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on Tuesday, 17 September 2002, at 3.05 p.m.President: Mr. BRILL (United States of America)Later: Mr. TOUQ (Jordan)
Mr. ARAMRATTANA (Thailand)

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Abbreviations used in this record

AEA	Atomic Energy Authority (Sri Lanka)
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
ARASIA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CEG	Contact Expert Group for International Radioactive Waste Projects in the Russian Federation
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DBT	design basis threat
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EU	European Union
G-7	Group of Seven [leading industrial countries]
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
ININ	National Nuclear Research Institute, Mexico
INIS	International Nuclear Information System
INSAG	International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IPSART	International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
Kyoto Protocol	Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Malaga Conference	International Conference on the Radiological Protection of Patients in Diagnostic and Interventional Radiology, Nuclear Medicine and Radiotherapy
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSF	Nuclear Security Fund
Nuclear Safety Convention	Convention on Nuclear Safety
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
ORPAS	Occupational Radiation Protection Appraisal Service

Abbreviations used in this record
(Contd.)

OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PSA	Probabilistic safety analysis/assessment
RAMP	Review of Accident Management Programmes
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SAGTAC	Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
TranSAS	Transport Safety Appraisal Service
Transport Regulations	Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material
TRANSAC	Transport Safety Standards Advisory Committee
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2001 (continued)
(GC(46)/2)

1. Mr. HOANG VAN HUAY (Vietnam) expressed appreciation for the Agency's achievements over the year, which were the result of good co-operation between Member States and the Secretariat. In particular, he welcomed the Agency's efforts to improve the safeguards system so as to maintain the non-proliferation regime and provide the international community with the assurance that States were complying with their respective safeguards commitments. The conceptual framework for integrated safeguards would, he hoped, enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the verification system and reduce the cost of inspections.
2. Vietnam valued highly the technical assistance and expertise provided by the Agency in the fields of radiation protection and nuclear safety under the Extrabudgetary Programme on the Safety of Nuclear Installations in the South East Asia, Pacific and Far East Countries and the regional projects on legislation for safe and peaceful nuclear applications (RAS/9/023), national regulatory control and occupational radiation protection programmes (RAS/9/026) and development of technical capabilities for sustainable radiation and waste safety infrastructure (RAS/9/027). In collaboration with the Member States in the region Vietnam had participated in all activities and had hosted a number of workshops and seminars within the framework of those projects.
3. Aware of the need for a strong national nuclear regulatory infrastructure in promoting the safe and peaceful applications of nuclear technology, his country had set up the National Action Plan on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety in 2000, which had proved effective over the last two years. In addition, he was pleased to report that his country was taking steps with a view to becoming a party to the CPPNM. Vietnam was highly appreciative of the national and international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism outlined in the Director General's statement, particularly the measures to improve the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials; however, it shared the view of many developing countries that such activities should not be carried out at the expense of the technical co-operation programme.
4. Vietnam accorded great importance to technical co-operation with the Agency aimed at strengthening research and development capabilities and promoting the safe and peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology in the service of industrialization and modernization. A national conference on the evaluation of international co-operation in the nuclear field had been held in August 2002 to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of international co-operation activities in the period 1998-2002. It had concluded by consensus that all technical co-operation projects supported by the Agency had been implemented well. The projects had contributed significantly to promoting the social and economic development of the country, particularly in the areas of agriculture, human health, groundwater management, oil and gas industry, environmental protection and human resources.
5. In that context, his delegation wished to reiterate its full support for the 1997 Technical Co-operation Strategy, which emphasized strong government commitment, high project quality and adequate funding as prerequisites for the successful delivery of the technical co-operation programme.

6. His delegation was encouraged by the recent positive development trend in nuclear power and noted with satisfaction that the nuclear-generated share of the world's electricity had increased by 3.9% in 2001 compared with 2000. He urged the Agency to continue to assist interested Member States in overall energy planning, in introducing nuclear power into their countries, and in managing and improving the safe performance of nuclear power plants.

7. As a further step towards introducing nuclear power, Vietnam had set up the National Steering Committee on Nuclear Power Development to study various aspects of nuclear power development in the country.

8. Mr. HUGHES (Australia) said that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had highlighted the fragility of the world and the importance of promoting and protecting international frameworks which ensured peace and security for all. The heightened concern about the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the spectre of nuclear or radiological terrorism, had underlined the Agency's pivotal role in ensuring the safe and peaceful development of nuclear science and energy. Australia commended the Agency for the substantive progress it had made in tackling those issues and welcomed the growing support from Member States for the Agency's programmes.

9. Australia was strongly committed to the three pillars of the Agency's mandate - nuclear safety, verification, and technology - and supported the Director General's efforts to integrate the different arms of the Agency's activities in order to present a more unified face to the international community.

10. Australia believed that the global implementation of an effective system of strengthened safeguards delivered universal security benefits. The long-term viability of nuclear science and energy was inextricably linked to the Agency's ability to offer the international community credible assurances that it was preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Without such assurances the nuclear industry would be irreparably damaged and the role of the Agency in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology would suffer accordingly.

11. In Australia's view the Agency's verification and promotional activities were mutually reinforcing in nature: strengthening the credibility of the Agency's verification systems promoted confidence in nuclear science and technology, while widening their applications to address environmental, health and other development issues promoted acceptance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The concept of balance between verification and promotion which was often invoked did not adequately describe the relationship between the two, which was one of mutual dependency rather than tension and exclusivity.

12. Achieving the wide application of the IAEA's additional protocol for strengthened safeguards was a priority for Australia and many other countries. Agency safeguards were not static and had undergone considerable evolution over the years, with the strengthened safeguards system and the conclusion of additional protocols marking the latest stage of that evolution. Indeed, the additional protocol represented the new verification standard for NPT safeguards. That meant that the IAEA safeguards system, which all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPT were obliged to accept, should come quickly to be regarded as

comprising both classical safeguards (INFCIRC/153) and strengthened safeguards under the additional protocol (INFCIRC/540).

13. Australia was pleased to have been the first country to ratify an additional protocol and the first where integrated safeguards were being applied. The Agency was gaining practical experience in Australia with implementing new measures such as unannounced inspections, complementary access and managed access which would prove invaluable as integrated safeguards were extended to other countries. It would also, he hoped, demonstrate to others that integrated safeguards were not burdensome but rather delivered benefits in terms of increased efficiency and effectiveness. His delegation urged States which had not yet signed and ratified an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible. While there had been an encouraging increase in the number of States concluding additional protocols over the previous year, there was still a long way to go. Australia therefore welcomed the global conference on additional protocols to be hosted by Japan in December 2002 and hoped for wide participation in that conference.

14. It was disappointing that no tangible progress had been made in relation to the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the DPRK. As a party to the NPT, the DPRK had an unconditional obligation to comply with its safeguards agreement. Since delays in verification work might delay delivery of key nuclear components for the KEDO light water reactor project likely to be needed in 2005, Australia urged the DPRK to move quickly to co-operate fully with the Agency.

15. With regard to Iraq, Australia welcomed the Agency's efforts and expressed its deep concern over Iraq's non-compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions requiring it to provide the Agency with the access and co-operation necessary to implement its Security Council mandate. Regretting that the second and third round of talks between the United Nations and Iraq had not led to a resumption of inspections, Australia looked to Iraq to co-operate fully with the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspectors in achieving the complete implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, thus demonstrating that it had permanently abandoned any intention of developing nuclear weapons.

16. Concerning threats of nuclear terrorism, the Agency, as the principal focus for international co-operation on nuclear issues, had a central role to play. That seemed to be a natural extension of the work the Agency already did in the areas of safeguards and the security and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Australia commended the Agency on its swift and substantive response to the threat of nuclear terrorism and, as a contributor to the newly created Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), urged those Member States which had not already done so to contribute financially and in kind.

17. Australia was aware that many Member States held the view that new nuclear security projects should not be given priority over traditional areas of technical co-operation activity, but in Australia's view the security of nuclear and radioactive materials should be a priority for all countries, given their widespread use in industry, agriculture and medicine. The use of nuclear or radioactive materials by terrorists in one country or other security shortcomings would inevitably lead to restrictions on their use in other countries, causing damage to national nuclear technology programmes and the welfare of their beneficiaries. Moreover, the

additional technical assistance stemming from projects financed from the NSF would be a net gain for all members.

18. Australia was gratified at the progress made in the strengthening of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, most recently at the technical meeting it had chaired in August. There was an obvious need further to improve the control of high activity sources as a means of enhancing protection against the risk of radiological terrorism. Australia supported the meeting's recommendation that, once the current revision of the Agency's categorization of radiation sources had been finalized, the Director General should convene a group of technical and legal experts to consider revising the scope of the Code.

19. On the other hand, Australia was disappointed at the failure to reach a consensus at the meeting of legal and technical experts drafting an amendment to the CPPNM and called on all delegates participating in that process to work constructively towards a solution.

20. The Agency had an essential role in establishing a global nuclear safety culture, inter alia through the development of international safety standards. Australia had contributed to regional and international efforts to enhance the understanding of how safety culture could be implemented in nuclear organizations.

21. Australia welcomed the outcomes of the second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety held in April 2002. While Australia did not have a nuclear power programme, as a party to the Convention and an operator of a multi-purpose research reactor it benefited from the review process and urged other Member States in a similar position to ratify that Convention.

22. Australia also welcomed the increased focus on the safety of research reactors. As chair of the experts' group developing a code of conduct on their safety, it was pleased to be playing a key role in strengthening the safety regime.

23. Turning to the safe transport of radioactive material, he noted that the transfer of nuclear technology and the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy depended very much on the global transportation of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Nuclear shipments had an excellent safety record, underpinned by effective Agency regulations in which Australia had every confidence. He welcomed the ongoing dialogue between shipping and coastal States and, in particular, the increased transparency shown more recently by the shipping States, as illustrated in the recent findings of the TranSAS mission to the United Kingdom. He was honoured to accept the responsibility of chairing the 2003 International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material and called on all parties to work constructively to ensure that a consensus outcome could be achieved.

