



GC(40)/OR.5
December 1996

GENERAL Distr.

Original: ENGLISH

International Atomic Energy Agency
G E N E R A L
C O N F E R E N C E

FORTIETH REGULAR SESSION

RECORD OF THE FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna
on Wednesday, 18 September 1996, at 10.10 a.m.

President: Mr. PADOLINA (Philippines)

CONTENTS

<u>Item of the agenda*</u>		<u>Paragraphs</u>
7	General debate and annual report for 1995 (continued)	1 - 156
	Statements by the delegates and representatives of the following States and organizations:	
	Germany	1 - 10
	Kazakstan	11 - 19
	European Commission	20 - 35
	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	36 - 40
	Tanzania	41 - 49
	Spain	50 - 70
	Croatia	71 - 81
	Slovakia	82 - 95
	Tunisia	96 - 106
	Denmark	107 - 119
	Slovenia	120 - 133
	Indonesia	134 - 148
	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials	149 - 156

[*] GC(40)/22.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(40)/INF/13/Rev.2.

Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
BSS	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
BWR	Boiling-water reactor
Committee 24	Committee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECU	European currency unit
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
G-7	Group of Seven
G-24	OECD Group of 24
ITER-EDA	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor - Engineering Design Activities
Joint Protocol	Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
LWR	Light-water reactor
NPA	New Partnership Approach
NPP	Nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review and E x t e n s i o n C o n f e r e n c e	Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
Paris Convention	Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (July 1960)
PHARE	Poland, Hungary: assistance for economic reconstruction in Europe (the programme now covers several East European countries)
PWR	Pressurized-water reactor
Quadripartite Agreement	Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting

RAPAT and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
Radiation Protection Advisory Team

Abbreviations used in this record
(Contd.)

RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SAGTAC	Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1963)
WHO	World Health Organization
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1995 (GC(40)/8) (continued)

1. Ms. YZER (Germany) said that her Government was endeavouring to pursue an energy policy which conserved resources and protected the environment while being economically efficient. In view of the need to reduce the pollution associated with fossil energy sources and given the limited potential for energy saving and the limited availability of other sources of energy, the use of nuclear energy could not be abandoned; it continued to be an important part of the German energy mix, currently accounting for approximately 30% of the national electricity supply. However, protecting humans and the environment from the hazards of radiation was a priority and the highest safety standards should be maintained at nuclear power installations.

2. Having welcomed the high degree of acceptance which the Convention on Nuclear Safety had found in the international community, demonstrated by the large number of countries which had signed or already ratified the Convention, she said that in Germany the parliamentary procedure for ratifying the Convention had begun and would probably be completed soon. She was pleased that the Convention would be entering into force on 24 October 1996.

3. Her Government welcomed the activities continuing under the Agency's auspices with a view to preparing a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management and would actively support all efforts which might contribute to smooth and speedy progress. It was her Government's hope that the experts would finalize their work in the near future and that a diplomatic conference could be convened soon afterwards to decide upon the draft convention.

4. Germany was continuing to provide assistance, both bilaterally and through international programmes, to newly independent States of the former Soviet Union and to countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In that connection, she expressed appreciation of the contribution which the Agency had made by directly assisting the countries in question and by providing overall support. Germany was currently concentrating on the operational safety situation at the Rovno and Balakovo NPPs.

Furthermore, it was continuing to help with the development and strengthening of regulatory authorities and the training of nuclear power plant personnel.

5. The current year was proving to be another decisive year as regards progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Together with its European and other partners, Germany had worked hard in helping to achieve the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). With the CTBT's conclusion, the participants in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference were fulfilling one of the main obligations enshrined in the document "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted at the Conference. Other obligations enshrined in that document, such as the early conclusion of negotiations on a "cut-off convention", provided an essential frame of reference for future Agency work.

6. Having expressed her Government's satisfaction with the results of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit held in April, she welcomed the fact that the States participating in the Summit had unanimously supported the current endeavours aimed at the safe storage and effective protection of all sensitive nuclear material not intended for defence purposes in the nuclear-weapon States. For its part, Germany would continue to co-operate in pursuing those goals.

7. The threat to international peace and security resulting from illicit trafficking in nuclear materials had by no means been eliminated. At the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, the participants had adopted a programme for combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other governments had been called upon to join in implementing it. Germany was particularly pleased that Ukraine had expressed its support for the programme at the Summit, and it hoped that other States would express their support before long.

8. Turning to financial matters, she said that most Member States were facing serious budgetary problems and that the Agency, like other organizations in the United Nations system, should give due consideration to that fact. The United Nations Secretary-General had recently proposed nominal negative growth for the 1998-99 budget of the United Nations, but the Agency's programme for 1997, involving an

overall budgetary increase of more than 1.8%, was unfortunately not in line with such thinking. The German federal budget was to be cut by 2.5%, which would affect Germany's voluntary contribution to the Technical Co-operation Fund (TCF) for the forthcoming year.

9. With regard to Programme 93+2, her Government had consistently and unequivocally supported it and would continue to do so. Germany had renounced nuclear weapons once and for all several decades previously and, with the conclusion of the EURATOM Treaty in 1957, had subjected all its nuclear activities to the world's first international comprehensive safeguards system. Her country had a particular interest in the application of equally effective safeguards throughout the world and would support any efforts to make Agency safeguards more effective and efficient. Experience had shown that the global effectiveness of Agency safeguards could not be strengthened by simply expanding routine measures in countries whose non-proliferation credentials were beyond any reasonable doubt. With the ever-increasing globalization of both legitimate and illegal activities, with the advent of instant transboundary communications, with the international trade in hardware and software, and with the mergers and cross-investment now taking place, there was a need for improved compilation, cross-checking and analysis of all available information that might hint at potentially dangerous activities. Germany therefore believed that the contemplated Programme 93+2 measures should be applied universally and was pleased that an increasing number of other countries shared that view. It would be difficult to understand if certain nuclear-related activities were to become the subject of additional reporting requirements and on-site inspections in most countries while corresponding activities of equal importance were to be disregarded in the five nuclear-weapon States or in other countries that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. Her country had therefore welcomed the statement made by the Governor from the United States at the June session of the Board to the effect that the United States, one of the strongest supporters of Programme 93+2, did not seek from other countries the acceptance of additional measures which it was not ready to accept itself. Such statements and their effective

transformation into legally binding commitments would be decisive in securing the wide acceptance of new measures designed to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system.

