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President: Mr. AL-ATHEL (Saudi Arabia)

Later: Mr. GUTIERREZ LEYTON (Chile)

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[*] GC(XXXVII)/1052, Corr.1 and Add.1.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXVII)/INF/328/Rev.1. 93-3747 (III)

Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
CEC	Commission of the European Communities
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
G-24	Group of Twenty-Four
IPERS	International Peer Review Service
NDT	Non-destructive testing
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PHARE	Poland, Hungary: assistance for economic reconstruction
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
R&D	Research and development
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
START	Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1961)
World Bank (IBRD)	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION (GC(XXXVII)/1052, Corr.1 and Add.1)

1. The PRESIDENT reported that the General Committee recommended to the General Conference that the agenda for the current session should include all the items listed in document GC(XXXVII)/1052, together with the additional item (Implementation of the agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) proposed by the Board of Governors in document GC(XXXVII)/1052/Add.1. The Committee also recommended that the Conference should consider the latter item before the lapse of seven days after its inclusion in the agenda in accordance with Rule 15 of the General Conference's Rules of Procedure.

2. The Committee further recommended that the items listed in the provisional agenda be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in documents GC(XXXVII)/1052 and Corr.1, and that the item entitled "Implementation of the agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" be considered by the Conference in plenary session.

3. With respect to the order of items, the Committee recommended that the order appearing in document GC(XXXVII)/1052 be retained, with the inclusion of the additional item as item 23 and consequent renumbering of the subsequent items, on the understanding that the new item would be dealt with not earlier than Friday and that the exigencies of the moment or the efficient conduct of business might well call for changes to be made both in the Plenary and in the Committee of the Whole. In that connection, the Committee recommended that the Conference take up item 7 (Approval of the appointment of the Director General) at the beginning of the meeting that afternoon.

4. Mr. LI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), noting that the adoption by the Board of Governors of the resolution to place on the agenda of the present session of the General Conference the item entitled "Implementation of the agreement between the Agency

and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" was a violation of his country's sovereignty, said that his delegation reiterated its strong opposition to the inclusion of that item in the General Conference's agenda.

5. Both the United States, which had threatened the DPRK with nuclear weapons, and certain officials of the Agency's Secretariat, who - acting on the basis of intelligence information fabricated by a third country - had attempted to force a special inspection upon his country, were responsible for the present complexity of the issue. There were in fact sinister political motives behind the attempt to add the item in question to the Conference's agenda.

6. The question of Agency inspections in the DPRK was a matter to be resolved by the parties concerned and it was not appropriate to place it on the General Conference's agenda. Moreover, at the present time, when talks and consultations between the parties concerned appeared to be progressing towards a possible resolution of the issue, its referral to the General Conference would block the progress made and make the situation more complicated.

7. In any case, there was no reason to add the item, since both the 5 MW research reactor and the radiochemical laboratory, about which some countries had suspicions, were under Agency safeguards. In August 1993, the Agency inspection team had confirmed that reprocessing had not taken place at the radiochemical laboratory, thus proving that nuclear material was not being used for other purposes. Furthermore, despite the unique and extraordinary circumstances associated with the temporary suspension of the effectuation of his country's announced withdrawal from the NPT, continuity of safeguards information from surveillance equipment had been maintained, a fact which the United States had noted with satisfaction.

8. Moreover, according to Rule 15 of the General Conference's Rules of Procedure, no additional item could be considered until seven days after being placed on the agenda and there was no justification for waiving that requirement.

9. In conclusion, he said that the issue should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation and, reiterating his delegation's strong opposition to the referral of the matter to the General Conference, requested that a roll-call vote be taken.

10. The PRESIDENT suggested that, leaving aside for the time being the question of the inclusion of the additional item, the General Conference accept all the other recommendations of the General Committee.

11. It was so agreed.

12. The PRESIDENT, complying with the request of the representative of the DPRK, proposed that the General Conference proceed with a roll-call vote on the proposed inclusion of the additional agenda item.

13. Peru, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

14. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Against: Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Abstaining: China, Cuba, Holy See, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Namibia, Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe.

15. There were 69 votes in favour and one against, with ten abstentions. The item entitled "Implementation of the agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" was therefore included in the agenda.

16. The PRESIDENT, complying with the request of the representative of the DPRK, proposed that the General Conference proceed with a roll-call vote on the proposal to waive the requirement of Rule 15 of the General Conference's Rules of Procedure that seven days should elapse after the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda before that item could be considered.

17. The Syrian Arab Republic, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

18. In favour: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Abstaining: China, Cuba, Holy See, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Namibia, Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe.

19. There were 69 votes in favour and one against, with ten abstentions. The proposal was adopted.

20. Ms. KSENTINI (Algeria) said that her delegation had voted in favour of the inclusion of the new agenda item and the suspension of the required lapse of seven days prior to consideration of that additional item in line with her country's consistent policy of promoting the democratic debate of the plenary bodies of all international organizations. Since all Member States were represented in those plenary bodies, it was proper that all

important issues should be discussed in such forums. Furthermore, since the title of the agenda item was factual, it would not prejudice the nature of the debate or any decision that the General Conference might take after objective and responsible consideration of the efforts being made. The Board of Governors had judged it appropriate to bring the debate on that issue to the plenary body of the General Conference. Although the political expediency of the inclusion of that item remained to be seen, her delegation would abide by the collective wisdom and it hoped that the present meetings would make a constructive contribution to the solution of a very sensitive problem that had been before the Board of Governors for the past eight months.

21. Mr. CHEN (China) recalled that the agenda for the General Conference had already been adopted by the Board of Governors in June in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference. The agenda had been formally circulated on 25 June and any additional item should have been submitted in time in accordance with the proper procedures.

22. There was no doubt that the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK was a very important issue, but there was no need for it suddenly to be treated as urgent. His delegation could not understand the reason behind the proposal to waive the required time lapse and hastily include the item on the General Conference's agenda. His delegation was also concerned about the possible negative consequences of that unusual action.