24. Noting the growing span of nuclear science and technology applications which were assisting the social and economic development of many countries, he said that the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization had been pleased to continue its participation in the Agency's co-ordinated research projects. Increasingly important factors in the area of nuclear science and technology included the issue of maintaining nuclear knowledge and the

efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Agency's technical co-operation programme. Australia welcomed the strong support for technical co-operation across the Agency's membership, as evidenced by impressive real increases in the TCF over the previous few years and by significantly higher rates of attainment. Australia for its part had increased its voluntary contributions to the TCF to 1.995 million Australian dollars, well above its rate of attainment target of 90% for 2003. While remaining committed to the principle of voluntary contributions, it stressed the importance of other countries also meeting that target, or at least increasing current levels of funding. Australia was also contributing significantly to an extrabudgetary project on radioisotope technology for sustainable development in Asia and the Pacific and to the RCA.

25. In conclusion, he assured the Agency of Australia's strong support in the implementation of its programmes and in its efforts to meet new challenges.

26. Mr. RÓNAKY (Hungary) said that the year 2002 marked the 60th anniversary of controlled nuclear fission as well as the 45th anniversary of the Agency. Since the first controlled chain reaction, mankind had faced the dual challenge of preventing the military use of nuclear energy while exploiting its peaceful potential. In addition, the events of 11 September 2001 had drawn attention to the responsibility of the nuclear community to protect the world against nuclear terrorism - a task that required both national and international efforts.

27. His country commended the Agency on its rapid response to the threat of nuclear terrorism and welcomed the leading role it was taking and the new measures adopted. In spite of strict budget constraints, his Government was considering making a financial contribution to the NSF. While a study of Hungary's nuclear installations had revealed that no substantial enhancement of physical protection at the nuclear sites was required, Hungary was aware that security could still be improved in some areas. Although fewer cases of illegal possession of and trafficking in radioactive and nuclear material were being reported in Hungary and the neighbouring countries, physical protection and illicit trafficking remained the key issues in the fight against nuclear terrorism. In that regard, he urged that the efforts to draft an amendment to the CPPNM be brought to a meaningful conclusion as soon as possible.

28. Hungary was a firm supporter of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its cornerstone, the NPT. It welcomed the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on a substantial reduction of their nuclear arsenals, although further progress would be needed in that area. It would also welcome the early implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the speedy conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Agency was to be commended on the elaboration of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards; however, a significant reduction of the risk of nuclear proliferation could not be achieved without the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all States which had the obligation to do so. Hungary had been among the first to sign an additional protocol and had fully co-operated with the Secretariat in implementing all its provisions during the evaluation of the country's nuclear programme. As Hungary was preparing to join the European Union and Euratom, it hoped that the Agency would soon

draw its conclusion on the absence of undeclared nuclear material in the country, thereby opening the way for the implementation of integrated safeguards.

29. His delegation was concerned that the Agency's safeguards staff and budget might be overburdened by an extension of the strengthened regime to all States; however, it trusted that the Agency's experience would enable it to optimize the methods it used. Hungary remained committed to the Agency's safeguards support programme, offering its facilities, equipment and experts for training courses, and was always ready to support the Agency's inspectors in nuclear material verification. It was also providing services in the collection of open-source information.

30. With regard to the second Review Meeting under the Nuclear Safety Convention, he noted that Hungary had satisfied the requirements of the Convention. He welcomed the improvements achieved by most of the Contracting Parties since the first Review Meeting and the conclusions drawn in 2002, which would no doubt help in further enhancing nuclear safety, although it would be up to States to put them into practice.

31. The entry into force of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was encouraging, and Hungary was preparing its national report on the fulfilment of its obligations pursuant to the Convention. It looked forward to participating in the first review conference, where it hoped that a wide range of States would be represented in view of the high priority of the issue. He urged the States that had not yet done so to ratify the Joint Convention as soon as possible.

32. He expressed appreciation for the work of INSAG and noted the Director General's intention to review its role and mandate. He also welcomed the decision to reconstitute the four safety standards committees. His delegation was convinced that with continuing efforts to ensure a high level of safety in the operation of nuclear power plants and the disposal of radioactive waste, the expanded use of nuclear power could become acceptable to most people.

33. One of the most important long-term goals with regard to the Paks nuclear power plant was to extend the life of its units while meeting the criteria of safety and economy. A feasibility study had shown that the plant could continue its operation beyond the 30-year design lifetime, and it was planned to extend it by a further 15-20 years. In that connection, his delegation hoped that the International Symposium on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management, to be held in Hungary in November 2002, would promote a fruitful exchange of views on that issue.

34. Several factors were crucial to the effectiveness of technical co-operation, namely ensuring adequate resources, allocating them according to a clear strategy and priorities, and selecting projects in an objective manner. Hungary had demonstrated its support for the Agency's technical co-operation activities by its 100% record of payment to the TCF. His Government had again decided to pledge its full share of the target for 2003 and appealed to all Member States to pay their contributions in full and on time.

35. Believing that well-established regional co-operation was the best way of ensuring efficient use of scarce financial resources, his delegation was concerned about the possible exclusion of peer review services from regional technical co-operation. The IRRT and OSART missions to his country had been of great assistance to it.

36. Government commitment and meeting the central criterion were of the greatest importance in ensuring the quality and relevance of technical co-operation, and he believed the CPF which Hungary had recently concluded with the Agency was a good example of the increased national leadership which had been recommended by SAGTAC.

37. His delegation was convinced that the technical co-operation programme had contributed significantly to the establishment of safety regimes and had a similar role to play in many of the activities planned against nuclear terrorism. Despite differences of view on many major issues, the Agency had managed over the years to maintain an appropriate balance in its activities, and he was sure it would continue to rise to that challenge in the future.

38. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Middle East region was currently witnessing an unprecedented escalation of Israel's aggressive expansionist policies against the people in the occupied territories of Palestine, the Shebaa farms and the Golan. Israel's military machinery indiscriminately hit children, women and the elderly in disregard of charters and undertakings governing international relations in wartime. The Israeli Government had not only built settlements in the occupied territories, it had also demolished the houses of hundreds of Palestinian families, thus displacing them within their own homeland. Young Palestinians were arbitrarily arrested and held without trial. The terrorizing practices and systematically discriminatory policies of the current Israeli Government against the people under occupation impeded all sincere efforts to find a lasting solution to the conflict in the region.

39. Syria's approach had been to strive for a just and comprehensive peace with restoration of owners' rights and a decent life for all parties; that approach remained valid and was underpinned by internationally acknowledged resolutions.

40. In accordance with international law and practices, Syria continued to demand Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan and the occupied Arab territories back to the lines of 4 June 1967, as required by the relevant United Nations resolutions, the Madrid Peace Conference terms of reference and the principle of land for peace. However, Israel persisted in setting up obstacles to the achievement of a just and comprehensive peace.

41. Israel was also the only nuclear Power in the region and had threatened to use its nuclear capability against its Arab neighbours, thereby endangering international security and stability. Despite numerous calls from the international community urging it to co-operate in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Israel had so far refused to do so. It was therefore high time the international community put greater pressure on Israel to submit to the non-proliferation regime by signing the NPT and a comprehensive safeguards agreement and placing all of its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards. When the Conference took up the agenda item "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East",

therefore, it should adopt a clear resolution calling upon Israel to implement the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and join the NPT. In addition, it should draw attention to the power imbalance in the Middle East region resulting from Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and the threat that nuclear capability posed to the region and the world as a whole.

42. The Syrian Government opposed and condemned all forms of terrorism, while systematically differentiating between terrorism and a nation's legitimate struggle against occupation and aggression. The international community should hold a conference to define terrorism clearly and precisely and to condemn it. The Secretariat's efforts to develop specific programmes on protection against nuclear terrorism were welcome. All States possessing nuclear materials should take prime responsibility for ensuring the security and safety of those materials and enhancing the physical protection measures for their nuclear installations and materials. Any international measure which fell short of being transparent and comprehensive and was therefore applied only selectively rather than universally would not have the full impact envisaged.

43. Over the 45 years since the Agency's foundation, a major challenge had been to preserve a proper balance between the Agency's promotional activities and its regulatory activities. While zero real growth in the Regular Budget should be maintained, it was desirable to explore mechanisms for making technical co-operation resources more assured and predictable.

44. An important development in the West Asian region had been the establishment of the new co-operative agreement for Arab States, ARASIA. Five countries, namely Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen, had so far joined the agreement, thus putting it into force. Those countries had submitted three technical projects addressing common development issues in the areas of energy planning, non-destructive testing, and quality assurance for nuclear analytical laboratories, and they looked forward to assistance from the Agency and from advanced States in the implementation of those projects.

45. The Agency's role in providing technical assistance for sustainable development and improvement of human well-being and security was growing steadily, and his delegation supported its approach of fostering technological development by helping Member States to acquire capabilities in nuclear science and technology. Regional training centres were important in disseminating nuclear culture and producing well-qualified young personnel. The strategy which was being followed in the Agency's education and training programme in the area of radiation protection involved the development of long-term agreements with regional training centres and the establishment of information networks between those centres and the Agency. His Government endorsed that approach and had hosted a regional postgraduate training course on radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources in Damascus for the last three years. In addition, several laboratories in Syria had recently been recognized as regional reference centres and were open to trainees from Agency Member States.

46. His Government supported the Secretariat's efforts to review the technical co-operation strategy. Increasing available resources and rendering them more predictable and assured,

inter alia by implementing the “Rate of Attainment” mechanism, would contribute to meeting Member States’ technical co-operation needs. On the other hand, limiting project areas to specific topics might prevent developing countries from requesting technical assistance for some projects which they considered important.

47. His country had supported the technical co-operation programme in the past year by providing training to fourteen trainees from sister Arab States and accepting five scientific visits to the Atomic Energy Commission’s laboratories. It had also hosted four regional courses and a co-ordinated research meeting in co-operation with the Agency and had offered eight of its scientists as experts within the framework of national and regional projects.

48. Mr. DAINIUS (Lithuania) commended the Agency for its outstanding contribution to the recent World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg and welcomed the Summit’s emphasis on capacity building and the transfer and use of modern technology as prerequisites for sustainable development - with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy continuing to be an important factor in economic development.

49. The share of nuclear energy in his country’s total energy production was one of the world’s highest, at 78% in 2001. Lithuania would endeavour to operate its Ignalina nuclear power plant safely until it could be closed and decommissioned in accordance with internationally recognized practices and safety standards, and with support from the Agency’s technical co-operation programme. The decommissioning of the Ignalina-1 unit was one of the priorities in Lithuania’s CPF, as action must be taken well in advance to ensure that long-term institutional capabilities and know-how for dismantling and waste management processes were maintained without causing any risks to population and environment.