10. Germany had also welcomed the Board's decision to set up the Committee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System (Committee 24), thus allowing for thorough examination and discussion of all the issues involved in defining necessary and effective new measures and in avoiding schemes which would be neither rational nor economic. It would continue to co-operate in Committee 24 and in the Board of Governors, and it hoped that highly effective Programme 93+2 Part 2 measures would be adopted and implemented in all countries in which relevant activities were being carried out.

11. Mr. SHKOL'NIK (Kazakstan), having welcomed the approval of Moldova's application for membership of the Agency, said that his country - a relatively new Member State - was committed to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation. In the 1991 Alma Ata Declaration, Kazakstan had announced that it would not seek to possess nuclear weapons technology. Accordingly, it had rid itself more than a year before of all nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. In 1993 it had acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and two years later had supported the NPT's indefinite extension; in 1994 it had concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency, which had entered into force in 1995, and now most of Kazakstan's nuclear facilities were under Agency safeguards.

12. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Kazakstan had been left with an advanced nuclear industry, with large-scale uranium mining and milling enterprises and with high-capacity nuclear fuel fabrication plants. Its BN-350 fast reactor, situated in Aktau on the shores of the Caspian Sea, was being used not only to produce electricity but also to supply fresh water and heat to the region. Kazakstan therefore possessed considerable scientific and technical potential in the nuclear power field.

13. His Government was very concerned about the former nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk and was working in close co-operation with the Agency in that

connection. Missions had been carried out to investigate the radiological situation at the site, and their findings would help in identifying options for eliminating the consequences of the many years of nuclear weapons testing. Kazakhstan was participating in the Agency's technical co-operation programmes and was prepared to share its accumulated expertise in the field of sea water desalination with interested countries.

14. His country was actively supporting efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. Programme 93+2 Part 1 measures were being applied at nuclear sites under safeguards in Kazakhstan, which valued the Agency's role within the non-proliferation regime very highly. The protocol additional to comprehensive safeguards agreements which was being prepared would undoubtedly make it easier to detect any undeclared nuclear activities, which should generally enhance the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the non-proliferation regime.

15. His country welcomed the steps being taken by the nuclear-weapon States as regards placing more and more of their nuclear activities and materials under safeguards.

16. An issue of growing importance was the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other sources of ionizing radiation. In its export policy, Kazakhstan observed all the Agency's requirements regarding nuclear exports and imports, the relevant principles being reflected in the export control law recently adopted in Kazakhstan. His country was supporting the Agency's programme to strengthen measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

17. Kazakhstan, which had one power and four research reactors, shared the Agency's position regarding nuclear safety matters, and the internal procedures for accession to the Convention on Nuclear Safety were near completion.

18. Radioactive waste management was another problem of concern to his country, which, like other countries with developing nuclear industries, was seeking acceptable solutions to that problem. Kazakhstan needed up-to-date laws and regulations governing radiation safety and waste management and an adequate infrastructure.

His Government therefore welcomed the Agency's interregional Model Projects on upgrading radiation protection and waste management infrastructures.

19. Kazakhstan was a keen participant in Agency technical co-operation projects on the use of nuclear and isotopic methods in industry, agriculture, medicine, hydrology and other areas, and it hoped that such collaboration would increase. It was grateful for the assistance which it had received from the Agency and would continue supporting the Agency's activities.

20. Mr. BENAVIDES (European Commission) said that, although some countries in the European Union (EU) were now important energy producers, the EU as a whole was still a net importer of energy, with a total energy self-sufficiency of just over 50%, which would probably decline in the future.

21. The EU was becoming an integrated and more competitive market where increased solidarity among the member States was called for in energy matters. In the light of that challenge, the Commission had in December 1995 issued a "white paper" designed to relaunch the debate on the EU's energy policy.

22. The EU supported the Secretariat's approach to strengthening safeguards through Programme 93+2, in particular the envisaged broader access to information and increased physical access to sites of concern. Implementation of Part 1 of Programme 93+2 was at an advanced stage, although a number of important questions needed further clarification. It would be necessary at some point to define the role which EURATOM should play in the implementation of Part 2 measures.

23. Safeguards co-operation between the Agency and the European Commission would continue. The New Partnership Approach (NPA), with which substantial results had already been achieved, represented an effective framework for co-operation between the Agency's international safeguards regime and EURATOM's regional safeguards inspectorate. The European Commission was sure that, thanks to the NPA, the Agency would be able to reduce its inspection effort in the EU countries even further. It was also sure that the NPA would play an important role in connection with strengthened Agency safeguards.

24. The nuclear tests carried out in French Polynesia the previous year had prompted a debate on the role of EU institutions with regard to the measures to be taken in that connection. The Commission had been pleased to make available members of its staff for participation in the Agency's study of the radiological situation at the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls.

25. Several conferences had been held in various cities, including Vienna, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. It was to be hoped that the many lessons learned from the accident, the more stringent safety measures now being taken at the national level, the new spirit of international co-operation in the nuclear safety field and the mechanism created by the Convention on Nuclear Safety would prevent a reoccurrence of such an event. The fact that a special summit on nuclear safety had been held in Moscow in April 1996 confirmed that the issue was being followed very closely at the highest political level. The Commission, which had actively participated in the preparations for that summit, welcomed its results and was involved in the planning of follow-up actions.

26. The safety of nuclear installations in Central and Eastern Europe and newly independent States remained a major concern, and technical assistance in that connection would be necessary for some time to come. The EU was still contributing significantly through its TACIS and PHARE programmes, and it was involved in the appraisal of proposals for safety improvement projects to be partly financed by EURATOM loans. The Commission would continue to support the international co-ordination of bilateral and multilateral programmes within the G-24 context. It welcomed the fact that many of the countries concerned had acceded to or were acceding to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and hoped that those which had not yet passed national legislation for implementation of the Convention would do so soon. It also hoped that the work of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage would be successfully completed in the near future and that a diplomatic conference to revise the Vienna Convention and to adopt the text of an additional funding convention could be convened for early in 1997.

27. Nuclear safety agreements had been negotiated between EURATOM and the Russian Federation and between EURATOM and Kazakstan, and it was expected that they would be signed that year; the negotiation of a nuclear safety agreement with Ukraine was under way. Nuclear co-operation agreements including framework provisions on nuclear safety had been concluded with the United States and Argentina.

28. The EU was contributing to the development of a worldwide nuclear safety culture through research programmes carried out in member States as shared-cost activities and at its Joint Research Centre and through a continuing search for consensus within the EU on safety requirements and optimum safety procedures - a search being conducted with the help of standing advisory groups consisting of experts from all nuclear energy sectors. During the year a consensus document on the safety of European LWRs had been published as a complement - particularly as regards severe accidents - to previous consensus documents entitled "Safety principles for LWRs" and "Assurance of safety".

