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Held at the Austria Center Vienna
on Monday, 27 September 1993, at 3.50 p.m.

President: Mr. AL-ATHEL (Saudi Arabia)
Later : Mr. KIENER (Switzerland)

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[*] GC(XXXVII)/1085.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXVII)/INF/328/Rev.2.

93-3741 (IV)

Abbreviations used in this record

AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IPERS	International Peer Review Service
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1992 (GC(XXXVII)/1060) (continued)

1. Mr. JIANG (China), having warmly welcomed the admission of six new Member States to the Agency, said that in recent years numerous Member States, under the Agency's auspices and with its encouragement, had been working together to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The developing Member States, which very much wanted more effective international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and were demanding balanced development of the Agency, had put forward many reasonable proposals for promoting those uses and had made important contributions to the prevention of nuclear proliferation.
2. The Agency had done much in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Conference had adopted a number of resolutions important to the social and economic development of Member States, particularly the developing countries. The work done by the Agency on the drafting of a nuclear safety convention, the follow-up to the seminars on liability for nuclear damage and international aspects of the plutonium cycle, the Helsinki Symposium on "Electricity and the Environment", and the sponsoring of special studies on nuclear energy and the environment and the practical utilization of food irradiation had all been contributions to the promotion of nuclear science and technology and of related disciplines. Particularly in the field of technical assistance and co-operation, the Agency had taken commendable initiatives in the past year. As an intergovernmental organization, the Agency had been playing a unique role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
3. However, much remained to be done before international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy reached a satisfactory level. The industrialized countries' monopoly of nuclear science and technology remained virtually intact. In the name of nuclear non-proliferation, some developed countries were even curtailing and harming the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries. Such actions were detrimental to the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. The prevention of nuclear proliferation was currently an important issue for the international community and would remain so in the future. China had always advocated the

complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. It neither encouraged nor engaged in their proliferation, and it never assisted other States in developing them. His country agreed in principle that the Agency's safeguards system should be strengthened. In March 1992 it had acceded to the NPT, and in February 1993 it had agreed to notify the Agency of its imports and exports of nuclear material, thereby demonstrating its support for the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5. However, the effectiveness of those efforts depended on a large number of interrelated factors. Thus, the legitimate requests of Member States - particularly the developing countries among them - wanting to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be ignored, and the development of nuclear science and technology and the nuclear industry in the developing countries should not be hampered under the pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation. China believed that an isolated or unbalanced approach to nuclear non-proliferation was not in keeping with the aims and principles set forth in the Agency's Statute and was contrary to the basic objectives of the NPT. Such an approach might ultimately affect the development of the Agency and the fundamental interests of the majority of its Member States. The Agency's Member States now had a common interest in seeing that the Agency adapted to the new international situation with regard to non-proliferation, in ensuring the fairer and more reasonable management of safeguards and in helping the Agency to play the role expected of it in the light of the aims and principles of the Statute.

6. In April and May, SAGSI and the Secretariat had put together a comprehensive report on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system - a report which merited thorough examination. In the light of the aims and principles of the Statute China believed, in the first place, that strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system should not jeopardize the sustained development of promotional activities. Enhancing the safeguards system and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be complementary - not independent or interchangeable - activities.

7. Secondly, his country believed that in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system one should abide by the basic principles of justice, objectivity, reasonableness and transparency. The monopolizing or manipulating of safeguards by a few countries should not be allowed. Any biased use of the system for the

purpose of putting pressure on Member States was inappropriate and detrimental to the Agency's reputation and role, and action to strengthen the system would command wide support only if the views of the majority of Member States were carefully discussed and taken into consideration.

8. Thirdly, his country believed that safeguards cost reductions and efficiency improvements should not jeopardize full attainment of the inspection goals at the key stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Any wilful intensification of safeguards in some countries or deliberate simplification of monitoring activities in others was detrimental to the development of the Agency's safeguards system.

9. Technical assistance and co-operation activities were an important component of the Agency's work, as they contributed greatly to social and economic progress in developing Member States. China noted with satisfaction the considerable efforts which the Agency had made and the notable results which it had achieved in recent years in that sphere, particularly in improving scientific infrastructures and manpower training in various countries. However, owing to the fact that different developing countries had reached different levels with regard to nuclear science and technology and to management, the benefits which they derived from the Agency's assistance also differed. In order for the technology transfer resulting from such assistance to be translated more effectively and rapidly into higher productivity, the Agency should further intensify its work on the formulation of development strategies for such countries, provide them with technical assistance suited to their key development projects and offer them more guidance on the planning and implementation of nuclear energy programmes. Economic and technological co-operation among developing countries, which had become an important element of international co-operation, stimulated social and economic progress in those countries and was very important for the maintenance of world peace. The Agency had done much to promote that form of co-operation, and his delegation hoped that it would continue to do so. For its part, China was willing to play a more active role to that end.

10. Member States and the international community were calling for the conclusion of a nuclear safety convention and the strengthening of international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiation protection. Since 1991, the General Conference and the Board of Governors

had confirmed, through a number of resolutions and decisions, the necessity and urgency of such a convention and had appealed for the drafting process to be completed as soon as possible. Thanks to the joint efforts of Member States and the Secretariat, a general consensus had been achieved on the convention's scope and structure and on organizational arrangements. During the drafting process, many countries had put forward a great number of proposals and views which provided a sound basis for further work. There should be no slackening of effort. His delegation believed that present conditions in the world were now conducive to negotiations on the convention and that no time should be lost in implementing the relevant resolutions of the General Conference. China had always been positive about the conclusion of a nuclear safety convention and had put forward numerous constructive proposals in that regard which had received the wide support of the representatives of many countries and had been taken up by the Chairman of the Group of Experts drafting the convention in his summary of the results of the Group's fourth meeting. China looked forward to further co-operation with all countries in finalizing the convention.

11. In China, with the rapid advance of socialist modernization, with the acceleration in the pace of reform and with the country's policy of openness, the nuclear energy industry had entered into a new phase of development. The Chinese-designed and -built first unit of the Qinshan nuclear power plant (a 300-MW(e) pressurized-water reactor) had been commissioned and connected to the grid in 1991 and was now operating at high output. Unit 1 of the Daya Bay nuclear power plant in Guangdong province, which had gone critical in July and been connected to the grid on 31 August, was expected to go into commercial service by the end of 1993, while Unit 2 would be commissioned in the first half of 1994. The basic design for an expansion of the Qinshan nuclear power plant with the construction work of two 600-MW(e) reactors, was complete, and the engineering design work and site preparations were under way.