23. In the past few months, as a result of the joint efforts of the parties concerned, some positive developments had taken place and the tense atmosphere of conflict had somewhat improved. The two rounds of talks between the DPRK and the United States had led to some initial progress. The DPRK had announced its decision to suspend temporarily effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT and consultations had also taken place between the Agency and the DPRK. The two parties had found a basic solution to the procedural issue concerning the second round of consultations, and it seemed likely that the remaining problems could be solved through further negotiations. It was important to create and maintain an atmosphere conducive to finding a solution to the issue. All parties should

therefore be encouraged to continue their contacts, dialogue and consultations so that further progress could be made.

24. The sole purpose of adding the item to the agenda, contrary to normal practice, was to arouse public opinion and exert pressure. Instead of helping to resolve the situation, it would only impede the subsequent consultations between the parties concerned. Furthermore, it seemed likely that as a result the Agency would be unable to continue its routine inspections in the DPRK, and it would thus lose continuity of inspection materials and data.

25. Lessons should be drawn from the past in order to avoid repeating mistakes in the future. If all parties concerned took a flexible attitude and participated in a dialogue based on mutual understanding and equality, there was no major international issue that could not be resolved. If too much pressure was applied and unrealistic preconditions were put forward, then the problem would become more complicated and the conflict exacerbated. The correct approach was to find a solution through direct bilateral consultations among the parties concerned - in the present case, the DPRK, the United States, the Republic of Korea and the Agency. At the same time, a comprehensive solution could not be expected to emerge from just one or two rounds of consultations and all parties should therefore demonstrate their sincerity, flexibility and patience.

26. In view of those considerations, the Chinese delegation had abstained in the votes which had just taken place.

27. Mr. BAKSHI (India) said that his delegation had always maintained that all difficulties and problems in the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK could and should be resolved through consultations and discussions and that everything should be done to encourage that process. However, the current situation had generated considerable concern and many delegations believed that it was important to refer the matter to the General Conference for discussion and that the guidance of the Conference would be useful to the parties concerned. His delegation had therefore voted in favour of both motions and sincerely hoped that the forthcoming debate would make a

positive contribution to the common objective of resolving all issues through dialogue and discussions.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

28. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had recommended to the General Conference that Friday, 1 October 1993, be set as the closing date of the thirty-seventh regular session and Monday, 19 September 1994, as the opening date of the thirty-eighth regular session of the General Conference, which would be held in Vienna.

29. The General Committee's recommendations were adopted.

REQUESTS FOR THE RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS (GC(XXXVII)/INF/326 and 329)

30. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had received requests from Iraq and Afghanistan that the last sentence of Article XIX.A of the Statute be invoked in order that they might be permitted to vote during the present session of the General Conference. The General Committee recommended that the General Conference reject both requests.

31. The General Committee's recommendations were adopted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1992 (GC(XXXVII)/1060) (resumed from meeting 354)

32. Mr. MONDINO (Argentina) said he wished first to extend a warm welcome to the new Member States of the Agency: the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, and the Republics of Armenia, Kazakhstan and the Marshall Islands, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

33. In the past year, Argentina and Brazil had continued to implement the common system of accounting and control of nuclear materials, which was now fully established and functional. A second important element of his country's recent nuclear policy had been the establishment in June 1992 of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), following on from the agreement for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy signed by both countries in July 1991 in Guadalajara, Mexico. Under

the terms established by the common system of accounting and control of nuclear materials, the national authorities of both countries had provided the ABACC with initial inventories of all the nuclear material at their nuclear facilities.

34. Inspections to verify those initial inventories had started in March, and by the end of April some 15% of the work had been completed in Brazil and some 20% in Argentina; it was hoped that by the end of the year the process would be complete for all material not subject to Agency safeguards. Thus, by the beginning of 1994, all the nuclear material in every nuclear facility in Argentina and Brazil would have been placed under the safeguards of either the Agency or the ABACC. In addition, the Secretariat of the ABACC had received design information questionnaires for all the nuclear facilities in the two countries which had not been placed under Agency safeguards. By the end of April, the ABACC had received 80% and verified 68% of the questionnaires, enabling it to produce, jointly with the national authorities, manuals of inspection procedures or facility attachments for each facility.

35. The comprehensive safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the Agency had already been ratified by the Argentine Parliament. A number of meetings had also been held with the Agency to discuss the general section of the subsidiary arrangements for that agreement and it was expected that those arrangements would soon be settled.

36. At its meeting in May 1993, OPANAL, following a request from the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, had decided to hold an extraordinary meeting at the end of the year to examine the financial and other conditions regulating the participation of those three countries in OPANAL. It was to be hoped that the process of ratifying the Tlatelolco Treaty would be completed by the end of that meeting. The amended Tlatelolco Treaty had already been approved by consensus in the Argentine Senate and endorsed by the Foreign Relations and Defence Committees of the House of Deputies. The whole House was expected to approve the Treaty shortly.

37. Furthermore, the Argentine Government had recently issued two decrees to establish a system for strict control of the export of equipment, material and sensitive technology in a number of areas related to the production of weapons of mass destruction, including the

nuclear field. That system was now fully operational. There had been a number of other related developments, including Argentina's application to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and formal signing by the Argentine Government of a memorandum of understanding with the United States covering exports of sensitive material .

