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# GENERAL CONFERENCE

THIRTY-EIGHTH (1994) REGULAR SESSION

RECORD OF THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna
on Monday, 19 September 1994, at 10.10 a.m.

Temporary President: Mr. BLIX (Director General)
President: Mr. BAER (Switzerland)

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[*] GC(XXXVIII)/25.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXVIII)/INF/11/Rev.2.

94-03779 (VIII)

Abbreviations used in this record

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| AFRA | African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology |
| Assistance Convention | Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency |
| Biological Weapons Convention | Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction |
| Chemical Weapons Convention | Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction |
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| G-7 | Group of Seven |
| G-24 | Group of Twenty-Four |
| GATT | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade |
| Notification Convention | Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident |
| NPT | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| RADWASS | Radioactive Waste Safety Standards |
| Rarotonga Treaty | South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty |
| RBMK | High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union) |
| RCA | Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific) |
| TACF | Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund |
| Tlatelolco Treaty | Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| WANO | World Association of Nuclear Operators |
| WWER | Water-cooled and -moderated reactor |

OPENING OF THE SESSION

1. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT declared the thirty-eighth regular session of the General Conference open.

2. In accordance with Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure, he invited the delegates to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation.

All present rose and stood in silence for one minute.

3. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT welcomed all the participants.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE

4. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT invited nominations for the office of President of the Conference.

5. Mr. van EBBENHORST TENGBERGEN (Netherlands), speaking on behalf of the Western European group, proposed Mr. Baer (Switzerland), who was currently Deputy Director for Energy in the Swiss Ministry for Energy and Transport, as President of the thirty-eighth regular session of the General Conference.

6. Mr. Baer (Switzerland) was elected President by acclamation.

7. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT, on his own behalf and on behalf of all the delegates, congratulated Mr. Baer on his election and wished him every success.

Mr. Baer (Switzerland) took the Chair.

8. The PRESIDENT said that he appreciated the honour bestowed upon himself and his country by his election as President of the thirty-eighth session of the General Conference.

9. Since the summer of 1945, nuclear energy had not been used in military operations. For decades, work in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation had been conducted within the framework of the Agency, the NPT and other forums. The Rarotonga Treaty, the recent developments relating to the Tlatelolco Treaty and the current efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free Africa had been the most important stages in that process.

10. Even if some people wished to put the clock back while others dreamed of a world without nuclear energy, it was impossible to deny that the applications of nuclear energy had transformed the world irreversibly and enriched the very structure of society. The cobalt bomb, the medical applications of radioisotopes, the campaigns for the sterilization of parasites, the preservation of foodstuffs by irradiation and the generation of electricity without carbon dioxide emissions were all evidence of that tremendous progress.

11. The planet Earth, a fragile globe that had become cracked as a result of the ravages of time, was in urgent need of repair. The Agency's Member States, which had decided, under Article II of the Agency's Statute, that the Agency should seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, were responsible for making the best possible use of nuclear energy as a means of repairing that globe and maintaining, embellishing and enriching it.

12. Turning to the appointment of the General Committee, he recalled that, under Rules 34 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference had to elect eight Vice-Presidents, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and five additional members of the General Committee. As the African group had not yet reached agreement on its candidates to serve on the General Committee, he suggested proceeding with the election of the candidates whose names were already known and deferring the election of the other members of the Committee until the regional group in question had completed its consultations. He therefore proposed that, under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the delegates of Austria, Cuba, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Viet Nam be elected as Vice-Presidents, and Mr. Hermann Goesele of Germany as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole; and that, under Rule 40, the delegates of Canada, the Czech Republic, Mexico and Qatar be elected as additional members of the General Committee.

13. The President's proposals were accepted.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The PRESIDENT said that, as the General Committee had not yet been fully constituted, it would be some time before the Conference was able to adopt its agenda for the current session. He therefore proposed that the General Conference, pursuant to Rule 102 of the Rules of Procedure, waive Rule 42 until the General Committee had met and had submitted its report on the agenda, so that the General Conference could consider items 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the provisional agenda contained in document GC(XXXVIII)/1 and start the general debate, and the Committee of the Whole could start meeting to consider provisional agenda items 10 to 22. That procedure, which had been adopted on several previous occasions, was, so far as he could judge, the only way in which the General Conference could complete its work within the traditional time limit of five working days.

The President's proposal was accepted.

14. Mr. GIACOMELLI (Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations) said that, despite the many positive opportunities for progress which the end of the Cold War continued to present, the world was still a dangerous place. The task of forging a new framework for global peace, security and development had been fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. In the context of those challenges and changes, the Agency's work had assumed a higher profile than at any other time in its history.

15. Ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was vital. Assisted by the Agency, Governments needed urgently to devise and implement truly effective methods to ensure that illicit nuclear material did not become available to the highest bidder on the international black market. He commended the efforts of those Governments which were already working together to address that concern and urged the international community to take all measures necessary to deal with that threat.

16. The NPT remained the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and it was essential to maintain its integrity. The Agency and the Member States of the United Nations as a whole had to play their respective roles in ensuring full compliance with its provisions. The effective co-operation that existed in that regard between the United Nations and the Agency was essential.

17. There had been several developments in recent months. The DPRK had taken some positive steps towards resuming its obligations under the NPT. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan had acceded to the Treaty, bringing the number of signatories to 164. The Government of Ukraine had agreed to place its nuclear material under Agency safeguards and had indicated its intention to accede to the NPT.

18. He welcomed those important moves but, although the Agency and the international community had clearly demonstrated their commitment to maintaining the integrity of the NPT, there was no room for complacency and much still needed to be done. He therefore welcomed the steps which were being taken by the Agency to strengthen the safeguards system and expressed his full support for the efforts which were being undertaken to submit proposals for an improved safeguards system to the forthcoming NPT Extension Conference, at which he hoped Member States would agree to extend the Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally.

19. It was regrettable that there still had not been sufficient progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Agreement on such a treaty should be a prime objective of international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A test ban agreement would demonstrate the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to a future free of nuclear weapons and would provide a significant boost to non-proliferation efforts worldwide.

20. In the preceding year, the General Assembly had adopted by consensus a resolution recommending that negotiations begin on an international treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. That was an encouraging first step. The Agency, with its extensive experience in safeguards verification activities, was well placed to play a key role in both the development and implementation of such a treaty.

21. Clearly, the Agency and the United Nations should continue to play a leading role in those vital areas, but the Agency had important responsibilities in other areas too - in particular in the field of nuclear power and safety. The recent adoption of a Convention on Nuclear Safety by 84 countries had been an important step forward in the field of nuclear safety. That Convention would serve as a basic international framework for safety and review procedures related to nuclear power plants. Among other things, it would help ensure the safety of older generations of plants, an issue which had been causing increasing concern in recent years. The Convention would be opened for signature at the General Conference and he urged all Member States to sign it so that it could enter into force as soon as possible.