12. The civil nuclear fuel industry was expanding fast in order to match the growth in the nuclear power plant sector. Having successfully supplied fuel assemblies for the Qinshan nuclear power plant, the nuclear fuel fabrication plant at Yi Bin was now preparing to produce them for the Daya Bay nuclear power plant by the end of 1994. The Chinese Government had approved the construction of a pilot reprocessing plant for spent fuel from

power reactors. The design and construction work for that plant, which was to be done in stages, was under way, and it was expected that the plant would be fully operational by the end of the century.

13. China was a peace-loving country pursuing an independent foreign policy aimed at creating and maintaining the peaceful international climate which it needed in order to modernize. In the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy it would continue to seek the friendship and co-operation of all countries on the basis of mutual respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit, and it would work for the establishment of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the interests of world peace and worldwide development.

14. Ms. O'LEARY (United States of America) prefaced her statement by reading out a message from the President of the United States to the General Conference.

"As you begin this thirty-seventh session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, I would like to express the strong and continuing support of the United States of America for the vital work of the Agency. The United States is confident that the IAEA will continue to play a critical role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and in ensuring that the peaceful use of nuclear energy contributes to international security and prosperity.

"We are pleased to join in welcoming six new Member States to the Agency. We look forward to working with the Governments of Armenia, Kazakhstan, the Marshall Islands, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in assisting the Agency in its important work.

"The United States commends the Director General for the Agency's vigorous and forthright efforts to implement safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK), and we urge the DPRK to co-operate fully with the IAEA. We also commend the Agency for its continued efforts to assure the destruction of Iraq's nuclear weapons-related capabilities and its contribution to long-term monitoring of Iraq's nuclear activities.

"The United States is committed to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we view the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a key foundation of international security. We will call for its indefinite extension in 1995.

"The United States also supports the Agency's important technical co-operation and assistance programmes in such diverse fields as health, agriculture, industry and

environment. In addition, we believe the Agency's involvement in promoting nuclear power plant safety is extremely valuable.

"The IAEA plays an essential role in helping to achieve a world of reduced nuclear tensions. The United States pledges its support in keeping the Agency a strong and active contributor to world peace, security and prosperity."

15. The changes currently taking place offered the possibility of creating a new and better world order. As far as nuclear affairs were concerned that entailed: a shift away from the production to the dismantling of nuclear weapons; the reinforcement of global non-proliferation; the strengthening of such international institutions as the Agency; indefinite extension of the NPT; ensuring nuclear safety and the safe, long-term disposition of radioactive wastes; and the utilization of nuclear energy in agriculture, medicine, industry and research and - where appropriate - power generation.

16. As the present decade proceeded, a primary task of the United States would no longer be to make nuclear weapons but to dismantle them. Every effort must be made, however, to ensure that the reduction of the nuclear arsenal was carried out safely, securely and in an environmentally sound manner. That called for an unwavering commitment to environmental restoration and to measures to clean up the residues of nearly five decades of weapons production.

17. The United States was also taking steps to open up access to environmental and radiological information about its nuclear weapons complexes. In so doing, it would of course be very sensitive to the need to protect against all kinds of proliferation risk. However, extensive reviews aimed at the declassification of a great deal of information were under way. That initiative was expected not only to improve efficiency but also to increase transparency. Her country hoped that that new openness would serve as an example and was supporting the efforts of other nuclear-weapon States to make available information on their nuclear weapons programmes and the impact of those programmes on human health and the environment.

18. In addition, and equally important, her country hoped that other Members of the Agency would strive for greater openness with regard to their peaceful nuclear activities.

19. The challenge of change also meant a final stop to nuclear testing. There was currently a de facto global moratorium on testing which the United States was championing and urging all nuclear Powers to uphold. Were a nation to break that moratorium now, the worldwide momentum towards an early comprehensive test ban and indefinite extension of the NPT might be lost. France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom were to be congratulated on their commitment not to carry out any tests, and her delegation fervently hoped that China would join those three countries and the United States in upholding the moratorium.

20. Through bold, collective action the five countries in question could exercise world leadership in reducing - and some day perhaps eliminating - the nuclear danger. But the United States wanted to do more. President Clinton had affirmed the commitment of the United States to negotiate a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. If the initiative received the support of all countries, non-proliferation would be reinforced. Other measures also warranted consideration. Moves to enhance the monitoring and control of the production and use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium might be a good way of strengthening collaborative non-proliferation efforts. Thus, certain fissile materials not currently under international safeguards could be placed under safeguards in order to expand the international non-proliferation regime.

21. The dismantling of large numbers of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Russian Federation would generate unprecedented stocks of weapons-grade nuclear material. Whereas it was possible to blend down highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium for use in civilian reactors, weapons-grade plutonium presented a far more delicate problem. Since fully acceptable disposition technologies were not yet operational, interim safeguarded storage was necessary. However, the practical issues associated with preparing for and implementing the safeguards had to be resolved first. The United States was now addressing those issues.

22. More generally, the United States favoured the conclusion of a multilateral agreement among nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States which would halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes. Such an agreement could provide the framework for similar limitation agreements in the Middle East and South Asia

and for the entry into effect of the North-South agreement on the Korean Peninsula, whereby regional stability would be strengthened and the risk of new nuclear arms races reduced. The Agency could play an important role in verifying compliance with commitments in that respect.

23. The international community was faced with the challenge of the post-Cold War era. Her delegation welcomed the new States joining the Agency and called on all Members of the Agency to accept international safeguards on their nuclear activities. The Agency had had to meet new challenges, first in Iraq and then in the DPRK, but the Board of Governors had acted with promptness and determination.

24. With regard to Iraq, the United States strongly supported the efforts of the Agency and of the United Nations Special Commission to obtain that country's compliance with the requirements of the Security Council, and it urged other countries to do the same.

25. With regard to the DPRK, the Agency had taken the lead in international efforts to convince it to demonstrate that it was complying fully with the commitments entered into under its safeguards agreement with the Agency. The Government of the DPRK was continuing to refuse to comply with those commitments, and its actions in that regard had forced the Board to refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council earlier in the year. Since then, the United States had gone to extraordinary lengths in an effort to find a way to persuade the DPRK to remain a party to the NPT and honour fully its obligations towards the Agency and its NPT safeguards agreement. Her country had fully supported the Agency's actions regarding the DPRK and would continue to do so.

26. The Agency's Secretariat had started to investigate new approaches aimed at strengthening and streamlining the implementation of safeguards. New ideas and approaches were needed in order to adapt the safeguards system to new challenges. The United States supported Agency initiatives to utilize science and technology in strengthening and streamlining the safeguards system.