38. Turning to the status of nuclear activities in Argentina, he observed that nuclear energy continued to play a major role in electricity production. In 1992 the Atucha I and Embalse power plants had contributed 14.78% of the total electricity produced by the national grid, in spite of the fact that those plants represented only 7.4% of the installed capacity. In the first half of the year, virtually the same excellent output had been maintained despite strong competition from the hydroelectric power sector, which enjoyed a privileged position in Argentina. Work on the Atucha II plant was nearing completion, after many delays caused by the economic difficulties of the past few years. Connection to the grid was now predicted for early 1997 at the latest. Another project held up by past economic constraints was the industrial heavy water plant at Arroyito. The plant, which had an annual capacity of 200 tonnes, was undergoing final pre-commissioning tests and it was hoped that commercial production would begin by the end of 1993. Another, no less important development was that Argentina now had a cyclotron at an advanced stage of construction, which would be used to produce short- and medium-lived radioisotopes, of which there had hitherto been such a shortage in Argentina. Production would commence by the end of the year and would greatly benefit the health and well-being of the population.

39. In the field of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the year had been a very active one for Argentina on both the multilateral and bilateral fronts. Under the Agency's technical co-operation programme in general, and under the ARCAL programme in particular, Argentina had hosted training courses and workshops; had provided training for visiting scientists and fellows from other countries; and in 1992 had occupied fourth place of all Member States in supplying experts and lecturers. Within the framework of the Organization of American States, Argentina continued to provide fellowships to students from Latin America for courses held in Argentina. In addition, Argentina had agreements on bilateral co-operation with a number of countries, including Germany, Brazil, France and Uruguay.

40. The Secretariat had made commendable efforts to optimize the use of its scarce resources in implementing the Agency's technical assistance activities over the past year. For its part, his Government had paid its contribution to the TACF for 1993 well in advance, and would be pledging a contribution for 1994 of US \$300 000, which it would pay as soon as possible.

41. With regard to Agency safeguards, his Government fully supported the steps being taken by the Agency to strengthen the safeguards system within the framework of the Statute and existing safeguards agreements. Nevertheless, it believed that the Secretariat should redouble its efforts to maintain confidence in the system by rationalizing its implementation approaches so that the budget did not become overburdened.

42. His Government attached great importance to the completion of the work to prepare a nuclear safety convention. However, it was concerned at the lack of progress made by the group of experts. The conclusion of the convention was an essential prerequisite to gaining wide public acceptance of nuclear energy. For that reason, he urged Member States which had adopted a more rigid approach during the group's work to show more flexibility with a view to facilitating a speedy and acceptable consensus.

43. The Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had made significant progress in evaluating a number of the issues involved. Again, however, he felt bound to express his concern at the uncompromising positions adopted by a small number of Member States with regard to certain conflicting aspects. His delegation also urged those States to show more flexibility, and hoped that a diplomatic conference could soon be held to discuss amendments to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and also, if possible, a new convention on supplementary compensation.

44. With those comments, his delegation could approve the Annual Report for 1992 and, in conclusion, wished to congratulate the Director General on his reappointment, commend the Secretariat for its dedication and professionalism, and pledge Argentina's continued full support and active participation in the Agency's work.

45. Mr. VILAIN XIII (Belgium), speaking on behalf of the European Community and its member States, said that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was an area in

which the international community and the Agency had had to face up to significant developments over the past year. The most serious problem had been the non-implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The European Community was deeply concerned that, despite the patience shown by the international community, the DPRK had still not complied with the commitments it had undertaken. The members of the Community called on that country to reaffirm its unconditional adherence to the NPT, to apply fully and in good faith the comprehensive safeguards agreement that it had signed on 20 January 1992, and to accept the inspection of the two sites designated by the Agency.

46. The European Community deeply deplored the fact that during its recent consultations with the Agency, the DPRK had shown no willingness to honour its commitments: instead, it was seeking to limit the scope of the consultations and to impose conditions upon them. Such moves were unacceptable. The members of the Community hoped, nevertheless, that the consultations could resume without preconditions and in a constructive spirit.

47. The Community thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for the diligence, professional competence and impartiality that they had shown in that delicate period and requested them to pursue their efforts with vigour. The Director General was likewise requested to keep the Security Council and Member States of the Agency informed of any important developments in that area. The Community hoped that the dialogue between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea would be resumed, thereby facilitating the establishment in the near future of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula, in conformity with the joint statement signed on 31 December 1991.

48. With regard to the situation in the former Soviet Union, the member States of the European Community naturally welcomed the accession to the NPT of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Uzbekistan and the Secretariat's efforts to prepare for the application of safeguards in other States of the former USSR. They called on those other States, particularly Ukraine and Kazakhstan, to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and hoped that the agreement between Russia and Ukraine on 3 September 1993 relating to the return to Russia of the nuclear warheads located in Ukraine would be implemented very soon.

49. Another subject of great concern was the situation in Iraq. The member States of the European Community regretted that, by refusing to transmit to the Agency the list of its suppliers, Iraq had still not applied fully the provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 and 707. They encouraged Iraq to provide the Agency with all the information relating to its nuclear programme that had not yet been communicated and requested the Director General to implement as rapidly as possible the provisions on the long-term monitoring plan provided for by Security Council resolution 715, while pursuing, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 687, the search for components of Iraq's clandestine programme that had not yet been uncovered.

50. Another significant development in the area of non-proliferation was the South African Government's acknowledgement of the fact that nuclear explosive devices had been developed there in the 1980s and had been dismantled before the country had acceded to the NPT. The Community members welcomed that openness, which revealed that a country could take an independent decision to renounce a clandestine nuclear programme. They had noted the Director General's report concerning the Agency's verification activities in South Africa, and welcomed the progress made during the past year in the negotiations to establish a denuclearized zone in Africa.

51. The rapid progress made in the peace process in the Middle East was encouraging. Recent developments justified the hope that the requirements for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in that region and for the application of comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East might soon be met.

52. The European Community hoped that the ratification of the quadripartite agreement signed by Brazil, Argentina, the ABACC and the Agency would be completed rapidly.

53. Lastly, on the subject of non-proliferation, he said the European Community welcomed the recent accessions to the NPT and strongly urged all countries that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT without delay and to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. The Twelve recalled their commitment to the unconditional extension of the NPT for an indefinite period, a commitment that had been reaffirmed at the first session of the Preparatory Committee held in New York in May 1993. Was it necessary

to stress that the NPT was the only worldwide framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons?