22. The continuing activities of the international community aimed at mitigating the effects of the Chernobyl accident were a constant reminder of the priority that had to be given to ensuring nuclear safety. The United Nations had acted as a catalyst for multilateral and bilateral efforts to address the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. The work of the Committee for Co-ordination on Chernobyl was a prime example of the many different types of relief operations which were currently being mounted under the auspices of the United Nations. Although the Chernobyl plant was still operating and was likely to continue to do so for the immediate future, the Agency had played an active role in monitoring the operations there to ensure that they were being conducted in accordance with recognized international safety standards. The high level of co-operation between the United Nations

and the Agency on those issues would continue. Co-operation would also continue between the Agency and the UNDP on their joint project aimed at improving the radiation safety infrastructure in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

23. In the context of its many global responsibilities, the Agency's role in implementing the recommendations of Agenda 21, the central document of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, should not be forgotten. In addition to serving as the lead United Nations agency with regard to the management of radioactive waste, the Agency had also assisted UNEP with the compilation of comprehensive data on a range of environmental issues. He looked forward to additional co-operative efforts between the Agency and other parts of the United Nations family in implementing the important recommendations of Agenda 21.

24. The Agency's work encompassed a broad range of areas and issues, many of which were of crucial importance to Member States and to the international community as a whole. He trusted that the close co-operation that had characterized the relationship between the Agency and the United Nations would continue.

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

25. The DIRECTOR GENERAL noted that two anniversaries of particular importance to the Agency would be occurring during the coming year: it would be 50 years since the founding of the United Nations and 25 years since the entry into force of the NPT. Those anniversaries would provide a good opportunity for thinking about future directions.

26. Frequently, the United Nations system was criticized as lacking in cohesion and co-ordination. That criticism was not valid for the Agency's relations with the United Nations and United Nations organizations. The General Conference and the Board of Governors consistently followed the lead of the United Nations in political matters. The Agency also sought to play its full part in any United Nations system-wide efforts, such as the current work to promote sustainable development by implementing Agenda 21. Above all, the cases of Iraq and the DPRK had demonstrated the close, prompt and effective liaison and interaction which existed between the Agency and the United Nations. The Security Council viewed the Agency as the nuclear inspection arm of the United Nations system and

the Agency looked to the Council as the body politically responsible for the implementation of nuclear arms control measures. As attention to nuclear non-proliferation issues increased and more nuclear arms control measures requiring verification were adopted, it would be reasonable and cost-effective to continue building on that distribution of functions in order to avoid duplication.

27. He asked the Secretary-General's representative, Mr. Giacomelli, to convey to the Secretary-General his appreciation for the excellent and close liaison which was maintained between the Agency and the United Nations and, in particular, the Security Council. A secure phone and fax line had recently been established between the Secretary-General's office and his own office. However, he hoped it would not need to be used very often.

28. The Agency's co-operation with other organizations in the United Nations system was extensive. As the current year marked the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of the Division which the Agency operated jointly with the FAO, it was appropriate to mention that Division's very successful activities testifying to the increasing relevance of nuclear techniques for food production and preservation. There was also reason to draw attention to the 30 years of close co-operation with UNESCO in the joint administration of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste. The operational responsibility for the Centre, hitherto borne by the Agency, was soon to be transferred to UNESCO. Since its creation in 1964, the Centre had grown rapidly. He greatly appreciated the work of Professor Abdus Salam, who had been the Centre's dynamic leader, and thanked the Italian Government for its great generosity in supporting the Centre. He was confident that it would continue to be an important meeting place for physicists from industrially advanced and developing countries.

29. In 1995, it would be 25 years since the NPT had entered into force. The more than 160 parties to the Treaty would be reviewing past experience of the Treaty, considering its future and deciding on its extension. The cases of Iraq and the DPRK had raised questions about the reliability of commitments made under the Treaty and had highlighted the need to strengthen verification activities. At the same time, the Treaty continued to attract new parties. The Agency was producing substantial background material for the NPT Extension Conference, in particular on safeguards implementation and the transfer of nuclear science

and technology for peaceful purposes. It looked forward to receiving guidance from the Conference on those tasks.

30. It had become customary to view the Agency's functions as being dual: promoting the use of nuclear energy on the one hand and providing verification of its peaceful use on the other. However, a simple distinction between promotional and regulatory functions did not do justice to the full range of functions and activities envisaged by the Statute. Where, for instance, did the Agency's normative work in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection fit into such a scheme? The Statute entrusted the Agency with a number of broad functions and activities and Member States had an interest in the effective pursuit of all those functions and activities. He took it that the right response to the concern expressed in resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/618, entitled "Strengthening of the Agency's Main Activities", consisted not only in the transfer of more nuclear technology and in updating and strengthening the Agency's safeguards system, but also in the development of international rules and services in the field of nuclear safety, and even the performance of verification tasks requested by the Security Council or under bilateral or multilateral agreements in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. All those activities were clearly within the Agency's mandate and none of them should be neglected. The real obstacle to any strengthening of the various parts of the Agency's mandate and activities did not lie in any statutory restraints, but rather in the zero-real-growth strait-jacket and in the non-payment and late payment of contributions.

31. Turning to Agency activities relating to nuclear power, he said that the conference which had been held two weeks previously on the nuclear power option had shown that it was relatively easy to describe the current status of nuclear power, but hard to predict its future role. Even with ambitious conservation efforts, the world would greatly increase its use of electricity in the coming decades. As the viable sources of large-scale electricity generation would be limited, for at least the next few decades, to the burning of fossil fuels, hydroelectric power and nuclear power, it ought to be in the interest of Governments to stimulate a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of those different options. The Agency had a long tradition of comparing the viability of nuclear power and other electricity sources in different countries. Together with a number of other organizations, it was

pursuing the so-called DECADES project, the aim of which was to respond to the growing interest in the comparative assessment of different electricity generation options in terms of their environmental impact, reliability and economy. Such assessments were of interest, not least in connection with the search for scenarios to counter the emission of greenhouse gases, notably carbon dioxide, in order to reduce the risk of global warming. It was striking, but not surprising, that the scenarios which achieved the most effective reduction in $CO_2$ emissions had a strong nuclear power component. The Agency's continued participation in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had enabled it to highlight the fact that realistic, sustainable electricity supply strategies would require a balanced mix of energy sources in the world, including a significant volume of nuclear power.

32. One area in which the Agency had drastically expanded its activities to respond to new needs was nuclear safety. The Chernobyl disaster had triggered the prompt elaboration of the Notification and Assistance Conventions. Those Conventions had become part of the international nuclear power legal infrastructure and periodic exercises were run to test their readiness. While an updated convention on liability was still sorely needed, a convention on the safety of nuclear power had been adopted in June 1994 and there was a consensus that a convention on the safe management and disposal of nuclear waste should be drafted. Such legal instruments, building on the still developing array of detailed but non-binding standards and guides, responded to new expectations in the international community. While national authorities retained full responsibility for and control of the safety of nuclear operations and waste handling, they wished to have an insight into how that responsibility was exercised in other countries and also to have the possibility to urge compliance with common standards.