27. President Clinton had reaffirmed that prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons was at the top of the United States' national security agenda. Strengthened safeguards, new limits on nuclear weapons materials, enhanced co-operation among the nuclear suppliers and

intensified efforts aimed at regional confidence-building were but a few of the non-proliferation measures which the United States was committed to pursuing in collaboration with other countries. Her country was also looking forward to working together with other NPT parties with a view to an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, for it considered that treaty to be one of the vital foundations of the non-proliferation regime. The fact that virtually all countries had become parties to the NPT in good faith demonstrated the world's continuing commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Non-parties to the NPT, which were few in number, were becoming increasingly isolated. In the present era of dramatic change, a strong and durable NPT was even more essential. Without the stability which it provided, the shift from building weapons to dismantling them could lose its momentum. For those reasons, the United States would continue to work for universal accession to the NPT, and particularly for the rapid accession of all countries of the former Soviet Union. The United States also remained convinced that indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 would best serve the cause of non-proliferation.

28. Another important Agency mission to which the United States remained firmly committed was promotion of the peaceful uses of the atom for the benefit of all mankind. Many countries had benefited enormously from the scientific and technical activities of the Agency in such varied fields as health, agriculture and the environment. The United States supported the Agency's programme of technical assistance to developing Member States and encouraged voluntary contributions to the TACF and also contributions in kind.

29. The future of nuclear energy was uncertain. In some countries it had been many years since a new plant had been planned or ordered, whereas in others new power plants were being built or planned. No global trend had yet emerged. Choosing the right mix of energy sources required the complex balancing of economic, environmental, safety, public health and non-proliferation factors. Developments in technology would no doubt shape the choice in ways that could not yet be fully anticipated. Governments should guard, however, against energy developments that posed excessive risks - whether in terms of public health, safety, the environment or proliferation.

30. The Agency had always placed a high priority on activities to improve and enhance nuclear safety in countries which had decided to use nuclear energy for electricity production.

Since the Munich Summit of industrialized States in July 1992, concerted efforts had been under way, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to address the issue of nuclear safety assistance. The Tokyo Summit in July 1993 had given further impetus to those efforts. The United States was implementing an ambitious programme of nuclear safety support and assistance to the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

31. The United States, which had appreciated the support provided by the Agency in that context, believed that the Agency could play an increasingly important role in three areas. Firstly, the United States - like many other countries - had found that the presence of a strong, independent and technically competent regulatory organization was indispensable to the achievement of a high level of nuclear safety.

32. Secondly, a key feature of the nuclear programmes of western industrialized States had been arrangements governing civil liability for nuclear damage which protected both the public and industry in the event of radiological accidents, with fair compensation for potential victims. It was clear that States which had not yet adopted such arrangements should do so promptly so as to enable private companies to participate fully in nuclear safety co-operation.

33. The third area where the Agency could play an increasingly important role was the finalization of a nuclear safety convention providing the legal basis for national and multinational efforts to improve nuclear safety. During the past two years, the United States had been participating actively in Agency efforts to draw up such a convention. That instrument could codify the basic principles of nuclear power safety and establish a system for reviews by the parties of the safety measures taken in implementing the convention. The United States delegation hoped that that convention would be concluded during 1994, but believed that it would be effective only if it was acceded to by all countries with active and planned nuclear power programmes.

34. Lastly, the Agency had long-established programmes to promote technical solutions for the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Her delegation commended the Agency's efforts to assist developing Member States and valued the forum which the Agency provided for international exchanges on radioactive waste issues. Her country was pleased to be participating in the process of updating guidance on radioactive waste management and

developing a consensus on fundamental principles. Consequently, it looked forward to a separate convention on nuclear waste management.

35. In conclusion, she said that when it had been founded, some 40 years previously, the Agency had broken new ground. In the present era of change, the Agency was facing not only serious challenges but also new opportunities. Its expertise could be tapped in support of efforts aimed at limiting the production and use of nuclear weapons material. Also, the Agency provided a credible framework for international efforts in areas ranging from the enhancement of nuclear safety technology to the monitoring of excess plutonium from the dismantling of weapons. Vigorous but impartial exercise of the Agency's inspection rights could significantly reduce the risk of proliferation. The challenge was indeed great, but the opportunities were also immense and there was no doubt that the Agency's future was bright.

36. Mr. AL-NOWAISER (Saudi Arabia) said that his country was aware of the constant endeavours of the Agency to achieve a balance between its two main functions: to provide technical assistance to its Member States on one hand, and to ensure safety and radiation protection and to verify non-diversion to armaments on the other. It was the responsibility of the General Conference, as the policy-making body of the Agency, to guide those endeavours.

37. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy posed a dilemma. While they provided grounds for hope, they also gave rise to public fears, particularly since the Chernobyl accident, at a time when many developing countries were facing a multitude of problems due to over-population and ever-increasing human needs - problems which were likely to worsen given the difficulties which those countries had in acquiring modern nuclear technology and enjoying its benefits.

38. The items on the General Conference's agenda reflected the growing interest of the Agency in nuclear safety and radiation protection, an area in which there was still much to be done. The development of new radiation protection standards, the conclusion and ratification of related agreements and the proposed programme for education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety were probably steps in the right direction, but safety depended essentially on the commitment of the competent authorities. The fears in Austria

about the presence in neighbouring countries of nuclear power plants without adequate safety levels might imply that progress was being made with regard to the theoretical aspects of safety but not the practical aspects. Given the fact that the safety situation in Eastern Europe had become known only since the countries in question had adopted a policy of transparency, what about the situation in States which were carrying out clandestine peaceful - or even military - nuclear activities?

39. The Agency, which had been entrusted by the international community with an important mission in the field of nuclear disarmament, was encouraging the adoption of regional agreements to that end. The results achieved by the Agency in the Middle East, however, were very limited. Furthermore, not all States in the region had acceded to the NPT. Saudi Arabia hoped that all of them would give the matter the attention which it deserved so that the Agency's mission might be crowned with success and they might enjoy peace and security.

40. The Agency was seeking to fulfil one of its essential functions by promoting the development and practical utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and also related research. It was following a rational policy of, for the main part, implementing activities approved within its technical co-operation programme. The share of that programme devoted to the "Middle East and Europe" region had been reduced. In that connection he wished to point out that the situation and the concerns of the two groups of countries comprising that region were different: the countries of the Middle East were more interested in nuclear energy applications in agriculture, health, hydrology and industry, whereas the interests of European countries were currently focused on the safety of nuclear facilities.