29. With regard to legislation, the EU Council of Ministers had in May adopted a revision of the directive laying down basic safety standards for health protection against the dangers of ionizing radiation; the revised directive was consistent with the BSS.

30. The Commission looked forward to the forthcoming entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and hoped to resume discussions on EURATOM's accession to it. It had been taking part in work - organized by the Agency - on drafting the international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management called for in the preamble of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and it hoped that the outstanding issues would be resolved soon.

31. With regard to the problem of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive substances, the EU was co-operating with the Agency in developing ways of detecting radioactive substances at borders. Information on initiatives under way in related fields was being exchanged, joint activities were taking place and an informal network of contacts had been created.

32. In the field of research and technological development, various initiatives had been taken in 1995 with a view to - inter alia - the closer co-ordination of European research efforts. The budget for the 1994-98 EURATOM framework programme covering nuclear safety, thermonuclear fusion and the nuclear activities of the Joint Research Centre had been increased to ECU 1336 million in order to take account of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU. With regard to nuclear safety, 168 shared-cost projects and 30 concerted actions had been selected in 1995, the level of Community funding being ECU 130 million. With regard to controlled thermonuclear fusion, the Community's programme of research and training - with the focus on magnetic confinement - had been stepped up with a view to the establishment of new association contracts, notably with Ireland, Austria and Finland. Also, the Commission and Canada had signed a memorandum of understanding on co-operation in the field of fusion and an agreement on Canada's involvement in EURATOM's contribution to ITER-EDA.

33. The European Commission and the EURATOM Supply Agency were continuing to monitor the uranium market and to ensure a reasonable diversity of uranium supply sources; the pattern of supply of natural and enriched uranium to users in the Community - primarily on the basis of multi-year contracts - had remained unchanged.

34. On 12 April 1996 a new agreement between EURATOM and the United States on co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had entered into force; it would, he was sure, strengthen co-operation in nuclear safety, the supply of nuclear materials and equipment, research and development, and other fields. On 11 June 1996, EURATOM and Argentina had concluded an agreement focusing on areas such as reactor safety research, nuclear waste management and disposal, radiation protection, the decommissioning of nuclear installations, controlled thermonuclear fusion, and safeguards.

35. In March the EU had decided to make an immediate contribution of ECU 5 million to KEDO, and in April the Commission had proposed that the EU seek membership of KEDO and that further contributions be made on the basis of a multi-

year commitment. Negotiations with KEDO's founding members were expected to open in the autumn.

36. Mr. SELMANI (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), having welcomed the fact that the Conference had approved the Republic of Moldova for membership of the Agency, said it was important to ensure that the mechanisms being applied within the United Nations system were as cost-effective as possible and that duplication was avoided through effective co-ordination.

37. Having noted the impressive record of the Agency in furthering the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes through its promotional activities and its safeguards, he said that nuclear non-proliferation was in the interests of all countries. Also, he welcomed the agreement which had been reached on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

38. Expressing support for the Agency's efforts to raise the safety standards at nuclear facilities, he urged those countries which had nuclear power plants at critically low safety levels to co-operate with the Agency in implementing enhanced safety measures. His country attached great importance to the Agency's work in the areas of radiation protection and radioactive waste management and welcomed the interregional Model Project on upgrading safety infrastructures to levels commensurate with levels of ionizing radiation utilization.

39. His country had no nuclear power plants, and its co-operation with the Agency therefore focused on the practical uses of nuclear energy in medicine, agriculture and industry. It appreciated the valuable technical assistance which it had received in various areas, including nuclear medicine and personal dosimetry.

40. His country supported regional co-operation activities and particularly appreciated the Agency-organized meetings designed to promote regional co-operation in Europe. In addition, it would like to participate fully in training programmes organized by the Agency and would be interested in organizing training programmes itself in areas where it possessed a high level of expertise.

41. Mr. MAKWETA (Tanzania) said that his country, along with many other developing countries (and particularly the least developed among them), had long been pleading for a predictable and assured means of financing the Agency's technical co-operation programmes, which were the only channel through which developing countries could benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Secretariat used the available technical co-operation resources to the greatest advantage of Member States, but those resources were neither predictable nor assured. The issue had been under discussion for years, and his delegation hoped that SAGTAC - established by the Board in 1995 - would address it and perhaps help to stop the steady decline in the percentage fulfilment of successive TCF targets.

42. Tanzania, which was very grateful for the excellent technical assistance it received from the Agency, had greatly appreciated the Director General's recent visit as proof of the importance attached by the Secretariat to technical co-operation. The Agency's large and complex technical co-operation programmes - involving over 1000 national, regional and interregional projects (more and more of them Model Projects), fellowships, training courses and workshops - were extremely valuable. The Model Project concept had proved to be important for meeting the real needs of end-users and forging closer partnerships between them.

43. As a result of a Model Project for the total eradication of the tsetse fly using the sterile-insect technique on the island of Zanzibar, to which the Director General had referred in his statement, the people of Zanzibar could now look forward to living on a tsetse-free island. Tanzania was determined to follow up the tsetse eradication results obtained on Zanzibar by making the tsetse mass-rearing facility at Tanga - established with Agency assistance - available to other countries in the region. The people of Zanzibar and of Tanzania as a whole were grateful to the Agency and to those Member States which had generously supported the Model Project.

44. The Agency was promoting regional co-operative activities as a means of accelerating the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries. Its support for AFRA had generated a firm common resolve among African Member States to strengthen institutional co-operation and ensure optimum use of the available

resources. For its part, Tanzania intended to continue collaborating with other African countries and with the Agency in maintaining the momentum which had been built up.

45. His delegation had noted with appreciation the attention being paid in the preparation of the 1997-98 technical co-operation programme to the fundamentals of nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and radiation protection, which were essential for safe nuclear technology transfer.

46. Tanzania, which had welcomed the indefinite extension of the NPT and the creation of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, regarded them as two landmarks on the long road towards world peace. They should encourage the nuclear-weapon States to conclude, as a matter of the highest priority and urgency, "a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty" and to step up their efforts to bring about total nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to reciprocate within a reasonable time.

47. Tanzania, like many other Member States, was concerned about illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources and was following with keen interest the steps being taken within the Agency to combat it. For Tanzania, such illicit trafficking included the dumping of hazardous radioactive waste in other countries in breach of the Basel Convention on the Control and Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal - an activity which his country thoroughly deplored.

48. His delegation hoped that the database on illicit trafficking which the Secretariat had established would reveal the true magnitude of the problem and that Member States would continue co-operating with the Secretariat in its efforts to combat illicit trafficking.