33. The Agency's assessment activities relating to the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union had continued. Significant progress had been made with the establishment of a consensus on priorities for safety improvements in the different generations of WWER and RBMK reactors. That consensus provided guidance both for national programmes to improve safety and international assistance efforts co-ordinated by the G-24 mechanism. It also offered information which was of relevance to the practical and useful work that was being performed by the WANO. Experts visiting plants had reported that safety was improving, though not at the same pace in all plants and

in all countries. It was clear that significant efforts would still be necessary for years to come and that the main responsibility for updating or phasing out reactors would be carried by the countries concerned.

34. The agreement on the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and the Safety of Radiation Sources, which had been sponsored by six international organizations, including the Agency, was another important development in the area of radiation safety. Those Standards, which had been adopted by the Board of Governors the preceding week, contained important guidelines on responsibilities for the control and safety of radiation sources and the protection of workers, the general public and medical patients. In that connection, it should be remembered that medical uses of radiation were by far the greatest man-made contributor to general radiation exposure.

35. In the field of management of spent nuclear fuel and the disposal of radioactive waste, States were making increasing use of the Agency as a channel for exchange of experience and as a mechanism for elaborating joint norms and securing services. Since long-lived nuclear waste would be a global heritage it was reasonable that international consensus should be sought on ways of dealing with it. International normative work on radioactive waste continued to progress under the Agency's RADWASS programme. In December, the Board of Governors was expected to approve two documents - the Safety Fundamentals document entitled "Principles of Radioactive Waste Management" and a Safety Standards document on planning. Those documents should provide the basis for work on a convention on waste management.

36. Although the concept of regional solutions for the safe storage and disposal of radioactive waste was a rational one, it was not easy to realize. Of course, countries that embarked on nuclear energy programmes had to be ready to manage and dispose safely of the radioactive waste that resulted from those programmes. However, since some nuclear waste would remain radioactive for thousands of years, a more responsible approach vis-à-vis future generations might be to agree on fewer, well-selected and well-built waste repositories, rather than obliging each country to use some piece of its own territory for disposal purposes. It might be possible to revive a rational discussion on that subject one day. However, even at the present time, in certain regions where technical and economic

resources and the scope of nuclear activities were limited, regional solutions would offer a practical alternative to national storage and disposal of certain types of radioactive waste. For instance, the Secretariat had begun to assess the feasibility of applying a regional solution to the problem of spent radium sources in Africa.

37. A particular aspect of radioactive waste disposal - sea dumping - had attracted much attention in the past year. At the sixteenth meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, which had been held in London in November 1993, a decision had been taken to prohibit the dumping of all types of radioactive waste at sea. The Government of Russia had provided much information about past large-scale dumping of radioactive waste and equipment in the Kara Sea in the Arctic, and in the Eastern Seas, and about the Soviet nuclear submarine "Komsomolets", which had sunk in the Norwegian Sea and which contained two nuclear warheads and a nuclear reactor. In all three cases, the Agency's Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco had been invited to participate in scientific missions. In the case of the submarine, the warheads had been successfully sealed to prevent leakages of plutonium into the ocean. The results of examinations undertaken so far in the three cases mentioned had revealed either no, or completely negligible, leakage of radioactivity. Nevertheless, environmental monitoring in those areas would have to continue.

38. In most countries, the desire to acquire new nuclear techniques had led to the early establishment of special atomic energy commissions. The Agency had a long record of successful co-operation with such institutions. However, with the increased practical use being made of such technologies, there was a growing tendency for transfers to be handled through commercial channels or by specialized departments within institutions for agriculture, hydrology, medicine or industry. The Agency had to adapt and was adapting its role in the transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear applications to that new situation.

39. There had also been significant changes in the orientation of the Agency's efforts to transfer nuclear science and technology, many of which were the result of system-wide recommendations within the United Nations family. One such recommendation was to make sure that the technical co-operation programme for each country was in line with national development priorities. Another recommendation was that emphasis should be placed on the

transfer of science and technology which could help increase food supplies and improve health. A third recommendation was to stress sustainable development and the protection of the environment in line with Agenda 21. A fourth emphasis was to ensure adequate radiation protection. All transfers of nuclear science and technology would be discredited unless they were matched by steps to ensure safety.

40. One main focus of the Agency's technical assistance projects was the increase in the supply of food. The vaccination campaign in Africa against the virus-borne rinderpest had been a very successful example of such a project. Projects involving the sterile insect technique were also designed to increase food supply by protecting crops and livestock. There was a high level of interest in using that technique in countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, which might result in the whole Mediterranean area becoming a medfly-free zone.

41. Food irradiation, which had been thoroughly tested and had been internationally approved by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, had considerable potential for preventing spoilage through insect and bacterial infestations as well as sprouting. The practical utilization of food irradiation had gained momentum both in advanced and developing countries. International trade in irradiated food was likely to increase further following the expected entry into force in 1995 of an agreement under the Uruguay round of GATT facilitating trade in food, including irradiated food, which had been processed according to international standards or recommendations. The media also seemed to have become increasingly objective in informing the public about the safety and benefits of food irradiation.

42. A second main focus of the Agency's efforts to transfer nuclear techniques was the improvement of human health. Just one example of those efforts was the development and transfer of nuclear technologies for monitoring applied nutritional intervention programmes.

43. A significant number of the Agency's technical programmes and technical co-operation projects were of relevance to environmental protection, sustainable development and the implementation of Agenda 21. For instance, a very large model project involving an industrial demonstration plant for electron beam purification of flue gases, with a cost

estimate of over US $18 million was being implemented in Poland. In that project, electron beams from an accelerator were used to help transform flue gases from coal-burning plants containing sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides into fertilizer. The technology had been applied successfully on a pilot scale. The major part of the cost of the project was being covered by Poland, but it was hoped that significant voluntary contributions would cover the rest of that important project.

44. The task of transferring nuclear techniques and technology posed major challenges to the Agency and to the recipient States, whose commitment and co-operation were required. It also posed challenges to donor States, as contributors to the TACF and to other funding mechanisms. Although the agreed target for the TACF had been steadily increasing and stood at $58.5 million for 1994, pledges for the current year had amounted to only 66.6% of the target as of 1 September and, of those pledges, only 33.2% had actually been paid. He earnestly appealed to Member States to pledge their share of the target for voluntary contributions and to pay their pledges so as not to jeopardize the Agency's programme. He also urged them to examine whether they could, in some cases, support projects in particular countries with resources from the bilateral aid programmes which they might already have with those countries.

45. One of the Agency's most important functions had been and remained the verification of the peaceful nature of nuclear activities through safeguards. The Agency's experience was unparalleled in the United Nations system and could be made use of in verifying future arms control and disarmament arrangements.

