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### RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna  
on Tuesday, 28 September 1993, at 3.10 p.m.

President: Mr. AL-ATHEL (Saudi Arabia)  
Later: Mr. YIMER (Ethiopia)

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Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
CEC	Commission of the European Communities
CERN	European Centre for Nuclear Research
Chemical Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G-7	Group of Seven
G-24	Group of Twenty-Four
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
IGPRAD	Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea
INSAG	International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
IRS	Incident Reporting System
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency (of OECD)
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NUSS programme	Agency's programme on nuclear safety standards for nuclear power plants
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
RADWASS	Radioactive Waste Safety Standards
Rarotonga Treaty	South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation

Abbreviations

(Contd.)

SCCC	(Argentine-Brazilian) Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
START	Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
THORP	Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.)
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
World Bank (IBRD)	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

APPROVAL OF THE APPOINTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL  
(GC(XXXVII)/1058)

1. The PRESIDENT said that, as stated in document GC(XXXVII)/1058, the Board of Governors, acting in accordance with Article VII.A of the Statute, had appointed Mr. Hans Blix to serve as Director General of the Agency for a period of four years from 1 December 1993. Under the same Article, the Board had further requested the General Conference to approve the appointment and had accordingly recommended that it adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXVII)/1058.
2. He asked whether the General Conference wished to follow the Board's recommendation.
3. The draft resolution contained in document GC(XXXVII)/1058 was adopted.
4. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Blix entered the meeting.
5. The PRESIDENT informed Mr. Blix that the General Conference had approved his appointment to the post of Director General for a further term. He was pleased to be the first to congratulate him and invited him to take the oath of office.
6. Mr. BLIX took the following oath:

"I solemnly swear to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to discharge these functions and to regulate my conduct with the interest of the Agency only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any Government or other authority external to the Agency."
7. The DIRECTOR GENERAL thanked Member States for the confidence they had shown in him by appointing him for a fourth term. The years ahead were likely to be full of exciting challenges and he was grateful for the opportunity to work with the Governments of Member States and an extremely competent Secretariat.
8. Nuclear disarmament and arms control measures would drastically reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world, but might also call for verification activities by the Agency. The non-proliferation regime could become universal. A large number of topics needed to be discussed before the 1995 NPT conference and the Agency would have a role to play in

those discussions. Other important issues included the strengthening of nuclear safety to improve acceptance of nuclear power and increase its role in global energy production, and the transfer of nuclear techniques in medicine, agriculture and industry.

9. He enjoyed working for the Agency. The Governments of its Member States and the policy-making organs had a long tradition of defining joint interests and translating them into constructive action. Although politics were inevitably never far away, the organization's dedication to science, technology and rationality was another great asset. Committed and highly competent international staff was the organization's third asset.

10. He was proud to have been appointed head of the Secretariat for a fourth term and assured all the Member States that he would serve them enthusiastically and impartially.

11. Mr. de YTURRIAGA BARBERAN (Spain), speaking on behalf of the Western Europe and Others Group, Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea), on behalf of the Group of 77, Mr. KOSTENKO (Ukraine), on behalf of the East Europe Group, Mr. WALKER (Australia), on behalf of the South East Asia and the Pacific Group, Mr. BAKSHI (India), on behalf of the Middle East and South Asia Group, Mr. YIMER (Ethiopia), on behalf of the Africa Group, Mr. DURAN ABAD (Ecuador), on behalf of the Latin America Group, and Ms. BATACLAN (Philippines), on behalf of Far East Group, warmly congratulated Mr. Blix on his appointment. The fact that he had been unanimously granted a fourth term was evidence of the high quality of his work over the past 12 years, during which the Agency had had to face many challenges in ever-widening areas of responsibility. Under the Director General's extremely competent guidance, it had met them successfully.

12. The representatives of the geographical groups wished the Director General every success and assured him of the continued support of the States in their groups.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1992 (GC(XXXVII)/1060) (resumed from meeting 355)

13. Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan), after warmly welcoming the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and the Republics of the Marshall Islands, Armenia and Kazakhstan as new members of the Agency, said that the steady increase in the membership of the Agency

conferred on it an increasingly global character, which should naturally be reflected in its policies.

14. After years of conflict, hope for peace - admittedly fragile, nevertheless real - had emerged in some parts of the world in 1993. Pakistan trusted that the peace process would be extended and consolidated so that the resources hitherto spent on a pointless arms race would henceforth serve a more worthwhile cause, namely promotion of human welfare.

15. There had also been significant progress in the nuclear field and there was increasing recognition of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. He reaffirmed Pakistan's unequivocal commitment to universal nuclear non-proliferation. A regional approach offered a constructive way of achieving that goal. Pakistan had, therefore, been advocating - since 1972 - the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and had put forward several other proposals for the establishment of an equitable and non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime. It was also ready to co-operate with Member States of the region in considering any other realistic suggestion to achieve that end.

16. With regard to the transfer of nuclear techniques for peaceful purposes, his delegation felt that restrictions in that field could be counter-productive in the long term; a country denied legitimate access to nuclear techniques might develop its own techniques, which might possibly be less safe and would certainly be less transparent. International co-operation, on the other hand, would create an openness and transparency which would promote a sense of responsibility and reciprocity. The Agency had an important statutory role to play in that context. It should continue to strengthen its promotional activities and give them at least as much importance as its regulatory activities. In particular, it should ensure that there was no restriction in technology transfer for facilities under safeguards.

17. In the wider perspective, only stability and economic prosperity could lead to lasting peace. Energy was the driving force of economic growth. The conventional means of electricity generation using fossil fuels posed serious environmental problems; more than 6 billion tons of carbon continued to be dumped into the atmosphere every year. With further industrialization, the situation would worsen unless appropriate alternative measures were adopted. Nuclear power offered a viable and sustainable solution; it was

environmentally benign and cost-competitive in most countries. There were, however, two major obstacles to the rapid introduction of nuclear power in the developing countries in that it was capital intensive and technologically demanding. The Agency should address that issue in an effective manner. Nuclear power had developed very unevenly, with just five per cent of the world's capacity located in the developing countries. The Agency should take account of the energy requirements of those countries, as stipulated in Article III.A.2 of its Statute. It was heartening that the Agency continued to devote its attention to nuclear safety issues. It could play a more vigorous role in promoting the sharing of experience and the transfer of safety-related information to developing countries with old reactors, as it had been doing for countries operating older Soviet-designed reactors. South-South co-operation could also be encouraged since a number of developing countries could now profitably share their experience in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

18. The General Conference had, in resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/587, called on the Agency to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities, and to develop effective programmes aimed at improving the scientific and technological capabilities of developing countries in the fields of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and achieving sustainable development. It should be noted that the majority of developing countries were oil importers and needed nuclear energy to meet their growing requirements and thereby to alleviate poverty. Unless nuclear power were seen as an engine of socio-economic development, it might lose its credibility in the Third World at large. Pakistan hoped, therefore, that in the years to come the Agency would propose some bold new initiatives - like the excellent concept of model projects - to enhance the scope and efficiency of technical co-operation and to restore the balance between its promotional and regulatory activities.

19. Referring briefly to a few issues related to the Agency's working modalities, he said that with regard to the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, which had been on the agenda of the Board and the General Conference for almost 20 years, a majority of delegates had adopted resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/600 the previous year to ensure that urgent steps were taken to redress the gross under-representation of certain regions on the Board of Governors. It was a priority issue, particularly in view of the increase in the Agency's

membership. Meanwhile, relatively advanced States in the various regions should help promote the development of other Member States, both through the Agency and bilaterally.

20. Pakistan supported adoption of the Agency's budget for 1994 as presented in document GC(XXXVII)/1062. It continued to believe that the concept of zero growth was unduly restrictive and that the Agency should free itself of that strait-jacket. He praised the sense of responsibility of the Secretariat, which had experience in the optimization of resources, and hoped that it would be allowed - indeed encouraged - to apply a moderate measure of overprogramming - a practice which had been rather unwisely discontinued several years before and which would be particularly welcome in the area of technical co-operation, where the overall implementation rate rarely exceeded 70%.

21. He called on all Member States to make early payment of their pledges to the TACF. Noting that Pakistan always paid its assessed and voluntary contributions in time, he took the opportunity of pledging its 1994 voluntary contribution to the TACF corresponding to their base rate of assessment.

22. Briefly recalling resolutions GC(XXXVI)/RES/598 and 599, calling for better representation of nationals of developing countries and of women in the Agency's Secretariat, he said it was in the Agency's interest to pursue those objectives in order to enhance the representative character of the Secretariat while maintaining its level of competence.

23. Pakistan had made some notable strides in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Work on the 300 MW reactor under construction in co-operation with China at Chashma was proceeding according to schedule; an important landmark had been reached in August with the pouring of concrete for the foundations of the reactor building. He thanked the Agency for its co-operation in that respect and trusted that it would continue.

24. The nuclear power plant at Karachi had been operating satisfactorily for several years on domestically-produced fuel. Several tests had shown that, in spite of its age, it conformed to current standards. Steps were being taken to upgrade its safety and extend its useful life beyond its design lifetime. Pakistan appreciated the contribution made by the Agency in implementing that major technical assistance project.

25. Pakistan also continued to promote the application of radiation sources and radioisotopes in agriculture, medicine and industry. Radiation-induced mutation had made it possible to develop 19 varieties of crops, including a variety of cotton which had had a significant impact on the country's economy. Unfortunately, that major national crop was being threatened by the pink bollworm and by a virus that damaged the leaves of the plant. Local scientists were working on ways of combating that menace and assistance had been requested from both the Agency and the FAO. Pakistan had ten nuclear medicine centres applying irradiation techniques in the diagnosis and therapy of malignant diseases, which had treated nearly 180 000 patients the previous year. Construction had started on two additional medical centres to cater for the growing needs of the population. A commercial irradiator had been operating for several years to sterilize medical and surgical supplies, and feasibility studies on extension of its use to food irradiation were being finalized.

26. South-South co-operation in some sectors of agriculture and medicine would be opportune and cost-effective, since the nuclear techniques had become more or less standardized and the basic know-how was now available in a large number of countries. Pakistan would like the advanced nations to take steps for the benefit of developing countries in the provision of water for drinking and agricultural purposes.

27. Trained manpower was vital to any development effort, and Pakistan was continuing to upgrade facilities at various specialized institutions providing training in areas such as nuclear science and engineering, computing and nuclear power plant operation.

28. Pakistan appreciated the role played by the RCA in catalysing South-South co-operation in various areas of nuclear research and development. It had hosted several workshops and training courses and would continue to give its full support to RCA activities. It was always ready to share its modest expertise with other developing countries and was grateful for the valuable technical co-operation it had received through the Agency.

29. Mr. CHIDAMBARAM (India) congratulated the Director General on his well-deserved nomination and the Secretariat on its efforts to attain the Agency's important objectives. He also welcomed the new Member States to the Agency.

30. Over the past few years, the world had witnessed momentous changes, which inevitably affected the Agency. Certain political developments had led to a significant increase in its role and activities in the area of safeguards, attracting public attention and giving the impression that safeguards were its primary or even sole concern. Such misconceptions, if not corrected, would undermine the Agency's very raison d'être.

31. It was important to recall that the Agency's primary objective, as clearly stated in the Statute, was "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". For many countries, nuclear energy might represent the only stable and viable source of power in the relatively near future. The Agency's Member States, particularly the developing countries, also wished to benefit, through the Agency's promotional activities, from the many other peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

32. Safeguards were an important aspect of the Agency's functions and useful work was being done in that area, but in order to be productive and cost-effective, the safeguards system should concentrate on activities involving nuclear materials of safeguards significance. The main objective of the safeguards system was to generate confidence and it was therefore important to ensure that measures taken in the future to strengthen the system were free of subjectivity and qualitative judgements. His delegation would co-operate fully with the Agency in establishing a streamlined, productive and cost-effective safeguards system.

33. India was one of the founder signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was a universal and non-discriminatory convention. Nevertheless, although it had been suggested that the Agency should draw on the provisions of that Convention relating to the verification mechanism in order to modify the safeguards system, his delegation believed it would be more prudent to wait and see how the Convention, which was still in its infancy, would be implemented.