49. For its part, Tanzania would continue to support the Agency's efforts to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear techniques and ensure the safe use of nuclear technology.

50. Ms. HUIDOBRO (Spain) said that the 55 444 GWh of electricity produced by Spain's nuclear power plants in 1994 had represented 34% of the country's total electricity production and that the average load factor of 85.5% (equivalent to 7492 hours of operation at full capacity) had been among the highest in the world. That was the result of extensive operating experience and constant attention to safety and reliability, with a high level of investment in operator training and plant overhauling. In the latter connection, it might be noted that the replacement of the steam generators at the Almaraz and Ascó NPPs, begun in 1995, was continuing and would be completed early in 1997.

51. Because of the low market prices for uranium, the Quercus uranium concentrate plant was still operating at reduced capacity, with an annual output of about 300 tonnes. At the Juzbado fuel element plant, 757 PWR and BWR fuel elements had been manufactured in 1995 for use in Spain and for export.

52. The decommissioning of Vandellós NPP Unit I was due to commence in the near future subject to ministerial approval. The first phase, scheduled to last four years, would involve the removal of conventional and radioactive components, except for the reactor pressure vessel and its internals. After a waiting period of 25 to 30 years final decommissioning would be undertaken, the aim being to restore the site to a state where it could be used without restrictions.

53. As regards the management of high-level radioactive waste, the process of exchanging the spent fuel racks in NPP storage ponds in order to maximize the latter's capacity was nearing completion. As the capacity of the different storage ponds became exhausted, metal containers would be used for spent fuel storage. At the same time, there were plans to build by the year 2010 a central facility for the medium-term storage of all the spent fuel from Spain's power reactors and of the vitrified and other long-lived waste that would be returned to Spain after reprocessing of the spent fuel from Vandellós NPP Unit I.

54. The search for a site for deep geological storage, begun in 1986, was continuing. At the same time, work was in progress on a conceptual design and on the technology for characterizing the selected site and building the facility.

55. As regards nuclear research and development, Spain's programme was oriented towards maintaining a technological capacity sufficient for the needs of the country's operating power reactors and for ensuring that the nuclear power option remained available.

56. In the field of energy policy, her Government had decided to introduce greater competition into the electricity sector by liberalizing the electricity market. In that connection, thought was being given to the arrangements that would apply in the case of nuclear power, which - as she had already indicated - accounted for about a third of electricity production in Spain.

57. Turning to Agency matters, she said that her delegation fully endorsed the organizational reforms which had taken place in the Secretariat with the establishment of a Department of Nuclear Safety. Also, it had followed with interest the review of the Agency's nuclear safety-related activities by an international expert group and welcomed the fact that the experts' conclusions were reflected in the proposed Agency programme for 1997-98. It would like to see similar reviews carried out of the Agency's activities relating to radiological protection and radioactive waste management.

58. With regard to the work on drafting a convention on radioactive waste, her country, which associated itself with the declaration made by the G-7 at the Moscow summit on nuclear safety, was participating actively with a view to the achievement of a document that would command a very wide consensus.

59. As stated on previous occasions, Spain attached high priority to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and was pleased that the conditions for its entry into force had now been met. It would continue participating actively in the meetings being held in order to prepare for the implementation of the Convention.

60. Her delegation welcomed the reorganization of the Agency's arrangements for developing and reviewing safety standards, and experts from Spain were participating in the work of the Advisory Commission for Safety Standards, the Radiation Safety Standards Advisory Committee and the Waste Safety Standards Advisory Committee (WASSAC). As regards the priorities of the standards development programme, Spain endorsed the relevant recommendations of the Nuclear Safety Standards Advisory Committee and the restructuring proposals made by WASSAC.

61. Spain would continue collaborating with various other Member States and with the Agency itself in advising on matters connected with the planning, establishment and restructuring of regulatory organizations.

62. Spain attached great importance to the efforts being made to improve the safety of nuclear power plants built to old Soviet designs, efforts in which Spanish companies were participating through projects sponsored by the Agency and the European Union. It also attached great importance to the work of the steering committee which was advising the Agency on priorities and would continue to press for close co-operation through the G-24 with other international organizations.

63. The success of the Agency conference "One decade after Chernobyl: Summing up the consequences of the accident" had demonstrated the significant role played by the Agency in promoting exchanges of experience and information on nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management and had highlighted the importance of international co-operation in responding to nuclear emergencies.

64. Referring to document GC(40)/INF/5, she said that Spain greatly appreciated the Agency's OSART, ASSET, RAPAT and other safety-related services and also the International Nuclear Event Scale and the Incident Reporting System. In that connection, she noted that Spanish engineering firms and institutions were closely involved in Agency initiatives directed towards improving the operational safety of reactors built to old designs. The benefits derived by Member States from the Agency's safety-related services should be assessed from time to time with a view to the possible combining of various services

65. Concluding her remarks about the Agency's safety-related activities, she said that Spain was ready to support the efforts of the Agency directed towards the establishment of a "global nuclear safety culture".

66. Turning to safeguards, she said that Spain, which had welcomed the success of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, was pleased with the progress made in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and making it more universal. It was also pleased with the progress made in the conclusion of safeguards agreements and subsidiary arrangements and looked forward to the early completion of negotiations on those which were still outstanding between the Agency and the countries in question.

67. As regards the Tlatelolco Treaty, her country welcomed the progress being made towards its full application and hoped that the Treaty would soon enter into force for the whole of Latin America.

68. Aware of the problems faced by the Agency in applying safeguards and of the fact that some of those problems resulted from the inadequacy of the financial resources assigned to the Department of Safeguards, Spain had not opposed the increases requested by the Director General for the Department in the draft budget for 1997, although the increases would mean a departure from the principle of zero real budgetary growth. At the same time, as the increases would not cover all requirements it was to be hoped that the gap would be bridged by voluntary contributions, especially from those industrialized countries in which the Agency was having to make heavy investments in order to safeguard new facilities or fissile material removed from the military cycle.

69. With regard to Programme 93+2, the Spanish delegation looked forward to an early and successful conclusion of the discussions taking place in Committee 24. In its contributions to those discussions, it was emphasizing two fundamental principles: the envisaged new safeguards measures should be compatible with the constitutional situation in each country; and those measures should be applied universally and, particularly with regard to non-nuclear activities, in a non-discriminatory manner.

With those principles in mind, the Spanish delegation would continue to participate in the quest for a generally acceptable protocol.