46. The discovery by the Agency that Iraq, despite full-scope safeguards, had been able to develop secretly a substantial programme for uranium enrichment and weaponization had accelerated the efforts to strengthen the safeguards system and to reduce the risk that material or installations which should have been subjected to safeguards could remain undeclared and undetected. It had been realized that the Agency needed, above all, increased access to information and easier access to relevant sites and installations. Some proposals had already been endorsed by the Board of Governors, such as the early provision of design information and reporting on the export and import of nuclear material and specified equipment. Further proposals for a strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system were being considered

in Programme 93+2 and were to be presented to the Board of Governors in March 1995. The key proposals related to increased access to information about a State's nuclear programme and increased physical access to sites. The programme also included a study of a number of technical and administrative efficiency measures that could become part of a streamlined and fully rationalized safeguards system. Thanks to the co-operation of a large number of Member States, many new concepts were undergoing field tests and a clean laboratory facility was being established at Seibersdorf for the receipt and handling of safeguards samples.

47. There was no doubt that the credibility of non-proliferation commitments would become increasingly important as the number of nuclear weapons in the world was reduced. Safeguards had a vital role to play in enhancing that credibility and should not be viewed by States as intrusions upon their sovereignty, but as opportunities to demonstrate compliance with important international obligations. That was how Governments generally viewed safeguards. Similarly, the increasing number of invitations which the Agency received to visit any place at any time were means by which States, in their enlightened self-interest, could increase their transparency and, at the very least, dispel specific unfounded allegations or suspicions which might have been expressed. He trusted that more such invitations would be issued, and that Governments would eliminate a number of restrictions which still reduced the effectiveness of safeguards and led to unnecessary costs.

48. The report contained in document GC(XXXVIII)/19 summarized the safeguards implementation situation in the DPRK. Since the DPRK's declaration of its intention to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 and its subsequent suspension of that withdrawal, it appeared not to have recognized any legal obligation to accept safeguards inspections under its agreement with the Agency. Rather, it had followed, and continued to follow, an à la carte approach, in which the extent of the access granted for safeguards inspections varied according to developments in its negotiations with a third party. Both the Agency and the United Nations had concluded that the safeguards agreement remained valid and that the Agency was under an obligation to seek to implement it fully. That was what the Agency had consistently tried to do and was still trying to do. By the time of the June Board in 1994, the Agency, after a long interval, had been allowed to inspect all declared nuclear

installations as required by the safeguards agreement. However, the DPRK's refusal to co-operate in providing access to additional sites and information, and the loss of data which had resulted from the method of fuel core discharge which the operator had chosen for the 5 MW experimental reactor earlier in the year had prevented the assessment of the nuclear material inventory declared by the DPRK. It had also prevented a resolution of the inconsistency between that declaration and the Agency's findings.

49. Although immediately following its withdrawal from membership of the Agency in June 1994, the DPRK had appeared to reject all safeguards inspections, that position had been modified somewhat following the meeting between the late President of the DPRK and the former United States President, Mr. Carter. The Agency had thus been able to maintain a continuous inspector presence at Nyongbyon since May 1994. During the summer, inspectors had been allowed to monitor some of the activities at the 5 MW plant in line with the request made to the Agency by the Security Council in late May. Maintenance of surveillance and seals at the reprocessing plant had also continued. However, the Agency's requests for access to the fuel fabrication plant, fresh fuel storage facilities and the new reprocessing line, which was under construction, had been denied during the summer.

50. On 5 September, representatives of the DPRK had indicated to Agency inspectors on site that, following recent progress in the bilateral talks with the United States, the DPRK was ready to enlarge the scope of inspections. Inspections had recently been completed at the fuel fabrication plant and at the fresh fuel storage facility. Access to the reprocessing line had, however, not been granted. The results of the inspections which had taken place in March and May 1994 had not provided any indication of reprocessing of recently irradiated fuel or of loading of fresh fuel into the reactor.

51. He hoped that all declared facilities would soon again be fully subjected to safeguards and that additional information and visits to additional sites would be forthcoming.

52. Under the mandate of the Security Council the Agency had, to date, carried out 26 inspection missions in Iraq and had completed the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all known nuclear-weapons-usable material, facilities and equipment. In particular, the Agency had arranged for and supervised the removal from Iraq of all highly

enriched uranium, the demolition of all facilities and the removal or destruction of non-nuclear material and equipment which could be used for the production of nuclear weapons. The Agency was satisfied that the scope of Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme was well understood and that Iraq no longer had any capability for the production of nuclear weapons.

53. The implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan did not affect the Agency's right to investigate any aspect of Iraq's former nuclear weapons capability and, in particular, its right to follow up on any new information which it felt warranted further investigation.

54. In 1993, the General Conference had requested him to continue consultations with States of the Middle East region in order to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all activities in the region. In pursuance of that mandate, and as reported in document GC(XXXVIII)/18, he had had further contacts with States in the region and the Agency had continued to participate in the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security. He had received additional views on verification relevant to Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zones during his visits to Iran, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. During the coming year, he intended to continue his consultations. As a follow-up to the seminar on the modalities for the application of safeguards in the Middle East, which had been organized in 1993, arrangements were currently being made to enable representatives of Middle East States to see a demonstration of verification techniques and to become acquainted with ways in which regional verification in Europe complemented the Agency's international verification efforts.

55. Turning to Latin America, he noted that Argentina, Brazil and Chile had now ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency had entered into force in March 1994. As Cuba had declared its intention to accede to the Tlatelolco Treaty in the near future, that Treaty was expected to enter into force, thus formalizing the status of the Latin American and Caribbean region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, a development much to be welcomed.

56. South Africa's adherence to the NPT and Algeria's declared intention to do the same raised the expectation that Africa too would soon become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. At its thirty-seventh regular session, the General Conference had requested him to continue to assist the African States in their efforts towards establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. That assistance had been given and, in May 1994, the group of United Nations and OAU experts had reached agreement on the draft text of a treaty establishing such a zone. The text entrusted the Agency with the task of verification.

57. Another area of increasing Agency safeguards activity was the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union. All those countries - with the exception, of course, of the Russian Federation - had declared their intention either to become or to remain non-nuclear-weapon States. So far, nine had acceded to the NPT. The Board had recently approved the text of a safeguards agreement with Ukraine, which included provisions for the application of safeguards by the Agency to all nuclear material under the jurisdiction or control of Ukraine. In preparing for full implementation of safeguards in the newly independent States, the Agency had provided assistance with the establishment of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and advice on physical protection and on mechanisms for reporting of imports and exports relevant to safeguards. To date, nearly 30 fact-finding missions and technical visits had been carried out for that purpose.

58. At the United Nations General Assembly in September 1993, President Clinton had stated that the United States would pursue new steps to control nuclear weapons material and, during their meeting in Moscow in January 1994, President Clinton and President Yeltsin had agreed on the establishment of a joint working group to consider, inter alia, steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of putting a portion of the fissionable material under Agency safeguards.

59. Against that background, the United States had begun a process aimed at the eventual submission to Agency inspection of all United States fissile material no longer needed for defence requirements. Locations where such material was to be stored and presented for Agency inspection over the coming few years had already been identified. Discussions had taken place between the Agency and the United States on legal, technical and financial aspects of the safeguards which were to be applied within the framework of the safeguards

agreement between the Agency and the United States and there had been an exchange of letters to take account of particular aspects of the arrangement. In that exchange of letters, the United States had confirmed its intention not to withdraw such material for any purpose related to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives. An initial inspection had recently been carried out at a storage site in Oak Ridge and that was a positive and encouraging development. However, long-term solutions would have to be found to issues concerning the management and financing of such arrangements.