34. The Agency could contribute to greater public awareness of the variety of nuclear applications in areas such as electricity production, agriculture, industry and medicine. Such promotion was all the more important in view of the mistaken perception of the Agency as the world's nuclear "policeman". He was pleased to note from the Director General's opening statement that the inspectorate was not a supranational police force. The Agency

should highlight the usefulness of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through programmes attracting public attention and interest, such as the food irradiation programme. There were many other such programmes and the Agency should take immediate initiatives in that regard.

35. Turning to financial matters, he said that lack of funds was one of the Agency's major difficulties. He hoped that all Member States would pay their contributions on time, although that would still not make it possible to meet the requirements of the developing countries.

36. Voluntary contributions, which were the primary source of financing for the Agency's promotional activities, had declined significantly and it was necessary to devise a mechanism to assure the financing of technical co-operation activities. In that context, he took the opportunity to pledge India's full assessed voluntary contribution to the TACF for 1994.

37. Non-proliferation was an important international objective which India fully supported; indeed, it had an unblemished track record in that area. His country nevertheless deplored the fact that non-proliferation had sometimes been used in recent times as a means of restricting access to technology, since certain technologies essential for the growth of developing countries had been classified as dual-use technologies. It was unfortunate that international co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy had declined considerably. The growing list of items subject to export restrictions was depriving the developing countries of the benefits of technological progress, not only in the field of nuclear power, but also in other areas vital for their development. Corrective action was required and the Agency should take new initiatives to promote international co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

38. India endeavoured to share with other countries the expertise it had developed over the past four decades in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the past year, a number of Agency fellows had been trained in India and the services of Indian experts had also been made available to the Agency. In addition, India offered training to various countries on a bilateral basis. It welcomed the Agency's role in strengthening technical co-operation among

institutions of Asia and the Pacific under the RCA, to which India had contributed by organizing training programmes and providing equipment and expert services.

39. India had always attached particular importance to manpower training with the objective of building up a network of scientists and technicians who could direct the country's nuclear power programme and develop new peaceful applications of nuclear energy. During the past four decades, India had developed sophisticated training programmes in a large number of areas and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre had provided specialized one-year training courses for over 6000 students. One-year diploma courses were also available in the areas of radiation protection and nuclear medicine and one-month courses on radioimmunoassay, industrial radiography and safety. Over 350 experts were contributing to those training programmes through various teaching activities.

40. He was pleased to announce that India was ready to share its expertise and experience in human resource development with other Agency Members States. If necessary, India could also provide special training programmes designed to meet specific requirements.

41. India had designed a 5/10 MW multi-purpose research reactor with a high enough flux for advanced physics and materials research, neutron activation analysis, radioisotope production and other applications, and it would be happy to offer that reactor for export under international safeguards. India had also designed a small 30 kW experimental reactor fuelled entirely by uranium-233 (600 g). The reactor had been tested in Trombay (PURNIMA-III) and it was being installed at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research at Kalpakkam. It would be used for neutron radiography, neutron activation analysis and various experiments. It would also be available for export.

42. In the area of environmental monitoring, India had made significant progress and was able to offer radiation monitoring networks with the necessary expertise to Member States which were interested. It could also offer heavy water produced in India for export under Agency safeguards.

43. In the past year, the Indian nuclear power programme had developed in many areas. In May the first unit (220 MW(e)) of the Kakrapar plant had begun commercial electricity production. Commissioning tests for the second unit were at an advanced stage and

connection to the grid was planned for the beginning of 1994. The use of thorium bundles for the first time at Kakrapar in order to achieve initial flux flattening had been successful. India was thus gaining valuable experience in various aspects of the handling of thorium in the nuclear fuel cycle. A pilot facility to process thorium fuel elements was being set up, which would eventually lead to the construction of similar plants with larger capacity. Work on the two units of 220 MW(e) being constructed at Kaiga and Rajasthan was continuing according to schedule. Significant progress had been made in the design of the 500 MW(e) pressurized heavy water reactors to be built at Tarapur.

44. Safety was a primary concern in the design and operation of Indian reactors. It was achieved through quality assurance and well-defined regulatory practices, supervised by an independent Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. Research and development programmes had led to the development of a number of useful technologies for power reactors, such as an in-service inspection system for coolant channels, a video inspection system, and a system based on vibration analysis for the diagnosis of faults. India was also continuing work on the design of an advanced heavy water reactor. In addition, it was building a nationally designed and manufactured synchrotron which was due to be commissioned in 1994 at the Indore Centre for Advanced Technology.

45. India had been reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for 30 years. It was completing the construction of a reprocessing plant at Kalpakkam to add to the existing plants at Trombay and Tarapur. It was also setting up a pilot plant for the separation of uranium-233 from thorium, which for India was the nuclear fuel of the future. The Indian nuclear programme gave priority to the treatment and disposal of various types of radioactive waste generated in nuclear fuel cycle activities. A number of development programmes were under way for the management of low-, intermediate- and high-level wastes. India was also participating in a number of Agency co-ordinated research programmes in that area.

46. India was a leading producer of radioisotopes for medical, pharmaceutical, industrial, agricultural, geological and hydrological applications. Nuclear technology was multi-disciplinary in nature and offered many practical spin-offs in the areas of materials, information technology and biotechnology. The know-how and technology from research

centres had been passed on to industry in very different areas ranging from solar energy to the railways.

47. In conclusion, he stressed the need to step up efforts to promote peaceful nuclear energy applications and to initiate large-scale public awareness programmes. The safeguards system should be streamlined to make it more productive and cost-effective. There was also an immediate need to rejuvenate and expand programmes for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For its part, his delegation would support and co-operate actively with the Agency to achieve those aims in the coming year.

48. Mr. WALKER (United Kingdom) said that in his country nuclear energy continued to make a major contribution to satisfying energy needs in an increasingly competitive market. The two nuclear power generating companies, Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear, were making progress in all areas and were reporting growing profits, lower unit costs, higher output and an increased market share. That progress was matched by further improvement in the already excellent results in the area of safety. With the help of many sectors of industry, Nuclear Electric hoped to start up the United Kingdom's first pressurized water reactor at Sizewell in 1994 - on schedule and within the planned budget. British Nuclear Fuels had recently completed its new THORP reprocessing plant at Sellafield, designed to meet the requirements of customers around the world. Commissioning tests for uranium had been carried out, but reprocessing itself would not commence until the statutory authorizations relating to discharges had been obtained.

49. His Government considered that the most effective means of meeting the country's energy needs was to allow market mechanisms to operate. That policy was presenting the United Kingdom's nuclear industry with continuing challenges and opportunities as preparations were under way for a review of the prospects for nuclear power. The Government had committed itself to such an undertaking when, in November 1989, nuclear power plants had been withdrawn from the privatization of the electricity supply industry. The timetable and modalities for the review were under consideration and would be announced in due course. The nuclear industry was confident that it could prove that new power plants were commercially viable.

50. Turning to the international scene, he associated himself with the congratulations given to the Agency on behalf of the European Community and thanked the Agency again for its continued successful promotion of non-power applications of nuclear energy to help improve the quality of life in an increasing number of countries.

51. It was very important that continued progress should be made in the areas of safeguards and safety, since they were crucial to fostering confidence in the use of nuclear technology for the benefit of all.

52. The NPT and associated comprehensive safeguards agreements constituted the primary assurance for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the world. There was no doubt that the Agency's full-scope safeguards agreements would remain the key element in encouraging widespread acceptance of nuclear science within a coherent and stable world framework. The Agency had a primary role in that process and deserved the support of all its Member States in its efforts to ensure that countries honoured their obligations under the Treaty and to prevent a climate of mutual suspicion or the clandestine development of nuclear weapons.

53. In that context, his delegation was grateful for the traditional objectivity and impartiality maintained by the Agency with respect to the DPRK, where it had identified non-compliance with safeguards and had subsequently referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council. His Government deeply regretted the DPRK's failure to comply with its safeguards agreement and urged the DPRK to honour the commitment it had made on 19 July 1993 to enter into dialogue with the Agency and to begin discussions with the Republic of Korea. The United Kingdom was determined to help find a satisfactory solution whereby the DPRK complied fully with its safeguards agreement and reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT. The Agency should also be congratulated on the vital role it continued to play in Iraq in implementing the Security Council resolutions requiring that illicit nuclear activities should be identified and suppressed.

54. His country welcomed the accession of Belarus to the NPT and hoped that all the countries of the former Soviet Union, in particular those which still had nuclear weapons, would soon follow suit. While pleased to note that a start had been made on deactivating

weapons on Ukrainian territory, his delegation expected Ukraine and Kazakhstan to take all the necessary steps to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with their solemn commitments made on the occasion of the Lisbon agreements in 1992. In the meantime, members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group had agreed to continue providing exports to those countries for a transitional period in order to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants until Agency safeguards could be applied to all their facilities. It was an interim measure justified by the exceptional circumstances, and the United Kingdom appealed to the States concerned to take the necessary steps immediately to fulfil their obligations under the Lisbon Protocol to enable the continuation of supplies on a stable and normal basis.

55. With regard to Latin America, his country urged those countries which had not already done so to sign and ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT. The quadripartite safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency should also be fully ratified and brought into effect.

56. He appreciated the Agency's continuing efforts to strengthen the safeguards system. Difficult questions concerning the effectiveness of safeguards had been tackled with a fresh outlook and commendable enthusiasm. As expected, SAGSI had made a vital contribution. That momentum should be maintained and top priority given to examination of appropriate measures to strengthen and streamline the safeguards system.

57. His delegation was convinced that the highest priority should continue to be given to safeguards in decisions on the Agency's budget and welcomed the many initiatives currently being examined with a view to improving the cost-effectiveness of safeguards. The United Kingdom attached particular importance to rationalization in the division of inspection responsibilities between the Agency and EURATOM. It looked forward to completion of the current negotiations on the new partnership agreement and its early implementation. His delegation also looked forward to receiving the External Auditor's 1994 report, which was due to focus on the administration of safeguards.

58. Nuclear safety, which - like safeguards - ranked as a key priority for his delegation, provided an opportunity for the Agency to consolidate its know-how and encourage all Member States to make responsible use of nuclear energy. His delegation fully supported

the Agency's actions to promote high levels of nuclear safety all over the world and international measures to strengthen co-operation in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

59. The United Kingdom therefore fully supported moves towards the establishment of a nuclear safety convention which would provide the basis for safety regulations in Member States. The aim should be to strengthen nuclear safety in the world through legislative, regulatory and administrative measures, without imposing unnecessary multilateral judgements. The Agency should act as the depositary for the convention and provide the secretariat for the peer review process. It should also continue to play a central role in the identification of generic safety problems and in disseminating information on solutions worldwide.

60. The Agency's actions in that area were usefully contributing to the international effort to assist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in improving nuclear safety. The Agency's technical support to the G-24 was essential if that assistance were to be properly targeted. His country was in favour of the Agency developing that role, provided that its activities did not duplicate assistance from other sources. The multilateral programme of nuclear safety assistance could only be successful if all those involved showed that they could work effectively with each other. The need to co-operate and avoid duplication of effort was no less relevant in other areas of the Agency's work in the present climate of budgetary constraint.

61. He reiterated the importance that his delegation attached to the Agency's Basic Safety Standards and to the updating of those Standards in the light of the latest ICRP recommendations. The best approach was undoubtedly to retain the tried and tested structure of the documents dealing with nuclear safety and to recognize that nuclear safety and radiation protection raised associated but very different questions which could not be incorporated into a single set of standards.

62. With regard to financial matters, his delegation shared the common concern over the current financial situation of the Agency, which could not successfully complete its programme of work unless Member States were prepared to pay their assessed contributions

promptly. There was no indication that the situation would improve in the short term; the Agency should therefore consider a more rigorous appraisal and priority-setting procedure in order to re-establish a balance with expected income. His delegation supported the commendable way in which the Agency had continued to adapt to a series of new and demanding challenges over the past year.

63. Lastly, his delegation was confident that the Agency would be able to deal with its financial difficulties and continue to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while working to strengthen safeguards and encourage further progress in the field of nuclear safety.