70. As regards the Agency's technical co-operation activities, on which the Spanish delegation had commented during the Board's June session, expressing satisfaction with the improvements made in terms of volume and quality and making suggestions for further improvements, Spain was participating in a variety of ways: despite the drastic cuts made in its national budget, it had substantially increased its voluntary contributions to the TCF; it was financing a number of footnote-a/ projects; it was providing Type II fellowships (64 man-months a year); it was making contributions in kind; and it was hosting Agency training courses, bearing all local costs and providing teachers. The total value of Spain's contributions in 1995 had been \$950 000 - a considerable increase on the 1994 figure despite the national budget cuts to which she had just referred.

71. Ms. BEŠKER (Croatia), having welcomed the fact that the Conference had approved the Republic of Moldova for membership of the Agency, said that Croatia attached great importance to the Agency's role in promoting and verifying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and was impressed by the Secretariat's constant efforts to adapt the activities of the Agency to the changing needs of Member States.

72. Having welcomed the progress made in the technical co-operation field since the General Conference's previous session and having commended the staff of the Department of Technical Co-operation and the Department of Research and Isotopes in that connection, she said that Croatia was in favour of Model Projects, regional projects and TCDC being developed further.

73. Her country, which would be very interested in increasing its participation in regional projects designed for Central and Eastern Europe, hoped to make rapid progress - with the Agency's help - in bringing its radiation protection regulations and arrangements into line with international standards and practices. At the same time, Croatian institutions with a long history of nuclear activities were ready to continue offering their services to the Agency for events such as the workshop on advanced in-

service inspection held in Zagreb during the summer. In that connection, she was pleased that Croatian expertise was to be drawn upon in implementing technical co-operation projects in a number of countries.

74. With regard to long-term energy planning in Croatia, she said that all available energy sources were being assessed in order to determine the most appropriate energy mix for the country; the Agency's programme "Comparative Assessment of Energy Sources" had been a valuable source of information in that connection.

75. With regard to the Krško NPP, which was owned jointly by Slovenia and Croatia, the construction of a repository for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste was being planned.

76. Croatia, which had played an active role in the NPT Review and Extension Conference, believed that the Conference's decisions should be implemented in their entirety; future nuclear security required that all NPT parties should adhere to the principles and pursue the objectives adopted by the Conference.

77. Her country, which had been pleased to support Australia in placing the text of the CTBT before the General Assembly, was pleased that the text had received such overwhelming support, but it regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had not been able to approve it by consensus. Croatia regarded the CTBT as an important step towards nuclear disarmament and would be signing and ratifying it in due course.

78. It was regrettable that, owing to a lack of political will, little progress had been made on the issue of a "cut-off" convention. However, her country welcomed the conclusion of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and would like to see further such treaties being concluded for other parts of the world.

79. In the post-Cold War world, Croatia attached great importance to credible Agency safeguards as a key element of the non-proliferation regime and was supporting the Programme 93+2 efforts to strengthen the Agency's capability for detecting undeclared nuclear activities. It believed that a successful conclusion of the current negotiations on a protocol additional to comprehensive safeguards agreements

would contribute greatly to the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards and to global security.

80. Her country welcomed the Agency's efforts to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management; it was one of the countries to have already ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety and looked forward to the forthcoming entry into force of the Convention. Also, Croatia welcomed the progress made in the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage and in the work on drafting a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

81. The success of the Agency's activities depended to a great extent on the availability of sufficient and stable funding. Accordingly, despite major financial problems, her country was making every effort to pay off its arrears. However, it would be grateful if special consideration was given to countries which had only recently come into existence, particularly where they had been ravaged by war.

82. Mr. MIŠÁK (Slovakia), having welcomed the approval of Moldova for membership of the Agency, said that the indefinite extension of the NPT had been welcomed by Slovakia, which would like all States that were not yet parties to the NPT to accede to it as soon as possible. In that connection, Slovakia strongly supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and welcomed the reductions in military nuclear potential achieved since the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

83. Slovakia was pleased that the General Assembly had adopted the CTBT, which it would be signing during the current week.

84. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had reaffirmed that the Agency's safeguards system was a fundamental element of the non-proliferation regime, and his delegation had noted with satisfaction that, in fulfilling the safeguards obligations of the Agency in 1995, the Secretariat had not found any indication of safeguarded nuclear material, facilities or equipment or safeguarded non-nuclear material being used for military purposes or for purposes unknown. It was regrettable, however, that

the issue of the non-compliance of the DPRK with its safeguards agreement had not yet been resolved; the DPRK should comply with that agreement.

85. Slovakia, which wanted to see the Agency's safeguards system strengthened, was already co-operating with the Agency in the implementation of Programme 93+2 Part 1 measures. It welcomed the progress made in the drafting of a protocol regarding Part 2 measures and hoped that the exercise would be completed before the end of the year.

86. His Government, which recognized the importance of effective national accounting and physical protection systems in the battle against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, had recently taken decisions regarding measures such as radiation monitoring at border crossings and increased co-operation among governmental agencies within individual countries and among the governments of neighbouring countries.

87. Approximately 50% of Slovakia's electricity was generated at nuclear power plants, which were essential for the country's future economic growth. Slovakia's primary energy resources were very scarce, while electricity consumption had been increasing by approximately 8% annually despite energy saving programmes. Nuclear power and hydropower were the most economical options for base load coverage, and the targets for the reduction of pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions could be met only with their help. Slovakia was therefore pursuing its nuclear power programme, with four WWER-440 units in operation at Bohunice and four under construction at Mochovce. Two of the Mochovce units were to be commissioned in 1998-99, and a governmental decision to complete the other two had been taken.

88. Slovakia believed that nuclear power was an indispensable energy source. At the same time, it believed - in line with the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit declaration - that safety had to prevail over other considerations in nuclear power generation, that nuclear safety could be enhanced by greater international transparency and that, although nuclear safety was primarily the responsibility of individual countries, collaborative efforts in the nuclear safety field must continue.

89. The tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident had been a poignant reminder of the importance of nuclear safety. Recognizing its importance, the Slovak authorities had ensured that the country's nuclear power plants were being operated or constructed with strong international involvement, which was also resulting in an increased transfer of know-how and in greater public confidence regarding the safety levels at the operating plants and the compliance of the plants under construction with current international standards.

90. In Slovakia, nuclear power generation was strictly regulated by the country's Nuclear Regulatory Authority - an independent public body whose maturity and competence had been recognized by the Agency and a number of other organizations. Also, Slovakia had recently acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and to the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol. Furthermore, a State Fund for the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants had been established and a peaceful uses of nuclear energy bill was at an advanced stage in the approval process.