50. His Government had decided to shut down Ignalina-1 by 2005 in view of its intention to join the European Union, and it was relying on financial and technical assistance from the EU, the G-7 countries, and other States and financial institutions. An international Project Management Unit was already in place at Ignalina to elaborate a final decommissioning plan and implement the preparatory stages of the work. Since the first conference of donor countries in June 2000, substantial financial assistance had been made available, with the Agency providing technical advice and training related to management and safety issues including the peer review of safety analysis reports for radioactive waste storage facilities, the review of regulations for radioactive waste disposal, and decommissioning practices in other Member States. His country particularly valued the Agency’s assistance at the decision-maker level, which had involved, inter alia, a workshop on decommissioning and a visit by Lithuanian members of parliament to the Agency.

51. He commended the Agency’s partnership with Member States to help them in formulating energy policies that were adequate, affordable and environmentally friendly. Thanks to the Agency’s assistance, Lithuania had developed substantial expertise enabling it to take well-considered decisions on meeting energy needs. With continued Agency co-operation, a comprehensive set of indicators for sustainable energy development would be established. A draft updated national energy strategy was under consideration by the Lithuanian parliament. While it envisaged closure of Ignalina-2 by 2009, subject to the

provision of adequate financial assistance from the EU, it also paved the way for balanced assessment of the nuclear and other energy supply options.

52. Lithuania remained a strong supporter of the Agency's safeguards system and was in favour of universal adherence to safeguard agreements and additional protocols. For its part, it was fulfilling all its obligations pursuant to its additional protocol, which had entered into force on 5 July 2000. However, his delegation was concerned about the slow progress being made in concluding additional protocols; it therefore called upon all States that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force such protocols at an early date so that the Agency could provide credible assurances of non-diversion of nuclear materials and absence of undeclared activities.

53. In that context, he welcomed the Agency's development of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards.

54. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had shocked the world and served as a painful reminder that international co-operation and concerted action were needed to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Lithuania fully supported the Agency's activities to protect against nuclear terrorism, including its new and expanded measures. International legal instruments as well as global, regional and national measures should all be used to ensure that nuclear materials and technologies did not fall into the wrong hands. Export, import and transit control measures should be strengthened.

55. His Government had co-operated with the Agency and other Member States in recent years to improve the national physical protection regime. Its national legislation had been amended and the physical protection system at the Ignalina nuclear power plant upgraded. Lithuania had received an IPPAS mission in 1999 and, based on the mission's recommendations, its competent authorities had developed a plan of protection measures which was currently being implemented at the regulatory and operator levels. A follow-up IPPAS mission was expected later in 2002.

56. His delegation commended the Agency on its efforts to strengthen the CPPNM, including in particular the convening of the open-ended group of legal and technical experts to prepare a draft amendment to the Convention.

57. He welcomed the fact that the second Review Meeting under the Nuclear Safety Convention had seen positive trends in nuclear safety reflected in States' national reports and had noted significant progress since the first Review Meeting in 1999. The development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes required commitment and adherence by all States to internationally accepted nuclear safety standards. The Agency had long been playing a vital role in promoting nuclear safety worldwide by developing conventions and standards for nuclear safety and radiation protection and by assisting States with their implementation. In 2001 the Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate had received an IRRT mission whose recommendations were reflected in an action plan that was to be implemented over the next two years. Some of the issues raised by that mission were also addressed in technical co-operation projects. A follow-up IRRT mission was due in 2004.

58. An IPSART follow-up mission had also taken place in 2001 to review the PSA level 1 and 2 and had concluded that the PSA level 1 was sufficiently comprehensive and its documentation adequate while identifying certain areas for further improvement.

59. The Agency had provided timely assistance to the Ignalina plant and to Lithuania's regulatory authority through its extrabudgetary programme on mitigation of intergranular stress corrosion cracking in austenitic stainless steel piping of RBMK reactors, which it had launched to assist countries operating RBMK reactors to develop effective mitigation programmes through technology transfer, training and guidance.

60. Turning to radiation protection, he said that, in co-operation with the Agency and the European Commission, his country had devoted significant resources to strengthening its regulatory infrastructure for the control of radiation sources and exposures to ionizing radiation. The regional project on development of technical capabilities for sustainable radiation and waste safety infrastructure would be successfully completed in the course of the year. The Central and Eastern European ALARA network set up in co-operation with the Agency to facilitate information exchange among countries with common radiation protection problems would also help to sustain the radiation protection infrastructure, as would the steps taken to establish a national education and training system and a national training centre for radiation protection.

61. With regard to the security of radioactive sources, his delegation commended the Agency on its efforts to provide more guidance and assistance in locating orphan sources, in establishing systems for the registration of sources, and in nuclear forensics and the response to illegal trafficking in radioactive and nuclear materials. His delegation fully shared the Agency's concerns about the radiological protection of patients.

62. The future of nuclear energy depended critically on the proper management and safe disposal of radioactive waste. The competent Lithuanian authorities were working towards ratification of the Joint Convention. In July 2001, the Lithuanian Nuclear Power Inspectorate had approved regulations to govern pre-disposal waste management at the Ignalina plant. Work had begun on preparing regulations for the final disposal of short-lived low- and intermediate-level waste to be approved in 2002. The Law on Radioactive Waste Management was being implemented, and a strategy comprising general provisions for the management of radioactive waste including spent nuclear fuel had been approved. In 2001, his Government had also established the Radioactive Waste Management Agency with responsibility for the safe management and final disposal of radioactive waste.

63. In conclusion, given the importance of adequate funding for the Agency's technical co-operation programme, he was pleased to be able to confirm that his Government was prepared to pledge and pay its share of the target for contributions to the TCF.

64. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ANINAT (Chile), having congratulated the Republic of Cuba on taking the important political decision to ratify the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty, said that Chile was ready to sign an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement in order to reaffirm its permanent commitment to progress on worldwide non-proliferation, to promoting the peaceful uses and benefits of nuclear energy, and to increasing public acceptance of that

technology. It viewed the additional protocol, which had already been approved by the Board of Governors, as an opportunity to build trust between States, and it hoped that the protocol could be signed before the end of the current session of the General Conference.

65. The unilateralism which was becoming a predominant factor in international relations did not exactly contribute to the establishment of a productive framework in which the interests and needs of developing countries were taken into account. There was widespread agreement on the urgent need to return to multilateral action under the auspices of the United Nations and its specialized bodies. The United Nations had an indispensable role to play in building a climate of trust, in taking specific measures to alleviate poverty and, ultimately, in placing humanity and human dignity at the heart of the international community's concerns.

66. Science and technology, and especially nuclear energy, provided a unique opportunity for like-minded countries with common aspirations and expectations to work together to achieve those goals. A major effort was therefore needed to underscore the peaceful uses and benefits of nuclear energy and to eradicate the perception that nuclear weapons were the basis of discussions in the United Nations General Assembly. The nuclear-weapon States in particular should be interested in the establishment of mechanisms to highlight the positive aspects of nuclear energy. To that end, his delegation wished to reiterate its proposal of the previous year¹ to include an item on "International co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy" in the agenda of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly for consideration in 2003. In that connection, he thanked the Agency's Secretariat for the important contribution it had made towards devising a conceptually convincing and diplomatically feasible initiative that would radically alter the public perception of nuclear energy, and he urged all States to engage in that wide-ranging undertaking with a view to averting the politically and socially destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation.

67. The maritime transport of radioactive waste by certain countries without any consideration for the concerns of coastal States was in direct contradiction with the general principles of international law to protect the environment and also with several legal precedents, such as the "trail smelter" case and the "Corfu canal" case. Furthermore, the climate of tension generated thereby in coastal States could erode international peace and security and adversely affect bilateral relations. Chile was not against international trade in and transport of radioactive material, but it insisted that a minimum regulatory framework be established in which nuclear activities were classified as "ultrahazardous" in accordance with international law. As under other international instruments, early prior notification of the transport of such materials was the least courtesy which countries affected by such shipments could expect.

68. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was frequently cited as an authority in such issues, but without taking into account Part II, section 3 on innocent passage in the territorial sea, in particular Articles 19.2(a) and 21.1(f), as well as Articles 192 and 197 of the Convention. The principal theme of the relevant parts of the Convention was to prevent situations which might give rise to accidents and thus might indirectly have an adverse effect on mutual confidence. The need for prior and timely notice and a regime of absolute liability

¹ See GC(45)/OR.4, para. 118.

in the event of an accident was obvious in that context. It had therefore come as something of a surprise to hear from legal experts at various formal and informal negotiations that such a liability regime was not sufficiently well established in international law, even though its basis went back to the 1947 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and other relevant instruments of international environmental law. In addition to the liability regime, there was also the precautionary principle which derived not only from conventions and treaties but also from sound practice. In the case of transport of irradiated nuclear material, timely prior notification was a key aspect of international practice. Moreover, many international bodies were turning to preventive diplomacy aimed at pre-empting conflicts that might give rise to tensions and misunderstandings between States and thus hinder more effective international co-operation. In a world where half the population lived on less than one dollar per day, technical co-operation was vital to address the most essential human safety needs, and in a globalized world those needs also affected international security and required effective preventive strategies.

69. In that context, he stressed that science and technology and the peaceful applications of nuclear energy provided a valuable instrument for reversing the trend towards international inequality. Although there were differences of opinion which the international community would have to overcome, nuclear technology offered reasonable solutions to some of the world's most pressing problems, particularly in the fields of medicine, agriculture and water supply.

70. The looming threat of nuclear terrorism required the constant attention of the international community. A comprehensive and holistic approach was needed to determine the most effective means and mechanisms to combat that threat. A unilateral policy would not only undermine multilateral relations but would also be short-sighted and inadequate to do justice to the complex fundamental issues at stake. His delegation was grateful to the IAEA for its reports illustrating the devastating consequences for mankind from terrorism on such a scale. Information exchange and other multilateral methods were the most effective approach, given that most of mankind categorically and unwaveringly rejected all forms of terrorism.

