



GC

GC(43)/OR.5
November 1999
GENERAL Distr.

International Atomic Energy Agency

GENERAL CONFERENCE

Original: ENGLISH

FORTY-THIRD (1999) REGULAR SESSION

RECORD OF THE FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna
on Wednesday, 29 September 1999, at 10.00 a.m.

President: Mr. KADRI (Algeria)
Later: Mr. DUBOIS (Canada)
Mr. RYZHOV (Russian Federation)

CONTENTS

<u>Item of the agenda*</u>		<u>Paragraphs</u>
7	General debate and Annual Report for 1998 (continued)	1 - 87
	Statements by the delegates of:	
	United Republic of Tanzania	1 - 8
	Kazakhstan	9 - 12
	Sudan	13 - 19
	Holy See	20 - 22
	Cuba	23 - 29
	Ireland	30 - 34
	Syrian Arab Republic	35 - 38
	Argentina	39 - 45
	Kenya	46 - 53
	Hungary	54 - 59
	Malaysia	60 - 64
	Canada	65 - 70
	Peru	71 - 76
	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	77 - 84
	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean	85 - 87

[*] GC(43)/27.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(43)/INF/15/Rev.3.

For reasons of economy, this document has been printed in a limited number.
Delegates are kindly requested to bring their own copies of documents to meetings.

Abbreviations used in this record

AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
Chemical Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
IPF	Indicative Planning Figure
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
MESA	Middle East and South Asia
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
Quadripartite Agreement	Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SEAP	South East Asia and the Pacific
SIT	Sterile insect technique
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
Trilateral Initiative	Trilateral Initiative launched by the Minister of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, the Secretary of Energy of the United States and the Agency's Director General on 17 September 1996 to consider practical measures for the application of IAEA verification to fissile material originating from nuclear weapons
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
Y2K	Year 2000

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1998 (continued)
(GC(43)/4)

1. Mr. MTELEKA (United Republic of Tanzania) appealed to all delegates to act upon the guidance provided by the United Nations Secretary-General in his message, in which he had outlined strategies for increasing the peaceful applications of nuclear techniques, and for controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. The speed and scale of the changes in the political and economic complexion of the world would have a profound long-term impact on all countries. Countries were increasingly being affected by events which could only be managed globally by making increased use of science and technology and by engaging in close international co-operation. Further development of basic sciences was necessary to address the fundamental needs of humanity, particularly those that were necessary for sustainable development. However, the most effective science and technologies would never be able to solve society's major problems and could create new ones, if they did not take human values into account.

3. As one of the least developed countries, Tanzania greatly appreciated the Agency's technical assistance, which enabled it to acquire, adopt and adapt nuclear techniques that would fuel social and economic development by reducing poverty, disease and famine. The Agency had provided support in various areas such as agriculture, health, water resources and industry.

4. The success of the Zanzibar tsetse fly eradication project had led to a rapid growth in economic activity and improvements in agriculture and livestock production and Tanzania was greatly indebted to Member States such as Belgium, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, China, the United States of America and the agencies which had contributed extrabudgetary funds so generously to that project. It welcomed the introduction of similar projects on the Tanzanian mainland. The tsetse fly, which infested approximately one half of the non-desert area of the continent, represented the main obstacle to increasing agricultural and animal production in Africa. Following the successes achieved with the SIT, every effort should be made to eradicate the tsetse fly from Africa and to make the technique more cost-effective and better able to deal with the various species of tsetse fly. He was pleased that large-scale projects for the eradication of tsetse flies were being implemented in other countries such as Ethiopia. All Member States and agencies with a mandate to increase food production should unite in combatting the tsetse fly as they had done in the case of the screw worm and fruit fly.

5. He commended the Agency's increased efforts to promote regional co-operation and collaborative ventures and welcomed the increased funding for regional programmes such as AFRA, ARCAL and RCA. However, increased allocation of resources to regional programmes left individual Member States with decreasing funds to build the infrastructure needed to make the most of nuclear technology. Since the appropriate infrastructure was a prerequisite for participation in regional projects, the least developed Member States, which generally had inadequate or no infrastructure, would receive increasingly fewer resources to

enable them to build the necessary infrastructure. The Agency should make every effort to resolve that problem.

6. Technical assistance had to be funded from predictable and assured sources and the fact that the Informal Working Group on the Financing of Technical Assistance had urged all Member States in its report to the Board to pay their assessed programme costs did not in itself make the TCF any more predictable and assured. Despite the strong political commitment associated with the TCF, pledges were low. The matter needed to be reconsidered, since it seemed likely that the recommendations of the Informal Working Group would be ineffective.

7. Radiation protection and safety, and the related problems of the dumping of radioactive waste and illicit trafficking, were causes for concern. Tanzania was closely following the measures being taken, including the conclusion of various conventions to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear, radiation and waste safety and welcomed the assistance given to Member States in taking remedial action. Member States should continue their co-operation through the Agency to ensure maximum nuclear, radiation and waste safety.

