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### RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

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on Wednesday, 24 September 1993, at 10.10 a.m.

President: Mr. AL-ATHEL (Saudi Arabia)  
Later: Mr. ZAITSEV (Russian Federation)

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[\*] GC(XXXVII)/1085.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXVII)/INF/328/Rev.2.

93-3759 (IV)

Abbreviations used in this record

AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GNP	Gross national product
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
INES	International Nuclear Event Scale
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
RADWASS	Radioactive Waste Safety Standards
RAPAT	Radiation Protection Advisory Team
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
START	Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco	
Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
WHO	World Health Organization

## GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1992 (GC(XXXVII)/1060) (continued)

1. Mr. HELLER ROUASSANT (Mexico) said that the past year had been an exceptional one from the point of view of safeguards. The Board of Governors had, for the first time, requested a special inspection, on account of inconsistencies found by Agency inspectors in the initial report provided by the DPRK. That event had, regrettably, led to doubts about the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT. His Government had welcomed the DPRK's decision to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT, and he hoped that the DPRK Government would continue consultations - both with the Agency and with the countries directly concerned - with a view to finding a satisfactory solution to the nuclear issue and to promote the rapid denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. His delegation hoped that examination of the matter by the General Conference would help ensure the continuation of safeguards in the DPRK and verification of the DPRK's initial report by the Agency.

2. With regard to the strengthening of safeguards, the Board of Governors had, at its February 1993 meetings, decided to establish a universal reporting system for nuclear material and specified equipment and non-nuclear material; also, a study had begun of initiatives proposed by SAGSI. Efforts to modify the safeguards system had - to a considerable degree - been triggered by the fact that a Member State had not fulfilled its obligations and by the problems arising from the fact that it had so far proved impossible to verify the completeness of the DPRK's nuclear inventory, the Agency focusing its efforts on the creation of a new safeguards system - preventive in nature - which would permit the identification of undeclared nuclear facilities. His delegation felt that such exceptional developments should not be allowed to unduly influence the exercise in which the Agency was engaged, since a safeguards system based on total lack of confidence ran the risk of calling into question the integrity of all States. Nevertheless, his Government fully recognized the need to strengthen the safeguards system and make it more effective, with the essential proviso that the measures adopted to that end be binding, universal, non-discriminatory and set in an appropriate legal framework.

3. Accordingly, his delegation was interested in some of the SAGSI proposals described in document GOV/2657. It believed that they could be implemented once the necessary legal

framework had been established and there had been an in-depth study of their technical, financial and political implications. His delegation shared the view that there was a need for a forum in which Member States could conduct detailed and comprehensive negotiations regarding the safeguards system and consider the creation of a complementary legal framework to accommodate the new elements agreed to by those States in the interests of strengthening the Agency's safeguards. He therefore supported the idea of establishing a committee open to all Member States along the lines of the Safeguards Committee (1970), which had formulated the material reproduced in document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected). That would enable Member States to undertake a continuous and in-depth study of the subject, and the Board of Governors would no longer have to engage in sporadic discussions of half-measures which were increasingly voluntary in nature and less and less universal.

4. Such a committee would have to be given a specific mandate and a target date for the completion of its work. The target date might well be 1995 - the year of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The aim should be to create a truly universal system which complemented both the one based on document INFCIRC/153 and the one based on document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2.

5. There was an urgent need to think about the question of compliance with those obligations entered into by States under NPT which were directly related to Agency activities. That would contribute to the preparations for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, to the strengthening of all the Agency's activities and to the timely drafting of the documents which the Agency would submit to the Conference.

6. In recent years, the countries which were suppliers of nuclear material, equipment and technology had increased export restrictions by broadening the scope of the London Guidelines, thereby undermining the principles contained in Article IV of the NPT, under which all the Parties undertook to facilitate the fullest possible exchange in co-operation with other States or with international organizations. The Agency was the appropriate multilateral body for carrying out the promotional activities foreseen in Article IV of the NPT.

7. The nuclear Powers had had a quarter of a century, since the adoption of the NPT, to demonstrate to the international community their willingness to fully comply with the aims

set forth in the preamble to Article VI of the Treaty: nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Now, in the post-Cold War era, they should make every effort to do so as soon as possible. In that connection, the Agency might play an important role in the application of safeguards to the nuclear material derived from the disarmament process.

8. The Agency might also become involved in the system for verifying compliance with a possible complete nuclear test ban treaty. His delegation recognized the importance of the unilateral nuclear weapons testing moratoria declared by the United States, the Russian Federation, France and the United Kingdom and hoped that all the nuclear Powers would abide by such moratoria in the interests of creating an international climate conducive to multilateral consultations on a nuclear weapons ban treaty. The entry into force of START I and START II would mean a significant reduction in nuclear weapons. Mexico hoped that all the republics of the former USSR would ratify the NPT and bring it into force as soon as possible.

9. His delegation welcomed South Africa's unprecedented decision to renounce nuclear weapons, to destroy the nuclear weapons already developed by it and to support the initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

10. His delegation hoped that the experience gained through the Tlatelolco Treaty would serve as a frame of reference for denuclearization in other parts of the world, particularly Africa and the Middle East. With Dominica's recent accession, the Treaty now had 25 full Parties, and Mexico was sure that the countries of the region for which the Treaty was not yet in force would accede to it soon and thereby consolidate the nuclear-weapon-free zone envisaged in Article IV of the Treaty. On 10 September 1993, his Government had deposited the first instrument of ratification of the amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty which had been approved by the OPANAL General Conference in August 1992.

11. In the view of his delegation, which had taken part in the meetings of the Group of Experts for the drafting of a nuclear safety convention, such a convention would help greatly to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants in much of the world. While the convention should ideally embrace all nuclear facility types, including fuel cycle facilities, his country could go along with its initial restricted application to civil nuclear power plants, on the

understanding that the preamble contained a commitment to the subsequent inclusion of other facility types once basic safety principles had been accepted by international consensus. He reiterated his country's firm belief that the responsibility for nuclear safety should remain with competent national authorities.

12. His Government welcomed the Agency activities aimed at enhancing the safety of nuclear facilities. The Agency's services should be provided only at the request of Member States, however, and the costs of providing them should be met from the Regular Budget.

13. The process of revising the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage had not made as much progress as his delegation would have liked, and he hoped that all countries participating in the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage would make every effort to enable a diplomatic conference on the matter to be convened in 1994.

14. Mexico fully subscribed to the principle that the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy should be accessible to all States which had made a legally binding commitment to non-proliferation and had accepted the application of safeguards to source and special fissionable materials. Those States had a right to participate in the broadest possible exchange of scientific and technical information relating to such applications. The Agency should therefore do more in the way of providing the materials, services, equipment and facilities necessary for promoting - throughout the world - nuclear power generation and the practical application of nuclear energy in agriculture, health, industry and scientific research.

15. Mexico wished to participate actively in the planning, implementation and evaluation of model technical co-operation projects which focused on the needs of the final users and which were closely linked to national and sectorial development plans. His delegation welcomed the initiative taken by the Department of Technical Co-operation to identify and support such projects.

16. The difficult financial situation of the Agency had become chronic. A pragmatic review of its activities from the point of view of efficiency and effectiveness was necessary in order to avoid duplication and waste. Evaluation was crucial for determining the real impact of projects. A strategic framework was essential for defining the main directions of

Agency activity; the 1995-2000 Medium-Term Plan could serve as such and should be developed on the basis of extensive consultations between the Secretariat and Member States.

17. Finally, it was essential to analyse the political changes taking place in the world and their impact on the Agency, the developments in the field of nuclear technology taking place in various Member States and the impact of the activities of the Agency on its Member States - all factors which should be reflected in the Agency's policy-making organs, and particularly in the composition of the Board of Governors, to ensure that the Agency kept up with the times and was able to face the challenges of the coming millennium.

18. Mr. KIENER (Switzerland) said that among the various noteworthy events of the past year, two had been particularly serious: the non-compliance of the DPRK with its safeguards obligations and the announcement by the DPRK of its intention - later suspended - to withdraw from the NPT.