71. As to his country's own nuclear activities, he was delighted to report that Chile had made great strides in the area of sustainable development. In addition to internationally recognized achievements such as the eradication of the fruit fly by the sterile insect technique a few years previously, progress had been made in human health and in isotope applications for the characterization and use of water in the desert region in the north of Chile, where the copper and lithium mining industries were concentrated.

72. Nuclear medicine in Chile had been strengthened by the installation of a modern cyclotron at the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission. The device, which had been wholly financed by the Commission itself, was designed to produce short-lived radiopharmaceuticals for use in positron emission tomography at two hospitals in Santiago. In addition, Chile would be hosting the eighth World Congress of Nuclear Medicine in Santiago at the end of the current month.

73. Mr. STRITAR (Slovenia) said that an overview of the important achievements of the last year should start with the second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Bearing in mind the general objective of the Convention, namely to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide, his delegation saw the submission of national reports for review as a learning and self-assessment exercise, rather than purely a reporting obligation towards the Contracting Parties. Both the first and second Review Meetings had proved their value for national nuclear safety programmes and had demonstrated the strong commitment of all Contracting Parties to the safety objectives set by the Convention. He was sure that the first review meeting under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, to be held in November 2003, would be conducted in the same effective spirit. Slovenia's national report on the fulfilment of its obligations under the Joint Convention was being prepared for submission in early May 2003.

74. The Agency had a key role to play in the area of verification and security. Since the necessary arrangements under Slovenia's safeguards agreement and additional protocol had been concluded, verification activities had taken place in 2001-2002 in all nuclear facilities in Slovenia to provide assurance that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities there. He noted, however, that although the Agency's work on negotiating and implementing additional protocols had been intensified, only 24 such protocols had entered into force by the end of 2001. He therefore urged all States which had not yet done so to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency in accordance with their NPT obligations and subsequently to conclude and bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible.

75. Also highly important were the Agency's activities to improve Member States' ability to protect nuclear and radioactive materials against illegal uses that could pose a proliferation threat or endanger health and safety. He welcomed the work which had already been done, including the organization of the Stockholm International Conference on Security of Material in 2001, the endorsement of a Security Fundamentals document and the preparation of a report on "Measures to Improve the Security of Nuclear Materials and other Radioactive Materials". His country also attached great importance to the strengthening of the CPPNM by extending its scope and was participating in the open-ended group of legal and technical experts working on a draft amendment to the CPPNM. In support of the Agency's activities focusing on protection against terrorist attacks and subnational threats, his Government had made a voluntary contribution to the multi-donor NSF established for that purpose. He was also glad to report in that context that, in response to an increased need to incorporate a "design basis threat" as part of the State system of physical protection, a DBT workshop had been organized a few days previously in Slovenia.

76. Slovenia continued to require the Agency's safety review services. A third OSART mission to the Krško nuclear power plant had already been confirmed for 2003, and a review of the Periodic Safety Review programme for that plant and a pilot mission under the new Review of Accident Management Programmes (RAMP) service had been carried out in 2001. The objective of the RAMP pilot mission had been to review the comprehensiveness, consistency and quality of the severe accident management programme for the plant. The mission had found that the programme had been successfully developed and largely implemented in accordance with Agency guidance and international good practice.

77. Turning to the area of radiation safety, he welcomed the progress achieved in revising the Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources and the Transport Regulations. Slovenia was taking an active part in strengthening and harmonizing international emergency preparedness and response arrangements for nuclear and radiobiological emergencies. In 2001 the Agency's newly developed ORPAS service had audited the regulatory and practical implementation of Slovenia's occupational radiation protection arrangements against the relevant Agency radiation safety standards.

78. With regard to technical co-operation, he was pleased to announce that Slovenia had, as always in the past, pledged its full share of the TCF target for 2003 and fulfilled its financial obligations for 2002. It continued fully to support the Agency's technical co-operation activities and appreciated the assistance provided through technical co-operation projects, both current and pending. Where research projects were concerned, eleven out of fifteen proposals submitted in 2001 had been approved.

79. In the last few years, Slovenia had hosted far more technical co-operation trainees than it had sent abroad, and the same applied to training courses. Each year Slovenia hosted Agency training courses, seminars and workshops, especially in the areas of nuclear power, nuclear safety and radiation safety. Slovenian institutes and organizations provided on-the-job training and made available their experts for technical co-operation. Slovenia's commitment to provide in-kind contributions of equipment to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to build an early-warning monitoring system demonstrated its strategy of taking an active and increasing part in technical co-operation activities.

80. Among other Agency activities, he welcomed the preparation and publication of safety standards. Those standards, together with the conventions negotiated and adopted under the auspices of the Agency and the European Union's legal framework, had provided the main input for the new Slovenian Law on Protection against Ionizing Radiation and Nuclear Safety, which had just been adopted and would enter into force on 1 October 2002. That was only a first step, however, since numerous regulations needed to be adopted either by the Government or by ministries in the various areas covered by the law.

81. Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands) said that much had been done in the fight against terrorism since the attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001, but much still remained to be done, in the nuclear field and in others. The Agency must approach the new situation without complacency, with an open mind and creatively.

82. International co-operation in the nuclear field required mutual trust in a safe and secure nuclear environment, underpinned by a fully effective safeguards regime, the standard for which in his country's view was the integrated safeguards system developed over the previous decade. There was still some way to go in strengthening the global system of nuclear non-proliferation, inter alia by promoting universal adherence to both the comprehensive safeguards regime and the Model Additional Protocol. Recent progress in that area had been slow, but the safeguards regime nevertheless remained an important yardstick for co-operation, both substantively and financially.

83. The necessary balance between the Agency's activities could only exist if the Agency was in a position to fulfil all its statutory obligations. However, years of zero growth budgets, a disappointing record of contributions payment, and the emphasis on balance at all costs had left the Agency close to being unable to provide credible safeguards, as the Director General had said himself. If that central goal was put at risk, the very foundations for further co-operation would be undermined and voluntary contributions to ensure an adequate technical co-operation programme might no longer be readily forthcoming.

84. In his Government's opinion, the traditional insistence on balance between safeguards and technical co-operation was too static a concept; it was not an effective tool for promoting the work of the Agency, indeed it divided Member States unnecessarily into two opposing camps, thus standing in the way of a one-house approach. Instead, since both safeguards and technical co-operation were in everyone's interest, his Government favoured flexible, results-based budgeting and fundamental debate about effective use of the Agency's scarce budgetary resources aimed at developing a new conceptual relationship between the twin objectives of international security and technical co-operation in the nuclear field.

85. Although there seemed to be widespread agreement that the TCF target should be increased beyond the original figure of \$74.1 million, the Netherlands was not in favour of such an increase, since many Member States had not yet paid their contribution in accordance with the "Rate of Attainment" mechanism and many States were greatly in arrears with their assessed programme costs. However, his country had not stood in the way of an agreement which was clearly favoured by most other Member States. It would continue to monitor developments.

86. The situation in Iraq remained a major concern of his Government. He hoped that the recent letter sent by Iraq to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, promising to allow the unconditional return of weapons inspectors to the country, would be the first step in the full implementation of all the relevant Security Council resolutions.

87. At present the NSF, set up to finance anti-terrorist activities, relied on an even smaller group of contributors than the TCF. Both funds should rank high on every Member State's list of priorities. His Government commended the Secretariat for the speed with which it had developed the action plan to combat nuclear terrorism, which included practical measures for increasing the protection of nuclear materials and their safe and secure storage. The Netherlands also welcomed the recent co-operation between the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Agency and the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

88. His Government believed that the action plan should be financed from the Agency's Regular Budget. Nevertheless, in view of the urgency of the current security situation, it had decided to double its original voluntary contribution to the NSF to €500 000, of which the first instalment would be paid in a few weeks' time.

89. His Government was concerned that the negotiations on the proposed amendments to the CPPNM were apparently making little progress. The amendments seemed to be growing more limited in scope as the negotiations continued. His Government therefore supported the

Agency's efforts to strengthen the regime governing the physical protection of nuclear materials through practical measures based on the existing rules, regulations and guidelines.

90. The Netherlands attached considerable importance to improvements in the control of sealed highly radioactive sources. Within the European Union alone, approximately 500 000 such sources had been distributed to various end-users, of which some 100 000 were still in use. For some 30 000 sources which were no longer in use, there was thought to be a serious risk that they would escape controls. The European Union was currently working to improve control of those sources and hoped that the Agency would co-operate with it in that task.

91. The only remaining nuclear power plant in the Netherlands, at Borssele, had been due to close in 2003, earlier than originally planned. However, the new Netherlands Government had postponed the closure in view of its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. The Government would try to reach an agreement with the owner of the Borssele plant about its continued operation, taking into account its scheduled economic and technical lifetime.

92. In closing, he said that his Government was concerned about maintaining its level of nuclear expertise in view of the ageing of the population of nuclear professionals in the Netherlands, as in a number of other Western countries. The maintenance and development of nuclear knowledge was very important, not only for the continuation of existing nuclear programmes, but also for the safe decommissioning of nuclear power plants, the safe storage of waste and the response to possible nuclear accidents. His Government therefore called upon the Agency to implement the recommendations of the meeting of senior officials on managing nuclear knowledge which had taken place in June 2002.

93. Mr. PRINATH DIAS (Sri Lanka) said that although his country had no nuclear power plants in operation and had no plans to use nuclear power in the foreseeable future, it was engaged, like many other Member States, in using nuclear technology for a wide range of other purposes. Co-operation with the Agency had enabled it to use such technology for improving health care facilities as well as agricultural and industrial productivity, with considerable benefit to the people of Sri Lanka.

94. In 2001 the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) of Sri Lanka had completed, at a cost of around \$1 million, the construction of a new building to house its laboratories and administrative office. The Government had provided funds in recognition of the contribution nuclear technology could make to national development. His country was grateful for the Agency's technical support in establishing an X-ray fluorescence analytical facility and a gamma irradiation facility in the new building. The scientific cadre had been increased almost threefold over five years, and there had been a significant rise in government funding for recurrent and capital expenditure. The AEA had also been very successful in increasing the income it generated: in 2001 it had earned about 40% of its recurrent expenditure, and that figure was expected to rise to 50% in 2002.

95. Sri Lanka had made significant efforts to improve the quality of the technical co-operation project proposals submitted to the Agency, selecting them according to the central criteria and ensuring that they concerned priority areas of development. Despite

financial constraints the Government was providing additional funds to settle the assessed programme cost arrears within a reasonable period of time.