54. In August 1993, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had adopted by consensus a decision giving the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty. Multilateral negotiations were to be launched with a view to developing a treaty of universal application comprising an effective verification regime. The European Community members welcomed with satisfaction that decisive step, which would contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

55. The Twelve were pleased that the proposals they had made two years previously to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system had been adopted by the Board of Governors and that the necessary steps for implementing those proposals were being taken. If the Secretariat was to be able to acquire an overall view of the transport and production of nuclear materials throughout the world, it was essential that all countries should take part in the system for reporting of exports and imports of nuclear material and of exports of certain equipment and non-nuclear material.

56. The study carried out by SAGSI on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system had given the Secretariat a useful foundation for a more in-depth revision of the safeguards system. The purpose of the exercise was to improve the detection of anomalies that revealed clandestine activities, even if it was hard to imagine that the Agency would one day be capable of certifying absolutely the absence of clandestine activities worldwide.

57. While the need to reduce the cost of inspection missions should not be underestimated, that requirement should not be allowed to impair the elaboration of a coherent project that might offer prospects for comprehensive effectiveness of Agency safeguards, while taking into account the very real dangers of proliferation.

58. The European Community had listened with great interest to the Director General's report on measures undertaken to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system, and were awaiting with interest the specific proposals he would make

at the December meeting of the Board of Governors on the basis of SAGSI's conclusions and the discussions within the Board of Governors in June 1993.

59. The negotiations on a partnership approach between the Agency's inspection units and EURATOM had made substantial progress during the past year. The increased co-operation had already had favourable effects on the Agency's budget, yet the benefits expected from the agreement remained subject to a number of conditions. The Director General should continue with the discussions with a view to ensuring that the partnership approach was fully implemented in the near future. One of the most important developments had been EURATOM's confirmation as a regional safeguards system for preventing the diversion of nuclear material towards objectives other than those declared by member States of the Community. The status of a regional safeguards system could be granted to other regional institutions under certain clearly defined conditions. The European Community had accordingly requested the Director General to study and submit to the Board of Governors a document on the conditions a regional organization must fulfil in order to negotiate a partnership agreement with the Agency.

60. The member States of the European Community were deeply committed to the control of nuclear exports, and particularly to the guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. They appealed to the suppliers that had not yet adhered to the guidelines for export controls to do so as soon as possible. All members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group had resolved to demand the application of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities, present as well as future, as a precondition for any new and significant supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States.

61. Turning to the fields of nuclear safety, radiation protection and technical co-operation, he noted that the benefits of the Agency's activities in areas where nuclear technology was not used for energy purposes were often underestimated. In the area of nuclear safety, the Agency played a role of primary importance. The European Community welcomed the progress made by the group of experts in elaborating a nuclear safety convention and believed such an instrument would improve nuclear safety worldwide, as well as the coherence of fundamental safety principles. That was why it called on all States, particularly those with nuclear reactors in their territories, to participate actively in the elaboration of the

convention. A consensus seemed to be emerging in favour of initially limiting the scope of application of the convention to power reactors and it should be possible for the text of the convention to be finalized at a diplomatic conference early in 1994.

62. It was to be hoped that the present session of the General Conference would provide the opportunity for the international community to express its desire, following approval by the Board of Governors of the fundamental principles relating to radioactive waste management, to initiate negotiations with a view to elaborating an international legal framework for the management of radioactive waste. It was also to be hoped that, as an international consensus on fundamental safety principles emerged, other aspects of the fuel cycle would likewise be covered by appropriate international instruments. The Community attached great importance to nuclear safety in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR, and had made substantial contributions in that area within the Community, within the Agency and within the Group of 24. The Agency played an important role in improving nuclear safety in the States of Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Furthermore, its OSART and ASSET missions and the programmes on reactors that presented problems continued to provide useful information for the activities of the Group of 24. Recent initiatives, such as the joint IAEA/UNDP initiative aimed at strengthening radiation protection and nuclear safety infrastructures in countries of the former USSR, and the International Arctic Seas Assessment Programme, supplemented the Agency's commitment to the improvement of nuclear safety.

63. For some time the Agency's Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had been involved in revision of the Vienna Convention and in the preparation of a new convention on supplementary compensation. Significant results had been achieved and the Community hoped that a diplomatic conference could be convened as soon as possible to finalize the two conventions.

64. The European Community considered technical assistance to be one of the Agency's essential tasks and believed that all States should have access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, be it for medical, agriculture, industrial or energy purposes. The Agency had a fundamental role to play in accelerating that process and enabling nuclear activities to be pursued in conformity with the highest level of safety and radiation protection.

65. The Community found it regrettable that, as in the preceding year, they had to express their concern about the Agency's financial situation. In the interests of the proper functioning of the organization, the Twelve called on all Member States to pay their contributions to the Agency's budget in good time. They welcomed the efforts made by the Director General and his staff to provide for the Agency's operations in very difficult circumstances and appreciated all the more the Secretariat's recent exercise aimed at more advanced analysis of the efficiency of Agency programmes.

66. In conformity with the Statute, the General Conference would be called upon to endorse the decision of the Board of Governors to renew the term of office for the Director General for an additional four years. The members of the Community had been deeply gratified by the decision of the Board of Governors to renew the Director General's term of office. They were very grateful to the Director General for the activities he had carried out in the past and expressed their warmest wishes for the years to come, which would be decisive, particularly for the future of non-proliferation.

Mr. Gutierrez Leyton (Chile) took the Chair.

67. Mr. MIKHAILOV (Russian Federation) extended a warm welcome to the new Members of the Agency and noted that, with the move away from the Cold War, partnership was taking the place of confrontation and political solutions were increasingly recognized as the only acceptable means of solving old and new conflicts. The Agency was quite rightly taking a leading role in the search for solutions to the world community's problems in meeting its growing energy needs, while providing an assurance that all efforts would be directed to peaceful aims.

