance the discriminatory singling out of one State alone. Moreover, the draft resolution once again seemed to treat safeguards as a sanction, rather than a voluntary step which a Member State could take to confirm the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

37. Including an item entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat" again in the agenda for the thirty-fourth regular session of the General Conference, as proposed in operative paragraph 4, would result in the continued involvement of the Agency in matters beyond its mandate and competence. The underlying issues concerned complex questions of international and regional security which ought to be resolved through

negotiations in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. Perpetuation of that issue on the General Conference's agenda would continue to prevent it from concentrating on the proper scientific and technical tasks of the Agency.

38. In conclusion, he urged other delegations to join him in opposing the draft resolution.

39. Mr. QIN (China) said that his delegation was gravely concerned about the Israeli nuclear capability and threat and therefore supported the draft resolution and called upon Israel to implement Security Council resolution 487 of 1981 immediately.

40. Mr. BADRAN (Jordan), referring to points raised by the delegates of Israel and the United States, said that Israel was being singled out for special treatment because it was the only State which had attacked a nuclear facility of another Member State while it was under Agency safeguards.

41. The political situation in the Middle East was of course very important in the present context, but the draft resolution did not refer to the politics of the Middle East, only to the threat to nuclear facilities there.

42. His delegation agreed with the delegate of the United States that the General Conference should concentrate on questions relating to nuclear science and technology, but wondered how States in the Middle East were to work on building up their peaceful nuclear programmes if such efforts were constantly threatened by Israel.

43. Mr. MAHMASSANI (Lebanon) thought Member States would agree that the technical study contained in document GC(XXXIII)/887 was the outcome of the Agency's experience in the area of safeguards in general and not specifically tailored to suit the Middle East. Although six modalities for the application of safeguards were listed in the study, the delegate of Israel had singled out the only modality that did not conform to the situation in the Middle East, namely the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the lines of the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties. The situation in the regions covered by those Treaties, namely Latin America and the South Pacific, was completely different, since there was no ongoing conflict between States there. If Israel were sincere in its intentions, it should adopt one of the other practical options listed in the study.

44. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution under consideration were not singling out Israel. It was the Security Council which had unanimously adopted its resolution 487 in 1981 and thereby singled out Israel. Articles III.A.5 and III.B.1 of the Statute specifically provided for the establishment, administration and application of safeguards. If that was a political issue, then the Statute would have to be amended.

45. The delegate of Israel had claimed that there was no evidence to substantiate the allegation that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. However, in a report issued as document GC(XXXII)/849 the Director General had concluded with a quotation from a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations stating that although the United Nations did not have conclusive proof that Israel possessed nuclear weapons, circumstantial evidence together with other factors would seem to indicate that Israel had developed the necessary technology and had the means to manufacture nuclear weapons, if it so chose.

46. According to an article in the "International Herald Tribune" newspaper relating to the heavy water imported by Israel from Norway, Israel had admitted to having operated the Dimona reactor with Norwegian heavy water since 1963. By now it could therefore probably have made enough plutonium for more than 100 atomic bombs.

47. Finally, the delegate of Israel had indicated his country's willingness to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, but if its intentions were sincere the first step should be to accept Agency safeguards.

48. The PRESIDENT, noting that there were no more speakers, invited the General Conference to vote on the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/895. As had been requested by the delegates of Morocco and Iraq, the vote would be taken by roll-call.

49. Cyprus, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

50. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,

Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Cuba.

Against: Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica.

Abstaining: Ecuador, Guatemala, Kenya, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire.

51. The draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/895 was adopted by 47 votes to 28, with 12 abstentions. [*]

52. Mr. TETENYI (Hungary) said that he had voted for the draft resolution because his country was a committed supporter of the NPT and was in favour of using all opportunities for inviting States which had not done so to join the Treaty and to put their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Nevertheless, he was aware of the non-compulsory nature of the Agency's safeguards under Article III.A.5 of the Statute. He agreed that discussion of political conflicts did not fall within the mandate of the Agency and should be dealt with in competent political forums. However, the recommendations contained in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution to the effect that the Director General should consult with the States concerned in the Middle East with a view to applying Agency safeguards in the area along the lines of the technical study submitted in document GC(XXXIII)/887, and in particular its paragraph 75, would help promote the NPT regime and establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