60. In December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly had adopted, without a vote, a resolution which recommended the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. That resolution also requested the Agency to provide assistance with the examination of verification arrangements for such a treaty as required. Pursuant to that request, he had established a working group within the Secretariat which was examining relevant issues and preparing background papers on verification of a so-called cut-off agreement in order to ensure that the Agency was able to provide prompt and sound advice.

61. During the past year, the Agency had been invited to provide information about the Agency's infrastructure and technical expertise in connection with discussions on the verification arrangements for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Presentations had been made on the Agency's experience in radionuclide monitoring and on-site inspections as relevant to such a treaty. The Agency's Secretariat believed that a verification role under a comprehensive test ban treaty would be consistent with the Agency's mandate and would fit in well with the Agency's current activities in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. Indeed, there was an obvious overlap between the commitment by a State not to test a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device and a non-proliferation commitment by the same State not to use nuclear material for weapons or explosive purposes. The Agency's verification activities under comprehensive safeguards agreements were therefore directly relevant to verification of compliance with a test ban agreement. Any non-compliance with a comprehensive test ban treaty would also mean that there was non-compliance with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, and both violations would be reported to the Security

Council. The establishment of a new organization to verify obligations under a comprehensive test ban treaty, the objective of which was in part identical to that of non-proliferation treaties, could lead to complications and would undoubtedly prove more costly than using the Agency for both regimes.

62. The international community had been much alarmed by recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Over the past year, the Secretariat had recorded many incidents which needed to be followed up. Fortunately, information received indicated that only small quantities had been involved and in no case did the material appear to have come from a nuclear weapons stockpile. That did not mean that the problem was not a serious one. Uncontrolled movement of nuclear material clearly involved both radiation safety and proliferation risks.

63. There had been extensive discussions among States in recent weeks with a view to finding remedies to the trafficking problem. The Agency's Secretariat had also consulted many Member States exposed to trafficking in order to identify ways in which the Agency might help mitigate the problem. There seemed to be wide agreement that preventing diversion at the sources was crucial and that nuclear material accounting and control together with physical protection systems were central to such prevention. The Agency had been active for many years in arranging for training, providing expert advice and co-ordinating the elaboration of guidelines in those two areas. With adequate resources, those efforts could be expanded without delay. Furthermore, the Agency's current system of collecting and analysing information obtained from the media and Member States could be improved significantly so as to allow systematic reporting to Member States in order to help them to separate fact from fiction and provide a basis for assessing the real extent of the problem. In order to promote more systematic consideration of ideas from Member States regarding additional Agency activities to help combat trafficking, he was prepared to convene a round table of Government experts that could recommend specific action which could be taken promptly.

64. It was clear that the Agency's existing programmes continued to fulfil an important role and that some new responsibilities would have to be assumed to meet emerging new requirements of Member States. It was entirely appropriate to insist that existing resources

be used well and only for activities to which Governments accorded high priority, before additional resources were requested. The Agency had a good record in that regard. It had refined the preparation process for its programme and budget with a view to redirecting resources to higher-priority activities. It was strengthening monitoring and evaluation of programmes in order to ensure efficient delivery and better assessment of impact. The Agency was moving to a programme-based accounting system, which would also help it focus on programme delivery. It had mastered a long cash crisis and had been able to implement progressively activities which had had to be deferred as a result of late payment of contributions. As of 1995, the Agency would, once again, be implementing close to the full approved programme and budget for that year. Those developments had all contributed to strengthening the Agency's main activities and had created a good basis for the Agency to assume new responsibilities, if Governments so decided.

65. However, if the Agency was to meet current and expected demands successfully, more adequate, orderly and predictable financing was needed. Many important activities were currently only possible because of extrabudgetary support from some Member States. That was not a desirable long-term solution. A new understanding among Governments was needed to secure adequate and timely funding for the full range of current and new activities which the Agency was being called on to undertake.

66. Turning to the question of staffing, he said that the reports which had been submitted to the Conference on the staffing of the Agency's Secretariat demonstrated that the Agency was gradually achieving greater diversity in staff recruitment. Proportionally more Professional staff came from developing countries, and there were proportionally more Professional female staff. That was a positive development and the process had to continue.

67. He was indebted to the staff of the Agency and was glad to head a team of Professional and General Service staff which had proved capable of meeting successfully the many challenges of the past year. Through dedicated hard work and with only a minimal increase in numbers, that team had managed to respond to the growing demands which Member States had placed on the Agency.

68. In closing, he thanked the Austrian Government and the City of Vienna for their continued efforts to facilitate the Agency's smooth operation and to make the life of the Agency's many visitors and resident international civil servants safe, comfortable and enjoyable.

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

69. The PRESIDENT, recalling the close co-operation for many years between the Agency and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, invited Mr. Diouf, Director General of the FAO, to address the Conference in commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the setting up of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture and the joint endeavour by the two organizations to promote world food production.

70. Mr. DIOUF (Director General of the FAO) expressed his pleasure at attending the Agency's General Conference again for the first time since 1981, when he had been a delegate of his country to the General Conference. In the intervening period, he had followed the Agency's activities and important missions in international affairs. The Agency played a crucial role in improving nuclear safety and developing its safeguards system, the importance of which had been highlighted by recent events.

71. However, there was more to the work of the Agency. Its Statute called for it to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. He believed that it was by increasing and preserving food supplies and contributing to improved health that the Agency would leave its greatest mark. There was a great deal of fascination associated with the application of nuclear technology to the solution of man's most basic need, namely the need to be adequately fed. The application of nuclear techniques to all links in the food production chain had enormously enhanced the sophistication of food production methods, resulting in immense benefits to farmers, consumers and society as a whole.

72. Most United Nations gatherings and the Governments of Member States continually launched appeals for more co-operation among United Nations agencies, for less overlapping

and duplication and for more harmony in their approach. It was therefore a source of great pride and satisfaction for the FAO to be celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of its extremely successful and harmonious co-operation with the Agency. Since the creation of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division in 1964, all activities in nuclear applications for food and agriculture in the United Nations system had been conceived, planned and executed jointly by the FAO and the Agency. All programmes and activities carried out by the Joint FAO/IAEA Division were subjected to scrutiny and approval by the governing bodies of both organizations, implicitly providing endorsement from the world's ministries of agriculture and atomic energy authorities.

73. Although the Joint FAO/IAEA Division was one of the best examples of interagency co-operation within the whole United Nations system, close and harmonious co-operation and sophisticated technologies would not amount to much if Member States did not enjoy the benefits.