68. His delegation attached great importance to further strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime and particularly the NPT. The Treaty had proved its effectiveness in limiting nuclear weapons and had a positive influence on international political stability. His delegation trusted that the participants at the 1995 NPT Conference would decide on its unlimited extension and make it a truly universal international legal document. Meanwhile, the number of accessions to the NPT continued to increase and he welcomed Belarus and Armenia among the new signatories. He hoped that the other countries of the CIS, particularly Ukraine and Kazakhstan, would join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in

the near future and that they would soon place all their nuclear activities under Agency safeguards.

69. At the same time, the Treaty was being tested in new ways. The DPRK had caused great concern in the world community by deciding to withdraw from the NPT. The suspension of that decision had been a step in the right direction, but a full review of that decision should take place and the necessary measures taken to ensure that the Agency could continue its safeguards activities in accordance with the DPRK's safeguards agreement.

70. Fundamental changes were taking place in the international situation, with growing confidence between the nuclear-weapon States leading not only to agreements on a significant reduction in nuclear weapons and arsenals, but also to qualitatively new steps being taken in the direction of nuclear disarmament. In line with Russia's support for a universal nuclear test ban, President Yeltsin had decided to extend the period of the Russian moratorium on nuclear tests for as long as it was observed by the other nuclear Powers. Every effort should be made to take advantage of the present conditions, which were uniquely favourable, in order to develop and conclude a verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty as soon as possible.

71. Real progress had been made in nuclear disarmament, with tens of thousands of nuclear warheads being dismantled. The resulting significant quantities of nuclear materials, including highly enriched uranium and plutonium, raised further questions and contributed to current discussions about the plutonium obtained in the reprocessing of spent fuel from nuclear power plants. The materials resulting from the elimination of nuclear stockpiles should be used for constructive purposes as far as possible. There was much potential in Russia for the use of such materials in priority areas such as nuclear power generation, improving nuclear power plant safety, solving ecological problems and supporting economic reforms. The highly enriched uranium could be used for the fabrication of fuel for nuclear power plants, while the plutonium obtained presented a unique chance for starting a large-scale nuclear energy programme in the twenty-first century. The experience Russia had acquired in setting up fast neutron reactors and the research carried out in recent years showed that a solution might be found to strategic energy problems, such as the gradual phasing-out of fossil fuels, fundamental action on ecological problems, as formulated by the

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, and the burning of actinides and gradual development of a fuel cycle which did not disturb the radiation balance of the planet. The Agency should play a co-ordinating role in such activities.

72. Russia attached particular importance to the Agency's efforts to improve still further its monitoring activities and the safeguards system. Agency safeguards were an effective international mechanism for building confidence. They helped provide appropriate conditions for developing co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was important that the Agency should be able to rely on the firm support of the world community. For its part, his country would continue to support the constant enhancement of safeguards effectiveness and the Agency's right to conduct special inspections. At present, the Agency's inspection efforts were directed to the declared peaceful nuclear activities of States. However, experience of the past few years had shown that there should also be some means of detecting undeclared nuclear activities and particularly any attempts to manufacture nuclear weapons secretly. New methods, which could include ecological monitoring, would be necessary. Russia had experience in that field and was ready to co-operate.

73. The Agency was currently working to verify that South Africa's nuclear-weapons programme had been completely dismantled. It was the first time that the Agency had been given a mandate to verify nuclear disarmament and the termination of a nuclear-weapons programme. It was important to receive exhaustive answers to all questions that arose. His country was satisfied with the co-operation between South Africa and the Agency and the spirit of openness demonstrated. Experience had shown that if such tasks were to be carried out successfully, it was important to involve specialists from Member States with knowledge of nuclear weapons. The Agency could continue to count on assistance from Russian specialists.

74. His country was actively co-operating with the Agency in the field of nuclear power. A concept had been developed for energy policy in the new economic conditions in Russia. Nuclear power played an essential role and its place in the energy balance was currently being clarified and ways of developing it were being studied. Definite long-term goals should be set, as well as priorities for the short- and medium-term future.

75. At the beginning of 1992, the share of energy production from thermal power plants using fossil fuels was approximately 70%, from hydroelectric power plants - 16%, and from nuclear power plants - 12%. Most of the energy production at thermal plants (60%) was based on natural gas. Twenty-nine units were in industrial operation at nine nuclear power plants with a total installed capacity of over 21 000 MW. The last unit to be brought into operation was at the Balakovo plant in April 1993 with a power of 1000 MW. By the year 2030 the contribution of nuclear power sources to electricity production would increase from the present 20% to 30% in the country as a whole and from 25% to 40-50% in the European part.

76. The next generation of nuclear power plants would probably consist mainly of WWER plants, thereby drawing on Russia's positive experience in that area and its existing scientific and industrial resources, complemented by international experience and co-operation.

77. Russia had also acquired unique experience with channel-type reactors, which had a number of advantages in terms of future safety specifications, particularly for the planned replacement of RBMK-type reactors at existing sites. Prototype nuclear power plants would be developed and installed in Russia using new technologies as the basis for the development of nuclear power in the twenty-first century.

78. The Agency's activities relating to water desalination were having a beneficial impact on the development of some countries. Russia had proposed the setting up of a demonstration floating desalination facility under the aegis of the Agency. Russia's experience could also be useful in the establishment of small-scale power reactors for the production of potable water.

79. Priority should be given to co-ordinated activities at international level to ensure the safety of nuclear power. When finalized, the international convention on nuclear safety should make a significant contribution to those efforts, although the drafting process was taking an unnecessarily long time. It was to be hoped that once agreement had been reached on the scope of the convention's application, the work would speed up.

