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President: Mr. SIEVERING (United States of America)

Later: Mr. RYZHOV (Russian Federation)

Mr. BAER (Switzerland)

Mr. HASHIM (Malaysia)

CONTENTS

<u>Item of the agenda*</u>		<u>Paragraphs</u>
7	General debate and annual report for 1993 (continued)	1 - 215
	Statements by the delegates of:	
	Chile	1 - 9
	Norway	10 - 19
	Saudi Arabia	20 - 33
	Belgium	34 - 37
	Croatia	38 - 48
	Cuba	49 - 64
	Sri Lanka	65 - 75
	Indonesia	76 - 87
	Viet Nam	88 - 95
	Qatar	96 - 101
	Greece	102 - 112
	Philippines	113 - 125
	Italy	126 - 138
	Syrian Arab Republic	139 - 148
	Slovak Republic	149 - 162
	Egypt	163 - 176
	New Zealand	177 - 190
	Ireland	191 - 203
	Lithuania	204 - 215

[*] GC(XXXVIII)/25.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXVIII)/INF/11/Rev.2.

Abbreviations used in this record

ARCAL	Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
DECADES	Databases and Methodologies for Comparative Assessment of Different Energy Sources for Electricity Generation
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECU	European currency unit
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G-7	Group of Seven
G-24	Group of Twenty-Four
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
London Convention	Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972)
LWR	Light-water reactor
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PHWR	Pressurized heavy water reactor
R&D	Research and development
RADWASS	Radioactive Waste Safety Standards
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
START	Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
TACC	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee
TACF	Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
THORP	Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.)
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1961)
WAMAP	Waste Management Advisory Programme
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1993 (GC(XXXVIII)/2) (continued)

1. Mr. PUCCIO HUIDOBRO (Chile) recalled that on 18 January Chile had become a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty, which confirmed its peaceful intentions and its wish to help extend the uses of nuclear energy in the interests of promoting national development at the political, economic and social levels. The associated safeguards agreement was being negotiated and would be concluded within the established time limit. Although it had no nuclear power plants, Chile had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which would play a vital role in the safe and balanced development of nuclear power and technology worldwide.
2. Chile's National Nuclear Development Plan, which had been submitted for Government approval, would be complemented by short-, medium- and long-term action plans involving extensive participation on the part of private companies and the secondary and tertiary sectors. It provided for the decentralization of activities and would promote the introduction of nuclear techniques for regional development purposes. In that regard, his delegation was convinced of the necessity of the actions that had been taken in order to derive maximum benefit from the resources that his country and the Agency made available for national nuclear development.
3. Chile, which attached great importance to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, believed that there should be a medium-term project aimed at evaluating their impact on the development of the States concerned. His Government had pledged an amount equal to its share of the TACF target for 1995. He thanked the Agency, and in particular the Department of Technical Co-operation, for the assistance which his country was continuing to receive.
4. Chile, which also attached great importance to bilateral co-operation, was willing to collaborate with any country which regarded the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy as an instrument for development. Thus, it had recently drawn up an action plan for the establishment of a co-operation agreement with the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission and was in the process of negotiating a similar agreement with the Polish Government. Likewise, the co-operation agreement concluded between the authorities of

Chile and China had led to an exchange of experts and the elaboration of joint projects regarding - for example - the development of ceramic compounds of lithium and the fabrication of low-enriched fuel for research reactors.

5. With regard to nuclear safety, he expressed concern about the procedures for assessing it worldwide and in particular about the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). The Agency should implement without delay criteria for using INES in the case of research reactors and similar facilities; improved information and a suitable classification of nuclear-safety-related events would contribute to greater public acceptance of nuclear energy.

6. Chile's long-standing concern with nuclear safety and radiation protection had been demonstrated in various ways. The 1984 regulations governing radiation protection and the authorization of radiation sources had been amended in 1994. During the period 1984-94, over 120 people had been trained in radiological protection in medicine and industry. Radioactive waste was still being treated at the national facility built with the Agency's assistance, which met all of the country's needs. In the area of metrology and secondary standards, procedures had been standardized at all of Chile's oncology units and an adviser on physical dosimetry had joined the Institute of Public Health. All radiation workers underwent radiological monitoring, representing altogether more than 1200 examinations a year. In personnel dosimetry, radon levels had been measured in the Santiago area and at a station in the Antarctic, workers exposed to neutrons had been given albedo dosimeters, and the development of high-dose neutron dosimetry had begun on the basis of the activation of human hair and body sodium. The Chilean Government's nuclear energy policy placed special emphasis on all such issues, and his delegation wished to express its appreciation to the Agency for the efforts it had made in the areas in question through its technical co-operation programme.

7. With regard to applications of isotopes and radiation, the Chilean Atomic Energy Commission had launched projects relating to agriculture, the environment, water resources, mining and medicine, in the last of which 90% of the country's demand for isotopes was still being met through production within Chile. With regard to the irradiation of materials and foodstuffs, the capacity of the cobalt-60 source at Chile's multipurpose irradiation facility had been doubled in order to meet the growing demand for services. GATT's interest in

international trade in irradiated foodstuffs was encouraging, for something had to be done about the restrictions which some countries were imposing on the importation of such foodstuffs and which were hampering the Agency's promotional efforts in that field.

8. An educational programme aimed particularly at private companies and the secondary and tertiary sectors had been started with the aim of familiarizing people with the possible applications of nuclear techniques through a publicity campaign in the media and through participation in sectoral conferences and seminars and in regional, national and international trade fairs. The Agency was supporting that programme. With regard to training, the Commission had held three courses on operational radiation protection and two on radiological protection for paramedical personnel. Within the framework of ARCAL, a national seminar for managerial staff on applications of nuclear techniques - especially X-ray fluorescence techniques - in the mining industry had taken place in June. In addition, the University of Chile's Centre for Food Quality Assessment, supported by the Commission and the Agency, had held a seminar on analysis validation as a quality assurance method. Lastly, a regional course on nuclear medicine in pediatrics had been held in September with Agency support.

9. All the activities he had mentioned testified to the wish of the Chilean authorities to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through international co-operation in accordance with the objectives for which the Agency had been established.

10. Mr. DAEHLEN (Norway) said that his country took a keen interest in the activities of the Agency, which was central to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One of the Agency's main tasks was to make the operation of nuclear power plants safer and more reliable and to help improve the qualifications of their operating personnel. The adoption of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety had been an important step in that direction and demonstrated the determination of the parties to co-operate in improving nuclear safety worldwide. During the elaboration of the Convention it had been agreed to press ahead with efforts to establish other instruments, in particular an international convention on waste management once the relevant Safety Fundamentals were in place. Member States should work towards that goal, so that work on such a convention, which was regarded as highly important by his country, could start soon.

11. His delegation appreciated the Agency's work in inspecting and upgrading nuclear power plants in countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. Within the limits set by its financial resources, Norway was actively supporting projects to improve safety at those plants. The role of the Agency should be to advise and assist the competent authorities, as safety must remain a national responsibility of the highest priority.

12. He welcomed the recent publication by the Agency of a handbook on radioactive waste management in countries of Central and Eastern Europe - a very helpful document which threw light on a key part of the fuel cycle. It was important to establish a clear picture of the situation in all those countries, devote greater attention to the matter and apply urgent corrective measures. In that regard, Norway was collaborating with the Agency, the Russian Federation and the other Nordic countries in organizing, under the Agency's auspices, a meeting on waste management.

13. Extensive civilian and non-civilian nuclear activities took place in the Arctic region, where radioactive waste and spent uranium fuel created a complex problem, one aspect of which was the dumping of such material in important fish breeding grounds and another the fact that facilities for processing, storing and disposing of such material were inadequate or completely lacking. In that regard, his delegation was grateful to the Agency for its efforts to monitor and assess the consequences of radioactive waste dumping in the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific. Norway was deeply concerned about that practice and had acceded to the London Convention, which it would like to see receiving universal support.

14. Norway and the Russian Federation were conducting extensive research and organizing expeditions in order to monitor the possible consequences of the dumping of nuclear waste in the Arctic. A preliminary report on the findings of the third expedition, carried out by Norway in the Kara Sea, would be submitted to the Agency and to the annual conference of the parties to the London Convention. Norway was grateful to the Agency for its involvement in those activities, particularly through the special programme with wide international participation which it had established in order - among other things - to assess the consequences of such dumping.

15. The changes that had taken place in the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe had affected the procedures in force for the management of spent uranium fuel and radioactive waste. In the past, spent fuel had normally been returned to its country of origin, but now there was a tendency for it to accumulate at nuclear power plants which were neither prepared nor equipped for such a situation. Norway, which believed that the situation should be addressed at the international level, had taken up the issue with a number of countries, including all the members of the Group of Seven. Suitable procedures and appropriate facilities should be established for the processing and storage of spent uranium fuel and radioactive waste.

16. Norway attached great importance to the NPT and to its unconditional and indefinite extension. It considered the Agency's safeguards essential for preventing the diversion of nuclear material and continued to support wholeheartedly the efforts being made to strengthen the safeguards system. His delegation welcomed the agreement concluded between Ukraine and the Agency regarding safeguards on all nuclear materials for peaceful purposes and hoped that an NPT safeguards agreement would soon follow. His delegation also welcomed the accession to the NPT of Georgia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the recent ratification of the NPT by the Moldovan Parliament.

17. Following a number of reports regarding cases of illegal diversion of fresh uranium fuel and other fissile material, Norway, which found the situation highly alarming, would like all countries to maintain effective controls over such material. Also, in order to detect and prevent such diversion his country would like to see greater international co-operation and increased transparency, and it would support the establishment of an international regime for the registration and control of fissile material. The Agency's role in that context would have to be examined. The agreed dismantling of a huge number of nuclear weapons and the storage of the resulting material made such an idea highly relevant.

18. His delegation, which had regretted the decision of the DPRK to withdraw from the Agency, remained very concerned about that country's non-compliance with the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the Agency. It very much hoped that the DPRK would allow the Agency to carry out a complete inspection of its fissile material and nuclear facilities.

19. In conclusion, he commended the Director General and the Secretariat on the comprehensive and impressive programme of technical co-operation activities in 1993 and announced that, subject to parliamentary approval, his Government would continue to contribute to the TACF.

20. Mr. AL-NOWAISER (Saudi Arabia) said that the agenda for the present session emphasized the importance and multiplicity of the tasks entrusted to the Agency by the General Conference. He believed that the Agency was in a position to fulfil the majority of those tasks, which derived from its statutory mandate, but additional tasks had arisen as a result of developments on the international scene. He was sure that the Secretariat was following a judicious path in strengthening its main activities while ensuring an appropriate balance between the Agency's principal objectives and that it was making every effort to increase the effectiveness of the Agency's programmes and the resources available for them.

21. The Agency Conference on the Nuclear Power Option at the beginning of September had provided additional information about the role that nuclear power could play in helping to meet the expected increase in energy demand and had served as a further opportunity to inform the public about that subject in the light of comparative studies of nuclear power and other sources of energy.

22. The peaceful applications of nuclear energy in industry, agriculture, medicine and science were not restricted to developed countries; the benefits of nuclear energy were regularly being exploited in the social and economic development programmes of all countries. The Agency should therefore, within the framework of its efforts to promote the safe use of nuclear energy, play the role of intermediary between providers and users of nuclear techniques, equipment and material, ensuring the highest level of safety, training specialized technical staff and informing those in positions of responsibility at national establishments about radiation safety and protection standards and guidelines. It was through technical co-operation that the Agency could best fulfil that role.