19. As a Member State of the Agency and a party to the NPT, Switzerland firmly believed that the DPRK should meet those obligations and allow the Agency to carry out its safeguards task to the full. His country was convinced that that would be in the interests both of the international community and of the DPRK.

20. In March, South Africa had disclosed that it had had a military nuclear programme. South Africa's invitation to the Agency to visit all the sites which had been involved in the programme had been a welcome gesture.

21. At its annual meeting in Lucerne (Switzerland), the Nuclear Suppliers Group had reaffirmed the importance of its guidelines on trade in nuclear-related goods and technology for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The members had agreed that the guidelines should be amended so as to require the application of Agency safeguards to all current and future nuclear activities as a condition for significant new supply undertakings vis-à-vis non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group had once again appealed to supplier countries which had not yet adopted such a policy to do so as speedily as possible.

22. Switzerland was concerned about the Agency's financial situation in respect of both Regular Budget and TACF contributions. Member States should pay their dues without

delay, and those Member States which had pledged TACF contributions should honour their pledges.

23. The year before, Switzerland had called upon the Agency to co-operate with those countries which had considerable experience of safeguards in order to make the system more effective and keep costs under control. In that connection, he recalled that in 1995 the Board of Governors had to submit to the General Conference a recommendation on the financing of safeguards which took into account the financial impact of the safeguards implementation measures then in force. By that time, some of the present measures would have been modified and new procedures would have been introduced, but beforehand the measures and procedures in question would have to be tested and their cost implications assessed. The two matters were linked, and there was no time to lose.

24. What were the Agency's objectives in that connection? Did it want to do a little better by making an extra effort? In his delegation's opinion, broadening the present system by extending safeguards procedures was not the right approach; nor was it necessarily useful or appropriate to perfect the present procedures to the point where all radioactive materials could be recorded and tracked. Such efforts, particularly in respect of States parties to the NPT, would merely provide further confirmation of transactions which were known or which conformed to the prescribed rules: they would not reveal any clandestine transfers. The Agency should consider reducing its substantial routine inspection effort, which related to declared materials without direct military significance unless enrichment or separation had taken place. Why should it not focus its efforts on fuel cycle facilities, which presented the greatest risks of diversion and were the natural crossroads in the movement of materials?

25. Nuclear safety was another important field of Agency activity. In 1991, when it had been decided to start the process of drafting a nuclear safety convention, Switzerland had thought that the task would soon be completed; the technical experience gathered over a period of 40 years was available, and all that needed to be done was to demonstrate that the basic principles of nuclear safety were known and recognized by the experts.

26. However, for various reasons that had little to do with the substance of the matter, the process had not advanced as far as it might have. Nevertheless, a first draft was likely

to appear the following month, and he hoped that it would be acceptable to all. While his delegation agreed with the idea of having initially a convention restricted to nuclear power plants, it believed very strongly that an extension to cover nuclear waste should not be delayed.

27. He hoped that those first two parts of the envisaged nuclear safety convention would soon be open for signature by States, for it was important not to give the public the impression that fruitless discussions were preventing agreement on the basic safety principles.

28. With regard to reactors in central Europe and countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), his delegation was pleased that work on enhancing their safety was proceeding well. International effort had brought about substantial improvements. The Agency was assisting the regulatory authorities of the countries concerned, thereby complementing the efforts of Member States, the European Community, WANO and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

29. A great deal of work had been carried out already, but much remained to be done. In that connection, he was pleased to convey his Government's decision to contribute S.Fr. 200 000 in support of the programme on RBMK safety.

30. As regards the nuclear energy situation in Switzerland, in 1992 the Mühleberg nuclear power plant had undergone major renovation and been subjected to a thorough examination by the safety authorities, with a view to obtaining a renewal of its operating licence and authorization to increase the power level by 10%; as a result, the Government had granted the authorization. That had given rise to strong protests from environmental organizations, which had decided to withdraw from the discussions being conducted with a view to achieving a consensus on nuclear waste.

31. The painful conflict about nuclear energy had thus been reactivated. Environmental organizations had renewed their demands for the abandonment of nuclear power generation while maintaining their demands for a reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. They were clinging to the idea that the latter goal could be achieved merely through the rational use of energy and the development of renewable energy sources, and they would not relinquish their opposition to the construction of hydroelectric power plants.

32. Despite the results of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED - held in Rio de Janeiro) and the efforts being made to develop safer plants, there was not sufficient acceptance of nuclear power in Switzerland for the construction of a new plant to be envisaged. Even if a majority of citizens wanted it, there would still be the problem of acceptance by future neighbours of the plant and the moratorium in force until the end of the century.

33. The current recession had led to a stabilization of energy consumption in Europe, including Switzerland. But let there be no mistake: consumption would start rising again (albeit more slowly), and new plants would have to be built. However, they would be built only if people were convinced that they were needed, so credible energy saving measures would have to be taken.

34. Advances would also have to be made in waste management. In some countries, facilities for the final storage of low- and medium-level radioactive waste were in operation. In Switzerland, after prolonged studies, the probable final storage site had been selected, but before construction work could start further studies would be necessary and political and legal opposition would have to be overcome. There was probably no other technology whose implementation was so difficult - at least in Switzerland.

35. Given the large amounts involved, each country using nuclear technology should store its low- and medium-level radioactive waste within its own territory. In the case of highly radioactive waste, on the other hand, given the small amounts involved the producer countries should, for safety and cost reasons, collaborate in establishing a few final storage facilities rather than each establishing its own facility. He hoped that more would be heard on that subject in the coming decades.

36. Mr. KOCH (Denmark) said that already in 1985, one year before the Chernobyl accident, Denmark had decided that nuclear energy should not be utilized in its electricity production - a decision based on the assessment that the nuclear safety and waste storage problems remained unsolved. His country had therefore also decided to reduce its CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by means that were, in its opinion, more acceptable from an environmental and safety point of view.

37. In accordance with international recommendations, Denmark aimed to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 20% during the period until the year 2005. It was also aiming to reduce total energy consumption substantially.

38. Denmark was, and had been for a number of years, one of the nations with the lowest consumption of energy per unit of GNP. Nevertheless, the Government and Parliament were of the opinion that even in Denmark there was considerable potential for increased energy conservation.

39. The target was to reduce energy consumption by 15% in the coming 15 years, in accordance with the target - set in the Brundtland Commission's report on sustainable development - of a 50% reduction in the energy consumption of the industrialized countries over a period of 50 years. Extremely important for attaining those ambitious targets would be greater efficiency in energy production and consumption and the use of other types of fuel.

40. An important way of increasing efficiency in district heating was to increase combined heat and power production from the present level of 50% to a level of 90%.

41. The means of increasing efficiency in energy consumption included a broad variety of regulatory and fiscal measures. The conversion to other types of fuel would consist mainly in replacing coal by natural gas and new and renewable sources of energy.

42. A CO<sub>2</sub> tax had already been introduced in Denmark, independently of the fact that the European Community had failed in its efforts to introduce a common Community CO<sub>2</sub> tax in the current year. The other elements of the Danish strategy had been implemented or were in process of implementation and had started to take effect.

43. Turning to Agency matters, he associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Belgium on behalf of the European Community and its member States.

44. Since the 1992 session of the General Conference, significant developments had taken place in two important fields of direct or indirect concern to the Agency, and it had become clear that strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and improving nuclear

safety were two of the most demanding challenges faced by to the international community in the nuclear field.

45. Denmark regarded the NPT as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime and was pleased that the number of States party to the NPT was still growing - making non-proliferation a universally accepted principle. At the same time, however, it was deeply concerned about the current problems regarding the acceptance and application of Agency safeguards verification. He was referring to the serious problems connected with the DPRK, but his delegation was also concerned about the fact that nearly 50 of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not yet concluded safeguards agreements in accordance with their treaty obligations. Although the outstanding agreements related to States with no significant nuclear activities, it remained a matter of importance for the credibility of the NPT and the safeguards system that States should comply with their obligations under Article III.

46. The non-detection of Iraq's secret nuclear weapons programme had demonstrated clearly the need to strengthen the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. Consequently, Denmark strongly supported every effort aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. The signing in February of the agreement between the Agency and EURATOM for application of the Partnership Approach had been a positive step in that direction. Through the Partnership Approach substantial economic benefits could be realized, enabling the Agency to achieve more effective utilization of safeguards resources, and use of that approach might also be considered in other regions of the world.