74. Reviewing the thirty years' co-operation, he was impressed by the great number of real benefits which had been derived from the use of nuclear technology in food and agricultural research and development. The most notable example was the eradication of the New World screwworm from Libya in 1991. As an African, he was extremely concerned at what might have happened if the fly had crossed the Sahara and become endemic in the African tropics and subtropics, playing havoc with the livestock industry and with wildlife, and posing a great threat to human health. The ingenious application of radiation-induced sterilization and the release of tens of millions of sterile flies each week in the affected areas had very swiftly led to total eradication, saving the African continent from a formidable threat. That achievement, which was the result of close and harmonious teamwork by the FAO and the Agency, served as an example for future co-operation attempts to use that technique to eradicate or control a number of insect pests.

75. In the revised programme of work for the FAO, approved by the FAO Council in June, one of the priority areas was the Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases, a programme for combatting pests and diseases in livestock and crops. Great importance was attached to the role of radiation sterilization of insects in controlling or eradicating pests, such as the tsetse fly in Africa or the

Mediterranean fruit fly, which had already been eradicated from Mexico and was currently being eradicated from Argentina, Chile and Guatemala.

76. In the past, the chief means of controlling insects had been to apply chemical insecticides. However, their indiscriminate use could pose a grave threat to human health and the environment. The FAO had therefore taken steps to regulate the trade and use of pesticides and to provide international laboratory standards, quality control instruction and training to chemists from developing countries to enable each importing country to analyse and control the chemical composition and quality of imported pesticides. He had suggested to the Agency that a joint training centre and reference service for food quality and pesticide control should be established.

77. He was also keen to explore the possibility of expanding co-operation with the Agency in the field of biotechnology, where nuclear techniques played such a crucial role. The unique presence within the Agency of an effective joint agricultural laboratory created interesting possibilities for providing better assistance and advice to developing Member States with respect to molecular biology and biotechnology applications to promote agricultural development.

78. Apart from sterilizing flies, radiation was also very effective in generating new variability in crops. Thirty years previously, there had been very few examples of successful applications of radiation in mutation breeding. However, with the development of that technique and as a result of the fruitful co-operation between the two organizations, almost 2000 plant varieties created through the use of induced mutations had been released to growers worldwide. In some countries, mutant varieties had become the leading ones for cultivation, providing enormous economic benefits to farmers and society as a whole.

79. The other main thrust of the FAO programme of work presented to the FAO Council the previous June had been to increase food production in low-income countries, particularly in the African continent, where there were food shortages. An appropriate programme was currently being formulated and would begin in 1995 with demonstrations in a number of selected countries of how crop yields could be drastically increased with proper inputs, agricultural management and water control techniques. He noted with great satisfaction that

the Agency had offered to support that initiative by undertaking to monitor and evaluate the results from field trials with the aid of radioactive and stable isotope tracer techniques. He intended to widen the approach to include research and development activities for both crops and livestock and looked forward to closer and more effective use of the joint programme to promote food security.

80. There were still formidable challenges to be faced, however, in the efforts to ensure food security for all. There were currently 800 million people deprived of adequate access to food. Unless drastic measures were taken, that number would increase rapidly. The current world population of 5.6 billion was expected to increase to some 9 billion by 2030. In order to feed the current starving population and an additional 3.5 billion persons, food production would need to be doubled. To do that on a sustainable basis and without further harm to the environment, all available intellectual skills and efforts would have to be combined through research and development to discover the proper inputs, devise the proper systems and ensure the proper management of resources. It was not only a matter of increasing food production. Up to 30% of food was ruined by insects and microbes after harvest. Here again, the use of nuclear technology could go a long way to reducing those enormous losses and improving the wholesomeness of food.

81. Nuclear science and technology, together with other advanced scientific disciplines, and particularly the new biotechnologies, would play a crucial and perhaps indispensable role in the future. The FAO and the Agency should build upon three decades of joint efforts and fruitful co-operation to help secure adequate food supplies for the growing world population. Congratulating the staff of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division on the thirtieth anniversary, he pledged his wholehearted support for the joint programme with the Agency and trusted that it would continue to be a model of interagency co-operation in the United Nations system, promoting the use of nuclear technology to fulfil the food and agriculture research and development goals of Member States.

## VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION FUND FOR 1995

82. The PRESIDENT said that the Agency's policy-making bodies had, since 1982, followed the practice of recommending indicative planning figures to be used in

establishing annual targets for voluntary contributions to the TACF. In 1992 the Board had agreed on increases in the targets for voluntary contributions to the TACF from $52.5 million in 1992 to $55.5 million in 1993, $58.5 million in 1994 and $61.5 million in 1995. Accordingly, in the draft resolution relating to the TACF, contained in Annex VI to document GC(XXXVIII)/5, the Board recommended the figure of $61.5 million as the target for voluntary contributions to the TACF for 1995.

83. Early pledging of voluntary contributions greatly helped the Secretariat in planning technical assistance programmes. He therefore urged all delegations that were in a position to do so, but had not done so as yet, to notify the Secretariat during the current session of the voluntary contributions that their Governments would be making to the TACF in 1995.

84. He would report at the end of the session, under a later agenda item, on the voluntary contributions which had been pledged up to that time, and was confident that he would then be in a position to report favourably on the percentage of the 1995 target figure already pledged.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1993 (GC(XXXVIII)/2 and Corr.1)

85. Mr. NZO (South Africa) pointed out that it was a great honour to stand before the General Conference as the representative of a completely free, non-racial and democratic South Africa that was based on universal equality and justice. The establishment of the Government of National Unity following the April 1994 elections was one of the most significant events in African and world history.

86. The ending of apartheid represented not only the attainment of human dignity and self-respect for all South Africans, it was also a major achievement in the context of the global effort to combat racism. South Africa had shown how a country riven by diversity and conflict could, through negotiation and a spirit of reconciliation, produce a new nation that was united and at peace.

87. The democratic transformation, which had been brought about by the efforts of all South Africans, would not have been possible without the consistent support and encouragement of the international community. For its part, the Agency had played a constructive role in that process by adopting a number of resolutions intended to help bring

apartheid to an end. South Africa was now a member of the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 and, within its own region, had recently joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC). South Africa had also resumed its seat at the United Nations General Assembly and, with the lifting of a number of embargoes, South Africa's relations with a number of United Nations organizations had become fully normalized.

88. Turning to nuclear-related matters, he said it was essential that the review and extension of the NPT in 1995 should result in the strengthening of the Treaty and the further promotion of non-proliferation and disarmament, objectives to which South Africa was deeply committed. South Africa was unique in the sense that it had voluntarily terminated its nuclear weapons programme and had destroyed the weapons that it had developed. The verification by the Agency and the international community of the information provided by South Africa in that respect had brought the vision of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone closer to reality. Furthermore, South Africa had contributed to the negotiations to draft a treaty to establish such a zone, which it believed would help lay the foundations for a future free of the threat of nuclear devastation. South Africa was equally committed to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, as demonstrated by the fact that it had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

89. South Africa's internationally acknowledged advanced nuclear industry had an integrated nuclear fuel cycle that included a significant uranium mining industry, a 20 MW reactor for isotope production, a 1900 MW nuclear power plant, waste and spent fuel storage and disposal facilities, facilities for the extensive production of isotopes for use in research, agriculture, industry and medicine, facilities for commercial food irradiation and other nuclear-related activities. South Africa was the leading African producer and exporter of radioisotopes for medical and industrial uses.