23. His delegation had participated in the Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar held just before the current session of the Conference, and Saudi Arabia welcomed most of the changes envisaged in the technical co-operation area, particularly the adoption of a

practical, integrated approach to the implementation of projects with clear social and economic advantages, the taking into account of sustainability criteria and the participation of end-users in the evaluation of technical assistance requests. It hoped they would help to increase the effectiveness of technical co-operation activities in the interests of developing countries.

24. Given the financial difficulties of the Agency and the fact that its limited resources were insufficient to meet the demands of its programme, his delegation - like others - feared that the planned expansion of activities related to inspections, safety, radiation protection and waste management would lead to a reduction in the share of resources devoted by the Agency to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing countries. It was essential that the Agency meet developing countries' legitimate technical co-operation needs and expectations, which constituted an acquired right.

25. However, his delegation did not underestimate the importance of safeguards or of activities related to nuclear safety, radiation protection and waste management; they were justified and useful. Safeguards were the only legal method for verifying that States respected their commitments and preventing the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes; they helped to maintain peace and security in the world. It was therefore necessary to strengthen the safeguards system, to extend its field of application and to increase its effectiveness. As his delegation was concerned to maintain confidence in the safeguards system, it accepted that the Agency should take appropriate measures to detect cases where countries did not comply with their commitments, provided that the Agency remained within its means and that its reputation and financial situation did not suffer. In that context, he drew attention to the comments made by the External Auditor on Programme 93+2 in his report on the Agency's accounts for 1993, which suggested that the increase in the Agency's inspection responsibilities would lead to such an increase in expenditures that the Agency would be unable to produce a proposal for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system by early 1995.

26. Most of the safeguards agreements with the Agency were concluded pursuant to the NPT, whose objectives were to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, to put an end to the nuclear arms race, to bring about disarmament under international

supervision, to define the rights and obligations of States with regard to the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, to promote the exchange of material and scientific information for those purposes and to ensure that all were able to enjoy the benefits in an equitable manner. Saudi Arabia had been participating in the meetings of the committees preparing the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the NPT (the most recent having been held in Geneva the previous week), which were laying the ground for an extension of the NPT 25 years after its entry into force.

27. Reiterating Saudi Arabia's support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, he said his country, which was ready to help establish it, believed that the accession of all Middle East States to the NPT would constitute an important step towards the achievement of that objective; in order to ensure that the States of the Middle East had confidence in Agency safeguards, those safeguards would have to be applied to all nuclear facilities in the region. In that connection, his delegation hoped to receive from the Agency specific proposals concerning model agreements for the application of safeguards in the Middle East in accordance with the requests made in the relevant General Conference resolutions.

28. The Agency had already taken, or planned to take, a series of measures aimed at strengthening international co-operation in the area of nuclear safety and radiation protection. Those measures included the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety during the Diplomatic Conference held in June, in which his delegation had participated. All countries with nuclear power plants should accede to the Convention.

29. Saudi Arabia, which attached particular importance to the project for producing potable water economically, appreciated the Secretariat's efforts and the support provided by certain Member States, but felt that the results to date were rather unsatisfactory. Apart from convening expert meetings and issuing theoretical reports on the subject, the Secretariat had since 1991 only carried out a regional feasibility study, which had not yet been completed. Citing a shortage of resources as a reason, it had not yet fixed a date for the launching of the proposed programme for improving public awareness of and promoting confidence in the use of nuclear power for water desalination. The theoretical reports contained in document GC(XXXVIII)/8 were not encouraging. They indicated that nuclear

desalination could be economically competitive only in the case of medium-size or large units, which the majority of developing countries could not afford. His delegation hoped that the Agency, the organizations concerned and Member States would combine their efforts in order to ensure that tangible progress was achieved quickly in that area.

30. With regard to the practical utilization of food irradiation in developing countries, there did not seem to be much chance of success in that area either. It would help if the Secretariat could obtain the resources necessary for implementing in 1995 and 1996 the activities of the food irradiation action plan which had been approved by the Board of Governors in June.

31. As to the Agency's financial situation, the Note by the Secretariat of 8 September showed that for 1994 the Agency had received from Member States contributions representing just over half of the Regular Budget total - which was hardly a very positive situation. Part of the problem was perhaps the way in which the Financial Regulations established deadlines for the payment of contributions.

32. It was regrettable that questions related to the financing of safeguards and technical assistance and to Article VI of the Agency's Statute had been on the agenda for years without any real progress being achieved. His delegation hoped that it would be possible to resolve them in the near future.

33. Finally, he said that his delegation had been alarmed at the reports in the media about illicit trafficking and trade in radioactive materials and the statements made by people in positions of responsibility in the countries concerned and by specialists who had determined the countries of origin of the materials in question. Still more disquieting was the fact that those involved in the trafficking were transporting the radioactive materials, which represented a risk for people and the environment, by primitive means and without taking safety precautions, thereby creating a serious hazard with easily imaginable consequences. The governments concerned should swiftly take stringent measures to control such criminal acts. He hoped that the Agency also would take measures to that end in view of the consequences that those acts could have for human health and the environment and the risks of such materials being diverted for illicit purposes.

34. Mr. CEYSSENS (Belgium) said that his statement would be brief since Belgium's basic position regarding the various items on the agenda for the current session of the General Conference had already been covered by the delegate of Germany, who had spoken on behalf of the European Union. Belgium's energy policy, which had been characterized since 1980 by the desire to maintain a balanced energy mix and security of supply, was founded principally on the efficient utilization and the diversification of energy sources, protection of the environment, and the strengthening of international co-operation. In the light of the economic situation, and with a view to diversifying energy sources, the Belgian Government had decided to postpone the construction of an eighth nuclear power reactor; its revised investment plan foresaw a 25% involvement in the operation of two French reactors, which were planned to start up in 1995 and 1996, and the commissioning of four non-nuclear units of the gas-steam turbine type. The Belgian Parliament had approved the continued implementation of a reprocessing contract currently in force and the use of the plutonium separated under that contract, but it had requested the Government to suspend for a period of five years the implementation of a contract for reprocessing activities after the year 2000 and to consider, instead of reprocessing, a strategy based on the conditioning and direct disposal of irradiated fuel. Belgium wished to collaborate with the Agency in determining the advantages and disadvantages of the "reprocessing" and "direct disposal" options.

35. With regard to radiation protection and safety, the Agence fédérale belge de contrôle nucléaire (Belgium's federal nuclear monitoring agency), which had been set up in April 1994 and was due to commence operations in 1995, would be responsible for checking both on safety and on radiation protection at establishments using ionizing radiation. It would also be responsible for ensuring that Agency safeguards inspectors were accompanied during their missions on Belgian territory, for providing training in radiation protection, for disseminating information on nuclear safety and radiation protection, for making preparations to deal with radiological emergencies at any facility and for radiation monitoring throughout the country.

36. With regard to radioactive waste management, he hoped that a group of governmental experts would meet at the beginning of 1995 to draw up an international convention. It was

essential that governments become involved as soon as possible since the financial and socio-economic implications were considerable, as the efforts of Belgium's national organization for radioactive waste and fissile materials - ONDRAF - showed. In the coming years, Belgium would have to put into storage approximately 3000 m³ of waste, including 75 m³ of vitrified waste from the reprocessing of Belgian fuel at La Hague. Belgium had a temporary storage capacity of over 11 800 m³, so that it would be able to wait until the modalities of final disposal had been settled and to accumulate several years' experience with high-level vitrified waste from the old Eurochemic reprocessing facility. A low-level solid waste treatment and conditioning facility with a receiving area, a preconditioning unit, a 2000-tonne supercompactor and a high-capacity incinerator had gone into operation at the beginning of 1994. With regard to the disposal of radioactive waste at sea, the Belgian Government, which had been observing a moratorium since 1983, had decided to abandon the practice altogether and to opt for the shallow-land disposal of low-level waste having a short half-life. ONDRAF, in a report it had submitted to the governmental authorities in April 1994, had identified about 100 areas suitable for the establishment of a near-surface repository. The final choice of a site would probably be made during the next three years.

37. Belgium had from the outset had extensive recourse to the civilian applications of nuclear technology and was very aware that the non-proliferation regime was essential for their continued development. It would therefore continue to support the international safeguards of the Agency as well as the Agency's activities relating to harmonization in the field of safety and to the promotion of non-power applications of nuclear energy.

38. Mr. KRAMBERGER (Croatia), expressing the continuing and unreserved support of his country for the Agency's efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, said that the Agency was playing a vital role in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and in monitoring compliance with nuclear safety standards. The mechanisms of international non-proliferation, including activities being conducted within the framework of the Agency, should be strengthened further.

39. The current session of the General Conference was the last before the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the NPT, which was the cornerstone of international security, and his delegation believed that the indispensable role being played by the Agency in the

implementation of Articles III, IV and V of the NPT should be further expanded. In view of the unprecedented complexity of non-proliferation problems, as demonstrated by the cases of Iraq and the DPRK and by recent incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear material, it was essential that an effective non-proliferation regime be universally accepted. For that reason, Croatia was very much in favour of an unconditional extension of the NPT for an indefinite period and hoped that its views would be shared by a large number of Member States.

40. Also, Croatia attached great importance to the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, a key disarmament objective, and it would like to see an immediate end put to experimental nuclear explosions and a continuation of the disarmament process which had been initiated with START 1 and START 2.

41. He was pleased to announce that Croatia, which had become a party to the NPT on 29 June 1992 by virtue of succession to the former Yugoslavia, had concluded a new safeguards agreement with the Agency on 9 June 1994. Also, it had participated in the adoption of the Nuclear Safety Convention, which it would be signing as soon as the necessary Croatian legal procedures had been completed.

42. Croatia, which welcomed the fact that the Board of Governors had the previous week approved the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, looked forward to the finalization of the Safety Fundamentals for nuclear waste management and to the start of negotiations on a convention dealing with that subject.

43. Croatia was concerned about the absence of effective action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear material (including weapons-grade plutonium), which could fall into the hands of terrorist groups, and would like the Agency to act swiftly and help develop a useful database, information exchange and a rigorous system of procedures and technical arrangements for transport control. Manpower training should also receive greater attention.

44. Turning to technical co-operation, he said that Croatia - a newly independent country, a country in transition and a developing country - was suffering from the devastating impact of a war which had been thrust upon it and therefore stood in dire need of Agency technical assistance, particularly with peaceful uses of ionizing radiation in medicine, agriculture,

industry and hydrology. Croatia especially valued the Agency's assistance with the establishment of its own legal and administrative infrastructure for radiation protection, nuclear safety and radioactive waste management; however, it would like implementation of the project in question to be speeded up. In addition to a number of ongoing technical co-operation projects, Croatia had benefited from expert advice on the strengthening of its analytical and in-service inspection capabilities. Thus, the Agency's Department of Research and Isotopes had installed an advanced microbeam line for sensitive measurements at the Rudjer Bosković Institute, the main nuclear research institute in Croatia, which was consequently now able to provide analytical services to other countries. Moreover, Croatia had taken part in regional technical co-operation projects and had hosted several Agency workshops. Croatian scientists had been awarded fellowships and had attended various Agency courses, and Agency fellowship holders had been placed at the Rudjer Bosković Institute. Croatia was ready to welcome more trainees, especially from other developing countries, and to provide highly qualified experts for Agency missions and training activities.