47. All possible ways of strengthening the safeguards system should be examined with a view to reducing the number of cases of illicit trade in nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.

48. To ensure that co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the comprehensive export and supply controls must be tightened. In that connection, Denmark welcomed the growing acceptance of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines on trade in nuclear-related goods and technology

and the fact that members of the Group had now modified the guidelines to provide that Agency safeguards were required on all current and future nuclear activities as a condition for significant new supplies. All other nuclear suppliers should adopt the policy of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply.

49. It was a problem of great concern to the entire international community that countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union were operating nuclear power plants at critically low safety levels. Some of the plants in question ought to be shut down immediately, and his delegation regretted that the current financial and energy supply situation of the countries concerned ruled out immediate decommissioning. However, it appreciated the efforts being made by the Agency to help strengthen nuclear safety in those countries and welcomed the fact that during the past year the Agency had moved into a closer working relationship with the multilateral bodies which bore the major responsibility for nuclear safety assistance. In particular, it was of significance that the Agency now had a formal relationship with the G-24 as a technical adviser.

50. The Danish Government supported efforts to exploit the large energy-saving potential in the countries in question and to develop longer-term alternative energy supply strategies aimed at reducing energy dependence and encouraging a swifter shutdown of the unsafe reactors.

51. Denmark favoured the creation of a comprehensive and legally binding international nuclear safety regime. Important steps towards that goal had already been taken in the work on drafting a nuclear safety convention and in the negotiations on a nuclear protocol to the European Energy Charter.

52. With regard to the drafting of a nuclear safety convention, Denmark was a little disappointed at the outcome of the work of the technical and legal experts. It would have preferred to see a convention covering all nuclear activities, but it now appeared that the convention would be limited essentially to civil nuclear power plants. However, his delegation hoped that, with the completion of the drafting of the convention, the political will to begin negotiations on an international instrument on the safety of waste management would be forthcoming.

53. As to the European Energy Charter, substantial progress had been made towards the conclusion of a protocol on principles governing the peaceful utilization of nuclear installations. The present draft protocol covered the entire fuel cycle and would supplement - not duplicate - the work done in the nuclear convention field. Another important aspect of the protocol would be a legal obligation for parties planning the construction of nuclear installations to consult with neighbouring States and take into consideration their concerns. Denmark believed that adoption of the principle that neighbouring countries must be consulted would be a major step forward.

54. The need to strengthen the nuclear liability regime was perceived with a growing sense of urgency. Denmark, which greatly appreciated the work being done by the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, hoped that the intensification of the Committee's efforts would lead to the submission of draft amendments to a revision conference on the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage - possibly in 1994.

55. Denmark attached great importance to the Agency's technical assistance activities, which were still growing at a substantial rate. It could accept the target of US \$58.5 million for contributions to the TACF in 1994 and had already pledged its full share.

56. Ms. OK (Turkey) said that the Agency's endeavours during the past year in the areas of nuclear safety and safeguards had been particularly noteworthy.

57. Nuclear safety was a matter of international - rather than merely national - concern, and it was to be hoped that the momentum gained to date would be kept up in the work on drafting a nuclear safety convention. However, the Group of Experts would have to make further progress before a diplomatic conference could be convened to finalize the text. The States interested in achieving a widely accepted convention should display the political will necessary for overcoming their major differences and seek solutions which took account of the basic interests of all. She hoped that the scope of the convention would ultimately be expanded to cover all parts of the fuel cycle.

58. Primary responsibility for applying the resulting international nuclear safety regime would rest with national authorities, but the internationally agreed nuclear safety principles would provide a basis for national regulations.

59. With regard to safeguards, her delegation shared the Director General's concern about the activities of undeclared facilities and supported the Agency's efforts to identify such facilities.

60. Regarding the early notification of nuclear accidents, Turkey favoured the conclusion of bilateral agreements with its neighbours; such an agreement was in the process of being concluded with Bulgaria. Initiatives of that kind could contribute greatly to the enhancement of nuclear safety at the regional level.

61. It was fortunate that there was now much wider awareness of the risks presented by reactors with inadequate safety standards. Her Government believed that every effort should be made, in particular, to raise the standards applied at the RBMK and old WWER plants in Central and Eastern Europe, and it looked forward to the early implementation of recommendations resulting from Agency missions to such facilities. Quite apart from pure considerations of safety, it should be borne in mind that, unless the standards were raised, nuclear power programmes of the countries in question would continually meet with the resistance of the anti-nuclear community. In that context, she urged the Director General to ensure maximum transparency in the Secretariat's dealings with Member States in the nuclear safety area and to report regularly to the relevant Agency bodies.

62. In recent years, no significant progress had been made with regard to liability for nuclear damage, which was very regrettable given the importance of that issue in a world where nuclear power plants were in wide use. While it was difficult, of course, to reflect all views and interests in a single global mechanism, there ought to be some way of meeting the expectations of different States both within and outside the framework of the existing conventions. In view of the difficulties encountered by the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage in its efforts to achieve an improved liability regime using the civil law approach, a mechanism should be established under public international law for compensating States in the event of transboundary nuclear damage.

63. International security depended very much on the effective implementation of Agency safeguards. In that connection, her Government favoured the adoption of regional approaches in efforts to achieve non-proliferation objectives, notwithstanding the international character of the safeguards regime, and it accordingly welcomed the agreement recently reached between the PLO and Israel. The Declaration of Principles signed in Washington represented an historic step forward in the peace process. It was to be hoped that the recent encouraging developments in the Middle East would prove conducive to greater nuclear co-operation in the region, the consummation of the peace process engendering a firm political will to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

64. With regard to Iraq, the Agency inspection teams and the Director General himself were to be commended for their efforts to ensure the implementation of various United Nations Security Council resolutions. Her delegation hoped that, combined with increased co-operation on Iraq's part, those efforts would help bring peace and security to the region, thereby alleviating the sufferings of the Iraqi people and all others affected by the situation directly or indirectly.

65. Her Government had repeatedly expressed its firm commitment to more effective safeguards, the urgent need for which had been clearly demonstrated by the unfortunate developments on the Korean Peninsula. Also, it believed that the NPT Review and Extension Conference would provide a good opportunity to examine the shortcomings of the existing safeguards and verification regimes. Steps should be taken, moreover, to demonstrate that violations of the NPT could not be tolerated and to put an end to a situation where certain countries, notwithstanding their adherence to NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, had nevertheless been able in recent years to develop nuclear weapons production capacities. If the NPT was to be extended indefinitely, that situation could not be allowed to continue.

66. It was imperative that every country adopt effective internal measures for controlling exports of nuclear technology and material and that the controls should be applied universally. Also, the transfer and sale of plutonium should be subject to international controls. Her Government was seriously worried about media reports relating to such matters and believed that some mechanism should be established whereby clarification could be sought from the States concerned. As a non-nuclear-weapon State that had faithfully met

all its NPT obligations, Turkey had consistently opposed any action leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it expected other States parties to adopt the same attitude.

67. The Board's endorsement of a scheme for reporting exports and imports of nuclear materials and special equipment had been a step forward in the creation of an effective and reliable safeguards regime, as had been the provision by SAGSI of advice in that connection. Her Government would continue to support the Agency in that area.

68. The non-proliferation regime had been considerably strengthened by the recent developments in Africa, and it was to be hoped that there would be similar developments.

69. In recent years, during a period when the Agency's ability to implement its programmes had been seriously impaired by financial problems, important international political developments and economic and technological changes had taken place, necessitating a careful review of the Agency's role in the light of the new challenges and the expanding needs of Member States. In that context, Member States and the Secretariat should look into ways of increasing the scientific and technological capabilities of developing countries with regard to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, the ultimate goal being sustainable development.

70. Inviting the Agency to co-operate with her Government in investigating the possible existence of radionuclides in the Black Sea, she said that the Turkish authorities were willing to co-operate with all the countries concerned under the Agency's auspices and would welcome proposals in that regard.