91. Slovakia welcomed the forthcoming entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and was satisfied with the progress being made in the run-up to the Preparatory Meeting of the Contracting Parties. It trusted that the review meetings provided for in the Convention would not be restricted to the reviewing of national reports, but would also provide a forum for comprehensive exchanges of experience regarding the operation of nuclear facilities. The Agency should play a leading role in that regard, and implementation of the Convention should be widely reflected in the Agency's activities. Efforts should now be concentrated on successfully completing a draft convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

92. Slovakia, which had a strong interest in the activities of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, hoped that the Committee would complete its task in the near future and that all the proposed amendments to the existing legal instruments would take account of the economic realities in the States involved.

93. Slovakia greatly appreciated the Agency's role in helping to improve the safety of its WWERs and to strengthen the nuclear regulatory regime in Slovakia, both

through the Regular Budget and with the help of extrabudgetary resources. In return, his country would like to make its relevant facilities and expertise available to the Agency.

94. As regards Agency technical assistance, which was important for Slovakia, his delegation welcomed the new management approach reflected in the interregional projects on radiation protection and waste management infrastructures. In that connection, it was particularly pleased that the project co-ordinator's office had become operational in Slovakia. The Model Project for strengthening Slovakia's nuclear safety regulatory body had already had a significant impact, demonstrated by the fact that Slovakia was now sharing its experience with countries such as Armenia and Ukraine - a contribution to regional self-reliance.

95. His country had been meeting its Regular Budget assessments in full and paying its full TCF target shares, and it would like to see all Member States fulfilling their financial obligations vis-à-vis the Agency.

96. Mr. EL FADHEL KHALIL (Tunisia), having welcomed the approval of Moldova for membership of the Agency, said that Tunisia's commitment to international co-operation in all areas of concern to the Agency was evidenced by the fact that it had been one of the first States to join the Agency, had concluded an NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency, had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety and had been the first country to become an AFRA partner. Also, Tunisia was the host country of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, which was eager to intensify co-operation with its international counterpart in Vienna.

97. Tunisia was supporting the work on drafting a comprehensive legal instrument dealing with the management of radioactive waste in view of the need to improve the relevant legislative structures in many countries, including Tunisia, and to introduce effective international arrangements in that area.

98. His country attached great importance to technical co-operation in all fields of nuclear science and technology in view of the scope it provided for the development of local capacities in most areas of economic and social development. It therefore

greatly appreciated the initiatives aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Agency's technical co-operation activities at the country level. In particular, it welcomed the introduction of a Country Programme Framework for technical co-operation with Tunisia, where the Agency was also supporting a programme of screening for neonatal hypothyroidism.

99. His country, which would be hosting the next meeting of AFRA country co-ordinators, greatly appreciated the support for AFRA that was being provided by France, the United States and OPEC and would like to see other countries and organizations following their example.

100. Tunisia paid its contributions to the Regular Budget in full and discharged all its other financial obligations to the Agency, and it would shortly be paying its full share of the TCF target for 1997.

101. Many developing countries, including Tunisia, would be unable to meet their growing energy needs in the coming decades without resorting to nuclear power. Small and medium power reactors were well suited to the consumption requirements of small countries, and Tunisia had therefore been pleased to host a recent meeting of the Advisory Group on the Status and Introduction of Small and Medium Power Reactors in Developing Countries. He hoped that the Agency would continue to support the Group.

102. A feasibility study on the use of nuclear power plants for water desalination in North Africa had shown that such plants were appropriate for countries which, like Tunisia, had medium-size electricity grids. The work being done on small and medium power reactors was relevant in that connection also.

103. It was essential to strike a balance between spreading the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and protecting the international community from the dangers inherent in the use of nuclear facilities - hence the importance of comprehensive safeguards. While welcoming the efforts being made to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system, his country believed that three basic principles should be observed at all times: firstly, a balance must be maintained between support for

safeguards and respect for national sovereignty; secondly, strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system must not create an undue financial burden requiring an increase in contributions to the Regular Budget (the costs of Agency safeguards should be met by Member States in accordance with the scale of their nuclear activities); thirdly, all States must accept comprehensive Agency safeguards.

104. In resolution GC(XXV)/RES/389, the General Conference had, in 1981, called for an expansion of the Board of Governors so as to achieve more equitable representation for Africa and for the Middle East and South Asia. Such an expansion would not have an adverse impact on the Board's efficiency; in fact, it would stimulate dialogue and enrich the Board's proceedings. The General Conference should take appropriate action at its current session.

105. The extension of the NPT had been an encouraging development, and his country would like to see all States become NPT parties. Tunisia was pleased that the United Nations General Assembly had endorsed the principle of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing and trusted that a CTBT would be concluded in due course, to be followed eventually by complete nuclear disarmament.

106. The efforts being made to bring about peace in the Middle East would prosper more if all nuclear facilities and activities in the region were subject to safeguards designed to ensure that all nuclear weapons of mass destruction were removed. Because of its geographical situation, Tunisia was following developments in that connection very closely. As an African country, it had signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, but the proximity of Africa to the Middle East meant that the benefits of that treaty could not be fully enjoyed until the spectre of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East had been dispelled.

107. Mr. BØJER (Denmark) said that his country, which strongly endorsed the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted at the conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, regarded the indefinite extension of the NPT as a historic event demonstrating that nuclear non-proliferation was now a universally accepted principle.

108. The NPT Review and Extension Conference had agreed to strengthen the NPT review process. That decision meant that the Agency would shortly be asked whether it had strengthened the effectiveness of its safeguards and improved its capability for detecting undeclared nuclear activities. The strengthening of safeguards should therefore be a key priority of the Agency.

109. The progress made by the Board under Programme 93+2 was welcome, but many problems remained. In his statement, the Director General had referred to the balance between the advantages which Member States might gain from strengthened safeguards and the burdens which they might feel they were assuming. It was obvious to the Danish Government that such far-reaching and fundamental objectives as non-proliferation and international confidence-building justified considerable cost and effort. In fact, however, the burdens implied by Programme 93+2 would be quite modest.

110. It was a matter of concern to his country that many non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT had not yet concluded safeguards agreements pursuant to their treaty obligations. Although the States in question had no significant nuclear activities, it was important for the credibility of the NPT and the safeguards system that all States parties to the NPT complied with their obligations under Article III.

111. The experience with Iraq had demonstrated that trade in sensitive nuclear and dual-use items, if not properly monitored, could contribute to nuclear weapons programmes in countries which did not honour their non-proliferation obligations. Comprehensive export and supply controls were therefore vital to effective implementation of the international non-proliferation regime. In that connection it was encouraging to note the growing acceptance of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines for trade in nuclear-related goods and technology.