96. The Agency's efforts to make national nuclear institutes self-reliant and self-sustainable were appreciated. The programmes of nuclear institutes should be of national relevance, and the institutes should establish strong links with potential users of nuclear technology to achieve self-reliance and sustainability. Although it did not require Sri Lankan scientific institutes to function as commercial establishments, the Government did expect them to be cost-effective and to provide services worth the public funds spent on them. The regional project on self-reliance and sustainability would further assist the AEA in improving cost-effectiveness and income generation by adopting better management strategies.

97. His delegation also appreciated the Agency's efforts to improve the radiation protection and waste management infrastructure in Member States. Technical assistance received under the interregional Model Project on improving radiation protection and waste management infrastructure had made it possible for Sri Lanka to improve its regulatory programme significantly. Having achieved milestones 1 and 2, Sri Lanka was making good progress with regard to the remaining three milestones, which it hoped to achieve in the near future. New radiation protection regulations conforming to the Basic Safety Standards had been promulgated and were being implemented. All the radioactive sources in the country had been inventoried and procedures prepared for notification, authorization and inspection of practices involving radiation and radioisotopes.

98. The countries participating in the RCA, including Sri Lanka, had reaped considerable benefits from it, and his country would continue to take part in RCA programmes and activities to the greatest possible extent. He particularly requested the Agency's continued support for the RCA project on harmonization of radiation protection (RAS/9/018), which was in his opinion important for mutual co-operation among RCA Member States in implementing activities outside the scope of the Model Project on radiation protection.

99. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his Government's support for the programmes and activities of the Agency, which had been extremely effective in promoting the application of nuclear science and technology for development, and without whose assistance developing countries such as Sri Lanka would have made very little progress.

100. Mr. VAPIREV (Bulgaria) said that his country, as a party to the NPT, had always supported the Agency's non-proliferation goals and contributed to its safeguards activities. The Agency's safeguards system was universal in nature and a key element in ensuring confidence among States that nuclear energy was used only for peaceful purposes.

101. The attacks of 11 September 2001 had rendered even more significant and urgent the common efforts required from all States in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The international community must use all existing international instruments to limit the scope of the terrorist threat, inter alia by strengthening and enhancing measures to prevent the acquisition of nuclear material and violent acts against nuclear facilities by terrorist groups.

102. As a current member of the Agency's Board of Governors, his country had repeatedly stated its position regarding the crucial role of the Agency's safeguards system in the overall anti-terrorist efforts. Further strengthening of the system remained essential to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material and to counter nuclear smuggling. His Government, willing to share the common responsibility in that priority area, had contributed \$15 000 to the NSF.

103. His Government believed that the Model Additional Protocol constituted a key element in the safeguards framework, and his country had been among the first to ratify it, as early as 2000. At the same time, one could not be satisfied with the slow progress of the ratification process. Despite appeals from all sides for speedy adherence to that important instrument, the overall number of ratifications stood at 24, with only 6 in 2001. Bulgaria was also concerned that some countries had not yet brought into force their NPT safeguards agreements and urged them to do so as soon as possible. His Government welcomed the development of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards as a major achievement in ensuring efficiency of the safeguards system. Introducing a new approach would give more flexibility and, at the same time, ensure greater consistency in the Agency's activities in various countries.

104. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, his country strongly supported the requirement for full-scope safeguards as a precondition for supplying nuclear material and equipment and applied that principle strictly in its foreign trade policy.

105. Nuclear power in Bulgaria contributed significantly to satisfying the energy needs of the economy and the population in the country and the region. For ten years the Kozloduy nuclear power plant had been providing 44.5% of the average annual electricity produced in Bulgaria, and Bulgarian electricity covered around 55% of the constant deficit in the total energy balance for the Balkan region, which was seen as a major contribution to stabilizing the region's economy.

106. In the last year there had been several important achievements in the nuclear field, all relating to European Union accession requirements. In March 2002 answers had been submitted to additional questions from the EU Council of Ministers Working Party on Nuclear Safety. The Peer Review Status Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of Enlargement had been submitted to the Permanent Representatives Committee on 5 June 2002 with a view to the evaluation and conclusions contained therein being taken into consideration in the accession process.

107. The national report presented at the second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in April 2002 had highlighted the substantial progress made in 2001-2002.

108. The Agency expert mission to units 3 and 4 of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant had concluded that all problems regarding the design and operational safety of units 3 and 4 had been solved in accordance with the recommendations and suggestions of the Agency, WANO, international experts, the plant's own experts and international good practice.

109. In May 2002 the Working Group on Nuclear Safety, which monitored the implementation of obligations originating from the Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of European Enlargement, had issued a report based on additional information. The report did not include additional recommendations, except to monitor the implementation of plans declared by Bulgaria, some of which had already been completed.

110. The time limits on operation for units 1-4, set in 1999, were based on data about the level of safety from the early 1990s and did not correspond to the existing design and operational safety of the Kozloduy plant's units. All new indications had been that the WWER-440/B-230 systems in units 3 and 4 could be modernized, and that had been done at a reasonable price. They now reached a level of safety comparable to that of nuclear plants of similar age worldwide. There were so far no grounds for early decommissioning of units 3 and 4, and requirements regarding their future operation should allow for a technically sound and economically viable period. The decision to decommission any unit should be based on safety considerations in accordance with international safety practice, taking into account economic arguments for maintaining a high safety level, and should not be politically motivated.

111. Noting that his country's efforts over the period 1991-2002 to solve the design and operational safety problems of the Kozloduy plant had been strongly supported by the Agency and the international community, he thanked the Agency for the safety review mission which its experts had carried out in June 2002, documenting the new design status of units 3 and 4, and endorsed the Agency's initiative for integrated safety reviews aimed at comprehensive assessment of a country's overall nuclear programme.

112. In June 2002 the National Assembly had adopted a new act on the safe use of nuclear energy complying with all relevant conventions ratified by Bulgaria, EU directives and Agency safety documents. Under the act, the Bulgarian nuclear regulatory authority had been transformed into a Nuclear Regulatory Agency which was institutionally and financially independent and had no promotional functions. The Council of Ministers had approved an increase in the regulatory staff by 22 expert positions, equivalent to almost 40% of the inspectorate. The Nuclear Regulatory Agency was now facing several important challenges, the most difficult of which would probably be revising secondary legislation. In line with the new act, 22 new regulations had to be developed over two years.

113. The Agency's Annual Report for 2001 clearly demonstrated the wide range of significant achievements in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the areas of technology, safety, verification, security and management. The Agency played an important role in establishing a global nuclear safety regime and in providing technical assistance to Member States.

114. Co-operation between Bulgaria and the Agency had continued successfully in 2001. His country was grateful to the Secretariat for its assistance in enhancing the safety of Bulgaria's nuclear facilities, increasing and strengthening the capabilities of the Bulgarian Nuclear Safety Authority and training Bulgarian specialists. His country in turn participated actively in the Agency's technical co-operation programme, giving high priority to projects related to nuclear power, nuclear safety, medicine and the corresponding legislation. Since

the previous session of the General Conference his country had contributed \$270 000 to the TCF.

115. With financial support from the Agency, Bulgarian nuclear scientists had been able to participate in international conferences, symposia and seminars and to exchange experience and knowledge with their colleagues from other countries. Bulgarian research institutes and laboratories had worked under contracts with the Agency and had taken part in co-ordinated research projects, and his country was also participating in the International Nuclear Information System, the Incident Reporting System, the Power Reactor Information System and other activities. The 30th Consultative Meeting of INIS Liaison Officers had been hosted in Sofia in May 2002.

116. His delegation supported the Agency's proposed budget for 2003, which was well balanced with regard to the Agency's priority activities and ensured the implementation of its programmes. Bulgaria had met in full its financial obligations to the Agency's Regular Budget for 2001 and the TCF, and had reimbursed 8% of the amount of technical assistance received. He could announce that Bulgaria's voluntary contribution to the TCF for 2003 would be \$10 000.

117. Mr. KANGAI (Zimbabwe) thanked the Agency for its technical co-operation activities in his country and expressed the hope that the forthcoming second CPF for Zimbabwe (2003-2004) would be as successful as the first.

118. Though gratified that most of the Agency's programmes in Zimbabwe addressed health issues, his delegation was concerned that some important components of the programmes could not be implemented for want of adequate radiation protection levels. He therefore requested the Agency's expertise to help his country meet requirements in that area.

119. Other areas of particular importance to Zimbabwe included agriculture, food and nutrition, and water resources.

120. The Agency had been involved in a project with the University of Zimbabwe Medical School to improve medical services by introducing in vivo diagnostic procedures at the Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals in Harare. It had also assisted in the refurbishment of a new site for the Nuclear Science Department at Parirenyatwa Hospital. He hoped the Agency would continue to offer specialist training to radiographers and nuclear physicians there.

121. The decommissioning of the old cobalt-60 unit at Mpilo Hospital in Bulawayo having been completed, his delegation requested that the Agency assist with a new treatment planning system and the upgrading of the dosimetry system.

122. Zimbabwe appreciated the equipment, training and expert visits provided in connection with the development of isotope-aided molecular techniques for the early detection, treatment and control of the human papilloma virus, which caused cancer of the cervix.

123. Malaria and tuberculosis were major killers in Zimbabwe, therefore it was important to revitalize the project on the detection of drug-resistant malaria and tuberculosis under the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare.

124. Zimbabwe, despite being an agrarian economy, needed to produce more food. To that end, it had instituted an equitable land reform programme which it hoped would mean that hunger would be a thing of the past. His delegation wished to thank the Agency for its involvement in developing bio-fertilizers for increased crop production and soil fertility. Although Zimbabwe had been hit by the severe drought which had afflicted southern Africa, the project had proved valuable to smallholders and had expanded to include all provinces except Matabeleland.

125. He also hoped for the Agency's help in finding much-needed technical and financial support for the groundwater assessment project in Northern Matabeleland.

126. The Agency's endeavours in assisting Zimbabwe to establish adequate legal frameworks for the application of safeguards and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the work undertaken in the Radiation Protection Unit under the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, were greatly appreciated. His country was committed to setting up an appropriate legal framework that would facilitate the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in Zimbabwe.