8. Despite the fact that the NPT had been in existence for thirty years, nuclear-weapon States continued to believe that they had a right to a monopoly in the possession, development and, by implication, use of nuclear weapons. The reluctance of those States to commit themselves to disarmament and the delay in the entry into force of the CTBT were very regrettable and could, if fuelled by regional conflict, lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

9. Mr. SHKOLHIK (Kazakhstan) said that his country, which was fully committed to further strengthening the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime, was taking an active part in the implementation of the CTBT and actively supported the Agency's efforts to strengthen the safeguards system. It welcomed the international community's efforts to prevent the spread of military nuclear technology and the continuing co-operation between the nuclear Powers, particularly between the Russian Federation and the United States, to broaden the scope of the application of safeguards to their nuclear activities and the nuclear material under their jurisdiction. For its part, Kazakhstan was currently completing the preparations for the signature of an Additional Protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

10. Kazakhstan attached great importance to the measures to stop illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radiation sources; it had adopted the Agency's requirements in that field as standards for its own nuclear export and import policy and was taking steps to improve co-ordination between the State export control and law enforcement authorities.

11. In the area of nuclear safety, Kazakhstan was preparing to ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It appreciated the Agency's role as co-ordinator of the international support programme for the decommissioning of the BN-350 reactor at the Mangyshlak atomic energy complex. Kazakhstan had begun to develop up-to-date legislation in the field of radiation safety and waste management, and was planning to establish the appropriate infrastructure. It

therefore supported the Agency's regional project aimed at solving such problems by the beginning of the twenty-first century.

12. Turning to technical co-operation, he expressed his country's appreciation for the Agency's projects involving the use of nuclear and isotopic techniques in various fields such as industry, agriculture, medicine and hydrology, and hoped that such co-operation would be expanded, despite the fact that its current financial difficulties prevented it from fulfilling its financial obligations. It was very grateful to the Agency for its understanding in that regard, and would make every effort to settle its debts in the near future.

13. Mr. OMER (Sudan), expressing appreciation for the technical co-operation provided by the Agency, said that Sudan was participating in various national and regional projects in different areas, including the control of human and animal diseases, improvements in agricultural production, and water resources management. He welcomed the fact that the implementation rate for the Agency's technical co-operation projects with Sudan had reached 95% in 1998.

14. Under the Model Project entitled "Upgrading Radiation Protection Infrastructure", Sudan had been able to complete the major part of the action plan for 1997-1999. The legal framework had been established, as well as regulations for licensing and waste management. In addition, an extensive inventory of radiation sources had been made. National training and seminars had been provided for groups of radiation workers and the relevant institutions.

15. Electricity shortages remained the fundamental obstacle to development and Sudan's energy authorities were focusing attention on improving the stability of electricity supply. In that context, the project with the Agency entitled "Energy Economics and Power Planning" had been very useful.

16. In the field of medicine, a second centre for the treatment of cancer had been opened in April on the occasion of the visit of the Deputy Director General for Technical Co-operation. That visit had had a major impact on the promotion and implementation of technical co-operation projects in Sudan and the visit had also resulted in the development of the Country Programme Framework for technical co-operation with the Agency for the years 2000-2005. The new programme focused on food security through the improvement of crop production; improvements in animal productivity to meet the national demand; the greater use of nuclear techniques for water resources management; and improved training in various areas.

17. While Sudan appreciated the support provided for AFRA projects, it looked forward to greater contributions from donor countries for such projects. In the light of the success achieved at national and regional level and the growing needs of developing countries, Sudan was concerned at the decrease in the resources being made available for technical co-operation. For its part, Sudan had fulfilled its responsibilities towards both the Agency's Regular Budget and the TCF by paying its arrears for previous years. It called upon all Member States to pay their contributions to the Agency in order to provide the necessary financial resources for the technical co-operation programme.

18. Turning to the amendment of Article VI, he welcomed the proposed expansion of the Board in response to the legitimate demands of developing Member States to have fair representation within the Board and to be able to participate actively in the Board's decision-making process. He appealed to all delegations to show wisdom and flexibility in finding a solution to that long-standing issue.

19. Since its inception, the Agency had made every effort to establish an effective universal regime prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For its part, Sudan had acceded to the NPT and was making the necessary arrangements to ratify an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the Agency. As a signatory of the Pelindaba Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, Sudan was eager for a similar zone to be established in the Middle East. In that regard, it was dismayed at Israel's continuing refusal to accede to the NPT and submit its nuclear installations to Agency safeguards. Israel thus represented a serious nuclear threat to all States of the region and beyond. It was regrettable that the recommendations made by the Agency's General Conference and the various General Assembly and Security Council resolutions had not achieved any positive results. The establishment of peace in the region required the application of comprehensive safeguards to all States without exception. Sudan was naturally ready to collaborate fully with the Agency in that effort and in other areas of concern such as illegal trafficking in nuclear materials and radiation sources, as well as problems in the area of nuclear safety.