71. With regard to the resolution on education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety adopted by the General Conference in 1992, she expressed her country's readiness to host some of the regional and interregional training courses referred to in document GC(XXXVII)/1067.

72. Expressing appreciation of the comprehensive report on personnel questions (GC(XXXVII)/1071), she commended the Director General for the internal measures which had been taken in order to create a working environment free from gender bias and conducive to the employment of women in the Secretariat. She looked forward to the

recruitment during the coming year of a large number of qualified women from developing countries.

73. Finally, she expressed her delegation's appreciation for the Secretariat's co-operation with Turkey under the technical assistance and co-operation programme for 1993; Turkey looked forward to maintaining its close co-operation with the Agency in the years to come.

74. Mr. OJANEN (Finland) said that the Agency, faced with new challenges, was in the process of rejuvenating itself. Fresh approaches were being sought to old problems, and some new activities had come to the fore. At the same time, financial constraints and the constantly changing environment in which the Agency operated had added to the pressures for change. It had become necessary to make economies by cutting back or discontinuing some traditional activities which, while valuable in themselves, no longer warranted the priority once accorded to them. More and more activities of lesser priority would have to be phased out in order to make room for new priorities.

75. The Agency's Secretariat had so far been reasonably successful in the difficult task of making proportionate savings across the entire overall programme. Increasingly, however, it found itself in a situation where it was difficult to start new activities within the constraints of zero-real-growth budgeting. Priorities would have to be established not only within, but also between, the various individual programmes. The Agency's essential activities, safeguards and nuclear safety, would have to be treated differently from the rest. That did not mean, however, that there would be no need for rethinking within those two programme areas: on the contrary, new concepts and ideas would be needed there more than ever before. Other activities could benefit from better co-ordination with other international organizations, such as FAO or WHO.

76. In the past, doing a little of everything might have presented itself as a workable compromise. In the future, however, the Agency would have to concentrate on areas where it could make a difference, and put other activities on hold or discontinue them altogether. A culture of priority-setting would no doubt take some time to emerge, but there was no better approach to saving. He looked forward to programmes with priority indications based on project alternatives rather than on universally applied percentage savings.

77. The creation of a more reliable nuclear safety regime remained one of the most important tasks facing the international nuclear community. In his delegation's view, the adoption of an international nuclear safety convention could be a major step in the right direction. The Group of Experts for the drafting of such a convention had made good progress, but problems remained which needed to be ironed out without further delay.

78. Finland would have preferred safety aspects of the whole nuclear fuel cycle, including waste management, to be covered by the envisaged convention. Waste emanating from the military utilization of nuclear energy was an increasingly topical problem, and he believed that the safety aspects of such waste should also be regulated internationally and hoped that the convention would be expanded in that respect in the future. Nevertheless, Finland was prepared to help in finalizing the convention by the spring of 1994, in the expectation that the standards to be established would serve to improve the legal status and the practical application of the safety regime worldwide.

79. He was pleased to note the rapid progress achieved during the past year with regard to nuclear safety assistance to countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The co-ordination structures for the provision of assistance had now largely been put in place.

80. The Agency had carried out thorough safety surveys on different reactor types, enlisting the best expertise available in Member States, and provided a forum for co-operation. In many cases, the Agency's studies and safety assessments constituted an indispensable preliminary phase for bilateral and multilateral projects.

81. Finland was contributing to those efforts through its bilateral programme of co-operation with the Russian Federation, giving priority to improving the safety of nuclear power plants adjacent to Finland. It was also participating in multilateral co-operation efforts, such as the projects initiated by the G-24 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

82. In his delegation's view, priority should be given to programmes in those countries where the supply of electricity was most dependent on nuclear power generation, where the general safety regime was inadequate and where there was a readiness to make a binding

commitment to joint efforts to close sub-standard reactors as soon as the energy situation allowed.

83. The role of safeguards as the Agency's main function was now more topical than ever. The innovative work done by SAGSI was an important contribution to safeguards development, and deserved to be followed up by SAGSI itself and by the Secretariat. The policy-making organs of the Agency should keep the matter under active consideration. Further work would no doubt be needed, and Finland was ready to participate in field trials of new safeguards methods and equipment.

84. Finland would participate fully in the voluntary reporting scheme for imports and exports of nuclear materials, and Finland's support programme on new methods of safeguards implementation would be continued.

85. The value of openness and transparency had been clearly demonstrated in various fields of intergovernmental activity, particularly where verification was an important aspect of the implementation of agreed arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures. Improved transparency, together with better understanding of the facilities to be inspected, might well lead to savings. In future, safeguards could be focused increasingly on facilities calling for particular attention, such as complex bulk-handling facilities and research reactors. Light-water reactors might be an example of facilities where safeguards implementation could be further streamlined.

86. That might involve difficult political decisions, and time would be needed in order to build up the necessary confidence, but he believed that, if the Agency was to increase its relevance in the non-proliferation field, it had to take that direction.

87. Despite some setbacks, the current decade held the promise of major advances in the fields of disarmament and arms control. The next milestone was likely to be the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and in that connection he emphasized Finland's support for the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT.

88. All countries which had not yet acceded to NPT should do so, thereby making universal the single most important arms control agreement. Together with the other Nordic countries, Finland had made representations to those countries and to the NPT parties which

had not yet concluded with the Agency the safeguards agreement required by the NPT. It was convinced that those two non-proliferation measures, accession to the NPT and conclusion of the required safeguards agreement, were also the best possible way to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

89. Those newly independent States which still had nuclear weapons on their soil should accede to the NPT as soon as possible. The international community stood ready to assist them in their denuclearization efforts. Finland was ready to contribute to support programmes designed to help develop a safeguards implementation capacity in Ukraine and other countries concerned.

90. Following recent new developments in the area of disarmament, the Agency might be given a role in the international verification of a comprehensive test ban and be entrusted with the task of safeguarding nuclear material deriving from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Another welcome development had been the initiatives taken with a view to the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

91. His Government was particularly pleased that South Africa had dismantled its nuclear weapons programme and subjected its nuclear materials to verification by the Agency. That unprecedented action was proof of the benefits accruing from accession to the non-proliferation regime.

92. Progress had also been made in dismantling Iraq's nuclear military capacity, although work remained to be done in implementing the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

93. On the other hand, the DPRK had yet to respond to the request of the Board of Governors for further information and access to certain locations, and he regretted that the Board had not been able to report any progress on that issue: on the contrary, even routine inspections and other safeguards activities had been jeopardized.

94. He reiterated Finland's full support for the actions of the Director General and the Secretariat. In his view, all aspersions cast on the impartiality of the Secretariat in performing tasks mandated by the NPT were unwarranted.

95. The case of the DPRK was a serious challenge to the NPT and to the integrity of the international non-proliferation regime; if left unresolved, it could pose a threat to international stability and security. The DPRK should remedy the situation by complying with its obligations without delay.

96. A week before, his country's Parliament had voted (by 107 votes to 90) against the decision taken the previous February by the Finnish Government, pending parliamentary approval, to license the construction of a new nuclear power unit in Finland. That would lead to a reformulation of the Government's energy strategy, since the current one included the option of new nuclear capacity.

97. That turn of events would not, however, lead to any change in the Government's policy concerning the Agency. His country remained a strong supporter of those activities of the Agency which it had supported all along - namely, activities which contributed to the safe and secure utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Zaitsev (Russian Federation) took the Chair.

98. Mr. EL-HUSSEIN (Sudan) said that recent major world developments would have important consequences for the Agency, which should adapt to them while continuing to pursue its objectives. For that to happen, Member States would have to foster a conducive climate, and in that connection he welcomed the fact that the large number of States party to the NPT was still increasing and appealed to all those States which had not yet acceded to the NPT to take that important step in the interests of world peace.

99. It was necessary to accelerate progress towards the establishment of international mechanisms in the fields of nuclear safety, radiological protection and environmental protection in order to enhance confidence in nuclear power plant safety and dispel fears connected with the dumping of nuclear waste, especially in developing countries. All Member States should collaborate towards that end.