53. Mr. SINAI (India) said that his country remained fully committed to the provision in Article III.A.5 of the Statute that safeguards could be applied "at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral

[*] Subsequently the delegation of the Philippines informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy". Thus, any proposal for uniform application of safeguards in a particular region required the prior approval of all the States in that region. India could continue to support the application of safeguards globally provided that could be achieved on a truly universal and non-discriminatory basis. His country had supported earlier resolutions in the General Conference on the present subject in view of the unique situation in the Middle East and had always shared the concern of the countries in that region with regard to the threat to peace and security posed by the policies of Israel. In 1981, following the unprovoked military attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the United Nations Security Council, in its resolution 487, had urgently requested Israel to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. Israel had still not complied with that request. The resolution just adopted by the Conference sought, inter alia, to enable the Agency to fulfil the task entrusted to it by the Security Council. With the exception of Israel all the countries in the Middle East which had a nuclear programme had already placed all their nuclear facilities under safeguards or had expressed their willingness to do so. It was for that reason that he had voted for the resolution.

54. Mr. SHENSTONE (Canada) said that, in his general debate statement earlier in the week, he had called on all States that had not yet done so, in the Middle East and in all other regions, to accede to the NPT and to accept Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities. Canada could not, however, support a resolution singling out one country for failing to place its facilities under safeguards. Moreover, the preambular clauses of the resolution contained several statements which gave a tendentious and unsubstantiated view of the situation. Still, the resolution submitted during the current session did represent an improvement over those of previous years; in particular, its operative paragraph 2 was essentially acceptable to the Canadian delegation.

55. Mr. KAZUHARA (Japan) said that his Government's position with regard to the present question remained unchanged. Israel was urged, together with all other countries which had remained outside the NPT, to become a party to the Treaty as promptly as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. However, the IAEA was a technical organization which

had been entrusted with well-defined functions, and factors not relevant to those functions should not be introduced into discussions since they did not come under the Agency's mandate and could only detract from its original and proper aims. Continued discussion of the present question within the Agency in the future might well jeopardize the normal conduct of the Agency's activities as defined in its Statute. However, the list of suggestions contained in paragraph 75 of the report in document GC(XXXIII)/887 was not only very interesting but suggestive of further steps which might be taken by all Member States in the region. That paragraph was referred to in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, which thus pointed to a positive and constructive direction for Member States to follow, and which was appropriate for discussion within the Agency since it was closely connected to one of the Agency's main purposes, the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

56. Mr. VILLAROS (France), speaking on behalf of the twelve members of the European Community, said that the text of the resolution bore clear witness to the concern of its authors to take into account the worries of a large number of Member States; that was particularly evident in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution. Such a concern was appreciated, but the resolution was still incompatible with the principles which the Twelve had always defended. They had been forced to vote against it for two main reasons: firstly, it perpetuated within the Agency the examination of a question which deflected the Agency from its purposes and divided its Members; secondly, its content was at variance with the objectives of Agency safeguards. Safeguards could be applied only as a result of a voluntary decision on the part of a State, and any attempt to use them as a means of putting pressure or bringing to bear sanctions upon a State ran counter to the objective for which they had been conceived.

57. Mr. KENNEDY (United States of America) commended the obvious efforts which had been made to render the resolution less offensive and more constructive than in previous years. Preambular paragraphs (a) and (f) made perfectly valid comments, and the United States could have supported operative paragraph 2 of the resolution were it not for the reference to the situation

in the Middle East, which lay beyond the Agency's competence. He hoped that the positive development which the resolution showed would continue in the future.

58. Mr. GUYER (Argentina) said that he disagreed with any attempt to impose safeguards in a binding manner against the sovereign wish of a Member State whatever reasons might be invoked to justify such a move. Any such attempt would not be in conformity with the Statute and would undermine confidence in the safeguards system. That was why he had abstained from the vote.