41. Saudi Arabia, which was keen to strengthen its technical co-operation with the Agency, had recently hosted a regional workshop for countries of the Middle East in Jiddah, thereby supporting the Agency's efforts to provide specialist training in advanced industrial applications of isotopes and irradiation.

42. The General Conference was well aware of the importance of providing developing countries with opportunities for education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety. In resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/584 it had called for the development of a suitable

programme. Saudi Arabia supported the measures taken by the Agency in establishing the proposed programme and hoped that its goals would be attained.

43. The General Conference had for a number of years been considering the problem of world shortages of potable water and had requested the Agency to look into the possibilities of using nuclear energy for water desalination. The General Conference had before it a document (GC(XXXVII)/INF/323) which reported on how the Agency had responded to resolutions adopted on that matter. Saudi Arabia, which had been one of the first Middle East countries to satisfy its needs for potable water by seawater desalination, had taken note of the conclusion reached in the Agency's studies that it could be economically feasible to use nuclear energy instead of fossil fuel in seawater desalination plants. In anticipation of an increase in its potable water needs, his country had initiated with the Agency a technical co-operation project on the economic feasibility of seawater desalination using nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia. In view of the extreme importance of seawater desalination for many developing countries, Saudi Arabia hoped that the Agency would be able - despite its financial difficulties - to allocate funds for the activities in question and that Member States would continue to make voluntary contributions in support of those activities.

44. Turning to the practical utilization of food irradiation in developing countries, the Agency had, in response to resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/588, prepared a detailed project proposal. His delegation had welcomed that proposal, which had been submitted to the Board of Governors in June in document GOV/2669. Saudi Arabia felt that food irradiation techniques would help developing countries overcome difficulties in providing food for their steadily increasing populations. The Agency was the appropriate organization for providing technical assistance and support to those countries, and his delegation hoped very much that it would achieve what was expected of it.

45. With regard to strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, as could be seen from the documents under consideration, the Agency, in an effort to reduce costs and extend the current safeguards approach, had made various proposals regarding the detection of non-declared nuclear activities and the reporting of specific information, and had called for increased co-operation with national accounting and control systems. His delegation was confident that the Agency would continue to examine

SAGSI's recommendations and do its best to evaluate them and follow them up. Although his delegation was convinced of the importance of safeguards and supported the Agency's efforts to strengthen their effectiveness and improve their efficiency, it felt that promotional activities should not be allowed to suffer as a result.

46. His delegation had no objection to divergences of opinion between countries, but it felt that unyielding positions might impede progress in the consideration of some issues that had been on the agenda of the General Conference for years. It therefore sincerely hoped that, despite appearances, the consideration of issues such as the financing of safeguards and the financing of technical assistance or of items relating to Article VI of the Statute had not become a routine exercise for the General Conference.

47. Saudi Arabia was somewhat concerned about the financial situation of the Agency as described in the Note by the Secretariat dated 10 September 1993. Delays in the payment of contributions were creating serious financial difficulties for the Agency and were preventing the implementation of part of its programme. Recalling that Saudi Arabia had paid its assessed contribution in full, he called on those States which had not yet done likewise to pay their assessed contributions soon.

48. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the favourable climate which had recently been created in the Middle East would have a positive effect on the future work of the Agency.

49. Mr. OCHOA ANTICH (Venezuela) said that his country had always firmly supported the Agency's activities, particularly those relating to technical assistance and co-operation. He thanked the Agency for its contribution to ARCAL and urged it to continue its efforts to provide the financial resources required for ARCAL projects. He also thanked the countries and institutions outside Latin America which had supported such projects.

50. On the other hand, Venezuela was concerned about the fact that the percentage of technical assistance assigned to Latin America was still declining, as shown by figures in the annual report for 1992. The decrease over the past ten years in pledges made to the TACF as a percentage of the TACF target was also a matter for concern. Further matters for concern were the decline in the amounts actually paid relative to the target and the 12% cut

being made in 1994 financial plans because of financial difficulties - a cut which would have a negative impact on the Department of Technical Co-operation.

51. As a party to the NPT, Venezuela was particularly attached to the Agency's safeguards system, which had helped to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it was worried about the discrepancies which had arisen during implementation of the safeguards agreement problems raised between the DPRK and the Agency. Clearly, if the matter was not resolved an awkward precedent would be set. That would have to be taken into account at the 1995 conference at which the question of extending the NPT and that of measures to establish a truly universal non-proliferation regime were to be considered. The situation created by the DPRK, which might indicate a deterioration of the non-proliferation picture, called for a more comprehensive and coherent approach to non-proliferation. That possibility had prompted the international community to renew its efforts to create an international security system and, under the terms of its Statute and of its relationship agreement with the United Nations, the Agency would have an important role to play in such a system.

52. His Government supported the work of SAGSI, which was studying ways of reducing safeguards implementation costs while maintaining safeguards effectiveness. However, a suitable legal framework was necessary for the adoption of some SAGSI proposals, the technical, financial and political implications of which would have to be analysed.

53. The Agency's activities in the area of nuclear safety and radiation protection were of great interest to the whole of mankind. His delegation therefore wished once more to emphasize that measures relating directly to power reactor safety should be financed from extrabudgetary contributions. That would free financial resources to improve the safety of non-power nuclear applications and to strengthen the radiological protection infrastructures in developing countries.

54. His country favoured the development of internationally accepted basic principles, standards and guidelines for the safe use of nuclear technology. It therefore appreciated the work done so far by the Group of Experts working on a nuclear safety convention.

55. With the payment which it had made, Venezuela had wished to demonstrate its determination to regularize its financial situation and contribute to the attainment of the objectives and the fulfilment of the functions referred to in Articles II and III of the Statute. In conclusion, his delegation warmly thanked the Director General and the staff of the Secretariat, and particularly staff members in the Department of Technical Co-operation, for the quality of their work.

Mr. Kiener (Switzerland) took the Chair.

56. Mr. SAFRA (Tunisia), having welcomed the countries recently approved for membership of the Agency, said that the organization had ever since its establishment endeavoured to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and technology throughout the world. It had also made considerable efforts to strengthen international co-operation in the areas of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

57. His delegation was concerned that the financial difficulties of the Agency might jeopardize its programmes. For its part, Tunisia had always paid its contributions on time, and in the present year it had made a voluntary contribution of US \$16 000. His country urged all Member States to give the Agency their financial and moral support.