112. Nuclear safety was a question of vital importance to Denmark, whose decision in 1985 not to include the nuclear option in its energy planning had been based on safety concerns.

113. Satisfactory solutions had still not been found to the problems of nuclear safety and radioactive waste storage, and it was particularly regrettable that many nuclear power plants were operating at unacceptably low safety levels.

114. Denmark was strongly supporting the initiatives which the Agency had taken with a view to the creation of a stronger and more dynamic nuclear safety culture. The expert review and advisory services offered by the Agency were extremely important, not least in connection with the safety assistance being given to countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to various newly independent States. Such assistance was vital for upgrading the safety of nuclear power plants built to earlier standards. Denmark had contributed through programmes of the European Union, by making voluntary contributions to the EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account and by allocating funds to bilateral assistance programmes. It nevertheless continued to believe that the only responsible solution for certain reactors operating in Central and Eastern Europe and in newly independent States would be to close them down as soon as possible.

115. Denmark, which was supporting the efforts being made to develop legally binding agreements in the field of nuclear safety, hoped that the current negotiations on a convention on the safe management of radioactive waste would soon be finalized. Such a convention should be as comprehensive as possible, covering both civilian and military waste and the safety of spent fuel reprocessing facilities.

116. It was essential that all countries with nuclear installations be parties to an effective nuclear liability regime. The signing by the Russian Federation of the Vienna Convention, one of the fundamental legal instruments in the nuclear liability field, and Ukraine's decision to accede to it were therefore welcome.

117. Denmark was also supporting the efforts being made to strengthen the international nuclear liability regime through - inter alia - the conclusion of a supplementary funding convention providing for adequate levels of compensation. In that connection, it was pleased with the progress made in the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage and hoped that a diplomatic conference on international nuclear liability could be convened in 1997.

118. Denmark attached great importance to the Agency's technical co-operation activities and could accept a 1997 TCF target of US \$68 million. It had already pledged its full share of that target.

119. The increasing attention being paid to the representation of women in the Secretariat and the Director General's commitment to continue efforts to improve the situation were welcome. His delegation looked forward to hearing about further tangible results of those efforts at the General Conference's 1997 session.

120. Mr. GREGORIČ (Slovenia) said that the past year had witnessed a number of milestone events in the life of the international - not only the nuclear - community. The indefinite extension of the NPT had established the framework for dealing with nuclear non-proliferation, while the CTBT - just adopted by the General Assembly - confirmed the global nature of long-term common security interests. Slovenia hoped that all countries would accede to the CTBT, which was of far-reaching importance.

121. A significant step had also been made at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, which had reaffirmed the basic, internationally recognized principles relating to the safety of civilian nuclear reactors and nuclear waste management and should result in enhanced international collaboration in promoting high levels of nuclear safety worldwide. As regards the security of nuclear materials, the importance had been recognized of improving nuclear material accounting and control and strengthening physical protection systems. In addition, increased intergovernmental co-operation in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials had been advocated.

122. The opening for signature of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994 had been a major step towards the creation of a comprehensive and legally binding safety regime, and his Government welcomed the Convention's imminent entry into force; the Slovenian Parliament was in the final stage of ratifying the Convention. Successful implementation of the Convention would depend to a great extent on the establishment of an effective peer review mechanism based on comprehensive country reports.

123. His Government was satisfied with the progress made in drafting a convention on the safe management of radioactive waste and looked forward to the convening of a diplomatic conference in 1997 to adopt such a convention.

124. The international conference entitled "One decade after Chernobyl: Summing up the consequences of the accident", held in April 1996 and co-sponsored by the European Commission, WHO and the Agency, had not reached a scientific consensus on all the issues connected with the Chernobyl accident, but it had led to a general acknowledgement that the scope of the disaster went far beyond the boundaries of nuclear safety and radiation protection and encompassed extremely significant social and economic aspects.

125. Slovenia, which was supporting Programme 93+2, was pleased that the implementation of Part 1 measures was making good progress. Convinced that the Agency's safeguards system should be able to give credible assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities, it was ready to accept Part 2 measures as well.

126. As regards the physical protection of nuclear materials, Slovenia had invited the Secretariat to review its nuclear material accounting system and relevant physical protection standards in the light of current international guidelines.

127. Slovenia was a strong supporter of the Agency's programme relating to illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources, and it was one of the 30 countries which had so far provided points of contact for that programme.

128. Slovenia endorsed both the Agency's continuous presence in Iraq, the purpose of which was to confirm Iraq's compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions, and the Agency's role in verifying the compliance of the DPRK with its NPT safeguards agreement.

129. Recognizing the important role of the Agency in connection with efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, his country had welcomed the opening for signature of the South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in December 1995 and of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in April 1996.

It would like to see the Agency and all States in the Middle East doing their utmost to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone there as soon as possible.

130. His Government was pleased with the current efforts to make Agency technical co-operation more relevant through the launching of further Model Projects and regional projects and the introduction of more effective evaluation methods. Although the level of contributions to the TCF was below the levels achieved in the 1980s, it was encouraging to note that the financial situation in the technical co-operation area had improved. Slovenia was ready to assist more extensively in implementing Agency technical co-operation projects by making its facilities available for training courses, workshops and similar activities.

131. The Agency was still faced by financial problems, the best solution for which would be for all Member States to fulfil their financial obligations. At the same time, further consideration should be given to making the most effective use of the funds available. For its part, Slovenia was fulfilling its Regular Budget obligations promptly, contributing to the safeguards budget as an "unshielded" State and paying its share of successive TCF targets.

132. Substantial progress had been made with regard to international nuclear liability. Slovenia was pleased that further States had signed the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol and that the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage had adopted the text of a revised Vienna Convention. Regrettably, there had been no such progress as regards a supplementary funding convention, and his country would like all States participating in the work of the Committee to adopt a more flexible attitude on that issue.

133. Slovenia, which was looking forward to the forthcoming ASSET mission to the Krško NPP, would continue to support the activities of the Agency.

134. Mr. SURYOKUSUMO (Indonesia), after welcoming the approval of Moldova for Agency membership, said his delegation had noted with appreciation the emphasis which the Director General had placed in his statement earlier in the week on the need to continuously improve the efficiency of the Agency.

135. His country was confident that the indefinite extension of the NPT would strengthen the Agency's role within the international non-proliferation regime, the ultimate goal of which, however, should be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

136. His country believed that the South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which had been signed by the Heads of State or Government of all ten countries of the South East Asian region in December 1995, would strengthen peace and stability in that region. It hoped that the ten signatory States would ratify the Treaty before the Informal ASEAN Summit to be held in Indonesia in December and that the nuclear-weapon States would accede to the Treaty's Protocol.