64. Mr. UTCHANAH (Mauritius) said that, in the many years in which he had held office, the Director General had demonstrated the considerable dedication and skill required to guide the Agency through difficult times and it was therefore fitting that the Agency should call on his services for a further period of four years. That continuity became even more necessary as, with the end of the Cold War, the Agency's role and functions would undoubtedly increase. The membership of the Agency had grown, indicating the confidence placed in it by the international community, especially in the nuclear field. The Agency should prepare itself for a host of new challenges and continue both to ensure that its Members acceded to the NPT and to strengthen the safeguards system.

65. Although the Cold War was over, regional conflicts - even on a reduced scale - persisted. He was therefore pleased that the General Conference's agenda included an item on the need to strengthen the Agency's main activities. Developing countries were often at a disadvantage with regard to access to technology. In that context, the Agency could play a crucial role in ensuring the transfer of appropriate nuclear technology to speed up the development process of more than half of the world's population. In practical terms, the Agency should take all the necessary measures to strengthen co-operation in such fields as agriculture, health and electrical energy. The draft proposal before the General Conference on the practical utilization of food irradiation in developing countries was commendable. A positive approach on the part of the Agency to ensure that the developing countries benefited from nuclear technology was one of the challenges facing it as the twenty-first century approached.

66. Nuclear safety and radiological accidents knew no frontiers. Universally accepted nuclear safety and radiation protection standards should gradually be developed and the Agency should be supported in its efforts to provide technical expertise to those Member States requiring it.

67. The world had become a safer place, but the Agency's responsibilities had not diminished. Indeed, the reverse was the case with the international community giving the Agency a prominent role in monitoring the safeguards system and reporting on compliance with it. The various documents before the General Conference added a new dimension to the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which could not be translated into reality unless all countries were willing to open their nuclear programmes to independent inspection by the Agency.

68. As an African nation, Mauritius welcomed the recent agreement between the African National Congress and the South African Government aimed at increasing the political role of the black majority. Democracy had triumphed again. He hoped that in the coming year South Africa would join other African nations and work towards African unity.

69. At the Agency's thirty-sixth General Conference, emphasis had been placed on the need for South Africa to co-operate with the Agency in implementing its safeguards agreement. The concept of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa was already at an advanced stage and would be actively followed by Mauritius. Successful implementation of the safeguards agreement with South Africa and the positive steps taken towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa would help relieve national tensions and remind the world that nuclear science and technology also had numerous peaceful applications. To use such technology safely, however, appropriate training in the relevant fields was urgently required. He therefore welcomed the Agency's initiatives to develop training programmes. The use of regional groups, such as those created through AFRA or ARCAL, to initiate and promote training programmes for the scientific community would help create the necessary awareness at the lowest cost. For a genuine transfer of technology to the developing world, appropriate education and training had to be provided.

70. The environment was precious, and it was important to preserve and improve its quality for future generations. Lessons should be learned from past mistakes and early corrective action taken. He welcomed the fact that the General Conference would have the opportunity to discuss the critical issue of nuclear waste management. As nuclear technology became more complex, the need to develop efficient waste management methods became ever more urgent. Nuclear waste disposal should be monitored to prevent waste from being dumped in developing countries. The Agency should continue to co-operate with other institutions so that appropriate conventions could be concluded.

71. Mauritius had always adopted a pragmatic approach in its development process. Projects with the Agency focused on two main activities, namely the use of isotopes to map underground water reserves and radiation protection, especially in the health sector. Mauritius had opted for a targeted approach, which had met with some success and took account of national priorities, because it had limited resources in terms of qualified personnel and equipment. The regional group formed through AFRA was still in its formative years and it would take some time before it achieved the same level of maturity as other regional groups. He was nevertheless confident that, given time, AFRA would become the regional forum for nuclear science and technology in Africa.

Mr. Yimer (Ethiopia) took the Chair.

72. Mr. JANEV (Bulgaria) noted that nuclear non-proliferation issues and Agency safeguards had been at the forefront of international headlines throughout the year. The NPT remained the most important building block of the international regime designed to cope with the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

73. The international community needed to take effective action to safeguard nuclear materials and to ensure the timely detection and prevention of the clandestine production or transfer of nuclear weapons. The Agency's role in that respect was well established but needed to be enhanced. The Agency had to be given all the resources it required to strengthen its safeguards system and conduct special inspections. In the new international situation, the Security Council could become an effective forum for the enforcement of non-

proliferation agreements to which the Agency could refer any unresolved cases of proliferation.

74. The new safeguards system which was taking shape within the Agency required that the information provided by the inspected State be supplemented by other data. The actions which the Agency's principal organs had taken to implement the concept of universal reporting of exports and imports of nuclear material, nuclear-related equipment and other non-nuclear material deserved to be encouraged and developed further as a means of supporting the Agency's safeguards programme.

75. The Bulgarian Government had established a national system for the control of nuclear-related exports which met the new international requirements. That measure should greatly facilitate the implementation of any decision to participate in a possible future universal nuclear reporting system.

76. In the context of the economic reforms which were currently under way in Bulgaria, and as a result of the radical social and political changes which had taken place several years previously, nuclear energy continued to be one of the mainstays of the country's energy policy. In 1992, nuclear power had accounted for approximately one third of the total amount of energy generated in Bulgaria - which placed the country thirteenth in rank in the world - despite the fact that two WWER-440 reactors had been inoperative.

77. In 1992 and 1993, Bulgaria had made reasonable progress with the implementation of the recommendations and suggestions of the Agency's safety review mission of 1991 and in responding to the more general problems identified through the Agency's programme on the safety of nuclear power plants with WWER-440/230 reactors. That progress was the fruit of considerable efforts on the part of the Bulgarian Electricity Company, the power plant staff, the design organization, and the Bulgarian Nuclear Safety Authority. Since the end of 1991, a large number of activities had been under way with a view to bringing the plant into line with the design standards and operational safety practices of the industrialized countries.

78. The CEC, WANO, and the consortium of nuclear energy regulatory organizations had assisted with the implementation of those measures. In addition, the CEC, the World Bank

and the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France had provided invaluable financial assistance. For its part, the Agency had played an active role in solving various technical problems. The solution of the problems of the Kozloduy plant was a unique example of efficient international co-operation where all the participants were determined to continue and bring to a conclusion the work which had been undertaken. In that regard, he noted that the financial aspect of safety issues was of great importance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which were going through serious economic difficulties during the current transitional period. The economic situation in Bulgaria was being further exacerbated by Bulgaria's compliance with the United Nations resolution on the embargo against Yugoslavia, which was not only inflicting heavy economic losses, but also seriously limiting the Bulgarian Government's capacity to implement fully and swiftly all the measures planned.

79. His delegation had studied thoroughly the Agency's Annual Report for 1992 and it associated itself with those delegations which had expressed their approval of that document. The Agency had made considerable efforts to compensate for its lack of funds and to implement the technical co-operation programme despite the difficult circumstances. Bulgaria had continued to receive technical assistance from the Agency and was grateful to the Department of Technical Co-operation, and in particular to the Deputy Director General, Mr. Qian, for the assistance it had received.

80. That co-operation in areas associated with the improvement of nuclear safety, radiation protection, the national regulatory body, and the reassessment of radioactive waste management had been very useful and he hoped it would continue in the future. However, though Bulgaria, like the Agency, paid particular attention to nuclear safety, it was also interested in non-power applications of nuclear energy, particularly in agriculture and medicine, and it hoped to receive similar assistance from the Agency for projects in those areas.

81. Bulgaria had recently hosted a research co-ordination meeting on the biological effects of hot particles from the Chernobyl accident and hoped that the new area of research which had been identified at that meeting, namely radioactive particles in nuclear power plants, would become the subject of an Agency research programme. Bulgaria was particularly

interested in the training activities on accident analysis and would like a training simulator to be developed for the Kozloduy plant within the framework of the technical co-operation programme.

82. Bulgaria would continue in the future to do its best to support the Agency's technical co-operation programme and, in conclusion, he once again expressed the appreciation and unreserved support of the Bulgarian Government for the Agency and its activities aimed at promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

83. Mr. NIEWODNICZANSKI (Poland) said that the developments which had taken place since the preceding session of the General Conference had once again demonstrated that the Agency played a major role in the areas of international security, economic development, nuclear safety and environmental issues. Some events seemed to indicate that its role could be even further expanded in future to include new verification tasks relating both to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Enlarging the Agency's verification function, by extending it to cover nuclear materials released as a result of reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals for example, would aid the cause of non-proliferation and, at the same time, help promote worldwide public acceptance of nuclear power.

84. The Agency should be congratulated on its continuing determined efforts in Iraq to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 687. The fact that, as announced by the Director General in his statement, the Agency had concluded that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme had been destroyed or neutralized was a very important conclusion and the Agency was to be praised for the contribution it had made in that regard. Poland also supported the strengthening of the safeguards system using the experience acquired during the operations in Iraq. The Agency's extensive safeguards activities in South Africa, and its work to verify that the South African nuclear weapons programme had been terminated, had rendered that country's integration into the international non-proliferation regime credible and had made a clear contribution to the process of denuclearization which was currently under way in Africa. The determined action of the South African Government in support of non-proliferation and its decision to adopt the status of a non-nuclear-weapon State under the

NPT, as well as the reaction of other African States and the Agency's involvement, augured well for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The news from Latin America was equally encouraging and there were grounds to hope that the Tlatelolco Treaty would soon enter into force for all countries on that continent.

85. The recent progress in the Middle East peace process gave room for greater optimism that a nuclear-weapon-free zone might be created in that region with corresponding Agency safeguards. Poland greatly appreciated the action taken by the Director General to implement the resolution adopted on that subject at the thirty-sixth session of the General Conference. The Agency should remain prepared to assist the States of the Middle East in implementing that resolution.

86. The preparations for the 1995 NPT Review Conference were also progressing well. Poland hoped that the Treaty would be extended for an indefinite period, since it remained indispensable for the security of the States Party and the world at large. However, it was also necessary to engage in a thorough and meaningful discussion of its implementation, in particular of the clauses relating to nuclear disarmament and assistance in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Expected progress with regard to the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and the provision by all nuclear-weapon States of categorical security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should help ensure that the NPT Review Conference was a success.

87. In that context, the problem of the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK could not but be cause for concern, and Poland hoped that a positive and final solution would be found. The Polish delegation welcomed the results of the bilateral talks between the United States and the DPRK which had been held in New York and Geneva, but noted with regret that there was still no progress in the consultations which the DPRK had promised to hold with the Agency. He urged the DPRK to make sincere efforts, in consultation with the Agency, to find means whereby the safeguards agreement could be fully implemented, in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Agency's Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council. Such a move would be in the interests of the DPRK, other countries in the region and the world at large.

88. Poland was following closely and strongly supporting the preparations which the Agency was making to implement safeguards in those newly independent States of the former Soviet Union which had substantial nuclear programmes, not only because those activities concerned some of its neighbours, but also because the issue constituted a major non-proliferation problem. In view of the importance of the problem and the political and economic interests of the countries concerned, Poland urged those States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency and to accede to the NPT.

89. A cursory examination of the problems which the Agency was currently encountering in the safeguards area showed that there was a need to increase efforts considerably and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Since, despite the scarcity of resources, a growing number of facilities were being placed under safeguards and the complexity of the technologies involved was increasing, it seemed reasonable to vary the intensity of verification efforts according to the significance of the facilities and the various parts of the nuclear fuel cycle from the point of view of non-proliferation. In that regard, the Agency and EURATOM should be congratulated on their new partnership approach, which aimed at increasing the efficiency of safeguards while at the same time making savings. The new safeguards approach required the provision of supplementary information in addition to the normal declarations concerning nuclear material, hence the importance of the information which was to be provided under the universal reporting system. Poland fully supported the latter, as it did the use of public domain information.