80. The Agency's extrabudgetary programme for providing assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS to improve the safety of their nuclear power plants had been

very useful and his country was grateful to the donor countries involved. General understanding had been reached on questions of technical safety of the first generation of reactors and countries operating those power plants were starting to take practical measures to improve safety on the basis of the Agency's analysis. In 1992 a satisfactory start had been made on projects for the safety analysis of nuclear plants with WWER-1000 and RBMK reactors. More than one hundred groups of specialists from various countries had visited Russian nuclear power plants over the past year.

81. After more than two years of negotiations with the CEC on the improvement of the safety of Russian nuclear power plants, an extensive programme had been agreed, which included the following basic areas for technical co-operation: increasing the safety of individual design features for nuclear power plants with reactors of basic design; improvement of personnel training; the nuclear fuel cycle; and support for the Russian regulatory body. Unfortunately, there had been significant delays in implementation of the programme and work was only just starting on the measures planned for 1991. There had also been intensive bilateral co-operation between Russia and a number of countries in the field of nuclear safety. In return for those efforts, Russia was willing to provide its partners with access to its priority nuclear technologies.

82. The Russian Federation attached great importance to establishing co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly with the countries of the CIS and an agreement on basic co-operation principles had been concluded in Minsk in June 1992. Under that agreement, Russia would provide technical co-operation to Armenia in continuing the recommissioning of its nuclear power plant, and would also fulfil its obligations concerning spent fuel and deliveries of fresh nuclear fuel for plants in countries of the CIS and in Eastern Europe.

83. Multilateral co-operation between the Agency, Russia and the new States of the CIS could be successful if based on a common understanding by the States of the CIS of the value of nuclear power applications, and nuclear and isotope technologies to the economy, a desire to co-operate in improving nuclear safety and an understanding of their responsibility to the international community for solving the associated problems, including the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, ecological problems and nuclear and radiation safety.

84. Russia would continue to support the Agency, which had successfully carried out its important tasks in the field of safeguards, in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the provision of technical assistance. The temporary financial difficulties which had led to a delay in the payment of Russia's contributions to the Agency's Regular Budget would be overcome and the necessary measures taken for gradual payment of the outstanding amounts.

85. In conclusion, the Russian delegation approved the Annual Report for 1992 and supported the Board's recommendation for the Director General's reappointment for another four-year period.

86. Mr. ROUVILLOIS (France), after welcoming the new Members of the Agency, pointed out that it was not as straightforward as usual to sum up the events of the past year. On the one hand, substantial progress had been made in two regions of prime importance in the Agency's discussions: the Middle East and the CIS. On the other hand, the problem posed by the DPRK, to which the Agency had had to devote considerable time and effort during the past year, had been added to the concerns which the Agency already had with respect to Iraq.

87. On the positive side, there was reason to rejoice at the decisive step that had been made towards the end of conflict in the Middle East. The mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO was an event of very great importance, not only for the security of the region, but also for peace in the world. It was to be hoped that the discussions at the General Conference on safeguards in the Middle East and the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction would profit from that major event.

88. After the accession to the NPT of Belarus, Kazakhstan had announced its intention to accede to that Treaty. Agreements recently signed by Russia and Ukraine had confirmed the desire of those two countries to continue their efforts aimed at the reduction and dismantling of nuclear weapons. Ukraine had also demonstrated its willingness to become a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It was to be hoped that those agreements would be confirmed and ratified as soon as possible, thus opening up the way for Ukraine's

accession to the NPT and ratification of START-1. Russia now envisaged international control of the fissile materials resulting from the dismantling of the weapons.

89. In Latin America, the progress during the last few years towards ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty seemed to be about to bear fruit. The quadripartite agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the ABACC and the Agency was also due to be ratified very soon by Brazil and should then be able to enter into force without further delay.

90. In Africa, the draft treaty on the denuclearization of the African continent had now been finalized and was expected to be submitted shortly to the United Nations General Assembly. The traditional importance of France's links with many countries in the African continent meant that it was following that development with both interest and sympathy.

91. On the other hand, there were reasons for concern. The Iraqi question had not been settled: grey areas still existed in the nuclear programme, the long-term monitoring plan was very difficult to implement fully, and the lists of suppliers had still not been made available by Iraq. There should, therefore, be no weakening of the international community's determination. At a time when major developments were taking place in the peace process in the Middle East, there should be no question of compromising it by relaxing vigilance in the case of a country which, only three years ago, had provoked a serious conflict.

92. New causes for concern had come from the Far East. Despite the Agency's patience, the Director General's undisputed openness to discussion, the Board of Governors' determination and the efforts of all concerned, the situation was still very unsatisfactory with respect to the Agency's inspections and with respect to the implementation of the agreement between the two Koreas. While diplomatic efforts on the part of the United States had persuaded the DPRK to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT, it would be disappointing if the suspension announced last June enabled neither the special inspection requested in February nor even the simple routine inspections to be carried out. The DPRK should definitively retract its intention to withdraw from the NPT and should honour all its international commitments in the area of non-proliferation.

93. The credibility of the Agency and of international safeguards was at stake in the case of the DPRK, as it had been and still was in the case of Iraq. The international community

had to show, especially at a time when various non-proliferation regimes were being strengthened, that a country could not refuse to comply with its international commitments with impunity.

94. Active preparations were being made for the NPT Extension Conference and current developments clearly showed that the question of the Treaty's extension affected all States Parties. Indeed, the stabilization of Africa with South Africa's renunciation of its nuclear capability and the draft treaty on the denuclearization of the continent would not have been possible without the NPT. The continuation of the peace process in the Middle East would make it possible to move decisively towards the verifiable renunciation of all programmes of weapons of mass destruction, with the NPT playing a leading role. Lastly, in Asia, the problem of the DPRK demonstrated the importance of complying with the terms of the Treaty, and the immediate destabilizing effect of the announcement by one country in the region of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty.