45. The Agency's help in keeping technical standards at the Krško Nuclear Power Plant (owned 50% by Croatia and 50% by Slovenia) at the highest possible level was greatly appreciated, particularly since the plant met 18.5% of Croatia's electricity needs and therefore played an essential role in the national economy. Croatia was lacking in energy resources and was therefore having to consider nuclear power as a possible energy source; accordingly, it would welcome more assistance and advice from the Agency, particularly with regard to education of the public. In that context, Croatia was looking forward to an imminent UNDP/Agency sectoral support mission designed to help it formulate model projects which might be financed by UNDP and other organizations.

46. The priority areas for medium-term co-operation between Croatia and the Agency, in line with the country's overall development plans, remained the same - the strengthening of nuclear safety and radiation protection infrastructures, the development of a national energy policy (including a review of the nuclear option) and the application of nuclear techniques in human health (particularly the introduction of new diagnostic and therapeutic methods and the upgrading of radiotherapy equipment).

47. Aware as it was of the indispensability of Agency technical assistance and co-operation activities, Croatia was very concerned about the financial difficulties which the Agency was experiencing and would continue to meet its own obligations at the earliest possible date, despite the heavy burden which the war had placed upon it. In fact, he was pleased to announce that the Croatian authorities had authorized the transfer of funds to cover the whole of Croatia's contribution to the Agency's budget.

48. In conclusion, having commended the Agency for its efforts to promote peace, security and prosperity in the world, he said that the peace process in the former Yugoslavia - where the current conflict constituted the greatest European tragedy since the Second World War and was severely testing the principles of the United Nations and the new European democratic order - must be accelerated. The international community had to act in unison and more forcefully and put an end to the conflict, for only then would Croatia and other countries in the region be able to participate fully in the pursuit of the objectives to the achievement of which the Agency was making such a unique contribution.

49. Mr. GARCÍA DE LA CRUZ (Cuba) took the opportunity of the thirtieth anniversary of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division to congratulate the Division on the valuable contribution it had made to improving food and agriculture in the world. He expressed the hope that the activities of the Joint Division would be strengthened and said that his delegation fully endorsed the GRULAC statement in support of those activities.

50. In spite of great difficulties due to the intensification of the unjust and inhuman blockade being imposed on his country for the past 30 years, Cuba was endeavouring to pursue its nuclear programme, for it was important that developing countries assimilate new techniques and reduce the technological gap separating the countries which developed them from those which - at best - were only able to use them.

51. Furthermore, Cuba was counting on advanced techniques - including nuclear techniques - to resolve various problems, particularly problems associated with food and the health of the population. In the 1993-94 biennium alone, it was implementing six technical co-operation projects in those areas, representing 56% of the total amount of technical assistance being provided to Cuba by the Agency.

52. Cuba was making constant efforts to improve the training of its personnel. The Agency's technical co-operation programme was making a significant contribution in that regard by enabling Cuban specialists to keep abreast of world developments in the field of nuclear technology. Cuba, like other developing countries, hoped that the international organizations would do more to promote exchanges of experience and the transfer of technology. It trusted that the Agency would remain faithful to its guiding principles and not make the provision of technical assistance to Member States dependent on political, economic, military or other conditions; that would be contrary to the provisions of its Statute.

53. Reviewing his country's activities in the field of nuclear applications, he announced that the construction of a centre for the production and development of labelled compounds and radiopharmaceuticals in the outskirts of Havana would be completed by the end of the year. The centre would promote medical, agricultural, industrial and other applications of radioisotopes by meeting the demand for radioisotopes in Cuba.

54. The Cuban Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene would soon have a whole-body counter and a secondary standard dosimetry laboratory, both provided through Agency technical co-operation projects. Those new facilities would give fresh impetus to efforts to improve the country's radiation protection services and bring them into line with the level of nuclear applications in Cuba.

55. Those applications had led, inter alia, to the development, through radiomutagenesis, of three new rice varieties and of disease- and parasite-resistant varieties of banana and sugar cane. Also, Cuba was continuing to expand the use of radioisotopes and nuclear analytical techniques in the nickel, oil and sugar industries. In addition, it was completing a study on the determination of heavy metals in marine ecosystems.

56. Cuba attached great importance to nuclear and radiation safety, and a national nuclear safety workshop aimed at strengthening the country's safety culture had been held for the first time in Cuba during the previous year. At that workshop, the results of comparative studies of WWERs belonging to different generations had been received with interest, as had those of measurements carried out on children from regions affected by the Chernobyl accident and of cytogenetic studies.

57. Finally, Cuba was maintaining the installations at Juragua in good order, was retaining the technical capability necessary for an immediate restart of construction and was pursuing negotiations to that end.

58. With regard to international co-operation, Cuba had not remained on the fringes of efforts to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities throughout the world. It had participated systematically in the work of revising the Basic Safety Standards, which had been approved by the Board of Governors at its most recent session, and it was already bringing its legislation into line with the new requirements.

59. Furthermore, his country had participated from the outset in the drafting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety - a landmark in its field. Like other countries, Cuba had joined the consensus in favour of its adoption because the Convention aimed to raise the level of nuclear safety in the world through improvements at the national level, through international co-operation and through the provision of technical assistance. Cuba nevertheless still considered that there was a need for similar legal instruments covering other nuclear facility categories; without such instruments there would be no international nuclear safety regime capable of commanding public confidence and hence of triggering a revival of nuclear power worldwide. As his delegation had stated at the Diplomatic Conference held in June, the accession of all countries to the Convention on Nuclear Safety would not be achieved unless the application mechanisms took into account the ability of countries to meet their obligations. That did not mean that the regime adopted should involve the preferential treatment of some countries, on the basis of different countries' levels of economic and nuclear development. Otherwise, the basic thrust of the Convention would be lost. In order to demonstrate its political will to contribute to attainment of the Convention's goals, however, Cuba had signed the Convention on the day it had been opened for signature. It hoped that implementation of the Convention would in no case limit the development of signatory countries, but rather promote the transfer of necessary nuclear safety technology.

60. With regard to Agency safeguards, he said that a complete ban on nuclear weapons was a noble objective to which all aspired and on which the future of the planet depended. Recently, however, the Agency had considerably intensified its safeguards activities, giving

international public opinion the impression that they were the principal activities of the Agency. He wished to make several comments on the subject.

61. The Statute stated that the Agency should "seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". The Agency had been carrying out that task for four decades by promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in many countries. He wondered, however, whether it could pursue its promotional activities while constantly alerting public opinion to the risk of diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. One might well ask whether that would not make the acceptance of nuclear power by the public even more difficult and whether it was a good thing for the Agency to be seen as a supranational force responsible for verifying non-proliferation.

62. He considered that the Agency should continue to pursue the objectives for which it had been created and that - consequently - it was vital to maintain an appropriate balance between safeguards and so-called "promotional" activities, the latter being capable of playing a major role in helping to resolve the crucial development problems which a large number of countries were facing as the century drew to a close. Care should be taken to ensure that strengthening of the safeguards system was carried out in conformity with the original mandate given to the Agency by the General Conference. That meant that increased effectiveness should be the direct result of improved efficiency. Furthermore, as his delegation had pointed out on previous occasions and in accordance with the consensus reached in the Board of Governors, no new measures should be applied until the necessary legal framework had been established and all their implications determined. In the meantime, Agency safeguards should continue to be applied as provided for in the agreements concluded with the countries concerned and in existing international treaties.

63. With regard to the proposed measures for detecting undeclared nuclear activities, account should be taken of the principles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, which Cuba firmly supported and according to which verification agreements should be applied without discrimination in such a way as to avoid all undue interference in the internal affairs of States and everything that might hamper their economic, technological and social development. In addition, the Agency, in carrying out the activities in question, should use

only information obtained through the performance of its task and not information provided by national intelligence services.

64. In conclusion, he said that his Government's decision to sign the Tlatelolco Treaty had been motivated solely by Cuba's desire to contribute to Latin American integration and by its commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons; the main reasons why Cuba had not acceded to the Treaty earlier still existed, some of them in an intensified form.

65. Mr. DAAS (Sri Lanka) commended the Agency on the work it had done since its establishment. The promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and safeguards-related activities had improved the quality of life and promoted economic development in many countries.

66. Sri Lanka attached great importance to the Agency's role in ensuring that nuclear technology was not used for military purposes. The international community had a duty to co-operate fully with the Agency for the achievement of that noble objective, and safeguards agreements based on the Agency's Statute offered good ways of resolving the problems of all parties.

67. The NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 would be an important milestone for nuclear non-proliferation. The Agency had contributed significantly to the implementation of the NPT, which - despite its imperfections - was still the international treaty which had attracted the highest number of signatories. Given the singular contribution which the NPT could make to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus to facilitating their eventual elimination, Sri Lanka would like to see universal adherence to it as soon as possible. His country hoped sincerely that the few nations which had still not yet acceded to it would do so shortly. In that context, it was important that the 1995 Conference be a success.

68. While recognizing the importance of the Agency's safeguards activities, his delegation considered that the resources being allocated to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were insufficient. Moreover, those resources should be distributed in a more rational and balanced manner. The ultimate goal of the international community should be to create a world free of nuclear arsenals and to channel the vast resources which were being used for

nuclear armaments into economic development. In that connection, his country had noted the vitally important steps taken by the two major nuclear Powers to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals.

69. Sri Lanka also attached great importance to the global concern regarding nuclear safety and radiation protection and recognized the urgent need to strengthen radiation protection infrastructures, to enact and enforce appropriate regulations and to intensify education and training in those fields. He welcomed the measures taken by the Agency to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiation protection and to resolve international radioactive waste management issues. Having embarked upon the development of its own radiation protection infrastructures, Sri Lanka stood to benefit from the activities in question and from regional model projects on radiation protection and waste management.

70. With regard to Sri Lanka's nuclear energy programmes, his country had neither power reactors nor research reactors and did not envisage having recourse to nuclear power in the foreseeable future. It had concentrated on peaceful applications of nuclear energy in industry, medicine and agriculture. In the medical sector, various nuclear techniques were being used for disease diagnosis, the treatment of cancer and the detection of the hepatitis B virus in donor blood. A model project on the radiation sterilization and preservation of tissue grafts was making good progress. Construction of the building which was to house the tissue bank would soon be completed, and the radiation processing of human tissues could begin before the end of 1994. In view of Sri Lanka's long experience with the sterilization and preservation of corneas, he did not doubt that when the project was fully operational it would bring benefits not only to his own country but also to end-users in other countries.

71. In the industrial sector too Sri Lanka was forging ahead, as demonstrated by its success in perfecting a technique for the radiation vulcanization of natural rubber which the competent authorities were in the process of transferring to end-users. Moreover, with the support of the relevant national agency non-destructive testing was currently being used in both the public and the private sector. In hydrology, there was considerable interest in the use of nuclear techniques in connection with the exploitation of groundwater resources, the maintenance of irrigation channels and the management of water reserves. Also, the use of

nuclear techniques in studies of the related problems of soil erosion and water body siltation had yielded good results.

72. In agriculture, nuclear techniques had made various advances possible, particularly the development of new varieties of rice through radiation-induced mutation breeding, the improvement of soil, water and fertilizer management practices, improvements in the biological fixation of atmospheric nitrogen by plants, and improvements in animal production and health.

73. Sri Lanka did not consider nuclear power to be a viable option for electricity generation at present since the capacities of the commercially available power reactors were too high for the Sri Lankan grid. The situation might change if small or medium-size reactors became available. However, the results of development work on such reactors in recent years had been rather disappointing. Several designs had been proposed, but none of them had yet been proven.