20. Mr. RÉZEAU (Holy See) said that security and safeguards in the nuclear field were preconditions for the peaceful world to which all aspired. Even though for the time being a nuclear conflict seemed remote, illicit trafficking in nuclear material could pave the way for clandestine activities. The full and proper implementation of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols by all countries would reduce fear and anxiety about a nuclear threat, promote trust and confidence and eventually lead to worldwide nuclear disarmament. For its part, the Holy See had signed and ratified the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement.

21. Another area of major concern was the shortage of potable water. It had been estimated that by the middle of the next century less than 50% of the world population would have full access to potable water. The Holy See welcomed all efforts and initiatives by the Agency and its Member States to solve the problem of fresh water shortages and fully supported the draft resolution submitted to the General Conference by India on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. The matter was particularly urgent in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The use of isotope hydrology in the search for untapped water resources and the use of nuclear technology for the production of potable water through the desalination of sea water appeared to be feasible ways of alleviating the problem. A solution to the worldwide demand for potable water was a precondition for sustainable development and the urgency of finding such a solution should not be underestimated.

22. The Agency's technical co-operation activities, aimed at environmentally friendly results and at keeping the natural ecological balance intact, made a very effective contribution to the process of sustainable development. The noted progress achieved through the introduction of Model Projects might eventually lead to what Pope John Paul II had meant by

“human ecology” - another precondition for sustainable development - meaning the balance within various social groups, including the family, the community and civil society. The Agency’s contribution to peace, health and prosperity might also be seen from the same standpoint.

23. Mr. CARRERA DORAL (Cuba) said that it was imperative that nuclear energy play its part in the twenty-first century to guarantee a secure future for following generations. Nuclear energy was a safe, technically feasible and economically viable alternative for meeting the energy needs of developing countries. Cuba, whose nuclear programme was completely peaceful and transparent, had the necessary technical potential, regulatory infrastructure and conditions for the safe use of nuclear technology for development.

24. However, for almost four decades there had been a relentless economic, political and financial blockade against Cuba which had prevented technology transfer to the country. The United States Helms-Burton Act of 1996 stated that “... the completion and operation of any nuclear power facility [in Cuba] ... will be considered an act of aggression [against the United States] which will be met with an appropriate response in order to maintain the security of the national borders of the United States ...”. It was clear that the free transfer of nuclear technology and Cuba’s own national security depended not on the signing of any multilateral agreement or treaty, but on the ending of the United States systematic policy of embargo, aggression, and hostility.

25. The current non-proliferation regime was discriminatory and there was a need for total nuclear disarmament. His Government was ready to move towards an efficient, effective and strengthened safeguards system based on a fair, equitable and universal non-proliferation regime which would bring about the immediate, total and unconditional elimination of nuclear weapons. In spite of the difficulties to which it had been subjected, the Cuban Government had taken specific steps in that direction.

26. Cuba was the first country with an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement that had voluntarily offered to sign an Additional Protocol and it would be signed during the Director General’s visit to Cuba in October.

27. He appreciated the Secretariat’s measures to strengthen technical co-operation in line with the General Conference’s many resolutions on that subject. However, the design and implementation of an effective and integral programme to strengthen technical co-operation should deal not only with improvements in organization, but also with the availability of financial resources to enable the genuine transfer of technology required by developing countries. Those countries which, for historical reasons, had reached a high level of development had the greatest responsibility to help provide genuine technology transfer that was unconditionally and universally accessible.

28. Cuba was very grateful for the support received under its technical co-operation programme with the Agency, which had achieved excellent results in human health, agriculture, industry and other areas. Cuba also continued to participate actively in various technical co-operation projects among developing countries in Latin America and the

Caribbean. Noting that the very successful ARCAL Programme had established priorities for regional co-operation and provided the basis for projects to solve problems of common interest using national capacities and infrastructures, he said that he would like the Agency to step up its contribution to the Programme.

29. Finally, he recalled that Cuba had always stressed the need to work together to democratize the United Nations system and had supported the efforts to reach a decision on the expansion of the Board of Governors. It therefore welcomed the fact that Member States had been brought close to a solution to the amendment of Article VI of the Agency's Statute.

Mr. Dubois (Canada) took the Chair.