59. Mr. VETTOVAGLIA (Switzerland) said that his country had always supported the principle that the specialized agencies of the United Nations should avoid discussion of items which were more properly discussed by other bodies. Certain of the preambular paragraphs in the draft resolution contained statements which were not in keeping with the nature and purpose of the Agency. The acceptance of safeguards was exclusively the sovereign decision of a State, and a State could not be singled out and forced to accept them. However, the obvious attempts which had been made to moderate the draft resolution deserved praise.

60. Mr. WILSON (Australia) said that in the technical study on modalities of application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East the Agency had produced a useful and factual analysis, which was a suitable response to the request made in operative paragraph 6 of the previous year's General Conference resolution (GC(XXXII)/RES/487) on the same subject. Similarly, the report appended to document GC(XXXIII)/886 was a fully appropriate response to the request in operative paragraph 5 of that resolution for a report on the implementation of the resolution. As to the resolution just adopted, it had been opposed by Australia because it sought to keep before the Conference political issues which were extraneous to the functions and responsibilities of the Agency. It was also discriminatory in that it singled out the safeguards situation in one State for criticism and condemnation. Australia, for its part, had consistently urged all States to accept NPT, or at least the application of full-scope safeguards.

61. Mr. GLEISSNER (Austria) said that his country was a convinced adherent of NPT and the safeguards regime and would always be ready to appeal to members of the international community to widen the geographical area

of its application; however, such appeals should not be addressed on a selective basis, as that approach would make the attainment of the desired goal less likely. He appreciated the new elements contained in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, which met with Austria's approval and support, even though it had not been able to vote for the resolution as a whole.

62. Mr. GRIFFITHS (New Zealand) said that his country was not complacent about the situation in the Middle East but did not believe that discriminatory resolutions were helpful. Several countries in various regions of the world possessed advanced nuclear facilities which had not been subjected to Agency safeguards. Regional and global security and stability would be enhanced by the application of safeguards to all facilities. Operative paragraph 2 of the resolution therefore seemed to him to reflect a more constructive approach to the question of safeguarding nuclear facilities in the region than had previous resolutions on the same subject.

63. Mr. ESCOFET ARTIGAS (Mexico) said that his delegation had reservations with regard to preambular paragraph (b) of the resolution. The General Conference was not competent to consider situations which endangered international peace and security, such matters being exclusively the concern of the United Nations Security Council. Also, certain expressions used in the text of the resolution were inappropriate.

64. Mr. FILHO (Brazil) associated himself with the position outlined by the delegate of Argentina, according to which safeguards could not be imposed on Member States but must always be the result of a sovereign decision on the part of a State. Brazil was in favour of non-proliferation, but on a non-discriminatory basis. It rejected the assumption implied in the resolution that unsafeguarded nuclear activities were not for peaceful purposes.

ORAL REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

65. Mr. NETHSINGHE (Sri Lanka), Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, presented the Committee's report on items 10 to 22 of the agenda.

66. Under item 10, "The Agency's accounts for 1988", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution on page III of document GC(XXXIII)/874.

67. Under item 11, "Measures to strengthen international co-operation in matters relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/907.
68. Under sub-item 11(a), "Dumping of nuclear wastes", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/901.
69. Under sub-item 11(c), regarding the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/902.
70. Under sub-item 11(d), regarding the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/903 as amended in document GC(XXXIII)/903/Corr.1.
71. In addition, still under agenda item 11, the Committee recommended to the Conference that it request the Director General to include an item entitled "Prohibition of all armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes whether under construction or in operation" in the provisional agenda for the Conference's next regular session.
72. Under item 12, "The financing of safeguards", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolutions set forth in documents GC(XXXIII)/877 and 908.
73. Under item 13, "The financing of technical assistance", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/909. In addition, the Committee recommended that the Conference request the Director General to transmit the summary record of its discussion under that item to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee.
74. Under item 14, "Plan for the production of low-cost potable water", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/904.