74. Sri Lanka was pleased at the progress which had been made under the RCA, to which it was a party. It had benefited greatly from most of the varied activities carried out, particularly the UNDP/Agency/RCA project on industrial applications, and a new UNDP/Agency project on the use of radiation and isotopes for sustainable development had enabled it to develop further and expand the activities initiated under that project.

75. In its nuclear activities, Sri Lanka was pursuing environmentally friendly policies through its Atomic Energy Authority, which was responsible for co-operation with the Agency. As a developing country, it was having great difficulty in achieving the objectives in question, particularly owing to a lack of resources for infrastructure development. Nevertheless, it would continue to participate in the Agency's voluntary funding system.

Mr. Ryzhov (Russian Federation) took the Chair.

76. Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia) congratulated the Joint FAO/IAEA Division on its thirtieth anniversary and said that the Division's activities had brought great benefits in terms of human welfare in developing and developed countries. He hoped that the Agency would continue to support the activities of the Division, particularly in the developing countries.

77. He thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for the Annual Report for 1993, which showed that good results had been achieved; his delegation had no difficulty in endorsing it. The report mentioned a number of courses, seminars and conferences which had been held in Indonesia, and the Indonesian Government hoped that the activities in question would be strengthened.

78. As a party to the NPT, Indonesia had taken note of the expanding scope of the Agency's activities in the safeguards area, to which it attached great importance. In 1989 it had accepted simplified procedures for the designation of inspectors, and since 1990 it had been implementing a safeguards support programme. In May 1994, the Serpong Research Centre had taken part in the field testing of new environmental monitoring techniques being considered for use in safeguards.

79. Agency safeguards were an important means of preventing proliferation, and efficient implementation of the NPT was contributing significantly to world peace and stability. His delegation was therefore pleased that so many countries had become parties to the NPT, and in that regard he hoped that South Africa, which was now a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and had acceded to the NPT in 1991, would resume its activities within the Agency.

80. The NPT Review and Extension Conference, scheduled for 1995, would be an event of major importance for the international community. As the main legal and political barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the NPT had made an important contribution to nuclear arms control. However, for many countries the overall record of the NPT was less encouraging as yet. There remained divergences among the parties regarding critical aspects of the NPT, such as those relating to disarmament and to the dissemination of nuclear know-how for peaceful purposes. The problems which would confront the Review and Extension Conference could not therefore be reduced to the simple question of whether the NPT should be extended for an indefinite or a limited period.

81. The eleventh ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Cairo in June 1994, had reaffirmed that, in order to be effective and lasting, the approach to international security should be non-discriminatory and balanced and should seek security for

all through total nuclear disarmament, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and progressive measures to reduce conventional arms. The ministers, who had reaffirmed that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States could help to eliminate some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons, had urged the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate - as a matter of priority - an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to undertake negotiations aimed at the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a set time-frame. In the same spirit, the Indonesian Government was continuing, in collaboration with the other ASEAN members, to pursue the concept of maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South East Asia. In that connection, the ASEAN foreign ministers had recently reiterated in Bangkok the importance of establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the region and reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of peace and security.

82. With regard to the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK, his delegation had been encouraged by the Director General's report that the DPRK had permitted an expansion of Agency inspection activities within its territory. Also, it welcomed the progress which had been made in the bilateral talks between the United States and the DPRK. Those developments should be allowed to proceed in line with efforts to promote confidence in non-proliferation safeguards.

83. His delegation was very concerned about the recent news reports regarding illicit trafficking in nuclear material and took little comfort in the fact that only small quantities had been involved. The incidents in question posed two problems, which could become extremely serious. The first related to nuclear proliferation, since illicit trafficking in small amounts of material could lead to the diversion of large amounts. The second related to the radiation hazards, since persons ignorant of those hazards might easily become over-exposed. He was pleased that the Agency was willing to take the initiative in seeking a solution and agreed with the Director General that Member States should begin by taking - preferably with the Agency's assistance - all the precautions indicated in the Agency's recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material.

84. Indonesia, which had always attached great importance to the safety of its own nuclear installations, was currently in the process of establishing a separate authority which would

be responsible for regulating nuclear activities - a task which had been handled previously by a unit within the National Atomic Energy Agency. The previous day Indonesia had signed the Nuclear Safety Convention, an instrument which it expected to strengthen public confidence in nuclear activities and particularly in nuclear power.

85. Indonesia was planning to construct its first nuclear power plant. It was therefore very interested in the recommendations which Agency experts had made relating to the choice of a site and to safety and various technical questions, and it would certainly take all of them into account so as to ensure that the prerequisites for construction were met.

86. Peaceful applications of nuclear energy had been integrated into the Indonesian economy - notably in agriculture, food preservation, health, hydrology and industry - and his Government hoped that the activities in question would be strengthened. As regards applications of radioisotopes and ionizing radiation, in order to respond to the local demand it had taken measures to upgrade existing facilities and build new ones. Thus, a commercial irradiation facility had recently been commissioned, demonstrating successful technology transfer in the field of radiation sterilization.

87. With a view to promoting South-South co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Indonesia, in co-operation with Argentina, had embarked upon studies on the encapsulation of cobalt-60 for medical and industrial applications. It hoped that South-South co-operation would expand to other areas, such as the exchange of experts. In that regard, his delegation was pleased that an Indonesian expert in tracer techniques had been recruited within the framework of the RCA as a regional long-term expert. In the interests of regional co-operation, Indonesia, which would continue to support the RCA, had made a donation of \$50 000 and also in-kind contributions.

Mr. Baer (Switzerland) took the Chair.

88. Ms. NGUYEN THI HOI (Viet Nam) said that since the previous session of the General Conference considerable progress had been made in international co-operation in the the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that her country welcomed in particular the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

89. Viet Nam, which had recently initiated a programme concerned with radioactive waste management and the study of the nuclear option, was aware that safety had to be a major factor in its efforts to foster the utilization of nuclear techniques for the development of various sectors of its economy. Priority had been given to strengthening the legal infrastructure for radiation monitoring and radiation protection. A draft law on radiation monitoring was undergoing final review by the competent bodies in preparation for its adoption during the next parliamentary session. The National Atomic Energy Commission (VINATOM) had become an integral part of the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment in September 1993. Lastly, an independent regulatory body had been established in August to deal with matters of radiation protection and nuclear safety.

90. As a developing Member State, Viet Nam appreciated the holding of the third Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar and the proposals made during it for increasing the effectiveness of technical assistance. Any decision of the Agency's policy-making organs would have to take full account of the diversity of developing countries as regards geography, level of development, culture and, in particular, medium- and long-term national priorities. The growing demand of developing countries for technical assistance in utilizing nuclear techniques should be given due consideration by the Agency in its future programmes.

91. In Viet Nam, nuclear techniques were increasingly attracting the attention of various economic sectors, the result being a growing demand that such techniques be used in industry, agriculture, human health and environmental protection. Thanks to technology transfer through the Agency, VINATOM had been able to meet the industrial sector's needs as regards guidance, training and the development of techniques. Groundwater and sedimentation studies using tracers, carried out with assistance from UNPD and the Agency, had yielded promising results. Three years after inauguration of the Hanoi Irradiation Centre, the public acceptance of irradiation technology had persuaded the Government to fund a centre in Ho Chi Minh City for the sterilization of medical products, for which it was once again counting on Agency assistance.

92. Her delegation shared the views expressed by the Director General as regards the Agency's activities relating to nuclear power. It was difficult to predict the future role of

nuclear power, so thorough comparative assessments of the various energy options should be made from the viewpoints of environmental protection, reliability and cost-effectiveness in order to help Member States make a choice. Her delegation looked forward to the results of the DECADES programme being carried out by the Agency in co-operation with other organizations.

93. The development targets that Viet Nam had set itself for the period up to the year 2000 would entail a rapid growth in the demand for energy, which conventional sources would be unable to meet. VINATOM, together with other national bodies, had been given the task of studying the nuclear power option in the context of the long-term development plan. Viet Nam hoped that assistance would be forthcoming from the Agency and from other Member States.

94. With regard to safeguards and non-proliferation, she reaffirmed that Viet Nam supported the application of safeguards on an equitable basis, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and worldwide nuclear disarmament. Viet Nam, as a party to the NPT, was committed to maintaining the Agency's safeguards system and looked forward to the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

95. In conclusion, she thanked the Director General and his colleagues for their effective support for technology transfer to Viet Nam and expressed the hope that their future efforts to promote development and prosperity through the peaceful applications of nuclear techniques would also be successful.

96. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) said his country was firmly persuaded as to the importance of the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime and believed it was essential that all countries, especially in the Middle East, accede to the NPT. In that context, he urged Member States to give the Director General greater support in his efforts to intensify the dialogue being conducted between the Agency and the States of the Middle East with a view to bringing all nuclear facilities in the region under Agency safeguards. In that regard, he said that real peace in the Middle East was not possible as long as Israel obstinately maintained its superiority in weapons of mass destruction, which constituted a serious and continual threat to all the peoples of the region. The conclusion of an agreement to establish

a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East would be an important step towards a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region and was essential for building confidence and strengthening peace and security worldwide. In that connection, Qatar attached great importance to the preparations for the 1995 NPT Review Conference and hoped that further countries would accede to the NPT and conclude agreements for the application of Agency safeguards to all their nuclear facilities.

97. As Qatar considered that nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste disposal were among the most important issues being dealt with by the Agency, it welcomed the Convention on Nuclear Safety adopted by the Diplomatic Conference held in June. However, the Agency's role should not be confined to problems in such areas. The Agency had been established to help developing countries acquire advanced technology that would enable them to benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear energy in agriculture, medicine, environmental protection and food preservation. For its part, Qatar attached great importance to projects aimed at ensuring water supplies for the inhabitants of arid regions and hoped that the Agency would help to promote the use of nuclear techniques in groundwater exploration. Also, his delegation believed that the work which the Agency had been doing in recent years on seawater desalination by means of nuclear power should be expedited.

98. His delegation welcomed the changes made in certain documents pursuant to resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/581. The Agency's Annual Report for 1993 was clearer and easier to handle than its predecessor, but it could have been improved further through the inclusion of information on budget implementation and on the extent to which various projects had enabled developing countries' real needs to be met.

99. The recent improvement in the financial situation was a reason for optimism and confidence; it suggested that in future the Agency could count on having the resources necessary for accomplishing its tasks. The stability achieved through budgetary cuts, the postponement of programme activities (beginning in 1991) and improvements in the payment by Member States of their annual contributions was encouraging, although the Regular Budget remained subject to zero real growth.

100. With regard to technical assistance, one of the Agency's main tasks, an in-depth study showed that the Middle East's share of such assistance was small, despite the considerable advantages - and particularly economic ones - that could be derived from the implementation of projects for technical co-operation between the Agency and countries of the Middle East. Over and above their applications in science and the field of human health, nuclear techniques had become essential in agriculture, animal production, industry, food preservation, mineral exploration and environmental protection. The Agency should therefore devote greater attention to the Middle East and support the technical co-operation projects being implemented there, with due regard for national development plans. Also, the training facilities and fellowships necessary for the creation of expert teams qualified to assume responsibility for peaceful applications of atomic energy in the region should be made available. In that connection, he urged Member States - and particularly the industrialized ones - to fulfil their obligations with regard to the funding of Agency activities relating to technical assistance and the transfer of advanced technologies.