30. Ms. DORAN (Ireland) welcomed the contribution that the Agency made to enhancing nuclear safety culture worldwide. Ireland had participated in the first review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and looked forward to the next meeting and to the review process that would take place under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

31. Ireland was one of an increasing number of countries, particularly in Europe, that had rejected the nuclear power option as it believed that the risks of a major nuclear accident outweighed the alleged benefits of nuclear power. Furthermore, the genuine public concern about the environmental impact of radioactive waste management and the disposal of spent fuel had led her Government to the firm conclusion that the case for nuclear power was unsound. One of the main concerns of successive Irish Governments had been the potential risk to the Irish population from the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom and, in particular, from the Sellafield plant, where spent fuel was being reprocessed and high-level radioactive waste was being stored on site. Ireland was totally opposed to the proposed expansion of operations at Sellafield and continued to urge that reprocessing and all forms of nuclear energy production at the Sellafield site should cease.

32. The continuation of radioactive discharges from Sellafield into the Irish Sea was unacceptable, and Ireland welcomed the strategy adopted by the Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, committing all the Contracting Parties to that Convention to reducing radioactive discharges into the marine environment to almost zero by the year 2020. In the light of its concerns, Ireland would be making every effort to ensure that the strategy was implemented fully within the time frame provided for.

33. Ireland shared the view that the nuclear non-proliferation regime enshrined in the NPT was the foundation for international efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the essential basis for nuclear disarmament. The universal application of strengthened safeguards and the effective verification of compliance with agreements to eliminate existing nuclear arsenals would increase confidence that a world free from nuclear weapons could be achieved. The Agency should continue to explore the elements of a system of verification

arrangements necessary to maintain a world free from nuclear weapons, as it had been requested to do in United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/53/77Y.

34. Lastly, noting that the Y2K computer problem was a matter of concern given its possible implications for nuclear safety, she welcomed the numerous initiatives undertaken by the Agency to promote Y2K preparedness and to establish an action plan to address the problem.

35. Mr OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic) drew attention to the increasing dangers faced by the Middle East as a result of Israel's nuclear capabilities, which posed a threat not only to regional, but also to international peace and security. Although Syria had reiterated its willingness to resume the peace negotiations with Israel at the point at which they had stopped, Israel had refused to do so and had taken no steps to encourage a resumption of the peace process. It continued to build settlements, to expel people and to enhance its arsenal of weapons. The imbalance of power in the region and the special treatment accorded to one State was one of the main causes of instability in the region. While all Arab States had acceded to the NPT and placed their nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards, the necessary international political will was lacking to exert pressure on Israel to make it follow suit. Since international disarmament was one of the main goals enshrined in the Agency's Statute, the Agency should take resolute steps to deal with the issue. He called on Israel to honour the provisions of the various General Conference resolutions that had been passed and, in particular, Security Council resolution 487 which called on it to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards.

36. Turning to the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, he recalled that for the past five years the General Conference resolution on that issue had been adopted by consensus. Syria had not opposed that consensus although the resolution did not respond to its demands because Israel had not been explicitly asked to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. The General Conference should call on Israel to do so because such a move would be a confidence-building measure leading to peace in the Middle East and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

37. Repeated General Conference resolutions and Board decisions had called for an amendment of Article VI to expand the Board to ensure equitable representation of the area groups and an increase in the number of seats for Africa and MESA. However, the proposed link between the expansion of the Board and the composition of area groups was unacceptable because all members of a group had to be able to work together and the current tensions in the Middle East precluded any possibility of Arab States working together in the same group as Israel.

38. Syria welcomed the improved technical co-operation implementation rate, but regretted that West Asia had been the area with the lowest percentage of actual delivery in 1998. The increase in the number of Model Projects was a positive development and the Model Project on upgrading the radiation protection infrastructure had been particularly useful. Syria was also grateful to the Agency for organizing, together with the Syrian Atomic Energy Agency, a basic professional training course on radiation protection to be held in Arabic in October and

November in Damascus. Lastly, he noted that the reduction in the resources allocated to the TCF was a source of concern to many Member States and called on all countries, particularly the major donors, to fulfil their obligations so that the Agency could carry out its statutory responsibilities.

39. Mr. KRECKLER (Argentina) said that the Agency should attach the highest priority to genuine integration rather than summation of safeguards measures. Argentina continued to participate fully in the Agency's activities aimed at strengthening and integrating the international safeguards system, and regarded the development of technology for remote monitoring and environmental sampling as particularly important. He recalled that Argentina and Brazil had recently announced their readiness to begin negotiations with the Secretariat with a view to concluding an Additional Protocol to the Quadripartite Agreement.

40. In keeping with the importance it attached to achieving and maintaining the highest nuclear safety levels worldwide, Argentina had taken an active role in the first review meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. If the review process continued to prove as positive as that initial exercise, it would be a further boost to the strengthening of nuclear safety worldwide. The other aspects of safety to which due attention should be paid were the transport of radioactive materials and the safety of radiation sources.