137. Indonesia, which had ratified the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, considered that the Convention on Nuclear Safety also had an important role to play in strengthening public confidence in nuclear power generation. His Government, which was in the process of setting up an independent nuclear regulatory body, therefore welcomed the fact that the Convention was soon to enter into force and intended to ratify it in the near future.

138. His Government also welcomed the adoption of the CTBT by the United Nations General Assembly, but was concerned that it would take a long time to enter into force. Nevertheless, the adoption of the CTBT had demonstrated the determination of States to halt the nuclear arms race.

139. His delegation was following with great interest the progress of the negotiations on a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. With regard to illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, which posed significant threats from both the radiation safety and the non-proliferation point of view, it commended the initiatives and precautionary measures which the Agency had taken to date.

140. His delegation was also satisfied with the steps taken by the Department of Safeguards to improve the Agency's capability for detecting undeclared nuclear

activities. It welcomed the progress made in developing and testing alternative safeguards measures, such as environmental monitoring, and also the increased involvement of national systems of nuclear material accounting and control. Indonesia was ready to continue participating in the associated field trials.

141. As regards the Agency's technical co-operation activities, his delegation was confident that the shift towards technology transfer would not only enhance the security and safety of food supplies in developing countries, but also lead to improvements in health care and environmental protection.

142. Agency technical assistance had made a significant contribution to economic progress in Indonesia. Thanks to irradiation techniques, improved varieties of food crops had been developed, the latest being the Cilosari rice variety released in July 1996.

143. Another success had been the development of Urea Multinutrient Molasses Blocks (UMMB) through laboratory research involving tracer techniques. On the island of Java, the use of UMMB as supplementary feed had increased animal body weight and milk production to such an extent that farmers' overall incomes had increased by 600%. The National Atomic Energy Agency (BATAN) was now collaborating with the Ministry of Agriculture and other governmental departments in extending the programme in question to other regions. His Government was grateful to the Agency, and particularly the Department of Technical Co-operation, for the continued support provided.

144. His Government, which was pleased with the technology transfer achieved through the Agency, was also grateful to those donor countries which had funded footnote-a/ projects in Indonesia.

145. In the context of the Agency's support for nuclear power programmes in developing countries, he said that Indonesia greatly appreciated the assistance provided to BATAN by the Agency through its review of a feasibility study relating to proposals for the construction of a nuclear power plant - Indonesia's first - on the Muria Peninsula (Java) which had been carried out by groups of experts recruited by

the Agency and had focused on the acceptability of the selected site and the design basis parameters. His Government now looked forward to the Agency's providing advice on potential external events and environmental impacts.

146. Having benefited from RCA activities during the past 25 years, Indonesia regarded an extension of the RCA for a further five years as extremely important for its national development. It was proud of the fact that in 1994 the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit had awarded to a UNDP/RCA/Agency collaborative effort one of its best ever ratings for a project in the field of science and technology.

147. That success reflected the excellent performance of the RCA Co-ordinator and the keen interest and serious commitment of the participating Member States, scientists and project co-ordinators. Also, it testified to the maturity of the interrelationships among RCA member States, between the RCA and the Agency, and between the RCA and various regional and other international bodies. The maturing process, together with the changes in the priorities of various RCA member States and the Agency over the past 25 years, should be taken into account in the future implementation of the RCA, the aim being to maximize its usefulness and strengthen TCDC. His delegation therefore welcomed the decision taken by the RCA member States in Beijing in June to review the structure and management of RCA programmes and activities with a view to achieving further improvements.

148. In conclusion, he reiterated his Government's support for the Agency's efforts to promote international co-operation in the peaceful and safe utilization of nuclear science and technology, particularly in developing countries, and announced that Indonesia would continue to offer its facilities for the use of Agency fellows and to organize regional and/or interregional training courses at no cost to the Agency.

149. Mr. COLL (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)) said that it had been four years and nine months since ABACC's establishment and two and a half years since the entry into force of the Quadripartite Agreement between ABACC, Brazil, Argentina and the Agency.

150. In 1995, a total of 149 inspections had been carried out in Argentina and Brazil, accounting for 710 man-days in the field, while in 1996 there had been 96 inspections accounting for 374 man-days. In the same two years, 39 and 21 nuclear material samples had been taken, 498 and 165 containment seals had been applied and 518 and 364 accounting reports had been received from the two countries and processed through ABACC's database.

151. Under the Quadripartite Agreement, co-operation with the Agency had increased satisfactorily until the requisite level had been achieved. All Agency inspections were being co-ordinated with those of ABACC, and co-operation in the field between the two groups of inspectors had proved to be effective.

152. The Brazilian and Argentine facility attachments were being discussed with the respective national authorities, and the ABACC Secretariat was hopeful that the first of them would enter into force in the near future.

153. The progress made in preparing guidelines for the co-ordination of the two organizations' inspection activities was an excellent example of the good relationship between ABACC and the Agency. Those guidelines - reflecting the Agency's present safeguards system with the addition of Programme 93+2 Part 1 measures - would be of prime importance in enhancing future co-operation, and the underlying principles were already being applied by the inspectors in the field, particularly as regards the common use of equipment.

154. When ABACC's common system for nuclear material accountancy and control had gone into operation, in 1992, safeguards had been of the conventional type, limited to the materials and facilities declared by States. The strengthening of safeguards, under Programme 93+2, with a view to the detection of undeclared nuclear materials and facilities had changed the picture entirely. Despite the fact that the role of regional safeguards systems in that exercise had not yet been clearly defined, there was nothing to prevent ABACC from incorporating the concepts of Part 1 of Programme 93+2 into its future activities. ABACC had replied in that vein when responding to an Agency questionnaire about regional systems, information handling

and the use of advanced techniques like remote sensing and environmental monitoring. Co-operation between ABACC and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) in developing and applying such techniques had been most fruitful. ABACC was now participating in a DOE-sponsored international remote sensing programme and had at its headquarters a data reception system linked to the Embalse NPP in Argentina.

155. With regard to Part 2 of Programme 93+2, ABACC had been invited to participate as an observer in the meetings of the Board's Committee 24 and hoped to play an active role there.

156. Regional safeguards could play an important part in the Agency's future safeguards system, as mutual monitoring by neighbouring countries was the best guarantee of confidence in a region. Since there were still very few regional safeguards systems, ABACC was ready to make its experience available to any interested States.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.