101. The noble purposes for which the Agency had been established could only be achieved if its Member States, in a spirit of mutual trust, pooled their efforts in a world where peace and justice prevailed. For its part, Qatar would continue to support the Agency and wished the General Conference every success.

102. Mr. TSOUNIS (Greece), associating himself with the statement made by the delegate of Germany on behalf of the European Union, said he wished to make a few additional remarks on behalf of his Government.

103. His delegation approved of the Agency's Annual Report for 1993 and appreciated the work which had been done by the Director General and the Secretariat despite serious financial difficulties and the long-standing practice of zero-real-growth budgeting.

104. Non-proliferation and safeguards issues had dominated the Agency's activities in the past year. The difficult tasks performed by the Agency in various parts of the world had shown that, more and more, the international community needed an effective safeguards system capable of detecting in time and preventing the clandestine production and utilization

of nuclear material for nuclear weapons. His delegation believed that Agency safeguards could play an expanded role in that regard.

105. His country, which was firmly committed to the NPT, the most widely accepted instrument in the field of arms control and disarmament, hoped that it would be extended unconditionally and indefinitely. Greece welcomed the accession of Kazakhstan, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan to the NPT as a valuable contribution to international peace and security. Also, it commended Moldova, whose parliament had ratified the NPT. It was pleased with the decision taken by Cuba to accede to the Tlatelolco Treaty, which had now entered into force for all Latin American countries. Greece would like all the nations of the world to accede as soon as possible to the NPT.

106. Greece would also like all countries to decide, like the members of the European Union and many other States, to submit to the Agency voluntary reports on their nuclear exports. With regard to safeguards inspections, it attached particular importance to the rational sharing of inspection responsibilities between the Agency and EURATOM and trusted that the partnership agreement concluded by the two organizations would enable real savings to be made.

107. Greece hoped that the Agency's continuing difficulties with regard to safeguards - for example, those connected with the DPRK - would soon be resolved. It was grateful to the Agency for the efforts it had made and its objective and impartial attitude.

108. Greece was deeply concerned about illicit trafficking in nuclear material - in some cases weapons-grade material. Such extremely dangerous activities, which had recently intensified, seriously jeopardized the efforts being made in the field of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. States should strengthen their physical protection and export control systems, place all their nuclear activities under Agency safeguards and adhere to the guidelines for nuclear exports.

109. The Agency's technical co-operation activities aimed to help Member States benefit from and achieve self-reliance in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. It was important, however, that the Agency not only improve programme delivery but also contribute to the determination of national priorities in accordance with local and regional needs.

110. With regard to safety, Greece had from the outset - for obvious reasons - attached great importance to the work on drafting a Nuclear Safety Convention, and it was pleased with the outcome of the negotiations. However, the text finally agreed upon and signed would have been better if its scope had been broader and if it had provided for more effective use to be made of the Agency's technical capabilities. Greece had agreed to the compromise on condition that a start would be made soon with the negotiation of a similar convention on radioactive waste management - a process which seemed to be under way already. Nuclear safety was of paramount importance worldwide, particularly where facilities of a certain type and age were located, and improvements made by whatever means - including technical means - would be in the interests of all.

111. Greece endorsed the Agency's programme and budget for 1995 and 1996 and believed that zero real growth should continue to apply as far as possible.

112. He outlined some of the activities relating to peaceful uses of atomic energy conducted in Greece during the past year. Following a recently promulgated presidential decree, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) was in the process of reorganizing its radiation protection infrastructure. In collaboration with the medical departments of the Universities of Athens and Ioannina, it was organizing a five-semester medical physics training course. Taking into account suggestions made within the framework of WAMAP, it was trying to make arrangements for the collection and storage of all spent sealed radiation sources. An Agency-organized regional seminar on the management of spent sealed sources held in Athens at the end of 1993 had been extremely useful. Finally, the GAEC, in collaboration with the European Commission, was planning to hold - for the third time - a seminar on off-site emergency planning and response to nuclear accidents in the spring of 1995.

113. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) thanked the Agency for the technical assistance it had provided to his country in the field of nuclear energy applications. The Philippines, which had been effectively implementing its Agency-assisted projects, had one of the highest implementation rates for the region (70.7%) - a result on which it hoped to improve.

114. In the field of nuclear power, the Bataan plant was still mothballed. However, a study carried out at the end of 1993 had concluded that nuclear power could play a role in meeting the electricity demand of the country towards the end of the decade and beyond. Thus, that option was still under active consideration.

115. The Philippines, a strong proponent of non-proliferation, would meet all of its safeguards obligations. Also, aware of the Agency's difficult financial situation, it had met its financial obligations in full, including the payment of its shares of the TACF and the RCA fund.

116. At the request of his delegation, a supplementary item entitled "Designation of members of the Board of Governors" had been included in the provisional agenda of the General Conference. Having cited Article VI.A.1 of the Agency's Statute, he said that on 9 June 1994 the Chairman of the Board had again proposed a list of 13 Member States for designation as members of the Board. As in the past, the Member States had simply been listed alphabetically. His delegation had asked the Chairman to indicate which of those 13 States were the "ten members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials" and which were the members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials in the areas in which none of the aforementioned ten was located. In response, the Chairman had invoked a Board decision, taken on 4 July 1958, that the list of designated members should be presented in alphabetical order.

117. Having raised the issue in the Board a number of times to no avail, his delegation had felt constrained to submit it to the General Conference. Just as the General Conference had been competent in 1976 to request the Board to review the designation of South Africa, it was now competent to request the Board to indicate, pursuant to Article VI.A.1, the category to which members designated in 1995 and subsequent years belonged.

118. Although some Member States, in particular those which derived advantage from the *status quo*, had attributed all kinds of motives to his delegation, the issue had been raised for a simple reason: his delegation wanted the Board to comply faithfully with the provisions of Article VI.A.1 of the Statute. Such compliance was a matter of great importance as it had

direct relevance to the question of the proper representation in the Board of those Member States which qualified under Article VI.A.1. The Board should not approve the list submitted to it without knowing the criteria on which it was based.

119. The same Member States contended that the matter was political and should remain so, and that there was a need to maintain the "delicate" balance in the composition of the Board. His delegation would be interested to know the basis on which and by whom the political decision in question was taken. In the most recent instance, the delegation of the Philippines - as a Board member - had been informed beforehand regarding the list of the countries to be proposed, but its involvement had ended there. It had been able to do nothing except express its reservations when the list was being formally adopted by the Board.

120. That "political" decision was inextricably linked with the issue of transparency in the workings of the Board of Governors. Everyone knew that the Agency had always set great store by transparency in its activities, particularly in the field of safeguards. The Board had adopted resolutions calling on Member States to make full disclosures of information on those of their activities about which the Agency was concerned. With regard to designations, however, some members of the Board had consistently refused to be transparent. Although the Board had decided in 1958 that the list of members proposed for designation should be in alphabetical order, at least the criteria applied should be made known to all.

121. Each of the areas enumerated in the Statute was accounted for on the list of members designated annually to sit on the Board of Governors. It was known that Latin America was represented by Argentina and Brazil alternately and that Africa had been represented by Egypt since 1977, but it was not known how the other members came to be designated. While Germany, France and the United Kingdom always had a seat on the Board, several West European countries alternated, in accordance with an understanding reached many years previously. His delegation wanted to know why that practice was not allowed in the case of other areas. In the case of the Far East, for example, only China and Japan were designated, although other States in the area were eligible. The situation was very confusing and should not be perpetuated on the grounds of mysterious political criteria to which only a few

Member States were privy. The only way of rectifying the situation was faithful implementation of Article VI.A.1.

122. In that regard, his delegation felt that the following criteria - among others - might be applied in determining which members were "the most advanced in the technology of atomic energy": the number of nuclear power plants in operation, under construction or planned; the share of electricity generation accounted for by nuclear power; the number of operational, reliable and fully utilized nuclear research facilities (research reactors, irradiation facilities, etc.); the financial resources allocated to nuclear R&D, nuclear applications, etc.; the level of work being done on breeder reactors, fusion reactors and other advanced reactors; the status of radioactive waste management; the existence of nuclear fuel cycle facilities; pioneering work on applications of nuclear techniques; the number of people engaged in nuclear R&D; the number of beneficiaries or users of nuclear applications.

123. Tremendous changes had taken place and were continuing to take place in the world, and the concepts prevailing when the Agency had been established had long since lost their relevance. Nevertheless, many members of the Board of Governors refused to accept those changes. They were adamantly perpetuating a practice which was not only legally questionable but also unfair to many Member States. Year after year, under the cloak of tradition those members induced the Board to evade a responsibility assigned to it by the Agency's Statute.

124. When his delegation had raised the issue at the June Board meetings, those same Board members had proposed that the matter be referred to the informal working group which was considering the question of a revision of Article VI and whose mandate was due for renewal at the present session of the General Conference. His delegation did not understand why such a serious issue should be debated by a group which was only "informal", especially as it was asking not for a revision of the Statute but simply for compliance with one of its provisions. In making that proposal, the Board members in question had clearly once again been defending the *status quo*. As the Agency's Member States knew, because of the myopic approach and narrow interests of those Board members the informal working group had not, during the several years of its existence, been able to rectify the anachronistic provisions of Article VI of the Statute.

125. Thus, his delegation hoped that all Member States would support the draft resolution contained in Attachment 2 to document GC(XXXVIII)/16, and his appeal was indeed addressed to all Member States. As the delegate of the United States had indicated, it was time to stop looking back to the past; in order to face the challenges of the twenty-first century it was essential to adopt a global strategy based on diversity and openness. Such a strategy would not be truly global or democratic, however, unless it involved the full participation of the entire international community, but that was not feasible at the moment since the Board's composition was not sufficiently representative and the method by which it was arrived at was less than transparent. It was therefore high time that the situation be rectified.

126. Mr. INDELICATO (Italy) said that his delegation fully supported the statement made by the delegate of Germany on behalf of the European Union and that he merely wished to make a few remarks on points of special interest to his country.

127. With regard to non-proliferation, Italy was satisfied with the preparations for the NPT Review and Extension Conference, which seemed likely to ensure the Conference's success. Italy was naturally in favour of an unconditional extension of the NPT for an indefinite period and of its maximum possible universalization. Indeed, the strengthening and full implementation of the NPT were a basic prerequisite for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

128. He congratulated the Director General on the substantial documentation which was being provided by the Agency to the Conference's preparatory committee and which showed the achievements and shortcomings of the safeguards system. Italy fully supported the efforts being made to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of that system. The case of Iraq had shown how essential it was that all provisions of safeguards agreements concluded with the Agency pursuant to the NPT be fully implemented, including - when necessary - provisions relating to special inspections. The non-compliance of the DPRK with its safeguards commitments remained a cause for grave concern, although it was to be hoped that the current negotiations would help to resolve the problem.

129. He commended the Agency teams that had been carrying out inspections in Iraq, recent results of which had been highlighted in a joint declaration issued in New York in July, and said that his delegation welcomed the launching of the long-term monitoring programme provided for in Security Council resolution 715; it would no doubt result in increased trust between the parties concerned.

130. Italy supported the dismantling of nuclear weapons currently under way in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, together with both of which it had established assistance programmes designed to make a real contribution to nuclear disarmament.

131. The Nuclear Safety Convention negotiated within the framework of the Agency and now open for signature represented a major political achievement on the part of the international community, although Italy regarded the text as only the starting point in a process which should lead to more stringent obligations for all parties. Only a few years previously, even the present obligations under the Convention would have been deemed unacceptable by many important States.