75. Under item 15, "The Agency's budget for 1990", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt draft resolutions A, B and C set out in Annex III to Part I of document GC(XXXIII)/875.
76. Under item 16, "Scale of assessment of Members' contributions for 1990", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/884/Rev.1.
77. Under sub-item 17(a), "Rules Regarding the Acceptance of Voluntary Contributions of Money to the Agency", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution attached to document GC(XXXIII)/879.
78. Under sub-item 17(b), "Confirmation of the acceptance of a voluntary contribution of money", the Committee recommended that the Conference take the action recommended in paragraph 4 of document GC(XXXIII)/882.
79. Under item 18, "Staffing of the Agency's Secretariat", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/911.
80. Under item 19, "Amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute", the Committee recommended the adoption of the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/905.
81. Under item 20, "Revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/906.
82. Under item 21, "Proposed amendment of Rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference", the Committee recommended that the Conference take the action recommended in paragraph 5 of document GC(XXXIII)/880.
83. Under item 22, "Representation of IAEA Member States not members of the Board at meetings of the Board as observers", the Committee, following a roll-call vote, had decided not to recommend the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXIII)/881/Add.1 to the Conference.
84. In conclusion, he thanked the two Vice-Chairmen, Mr. Papadimitropoulos of Greece and Mr. Posta of Hungary, for their extremely valuable support.

85. The PRESIDENT suggested that the draft resolutions relating to the agenda items which had been referred to the Committee of the Whole, together with its other recommendations, might now be considered by the Conference with a view to their adoption.

The Agency's accounts for 1988

86. The draft resolution on page III of document GC(XXXIII)/874 was adopted.

Measures to strengthen international co-operation in matters relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection

87. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/907 was adopted.

(a) Dumping of nuclear wastes

88. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/901 was adopted.

(c) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

89. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/902 was adopted.

(d) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

90. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/903, as amended in document GC(XXXIII)/903/Corr.1, was adopted.

(e) Prohibition of all armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes whether under construction or in operation

91. The PRESIDENT recalled that the Committee of the Whole had recommended that the Conference request the Director General to include an item entitled "Prohibition of all armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes whether under construction or in operation" in the provisional agenda for the next regular session of the Conference.

92. Mr. KENNEDY (United States of America), reiterating his country's stand on the subject, emphasized that his delegation did not regard the matter as an appropriate topic for discussion by the General Conference of the Agency, which did not have the competence to consider complex political and military aspects of the problem, or to decide what was against the Charter of

the United Nations. Armed attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities were a subject more suitable for the United Nations Security Council, the Conference on Disarmament or similar bodies.

93. The PRESIDENT assumed that the Conference wished nevertheless to take the action recommended by the Committee of the Whole.

94. It was so decided.

The financing of safeguards

95. The draft resolutions set forth in document GC(XXXIII)/877 and in document GC(XXXIII)/908 were adopted.

The financing of technical assistance

96. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/909 was adopted.

97. The PRESIDENT assumed that, as recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the Conference wished to request the Director General to transmit the summary record of the Committee's discussion under that item to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee.

98. It was so decided.

Plan for the production of low-cost potable water

99. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/904 was adopted.

The Agency's budget for 1990

100. Draft resolutions A, B and C set out in Annex III to Part I of document GC(XXXIII)/875 were adopted.

Scale of assessment of Members' contributions for 1990

101. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/884/Rev.1 was adopted.

Voluntary contributions to the Agency

(a) Rules Regarding the Acceptance of Voluntary Contributions of Money to the Agency

102. The draft resolution attached to document GC(XXXIII)/879 was adopted.

(b) Confirmation of the acceptance of a voluntary contribution of money

103. The PRESIDENT assumed that, as recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the Conference wished to confirm the Director General's acceptance of the voluntary contribution of money made by the Asian Development Bank, concerning which details were contained in document GC(XXXIII)/882.

104. It was so decided.

Staffing of the Agency's Secretariat

105. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/911 was adopted.

Amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute

106. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/905 was adopted.

Revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole

107. The draft resolution in document GC(XXXIII)/906 was adopted.

Proposed amendment of Rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference

108. The PRESIDENT took it that, as recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the Conference wished to take the action recommended in paragraph 5 of document GC(XXXIII)/880.

109. It was so decided.

Representation of IAEA Member States not members of the Board at meetings of the Board as observers

110. The PRESIDENT assumed that the Conference wished to take note of the report concerning the item made by the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole.

111. It was so agreed.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.