41. Turning to the achievements in his country over the previous year, he said that the principal event had been the completion of the basic engineering for the CAREM 25 MW(e) reactor, specifically designed to supply electricity in isolated regions or for small distribution networks, and possibly to be coupled to a seawater desalination system, as indicated in document GC(43)/20. The second notable achievement was the development of a new generation of membranes for Argentina's gas diffusion uranium enrichment plant, bringing both technical and economic improvements. Thirdly, a new reactor fuel had been developed which could be used at the Atucha and Embalse nuclear power plants, both of which were operating smoothly and had recorded high availability factors.

42. In addition, the National Atomic Energy Commission had launched an ambitious programme intended to increase national production of cobalt-60 sources, which would also be exported, and hoped to increase production of fissionable molybdenum-99 for medical applications.

43. The independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority had continued to discharge its responsibilities satisfactorily in the areas of radiation protection, nuclear safety, non-proliferation and physical protection, and had established a regional office in the south of the country in order to ensure a permanent presence in areas of concentrated nuclear activity.

44. Argentina continued to play a full part in furthering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the context of multilateral and bilateral co-operation. In conjunction with the Agency, Argentina had continued to host courses, workshops and scientific meetings, to train Agency fellows, to receive scientists from other countries, and to make experts and lecturers available to the Agency. Argentina had recently signed a new co-operation agreement with Romania.

At the regional level, it welcomed the new ARCAL Agreement, which it had ratified during the previous year, as a very useful multilateral mechanism.

45. Turning to the matter of the Board's expansion, he noted the significant progress which had been made and expressed the hope that an arrangement would be reached which ensured equitable representation for all regions, without impairing the level of representation of any region in particular. In conclusion, he stressed that the Board should continue to conduct its considerations efficiently, with particular emphasis on the Agency's statutory functions.

46. Mr. RANA (Kenya) welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to develop a technical co-operation programme that responded more effectively to the priorities of Member States and urged it to redouble its efforts in that area. His Government was committed to further enhancing the understanding of the benefits of nuclear energy and its applications among the general population in Kenya with a view to promoting public co-operation and support for technical assistance programmes.

47. Under the current technical co-operation programme, there had been notable progress in the project on the early diagnosis and treatment of cervical cancer, which would greatly enhance the level of national health care. Further technical assistance in developing nuclear medicine and oncology, particularly at the infrastructure level, would be greatly appreciated.

48. Kenya was grateful for the assistance provided in the area of water resources management and looked forward to the Agency's continued efforts to increase the use of isotope techniques to control groundwater and surface water pollution.

49. With a view to increasing food security, Kenya was using nuclear technology to develop drought-resistant wheat varieties, to improve livestock production and to develop biofertilizers, particularly for small-scale farmers, under the AFRA programme. Consultations had also been held with the Agency over the past six months on tsetse fly eradication in the Lambwe Valley and other tsetse-infested areas.

50. The existence of nuclear weapons continued to pose grave threats to international security and the Agency's active role in eliminating those threats, through its safeguards system, was crucial. His Government supported the strengthened safeguards measures, which it believed should be implemented with due regard for the requirements of national sovereignty.

51. Turning to safety issues, he said that public confidence in nuclear technology depended on its safety. The Agency had played an important role in facilitating the negotiation of several important international safety conventions that prescribed the basic legal norms for the safe use of nuclear energy, internationally accepted safety standards and measures to assist Member States in the implementation of those standards.

52. With regard to illicit trafficking, Kenya greatly appreciated the effective measures taken by the Agency to improve the security of nuclear material. Major challenges nevertheless remained and the Agency should strengthen the effectiveness of international and national

efforts for the prevention and detection of illicit trafficking with a view to its global eradication.

53. On the question of staffing, the Secretariat should continue its efforts to increase the proportion of women in the Professional category in the Agency until a proper gender balance was achieved. Women should therefore be encouraged to take advantage of the current mood of Member States to make the Agency an international example of an equal opportunity employer. In addition, the recruitment of qualified candidates from developing Member States should be given special consideration.

Mr. Ryzhov (Russian Federation) took the Chair.

54. Mr. RÓNÁKY (Hungary) welcomed the Agency's efforts to conclude Additional Protocols with Member States. Hungary was one of 45 States that had signed an Additional Protocol, and work was already in progress to elaborate national regulations for its implementation. It hoped that a comprehensive, integrated safeguards system could be put in place at an early date and would co-operate with the Agency in tackling any problems that might arise in connection with such a system. As to the Agency's efforts to fulfil its mandate in Iraq and to implement safeguards in the DPRK, he urged those countries to co-operate fully with the Agency.

55. Turning to illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, he said that Hungary appreciated the technical and financial assistance provided by the Agency to improve its central registry of radioactive materials. Nuclear and radioactive materials in Hungary were subject to regulatory control and the national radiation protection regulations met international standards.