132. As recalled in the Convention's preamble, an international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management was also needed. Timely implementation of the RADWASS programme, particularly the adoption of the Safety Fundamentals and related Safety Standards, was therefore important, in order to demonstrate the possibility of achieving international consensus on waste management principles and requirements.

133. Nuclear safety in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union remained a priority objective of international co-operation. The strong commitment of the G-7 in that connection, which had been reaffirmed shortly before at the Naples Summit, presided over by Italy, had played a decisive role in the establishment of an action programme for Western assistance and of a framework for the co-ordination of initiatives. Important short-term measures had been taken to improve nuclear power plant safety and to strengthen regulatory bodies and ensure their independence. The Agency was making a significant contribution by evaluating the safety of plants in the countries concerned and by providing valuable assistance to the G-24 co-ordinating mechanism.

134. It was now time to take long-term measures on a country-by-country basis. The early shutdown of high-risk reactors, a process which had not yet started, should be strongly encouraged. In particular, the shutdown of the Chernobyl plant, which should be given high priority, would demonstrate to the general public the shared willingness of Ukraine and the international community to remedy a very disturbing situation. His delegation therefore associated itself with the call for urgent action made by the delegate of Germany on behalf of the European Union.

135. Turning to the question of Article VI of the Agency's Statute, he said that there had not yet been enough progress to permit amendments that would bring it into line with new realities. Major changes had taken place in the world, and Italy believed that it was necessary to look afresh at the Board's composition - in terms both of the number of members and of the countries involved. His delegation hoped that future efforts within the working group on Article VI would make it possible to get to grips with the real issues.

136. With regard to technical assistance, his delegation continued to appreciate the work being done by the Agency, and particularly the model project approach developed by the Department of Technical Co-operation. The concept of technical assistance packages proposed by the Deputy Director General was also of great interest.

137. Since the 1970s, Italy, through the National Committee for Research and Development on Nuclear Energy and Alternative Energy Sources, had been working with the Agency on the use of the sterile-insect technique to eradicate the Mediterranean fruit fly without damage to the environment. The aim was to make the acquired know-how available throughout the world, and particularly in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America. With the participation of the regional authorities in Sicily, a new phase in that co-operation was now under way, the aim being to establish a sterile-insect production facility which would serve the Mediterranean basin.

138. The agreement between the Agency, UNESCO and Italy regarding the transfer of administrative responsibility for the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste from the Agency to UNESCO had been approved by the Italian Council of Ministers on 5 August 1994. It should soon enter into force, after ratification by the Italian Parliament.

In that connection, he paid tribute to Professor Abdus Salam, whose state of health prevented him from continuing as Director of the Centre, and welcomed the new Director, Professor Chaudhari.

Mr. Hashim (Malaysia) took the Chair.

139. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic) commended the Agency for its efforts to protect mankind against the risk of mass destruction by nuclear weapons and said that the General Conference's agenda indicated the Agency's commitment to preventing such a disaster. In particular, item 28 - "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East" - called to mind the persistent efforts being made to eliminate the threat to the Middle East presented by the acquisition of nuclear weapons and to protect the region from the effects of the nuclear arms race that was taking place under the pretext of self-defence.

140. The main factor heightening tension in the Middle East, and making the region a powder keg which might explode at any time, was the fact that Israel possessed nuclear weapons, that it was threatening its neighbours and that it refused to submit all its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards, despite the efforts made at earlier sessions of the General Conference and by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to persuade it to accept Security Council resolution 487 and despite the steps taken by the Director General to implement the relevant General Conference resolutions. Israel was the only State in the region with nuclear weapon, which it had been producing for years, and it had the largest arsenal of conventional weapons. In the peace negotiations as in the past, Israel was endeavouring - by scheming, by circumventing the Madrid Principles and by repeatedly making contradictory statements - to hold on to the Arab territories which it was occupying while making the world believe that it was seeking peace. If it really wanted peace, it would have complied with the international resolutions calling for its withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories.

141. The Syrian Government, believing that peace was a vital necessity for the peoples of the region, was making every effort to bring it about in accordance with international resolutions and had stated repeatedly, particularly in international fora, that it was ready to accept a just and global peace which provided for the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied

Arab territories. For its part, Israel had so far insisted on keeping occupied Arab territories, but Syria could not accept a peace which, in its opinion, would be spurious, containing the seeds of war and not restoring to the Arabs their rights and territories.

142. The threat of war did not come from Syria, which had always strived sincerely for peace and had demonstrated its commitment by acceding to the NPT and concluding a safeguards agreement with the Agency. It was Israel which continually created obstacles to peace, relying on its military and nuclear might and on the lack of real international pressure to comply with international law and with the many Security Council resolutions directed at it.

143. With regard to applications of nuclear energy, Syria's intentions were completely peaceful. Everything it did in that area was subject to Agency safeguards, and whenever it acquired nuclear equipment it did so in full view of the Agency, or through the Agency or in collaboration with the Agency. Syria looked forward to the time when States would succeed in bringing about implementation of the international community's resolutions concerning Israel as they had done in the case of other countries and would force Israel to comply with those resolutions, in order that a comprehensive and just peace might be achieved in the Middle East and the region might become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Freed from the spectre of war, the region's inhabitants could then devote themselves to economic and social progress and contribute to the development of mankind in an environment of peace. It was with that aim in mind that the Syrian delegation called for the adoption of an appropriate resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. In that connection, it believed that the resolutions regarding Israel which had been adopted by the General Conference, and particularly the one concerning the suspension of technical assistance, should remain in force until Israel accepted Agency safeguards on all its nuclear facilities, for Syria did not consider there to be any link between technical assistance and the peace negotiations.

144. With regard to the discussions concerning the inspection of nuclear facilities in the DPRK, Syria hoped that the issue would be resolved through dialogue and not through sanctions and economic pressure or military threats.

145. It was important to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management, and his Government was ready to co-operate with the Agency to that end. His delegation would sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety during the present session of the General Conference.

146. With regard to the practical utilization of food irradiation, Syria welcomed the co-operation under way between the Agency and other United Nations organizations and would like the Director General to arrange for developing countries to receive additional support in acquiring the means necessary for the application of that technique.

147. It was important to strengthen the Agency activities directed towards increasing the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, to encourage research in the field of nuclear energy and also its peaceful applications, and to ensure nuclear technology transfer to developing countries with a view to their accelerated development. His delegation hoped that further initiatives would be taken in the interests of strengthening the Agency's main activities through effective programmes aimed at improving the scientific and technical capabilities of developing countries as regards the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In that connection, his delegation appreciated the services being provided by the International Nuclear Information System to scientists interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

148. Another agenda item of considerable importance for the work of the Agency was the one entitled "Staffing of the Agency's Secretariat". Despite the requests made at previous sessions of the General Conference for an increase in the representation of developing countries in the Secretariat, and despite the efforts made by the Director General, the number of staff members from developing countries remained small, particularly in the Professional category. An increase would help to strengthen the links between the Agency and developing countries, which would thereby benefit in a very practical way. In that connection, his delegation believed that countries of the Middle East and neighbouring areas should receive better treatment.

149. Mr. MIŠÁK (Slovak Republic) said that his country - one of the few still stepping up their nuclear power programmes - was making a significant effort to improve the

safety of its older nuclear power plants. The Agency was playing an irreplaceable role in that connection by helping his country to do so in a manner acceptable at the international level. Despite its difficult economic situation, Slovakia had accordingly paid its contributions for 1993 and 1994 in full and would do so for 1995.

150. In the Slovak Republic it was the Nuclear Regulatory Authority that was responsible for regulating safety. An independent State body established on 1 January 1993, it answered directly to the Government. Since the beginning of 1994 its staff of nuclear experts had been at full complement. He thanked the Agency for having made, mainly within the framework of model project SLR/9/005, a major contribution to strengthening the capabilities of the regulatory body, which his country sorely needed.

151. Considerable progress had been made recently with regard to the sensitive problem of third-party liability. On 24 August 1994, the Minister of the Economy had, as a temporary solution, signed the "Declaration of the Government of the Slovak Republic on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage", which made operators fully liable for damage. Also, the Government had initiated all legislative steps necessary for Slovakia to become party to the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol thereto as soon as possible.

152. A further important legislative step had been the National Assembly's approval in August 1994 of a law establishing a State fund for the decommissioning of nuclear power plants and the treatment of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Lastly, an "Atomic Energy Act" would be ready by the end of 1995 at the latest.

153. His delegation was satisfied with the outcome of the work on preparing the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which his country had been one of the first to sign. The Convention, which imposed many obligations on the contracting parties, especially those with nuclear facilities on their territory, constituted a very important means of strengthening the safety of nuclear power plants in general and also of establishing confidence in safety levels at Slovak plants. In addition, his delegation hoped that the Convention would lead to a harmonized approach to the safety evaluation of all types of nuclear reactor built according to earlier standards. Slovakia strongly supported, as a next step, the elaboration of a convention on radioactive waste.

154. Nuclear energy accounted for 50% of the electricity generated in his country and was thus an important element in the Slovak economy. According to recent forecasts, that proportion would remain constant over the next 15 years. In order to restrict electricity imports the two WWER-440/230 units at the Bohunice V-1 nuclear power plant would have to operate until the year 2000, the two WWER-440/213 units at the Bohunice V-2 plant would have to remain in operation until the end of their scheduled lifetimes and the four WWER-440/213 units under construction at the Mochovce site would have to be completed by the year 2000. In May 1994 the Slovak Government had decided to close the two WWER-440/230 units by the year 2000 provided that at least two units at Mochovce could be brought into reliable commercial operation by then.

155. The original safety philosophy behind all those reactors did not fully comply with current standards, but the plants would be modified gradually with a view to improving safety levels and operational characteristics. Special attention was being paid to the two units at the Bohunice V-1 plant, where safety had recently been improved considerably - as confirmed by several Agency missions - and would continue to be improved during the period 1994-97. Because it cost less, that option had been preferred to two based on the use of fossil fuels. With regard to safety upgrading of the WWER-440/213 units, the information needed in order to establish priorities was currently being gathered.

156. The Agency had rendered valuable assistance through several national and regional technical co-operation projects, particularly an extrabudgetary project on the safety of WWERs, and through safety review missions. For the future, his delegation would suggest that greater effort be devoted to problems related to the decommissioning of nuclear power plants and to radioactive waste treatment.

157. For Slovakia the technical assistance and co-operation programme was one of the Agency's most important activities, as it facilitated the transfer to Slovakia of knowledge from more advanced countries and enabled Slovak experts to become involved in activities at the international level. His delegation was satisfied that the 1995-96 programme responded to Slovakia's needs and priorities and that the assistance to be provided would be well balanced between the regulatory sector, the nuclear power generation sector and other areas of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. His Government had already paid its

contribution to the TACF for 1994 and had pledged its share of the target for 1995. It was prepared to play an even more active role in the Agency by organizing training courses and technical meetings, providing expert services and receiving fellows from developing countries. Also, it could offer the Agency specialized services in such areas as the on-site training of safeguards inspectors, software development and the production of specialized instruments.

158. Slovakia had always considered that rigorous compliance with the NPT and the strict application of all the rules of conduct deriving from its safeguards agreement with the Agency were of utmost importance and that they should constitute guidelines for its nuclear policy. It therefore welcomed the steps which the Agency was taking to strengthen the safeguards system. It considered that the NPT should be extended unconditionally in 1995 for an indefinite period and that the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was a top priority in the area of non-proliferation.