90. Nuclear power plants currently in operation or under construction in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had been subjected to safety reviews and evaluations during 1992-93. Measures had already been taken and were still being taken to remedy the shortcomings which had been identified in those plants and in national nuclear regulatory systems. Poland thanked the donor countries, the Agency and the other international organizations for the assistance they had provided under that programme, in which Polish experts had also participated. The programme should be maintained, since a number of plants which had been in service for several years and where improvements had to be made to design and operational safety would continue to operate in those countries owing to the shortages in the national electricity generating systems. The development of a common basis

for evaluating the safety of those plants and improvements to their safety systems would constitute the most important components of that assistance programme.

91. A number of countries were currently re-examining and assessing their nuclear power programmes in order to address public concern in that area. The work which Member States were undertaking within the Agency on the preparation of an international nuclear safety convention, the examination of all aspects of the issue of liability for nuclear damage, the drafting of safety principles for future nuclear power plants and the development of a set of internationally agreed radioactive waste management standards was vital and should be viewed as a high priority.

92. The majority of countries were only interested in non-power applications of nuclear energy. Protection of the environment was a field which was attracting ever-greater attention and to which, consequently, an increasing level of resources was being allocated in both the industrialized and the developing countries. That trend should be more widely reflected in the Agency's programme. For example, moves to use radiation technology to purify drinking water and waste water should be encouraged.

93. Poland had always supported the Agency's technical co-operation programme and had contributed to and benefited from it. The External Auditor had suggested that technical co-operation projects should be harmonized more closely with national development plans. That proposal seemed to be in line with the model project approach which had been introduced by the Secretariat. That approach was a desirable one and should allow assistance to be focused on projects which had a greater impact on national development plans. The Agency's technical co-operation activities in Poland relating to the treatment of flue gases using electron beams could serve as a good illustration of that. A number of developing countries had expressed interest in that technology and had invited the Agency to prepare feasibility studies, taking into account experience acquired through international co-operation.

94. His delegation welcomed the measures which had been introduced by the Secretariat to ensure harmony and compatibility between the Agency's programme and budget and accounts documents. As a result, a fourth annual document, the programme and budget performance report, had been added to the three traditional documents. However, those

four documents should not, overall, be larger than the three original documents. As the Agency's budget had hardly increased at all in real terms in recent years, overheads should be reduced not increased. His delegation also appreciated the External Auditor's proposal from the previous year that the Secretariat should consider adopting a biennial budget, in consultation with Member States.

95. Poland was grateful to the Agency for organizing an information seminar in Poland in June 1993 on nuclear energy and the environment, which had been aimed at representatives of the media, teachers, doctors and senior officials from governmental organizations. The media were still using information acquired during that seminar when they dealt with questions relating to nuclear energy.

96. In conclusion, he congratulated the Director General on his reappointment and assured him that the Polish Government would continue to give him all the necessary support.

97. Ms. MACHADO QUINTELLA (Brazil), noting that deep and rapid transformations were taking place in the world, said she hoped that that process would lead to a better and safer international society. In addition to the recent positive developments in the field of non-proliferation, there had been important political developments which, although not directly related to nuclear activities, helped to promote confidence and hence disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. Her delegation welcomed the agreement reached a few days previously by Israel and the PLO, which led one to believe that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was an objective within reach of the countries of the region.

98. The decision by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Federation to refrain from carrying out nuclear tests was another positive development which helped to prevent vertical nuclear proliferation. Her delegation firmly supported the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It also welcomed the agreement announced between the Russian Federation and Ukraine concerning the control of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, testifying to the resolve of the Governments of those countries to reduce tensions between them and contribute to the establishment of a safer world.

99. The destruction of nuclear weapons and reutilization of the nuclear materials in them for peaceful purposes was another topic of great interest. Like non-proliferation, disarmament also required verification and should be subjected to adequate international supervision. Although the Agency did not yet have a precise mandate with regard to disarmament, her delegation believed that it would have an important role to play in view of its experience and accumulated knowledge in verifying non-proliferation.

100. Regional and subregional agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty and the agreement between Brazil and Argentina, were an effective means of reducing tension and of promoting confidence and security and had the additional advantage of being adaptable to the characteristics and special needs of the geographical region to which they applied. Consequently, her delegation took a favourable view of initiatives aiming at the denuclearization of Africa and the Korean Peninsula. The Director General's report on the status of consultations with the DPRK concerning the implementation of the safeguards agreement between that country and the Agency was disappointing. Although recent developments were a cause of great concern, she remained hopeful that the issue would be resolved through dialogue and negotiation within the framework of the Agency.

101. Her Government felt that it was advisable for all countries to adopt measures to control the export of sensitive technologies, equipment and material, especially those related to weapons of mass destruction. The Brazilian National Congress was considering comprehensive legislation to update existing rules, and regulations for its future application were under preparation. Related measures, but international in nature, were also under consideration.

102. Her delegation was happy to announce that the agreement between Argentina and Brazil for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy (INFCIRC/395) was fully in force and that ABACC, created under that agreement, was fully operational. Moreover, Brazil was in the final stages of the legislative process leading to ratification of the quadripartite agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency and of the amended text of the Tlatelolco Treaty. Those two texts had been approved the previous week by the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and were now before the Senate. As far as the quadripartite agreement

was concerned, a very fruitful meeting had been held, as part of the negotiations on the subsidiary arrangements, in Rio de Janeiro from 8 to 10 September. Her delegation was convinced that the current negotiations would result in a document which fully reflected the quadripartite agreement and would enable ABACC to exercise its responsibilities under that agreement. Consolidation of ABACC to establish it as a sound and internationally respected agency would contribute to the rational application of Agency safeguards in Brazil and Argentina.

103. The strengthening of the Agency's safeguards had always been of interest to Brazil and it therefore welcomed the progress already achieved in that respect, largely based on suggestions made by SAGSI. While supporting efforts to strengthen the safeguards system, her delegation considered it essential that decisions be taken by consensus and that, when examining any issue related to safeguards, consideration also be given to views other than those expressed within SAGSI.

104. An adequate balance between the Agency's safeguards and non-safeguards activities was vital. Developing countries must be able to draw increasing benefit from the Agency's technical co-operation programmes. There was no incompatibility between the Agency's technical co-operation and its non-proliferation mandate. Programmes of interest to developing countries should be encouraged and receive full financial support from the Agency.

105. Nuclear safety was another area worthy of special attention. Her delegation was looking forward to the outcome of negotiations to establish a nuclear safety convention which laid down fundamental principles and which was inspired, as far as possible, by the Agency's NUSS codes. The objective should be to improve international safety standards. Her delegation had already indicated that it believed that the scope of that convention should be limited in the first instance to nuclear power reactors.

106. The Brazilian Government had recently ratified the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, which had entered into force for Brazil on 26 June 1993, and was following with interest work related to revision of that Convention by the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage. With respect to supplementary funding, her

delegation thought that a regional approach, taking into account the characteristics of each region, was the appropriate solution.

107. The new Basic Safety Standards currently under preparation should be of a purely advisory nature and it should be up to each State to decide whether to adopt them.

108. She was pleased to note that the Agency's financial situation had improved over the current year. She welcomed the efforts being made by the Secretariat to comply with the resolution on harmony and compatibility of the Agency's programme and budget and accounts documents. Such harmony and compatibility would enable the Member States to have a clearer picture of the Agency's administration and of its financial needs. In order to contribute to the full implementation of the Agency's 1992 programme, Brazil planned to pay its contribution for the preceding year that week. In view of the high amount of Brazil's annual contribution and the country's difficult economic situation, that constituted a major effort.

109. The Agency had complex and important duties to carry out. To do so, it needed the full support of its Member States and highly qualified staff. Her Government was convinced that the developing countries could help the Agency recruit competent staff. She urged the Director General to intensify his efforts to recruit experts from developing countries and, above all, female experts.

110. International security had developed into a complex issue. Her Government was following the matter closely and was ready to help eliminate or reduce the associated tensions. It was firmly committed to disarmament, to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and to non-proliferation. She reiterated, however, that the guarantees asked of Brazil, and of other countries, should in no way curtail their chances for development.

111. In conclusion, she said that there was hope for a better world in which the spectre of nuclear confrontation would become a thing of the past. Member States should work together to banish that spectre and ensure a brighter future for the coming generations.

112. Mr. HASHIM (Malaysia), noting with satisfaction the improved harmony and compatibility of the annual report and the Agency's programme and budget and accounts documents, said that he looked forward to further progress to enhance the programme's

transparency. His delegation, therefore, endorsed the Agency's annual report and accounts for 1992 as well as the budget for 1994.

113. Despite financial difficulties, the Agency had carried out its functions in an efficient and effective manner. It was encouraging to note the substantial progress made in 1992-93, especially in the field of safeguards. Malaysia, which was party to the NPT and had concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency, supported efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system and reiterated its full support for the measures taken by the Director General to that end. He commended the role played by the Agency in the denuclearization efforts in Africa and hoped that it would make similar efforts with a view to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and in South East Asia. He urged Member States to co-operate fully in the implementation of safeguards agreements. He congratulated the Republic of Armenia on concluding such an agreement pursuant to the NPT and called on other Member States which had not yet done so to follow that example. With regard to the financing of safeguards, the current arrangements seemed to be the most appropriate at present.

114. He was pleased that the Agency had also made efforts to improve the efficiency of its technical assistance activities as part of measures to achieve an adequate balance between its safeguards and other activities. The delay in preparing and presenting the document concerning non-safeguards activities was, however, regrettable.

115. The model project approach was a very good way of increasing the impact of the technical co-operation programme. The number of model projects should be increased and equal opportunity given to all Member States to participate. In addition, assistance aimed at enhancing the ability of developing countries to use nuclear energy should continue to be strengthened.

116. Efforts were also being made in Malaysia to make better use of research and development results and to ensure the transfer of technology from the research institutions to the end-users. The priority needs of Member States and those of the Agency should, consequently, be compatible. The commitments undertaken by his Government, together with the support provided by the Agency, had enabled Malaysia to make tremendous progress

in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Current efforts were being focused on nuclear energy applications in industry, particularly in non-destructive testing, nucleonic control systems, tracer techniques and radiation technology. Some research results were already being exploited commercially. Encouraging progress had also been made in the use of analytical and tracer techniques to study and solve pollution problems. Nuclear medicine was another area in which Malaysia would continue to strengthen its activities.

117. Malaysia fully realized that the strengthening of technical co-operation activities required increased resources. It was therefore concerned that resources allocated to the technical co-operation programme had been declining recently. Two measures to overcome that situation should be considered: one was timely payment of pledges and the other was to share resources, expertise and experience more effectively amongst developed and developing countries. In that connection, Malaysia pledged US \$70 200 as its share of the TACF target for 1994 and was prepared to provide fellowship training in the field of nuclear science and technology for non-power purposes for scientists from other developing countries in competent institutions in Malaysia. It also wished to encourage and further strengthen the links between those institutions and their counterparts in developed and developing countries, either on a bilateral or a regional basis. In addition, it would continue to host some of the Agency's activities in future.

118. Malaysia was grateful to the Agency for its assistance, including assistance within the framework of the RCA, which had helped it to make progress in nuclear science and technology, and was also grateful to developed countries in its region, such as Australia and Japan, for the strong bilateral arrangements that had been established. It appreciated the measures taken by the Agency in connection with the various resolutions to strengthen international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection. It also commended the Agency's implementation of the resolution on the revision of the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection which had been adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the General Conference. It attached great importance to nuclear safety and radiation protection and had always supported activities in that field. Recently, it had hosted a regional workshop on the application of the 1990 ICRP recommendations, which had given the region the opportunity to learn about the latest developments in radiation safety principles and concepts

and become familiar with the regulatory requirements. It had been suggested that a follow-up workshop on a similar subject be held in two to three years' time to enable an exchange of information on the results obtained and the problems encountered in applying the 1990 ICRP recommendations.

119. Turning to waste management, he welcomed the Agency's initiative to provide Member States with information on how to resolve waste management problems and reaffirmed the importance of sound practices for the safe management and disposal of radioactive waste.

120. With regard to the transport of radioactive material, he reiterated Malaysia's standpoint that the routing of radioactive material and toxic wastes should avoid densely populated areas and busy waterways. Malaysia also appreciated early notification of shipments of such material.

121. With respect to the amendment of Article VI of the Agency's Statute, his delegation supported the move to re-establish the working group to review the issue as a whole and looked forward to the outcome of the group's deliberations.