56. With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Hungary, he said that the periodic safety report for the first and second units of the Paks nuclear power plant had been completed in 1997 and the report on the third and fourth units would be completed by the end of the year. The implementation of the most important corrective actions was a prerequisite for the operating licence granted for the first and second units until 2008, and various safety improvements were being carried out. Hungary looked forward to the IRRRT mission to review the performance of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority, and had already decided to invite the Agency to organize an OSART mission to give further assistance in the upgrading of the operational safety of the Paks nuclear power plant. His country had also paid special attention to the Y2K issue and was convinced that the safe operation of the units would not be jeopardized.

57. As a result of collective efforts and the assistance made available to improve the safety of reactors of Soviet design, nuclear safety in Eastern Europe had improved significantly. However, ultimate responsibility remained at the national level, and major upgrading programmes could not be financed from foreign assistance. Although external assistance was not a prerequisite for the completion of the safety upgrading programmes already in progress in Hungary, his country would require further assistance in the fields of human health, agriculture, education and training. The countries of Eastern Europe were committed to

working together to solve common problems of a regional nature and the Agency had created an excellent framework for fostering such co-operation.

58. The review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and the International Conference on the Strengthening of Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe had confirmed the importance of collective knowledge, openness and international co-operation in the area of nuclear safety, and had provided an excellent opportunity for countries to provide a detailed picture of their nuclear-related activities.

59. Hungary had recently been the venue for several important international events in the nuclear field, including the international nuclear emergency preparedness exercise, the World Conference on Science, and the International Symposium on the Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability, which he hoped had promoted greater public understanding of the benefits of nuclear energy and increased public confidence.

60. Mr. HASHIM (Malaysia) said that the Agency's professionalism in nuclear material safeguards and arms control verification should serve as a model for other multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies, particularly those under the auspices of the United Nations, and might also serve as a basis for the development of an appropriate verification system for a fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

61. The nuclear-weapon States and other States which had played a role in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, by, for example, providing test sites or allowing such weapons to be stationed on their territory, had a special responsibility for financing the Agency's nuclear arms control verification activities in view of the power and privileges they had long enjoyed through their possession of nuclear weapons. States which had never contributed to the development or deployment of such weapons and had unequivocally renounced them should not be burdened with the financial responsibility for their dismantling or verification. The NPT, the CTBT, and the fissile material cut-off treaty that was being negotiated were critical elements in the evolving global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

62. While safeguards implementation was an important aspect of the Agency's work, equal consideration and weight should be given to its other statutory roles, in particular technical co-operation. The Agency's technical co-operation programme was a valuable and significant confidence-building measure for promoting greater transparency in national nuclear programmes and, in turn, for helping to deter the misuse of nuclear technology and the diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes. Although it was encouraging to see that the pledges made by Member States to the TCF in 1998 had been at a record level, the decline in the potential resources of the TCF, the gap between the target and the actual level of contributions, the declining share of footnote-a/ projects, and the lack of agreement on the IPFs for 2001-2002, as well as on the recommended target figures for 2003-2004, were causes for serious concern. For its part, Malaysia would continue to honour its financial commitments to the Agency, including its obligations with respect to the TCF and its assessed programme costs. It would also continue to co-operate with the Agency to assist other

Member States in the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. National nuclear technology programmes could not be developed in isolation and the development of stronger links between developing Member States through the Agency's TCDC mechanism should be encouraged.

63. With regard to Article VI of the Statute, Malaysia strongly supported an expansion of the Board of Governors, provided that the representation of the developing Member States was thereby improved and the distribution of the additional seats was acceptable to all area groups, including SEAP. Although he appreciated the argument that those Member States with active nuclear power programmes and capabilities had more legitimate claims to seats on the Board, he pointed out that the Chernobyl accident had demonstrated that nuclear accidents were transboundary in nature. The issues of nuclear safety and non-proliferation were unquestionably of global concern and interest. Transit and littoral States should have as much say with regard to the transport of nuclear materials as those which owned, used, processed or shipped such materials. The fact of being a signatory to a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty, as well as to the NPT, should also be a valid consideration for the purposes of representation on the Board.

64. Finally, he welcomed the management reform and modernization methods initiated by the Director General to ensure better planning, implementation and evaluation of the Agency's programme activities, including the one-house concept.

65. Mr. DUBOIS (Canada) highlighted the importance of the Agency's three main strategic objectives: safeguards, safety and assistance to Member States in connection with the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Canada was a strong supporter of effective measures to promote the harmonization and co-ordination of the Agency's programmes and resources in line with the established priorities which themselves reflected the needs of Member States, and noted that it was necessary to promote a balanced understanding of the benefits and potential of nuclear energy, particularly at a time when urgent demands were being made concerning climate change and sustainable development.