159. Slovakia, which wanted to help the international nuclear community promote the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, hoped to contribute, through its participation in the work of the Board of Governors, to the establishment of good relations among Member States and to the moderating of a flux of fast, ill-considered decisions so as to produce a slow but sustained chain-reaction of mutual understanding and co-operation.

160. Slovakia welcomed the efforts being made to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and - within the framework of the Tlatelolco Treaty - in Latin America and also the recent positive developments in the Middle East.

161. In the short time since coming into existence, Slovakia had proved that it was possible within a mere 18 months to adopt consistent national legislation and administrative measures and to demonstrate vis-à-vis its neighbours and the Agency a willingness to comply with the international standards and limits in force. The Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority and competent governmental bodies and national institutions had taken measures aimed at strengthening international co-operation and compliance in the areas of nuclear safety and radiological protection.

162. Lastly, Slovakia had embarked on making improvements in the physical protection of nuclear material so as to prevent illicit trafficking. As the problem was becoming a serious one worldwide, Slovakia would like the Agency to do its utmost to help counter uncontrolled movements of nuclear material. Slovakia had joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which monitored nuclear material capable of being diverted to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices and had established a regime covering dual-use items, and it was also helping to improve and extend that regime. In that connection, it was willing to co-operate with all countries which shared its principles regarding nuclear energy issues, particularly in efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world.

163. Mr. ONSY (Egypt) said that extension of the NPT should not be considered without an examination of its weaknesses and of the extent to which the nuclear-weapon States had complied with their obligations pursuant to Articles IV and VI. Also, accession to the NPT should be universal, and effective steps should be taken at the international level to protect non-nuclear-weapon countries which requested security guarantees in return for the acceptance of comprehensive safeguards.

164. In order to maintain world peace and security, it was not enough to end the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race; it was also necessary to eliminate all nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. That objective had not been achieved, despite some progress made in the nuclear arms limitation area under agreements concluded between Moscow and Washington. The nuclear-weapon States should agree on a timetable for achieving further progress in the nuclear disarmament area and notify the other NPT parties. Also, it was essential to achieve an agreement on the banning of nuclear tests - a key objective of the intensive discussions being conducted within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

165. Turning to the provisions of Article IV of the NPT, he said that developing countries should receive greater benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which were vital to their economic and social development.

166. As one of the first countries to sign the NPT, Egypt was firmly persuaded that the Middle East should be a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass

destruction, and in that connection it had launched an initiative based on the provisions of Article VII of the NPT. Although it welcomed the progress being made towards peace in the Middle East, his delegation continued to believe that security and stability were possible only if associated with arms control and disarmament measures which applied to all States without exception and without discrimination. The fact that one State in the region was alone in having a non-peaceful nuclear programme was undoubtedly encouraging others to embark on an arms race. Furthermore, transparency in relation to nuclear and other weapons strengthened peace and helped to promote friendship and good-neighbourliness.

167. Egypt was strongly supporting the Agency in its important task of strengthening the safeguards system. With regard to the Middle East, his delegation hoped that the Director General would pursue his dialogue with the countries of the region in the interests of achieving the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities there and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Conference. His delegation appreciated the constructive role played by the Agency in the activities of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Limitation and Regional Security in the context of the Middle East peace negotiations and considered that the Agency's participation was a sign of the international community's support for those negotiations. Also, it was grateful to the Agency for having recommended the organization of visits by experts from the Middle East to a nuclear power plant in a European country so that they might familiarize themselves with the regional verification structures and activities that complemented international activities. In addition, it hoped that the States of the Middle East which had not replied to the letters sent to them in November 1992 by the Director General would soon let him know their opinions about the commitments which might be provided for in an agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Perhaps the Director General could, in the light of the replies, work out the elements of a draft agreement or prepare a report on basic principles, to be used as a basis for negotiations by those concerned.

168. Egypt and the other countries of Africa had, together with the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, been preparing a draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. His delegation hoped that the endeavour would succeed

and that the objective announced in the declaration made at the first meeting of African Heads of State and Government - held in Cairo in 1964 - would be achieved. That would be a significant step towards regional and global peace and security, and his delegation hoped that other regions of the world - and particularly the Middle East - would achieve similar progress in the elimination of nuclear weapons on their territory.

169. Given the progress made in the peace process, his delegation believed that the Agency should provide technical assistance to the Palestinian people. By taking such an initiative, the Agency would be acting in accordance with the wishes of the international community and in the spirit of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. Perhaps the General Conference, at its current session, should invite the Board of Governors to request the TACC to consider ways of providing such assistance in collaboration with other organizations and to submit its recommendations on the matter to the Board in December.

170. Turning to developments in his country, he said that a project relating to the installation of a multipurpose 22 MW(e) research reactor was under way at the Nuclear Science and Technology City at Inshas. A programme was being drawn up for promoting local participation in the construction of nuclear power plants, including the manufacture of equipment. The training centre at El-Daba had been equipped with an LWR and PHWR systems simulator. An environmental research laboratory had been established at the same site.

171. With regard to the production of radioisotopes and their applications in medicine, agriculture and industry, Egypt was modernizing its facilities and enhancing its ability to use advanced techniques in nuclear medicine. The installation - with Agency help - of a cyclotron had increased Egypt's isotope production capacity and would enable it to provide services to other countries of Africa and the Arab region. Mention should also be made of a project involving the use of nuclear techniques to increase agricultural production and improve water and chemical fertilizer utilization in desert areas.

172. Egypt attached particular importance to radiation protection and radioactive waste management. A treatment facility for low- and intermediate-level waste had been commissioned at the start of 1994 as a result of technical co-operation with the Agency. In

that regard he said that Egypt, in collaboration with the Agency and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, had organized several courses for participants from African and Arab countries at the Egyptian Centre for Radioactive Waste Treatment. During the previous two years, two seminars had been held for participants from African countries within the framework of AFRA and two for participants from Arab countries.

173. Egypt had participated in the various stages of preparatory work on the Convention on Nuclear Safety and had signed the Convention in the belief that it would contribute significantly to the strengthening of international co-operation in the nuclear field and in the hope that its scope would later be broadened to include all types of nuclear facility.

174. Egypt was making steady progress in areas such as nuclear power, applied research, plasma physics and nuclear fusion, and in collaboration with Germany it had established a tokamak research reactor near Inshas. It was continuing to prospect for nuclear raw materials and was undertaking an evaluation of the uranium reserves at a number of sites and a study on production methods.

175. As regards regional co-operation, the Middle East Regional Radioisotope Centre for Arab Countries, together with the Egyptian Research Centre, was conducting programmes for the training of specialists from the region in the use of nuclear power for seawater desalination and of nuclear techniques in agriculture, medicine and industry. Also, it was carrying out a large number of research projects.

176. Expressing his satisfaction at the historic events which had crowned the rightful struggle of the South African people, he warmly welcomed the Republic of South Africa - now a democratic country - as an active member of the African family; he was confident that it would support efforts serving the interests of Africa within the Agency. In that regard, it was time to take speedy action in order to remedy the underrepresentation of Africa on the Board of Governors; the number of seats assigned to Africa was not in line with the growing number of African Member States, the African group having become the largest regional group within the Agency as in the United Nations.

177. Mr. COOK (New Zealand) said he would like to outline the major issues which, in his delegation's opinion, the Agency would be facing in the near future.

178. New Zealand was above all concerned about nuclear proliferation. Like some of his colleagues, the previous week he had attended a preparatory meeting for the NPT Review Conference at which the essential contribution of the Agency to implementation of the NPT had been abundantly recognized. He thanked the Secretariat for the excellent quality of the documentation presented at that meeting.

179. The importance of the decision to be taken in 1995 in New York on extension of the NPT could not be overstated. New Zealand regarded the NPT as the cornerstone of the entire non-proliferation system; without it the disarmament progress made in recent years would be placed at risk and the very foundation of international security would be undermined. His country was therefore convinced of the need for unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT.

180. He assumed that most countries would concur that the traditional safeguards system had worked well. The fact that the Agency had never detected any diversion of nuclear material from facilities under its safeguards constituted a good record.

181. One could not, however, ignore the fact that new proliferation problems, not envisaged 25 years before, had now arisen. In order to retain the confidence of the international community, the safeguards system would have to rise to the challenge. Fortunately, safeguards agreements based on document INFCIRC/153 were sufficiently flexible to respond to changing situations.

182. New Zealand therefore strongly supported the study being carried out by the Secretariat on ways of making safeguards more efficient and effective and endorsed the manner in which the task was being tackled. It fully agreed with the priorities set for Programme.93+2, including an increase in the Agency's capabilities for dealing with undeclared nuclear activities.

183. Also, New Zealand welcomed other initiatives already undertaken by the Agency in order to promote transparency regarding nuclear activities. Since the previous General Conference session, his country had formally become a participant in the voluntary reporting system for nuclear material and specified equipment and non-nuclear material, and it would like all countries to participate in the system.

184. Over the past year, the Agency had continued to report to the Security Council on two cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements. As regards Iraq, New Zealand appreciated the Director General's report on measures taken pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions, including the installation of an effective long-term monitoring and verification system. The DPRK issue remained unresolved. Despite encouraging developments, the Director General was still unable to report that the DPRK was complying fully with its safeguards responsibilities as urged by the General Conference in 1993. New Zealand was concerned at the fact that the DPRK had discharged its reactor core in such a way that it had become much more difficult for the Agency to verify the DPRK's initial report. Also, it regretted the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the Agency.

185. Turning to more positive aspects, he welcomed the understandings reached in principle by the United States and the DPRK, which the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs had described as "an important step forward in resolving the nuclear issue". There were, however, still significant issues to be resolved. His delegation hoped very much that recent developments would soon lead to the DPRK's co-operating with the Agency in fully implementing its safeguards agreement, with the provision of additional information and access to additional sites in order that the Agency might fulfil its verification responsibilities.

186. In recent months there had been increasing concern about international trafficking in nuclear material. Although the problem had not yet had any direct effect on New Zealand's region, it could have serious proliferation implications if an end was not put to it quickly. His delegation believed that all countries possessing nuclear material or equipment which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons should apply the highest standards of security and physical protection. The Agency had a contribution to make in that regard, and New Zealand supported the ideas put forward by the Director General for practical steps which the Agency might take to enhance international co-operation.

187. He did not want to give the impression that the challenge facing the Agency was due entirely to negative developments. There were encouraging developments in the field of disarmament which might have considerable implications for the Agency's workload. New Zealand was a leading proponent of a nuclear test ban and was playing an active role in the negotiations taking place within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

It had an open mind about the infrastructure needed for verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty, but it seemed clear that the Agency had a contribution to make in that area.

188. Also, New Zealand regarded the proposed cut-off in the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons as a significant contribution to the disarmament process. Here, too, the Agency had relevant expertise to assist in verification. Furthermore, the important steps taken by the United States towards placing fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons under Agency safeguards foreshadowed further demands on the Agency in support of the disarmament process.

189. With regard to his country's priorities in the year ahead, he was pleased to announce that New Zealand had recently become a party to the RCA. It was participating for the first time in the annual meeting of RCA parties, being held in parallel with the General Conference session, and it hoped to be able to contribute to the sharing of technical knowledge in the Asia/Pacific region.

190. In conclusion, he paid tribute to the Agency for the effective way in which it had carried out its tasks over the past year. While it had not been easy, it would have been much more difficult without the skill, imagination and dedication shown by Mr. Blix and his staff.