Mr. Al-Athel (Saudi Arabia) resumed the Chair.

122. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that over the past year satisfactory progress had been made on a number of issues that fell within the Agency's purview. At the same time some international events continued to confront the Agency with serious challenges, while other recent events could well provide it with unparalleled opportunities to participate in and help shape future global and regional security arrangements.

123. The Australian delegation noted with satisfaction that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime had been strengthened by the increasing international recognition of the crucial importance of guaranteeing the effectiveness of the NPT and its indefinite extension in 1995. It was particularly pleased to note that, with the recent new accessions, the Treaty now numbered 160 States Party. The accession of the new members had served to reinforce the importance of the Treaty for global security and as a basis for peaceful nuclear co-operation. South Africa's willingness to disclose its past nuclear activities had been a further example of the normative force of the NPT and of the rigour of the Agency's safeguards.

Australia would encourage all Agency Member States which had not yet acceded to the NPT to reconsider the benefits of accession. An effective non-proliferation regime was a necessary support for nuclear disarmament. To join the regime was the single most effective action a non-nuclear-weapon State could take to contribute to nuclear disarmament and also to promote peace in its own region. Australia urged, in particular, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to act swiftly to fulfil the obligations they had undertaken under the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty and to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

124. It remained a matter of serious concern to Australia that two countries - Iraq and the DPRK - were not complying with their obligations under the NPT and under their safeguards agreements with the Agency. It was regrettable that Iraq's failure to implement fully the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions would be a focus of attention at the General Conference for the third consecutive year, and his delegation again called upon that country to take the steps necessary to discharge its obligations under those resolutions.

125. The DPRK's failure to co-operate with the Agency in the implementation of its safeguards agreement - which had forced the Board in April of that year to conclude that it was not complying with its obligations - was unquestionably the most disturbing proliferation issue to emerge since the previous session of the General Conference. The DPRK's activities posed a serious threat to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and to the Agency's safeguards system, as well as to security and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia and the Pacific. Australia earnestly hoped that the DPRK would make a sincere effort to resolve its differences with the Secretariat and would move in the near future to a position of full compliance with its international safeguards obligations.

126. Over the past few years, Australia had actively encouraged the Board of Governors and the Secretariat to examine new measures aimed at maximizing the Agency's ability to detect undeclared facilities. It welcomed the Board's formal endorsement of a reporting scheme to provide additional information on exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. That measure would add significantly to the Agency's knowledge of production and transfers in the nuclear field. Australia was pleased to have been participating in the trial period of that scheme and intended to continue its involvement. All Member States should consider doing likewise at the earliest possible date.

127. The report that SAGSI had recently submitted to the Director General merited careful study by all Member States. It was clear that ways had to be found of reducing costs while at the same time meeting new requirements and maintaining effectiveness. He wished to commend SAGSI for its report, which set very useful parameters for further consideration of that crucially important issue. He was pleased to announce that the Australian Government was holding discussions with Agency officials on the possibility of testing some of SAGSI's proposals, including environmental monitoring and extended access, at the Australian national nuclear reactor complex at Lucas Heights in New South Wales. He hoped that other Member States would participate in similar trials to ensure that future important decisions on the direction of safeguards could be based on sound knowledge and experience. Experience from developing countries would be particularly valuable.

128. Australia was pleased to note that the Nuclear Suppliers Group had incorporated into its guidelines a policy requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition for significant new nuclear supply. That was a response to the concerns on that matter that had been expressed so clearly by numerous States at the Fourth NPT Review Conference. The fact that, when it resumed work in January, the Conference on Disarmament would begin by negotiating, as a matter of urgency, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was another encouraging prospect. That had been one of Australia's long-standing disarmament goals and his Government had warmly welcomed recent developments. There had been mention of the possibility that the Agency might contribute to the verification of a test ban. Australia would like to see that idea thoroughly explored and it was pleased that the Agency had been invited to participate in the Conference on Disarmament to discuss its possible role in that area.

129. The end of the Cold War had brought an opportunity for the early negotiation of a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, something that was the subject of a long-standing United Nations General Assembly resolution. There would no doubt be widespread interest in the Agency's providing assistance in the discussions and negotiations on that matter. It was clear that, through its safeguards system, the Agency would assume responsibility for the verification functions under such a convention.

130. The subject of excess civil plutonium stocks and fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons was continuing to attract extensive international attention. His Government

believed that the Agency had a role to play in that area. Since the questions involved were a matter of concern to many Member States, there should be an opportunity for wider discussion of the issues and of such concepts as the international management of plutonium.

131. Turning to nuclear safety, he said that his Government attached the utmost importance to the need for compliance with the most rigorous standards in the design and operation of nuclear facilities. Accordingly, his Government endorsed the Agency's involvement in nuclear safety activities designed to address the needs of broad categories of Member States. In particular, it supported the activities that the Agency and Member States were conducting in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but it believed that those activities had to be properly co-ordinated if they were to be fully effective. While it was understandable that the focus should be on Eastern Europe, the attention given to safety issues in other regions should not be neglected.

132. Australia had supported the proposal for the drafting of an international nuclear safety convention and had participated from the outset in the work of the group of experts convened by the Agency to examine the possible content of such a convention. His Government urged all countries to recognize the importance of the early and satisfactory conclusion of those negotiations.

133. Likewise, Australia continued to support the work on the revision of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. It was important that the largest possible number of countries should participate actively and constructively in the eighth session of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage so that an agreement on State liability and supplementary funding could be reached.

134. Australia remained a firm supporter of the Agency's technical assistance activities. Despite currency fluctuations, it had continued to pay in full its assessed voluntary contribution to the TACF. It supported a dynamic technical assistance programme that brought tangible advantages to the intended beneficiaries. His Government, which would contribute 1.3 million Australian dollars to the TACF in 1994, urged all Member States to take seriously their obligations to help finance the Agency's technical assistance activities. That was in the interest of all Member States, donors and recipients alike.

135. During the previous year, Australia had hosted and funded two Agency regional training courses and had provided places for more than 40 Agency fellows in such fields as nuclear medicine, radiation protection, the production and control of radiopharmaceuticals, and the production of isotopes. As part of a three-year programme of extrabudgetary assistance under the RCA, Australia was supporting a project involving the application of distance learning techniques in the fields of radiation protection and nuclear medicine. In addition, it had provided extrabudgetary funding for a co-ordinated research programme on the use of nuclear techniques in retrospective studies on coral reefs. It also intended to host a course - the third such one in ten years - on national systems of accounting and control in May 1994.

136. At its recently concluded meeting, the South Pacific Forum had recognized that some of its island Member States were unable, owing to a lack of infrastructure, to join international bodies such as the Agency. The Forum had agreed to begin negotiations on a regional instrument that would cover various forms of wastes and complement existing global regimes, specifically the Agency's Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Wastes. Along with other members of the Forum, Australia was working to promote the adoption, under Article XVI.A of the Agency's Statute, of an arrangement under which the Pacific Island States would receive the protection accorded by the Agency's Code of Practice. His delegation also wished to draw the Conference's attention to document GC(XXXVII)/INF/330, which had been submitted at the request of Australia, New Zealand and the Marshall Islands and in which sections of the communiqué of the twenty-fourth South Pacific Forum dealing with various nuclear matters were reproduced.

137. On the question of nuclear activities at the national level, he said that at the beginning of the year the United Kingdom and Australia had agreed on measures to decontaminate the former British nuclear test site at Maralinga in South Australia. His Government had informed the Agency of developments on that issue, in accordance with the provisions and spirit of its safeguards agreement.

138. Under the direction of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, Australian scientists had participated in a number of major international scientific projects.

Intensive contacts had been pursued under co-operation arrangements with CERN and various organizations in other countries. His delegation believed that the main challenge facing the Agency was to work effectively, within its budgetary constraints, to maintain the credibility of the safeguards regime.

139. Australia was aware of the particularly difficult financial situation faced by the Agency in the previous two years, and for that reason it again called on all Member States to make prompt and full payment of their assessed contributions to the Regular Budget. Australia had also made a number of proposals in the Board of Governors aimed at reforming the processes involved in the formulation and management of the Agency's programme and budget. Those proposals were intended to ensure the availability of sufficient funds for the Agency's priority activities. In that context, one could not emphasize enough that, unless all Member States paid their assessed contributions on time and in full and unless steps were taken to carry out a constructive review of programme priorities, the Agency would simply no longer be able to fulfil its mandate. In that connection, his country welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to present the Annual Report for 1992 on the basis of a programme-related rather than an administrative structure.

140. In conclusion, he noted that the 1990s were a decade of radical change in the world's political landscape. That situation presented the Agency with unprecedented opportunities to participate in and help shape global and regional security arrangements. Moreover, nuclear technology still had a great potential for improving the quality of life. It was important therefore to seize those opportunities so as to ensure that the Agency would contribute to the fullest extent possible to the security, prosperity and general well-being of mankind.

141. Mr. ZILLER (Germany) said that the year which had passed since the previous session of the General Conference had been marked by several events which demonstrated once again that there was still a need for vigorous efforts in order to rid the world of the nuclear threat.

142. The complete elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction continued to be a goal of great importance. The Security Council had charged the Agency with that task, to be

carried out in close co-operation with the United Nations Special Commission for the Disarmament of Iraq. His country congratulated the Agency and the Special Commission on their successful work. The German Government had contributed to that success by providing important financial, logistic and expert support. Nevertheless, the work had not yet been completed. There still seemed to be a possibility that the Iraqi Government would resume its nuclear weapons programme. It was still not fully complying with its obligations under Security Council resolutions 707 and 715. Germany appealed to it once more not to continue refusing to comply fully with the Security Council resolutions, and urged it to start co-operating at last with the Agency's Action Team and the Special Commission in a spirit of openness and confidence, and to use Iraq's considerable industrial potential for exclusively peaceful purposes to the benefit of the Iraqi people.

143. The continued non-compliance of the DPRK with its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the Agency was giving rise to very serious concern. Germany welcomed the fact that, following bilateral consultations with the United States Government, the DPRK had suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT and had again entered into consultations with the Agency. In order to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of the DPRK, however, it should be stated clearly that compliance with binding legal commitments established by the Board of Governors and confirmed by the Security Council was not a matter for negotiation. That would undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the safeguards system as a whole.

144. The control mechanisms and decision-making procedures provided for in that system had proved to be effective. Germany commended the Director General and his staff for their competent, diligent and impartial handling of what was a difficult and sensitive case. In the interests of peace and security in the region and worldwide, it therefore urged the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement and to reverse definitively its decision to withdraw from the NPT.

145. In accordance with a unanimous decision of the German Parliament, his Government remained strongly committed to striving for universality of the non-proliferation system and, at the same time, to strengthening its effectiveness, particularly in the field of nuclear safeguards. Germany was concerned that there were several countries with major nuclear

programmes and activities still outside the non-proliferation and safeguards system. It particularly urged those successor States of the former Soviet Union which were not yet parties to the NPT to accede without delay as non-nuclear-weapon States. That would open the way for full-scale commercial and industrial co-operation, which was urgently needed in order that the safety of nuclear facilities in those countries might be enhanced. In that context, the agreement reached at the meeting between the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the future of the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory was of great importance.

146. Germany welcomed the measures taken by the Director General and the Board to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system, particularly with regard to the carrying out of special inspections and the establishment of a universal reporting system - which was so far being applied only on a voluntary basis by a number of countries. Germany urged all of the Agency's Member States to adhere to the system in order to increase transparency in international nuclear transfers and domestic production. Also, it looked forward to new proposals by the Director General, particularly with regard to the problem of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities.

147. In view of the need to make sure that the Agency had sufficient resources to cope with its many new tasks, Germany had noted with satisfaction that it had been possible to achieve important savings by bringing the Agency's inspection effort in the European Community countries down to a level equivalent to the effort deployed under comparable circumstances in other parts of the world. Given the important progress made some months before, his country hoped that it would soon be possible to implement a true "partnership approach" in the co-operation between the Agency and EURATOM.