127. His country was participating in the project on sustainable energy development in sub-Saharan Africa and hoped that appropriate plans for sustainable energy would be devised. It was also participating in a number of AFRA projects on maintenance of medical and scientific instruments, strengthening of waste management infrastructure, development of crop varieties, improvement of clinical radiotherapy and tumour marker capabilities, and non-destructive testing. Through such projects Zimbabwe was gleaning numerous benefits in the form of manpower development and equipment.

128. Mr. O'SHEA (United Kingdom) said that the Agency had a crucial part to play in preventing terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both issues to which his country attached particular importance.

129. In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001 and at the request of the General Conference, the Agency had speedily developed a well-focused and practical programme that would make a major contribution to fighting the global scourge of terrorism. In that connection, the United Kingdom would contribute £500 000, in two instalments, to the Agency's work in the former Soviet Union, in addition to its voluntary contribution of £250 000 to the NSF. He thanked those donors that had contributed and hoped that others would follow suit so as to ensure the future viability of the programme.

130. While responsibility for the security and safety of nuclear and other radioactive materials and nuclear facilities lay with Member States themselves, the Agency should encourage them to accede to international instruments relevant to the struggle against nuclear terrorism and provide specialist guidance on the legal and regulatory steps for such accession. He welcomed the Agency's preparation, revision or review of a number of guidance

documents and urged Member States to make a substantial input to that work. He also welcomed the United States' proposal to convene a conference to advance work on the potential misuse of radiological materials.

131. He commended the Agency's progress with the application of effective nuclear safeguards and the Secretariat's continued work with Member States, which had resulted in the entry into force of 4 new safeguards agreements and 6 additional protocols and the signing of 10 new additional protocols. However, Member States must strive to make speedier progress with the conclusion and implementation of such agreements.

132. Since May 2000, the United Kingdom had had the domestic legislation in place to fulfil its obligations under its additional protocol, and had been providing the Secretariat with voluntary declarations of the information that would be required once its protocol entered into force together with those of its EU partners.

133. Successful implementation of an additional protocol enabled the Secretariat to draw conclusions about the correctness and completeness of a State's safeguards declarations, and so provided the basis for implementation of integrated safeguards. In that connection, he welcomed the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards presented to the Board by the Secretariat in March. His country would continue to work towards the further development of integrated safeguards.

134. His delegation warmly welcomed Cuba's accession to the NPT and urged all other States which had not yet done so to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. He also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completed the Latin American and Caribbean nuclear-weapon-free zone.

135. It had been three and a half years since the Agency had been able to fulfil its mandate in Iraq, and it could now offer no assurances of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, the length of time elapsed since the Agency had last carried out UN-mandated inspections in Iraq meant that its key task on returning to Iraq must be to determine whether Iraq's nuclear activities and capabilities had changed since December 1998. Iraq was aware that it must provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to enable the Agency to carry out its mandate, but Iraq's recent behaviour forced his country to view with scepticism its stated intention to do so.

136. The DPRK's continued failure to implement fully its safeguards agreement with the Agency caused deep concern. While technical discussions continued at a working level, there had been no tangible progress on the verification issues of the completeness and correctness of the DPRK's initial declaration, despite the Agency's proposal of concrete steps to that end. Given that the Agency expected the process to take 3-4 years, that completion of the process was essential if the DPRK was to return to full compliance with its safeguards agreement, and that full compliance was in turn essential before delivery of the key components of the KEDO light-water reactor project, he urged the country to co-operate fully and immediately with the Agency on the verification process.

137. His country's Government and civil nuclear industry took very seriously their responsibilities for ensuring safety at nuclear installations, with regard to both the workforce and the wider public. The United Kingdom's stringent regulatory regime imposed high safety standards. The requirements of the Nuclear Safety Convention and the Joint Convention were fully applied. The United Kingdom called on all States that had not yet acceded to the Joint Convention to do so. It fully supported the Agency's active programme to promote high and consistent international levels of safety and considered that the work of revising the suite of existing safety standards should continue to be given high priority in Major Programme 3.

138. The United Kingdom would play a full and constructive role in the conference on transport safety being organized by the Agency in 2003. As a State involved in the transport of nuclear material, both domestically and internationally, the United Kingdom had recently welcomed a TransSAS mission. He hoped that other Member States would study the mission report, which attested to the existence of effective systems to ensure high safety standards for such transport, and that they, too, would make use of that service.

139. The United Kingdom continued its active participation in the CEG and its development of a fully co-ordinated international action plan for the safe and effective management of radioactive material from decommissioned nuclear submarines in north-west Russia. It would continue to help countries of the former Soviet Union manage their nuclear legacies, but hoped that the necessary framework would soon be put in place.

140. Turning to technical co-operation, he said that the United Kingdom had again shown its commitment by paying its full share of the TCF target. He urged others to do likewise. He welcomed the Agency's contribution to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, at which it had demonstrated its relevance to the sustainable development agenda - where much more work was needed to dispel misconceptions, and its participation in the inter-agency evaluation of ways in which the United Nations family could achieve the Millennium Declaration goals. He recommended a more explicit orientation of the technical co-operation programme towards those goals and those of Agenda 21, as well as the anchoring of certain Agency interventions more firmly into the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the Poverty Reduction Strategy process.

141. Regarding key challenges for the future, he recalled that the Agency could pursue its important role under the three pillars of its mandate only in active partnership with Member States. In its crucial safeguards work the Agency must be able to continue to provide credible assurances that nuclear material was not being used to create weapons of mass destruction. The development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies - so valuable for economic and social development - could not be guaranteed unless those assurances were in place. Member States must therefore ensure that they collectively provided the Agency with the means to carry out its work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

142. The United Kingdom was concerned at recent evidence of an increasing shortfall in resources for safeguards activities, which had resulted in uniquely high levels of core activities unfunded in the Regular Budget and in 2001 had necessitated the equivalent of 17 extra person-years of work by safeguards personnel in the form of unpaid overtime and unclaimed leave. That situation was not sustainable and called for urgent consideration of an

increase in Regular Budget funding for safeguards. It was Member States' duty to ensure that the Secretariat had the resources it needed to fulfil its legal safeguards obligations. He therefore urged Member States to heed the Director General's clear warning that the Agency was close to being unable to do so and - provided a convincing case for increased funding was made - to ensure that the extra resources were made available.

143. His delegation was pleased that an agreement had been reached in the discussions on the 2003 TCF target figure and wished to express particular thanks to Ambassador Hughes of Australia, who had chaired the discussions, for his sterling work. All Member States should endeavour to pay their contributions in full and on time so that the Agency could move towards achieving its 2002 minimum attainment target. Regrettably, 55 countries, developed and developing, had made no TCF pledges in 2001, and a further 11 had not paid theirs, while 18 had paid only a part. Also, the present level of accumulated arrears on assessed programme costs was over \$7 million, or around 10% of the value of the technical co-operation programme, and a significant proportion of them had been outstanding for a long time. That matter should be addressed by the Board of Governors in 2003 when considering the question of the future financing of technical co-operation.

144. The elimination of unnecessary activities was one way of making the Agency as efficient as possible. He therefore welcomed its pursuance of his country's request the previous year² for a study to identify areas of potential internal inefficiency. He thanked Member States that had supported the initial phase of that work, to which his country had contributed £75 000, and hoped that other Member States would support the upcoming second phase.

145. In conclusion, he said that the immediate challenge for Member States was to ensure that the Agency was equipped to fulfil its safeguards obligations while also pursuing its other objectives, and that the United Kingdom pledged its wholehearted support to that endeavour.

146. Ms. ESPINOSA CANTELLANO (Mexico) expressed her delegation's satisfaction at Cuba's recent decision to join the NPT and to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty.

147. The Agency's Annual Report for 2001 duly reflected its major achievements in the promotion of international co-operation on the peaceful use of nuclear technologies and the transfer of such technology to developing countries, as well as its efforts towards an effective nuclear safety regime and an effective and efficient verification system. However, there was widespread concern among Member States with regard to maintaining a balance in the resources devoted respectively to technology, safety and verification; the inclusion in the Annual Report of a diagram showing the distribution of resources should help to allay such worries.

148. With regard to technical co-operation, her delegation acknowledged the Agency's efforts to improve quality and impact. The two phases of the technical co-operation strategy had been of great assistance to developing countries in preparing better, more

² See GC(45)/OR.4, para. 11.

socio-economically effective projects, in accordance with their national priorities, and in finding new users and involving key institutions in priority areas for sustainable development.

149. Mexico was a promoter of technical co-operation between developing countries in Latin America and continued to support the subcontracting activities encouraged by the Agency and regional co-operation mechanisms such as ARCAL. The concept of “Partners in Development” formed the main basis for Mexico’s relations with the Agency. In line with the state of development of its nuclear sector, Mexico would continue to request Agency assistance in certain areas. At the same time, it would continue to place at the disposal of the international community, particularly in Latin America, the knowledge and experience it had gained in the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology.

150. Noting with satisfaction the Agency’s progress on important issues such as combating disease in Africa and drought in Central America, for which nuclear technologies could be crucial, she reiterated her Government’s desire to collaborate in those efforts through the experience of Mexican institutions and experts, especially in isotope hydrology and the sterile insect technique.

151. Mexico shared the concerns expressed during the meeting on managing nuclear knowledge in June 2002 with regard to the declining interest among the younger generation in studying nuclear science and related subjects at university level and to the aging of the nuclear workforce. Given the importance of nuclear science and technology for socio-economic development, there was an immediate need to preserve existing knowledge for future generations by following an integrated strategy to inform the public, simply, clearly and directly, of the great usefulness of nuclear applications.

152. In that context, her Government, in view of the importance it accorded to public opinion, would be launching an information and training programme aimed at various levels of government, the media and the education sector, under the Agency’s 2003-2004 technical co-operation programme.

153. Turning to the advances made in her country in the past year, she noted that preventive maintenance had been carried out on the aluminium pool liner of the TRIGA Mark III research reactor at the National Nuclear Research Institute (ININ), thus prolonging its useful life. A new digital control console designed and built at ININ had been installed to operate the reactor and acceptance tests had been successfully performed. All activities had been conducted under ININ’s quality assurance programme, with the approval and supervision of the national regulatory body, the National Commission for Nuclear Safety and Safeguards, and the application process had been concluded with that body to renew the licence for the reactor, which had been in operation since 1968.