90. South Africa was willing to share its technology and know-how with other countries, particularly those in Africa, within the framework of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. In 1995 South Africa would be hosting an African regional information seminar on co-operation with the Agency, in addition to the annual AFRA conference and an international conference on radiation protection and radioactive waste management in the

mining and mineral processing industries. The possibility of siting an African regional repository for spent radioactive sources in South Africa was under discussion. South Africa was fortunate in having a repository for low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste that was the equal of any such facility anywhere else in the world.

91. He welcomed the fact that the General Conference would have before it a draft resolution on the participation of South Africa in the Agency's activities. Having lost its designation as a member for the area of Africa in 1976 owing to the unacceptability of the apartheid regime, democratic South Africa was once again ready to play a full role in all organs of the Agency.

92. Turning to the issue of nuclear and radiation safety, he said South Africa had always maintained strong regulatory control over its civil nuclear fuel cycle activities and had taken further steps in recent years to ensure their independence and effectiveness. His country was willing to make its experience and expertise in such matters available to the countries of its region. South Africa had always viewed nuclear safety as a matter of the utmost importance, and during the current session of the General Conference it would be one of the first countries to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It was committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Convention. However, it felt strongly that the Convention should not be limited to land-based civil nuclear power plants, but should cover all civil and military installations and radioactive waste management facilities.

93. While South Africa welcomed the continual increase in the number of countries joining the Agency, it urged all Member States to accede to the NPT and, where applicable, sign comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. However, without the necessary political will and moral integrity, all agreements, including the NPT, were meaningless. The world needed total commitment to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. For its part, South Africa had changed the nuclear sword into a nuclear ploughshare and was committed to making the world a safer place.

94. Ms. TANAKA (Japan) said that with the expected increase in the world's population to ten billion by the middle of the twenty-first century, action had to be taken to assure energy supplies. However, in doing so, care should be taken not to waste valuable

natural resources and attention should be paid to environmental considerations. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy would undoubtedly have an important role to play in solving a number of problems in the twenty-first century.

95. In June, the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan had established a new long-term programme for research, development and utilization of nuclear energy based on Japan's twin objectives of using nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes and of ensuring the safety of its applications. The programme set forth four fundamental policies for the development and utilization of nuclear power: the implementation of nuclear policies appropriate for a nation devoted solely to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; the creation of a more reliable, efficient and safer system for the generation of nuclear power and development of solutions to the problem of radioactive waste management; the gradual implementation of long-term fuel recycling programmes, while respecting the principles of holding no surplus plutonium and of maintaining transparency; and the promotion of nuclear science and technology and strengthening of basic research in areas such as medicine, agriculture and environmental conservation.

96. Turning to efforts to prevent proliferation, she stressed the importance for world peace and security of preventing the emergence of a new nuclear-weapon State and urged nations that had not ratified the NPT to join the regime as non-nuclear-weapon States. Japan supported the indefinite extension of the NPT for three reasons: because stabilization of the non-proliferation regime was vital to achieve world peace and security; because maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime would contribute to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the development of smooth, co-operative international relations; and because Japan adhered to the principles of not possessing, not producing, and not introducing nuclear weapons into its territory. Her country hoped that as many parties to the Treaty as possible would support its indefinite extension. Japan sought the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and once again urged the nuclear-weapon States to endeavour to make further reductions in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

97. Work to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system and to improve its efficiency was crucial to preserve and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, to maintain the credibility of the safeguards system itself, and to make optimum use of limited resources in a time of

budgetary austerity. Japan welcomed the improvements made in the field of special inspections, early provision of design information and the creation of the nuclear material and equipment reporting scheme.

98. With regard to the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the DPRK, Japan strongly supported the efforts of the Agency's Secretariat and the nations concerned to solve the problem. The agreement had not been fully implemented owing to a lack of co-operation on the part of the DPRK and consequently it had not been possible to confirm that there had been no diversion for military purposes. Japan called upon the DPRK to act in accordance with the statement it had made jointly with the United States in August; to clarify its position with regard to the NPT; and to implement fully its safeguards agreement and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Japan also regretted the DPRK's withdrawal from the Agency and hoped that it would rejoin.

99. In order to reduce fears about nuclear proliferation in the countries of the former Soviet Union, it would be essential to place the nuclear material obtained following the dismantling of nuclear weapons under strict control. As part of its efforts to support denuclearization and to improve the control of nuclear material in the former Soviet Union, Japan was currently co-operating with the Russian Federation in areas such as the storage of nuclear material resulting from the dismantling of weapons and had also indicated its intention to co-operate with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus in establishing their State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials. Japan welcomed the approval of the safeguards agreement between Ukraine and the Agency by the Board of Governors the previous week and hoped that Ukraine would accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

100. The international community's attention had been drawn to the problems associated with the control of nuclear material derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons and the issue of the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Japan attached great importance to the need to increase transparency, enhance international understanding, and eliminate international concerns regarding plutonium utilization. In that connection, it would continue to play an active part in developing an international framework to improve transparency in that area.

101. Her country was extremely concerned about the illegal trafficking of sensitive nuclear material recently disclosed in Germany. All countries should co-operate in order to prevent illegal trafficking of such material from leading to the spread of nuclear explosive devices and the matter should be discussed in the Agency.

102. Safety was of crucial importance in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and, as one of the parties to have participated actively in its formulation, Japan welcomed the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which was the first legally binding international framework to ensure the safety of civil nuclear power plants. Japan sincerely hoped that as many nations as possible would sign the Convention, which would foster a nuclear safety culture in the signatory States and raise the overall level of nuclear safety.

103. Although it deeply regretted the Russian Federation's dumping of radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan in October 1993 in contravention of existing international obligations, Japan welcomed the increased co-operation with the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation on that subject. The Russian Federation had the primary responsibility for the storage and treatment of its radioactive waste. However, in view of the difficult conditions in that country, Japan was prepared to co-operate in the construction of facilities to store and treat such waste. It was to be hoped that there would be no further cases of such dumping of radioactive waste.

104. The Agency's activities in the area of technical co-operation, which had greatly contributed to the spread of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing countries were very important and Japan would continue to contribute to them as far as possible. It also intended to play a more active part, despite its financial difficulties, in assiting the Agency in its crucial role in the formation of a new world peace order.

105. Mr. JIANG (China) said that there had been several new developments in the field of international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. The international community had achieved significant progress by concluding the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Agency's financial situation had improved generally and the increase in the total financial resources available for technical co-operation had been particularly gratifying. Member States were paying more attention to strengthening the

effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system and the Secretariat had also been working hard on the development of Programme 93+2. The Agency had achieved fruitful results in helping the East European and CIS countries to apply safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities, to improve the safety of their nuclear facilities and to eliminate radioactive contamination. Another encouraging sign was that many Member States had requested assistance from the Agency in carrying out studies related to energy and electricity planning and nuclear power feasibility. Furthermore, model technical assistance projects, aimed at better meeting the development priorities and needs of Member States, had been set up.