66. The budget was a fundamental issue for his country. Canada advocated nominal zero growth for the budgets of all international organizations although budgetary restrictions were not an end in themselves. Even with strict rationalization of resources, it was still possible to implement activities more effectively and efficiently without adversely affecting them.

67. During what had been a difficult year, the Agency's technical co-operation activities had achieved a number of good results: an increase in the implementation rate, a record payment of assessed programme costs and an increase in contributions to the TCF. Canada fully supported all initiatives to improve that programme, such as strengthening interaction and co-operation among recipient countries, and the efforts to make sure that projects contributed to the objectives of sustainable development. The success of that programme required commitment and discipline both from the Agency and recipient countries. Canada looked forward to further progress in establishing a management strategy geared towards results, particularly in the development of performance indicators.

68. An excellent way of marking the 2000 NPT Review Conference would be to achieve significant advances in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Canada continued to be concerned about the nuclear tests conducted the previous year in India and Pakistan, and it called on those two countries and all other States that had not yet done so, particularly those which operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the NPT at the earliest date. Crucial to halting nuclear weapons proliferation would be reductions by the nuclear-weapon States of their strategic and tactical nuclear weapons inventories and the devaluation of the political significance ascribed to such weapons. As for non-nuclear-weapon States, they should place all their nuclear activities under Agency safeguards.

69. After the significant developments in activities to strengthen and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards, the Agency now needed to fulfil the promise of the Model Additional Protocol. A high priority for Canada was the preparation, development and implementation of integrated safeguards. An integrated safeguards approach at State level would enable the Agency to reduce safeguards implementation costs while increasing effectiveness. The Agency needed to move away from the current rigidly structured criteria towards criteria specific to integrated safeguards, thus adopting more qualitative and less quantitative approaches. He called on all States to conclude Additional Protocols by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Physical protection of nuclear material and facilities was also an integral part of effective nuclear non-proliferation, and he supported the decision to convene an informal open-ended meeting of experts to discuss whether there was a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

70. The Agency's programmes needed to be refocused and rationalized to address the new priorities in the area of nuclear safety and in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. There was a need for more effective communication about the benefits and challenges of nuclear power and the Agency could play an important role in assisting Member States and in providing a credible and balanced perspective on nuclear power to the international community. The Agency should work closely with other international organizations to ensure that nuclear power's vital role in addressing the challenges of climate change and sustainable development was fully recognized.

71. Mr. CHAUNY de PORTURAS-HOYLE (Peru) reaffirmed his country's faith in the Agency's scientific credibility and technical competence. The Agency had an important role to play as an international centre of co-operation for sustainable development and was a valuable instrument for the strengthening of international security.

72. During the past year, Peru had continued to take steps to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It had participated actively in national and regional technical co-operation projects and had improved its control of radiation sources and their users. Among the various projects that were being implemented, the bilateral project with Chile on the eradication of the medfly and the project with Bolivia on the study of Lake Titicaca were particularly noteworthy. Other projects involved the strengthening of the research reactor infrastructure, laboratory automation, irradiation of food and medical products, enhancing nuclear safety, selection of improved native crops and improvements in the area of animal health and reproduction. Since the previous General Conference, 39 expert missions had been

conducted and 88 professionals and technicians had received different types of training. Peru had co-operated with the Agency in the organization of 8 international meetings, 5 of which had been under the ARCAL Programme. Participation in the ARCAL Programme had, inter alia, helped to improve nuclear instrumentation maintenance, quality assurance in analytical laboratories, radiotherapy practices, and aquifer characterization for sustainable management. Peru was particularly grateful to the Agency and the United States Government for the supply of X-ray fluorescent equipment under the project to improve brachytherapy services. It also appreciated the French Government's announcement of its intention to finance the implementation of the project on nuclear techniques in mining and industry.

73. In the area of nuclear, radiation and waste safety, Peru, as one of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, had participated in the first review meeting and had presented its national report on measures taken to comply with its obligations under the Convention. Peru had almost completed the procedures for legislative approval of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. In the field of environmental monitoring, work had continued on the development of techniques to evaluate and mitigate the adverse effects of ionizing radiation. An emergency response programme had been established and advice was being provided to national users of ionizing radiation.

74. Despite those efforts, an accident involving a radiation source used for industrial applications had occurred, resulting in the exposure of a worker at a hydroelectric power plant construction company. The Agency and the French Government had provided invaluable assistance in evaluating the patient in Lima and then providing highly specialized treatment in France.

75. Turning to safeguards, he said that the preparatory steps at national level for the conclusion of an Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement between Peru and the Agency had been completed.

76. Lastly, he noted that the Director General's visit to Peru in October would constitute a milestone in the relations between Peru and the Agency and was an example of his efforts to seek not only closer contacts with civil society and non-governmental organizations, but also direct contacts with Governments, with a view to promoting awareness of the Agency's work.