148. With regard to the Agency's other main functions, he reiterated his delegation's strong support for the Agency's very valuable activities in the field of nuclear safety. In particular, the German Government appreciated the extensive and competent efforts to improve the safety of nuclear installations in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS. There had been important progress in the implementation of international support programmes and mechanisms, but that had not yet led to technical safety improvements of the required extent.

149. Considerable progress had been made in the negotiations on a nuclear safety convention. Such a convention, entering into force as soon as possible and signed by the greatest possible number of countries, would make a significant contribution to the improvement of nuclear safety worldwide. However, it was still difficult to see which States with nuclear installations would ultimately be prepared to accept the text now being formulated. It was very much to be hoped that the text would be presented to a diplomatic conference early in the following year.

150. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that he associated himself with the statement made by the delegate of Belgium on behalf of the European Community and its member States. He would therefore confine himself to a number of remarks reflecting a more strictly national point of view on some matters concerning his country in particular.

151. First of all, the Director General was to be congratulated on his reappointment. Mr. Blix had carried out his role with great success, to the satisfaction of all Agency Member States, and Italy looked forward to continuing to work with him during the next four years. Also, his country welcomed the States that had shortly before been approved for membership of the Agency and hoped that they would ratify the Statute soon, together with those countries approved for Agency membership the previous year which had not yet done so. It was important that that obligation be met in order that the States in question might participate fully in the Agency's activities.

152. Italy attached the utmost importance to the great progress made in the field of nuclear disarmament, particularly through the signing of START-I and START-II. As a result of such agreements, a denuclearization process had begun in the countries of the former Soviet Union and, in line with the policy followed by other members of the G-7, Italy had negotiated an agreement under which technical assistance would be provided to the Russian Federation in that connection. His country considered the dismantling of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union to be a key contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security.

153. The recent announcement by some nuclear-weapon States of the extension of the moratorium on nuclear testing and the decision taken in Geneva to mandate the Ad Hoc

Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to negotiate, in 1994, a global nuclear test ban were signs of movement in the right direction.

154. In that regard, the NPT remained a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; it had been demonstrating its effectiveness for almost 25 years. Italy was therefore looking forward to the 1995 Review Conference and advocated an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. Non-proliferation issues were of central importance for the General Conference, and they had been addressed by the Presidency of the European Community. He would simply like to emphasize that his country would spare no effort to strengthen and extend the non-proliferation regime, both in time and in space.

155. His delegation was pleased with the results of the 21 inspection missions to Iraq carried out by the Agency so far and looked forward to the completion by the Agency of the task assigned to it in Security Council resolution 687, and particularly to the early implementation of the long-term verification plan. It called on Iraq to comply with its obligations and to provide the Agency with the necessary information on its procurement sources, which it had so far refrained from doing.

156. It was gratifying to note that in 1992 the Secretariat had not detected any event indicating a diversion of a significant quantity of safeguarded nuclear material for non-peaceful activities or for purposes unknown.

157. Italy had adhered with conviction to the universal reporting policy of the European Community, which the Agency was now implementing, albeit with more limited scope and participation, as a scheme for export-import notification; it appealed to other countries to follow its example in order that the scheme might become truly universal and to provide the Agency with comprehensive information on all transfers of nuclear material and equipment.

158. Welcoming the results of SAGSI's work on the strengthening and rationalization of the safeguards system, he said that in his delegation's opinion it should be accompanied by efforts to identify ways of reducing the costs of the system. In order to strengthen safeguards while enhancing their credibility, the Agency might delegate a number of activities to regional systems while retaining final responsibility in the field of verification. His delegation would like a study to be made in the near future on the possibilities of establishing

direct links between the Agency and regional systems, drawing on the impressive example of EURATOM and its partnership approach.

159. Turning to nuclear safety and radiation protection, he recalled the importance which his Government attached to the Agency's work in that field, to which absolute priority should be given. Nuclear safety and public perceptions regarding nuclear power remained at the heart of the nuclear debate both in Italy and at the international level.

160. The lengthy negotiations on the drafting of an international convention on nuclear safety seemed to have reached a turning-point thanks to the willingness of many delegations to compromise. Nevertheless, it was now necessary to concentrate on a number of essential points, such as the peer review system and the role of the Agency, in order to ensure that the convention was implemented effectively. The recommendations of INSAG on the matter represented a useful contribution in that connection. There would also have to be a clear commitment to a broadening of the scope of the convention as soon as possible. Italy was ready to co-operate fully in reaching a rapid agreement along those lines.

161. At the same time, the importance should be emphasized of the specific Agency mechanisms - the effectiveness of which had been demonstrated over the years - for the strengthening of nuclear safety and the enhancement of co-operation among Member States. Despite all their limitations, which his delegation had referred to on various occasions, those mechanisms - for example, the OSART, ASSET and IRRT services and the IRS - represented an achievement which ought to be not only preserved, but also consolidated.

162. Mention should also be made of the work that lay ahead in dealing with the risks, in countries of the former Soviet Union, associated with the low safety levels of nuclear facilities and the radioactive contamination of large areas. Similarly, it was necessary to tackle the problem of the dumping of radioactive waste in Arctic seas and the Sea of Japan.

163. Italy, which was playing an active role in the programme agreed at the Munich Summit to enhance reactor safety in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the CIS, welcomed the progress made in the implementation of that programme and the contributions made by the institutions concerned. Moreover, it hoped that there would be a continuation of the dialogue between, on one hand, the countries involved and, on the other, the World

Bank, the EBRD and the Agency with a view to the formulation of energy strategies for those countries, account being taken of the priority need to shut down the highest-risk reactors as soon as possible. In keeping with what had been stated recently at the Tokyo Summit, Italy agreed that it was necessary to make rapid improvements to those facilities whose safety levels were a source of great concern and to give priority to the strengthening of independent regulatory bodies. It would continue to contribute to the success of the programme, both directly and within the framework of the G-7's working group on nuclear safety.

164. The Agency's financial situation was a matter for concern. In the planning of the budget, greater account should be taken of the capacity of Member States to pay their contributions. In addition, more funds should be earmarked for nuclear safety. In that regard, there should be a more selective approach in the identification of planning goals so as to ensure that all Agency activities in the field of safety were financed from the Regular Budget, rather than from uncertain voluntary contributions.

165. Italy was pleased to inform the General Conference that, following endorsement by the Board of Governors in February, the agreement on the administrative restructuring of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics had been signed by the Agency, UNESCO and the Italian Government. The agreement was now before the Italian Parliament.

166. In expressing its sincere gratitude to Professor Salam for his dedication at the helm of the Centre for so many years, his delegation noted that a new Director would have to be appointed in the near future. Italy would continue to support that important institution, both financially and in other ways. It was proud to have contributed substantially to the creation and development of an international institution which had proved to be a particularly effective tool for the transfer of science and technology to developing countries.

167. In conclusion, he said that his country looked forward to being a member of the Board in 1993-94. Italy's position on the question of a revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole was an important element in its attitude towards the Agency. It hoped that future reports of the working group concerned with that question would contain suggestions regarding new opportunities for countries which were not permanent members of the Board.

168. Mr. TSOUNIS (Greece) associated himself with the statement which had been made by the representative of Belgium on behalf of the European Community and its 12 member States, but said that he wished to make a number of additional comments.

169. He endorsed the Agency's Annual Report for 1992 and congratulated the Secretariat on its good work and the results it had achieved despite the Agency's budgetary constraints and financial difficulties.

170. The Agency's Member States could not fail to be gratified by the successful implementation of technical assistance programmes, the handling of new problems related to safety and safeguards, the Agency's participation in activities to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities in Eastern Europe and the worldwide recognition of the Agency's role in the field of non-proliferation. However, the new political era of the 1990s, which was so different from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, had opened up new horizons. The Director General was being called upon to face the challenges of the 1990s and to respond efficiently to the changing needs of Member States. At the beginning of his new four-year term of office, Greece expected that the Director General would proceed to shape new ideas and review plans in order to meet the challenges of the coming era. Nuclear energy, nuclear safety and nuclear non-proliferation had already entered into a new phase.

171. Greece was following the Agency's nuclear safety activities with increasing concern. He welcomed the progress which had been made with the provision of assistance to Member States and the analysis, in collaboration with other interested countries, of the shortcomings of Soviet-designed pressurized water reactors such as the RBMK. Greece continued to be interested in those activities, particularly those relating to the WWER-440/230 reactors at the Kozloduy plant. The close co-operation between the Agency, the CEC and the NEA/OECD on the provision of technical and financial support to the States of the former USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe with a view to improving nuclear safety was especially important. He also welcomed the collaboration between the Agency and the UNDP aimed at helping those countries to resolve problems related to safety and radiation protection.

172. Greece was collaborating closely with the Bulgarian authorities. In the preceding year, it had organized a course on the planning of emergency interventions in the event of

a nuclear accident. A similar course was also planned for October of the current year, with the financial support of the European Community. The Director of the Greek Atomic Energy Commission, accompanied by his technical advisers, had visited the Kozloduy plant as part of the existing bilateral agreement between the two countries. He had also initialled, together with the Director of the Romanian National Commission for the Control of Nuclear Activities, a co-operation agreement on early notification in the event of a nuclear accident and on the exchange of information. The Greek Atomic Energy Commission and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission had signed a similar agreement on the exchange of information and co-operation in the field of nuclear safety.

173. Nuclear facilities in Greece had joined forces with medical physics departments in Greek universities to establish an intensive two-year training programme for specialists in radiation physics. Radiation protection teaching programmes had also been set up for dentists.

174. With regard to the nuclear safety convention, Greece had taken part in the deliberations of the working group on that issue and was of the opinion that there was an urgent need to improve general nuclear safety standards throughout the world. He thanked the chairman of the working group and the competent staff of the Secretariat who had helped with the redrafting of the convention, taking into account the working group's views. The latter had recently reached a compromise over the scope of the convention. Although Greece was of the opinion that the convention should cover all aspects of nuclear facilities, it endorsed the compromise reached in the current draft, which limited the scope to civil nuclear power plants. That compromise had been accepted by the various parties on the understanding that negotiations would be initiated on an international instrument on the safety of waste facilities as soon as the safety fundamentals for that type of facility had been agreed upon. The convention should encourage full technical co-operation with the Agency and promote transparency and public information. The report which had been drawn up by INSAG in July at the request of the Director General also merited serious study by the working group during its forthcoming meeting in October. He hoped that the working group would complete its work soon so that the diplomatic conference could take place at the beginning of 1994.

175. Greece had also taken part in the deliberations of the Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. He hoped that that Committee would soon produce a document for consideration by the political authorities. While he supported the Committee's work, he hoped that the question of supplementary funding would be resolved satisfactorily and that the Committee would be able to address the issue of State liability within the desired space of time.

176. Nuclear non-proliferation and the Agency's safeguards system were inseparable and played a major role in ensuring peace and security in the world. Greece reaffirmed its firm commitment to the NPT, which was the most widely accepted international instrument in the field of arms control and disarmament. Despite its weaknesses and limitations, the Treaty should be maintained in the years to come and extended for an indefinite period. However, the capacity of reactors in operation was continuing to increase and the amount of spent fuel and plutonium subject to safeguards was steadily growing. In addition, confronted as it was with the problems caused by the end of the Cold War, the existence of facilities which were not subject to safeguards in certain countries, the complexity of the system, increased resistance in certain isolated cases and the lack of adequate financial resources, the Agency was experiencing greater difficulty in performing its safeguards tasks. Nevertheless, it had so far managed to carry out its activities without encountering any major obstacles. As far as it was able, it continued to provide the international community with the assurance that material and equipment which had been declared to it remained in peaceful uses. It had been able to verify the inventory of South Africa and the destruction of the latter's nuclear weapons programme. It had performed inspections in Iraq and implemented the main elements of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items listed in Security Council resolution 687. It had instituted a new partnership approach with the CEC for the implementation of safeguards in the European Community. The crucial work of SAGSI aimed at developing improved monitoring techniques and reinforcing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system had continued. Greece was looking forward with interest to a more systematic in-depth study of the measures envisaged by SAGSI and other technical groups of the Secretariat prior to the Board's discussions in December.