100. He welcomed the courageous step taken by South Africa in acceding to the NPT and concluding the required safeguards agreement with the Agency and also the recent declaration that South Africa had terminated its nuclear weapons programme. He greatly regretted, however, that Israel had not yet acceded to the NPT. Israel's attitude was hampering efforts

to achieve a just peace in the Middle East and rendering meaningless the resolution concerning safeguards in that region which the General Conference had adopted in 1992.

101. The Agency's technical co-operation activities were important for developing countries, particularly the least developed among them. However, the serious financial situation of the Agency was having an adverse impact on many technical co-operation projects. There was accordingly an urgent need to find ways of increasing the resources available for technical co-operation - perhaps through allocations from the Regular Budget, whereby there would be less need to rely on voluntary contributions to the TACF.

102. The Agency's African Member States were pinning their hopes on AFRA as a mechanism for achieving some of their goals in such fields as medicine, agriculture, radiation protection, food irradiation, environmental protection, and training and manpower development. However, inadequate funding remained an obstacle to the implementation of many projects which had been pronounced feasible. He hoped that those projects would ultimately attract the necessary financial support from all Member States and/or international donor organizations.

103. Sudan, which strongly supported the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, was convinced that nuclear energy had an important role to play in helping to create the infrastructures necessary for development. The competent authorities in Sudan, in co-operation with the Agency, were striving to enhance the country's capabilities in that field with a view to Sudan's engaging in a wide range of peaceful nuclear applications.

104. Mr. FRANK (Israel) said that the last decade of the twentieth century had introduced momentous and unexpected changes in a world to which people had become accustomed over nearly half a century. Wherever one looked, there was flux and motion, hopefully in a positive direction. The ultimate outcome of the worldwide turmoil was hard - if not impossible - to predict, but the flow of events presented new, exciting challenges and a fresh burden of responsibility.

105. Everyone was aware of the momentous developments which might usher in a more benign era in the Middle East: the unprecedented breakthrough that had taken place during recent weeks in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and

Jordan. The same, he hoped, would happen soon with the other participants in the peace process. The people of Israel hoped and prayed that those positive developments would mark the opening of a new era in the Middle East, and in the relationship between Israel and its neighbours - an era of peace, true reconciliation, security, co-operation and economic growth. They knew that the international community to a large extent supported that process.

106. It was important, however, not to lose sight of the difficulties with which the transition was fraught and of the fact that goodwill, patience and restraint were required of all parties involved in order to create the confidence without which progress could not be achieved. All the same, there was dramatic movement on some crucial political issues, and intensive multilateral talks were in progress on various matters of regional concern.

107. Nevertheless, the fact still had to be faced that there were powerful States in the region which continued to deny Israel its existence, refused to forswear war as a means of settling outstanding issues with it and refused to be parties to the peace talks. That fact had a special bearing on the problems of regional security and arms control, which could not be adequately addressed until all parties explicitly accepted Israel's place in the Middle East and renounced war as a means of settling conflicts. Until such time, the best that Israel could do was to work out confidence-building measures with its partners in the peace process. Such measures could be eminently useful in promoting bilateral reassurance, but regional security and arms control depended above all on the express willingness of all States of the region to co-exist peacefully. That stage had not been reached yet.

108. As the Agency pondered its own contribution to the peace process, it should above all acknowledge the primacy of the peace talks - the free and direct negotiations between the parties on all outstanding issues, and not on any single issue alone. The Agency should, he believed, put its expertise at the disposal of the parties to the peace talks once they began to engage in negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It would not be helpful if the Agency were to pre-empt the agenda of the peace talks and take initiatives unrelated to the preconditions for regional security about which he had just been speaking.

109. The Agency had a tremendously important technical mission and deserved to be commended on its highly professional and dedicated work in striving to meet new challenges. The Director General had once said that the Agency was the "tailor" who knew how to make a suit to fit the requirements of the customer. That was a modest but apt description of the Agency's role, and in the present instance it was the parties to the peace talks who were the customers. They would undoubtedly call on the experience of the Agency when the time was ripe.

110. The new spirit of the peace process warranted the long overdue reinstatement of all the rights and privileges of Israel as a full Member State by the governing bodies of the Agency.

111. The Agency was to be commended on the systematic, coherent and comprehensive way in which it dealt with nuclear safety and radiation protection issues. Its intensive programme aimed at improving the safety standards for nuclear power plant and research reactor operation, radiological protection and waste disposal was making impressive progress. However, like some other intensive and comprehensive programmes, that commendable enterprise should be protected from a tendency to grasp too much or to try achieving very far-reaching goals too soon. He would illustrate that point by means of two examples.

112. One was the revision of the Basic Safety Standards for Radiological Protection, an important safety-related effort where an attempt had been made to introduce new approaches and a much broader coverage. That had caused a number of States concern because of the implications it might have for practices which they had been implementing formally for a long time. Israel, which had submitted detailed comments on the first draft revised texts, believed that the Agency and its partner organizations should limit somewhat the scope of the Basic Safety Standards so as to gain the widest possible international acceptance while still following the main recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).

113. The other example was the continuing effort to draft a nuclear safety convention. Israel's policy had been to support the establishment of such a convention provided that it was limited at the present stage to nuclear power plants (*on the safety principles for which*

there was wide consensus) and that it was an incentive-type convention; both stipulations seemed to be essential if the convention was to gain wide participation with negligible reservations. Israel, which had expressed its views on the convention at the General Conference's 1992 session and at the meetings of the Group of Experts, hoped that with some narrowing of the draft convention's scope more progress would be made in the near future on what was a very important subject.

114. Most of the Agency's safety-related activities, being conducted at the level of the professional expert, went virtually unnoticed by - and were hardly comprehensible to - members of the public. Yet the public acceptance of nuclear applications which were not just safe, but obviously safe, was essential. In many respects, the public acceptance issue was the most complex problem facing the world nuclear community in general and the Agency in particular. Risk perceptions based on partial knowledge and misconception were hard to counter, and long-standing credibility gaps were difficult to bridge. He believed, however, that the task was not impossible. Much could be accomplished by a sustained, well co-ordinated and purposeful educational campaign in which the Agency played an important role. Without such an effort, the Agency's other - technical - efforts might prove to be insufficient.

115. A major topic of such a campaign should be food irradiation, an urgently required technique which was wholeheartedly recommended by all relevant international organizations but whose application was encountering unjustified obstacles. There was a pressing need to understand what was preventing the public acceptance of food irradiation and to provide the public with information which brought out the enormous advantages of the technique.

116. Noting that he came from a region where water supply problems were of acute concern to the responsible authorities and the public at large, he said that the use of nuclear reactors as a source of power for water desalination plants had long been an unfulfilled promise. Only one nuclear desalination project had ever been implemented. The Agency's activities in that field, restarted about four years earlier with the active participation of an expert from Israel, had produced good technical documents and recommendations, but practical implementation was still a long way off and much remained to be done. The Agency should devote more effort and resources to the outstanding activities, such as the

preparation of a detailed guidebook describing the steps that should be taken by any country or organization contemplating nuclear desalination. Public acceptance was crucial in that area also for, besides the usual issue of nuclear power safety, the public had to be absolutely convinced that the water produced by nuclear desalination plants was completely safe and wholesome. Nuclear power offered the hope of cheaper, safer, cleaner and more reliable energy for both desalination and general purposes. The Agency was playing an important role in that connection, but additional efforts were needed.

117. Israel's participation in the Agency's technical activities had increased in recent years. Israel had hosted several Agency meetings sponsored by various governmental and non-governmental institutions, the most recent being an international workshop on integrated risk management, held in Tel-Aviv in November 1991, and an advisory group meeting on radiation technology, held in Jerusalem in February 1992. A workshop on expert system prototypes used in nuclear technology was due to take place in October in Herzelia, near Tel-Aviv.

118. Nuclear techniques were nowadays widely used in research establishments and in industry, agriculture and medicine, and the use of isotopes, sealed sources, commercial accelerators and nuclear medicine instrumentation was growing every year. It was essential to ensure that the workers using them and the public at large were protected by stringent safety measures. However, safety measures alone were not enough; rigorous and efficient training of radiation protection personnel was needed in order to establish a sound professional infrastructure of people dedicated to the safety of all users. Safety principles were the same everywhere and were not subject to national boundaries. Safety training was therefore an appropriate subject for international co-operation. Israel, which was willing to share its knowledge and experience in the field of radiation protection, would be hosting a two-week training course on basic radiological protection to be held in 1994 under the auspices of the Agency - and it would be doing so in the spirit of peace and co-operation that was dearly needed in the region.