154. Infrastructure modernization had been completed at the new radioisotope production plant, which had 16 hot cells for the production of radioisotopes, radiopharmaceuticals and labelled molecules for medical and industrial applications throughout Mexico. The design, construction and automation of the cells had been carried out by ININ in line with international standards. In July 2002 the regulatory body had approved the operating licence

for the plant and documentation had been prepared for certification of the plant's quality system in accordance with ISO 9001-2000.

155. The Gamma Irradiation Service was being used to improve various products through sanitization, disinfection and/or sterilization. Regular users of the service included 200 businesses with nearly 400 products, principally dried or dehydrated foodstuffs, medical products, cosmetics and herbal products. The service's quality management system, provided by ININ, had also been certified in accordance with ISO 9001-2000.

156. With Agency support, Mexico had established its first and only tissue bank at ININ, where ionizing radiation was used to sterilize tissues for medical applications in accordance with international quality assurance standards and pharmacopoeia regulations. To increase the uses of those tissues, agreements had been signed with public-sector health institutions to establish clinical protocols for different tissues, including test protocols for the use of porcine tissue on large-area burn patients and for dental applications of lyophilized, powdered and sterilized bone.

157. Her delegation acknowledged the Agency's safety activities, particularly the drawing up of a code of conduct on the safety of research reactors and the implementation of the revised Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources. A regional workshop on the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive materials had been successfully held in Mexico City in September 2002 under the auspices of the Agency.

158. She reiterated her delegation's total support for all measures in the area of radiation protection that were designed to promote the application of safety standards to protect health, the enhancement of education and training, and the exchange of information and co-ordination between research projects. She accordingly welcomed the proposed International Action Plan for the Radiological Protection of Patients and offered the services of Mexican experts for the implementation phase of the plan.

159. With regard to safety culture, the seminar on self-assessment training held under Agency auspices at the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant in June 2001 had significantly contributed to the plant's own programme on the same subject, established in 1996, under which safety was considered the top priority in providing safe, reliable and economical electricity in strict compliance with environmental regulations.

160. The Laguna Verde plant, with its two units, had been operating successfully at high capacity for 19 years.

161. Mexico had presented the required report to the second Review Meeting under the Nuclear Safety Convention, and the two recommendations it had received, relating to the regulatory body and the nuclear power plant, were being given due attention.

162. She congratulated the Secretariat on the steps taken to strengthen safeguards. However, in view of domestic economic difficulties affecting many developing countries, including Mexico, it was difficult to accept any increase in the Agency's budget to provide extra financial resources for safeguards.

163. Her delegation noted with satisfaction the steps taken against nuclear terrorism and, believing that international co-operation should be the main mechanism for the fight against terrorism within international organizations and the United Nations in particular, had participated actively in drawing up the action plan for the prevention of nuclear terrorism. It also continued to play an enthusiastic part in the work on drafting an amendment to the CPPNM. In that context, she wished to stress that, even if there were no direct link between poverty and terrorism, marginalization and lack of opportunities could produce susceptible groups of potential terrorists. Any measure aimed at sustainable development, for example strengthening the technical co-operation programme, was therefore important in preventing terrorism.

164. Monsignor BOCCARDI (Holy See) expressed his gratitude to the Director General and his staff for their dedicated work and underlined the Agency's valuable contribution to the establishment of a global nuclear safety culture, especially through its work on radiological protection of patients, monitoring and reduction of occupational exposure to radiation and safe management of radioactive waste.

165. If a global nuclear safety culture was to be achieved, an up-to-date system of training and education must be created and universally applied in order to prevent disparities in safety, radiation protection and quality assurance between developed and developing countries. While it was important to upgrade old equipment, it was surely even more important for a culture of nuclear safety to increase awareness of potential dangers accompanying nuclear technology.

166. His delegation believed that the human person was at the centre of all scientific research and development. For that reason, it attached great importance to radiological protection for patients and caregivers. However, the impact of nuclear technology on the environment was also a vital issue. His delegation therefore welcomed the ongoing discussions between the Agency and a group of consultants about ethical considerations in protecting the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation. Preserving the world's biodiversity was an indispensable part of the effort to create a more human world for future generations. The regulations governing the use of radioactive and fissile materials were generally strict, but must be fully enforced in order to protect humans and the environment.

167. One of the greatest concerns relating to the safety and security of nuclear materials was the increasing problem of orphan sources. The Agency performed an indispensable task by helping Member States to set up or strengthen national regulatory infrastructures and providing assistance to both institutions and States in emergency situations.

168. His delegation commended the Agency for its technical co-operation activities in the areas of medicine and agriculture. Its work in cancer treatment, diagnostic radiology and nuclear medicine helped many people in regions where those forms of diagnosis and treatment were not yet widely available, especially in rural areas. In agriculture, the Agency's work on the control of pests and diseases, food safety and the use of isotopes in the exploration of water resources and the control of pollution in large cities contributed greatly to social and economic development in many parts of the world.

169. If technical co-operation projects were to be successful in the long term, participants must adapt the projects to their own regions, develop them further and pass on their knowledge to neighbouring countries with similar problems. Such cross-border co-operation could have a great impact on the social, economic and humanitarian situation in many societies.

170. Mr. GARCIA (Philippines) said the subject of nuclear terrorism had been very much in his country's consciousness since the terrible events of 11 September 2001. He appreciated the Agency's vigilance against the threat and the specific measures described in document GC(46)/14.

171. A Philippine action plan for the safety and security of radiation sources had been set in motion earlier in the year. The Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources was being implemented even as regulations continued to be reviewed and updated. His country's inspection system had been rationalized to accord greater attention to high-risk sources, and a comprehensive up-to-date registry of all radiation sources in the country had been completed in August 2002.

172. The Philippines condemned terrorism in all its forms and was committed to combating it in the nuclear field. Being a small country with limited financial resources it was willing to consider measures additional to those it was taking independently; however, it hoped they could be funded by extrabudgetary contributions rather than displacing priority activities in the Regular Budget or departing from zero real growth.

173. Emphasizing the need for technical co-operation to be financed through predictable, adequate and assured funding, he said the Philippines supported the agreement reached on the TCF targets for the 2003-2004 biennium and the indicative planning figures for the biennium thereafter. His delegation firmly believed that the technical co-operation programme should be driven by priorities defined by recipient Member States, according to the principles laid down in document INFCIRC/267. Special attention should be given to the development and propagation of non-power applications that addressed existing problems, as they contributed to the Agency's continuing relevance.

174. The application of nuclear techniques to harmful algal blooms - better known as "red tide" - had been practically unheard of five years previously. The first project on such blooms had been funded through the Reserve Fund at the request of his country. The receptor binding assay based on nuclear techniques had proved to be superior to the conventional mouse bioassay in terms of speed of detection and sensitivity to lower levels of saxitoxins in shellfish and was now a nuclear application that was spreading to other places. At the recent World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, the Agency had presented the technology as one of its partnership initiatives in support of Agenda 21.

175. Agency technical assistance had also facilitated other recent strides in nuclear applications in his country, including an 80% increase in neonatal screening for congenital hypothyroidism and the establishment of the first positron emission tomography centre in South East Asia. By way of a contribution to technical co-operation among developing

countries, the Philippines had hosted eight training events and received six fellows and scientific visitors in 2001.

176. His country attached particular importance to radiation safety because medical practices involving the use of ionizing radiation were the largest contributor to human exposure to radiation from man-made sources. The Philippines was currently engaged in activities under milestone 3 of the Agency's Model Project on radiation protection, which were being undertaken jointly with the concerned professional groups and associations, and it was participating in the regional RCA project on radiation protection, which complemented the activities of the Model Project. He had learnt with disappointment that core funding from the Agency for the RCA project was to be discontinued, and he wished to request that the decision be reconsidered in view of the value of the activities involved, such as intercomparison exercises.

177. Noting the International Action Plan for the Radiological Protection of Patients contained in document GC(46)/12, he reported that the recommendations of the 2001 Malaga Conference were being implemented in the Philippines, taking into account local circumstances. With regard to the goal of dose reduction, Agency guidance documents were being used in the review and revision of relevant regulations.

178. Having participated in the Conference on Occupational Radiation Protection held in Geneva in August 2002, his delegation maintained that the few new aspects that had been suggested for incorporation into the existing system of radiological protection did not justify a major change in the current ICRP recommendations, from the point of view of both practicality and ease of adoption, especially in a developing country such as the Philippines.

179. Ms. BRIDGE (New Zealand) said that the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001 had led to increased emphasis on the physical protection of nuclear materials and, indeed, on nuclear safety and security and nuclear safeguards in general. The Agency's programme of new and expanded measures against nuclear terrorism had rightly occupied a great deal of Member States' attention over the last year.

180. New Zealand fully supported the Agency's initiative of establishing the NSF for activities to combat terrorism. She was pleased to announce that her country would contribute 25 000 New Zealand dollars to the Fund as a demonstration of its commitment to the global anti-terrorist effort and its confidence in the Agency.

181. Two years had passed since the 2000 NPT Review Conference, at which the five nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, however, little progress had been achieved in that direction. A few days before, at the General Assembly, her country and the other members of the New Agenda Coalition had expressed their dissatisfaction at that lack of progress, as well as their concern about the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons.

182. The Review Conference had called upon all States to accede to the CTBT, which had a critical role to play in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The New Zealand Foreign Minister had been one of the authors of a joint ministerial statement, issued at the General

Assembly, in which the ministers had personally committed themselves to working for the entry into force of the CTBT as soon as possible.

183. One of the Agency's most important functions was to implement the safeguards agreements entered into by the States Party to the NPT. However, some countries had still not signed the NPT at all, and too many others had signed but had not yet concluded safeguards agreements. She also urged those countries which had not yet done so to conclude additional protocols with the Agency.

184. There was one country in her region which had both signed the NPT and concluded a safeguards agreement, but had failed to fulfil its obligations, namely the DPRK. She called upon the Government of that country to allow the Agency to verify the declaration of nuclear material dating from 1992, which would allow work to proceed on the KEDO light water reactor. There had been recent positive signs that verification might be allowed to proceed in the near future.