95. There had also been important developments in the field of safety. Real progress had been made on the drafting of an international safety convention. France had actively participated in that work within the group of international experts and hoped that those efforts would soon be successfully completed. France favoured a pragmatic approach whereby priority was given to power reactors, without however neglecting other nuclear activities which still required attention. It was to be hoped that the first draft, which would be submitted by the group of experts in the autumn, would meet with broad consensus so that the diplomatic conference could be convened at the beginning of 1994 if possible.

96. The safety of nuclear power plants in Central and Eastern Europe still remained a priority. The World Bank, the Agency and the EBRD were concluding their studies of the structure of the energy industry in Eastern European countries and the associated financial requirements. In addition to the major assistance it was providing both to the multilateral nuclear safety fund - to which it was the largest contributor - and through its participation in financing the European Community's PHARE and TACIS programmes, France had also set up, together with Germany, a joint body of experts on nuclear power plant safety.

97. At a time when many countries were debating their future energy policies, France continued to place its faith in the nuclear power option based on advanced technologies and broad international co-operation. French and German designers and electrical engineers were collaborating on the European Pressurized Water Reactor project to develop the next generation of light water reactors. A detailed preliminary design would be begun at the beginning of 1994 and construction of the first model was foreseen for 1998.

98. With regard to fast neutron reactors, French, British and German studies carried out, as well as current projections of uranium consumption, showed that that technology was not yet sufficiently competitive for development at an industrial level. Nevertheless, breeder reactors were still of great interest in view of the difficult energy situation which would have to be faced in the more distant future. In the short term, however, France had redirected its research efforts in that field towards a reactor concept which would considerably increase the consumption of plutonium and minor actinides to help deal with the stocks of plutonium resulting from the reprocessing of spent fuel.

99. The back-end of the fuel cycle was a subject of particular concern to the French authorities. Within the framework of the bill on waste passed in 1991 by its parliament, France was intensifying research into long-term radioactive waste management. The chief research objectives were to reduce the volume of long-lived waste by three-quarters by the year 2000, and to reduce their toxicity by a factor of 10 and then by a factor of 100; to investigate the separation of minor actinides and long-lived fission products using innovative processes; to study incineration of minor actinides and long-lived fission products in pressurized water reactors and particularly in optimized fast neutron reactors; and to study the long-term behaviour of material in intermediate storage facilities and repositories with a view to developing conditioning methods specifically adapted to various radionuclides which would guarantee their long-term containment.

100. In conclusion, recent developments had presented the Agency with new problems. It had set about dealing with them efficiently and competently and it now played a vital international role in the complementary fields of safety, non-proliferation and the promotion of nuclear energy. France was determined to continue its firm support of the Agency's activities.

101. Mr. PUNGOR (Hungary) welcomed the new Members to the Agency and expressed his country's wholehearted support for the reappointment of the Director General.

102. Despite some discouraging signs over the past year, progress had nevertheless been made towards attaining the common goal of establishing a genuine universal non-proliferation regime. It was gratifying that all the nuclear-weapon States were now party to the NPT and to see other important developments which had further strengthened the regime that was so vital for the security of the community of nations. That augured well for the forthcoming 1995 NPT Extension Conference at which his country hoped the Treaty would be extended indefinitely. Hungary, a committed supporter of the NPT and its universality, was taking an active part in the preparatory work for that Conference. He urged all those States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the Agency.

103. Regrettably, in the preceding year the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime had continued to be challenged. Hungary had consistently supported the Agency's activities to implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and commended the Secretariat's excellent work in that regard. He reiterated his Government's serious concern about the lack of progress in the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the Agency. The DPRK should fulfil its obligations under the NPT and heed the world community's call for full transparency of all its nuclear activities in order to provide assurances about the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

104. The Agency's safeguards system had always played a central role in preventing nuclear energy from being used for non-peaceful purposes. Innovative and far-reaching proposals for achieving a more cost-effective system, covering both declared and undeclared activities, had been formulated in the SAGSI report. The Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission was prepared to place its facilities at the Agency's disposal for the purpose of carrying out tests and trials of the new safeguards approach.

105. Hungary's nuclear power plant at Paks continued to have a major social, economic and technical impact, since it was responsible for generating almost half of the country's total

net electricity production. The first unit had been connected to the grid ten years ago and, according to Agency recommendations and in line with the practice adopted in industrialized countries, safety reassessment was now due. The specific experience and knowledge acquired by Hungarian organizations on WWER plants could be utilized in international efforts to enhance the safety of Soviet-designed reactors.

106. The 1991 International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power had resulted in a valid and good framework for future work towards an international convention on nuclear safety and his delegation very much hoped that the convention would soon be finalized. The Agency should be given a substantive role in the process of enhancing nuclear safety under that convention and his delegation was ready to co-operate in finding answers to any open questions that remained.

107. While nuclear power plant safety held top priority, the problems associated with waste disposal could not be underestimated. In 1992 a national project had been launched to formulate a long-term strategy for the management and final disposal of all kinds of radioactive waste. There were plans to set up an independent institution responsible for the construction and operation of a repository. The national project would be implemented through a competitive bidding system set up by the National Committee for Technological Development.

108. In 1991 the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission had initiated a comprehensive programme for the revision and updating of Hungarian regulations with the result that the regulations for accountancy and control of nuclear material and the registration of radioactive materials, as well as the regulations concerning the safety of nuclear facilities, had been replaced by new ministerial orders. New government decrees had been issued both to update the National System for Emergency Planning and Preparedness and to extend the regulations concerning nuclear exports and imports. In the context of the important task of further enhancement of regulatory activities in the nuclear safety field, Hungary looked forward to co-operation co-ordinated by the Agency and assistance from the European Community.

109. With regard to the revision of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, his delegation hoped that the preparatory work would soon be completed and that the diplomatic conference could be convened in the near future.