58. Tunisia attached particular importance to the strengthening of technical co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and techniques with all countries, and in particular the Arab and African countries. As host country of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, it was doing everything possible to strengthen co-operation between the Arab countries in the field of atomic energy. Tunisia had been the first African country to ratify the AFRA agreement. Also, it had recently hosted several scientific and technical meetings convened with a view to strengthening regional co-operation and the Agency's activities, including one AFRA co-ordination meeting on the monitoring of radioactivity in the environment and another on non-destructive testing. In addition, it was also currently participating in ten regional projects. He thanked the French and Spanish Governments for supporting AFRA, and expressed the hope that other States and organizations would follow their example, so that the AFRA programme would attain its objectives and the AFRA projects - which had all been approved by the Agency - would be implemented.

59. The developing countries set great store by strengthened co-operation with the Agency, as that was the ideal framework for healthy and balanced international co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear techniques. Tunisia believed that the Agency should concentrate its efforts on improving small and medium power reactors from the point of view of quality and cost so that developing countries could use them in meeting their urgent needs for energy and potable water. It would also like the Agency to intensify its training activities and to organize scientific meetings on the progress being made with regard to reactors. Tunisia was doing everything possible to support important activities of that kind. In Djerba, from 6 to 10 September 1993, it had hosted an Agency meeting on small and medium power reactors in which many experts from industrialized and developing countries had participated.

60. In resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/540, the General Conference had asked the Agency to assess the costs of potable water production and to compare the costs of desalination by nuclear and other means with a view to remedying chronic water shortages due to population growth. Many developing countries hoped that suitable and economically feasible nuclear techniques for the desalination of seawater would be found. The Agency should intensify its efforts in that area and support regional programmes for desalination of seawater using nuclear techniques and also studies relating to the development and design of small and medium power reactors.

61. Irradiation was an ideal tool for ensuring food self-sufficiency, particularly in developing countries where food production and conservation involved chronic problems, and closer collaboration in that area was desirable. Tunisia planned to build a pilot irradiation facility and, in order to ensure the co-ordination of all projects relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, had decided to set up a national centre for nuclear science and techniques. It was counting on the Agency to support the project.

62. While doing everything it could to help Member States derive maximum benefit from nuclear techniques, the Agency was also seeking to limit the associated risks. His delegation welcomed the fact that so many States had acceded to the NPT and commended the Agency for its efforts in that respect. However, accession to the NPT could produce the desired result only if there was an effective safeguards system, and all Member States should therefore sign safeguards agreements with the Agency, as Tunisia had done in 1989.

63. The efforts to bring about peace in the Middle East had as their final aim the strengthening of security throughout the world. His delegation was convinced that disarmament in general and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in particular contributed to the achievement of that objective. Questions relating to non-proliferation should therefore be settled globally, on the basis of the principle that comprehensive safeguards should be applied to all nuclear activities in the Middle East. That would be in line with efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone and would provide the best guarantee of a peaceful, global and just solution to the problems which the region had been experiencing for several decades.

64. Tunisia, which had full confidence in the Agency's efforts in that respect, was convinced that the establishment of such a zone would speed up the process of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and contribute to world peace and security. His delegation would like to see all States of the world working towards that objective and helping the Agency to accomplish its inspection tasks.

65. All Member States recognized the importance of international nuclear safeguards, but it should be recalled that the implementation of safeguards was a heavy burden for the Agency. The industrialized countries, which were benefiting from nuclear energy, should therefore make a greater contribution to the financing of safeguards, without prejudice to technical co-operation. Safeguards should be applied to all members of the international community and in all areas, so that nuclear science and techniques might serve mankind and peace prevail throughout the world.

66. In conclusion, he thanked the Director General and all of the Agency's staff for their efforts to accomplish the difficult tasks assigned to them.

67. Mr. GARCIA DE LA CRUZ (Cuba) said that, in the present world situation, international organizations had a more important role than ever to play in seeking solutions to the pressing problems of mankind. The widening development gap between different countries and regions, worsening poverty and environmental pollution were problems which had to be tackled at the international level. As it had already been shown that nuclear energy could help to resolve those problems, the Agency's work became more important by the day.

68. Cuba was in a difficult situation due to an intensification of the economic embargo to which it had been subject for over three decades and the natural catastrophes which had occurred during the current year. Also, there had been an epidemic of unknown origin for the combating of which a major effort - with the very timely support of the Agency - had been necessary. Faced with that situation, Cuba was working actively to increase its exports and develop tourism, increase agricultural production for internal consumption, achieve a more rational utilization of energy and maintain health and education standards. In that context, the need for nuclear techniques was becoming increasingly apparent. A modern production and development centre for radiopharmaceuticals and labelled compounds was due to enter into service in 1994; that would facilitate dissemination of the nuclear techniques in question.

69. The temporary suspension of construction work on the Juragua nuclear power plant did not mean the end of all activities relating to nuclear power generation. With a view to a resumption of construction (possibly in association with third parties) various possibilities were being considered. Also, the Cuban Parliament had recently emphasized its support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear power. In that connection, the importance had been stressed of continuing to develop Cuba's scientific potential and infrastructure in the nuclear field and of restructuring Cuba's nuclear programme so that greater reliance was placed on the work of Cuban scientists and engineers. A great deal was being done to implement the wishes of the Cuban Parliament.

70. Cuba had also continued to strengthen its nuclear safety and radiation protection infrastructure and to improve its national system for supervising the safety of establishments using radioactive materials, of which the country currently had about 190. Work was continuing on the evaluation - with a view to implementation - of new international recommendations in the area of radiological protection.

71. The Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities were making a significant contribution to the achievement of his country's development objectives. He thanked the Agency and others who had contributed in one way or another. In 1992, Cuba had completed four projects - relating to the improvement of medical diagnostic services, the

use of nuclear techniques in sedimentation studies and the monitoring of environmental radioactivity.

72. With regard to the question of making more rational use of the funds available for technical assistance, Cuba had studied with interest the ideas presented by the Secretariat and analyses carried out by the Board of Governors. He strongly supported the idea of assigning the funds available for technical assistance to the solution of specific problems so as to achieve maximum social and economic impact, and he therefore believed that projects should be aimed at the final user, who should be closely involved in project implementation. His country, which had been following that direction for several years, had formulated its project proposals for the current and the following biennial cycle in accordance with that idea.

73. In that connection, the idea of establishing model projects might well prove to be a good one, and Cuba was working on the formulation of a model project proposal relating to the sterile insect technique. However, he hoped that, when model projects were being established, priority consideration would be given to the needs of and the infrastructures available in the requesting countries, so that the assistance was not subordinated to the Agency's general objectives.

74. Cuba continued to support the Agency's activities relating to regional co-operation, particularly within the framework of ARCAL. Commendable efforts were being made to increase the effectiveness of ARCAL - efforts reflected in the strategy approved at the tenth technical co-ordination meeting.