77. Mr. HUANG Yu (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) said that the Chemical Weapons Convention, adopted in 1992, aimed to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction in a time-bound framework under international supervision. States Parties to the Convention had made a commitment not to develop, produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons. Under a comprehensive verification regime, they had agreed to make declarations related both to military activities and to the production, processing and consumption of certain "dual use" chemicals which also had peaceful uses in the civilian chemical industry. The declarations were backed by routine inspections, short-notice challenge inspections and investigations of any alleged use of chemical weapons. The

Convention applied equally to all its States Parties whether or not they possessed chemical weapons or had an advanced chemical industry. States Parties were obliged to declare the possession of riot control agents, to reaffirm the undertaking in other international instruments not to use herbicides as a method of warfare, and to destroy all chemical weapons which they might have abandoned on the territory of any other State Party. The obligations were offset by provisions on peaceful economic and technological development in the field of chemistry.

78. There were 126 States Parties to the Convention, which had entered into force in April 1997, and a further 44 States had signed the Convention but had yet to deposit their instruments of ratification. The world's largest known chemical weapons or stockpiles had already come within the purview of the Convention.

79. The OPCW had already received declarations from the majority of States Parties and had embarked on its enormous verification task: 540 inspections had already been carried out in 30 Member States, involving approximately 60% of the Organisation's staff; inspection teams had witnessed the destruction of some 3000 tonnes of chemical weapons agents and over 700 000 munitions and containers related to such weapons. A very successful mission had been undertaken in Baghdad, under the aegis of the United Nations, to close down the UNSCOM chemical laboratory.

80. Despite its achievements, the OPCW knew that there was little room for complacency. A number of Member States still had to submit their initial declarations and some declarations which had been submitted were incomplete. The Russian Federation, which had the world's largest declared quantity of chemical weapons, amounting to some 40 000 tonnes, faced economic difficulties in fulfilling its obligations in respect of the timely destruction of its chemical weapons and related facilities.

81. In addition to immense potential benefits to Member States, such as enhancement of security and access to chemicals and equipment for the development of chemistry for peaceful purposes, the Convention contained provisions for trade sanctions which could have a severe impact on the imports of certain essential chemicals by States outside the purview of the Convention.

82. The level of representation of States from Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia, the Caribbean and South Pacific was a cause for concern. The Director General of the OPCW had therefore written to the Foreign Ministers of all signatory and non-signatory States informing them of the benefits of being Parties to the Convention.

83. The Agency and the OPCW largely shared a common constituency. The Agency had been a pioneer organization in the area of sophisticated international verification and accounting regimes and the OPCW had continued that tradition. For its part, the Agency had drawn upon the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention with respect to short-notice challenge inspections as a method of last resort, together with intermediate measures designed to clarify uncertainties and facilitate compliance in a constructive and co-operative manner. There was a significant body of expertise within the Secretariats of the two organizations,

which had a wide range of common interest such as provisions for technical co-operation, verification and confidentiality procedures, financial and operational aspects of inspections, dispute resolution procedures and experience with other international organizations in the area of disarmament. Participation in meetings organized by the two organizations, and the exchange of personnel and speakers would go a long way to establishing that co-operation on a firm footing.

84. The OPCW fully subscribed to the strategic vision of the Agency's Director General, particularly his emphasis on the importance of confidence-building measures in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, on strengthened international co-operation and the fostering of a culture of communication and transparency. In those and other respects, the OPCW would closely follow the developments in the Agency.

85. Mr. ROMAN-MOREY (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) noted that, while the twentieth century had been rich in scientific and technological developments, it had also been plagued by internal confrontations, international conflicts and two world wars. For its part, the Agency had, by promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, made a major contribution to the preservation of peace and security during the past forty years.

86. The idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean had been mooted in 1962, with the Tlatelolco Treaty being opened for signature in 1967. At that time, only 18 States had signed, but now all 33 States of the region had signed and all but Cuba had ratified it. It was hoped that Cuba would soon ratify it thereby making the region the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone. He welcomed Cuba's announcement of its intention to sign an Additional Protocol and the Agency's approval of the application by Honduras for membership of the Agency.

87. While the NPT was undoubtedly the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the CTBT, verifiable bilateral agreements, and the Agency's verification and control measures all provided vital support for that regime. Nevertheless, there was no room for complacency and it should be borne in mind that the end of the Cold War did not signify the end of the nuclear threat - a threat posed not only by the immense arsenals of nuclear weapons possessed by the officially recognized nuclear-weapon States, but also by the desire of a small group of countries to establish themselves as nuclear Powers. While reductions in nuclear arsenals were welcome, it would be far better to eliminate such arsenals completely. If countries that had adopted nuclear weapons programmes took the courageous decision to discontinue such programmes, he was confident that others would follow suit and the hope of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons could be realized.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.