110. On the subject of co-ordination of efforts to provide nuclear safety assistance to Eastern and Central European countries, his delegation was grateful to the Agency for organizing an advisory group meeting to review progress made under the Agency's nuclear safety programmes and for the establishment of the steering committee on the safety of WWER plants. It also valued the Agency's participation in the working groups established by the G-24, and its help to the G-24 in establishing a database on nuclear safety assistance.

111. Technical co-operation between Hungary and the Agency continued to be very successful. The Agency was providing technical assistance for the evaluation of the earthquake resistance of the Hungarian nuclear power plant, and potential impact of aircraft crashes, assistance in the reconstruction and assessment of the Budapest research reactor, as well as IPERS and ASSET missions. In the continuing task of nuclear safety enhancement, his delegation welcomed the Secretariat's proposal to set up model technical co-operation projects. His country had pledged its full voluntary contribution to the TACF for 1993.

112. Finally, his delegation recommended that the General Conference approve the Annual Report for 1992.

113. Mr. PASHA (Bangladesh) having welcomed the new Member States of the Agency, reiterated his Government's firm belief in the potential which the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology offered for the socio-economic development of his populous country. To that end, Bangladesh remained firmly committed to the NPT, to its safeguards agreement with the Agency and to the creation of a universal non-proliferation regime. Although the end of the Cold War had brought positive changes and a relaxation of tension on the international scene, the threat of nuclear annihilation had yet to be eliminated.

114. In recognition of the importance of applied science and technology as a vehicle for socio-economic development, his Government had recently elevated its Science and Technology Division to the status of a full ministry. The intention was to use and adapt

imported technology while gradually increasing research funding. The main areas in which nuclear technology was applied to research and development were food preservation, the sterilization of medical products, agriculture, radiation protection and environmental monitoring, quality control and assurance, electronic instrumentation and control systems, radioisotope production, hydrology, non-destructive testing and radiation protection services. Imported foodstuffs and consumables were already being tested to determine their acceptability for consumption from a radiation point of view. In the area of medicine, the country already had one institute and nine other nuclear medicine centres providing services involving the use of nuclear and other related techniques for the diagnosis and treatment of diseases. There were also plans to set up other centres providing such services.

115. The services provided by the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission to various industries and organizations included an NDT service and training in the use of NDT techniques, as well as the use of nuclear and other techniques to study pollution and perform elemental analyses. Other developments in Bangladesh included the start of production of short-lived radioisotopes, with a view to reducing their importation substantially when full-scale production commenced; a manpower training programme to provide for the repair and maintenance of equipment used in research and development projects; the joint venture between the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission and a Bangladesh company, with the Agency's assistance, to establish a commercial irradiator plant, which had been successfully operating since 1 March 1993 and had encouraged some of the country's entrepreneurs to consider setting up similar plants for medical sterilization; the passing of a Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Act by the Bangladesh Parliament to provide a legal framework for controlling and limiting the use of ionizing radiation sources; and preparations for a twenty-year plan covering R&D activities in the nuclear field, which it was hoped would improve the organization and efficiency of research activities and also serve as a basis for future assistance from the Agency and other donors in the field of nuclear technology.

116. Bangladesh currently benefited from 21 projects under the Agency's technical assistance programme and a number of others under the research contract programme. He gratefully acknowledged the Agency's support and hoped that the Agency would be able to contribute towards optimizing the use of existing facilities, especially the research reactor.

117. Bangladesh was also actively involved in various RCA programmes, and his delegation felt strongly that RCA activities should be widened even further to include such areas as the application of tracer technology to ground water surveying and studies on river flow and sedimentation problems. While the programmes to apply nuclear techniques in industry, medicine, agriculture and other sectors of the economy would undoubtedly benefit the countries participating in the RCA, the scope of the project on energy and nuclear power should be widened to enable the countries concerned to cope successfully with the challenges presented by their energy development programmes. Bangladesh had begun to host various RCA activities, with the support of the Agency, and was benefiting from the exchange of experience they provided.

118. With a per capita generation of electricity less than one tenth of the Asian average and one fortieth of the world average, and limited indigenous primary energy resources, Bangladesh was seriously short of the energy it needed to embark on the path of socio-economic development. The demands for energy in general, and electricity in particular, were growing rapidly. However, despite the fact that a number of technical and economic feasibility studies had confirmed the viability of nuclear power, no start had yet been made to implement plans first made three decades previously.

119. Problems associated with safety and the management of radioactive waste were frequently cited as reasons for discouraging the expansion of nuclear power, although the technologies for solving those problems were available. Furthermore, a number of countries with limited resources of primary energy had demonstrated that it was possible for nuclear power to account for a significant share of their overall electricity generation.

120. The developing countries' need for energy, the bleak prospects for the emergence of viable alternative sources of energy, and the harmful environmental effects of conventional methods of electricity production were all arguments for increasing the global share of nuclear power. However, hardly any developing Member State of the Agency had successfully implemented a nuclear power project since the last energy crisis. The Agency should thus strengthen its promotional activities to convince the world community that nuclear power was a valid option, especially in the energy-scarce developing countries. The Agency was in the best position to convince potential suppliers and financing institutions that

there was a need to increase the global share of nuclear power, and that it was a safe, environmentally benign, economic and reliable alternative. As a starting point for such promotional activities, a forum of potential financial institutions and promoters should be arranged.

121. In conclusion, while appreciating the Director General's contribution in managing the Agency's affairs efficiently and effectively, and the positive and beneficial role the Agency had played in developing nuclear technology over the years, his delegation felt that a representative from the developing countries should be considered for the post of Director General when the term of office of the present incumbent expired.

ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING NEW MEMBERS OF THE AGENCY

122. The PRESIDENT announced that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic had deposited their instruments of acceptance of the Agency's Statute with the Government of the United States of America. They were henceforth full Members of the Agency.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.