191. Mr. CONNOLLY (Ireland), having expressed his full support for the statement made by the delegate of Germany on behalf of the European Union, said that he would concentrate on the Irish Government's main nuclear policy objectives, which placed heavy emphasis on the control and elimination of nuclear weapons and on all aspects of nuclear safety.

192. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continued to constitute a serious threat. Despite a number of positive trends in international relations, some States were still aspiring to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. The growth in world stocks of fissile materials and a surplus of personnel with the requisite technological skills had made horizontal proliferation a real and immediate risk.

193. In that context, the fact that the DPRK continued to refuse to comply with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the Agency was a matter of grave concern

to Ireland. It was essential for the integrity of the safeguards system as a whole that the Agency insist on full implementation of the terms of that agreement.

194. While the considerable progress being made in the reduction of nuclear arsenals was to be welcomed, further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime was necessary given the challenges facing it. The fifth NPT Review Conference, which would be taking place in 1995, would offer a timely opportunity to strengthen the regime by building on the principles which underlay the NPT. Crucial decisions would have to be taken in order to achieve progress towards the NPT's universality and towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as envisaged by the NPT. To that end, Ireland would like to see the NPT extended indefinitely and unconditionally at the 1995 Conference. It would also like to see it strengthened, with improved verification procedures, and truly universal, through the accession of further States.

195. The Agency's safeguards system played a central role in the endeavours of the international community to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. Ireland therefore supported the efforts being made to improve and strengthen that system and looked forward to the proposals which the Director General would be presenting to the Board of Governors early in 1995. The collective determination to strengthen safeguards would, of course, be reflected in a collective willingness to allocate the resources necessary for that purpose.

196. In contrast to the welcome reduction in nuclear arsenals, the growing stockpile of fissile material was becoming an increasingly acute problem. There now existed worldwide more separated fissile plutonium and highly enriched uranium than ever before. That situation had resulted from the dismantling of weapons and the reprocessing of spent fuel. Such reprocessing was continuing despite the absence of commercial fast breeder reactors in which it had originally been intended that the reprocessing products would be used. At the previous session of the General Conference, Ireland had indicated its concern about the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and, in particular, the expansion of reprocessing activities due to the commissioning of THORP at Sellafield in the United Kingdom. He wished to draw the General Conference's attention once again to the fact that reprocessing involved serious hazards in terms of both safety and safeguards, as it led to a growing stockpile of plutonium and other highly radioactive material for which there was no immediate use. The

surplus of fissile plutonium alone already amounted to several hundred tonnes, which was sufficient to produce at least 100 000 nuclear weapons. That situation was unsatisfactory and dangerous. International discussions were currently taking place under the auspices of the Agency regarding the possible international management of plutonium. While welcoming that positive development, Ireland would like to see the Agency initiating, as a matter of urgency, a much broader debate on that general issue. Such a debate should focus on meaningful international action, starting with international surveillance of separated fissile material in storage and, most crucially, leading to the development of effective means of reducing surplus stocks.

197. Ireland welcomed the recently adopted Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it had signed the previous day. However, it regretted that the Convention applied only to civil nuclear power plants and did not cover other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle which also posed a risk of radioactive contamination of the environment. Ireland had called for the inclusion within the Convention's scope of important activities such as nuclear waste management and reprocessing. Nevertheless, it was encouraged by the commitment, made at the previous session of the General Conference, to start preparations for a convention on nuclear waste management as soon as a set of basic principles had been developed; it looked forward to agreement on those principles at the December meetings of the Board of Governors. It was also encouraging that the General Conference had, at its previous session, envisaged the development - with time - of instruments covering other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.

198. His delegation had been pleased to read in the Nuclear Safety Review 1994 about the growing use by Member States of the Agency's IRRT service. Seven years previously, in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, Ireland had proposed the provision of such a service. It continued to believe that one of the fundamental lessons of the Chernobyl accident was that operational safety was dependent on continuous oversight by an independent and competent regulatory authority. IRRTs, which had become an extremely useful instrument, would help to ensure such oversight.

199. Since the Chernobyl accident, it had become evident that the existing international regime of civil liability for nuclear damage was seriously deficient in many respects. For that reason, Ireland considered it extremely important to update and enhance that regime,

which should ensure adequate, fair and prompt compensation for damage to health and the environment in the event of a nuclear accident.

200. Ireland believed that efforts should be made not only to revise the Vienna Convention, but also to establish a supplementary funding convention which would provide meaningful compensation for nuclear damage and would attract universal acceptance. It therefore welcomed the integrated approach adopted by the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage and hoped that a single diplomatic conference covering both issues would be held soon.

201. An important question which had not yet been settled was that of the criteria for determining the contribution percentages of States participating in a supplementary funding scheme. His delegation believed that those criteria should clearly reflect the differences between the risks posed by different countries. On that basis, genuinely non-nuclear States should be exempted from any contribution, as they would not pose any risk.

202. With regard to the Agency's technical assistance programme, he was satisfied with the implementation rate achieved in 1993 and the high quality of the projects which had been supported by the Agency. The introduction of model projects, which brought the benefits of nuclear technology directly to the public, was a very commendable initiative and had given technical assistance new momentum.

203. Finally, his Government appreciated the Agency's efforts to improve the efficiency of its programmes despite severe budgetary constraints. It had taken note of the Director General's remarks about the need to reassess the growing responsibilities of the Agency in providing essential services to Member States. The question of the resources necessary for discharging those responsibilities would have to be examined with an open mind if the world was to become a safer place for all.

204. Mr. KUTAS (Lithuania), noting that the political map of Europe had changed radically in recent years, said that the occupation of the Baltic States - which had been entirely cut off from European co-operation - had only just come to an end. Those countries were currently endeavouring to take their place among the countries of Europe by developing their trade, their research and their technical co-operation activities and by integrating

themselves into the safeguards system. There was greater scope for co-operation, a climate of openness and trust prevailed and opportunities for establishing economic and technical links had arisen. International organizations were being called upon to play an increasing role, which Lithuania considered highly important. In that context, the importance of the role of the Agency in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and its efforts to bring about a comprehensive nuclear test ban should not be underestimated. Lithuania had acceded to the NPT in 1991 and was meeting its obligations scrupulously.

205. The cases of non-compliance which had been uncovered in the non-proliferation area were cause for concern. It mattered but little whether the countries involved were in the Near East or in East Asia, since nuclear hazards knew no boundaries. All countries should be fully aware of the heavy responsibilities involved. Despite the present situation, however, Lithuania remained optimistic and hoped that common sense would prevail.

206. Turning to the question of nuclear power, he said that everyone agreed in thinking that there would have to be an expansion. It was therefore important to ensure the safe operation of reactors and, even more, to develop the reactors which would be needed in the twenty-first century. The Agency's activities in the field of nuclear power plant safety were of prime importance, and organizations involved in the design of nuclear facilities should base their work on Agency recommendations. The memory of the Chernobyl accident had given rise to hesitancy about the construction of new nuclear facilities, but it had also had a positive effect in that it had obliged designers to study safety problems more carefully.

207. The recent reports about illicit trafficking in nuclear material should prompt all States to adopt very strict physical protection measures. The Nuclear Suppliers Group was doing a considerable amount of work in that connection. His country was endeavouring to implement the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to which it had become a party. Its customs services did not have all the necessary equipment, however, and Lithuania, which lacked experience and specialists, would greatly appreciate technical and financial assistance from international organizations and States with experience in the control of nuclear material.

208. Since Lithuania had been incorporated into the Soviet Union against its will, it had hardly been in a position to choose what power plants were constructed on its territory. The presence in Lithuania of the largest RBMKs in the world was due to historical reasons. However, the reactors at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant were third-generation ones and therefore safer than the Chernobyl reactors. When Lithuania had recovered its sovereignty and independence, it had inherited the problems of operating and maintaining the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, which - once a totally closed-off facility - was now accessible to all. A large number of Western experts familiar with the equipment there had studied its specific features and proposed reliability and safety improvements. He thanked all donors for their very useful assistance.

209. Nuclear power, which was extremely important for Lithuania, was accounting for a constantly rising share of the electricity produced in his country. Its share had risen from 50% in 1990 to 80% in 1993 since, owing to an increase in the price of fossil fuels, electricity generated at Ignalina had become cheaper than electricity produced by fossil-fired plants. Electricity supply and demand scenarios were based on the assumption that the two Ignalina units would be operated at full capacity, and it was therefore vital to ensure their safety and availability. The plant management had drawn up, together with the Ministry of Energy, a safety improvement programme which would be continually reviewed in the light of new information provided by various international working groups and of the operating experience of all RBMK plants.

210. Because of shortcomings in the national energy sector, Lithuania had chosen to continue operating the Ignalina plant - and it would require continuing assistance. It therefore strongly supported the OSART and ASSET programmes and the initiatives for strengthening national nuclear safety and radiation protection infrastructures and national regulatory regimes.

211. The safety of the Ignalina plant was being evaluated on the basis of a tripartite agreement concluded between Sweden, Lithuania and Russia for a probabilistic safety assessment (Barselina project). The assessment methodology took into account the specific features of the plant. When the safety improvement programme had been put in place and the main outstanding weak points eliminated, the probability of an accident which might

affect the area surrounding the plant would be much lower. Some of the improvements would be financed by the operator but, in view of the economic difficulties which Lithuania was facing, it would be impossible to make certain improvements without technical and financial support from Western countries. The Russian specialists who had designed the RBMKs would certainly wish to upgrade their safety and no one was as well acquainted with the specific features and the weak points of those reactors as they, so Lithuania hoped that Russia would help with the upgrading. In December 1993, the Lithuanian Minister of Energy and the EBRD had signed an agreement for a grant of 33 million ECU to improve the safety of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant within the framework of an operational safety project which would involve in-service inspections, the provision and installation of equipment, and short-term preventive measures.

212. Lithuania did not yet have any nuclear legislation, but it had begun drafting laws and was planning to accede to the relevant conventions and international agreements. It had already acceded to the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol thereto, but it was experiencing difficulties since certain countries, including Russia and Belarus, were not yet parties to them. Producers of nuclear equipment were therefore reluctant to supply the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. He hoped that Russia and Belarus would accede to the aforementioned instruments or find some other means of resolving the issue of liability for nuclear damage. He also hoped that the endeavours of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage would be successful.

213. Lithuania had not participated in the drafting of the Nuclear Safety Convention, but it had studied the text and felt able to accede to it. Convinced as it was of the importance of multilateral co-operation in the nuclear sector, it had embarked on a co-operative venture with Sweden and concluded agreements with France, Denmark, Canada, Russia, Poland, Belarus and other States.

214. The issue of radioactive waste management and, more specifically, spent nuclear fuel disposal was becoming more and more urgent for Lithuania. In parallel with a project on spent nuclear fuel storage in ponds, work was being done at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant on the design of a facility for storage in metallic containers produced by a German company. However, those solutions were only temporary. Perhaps several countries might

be able to find a more permanent solution by pooling their efforts, for it was surely not necessary for all countries operating power reactors to construct repositories of their own. It would not be easy to reach agreement on that issue, and obviously a commercial basis for such projects would have to be created.

215. In conclusion, he noted with pleasure that the Agency was successfully addressing issues related to the strengthening of safeguards, development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technical assistance. The Agency's technical assistance was efficient and the funds allocated to it were being well used, and Lithuania had greatly appreciated the Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar.

The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.