177. Some obstacles to the application of the Agency's international safeguards system had been identified. The DPRK's refusal to allow Agency inspectors full access to its facilities was the most serious of those. The system could not function correctly if that State did not co-operate with the Agency. As long as co-operation was hampered, the Agency could not carry out its activities and could therefore not provide the assurance, required by the commitments which the DPRK had undertaken under the NPT and the safeguards agreement, that nuclear facilities and material had not been diverted to non-peaceful purposes. Greece hoped that the DPRK would allow the Agency to continue as soon as possible with the application of proper safeguards. The DPRK's recent reaction was extremely disappointing and regrettable. He hoped that the DPRK would allow the planned inspection of nuclear sites on its territory. The gravity of the matter made it necessary to discuss the issue at the General Conference and to notify the Security Council promptly.

178. Non-proliferation objectives were also served through regional initiatives. Greece had already noted the initiation of such measures and looked forward to further similar developments in various regions of the world. The historic progress which had recently been made in the Middle East gave grounds to hope that safeguards might also be applied in that region. He was sure that the Director General would pursue consultations with the States in the region with a view to promoting the swift application of comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East and, in particular, with a view to preparing model agreements as an initial step towards the setting up of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region in accordance with resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601. He was convinced that the States in the region would soon be ready to discuss the terms of a non-proliferation regime in that part of the world.

179. He commended the Agency on the efforts it had made to date to implement Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715, but regretted the fact that Iraq had not yet provided detailed procurement and supply information. He urged Iraq not to continue to withhold that type of information and to co-operate more closely with the Agency with a view to normalizing its relations with the organization responsible for the promotion and control of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He also hoped that the monitoring programme would soon be implemented in Iraq.

180. The aim of the Agency's technical co-operation activities was to assist Member States in need and to make them autonomous in the fields of nuclear energy, science and technology. Greece both contributed to and benefited from technical assistance and thought that the Agency was achieving its objectives in assisting Member States, within the limitations of the financial resources available to it for that purpose. Greece had always paid its contribution to the Regular Budget and its voluntary contribution to the TACF in full. It also paid its share of the assessed programme costs, which were valuable since those funds eventually became part of resources available to the Agency for the provision of assistance to developing Member States.

181. Greece welcomed the new Member States of the Agency and expressed the hope that they would all work together to promote harmonious co-operation among all Member States in the nuclear field.

182. Mr. COOK (New Zealand), having welcomed the new Member States of the Agency, said that recent sessions of the General Conference had taken place against the background of dramatic change and that the 1993 session was no exception. The end of the Cold War and the increased dangers of nuclear proliferation presented fresh challenges to the Agency.

183. He noted that 1993 had seen the start of the process leading to the review and extension of the NPT in 1995. New Zealand believed that that Treaty, and particularly Articles III and IV dealing with safeguards and technical co-operation, underpinned the entire non-proliferation structure. There would, therefore, be interaction between the review and extension process and developments within the Agency in those two key areas. His country had gone on record as supporting indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, which would further strengthen the Agency's role. The Director General had noted ways in which international changes might extend that role in future. It had been suggested that the Agency should participate in the verification of a possible comprehensive test ban. New Zealand believed that that idea deserved further examination. A stop to the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would be another major contribution to international disarmament, and the Agency might be able to play a constructive role in implementing and

verifying such a ban. A further task which the Agency should address was the need for secure handling and storage of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

184. The greatest challenge, however, remained the threat of nuclear proliferation. The lessons learned from recent experience were clear. Confidence in the international non-proliferation regime could exist only when countries were completely transparent about their nuclear activities. Full co-operation with the Agency, which administered the nuclear non-proliferation regime on behalf of the international community, was essential. The Agency's right to conduct special inspections where necessary must be upheld. The support of the Security Council might prove necessary as a last resort. Furthermore, New Zealand considered that all Member States had a responsibility to supply the Agency with relevant information - including national intelligence information - which might help improve the effectiveness of its safeguards operations.

185. His delegation commended the Agency on its continuing work in implementing the Security Council resolutions on Iraq. While invaluable work had been done in identifying and dismantling Iraqi nuclear facilities, the provision of essential procurement and supply information was still outstanding. New Zealand urged Iraq to provide that information in the near future.

186. While the proliferation threat from Iraq had been checked, there was growing concern about a country in the Asia and Pacific region, namely, the DPRK. Throughout 1993, there had been repeated calls for the DPRK to resume full compliance with its safeguards obligations. It was most regrettable that a solution to that impasse still seemed as far away as ever. For its part, New Zealand fully endorsed the resolutions adopted by the Board. It did not accept the criticisms levelled by the DPRK at the Agency with regard to impartiality; on the contrary, it considered that the Director General and Secretariat had acted entirely in accordance with the responsibilities entrusted to them by the international community. It rejected the proposition that legal commitments assumed under a safeguards agreement were in any way negotiable. His country was therefore concerned that the DPRK had not only failed to take the necessary steps to clarify the inconsistencies in its nuclear inventory, but that it was now placing obstacles in the way of even the routine and ad hoc inspections required to ensure the continuity of safeguards data. It was entirely appropriate for such an

issue to be considered at the General Conference. New Zealand hoped that the clearly expressed views of Member States would prompt the DPRK to reconsider its position.

187. In other areas progress had been more encouraging. South Africa's announcement that it had abandoned its nuclear weapons programme had been a victory for non-proliferation. New Zealand was pleased that the Agency's inspections had revealed nothing to suggest that that programme had not been fully dismantled. It welcomed the prospect of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, which now appeared to be an attainable goal.

188. New Zealand had warmly welcomed the PLO-Israel agreement. A wider regional peace settlement could pave the way for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. New Zealand commended the initiatives taken by the Director General in that regard, including the workshop organized in Vienna in May.

189. Those proliferation problems demonstrated the limits of the existing safeguards system. New Zealand fully endorsed the steps that were being taken as a matter of urgency to make safeguards more effective and efficient. It believed that the SAGSI recommendations were a major step forward. It favoured the examination of new approaches and techniques to facilitate the detection of undeclared installations. Furthermore, it agreed that routine inspection activities could be reduced through such methods as increased co-operation with State systems of accounting and control. New Zealand also regarded the new universal reporting scheme on exports and imports of nuclear material as a useful confidence-building measure. Although its involvement in such transfers was insignificant, it would participate in the scheme as an indication of its support.

190. While the Agency was rightly seeking to introduce new measures to make safeguards more cost-effective, his country was concerned that continual financial problems had impaired the Secretariat's ability to fulfil all its tasks. In the past, New Zealand had pointed out some inequities in the burden imposed by the present safeguards funding system on States with no nuclear programmes. It was all the more important, therefore, that Member States - particularly those with significant nuclear activities - should pay their budget contributions promptly. In 1993, New Zealand had once again made a modest extrabudgetary contribution to the Agency's safeguards programme.

191. While the safeguards programme was a major priority, New Zealand recognized the importance of other areas of the Agency's work - particularly the transfer of technology. Although his country's capacity to contribute to such programmes was limited, New Zealand scientists had been able to help provide training and technical input in areas in which they had appropriate expertise.

192. The preparatory work for conventions on nuclear safety and liability for nuclear damage were also of interest to his country. New Zealand produced no nuclear power itself, but felt that countries which did operate nuclear reactors should apply the highest possible safety standards. Similarly, not only States with nuclear activities, but also those without, were concerned by the issue of liability and compensation for possible nuclear damage. New Zealand looked forward to early progress in both series of negotiations.

193. His country was also worried about nuclear waste management. The dumping of nuclear waste at sea in his own region was already prohibited by the Rarotonga Treaty. New Zealand was actively supporting the adoption of an amendment to the London Convention of 1972 to bring about a total ban on the dumping of radioactive waste at sea. It welcomed the conclusions of the IGPRAD report on that subject. Its concern was shared by its Pacific neighbours and had been clearly expressed in the South Pacific Forum communiqué in August 1993. New Zealand supported the Agency's important work in that area, such as the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project and the RADWASS programme.

194. In conclusion he said that, in the present period of transition, it was more necessary than ever to keep the dangers of nuclear proliferation at bay and that New Zealand was ready to contribute to that task.

195. Mr. WALKER (Canada) noted that now, more than ever, world attention was focused on the important role that the Agency was expected to play in ensuring the safe use of nuclear energy and in supporting the NPT, particularly during the period leading up to the NPT Review Conference scheduled for 1995. The global political climate had changed, presenting new opportunities as well as fresh challenges. He was confident that the Agency

would have no problem in meeting those challenges under the able leadership of the Director General, whom he wished to congratulate on his re-election.

196. During the past year, the Agency had been confronted with some new, disquieting challenges to the integrity of the system it supported, notably on the part of Iraq and the DPRK. However, those events proved that an international organization was in the best position to deal with problems of that kind. The Canadian Government strongly supported the Agency's non-proliferation and safety objectives and encouraged those countries that had not yet acceded to the NPT or accepted full-scope safeguards to do so. In that way, all countries could contribute to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As concerns about environmental protection and sustainable development emerged, nuclear energy was called upon to become an ever more widely used energy source.

197. Given the disquiet that had arisen regarding safeguards and the status of nuclear power programmes throughout the world, it was worthwhile reflecting for a moment on the Agency's role as set forth in its Statute. The Canadian Government believed that the changed global circumstances made such reflection all the more necessary. It was customary to draw a distinction between the Agency's "promotional" activities, on the one hand, and its "regulatory" activities, meaning essentially safeguards, on the other. Canada believed that that distinction remained valid. However, in view of the current status of nuclear power and possible future developments, it was now appropriate to distinguish, among the Agency's promotional activities, between the promotion of the safety of all nuclear installations, including the management of radioactive waste, on the one hand, and the promotion of the many applications of nuclear technology in the fields of food and agriculture, human health, water resources, environmental studies and industrial applications, on the other.

198. Over the past decade there had been an increase in the number of Agency programmes dealing with safety. To some extent that increase had been accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the emphasis on the Agency's traditional nuclear power programmes. That trend appeared to be a clear reflection of Member States' needs. The current situation was very different from the situation prevailing at the time when the Agency was established. The number of countries, particularly developing countries, that were now seriously considering embarking on nuclear power programmes was significantly smaller than

it had been 20 or 30 years before. The paramount need at the moment was to ensure that all nuclear activities were conducted safely. That need was underscored by the current situation in the States of the former Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Against that background, the Agency was in a good position to play a meaningful role, particularly by offering safety-related services and by acting as the principal forum for the sharing of safety-related information.

199. Canada was not suggesting that the Agency should become an international regulatory authority, but that it should continue to play a useful role in facilitating the exchange of safety-related information. It was in fact achieving that objective through the organization of expert group meetings, workshops, and projects for the provision of safety services and the development of manpower, without however limiting itself to those activities. Canada was proposing that the Agency's basic mission be refocused so that it would rest on the following three "pillars": firstly, safeguards - involving the establishment and maintenance of an effective and efficient system of safeguards; secondly, safety - involving the implementation of programmes aimed at ensuring the safety of all nuclear installations; and thirdly, technology transfer - involving the implementation of programmes aimed at transferring to developing Member States appropriate nuclear technologies in the fields of power generation, radioactive waste management, food and agriculture, human health, environmental studies and industrial applications.

200. In elaborating on those three areas, he noted first of all, with respect to safeguards, that Canada attached great importance to the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system as part of the nuclear non-proliferation effort. That was the aim of SAGSI, whose advice the Director General had requested concerning initiatives for strengthening and streamlining safeguards. The Group had proposed a number of innovative ideas along those lines. In accordance with SAGSI's interim conclusions and recommendations, Canada agreed that the Agency's safeguards, which at present were a purely quantitative system based on material balance accounting, should include the detection of undeclared activities and facilities. Different models existed for providing the Agency with that type of capability; all relied on increased transparency, on an improvement in the Agency's capability to process information,

and on acceptance of additional safeguards activities. Canada had offered itself as a venue for the testing of some of those ideas.

201. His country believed that priority should be given to ways of detecting undeclared activities that contravened non-proliferation undertakings, and especially to the provision of resources and mobilizing of the collective will to ensure total respect for the inspection rights that were inherent in the Agency's Statute, but not explicitly set out in individual safeguards agreements.