106. There was, however, still an imbalance between the Agency's promotional and regulatory activities. A number of promotional activities were still failing to make satisfactory progress and some were at a standstill. China was concerned that, in recent years, there had even been attempts to weaken the Agency's promotional functions in the name of nuclear non-proliferation. China wholeheartedly supported the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. It did not advocate, encourage or engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons; nor would it ever assist any other country to develop nuclear weapons. China believed that the NPT should be made more universal and the Agency's safeguards system more effective. Although non-proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were closely related, nuclear non-proliferation should not be pursued to the detriment of the legitimate rights and demands for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of Member States, especially the developing countries. It should also not be used to limit the development of nuclear technology and a nuclear energy industry in those countries. One-sided advocation of non-proliferation not only ran counter to the aims and principles set forth in the Agency's Statute, but also to the fundamental objectives of the NPT.

107. China therefore felt that a balanced approach should be adopted in strengthening the Agency's technical assistance activities and its safeguards system. The Agency should make greater efforts to redress the present imbalance and promote technical assistance and co-operation in the developing countries. In doing so, it should continue its efforts to elaborate technical assistance and co-operation programmes which best suited the specific

conditions of the developing countries and which were adapted to national development goals and strategies. The concept of model projects was a valuable experiment in accommodating national priorities and achieving greater economic and social impact. The Agency should remove any unreasonable restrictions on nuclear technology transfer and help the developing countries acquire expertise in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Only in that way could favourable conditions be created for the establishment and development of a new relationship in international nuclear co-operation. Furthermore, the Agency should play a more positive role in supporting co-operation between developing countries and improving their collective and individual self-reliance. China hoped that the Secretariat would continue its consultations with Member States, especially the developing countries, to develop practical technical assistance strategies and improve co-operation.

108. China was fortunate in having rich uranium resources and its own design and construction capabilities. After forty years of development, China's nuclear industry had acquired a complete nuclear fuel cycle system and was now entering a new phase. The 300 MW(e) reactor at the Qinshan power plant, designed and built in China, was now operating well. Following the successful operation of Unit 1 of the Daya Bay nuclear power plant, Unit 2 had started commercial operation in May 1994. In order to meet the demand for electricity, China planned to start construction of nuclear projects in Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces. The total capacity under construction was expected to reach 8000-10 000 MW(e) by the year 2000.

109. As China continued to open up to the outside world, international co-operation in the field of nuclear power, including co-operation with the Agency, constituted an integral part of its development. China would continue to follow the principle of seeking foreign co-operation while emphasizing self-reliance. It was grateful for the assistance given by the Agency in recent years in the construction of the Qinshan power plant in the fields of personnel training, project management, quality assurance, commissioning, operation management and emergency response. It hoped that the Agency would increase its efforts to assist in the development of nuclear energy and support the nuclear power industries of Member States, especially the developing countries. China also hoped that the Agency would further expand the scope of its assistance in the transfer of nuclear technology.

110. The guiding principle of China's nuclear power industry had always been to give the highest priority to quality and safety. High levels of nuclear safety were the basis of sustainable and smooth development of nuclear power. Conversely, maintaining a strong momentum in nuclear power development brought advances in nuclear safety technology. In recent years, the Agency had done much commendable work in the field of nuclear safety, notably in formulating nuclear safety standards and carrying out operational safety reviews of nuclear power plants. It was important, however, to ensure that nuclear safety and the development of nuclear power were promoted in conjunction, without undue emphasis on the former. Furthermore, assistance given by the international community to improve nuclear safety in East European and CIS countries should not detract from assistance to other Member States.

111. In the ten years that China had been a member of the Agency, the Agency and China had conducted fruitful exchanges in the fields of nuclear power construction, nuclear safety, radiation protection, application of nuclear technology and basic physical and chemical research. In addition to the traditional forms of co-operation (equipment provision, scientific visits, research contracts) there had been initiatives in areas such as joint research, technical advisory services and assessment, and training courses. Thanks to Agency assistance, a number of training centres had been established in China. China welcomed scientific and technical personnel from developing countries for research and training and had made Chinese experts available for Agency programmes. The importance attached by China to its co-operation with the Agency was reflected in its timely payment of its Regular Budget and voluntary contributions. Moreover, China had provided contributions in kind for RCA projects and had decided to donate an extra $1 million to the Agency to help finance model projects in other developing countries.

112. Over the past ten years, China had also co-operated extensively with the Agency in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards. China had concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency and had signed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In March 1992, China had formally acceded to the NPT, thus demonstrating its sincere determination to ensure peace and stability in the world. To facilitate the Agency's safeguards activities, China had undertaken to report all its imports

and exports of nuclear material and exports of nuclear equipment and non-nuclear materials. China followed international practices and exercised strict control over its exports.

113. After more than two years of negotiation, the Convention on Nuclear Safety had finally been concluded. Despite the fact that some imbalance in certain provisions remained, the Convention had gained the broad support of Member States. The Chinese Government intended to sign the Convention after the necessary legal procedures had been completed. China would strictly fulfil its obligations under the Convention and take an active part in internationally co-ordinated actions aimed at strengthening nuclear safety.

114. China supported the Agency's endeavours to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system and believed that the system should be just, objective, reasonable, transparent and practicable. It should be able to deter and detect any non-compliance, and redress any such instance. China had always maintained that the underlying aim of improving the effectiveness of safeguards should be to build confidence. Any measures adopted should be in strict conformity with the Statute and other relevant international legal instruments, should respect State sovereignty, and ensure the equal status, rights and obligations of all countries. In view of the complex nature of international relations, a vigilant guard should be kept against the possible abuse of environmental monitoring.

115. China supported the Agency's decision to give high priority to activities related to the practical application of food irradiation and economical production of potable water and was prepared to participate actively in technical exchanges and industrial co-operation in that area.

116. The recent increase in illicit trafficking of nuclear material in Europe was a matter of concern to the international community. As a signatory of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, China attached great importance to the control and protection of nuclear material and was opposed to any form of illicit trafficking. The Agency had a role to play in addressing that problem and Governments and the international community should join efforts to stop such trafficking.

117. As a developing Member State, China naturally hoped that the Agency would adapt to the new international situation and deal with the important issues related to international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation in a balanced and just manner. It was the Agency's fundamental task to ensure the comprehensive implementation of the principles of its Statute. China, together with other Member States, was willing to make every effort to help the Agency fulfil that noble task.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE (resumed)

118. The PRESIDENT said that agreement had been reached in the African Group on its nominations for the General Committee and accordingly he proposed that, under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the delegate of Tunisia be elected as a Vice-President of the General Conference and that, under Rule 40, the delegate of Namibia be elected as an additional member of the General Committee.

119. It was so agreed.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.