75. Cuba, which was following with interest the Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection, was prepared to offer the services of scientists and scientific centres in support of the programme for education and training in that area and to participate in the review of the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection and in Agency activities to improve the safety of power plants of Russian design.

76. The Nuclear Safety Convention currently being drafted should aim to raise the general level of nuclear safety. It should apply to all nuclear facilities and be based on the principle that nuclear safety was primarily the responsibility of the individual State. Also, international co-operation and technology exchange should be promoted within the framework

of the convention. The Cuban delegation wished to emphasize that the convention should in no way limit the access of developing countries to nuclear power technologies and to other peaceful nuclear applications, for it was precisely such applications that developing countries needed in order to solve their social and economic problems.

77. In recent years, the Agency's safeguards activities had been at the centre of attention of the world community, which was urging that the system be strengthened and in particular calling for universal accession to multilateral non-proliferation treaties and for a ban on nuclear weapons. As a founder State of the Agency, Cuba had not stood by while efforts were being made in that area. Cuba had retained the political will to make its modest contribution to any dialogue which might lead to the realization of those objectives, at the same time defending the principles of unconditional respect for the sovereignty of States and compliance with international obligations voluntarily undertaken. Thus, since the beginning of its nuclear programme Cuba had offered sufficient guarantees concerning its peaceful nature and had concluded the relevant safeguards agreements with the Agency.

78. With regard to the Tlatelolco Treaty, Cuba, in a sincere desire to contribute to the integration of Latin America, would accede to it on the basis of the principles just mentioned, even if the main reasons which had prevented its accession thus far remained valid or had been strengthened. It was ready to accede as soon as the accession of all other countries of the region had become effective.

79. Many years had passed since the Agency had set up the present safeguards system, and all agreed that adjustments were needed in order to update it in the light of current scientific and technical developments. Cuba had always been willing to participate in a serious and constructive manner in any necessary analysis based on principles which would ensure that the safeguards system was both effective and efficient. Safeguards, which were an integral part of the present non-proliferation regime, should help in establishing a climate of international confidence, and it was therefore impossible to isolate safeguards from other questions with implications for the achievement of that objective. It would be difficult to establish such a climate of confidence while archaic practices such as the unjust embargo imposed on Cuba remained, while disarmament efforts were lacking the necessary urgency and while resources were not being freed for development. Within the framework of a

strengthened non-proliferation regime, future safeguards should be designed not to maintain the prerogatives of States possessing nuclear weapons and the current technological and social imbalances, but to ensure the peaceful development of States which did not possess such weapons and which did not present any threat to humanity. That would also enable the present generation to meet its obligations to future generations.

80. In conclusion, it was essential to continue efforts to raise nuclear safety and radiation protection levels throughout the world and to fulfil moral obligations towards countries which urgently needed nuclear power for their development. Cuba believed that the Agency should devote itself to such efforts in the coming years.

81. Mr. AMROLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran), congratulating the Director General on his re-election, said that, as always, his excellent report to the General Conference and the actions he had taken pursuant to resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the General Conference deserved high praise.

82. Countries looked upon the international organizations as fora where global concerns could be dealt with effectively. Such fora were perceived as gatherings of States with equal rights - gatherings free of segregation and prejudice and devoted to the service of mankind. Unfortunately, at present the reality was somewhat different. During the Cold War, owing to the conflict of interests between the two world Powers, the international organizations did not succeed in addressing global problems with the necessary effectiveness. Now that the Cold War was over, they were the object of even stronger criticism. It was often said that they seemed to have lost their sense of direction and their effectiveness and that they were unable to produce tangible remedies for the world's troubles. The rumour was even heard that certain international bodies, in particular the United Nations and its Security Council, had been transformed into instruments which served pre-ordained objectives.

83. The post-Cold War era had started with the premature notion that a new world order was being ushered in. Some had hoped for a world without the dominance of one or several States over the rest solely on the basis of misconceived notions of superiority. As yet, nothing had emerged to confirm those hopes. Instead, many were predicting an era characterized by lack of vision, vague objectives and poor statesmanship. In order to prevent

the international organizations' ineffectiveness in dealing with global problems from leading to a highly volatile situation, what was needed was conscientious scrutiny of the present situation and a reassessment of the role of those organizations in handling global social and political issues - in particular the organizations with sensitive mandates.

84. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that the Member States of the international organizations should undertake such an initiative and endeavour to coexist on the same legal footing as a body of independent, responsible States whose mission was to serve, not the interests of a particular State or group of States, but those of mankind.

85. The lamentably ambivalent role of the United Nations in handling the problems of the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and other troubled areas around the globe was a disturbing reminder that the organization was losing sight of its basic *raison d'être*.

86. For example, many believed that, apart from having failed to identify the causes of the crisis in Bosnia Herzegovina, the United Nations had committed a fundamental error by participating in a plan under which the legitimate government of a European Member State of the United Nations was forced to agree to being dismembered by a brutal campaign of aggression and genocide and a loathsome policy of ethnic cleansing.

87. Others maintained that the United Nations should not assume a militaristic stance or play the role of a world policemen trying to enforce dictated policy objectives. Many Member States of the United Nations found it difficult to reconcile such unfamiliar - indeed absurd - procedures with the spirit of the United Nations Charter, even under humanitarian pretexts. A particular case in point was the endorsement by the United Nations of the discriminatory disarmament policies promoted by certain States.

88. Others feared that such ambivalence and obscurity, particularly where the tasks of the United Nations and the Security Council encroached upon the mandates of affiliated organizations, might adversely affect the latter. With regard to the Agency, it should be stated in all fairness that, on the whole, it had so far carried out the tasks assigned to it admirably despite the complexities of the present world situation. That was in large measure due to the skills of the Director General and the dedication of the Secretariat. Happily, there was no cause to level serious criticism at them. However, the same could not be said of

certain other organizations belonging to the United Nations system, which had recently been subjected to extremely serious criticism.

89. In order to avoid sinking into complete pessimism, it should be recalled that the founding documents of the international organizations were basically sound, for they had been drafted by men of vision. Time and geopolitical changes, together with certain arbitrary interpretations of those documents might, however, have resulted in some degree of deviation from the intended objectives. The Islamic Republic of Iran therefore believed that, in the interests of avoiding such deviation, there was a need for standing committees, within the international organizations, charged with determining the extent to which those organizations' present activities conformed to the spirit of their founding documents. There was perhaps more tolerance of self-criticism in the Agency than elsewhere, since there already existed a working group for that purpose, although it was informal and its mandate was limited. He proposed that the group set an example by establishing a standing committee, with a broad mandate, to determine the extent to which the Agency's activities conformed to the Statute. Other international organizations should also take such initiatives.