119. MR. YTURRIAGA (Spain), having expressed his delegation's full support for the statement made on behalf of the member States of the European Community by the Ambassador of Belgium, said that in 1992 Spain's nuclear power plants, with a load factor

of 85.8%, had produced 53.837 GW.h of electricity, accounting for 38.7% of the country's total electricity production. The figures reflected the fact that Spain's nuclear power plants were performing well.

120. A priority of Spain's National Energy Plan was maximum safety and reliability in the operation of the country's nuclear power plants. Accordingly, a considerable investment was being made in plant maintenance and there was a permanent process of adaptation to increasing safety demands.

121. Turning to radioactive waste management, he said that the El Cabril storage facility for low- and intermediate-level waste was now in operation and would be able to accommodate all such waste produced in Spain over the next 20 years. As to high-level waste, an extensive geological survey was under way with a view to the selection, by the end of the century, of suitable sites for storage facilities.

122. At the international level, there was growing co-operation among Agency Member States in harmonizing nuclear safety standards and criteria, and the Agency's involvement in that exercise was proving essential.

123. His authorities, which considered nuclear safety to be something that was universal in character, were looking forward to the adoption of the envisaged nuclear safety convention - an instrument which should spell out the fundamentals of nuclear safety and provide for the mechanisms necessary for verifying compliance with them. They believed that the convention should cover not only nuclear power plants, but also fuel cycle facilities, but for the sake of expediting adoption they were prepared to accept a convention covering only nuclear power plants - on the understanding that fuel cycle facilities would be covered by a subsequent convention.

124. His authorities also hoped that agreement would soon be reached on a revised version of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and to that end they were contributing to the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage. They would prefer it if the scope of the new convention included the question of supplementary compensation, but in the interests of speeding up the revision process they could go along with the idea of two separate conventions.

125. Spain, which attached great importance to the services provided by the Agency through OSART, ASSET and RAPAT missions, had made experts available to serve as team members and had received missions at its own plants and facilities.

126. His delegation welcomed the Agency's initiative in establishing the IRRT (International Regulatory Review Team) service with a view to strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of Member States' nuclear regulatory bodies. The initiation of the ASCOT (Assessment of Safety Culture in Organizations Team) service was also a highly interesting development.

127. Spain supported the work on developing a common basis for safety assessments at nuclear power plants built to earlier standards and the initiative to establish a material properties database with a view to gaining a better understanding of the ageing of principal nuclear power plants systems and components. Spanish organizations, companies and experts were participating in the Agency's extrabudgetary programmes related to the safety of nuclear power plants in Central and Eastern Europe, and his Government's financial contribution to those programmes was considerable. Finally, his country supported the Agency's work on decommissioning under the RADWASS programme.

128. His delegation was pleased that INES was being applied for a trial period to facilities other than nuclear power plants. It regarded the scale as a useful means for establishing a climate of understanding between the media and those responsible for nuclear safety.

129. Also, his delegation supported the work on revising the Agency's Basic Safety Standards (BSS) in the light of the ICRP's 1990 recommendations; the revised BSS should provide valuable guidance to Member States wishing to establish radiological protection regimes and thereby reduce radiation exposures. In that connection, his delegation considered that it was time to update the Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material in the light of the ICRP's latest recommendations thereby bringing them into line with the BSS as revised.

130. Believing that nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes, Spain had acceded to the NPT and looked forward to the time when all countries would be party to it. Accordingly, his country urged all States which had not yet done so to accede to the NPT.

Also, it endorsed the initiatives aimed at the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and Africa and supported the Agency's efforts to achieve the application in the near future of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in those regions.

131. The South African Government was to be commended for the positive stance it had taken recently in collaborating closely with the Agency in the implementation of its NPT safeguards agreement and in renouncing its nuclear weapons programme. He trusted that its example would be followed by other States.

132. His delegation believed that the NPT should be applied in its entirety and that States parties could not elect to fulfil only certain obligations while avoiding others, as the DPRK was unfortunately trying to do. The Agency, for its part, should ensure full application of the safeguards provided for in the NPT and in the agreements concluded pursuant to it, and Spain strongly supported the Agency's efforts and had full confidence in what the Director General was doing to that end.

133. Welcoming the fact that in 1992 the Secretariat had detected no diversion of safeguarded materials, he said that recent experience had shown how useful it could be if Member States were informed about the non-detection, in countries which had concluded INFCIRC/153-type agreements, of undeclared nuclear facilities and materials.

134. For that to be achieved, the present safeguards system would have to be changed in a number of ways and the Agency's ability to obtain and analyse information on nuclear activities in the different countries and on international movements of nuclear equipment and materials would have to be strengthened. That was the purpose of certain proposals which had been made by the Director General and which Spain - and the other countries belonging to the European Community - supported. In that connection, his delegation considered that the decisions taken by the Board of Governors on special inspections, the reporting of imports and exports of nuclear material and the early provision of design information represented important steps in the process of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system without an appreciable increase in costs. Since the beginning of 1993, Spain had been providing the information required under the system of

universal notification. If the system was to work properly, however, there had to be reciprocity, and he called upon all States which had not yet done so to join the system.

135. His delegation was awaiting new proposals from the Director General, made in the light of recent SAGSI recommendations, and trusted that in them due importance would be given to the streamlining of safeguards, the costs of introducing new measures being balanced by savings achieved through the discontinuation of non-essential activities; for example, considerable savings should be possible as a result of the agreement concluded by the Agency and the European Community on a new Partnership Approach. His country, which attached great importance to the current activities aimed at strengthening and streamlining the safeguards system, would continue collaborating with the Agency to that end.

136. Turning briefly to technical assistance and co-operation, which Spain regarded as one of the Agency's fundamental activities, he reiterated his country's position of principle regarding contributions to the TACF: Article XIV of the Agency's Statute provided for assessed contributions to the Regular Budget (determined in the light of principles adopted by the United Nations) and voluntary contributions to the TACF (dependent on the willingness of Member States to pay), and it was contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Statute to try to convert, as if by magic, the latter type of contribution into the former type.

137. In 1992, although it had been going through a period of great economic difficulty, the peseta losing 21% of its value, Spain had during the previous year made contributions totalling US \$752 000 in value in support of Agency technical assistance activities - an increase of \$165 000 over the value of its 1991 contributions. A policy of financial austerity had now been introduced, however, and that was affecting - inter alia - Spain's voluntary contributions to international organizations. His country was therefore not able to increase its contributions in support of technical assistance activities during the current year, although the 1992 level would be maintained.

138. Mr. SQUICCIARINI (Holy See), commending the Agency's efforts to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, said it now seemed to be widely accepted that, particularly in the developing world, economic growth and industrial development could not be achieved

without some resort to nuclear energy. However, besides having a great diversity of beneficial applications nuclear energy was open to abuse for destructive purposes, and there was also the risk of harm as a result of incidents at reactors and other nuclear facilities. The Agency had therefore been created in order to demonstrate that nuclear energy need not be a source of destruction and that it could be harnessed for peaceful purposes - to the benefit of everyone.

139. There was now a pressing need for greater worldwide collaboration within the Agency framework in order to minimize the hazards involved in using nuclear technology and to ensure that the technology was used for peaceful purposes only. The importance of "building up a common consensus through common effort and commitment" had been emphasized by His Holiness Pope John Paul II on the occasion of his visit to the Vienna International Centre (VIC) ten years previously.

140. In the modern world, where all countries were seeking to improve the economic and social life of their people, every effort should be made to extend the benefits of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, the industrialized countries sharing their expertise with the developing ones. Also, now that the East-West confrontation was over, the industrialized countries should do their utmost to improve the nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and thereby help ensure reliable energy supplies there. In addition, the Agency - together with other international organizations - should continue with the efforts under way to mitigate the still widespread consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

141. States should rise above merely national interests and ensure that the established channels of dialogue, including dialogue on nuclear issues, did not become blocked. Mankind's resources should be used carefully, to the maximum benefit of mankind; they should never be used against life, but rather for enhancing it and making it truly human. In the use of science and technology, which could contribute greatly to the advancement of life, man was the ultimate arbiter. It was therefore important that scientific and technical knowledge went hand in hand with respect for the individual human being and for the common good.