202. States that had accepted full-scope safeguards should recognize that the Agency had a legitimate right of access at any time to nuclear installations, whether or not they had been declared, and to any other site for the purpose of verifying the absence of undeclared activities. The world might have to accept a slightly higher price for the strengthening of international peace and security that would result from the application of a truly effective safeguards regime.

203. In the second place, one of the Agency's key functions must be to continue to organize programmes to promote the safety of all nuclear facilities. There would be a readier public acceptance of nuclear energy if it were possible to demonstrate that all nuclear activities were safe. In that connection, the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors had become a major international concern. Canada believed that the Agency's programmes dealing with that matter were of fundamental importance. By way of complementing those efforts, his Government was formulating with the Russian Federation a bilateral programme entitled the Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative. It also strongly supported other multilateral efforts aimed at addressing those concerns and was looking forward to an early conclusion to the negotiations on a nuclear safety convention. It was to be hoped that a similar instrument could be developed to deal with the problem of radioactive waste management.

204. In the third place, technology transfer traditionally involved the identification of needs, the transfer of skills and equipment, and the modernization of institutions so that nuclear technology, appropriately applied, might meet the needs of Member States in various areas. At the forthcoming meetings on the Medium Term Plan, the Canadian delegation would be taking the position that it was vital that the transfer of technology should proceed

in a way that respected the principles of sustainable development. In that context, his delegation wished to emphasize that it was important that the technical assistance programme should adopt a country programme approach and take into account the lessons learned from the evaluations of the projects in progress. Canada looked forward to the Agency's reaction to those recommendations and to those of the External Auditor.

205. It was essential to maintain a balance in the Agency's various activities and his delegation believed that the Agency had succeeded in striking a proper balance between its activities and the different needs and concerns of Member States. At the same time, his delegation recognized the need for a flexible approach capable of responding to urgent problems. Particularly in view of the budgetary constraints, all Member States should endeavour to take a broad overview of the Agency's activities instead of focusing solely on issues of particular interest to them. It should also be kept in mind that the Agency had an important contribution to make to the NPT review process, given its paramount role as the custodian of the safeguards arrangements and its mandate to promote the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

206. In the light of the current situation with respect to non-proliferation, the Canadian Government was absolutely convinced that the Agency had a decisive role to play in the control of material originating from dismantled nuclear weapons and believed that the Agency should move quickly to place that material under safeguards. Although the recent reductions in nuclear arsenals were encouraging, the problem of safeguards had yet to be settled definitively. Canada believed that the security interests of all the members of the international community made it imperative that there be every possible assurance that such material was not being diverted or misused. Through its safeguards system, the Agency was in a position to provide that assurance. Similarly, the establishment of an international system for the management of plutonium would also constitute an important confidence-building measure. His delegation was looking forward to a report from the Director General on the technical discussions currently in progress on that subject and suggested that that item be placed on the agenda of future sessions of the General Conference.

207. In conclusion, he noted that it would become increasingly difficult to separate completely the Agency's different activities. Safeguards, safety and technology transfer were

all important and interconnected areas. It was up to each Member State to advise the Agency on how best to approach those subjects, taking into account the new demands and the activities in progress. Moreover, the time had come to re-examine the Agency's involvement in certain extremely useful development activities that, given the scope they had acquired, might perhaps be more appropriately pursued on an industrial scale. The Medium Term Plan would be useful in that regard, and the Canadian delegation would examine it with those objectives in mind.

208. Mr. AL-SALAMI (Observer for Yemen), welcoming the new Member States of the Agency, said that he was certain that the increase in the Agency's membership would contribute to the efforts to promote peace and security in the world.

209. The Cold War of the last few decades had hampered the process of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and had prevented the less developed or newly independent countries from generating the resources required for their development programmes and from meeting the basic needs of their peoples.

210. He was convinced that the policies of the Cold War would soon yield to those of détente and co-operation and that if more States acceded to the NPT, the developing countries would be able to obtain the support and assistance they needed in order to draw maximum benefit from the progress achieved in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in other areas conducive to national development.

211. The experience of recent decades had underscored the importance to developing nations of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which could compensate for a shortage of conventional energy resources, or provide an alternative to them, enabling those countries to meet their growing energy requirements. Nuclear energy also had important applications in medicine, agriculture and industry.

212. In that context, the Agency was playing an increasingly important role through its nuclear safety, technical assistance and safeguards programmes, under which it was contributing to strengthening confidence and co-operation between Member States, to promoting peace in the world, to accelerating the development process in developing nations,

and to ensuring a balance between the developed countries of the North and the developing countries of the South.

213. Many countries in the South were still grappling with the after-effects of colonization and resulting economic and social constraints that were being further aggravated by the population problem. Those difficulties were reflected in the inhuman, abject and insecure living conditions of their people. Co-operation was essential therefore in order to meet the basic needs of those countries' populations in terms of food, health care and social services. Specialized international agencies could help those countries to develop and diversify their energy resources for use in the economic, social and cultural sectors. Yemen urged the Agency to prevail upon international and regional organizations and the industrialized States to support the transfer and promotion of technology in developing countries.

214. Nuclear energy had become essential for raising output and improving quality in agricultural, animal and industrial production and also had applications in the development of applied sciences such as medicine.

215. Since all States with nuclear programmes were represented in the Agency, it was in a particularly good position to mobilize resources, find new methods, strengthen nuclear safety measures, monitor the production and use of nuclear source material, and ensure the safe disposal of nuclear waste.

216. Co-operation between the Agency and its Member States should be intensified in view of the practical and legal importance, not only at the national level but also at the regional and international levels, of implementing the decisions and resolutions of the Agency's policy-making organs. In that way, the Agency would be able, in co-operation with national authorities, to draft, conclude and implement international agreements and arrangements with a view to the widest possible application of regulations and guidelines governing nuclear safety, safeguards and the disposal of radioactive waste.

217. He noted with concern the gravity of the difficulties of water and food supply in some of the least developed countries, especially on the African continent and in Yemen's own region of South West Asia, and expressed his apprehensions about the serious economic, social and health-related consequences that might ensue.

218. As one of the countries most affected by drought and the depletion of groundwater reserves, Yemen was counting on the Agency's assistance in finding the most advanced and least costly techniques for groundwater prospecting or for the use of nuclear energy in the desalination of sea water so as to make it suitable for human consumption and use in agriculture.

219. His delegation welcomed the peace negotiations in the Middle East and hoped that they would lead to positive and tangible results. It also welcomed any effort that would lead to declaring the Middle East a region free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

220. He called upon the Director General to continue his consultations with a view to implementing the General Conference's resolutions on the Middle East, the application of safeguards, radiation protection, nuclear safety and the safe disposal of radioactive waste.

221. While commending the Agency's efforts to overcome the difficulties of financing the various activities under its programmes, he emphasized that all Member States should meet their financial commitments. He was confident that the Agency would be able not only to increase its resources, but also to distribute them in a balanced way among its various activities, according due priority to technical assistance and research contracts.

222. As one of the world's poorest countries, with its national existence and development still affected by the consequences of the Cold War at the international and regional levels, Yemen hoped to be able to improve its infrastructure and to acquire a sound physical base that would enable it to profit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing its resources.

223. Yemen had already taken most of the steps required for membership of the Agency. It hoped to be accorded priority in obtaining technical assistance and to receive the necessary support for establishing a national body to be responsible for devising systems and methods for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for co-ordination and co-operation with the Agency and with national and regional organizations.

224. Mr. ORTAKOVSKI (Observer for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) thanked the Agency for having admitted his country among its Member States.

Having co-operated with the Agency in the past as part of the former Yugoslavia, his country was aware of the Agency's role in stimulating science and providing technical assistance, and of its capabilities for collecting, systematizing, developing and transmitting knowledge and experience related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Now, as an independent State, his country was endeavouring, as before, to preserve peace and was making every effort to overcome a difficult situation. It was convinced that closer co-operation with the Agency would help it to achieve that end.

225. The admittance of his country to membership of the United Nations, after being made to wait 15 months, had given his country the hope that it would be possible to avoid the outbreak or spread of conflicts on its territory. As an advocate of economic development through scientific research, and concerned to promote parliamentary and multiparty democracy, his country was firmly determined to remain outside all conflicts, to help prevent war in the Balkan region and elsewhere, and to endeavour to find a peaceful solution to the current disputes in the interests of stabilizing the political situation beyond its borders. Acting in accordance with its policy in favour of peace, his country had succeeded in breaking out of forced isolation by becoming a member of a number of specialized organizations and agencies of the United Nations system, including the Agency. The help that the latter would be able to make available to it in applying nuclear technology in the fields of food and agriculture, human health, industry, research and technical co-operation would be of great value to his country.

226. Mr. SPETSIOS (Greece) took the floor to say that, following the statement of the preceding speaker, the Greek delegation wished to draw the General Conference's attention to the fact that, in accordance with its resolution of 27 September 1993 (document GC(XXXVII)/1083), it had been decided that the State represented by the preceding speaker was to be provisionally referred to, for all purposes within the Agency, as the "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", pending settlement of the difference that had arisen over the name of that State.

227. Mr. FEU ALVIM (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) recalled that Argentina and Brazil had signed, on 18 July 1991 in

Guadalajara (Mexico), an agreement, which had come into force on 12 December 1991, on the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

228. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, which had been established to monitor compliance with that bilateral agreement, had as its main objectives the administration and application of the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC), a full-scope system aimed at verifying that the nuclear material used in any nuclear activities was not being diverted to purposes prohibited under the agreement.

229. Since both countries had already placed nuclear materials under Agency safeguards at many nuclear facilities, the ABACC Secretariat had decided to assign priority to safeguarding nuclear materials subject only to the SCCC system. Mentioning a few of the operations conducted by ABACC, he said that it had already inspected 45 % of the facilities listed in the initial inventory and that it hoped that verifications would have been carried out at all the installations by the end of the year. Arrangements had been made for the destructive analysis of nuclear material samples, and a programme for certifying several laboratories was under way in both countries. In addition to the two seminars for inspectors that it had organized in 1992, ABACC had recently sponsored a special training course for inspectors and had scheduled another for 1994. Other tasks had involved the establishment of databases, the calibration and maintenance of equipment, and the preparation of seals.

230. In December 1991 in Vienna, Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency had signed a quadripartite agreement on the application of safeguards. The basic provisions of that agreement, which had not yet come into force, were the acceptance by the States Parties of safeguards covering all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities; verification to ensure that nuclear material had not been diverted to military purposes; the right and obligation of the Agency to ensure that safeguards were being applied; and the application by ABACC of its own safeguards and its co-operation with the Agency under the terms of the agreement. The agreement also provided that the States Parties, ABACC and the Agency were to endeavour to avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort in their activities. Recalling the different negotiations that had been held on the subject of subsidiary arrangements between the four

parties, he said that it was possible that a final agreement would be reached by the end of November 1993.

231. Once the quadripartite agreement entered into force, it would be possible to integrate the regional system managed by ABACC into the international system co-ordinated by the Agency. It was ABACC's view that regional safeguards systems would play an increasingly important role in nuclear non-proliferation policy. Those regional systems were effective because they were based on the principle of "neighbours watching neighbours". Regional safeguards agencies would therefore not be reduced either to playing a purely passive role or to serving as an information intermediary between the participating countries and the Agency. The ABACC safeguards system had been implemented taking into account the entry into force of the quadripartite agreement, so that that system was compatible with the Agency's own system.

232. The protocol that was part of the quadripartite agreement provided that the Agency and ABACC were to arrive at their own conclusions independently, while co-ordinating their activities so as to avoid duplication of effort. Although the ABACC system was independent and provided access to more in-depth information than the Agency's system, it was not intended that it should compete with the Agency's system, but rather that it should complement it. Moreover, it would be the Agency's task to evaluate the effectiveness of the ABACC safeguards, and he hoped that, in the near future, it would also assume responsibility for checking and certifying the quality of the regional systems.

233. At a time when safeguards effectiveness was being strengthened, regional agencies like ABACC could help to enhance that effectiveness with a view to reducing considerably any regional motivations that might exist for building a nuclear device.

The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.