90. His delegation, which had read the annual report for 1992 (GC(XXXVII)/1060) with interest, noted with regret that the Agency was still operating under financial constraints. His delegation hoped that all Member States which were behind in their payments, particularly those whose financial obligations were greatest, would quickly pay what they owed.

91. In the previous few years, the Agency had had to deal with a number of issues of unprecedented importance and exceptional complexity, among them the strengthening of safeguards and international co-operation in matters relating to nuclear safety and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

92. The strengthening of safeguards had been the subject of lengthy discussions, where some progress had been made. However, the task had by no means been completed. It was to be hoped that all the newly independent States which had been approved for membership of the Agency would soon conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

93. The Islamic Republic of Iran supported and would continue to support all efforts of the Agency to enhance the effectiveness of its safeguards regime. Under its policy of openness and transparency in the nuclear field, his country had taken the initiative of inviting the Agency to visit nuclear facilities of its choice in order to verify their peaceful utilization. Subsequently, an Agency team had travelled to Iran and carried out verification activities to the Agency's satisfaction. It was to be hoped that other Member States would follow that example.

94. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran believed that, in view of the current budgetary constraints, the main objective should be cost-effectiveness. His delegation had noted with concern the statement of one Governor, made at the 815th meeting of the Board, about safeguards in his country, "Each year over 700 person-days of inspection were expended on safeguarding material which could not be used for producing nuclear weapons ... Six hundred of the inspection days ... and nearly 80% of the 170 sites focused on spent reactor fuel, material which was without value to a weapons programme ..." That was a good indication of the potential for improving the allocation of financial resources in safeguards implementation. Furthermore, his country continued to believe that the safeguards regime should be considered essentially as a mechanism for verifying that non-proliferation commitments in the broad sense had been honoured in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the NPT. Therefore, allocating budgetary resources for safeguards implementation in nuclear-weapon States without any consideration of vertical proliferation had no value and was completely unjustified.

95. In view of its complex nature, international co-operation in matters relating to nuclear safety was still an open issue requiring further efforts. His country had stated on numerous occasions that it regarded the issue as equal in importance to the strengthening of safeguards, and even more important in certain cases. Thus, the potential risks of keeping certain outdated nuclear installations - particularly installations serving military purposes - in operation were a cause of great concern to some Member States. A case in point was the Dimona nuclear reactor in occupied Palestine, which continued to be operated without being subject to safeguards. No one knew the conditions under which that antiquated reactor, used solely for non-peaceful purposes, was being operated. However, the entire population of the

occupied territories and neighbouring States lived in constant fear of the catastrophes it might cause. In Iran's opinion, such cases required the attention of the international community in general and the Agency in particular, and his delegation would like the Director General to consider the possibility of looking into the matter.

96. The Agency was to be commended on its efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, and in particular for having organized, in June, a workshop on the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic of Iran considered that such informative gatherings, although insufficient in themselves, were very useful in addressing such important issues. Recalling that no real progress had been made on the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa until South Africa responded to the wishes of the international community by dismantling its nuclear weapons and submitting its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards, he said that a parallel could be drawn in respect of the Middle East. As long as Israel, with the full support of the United States, continued to refuse to respect the wishes of the international community, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would - he feared - remain a dormant one.

97. The fact that the United States and other western Powers were, on one hand, imposing severe political and economic sanctions on certain States which they accused of fostering the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies and, on the other, displaying complete tolerance of Israel's nuclear policies, which were in complete violation of international treaties, was equivalent to tacit approval of the Israeli régime's access to nuclear weapons. It was difficult for the international community to understand such double standards.

98. The Islamic Republic of Iran had been the first State to propose the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It continued to subscribe to that concept and was prepared to consider constructive initiatives relating to it. Clearly, the international community should display firmness in obliging Israel to respect the views of the majority.

99. In recent years the progress of peaceful applications of nuclear energy had been drastically curtailed, mainly because of nuclear accidents, fear of nuclear weapons proliferation, an abundance of cheap fossil fuels and a reduction in the global demand for

electricity. Nuclear technology and, by extension, the nuclear industry were undergoing the most severe recession they had experienced in their 50-year history. In particular, the construction of new nuclear power plants had been halted almost completely. That was unfortunate, because nuclear power technology was just reaching maturity and nuclear power plants were well set to establish a reputation as a remarkably safe and environmentally very sound means of producing electricity. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran believed that the establishment of effective and strengthened safeguards and the implementation of measures to enhance nuclear safety and radiation protection, combined with consideration of the world's serious environmental problems, would provide ample grounds for a renaissance of the nuclear power industry in the near future.

100. The recession in the nuclear market, combined with a drastic reduction in nuclear technology transfers by supplier States, had seriously affected the promotional side of the Agency's activities. Although it supported the Agency's regulatory role, his country considered that - as clearly stipulated in the Statute - the organization had other roles to play as well.

101. The majority of Member States, particularly those undergoing development, were seeking tangible results from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in support of their development programmes. At present, however, there seemed to be more drawbacks than advantages to involvement in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, as developing States could easily be accused of contributing to nuclear proliferation if they showed an interest in such applications.

102. The Islamic Republic of Iran hoped that soon a balance would again be established between the Agency's regulatory and promotional activities. After all, no one wished to arrive at a point where the developing States began to question the benefits of membership of an entirely regulatory organization.

103. Turning to the question of his country's nuclear programmes, he said that, contrary to unjust and unfounded allegations, made primarily by the United States, they were entirely peaceful. Apart from the innuendoes and falsifications of Zionist-sponsored media pursuing

political goals, there had never been a basis for those allegations, no supporting proof having been provided so far for the attention of the international community.

104. The Islamic Republic of Iran remained fully prepared to co-operate with the Agency in the fulfilment of its tasks, the most important of which was to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. However, owing to the aforementioned allegations and innuendoes, European suppliers had drastically curtailed his country's access to peaceful applications of nuclear energy, in particular in the nuclear power sector. Consequently, in the light of Iran's development and energy programmes his Government had concluded with the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of China bilateral agreements on co-operation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy. On the basis of those agreements, consideration was being given to the conclusion of contracts for the construction of new nuclear power plants and the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

105. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that all States should have the right to benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear energy provided they respected the relevant international codes of practice. If that was considered to be the case, and it would after all be in keeping with the spirit of the NPT, then there should really be no prejudice on the part of suppliers. If supplier States changed their attitude, the chances of an extension of the NPT in 1995 would be considerably greater.