142. Recalling that, when visiting the VIC, His Holiness Pope John Paul II had encouraged those working there "to be servants of the world, which needs to be ever more united, to be servants of the truth about man, to be servants of the common good of all nations and peoples", he wished the Agency ever greater success in its efforts to serve humanity. The field in which the Agency operated was one where abuse could lead to death and destruction, but also where an important source of energy for the economic and technical progress of future generations was to be found.

143. Mr. GUTIERREZ LEYTON (Chile) said that in his country increased efforts had been made over the past year - by a growing number of private and State bodies - to incorporate nuclear applications in the exploitation of natural resources, environmental protection and production processes, the focus being on projects which yielded measurable social and economic benefits within a short space of time.

144. Turning to technical co-operation matters, he said his delegation was most grateful for the continuing support of the Agency - particularly the Department of Technical Co-operation and the Department of Research and Isotopes. Also, he informed the Conference that his country had recently concluded with Uruguay a new agreement for technical co-operation in the nuclear field and that a plan of action for 1994-95 would be established before the end of the year. He informed the Conference in addition that Chile would shortly be paying its full share of the 1994 target for voluntary contributions to the TACF and called on all other Member States - budgetary restrictions notwithstanding - to do likewise.

145. Chile, which welcomed the current nuclear test moratorium, was concerned about China's apparent reluctance to express support for it and hoped that China would come out with an expression of support soon.

146. His country, which was committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, would like to see the Tlatelolco Treaty modernized and fully in force. Ratification procedures were under way in Chile, for which the treaty should enter into force soon.

147. Chile remained concerned about the possibility of accidents during the transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive waste and about the lack of international arrangements for the timely and universal reporting of such accidents. It believed that a study should be

undertaken - with due account for existing international standards - into ways in which countries could protect people and the environment within and beyond their air space and territorial waters. Agreement on a commitment to inform the Agency's Secretariat of the route to be followed by every ship carrying radioactive materials, so that the Secretariat could notify Member States, would be a significant step forward in this important and delicate area.

148. Radioactive waste could be transported by land, sea or air. Transport by land was the easiest to monitor since all land was under the jurisdiction of some State or other. Monitoring sea transport was more difficult since territorial waters accounted for only a small fraction of the world's seas and oceans, but Chile had formulated some principles for the monitoring of marine transport outside territorial waters with due respect for the right of free passage. As to transport by air, there were infinite expanses of air space outside the national jurisdiction of States to which no serious thought had so far been given, but it was easy to imagine the damage that could be wreaked by an aircraft with radioactive materials on board crashing onto a densely populated area. That issue was an important one, and Member States should begin to give it serious consideration.

149. Regarding the current work on drafting a nuclear safety convention, Chile attached great importance to it both in view of the boost which such a convention could give to nuclear power generation worldwide and in connection with the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear waste management.

150. The criteria for the use of INES in reporting nuclear events at research reactors and other facilities should be implemented as soon as possible in the interest of improving the public image of nuclear energy applications. At the same time, steps should be taken to prevent misuse of the information provided.

151. Nuclear techniques could be used to combat deterioration of the environment - as had been shown by the major achievements in the use of electron beam technology to treat flue gases in Poland, where the cost-benefit ratio appeared more favourable than that of conventional methods. There was particular interest in Chile in using the technology to treat the gases from copper smelting works, which had a high sulphur dioxide content. His

country hoped to receive Agency support for the project in question, which was at an early stage. It was also looking into the uses of radiation in the treatment of liquid effluent.

152. Chile, which was pleased to be co-operating with the Agency in its important initiative relating to the practical application of food irradiation in developing countries, had been selected by the Agency for a techno-economic feasibility study as described in document GC(XXXVII)/1068. His country had 15 years of experience in irradiating foodstuffs not only for internal consumption but also for export, and it was therefore concerned about the restrictions which had been imposed by the authorities in some countries on the import of irradiated foodstuffs despite the fact that food irradiation was an accepted practice in their own country. Such restrictions were hampering the Agency's promotional efforts.

153. With regard to education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety, his delegation believed that the use of a standard syllabus for post-graduate courses in radiological protection would help in ensuring an equally high level of theoretical and practical instruction in all regions. Also, account would be taken of the standard syllabus in the adaptation of various training courses to legislation recently passed in Chile.

154. During the past year a group of Chilean scientists had been studying the properties and behaviour of ceramic compounds of lithium subjected to neutron irradiation, while another group had been carrying out modifications to Chile's research reactor in order that it might be used in neutron diffraction studies and the development of analytical techniques involving the neutron irradiation of the surfaces of various materials.

155. Chile had recently joined the International Fusion Research Council. It hoped that through its membership of the Council its fusion activities would receive greater outside support and that would in turn it would be able to make a greater contribution to the efforts of the international scientific community in the fusion field.

156. Since Chile was a major fruit grower and exporter, agricultural pest control was an important issue there. It was hoped that, with the help of a facility for producing sterile insects recently opened in the northern city of Arica, the Mediterranean fruit fly could be controlled or even eradicated throughout the country. It was estimated that the output of the facility would be sufficient not only to cover the domestic demand, but also to permit the

export of sterile insects. He thanked the Agency for supporting Chile's efforts through the provision of expert services, specialized equipment, and training.

157. With regard to human health, new labelled molecules had been synthesized for use in cancer diagnosis and treatment in Chile, which was continuing to meet approximately 90% of its radioisotope needs through domestic production. In addition, samarium and rhenium isotopes were being produced in projects supported by the Agency. In nuclear medicine, there had been interesting advances in investigations of chromosome damage due to radiation and in work on localizing radiopharmaceuticals in the organs and tissues of experimental animals; the use of computerized image processing in those studies had proved very helpful.

158. The country's regulations for radiation protection and for licensing the use of ionizing radiation had been updated with the help of the Ministry of Health. In the field of radiation protection, intensive efforts were being made to achieve 100% coverage by mid-1994 of Chilean facilities using ionizing radiation.

159. Chile's emergency preparedness had been put to the test when a radiation accident had occurred in Costa Rica and Chile had provided assistance under the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The country's programme of public information and education relating to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy had been concentrating its efforts on the production and services sectors, and the response from business had been encouraging.

160. The National Atomic Energy Commissions of Chile and Argentina were working on plans for joint projects which might be carried out in the coming biennium.

161. A number of seminars had been held in Chile over the past year with the participation of Agency experts. The topics covered had included nuclear law and safeguards, the preparation of technical assistance projects, and public education and information in the nuclear energy field. ARCAL activities had included a programme on the application of nuclear techniques in industry and one on the labelling of biomolecules and blood cells.

Mr. Al-Athel (Saudi Arabia) resumed the Chair.

162. Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia) said that his Government attached great importance to the promotional activities of the Agency and looked forward to an extension of those activities for the benefit of developing countries as a whole. The Agency's annual report referred to a number of training courses, seminars and conferences which had been held in Indonesia, and he hoped that such activities would be intensified in the future.

163. Indonesia, whose foreign policy was geared to the achievement of a peaceful world based on justice and prosperity, had always emphasized the importance of comprehensive regional security. Over the years, the members of ASEAN had been in the forefront of efforts to achieve such security within a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), of which a nuclear-weapon-free area was a principal component.

164. A meeting of States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, usually referred to as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), had been held in New York on 10-11 August 1993 to examine the feasibility of reconvening the PTBT amendment conference later in the year. His country believed that achievement of the PTBT's ultimate objective, which was the discontinuation of test explosions of nuclear weapons in all spheres for all time, would be beneficial to people throughout the world, and his country's efforts in that direction were closely related to its efforts regarding the NPT Review and Extension Conference to be held in 1995. That year was likely to be a crucial one, since the Conference was to decide whether the NPT should remain in force, and if so, whether it should be extended indefinitely or only for additional periods or an additional period of time.