106. Mr. HÖGBERG (Sweden) recalled the importance which his Government attached to the NPT and said that with 160 parties, including all the nuclear-weapon States, it was the foremost international disarmament treaty. Sweden would like all States to accede to the NPT, thereby making it truly universal, and was firmly convinced of the need to extend it indefinitely in 1995. Also, Sweden considered that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty covering all nuclear explosions would be an important element in the non-proliferation regime, and it had proposed that the Agency be given a prominent verification role under such a treaty. Sweden welcomed the progress made towards bringing the Tlatelolco Treaty fully into force and sincerely hoped that all States in Latin America would accede to it. In addition, his country noted with satisfaction that work on a treaty for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa was progressing well, and it was grateful to the Agency for its efforts in that regard.

107. His delegation hoped that those States parties to the NPT which had not yet done so would conclude and implement without delay the required safeguards agreements with the Agency. It had listened with deep concern to the reports presented by the Director General to the Board of Governors the previous week on the application of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK. He urged the DPRK to fulfil all its obligations under that agreement. His delegation endorsed the actions which the Director General had taken in an effort to implement the agreement and commended the Secretariat for the objective manner in which it had proceeded.

108. Likewise, in calling on Iraq to comply fully with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council, his delegation commended the Director General and the Secretariat for what they were doing in that regard. Emphasizing that the safeguards system was a key element of the non-proliferation regime, he said that all parties involved in international nuclear co-operation and trade should undertake to ensure the full transparency of their nuclear activities through comprehensive Agency safeguards. The principle of requiring full-scope safeguards for nuclear exports was another important element of the undertaking in question, and the nuclear-weapon States had a particular responsibility in that regard.

109. His country had often emphasized the importance of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system, and wished to commend the Director General for the measures he had taken to that end. Sweden particularly welcomed SAGSI's re-examination of safeguards implementation and its proposals for an alternative safeguards regime. SAGSI's work was all the more important given the continuing decline in the level of inspection goal attainment indicated in the Safeguards Implementation Report for 1992 (GOV/2653). The principles for an alternative safeguards system currently being elaborated and the measures proposed by SAGSI for the detection of undeclared activities would create the necessary confidence and increase cost-effectiveness.

110. A decision on the proposed measures needed to be taken before 1995. Sweden therefore welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to initiate co-operation with Member States in studies of the proposals and in field trials. It was already conducting a field trial regarding the possibility of detecting undeclared activities, and it was considering co-operation with the Agency in other areas. The field trials would be of most use if they could be carried out in

an adequate number of Member States which had reached various levels of nuclear development. It was important to find the means of enabling all interested States to participate. His Government hoped that the Director General would continue his efforts in that sphere in co-operation with interested Member States. His delegation looked forward to discussing the results of forthcoming studies and field trials.

111. Sweden particularly welcomed the ongoing efforts to establish a comprehensive system for reporting exports and imports of nuclear materials and equipment. Refined techniques for evaluating information were essential in order to ensure the viability of the system.

112. Sweden was privileged to be co-operating with several newly independent States of the former Soviet Union in the development of their nuclear material control systems. His country looked forward to continuing its co-operation and welcomed the co-ordination of the activities in question with the corresponding Agency activities; that would help to avoid duplication and ensure a high level of effectiveness and efficiency.

113. At the thirty-sixth session of the General Conference, Sweden had urged all Member States to work towards rapid completion of the work on a nuclear safety convention. Since then, impressive results had been achieved by the Group of Experts and its Chairman. Sweden, which believed that the rapid establishment of such a convention was essential, would like to see agreement on a final text early in 1994. To that end, together with other States it had agreed that the scope of the convention should be limited to civil nuclear power reactors, on the understanding that work on preparing a convention on waste management would start without delay. Sweden therefore called for preparatory work to begin immediately so that negotiations on the convention might take place as soon as agreement had been reached on the relevant safety fundamentals. The Director General and the Secretariat were to be commended for their ongoing work on waste management safety fundamentals, and his delegation looked forward to the speedy completion of that work.

114. His Government attached a high priority to the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage and looked forward to its early completion so that a diplomatic conference could be held as soon as possible in 1994. It was important that the Vienna

Convention and the Joint Protocol attract the widest possible adherence. Several States with nuclear power plants - and also their neighbouring States - were still not parties to those instruments.

115. Sweden regarded nuclear safety as one of the Agency's priority activities and strongly supported safety services such as the OSART and ASSET services and IPERS and also initiatives to strengthen national infrastructures for radiation protection and nuclear safety. The Agency's work on nuclear safety and radiation protection in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union was of particular importance. It was essential to co-ordinate as much as possible the work of all parties, especially as several of the States in question had only a few experts available for participation in the activities of the various international groups involved.

116. For its part, the Swedish Government had allocated some 125 million kronor for nuclear safety and radiation protection programmes being conducted in co-operation with countries of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly the Baltic States and the Russian Federation. Those programmes had led to considerable improvements in reactor safety and radiation protection, and to a better mutual understanding of needs and priorities as regards improvements in reactor safety, radiation protection and waste management. Needless to say, such progress could not have been achieved without the strenuous efforts of Sweden's partners in the co-operative effort.

117. His delegation welcomed the establishment of the Nuclear Safety Account administered by the EBRD, which would provide a good basis for further improvements in nuclear safety. The resolving of the nuclear liability issues which he had mentioned earlier had proved to be an essential factor in that regard.

118. His Government considered that the dumping of radioactive waste, in whatever form, should be completely prohibited under the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the so-called London Convention of 1972). His Government also wished to see military waste included within the scope of the Convention. In that regard, he commended the Agency for the important work it was doing in co-

operation with Norway and the Russian Federation within the framework of the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project.

119. Regarding the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities, to which his country attached high priority, he noted that demand was strong in the areas of food and agriculture, radiation protection, safety of nuclear installations and radioactive waste management. It was important that the TACF's resources be predictable and assured. The decline in pledges and payments was therefore extremely regrettable, particularly in view of the impact in areas such as nuclear safety, waste management and radiation protection. Sweden had pledged its share of the TACF target for 1994, and its extrabudgetary contributions for technical assistance averaged almost US \$1 million annually. Sweden considered that the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities were carried out in a very competent and efficient manner. As on previous occasions, his delegation welcomed the wider co-operation between the Agency and other organizations.

120. In conclusion, he said that safeguards, nuclear safety and technical assistance were all areas of high priority. It went without saying that scarce resources had to be used for high priority tasks. He had already indicated those issues which were of most importance to his country. Lastly, he complimented the Director General and the Secretariat on the work they had done in 1992, a year in which the Agency's performance had once more earned it the confidence and gratitude of its Member States.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.