165. Although the Agency's efforts to strengthen the safeguards system were widely appreciated, the political and geographical changes with disarmament and non-proliferation implications which had taken place during the past three years had meant that the Department of Safeguards was inevitably confronted with new problems. His delegation believed that the present situation, in which some countries claiming to be non-nuclear-weapon States had nuclear weapons within their territories, was not conducive to world peace and stability and posed a major challenge to the present safeguards regime. The geographical changes which might take place in the near future would bring further security problems. For that reason, Indonesia believed that the present uncertain situation definitely warranted an extension of

the NPT, although periodical reviews of its implementation should be undertaken in the light of current developments.

166. Indonesia had always regarded safeguards as an important means of ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, particularly in regions of conflict or instability. The NPT had been designed to meet concerns about instability and to allay feelings of insecurity, and many countries had acceded to it for those reasons. In that context, he was pleased that the DPRK had decided to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT and that it was willing to resume consultations with the Agency on inspection and related matters. He hoped that these consultations would be resumed in the near future and that they would produce solutions acceptable to all.

167. The tasks currently being entrusted to the Agency safeguards system were more sensitive than the tasks assumed by the Agency in other fields. In endeavouring to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, the Secretariat should aim to make it scientifically and technically sound, and hence politically more acceptable. Indonesia would support the Secretariat's efforts to that end.

168. Indonesia had recently been taking part in the Agency safeguards support programme, and his Government had been represented at the sixth meeting of Member State Support Programme Co-ordinators, at which the Indonesian participants had stated that Agency experts could use facilities in Indonesia for activities such as the testing of certain innovative ideas put forward by SAGSI earlier in the year.

169. His country greatly appreciated the assistance which it had received from the Agency. During the first 25 years of Indonesia's long-term development plan, which had started in 1968, the Agency had supported the national nuclear programme through assistance in such areas as the utilization of isotopes and radiation in agriculture, human health and industry.

170. By the end of Indonesia's fifth five-year development plan, in March 1994, the National Atomic Energy Agency would have succeeded in transferring the results of its research and development efforts to a significant number of users. For example, the National Institute of Agriculture had been provided with a number of mutants of improved

quality - such as four varieties of upland rice and one variety of lowland rice, two varieties of soybean and one variety of mung bean - developed in the National Agency's facilities. In addition, a cobalt-60 irradiator specifically geared to sterilization and polymerization applications had been inaugurated in December 1992.

171. In the area of human health, his delegation was grateful to the Agency for having contributed so significantly to the success of the 5th Asia and Oceania Congress on Nuclear Medicine and Biology, which had taken place in October 1992 in Jakarta and subsequently in Bali, and had been attended by about 600 doctors, pharmacists, biologists and other experts.

172. Indonesia had also benefited from highly effective Agency technical assistance provided through projects designed to help with preparations for the introduction of nuclear power and related nuclear technology applications. The need for the exchange of up-to-date scientific information - a need felt particularly by developing countries - should be emphasized in that context.

173. In the energy sector, close co-operation between interested national authorities was being ensured by the National Energy Co-ordination Board, which had instructed the National Atomic Energy Agency to conduct a feasibility study for Indonesia's first nuclear power plant. The first part of the study, covering economic and technical aspects, would be completed by the end of the year; the second part, containing a site evaluation, an environmental impact analysis and a safety assessment, would be completed by early 1996. Indonesia appreciated the Agency's assistance in that connection, particularly with the evaluation of initial draft documents.

174. Within the framework of RCA, Indonesia had in July hosted a very useful meeting on project formulation in the field of energy and nuclear power planning.

175. His Government, which appreciated the Agency's continued efforts to promote the safety of nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, hoped that the work on safety principles for future nuclear power plants would be completed soon. The recommendations would be particularly useful for countries that were embarking on their own nuclear power programmes.

176. His Government had earlier that month ratified both the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The required points of contact had been established directly after the signing of the Conventions, in 1986, and the required infrastructure had now been set up.

177. One of the problems Indonesia was currently facing was that of educating the general public about nuclear energy, and in particular about the acceptability of generating electricity from nuclear power. For several years the National Atomic Energy Agency had been dispatching experts to various parts of the country to give lectures and demonstrations on the safe use of nuclear energy, and the meetings had always aroused great interest in all sections of the population. In that context, his Government was grateful to the Agency for its assistance in convening a seminar in Jakarta on the topic "Nuclear Power and Public Acceptance" in November 1992. The seminar had been attended by about 100 participants from various institutions and from the mass media.

178. Indonesia was grateful to those Member States which had assisted it in establishing a complex for nuclear research and development at Serpong. Other countries would be welcome to share in the use of the facilities. His Government was also offering the use of Indonesia's research and training facilities at Pasar Jumat Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta within the framework of the Agency's technical assistance activities.

179. Greater attention was now being paid in Indonesia to user-oriented programmes in areas such as food and agriculture, industry and earth sciences. In that regard, his authorities were happy to note that increasing numbers of experts from developing countries, including Indonesia, were now being selected as consultants to assist other developing countries in preparing for new nuclear projects. They believed that it was only through co-operation among all Member States of the Agency - large and small, developed and developing - that the aims of the Agency could be achieved.

180. Mr. KIJINER (Marshall Islands) said that the United States nuclear testing programme in the Marshall Islands had been a major episode in the early years of the nuclear era, and his Government was very pleased that the Agency would now be able to assist the

Marshall Islands in evaluating the long-term effects of the detonations on Bikini and Enewetak, leaders of whose communities were present in the Marshall Islands delegation.

181. The Marshall Islands strongly endorsed the important work being done by the Agency, especially its safety and safeguards programmes. Both his country and other Pacific island nations attached special importance to Agency efforts to stop the nations of East Asia from embarking on a nuclear arms race. They prayed that the nations of the world would come to an agreement on dismantling nuclear weapons.

182. The Marshall Islands would never be a military power and most certainly would never seek to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Electricity generation by means of nuclear power plants was not likely to be a practical option for it for many years to come. The Marshall Islands would, however, be looking to the Agency for help in dealing with the after-effects of the 66 atmospheric weapons tests that the United States Government had conducted on Bikini and Enewetak between 1946 and 1958. Those tests had completely disrupted the traditional way of life in the northern region of the Marshall Islands. The communities of the Bikini and Enewetak Atolls had been forcibly removed to other locations, where they had endured severe privation while their ancestral homes had become test sites for mankind's most powerful explosives and had been subjected to a tremendous barrage of fission activity. Furthermore, many other Marshallese people had suffered from fallout from the tests, especially from the 15-megaton test on Bikini in 1954 that had deposited large quantities of radioactive debris on two communities downwind.

183. The United States Government and his Government had set up programmes for dealing with the destruction and physical injury caused by the tests. In addition to a medical programme and environmental monitoring administered by the United States Department of Energy, his Government was operating programmes for evaluating the personal injury and environmental degradation caused by the tests and for providing compensatory services both to the people of Bikini and Enewetak and to the fallout victims. The objectives were to help the people who had suffered, to see that justice was served and, to the extent possible, to restore that small corner of the world to the way it had once been.

184. He believed that the Agency could make an important contribution to the process of restoration, especially on Bikini and Enewetak. Over the past decade, the people of Bikini had developed plans for the rehabilitation and resettlement of their atoll and had made considerable progress in implementing those plans. With the backing of the Marshall Islands Government, they would be looking to the Agency for assistance in reviewing earlier environmental assessments carried out on Bikini, for technical advice during clean-up and rehabilitation operations and ultimately for assistance in establishing on Bikini a laboratory to monitor radiological conditions once the community had returned. In addition, the Government of the Marshall Islands might approach the Agency in the future for help with environmental monitoring at other locations and with matters relating to the health of the population.

185. While several islands of the Enewetak Atoll had been resettled, the major part remained off-limits for the gathering of food crops. The people of Enewetak might request the Agency to carry out an independent review of previous assessments of the radiological conditions within the atoll. The most immediate need, however, was technical assistance for the Bikinians.

186. Whatever requests the people of the Marshall Islands made of the Agency, they needed the reassurance that went with the independence of the Agency's technical experts.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.