185. Her country was likewise concerned that Iraq was failing to fulfil its international obligations under Security Council resolution 687 and other associated resolutions. Unless Iraq allowed weapons inspectors back into the country, the Agency would be unable to give the required assurances that Iraq was fulfilling its obligations under those resolutions. Her country welcomed Iraq's recent announcement that it would allow the weapons inspectors to return without preconditions and hoped that it would implement that decision in full and without delay. The failure of some parties to the NPT to fulfil their obligations could only undermine the Treaty itself and reduce confidence in international processes and the rule of law.

186. One issue which was especially important to her delegation was the safe transport of radioactive material. Her Government felt strongly that it had an obligation to protect the population's health, the environment and the national economy from the consequences of an accident or hostile incident during the transport of radioactive material by sea, no matter how small the risk might be. Shipments must be subjected to a comprehensive international regulatory regime which satisfied not only the shipping States, but also those States past whose shores the shipments were regularly sent and would continue to be sent for at least the next 10 years. At present, the shipping States were satisfied, but the coastal States were not. Her country was willing to work towards a mutually acceptable solution and looked forward to the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, to be held in Vienna in July 2003, which she hoped would achieve further progress.

187. Mr. BADDU (Morocco) acknowledged the Agency's role in the preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg and the contribution it had made to its various resolutions, which were a clear expression of the objectives set by the international community.

188. Morocco had adopted a democratic and participatory approach to the threats of drought and desertification which it, along with many countries in its region, was facing. Aware of the urgent need to protect the environment and biodiversity, it welcomed the role the Agency played in that regard and called on the entire international community to fulfil its

commitments so as to ensure sustainable development for all. His country was proud to have hosted a series of international meetings on those issues, including the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.

189. Despite the determination shown by Morocco and the other countries of the South, their aspirations to sustainable development remained dependent on a universal sense of shared responsibility. If they were to bear fruit, those countries' efforts and sacrifices would have to be backed up by a global strategy involving the entire international community. The Agency was undoubtedly one of the major organizations that could help to achieve that. He therefore encouraged it to continue promoting the appropriate use of nuclear technology and applications to assure the sustainable development of those countries.

190. The tragic events in the Middle East and the unbearable suffering of the Palestinian people in particular troubled the universal conscience and aroused serious concerns. With the exception of Israel, all the Middle Eastern countries were party to the NPT, and most had signed safeguards agreements. It was morally unacceptable for a country to flout all the relevant Security Council resolutions, jeopardizing world peace and stability. He called on the international community to take the measures necessary for the region to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

191. His delegation was relieved by the Iraqi Government's decision to abide by the relevant Security Council resolutions and allow inspections to recommence without preconditions. That move would contribute to re-establishing trust in the region and reinforce the role of the international authorities in maintaining peace.

192. Morocco saw the Agency's mandate regarding nuclear security as fundamental and supported unreservedly the action plan adopted by the Board of Governors. It had also recently transmitted to the Director General the instruments of ratification of the CPPNM.

193. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy undoubtedly had to comply with Agency safety standards, but setting those standards was not enough - they also had to be understood and above all implemented. To help the Agency provide the training that would be required, Morocco had made its National Centre for Nuclear Energy, Sciences and Technology available for a graduate course on radiological safety and waste safety for French-speaking countries. Morocco would also host the Agency's International Conference on National Infrastructures for Radiation Safety in September 2003. Moreover, with the Agency's assistance, it had begun drafting a nuclear law which would unify and homogenize the existing legal infrastructure and establish a regulatory authority.

194. Mr. TABIBIAN (Armenia) said that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had revealed a threat not only to the United States of America, but to all the countries of the world, a threat which must be met with international solidarity. Among the most potentially devastating risks posed by the new situation was that related to nuclear security. The Agency must be even more vigilant than before. Nuclear facilities and radioactive materials could only be protected if there was maximum co-operation within the nuclear community. As the Director General had recently pointed out, the international regime for the physical protection

of nuclear material and facilities required further strengthening. His country fully supported the Agency's action plan to combat nuclear terrorism.

195. Nuclear power was one of Armenia's main energy sources, providing 35% of the country's electricity. Over the last decade, in view of a continuous blockade of the country's borders by two of its neighbours, Azerbaijan and Turkey, the Government had concentrated on resolving its immediate energy supply problems rather than on medium- or long-term solutions.

196. Armenia saw many advantages in nuclear power: it had environmental benefits compared with fossil fuels and a predictable cost structure which did not fluctuate with variations in fuel prices, and it helped the country to diversify its energy sources. With its land-locked situation, lack of domestic fuel sources and vulnerability to pressure from other countries, Armenia could not abandon nuclear power unless there was a genuinely reliable and affordable alternative.

197. The Agency was helping his Government to develop a national master plan for energy as part of a technical co-operation project on energy and nuclear power planning. His country would help the Agency in its turn by specifying user requirements as inputs for research into innovative reactor design and more efficient fuel cycle utilization. Such solutions would, he hoped, increase the attractiveness of nuclear power, compared with other sources of energy, for developing countries such as his own.

198. Armenia attached great importance to improving the legal framework for nuclear safety and non-proliferation. The National Assembly would debate the ratification of an additional and a supplementary protocol and the CTBT at its forthcoming autumn session. The Government was likewise considering acceding to the Joint Convention. It had already acted to improve the safety and security of spent fuel: a dry storage facility, built by the French company Framatome and financed by the French Government, had come into operation in 2000.

199. Commenting upon remarks made by the delegate of Azerbaijan in the Plenary the previous day³, he said that the Agency owed its effectiveness to its technical and scientific competence, the transparency of its operations and the objectivity of its assessments, but also to its efforts to remain above political controversy. He was therefore disappointed to note that Azerbaijan's recent accession to the Agency had not given it a sense of moderation or responsibility, but had merely provided it with yet another forum in which to criticize Armenia. In reply to Azerbaijan's specific accusations about the safety and security of Armenia's nuclear facilities, he could state that the Armenian nuclear power plant and all activities related to it had been subjected to the most thorough safety evaluation. Since 1994, some 30 missions from the Agency and elsewhere, involving over 100 experts and inspectors each year, had examined every aspect of Armenia's nuclear energy programme. Azerbaijan had been invited to join those inspections. Its constant repetition of the same accusations could only be a sign of bad faith.

³ See GC(46)/OR.2, paras 42-52.

200. A recent IRRT mission had assessed the activities of the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Agency and found it to be acting entirely within its mandate. Several of the mission's recommendations were being taken into consideration. Armenia had presented its national report to the second Review Meeting under the Nuclear Safety Convention, which had concluded that Armenia had fulfilled all relevant requirements. Measures had also been recommended to increase safety at the Medzamor nuclear power plant, and Armenia was preparing a safety analysis report with the assistance of the United States Department of Energy. The Armenian Government was seeking funds for improvements to unit 2 of the plant, and the construction of a new nuclear power plant was under consideration.

201. Turning to technical co-operation, he said that Armenia had undertaken a number of training and other projects with the Agency. Its CPF had been signed in May 2001, and five additional projects arising from it would be implemented in 2003-2004. Armenia participated in all regional technical co-operation initiatives related to nuclear energy and nuclear safety, including the Model Project on national regulatory control and occupational radiation protection programmes, which had enabled it to upgrade its national infrastructure significantly.

202. Mr. TAVARTKILADZE (Georgia) welcomed the IAEA's continued work in the area of radiation safety. Georgia had become a member of the Agency in 1997 and by 1999 had established, under the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, a Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service for the regulation and control of nuclear activities. Within a short time and with Agency assistance, laws and documents permitting the effective regulation of radiation source management had been drawn up.

203. One of Georgia's main problems was the presence of orphan sources. That had led to incidents such as the one at Lilo involving caesium-137 sources and the discovery of strontium-90 thermoelectric generators in Svaneti where an environmental disaster had only been avoided thanks to Agency assistance. Unfortunately it was not known how many other such sources might still be in Georgia. An airborne gamma survey of Western Georgia in 2000 in conjunction with IAEA and French experts had uncovered an orphan source in a residential area. Similar work was also planned for the Abkhazia area under the auspices of the Agency and with assistance from France, the United States of America and India; two large areas had already been surveyed and several radiation sources rendered harmless.

204. At the Georgian Academy of Sciences, a detailed plan had been drawn up for bringing the research reactor into a safe condition, a project which had succeeded through joint efforts.

205. The storage of radioactive waste remained a key issue, which the Government planned to resolve by establishing a repository in Eastern Georgia. High priority would be given to its construction, as over 200 orphan sources were already in temporary storage that did not meet minimum international safety standards. Work financed by the United States was currently under way to improve the storage conditions. Donor countries such as France and the United States, as well as the IAEA, would help to equip the repository, whose construction would also help prevent terrorist use of highly radioactive sources.

206. Georgia was developing a legislative basis for the effective regulation of nuclear and radiation activities and had already adopted a law and national standards, based on international standards, to govern nuclear and radiation safety, as well as a regulatory protocol on licensing. Laws on the transport and storage of radioactive materials had been drafted and should be adopted soon. Georgia hoped for continued IAEA support in all areas including the development of the infrastructure for a regulatory authority.

207. Turning to the subject of illicit trafficking, he said that more than 4 kg of smuggled uranium had been confiscated in Georgia since 1999. Special attention would be paid to that matter, particularly in view of Georgia's location. In that connection, the existence of some separatist-occupied areas which the Government did not control was a cause for concern, especially in view of the recent attacks on the United States. Thus Georgia felt a great responsibility to the international community to ensure security and hoped to strengthen co-operation with all countries and the IAEA in organizing the active prevention and control of trafficking in nuclear materials. The Government of Germany, through the IAEA, had recently given Georgia a mobile laboratory for radiation monitoring, an example of international co-operation to ensure radiation safety in developing countries. Given such co-operation, the Great Silk Route, which passed through Georgia, would help bring about not only economic development, but also political stability in the entire Caucasus region, and the Director General's visit to Georgia had encouraged hopes of further fruitful co-operation as well.

208. For its part, Georgia would do everything possible to embark on a payment plan to meet its financial obligations to the Agency; the first steps had already been taken. He trusted that Georgia's voting rights would be restored, as that would act as a stimulus for further efforts.

209. Mr. VARGAS CARREÑO (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) welcomed Cuba's decision to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty. That meant that all States in Latin America and the Caribbean would be OPANAL members and that the Treaty would enter into force for all the countries in the denuclearized zone established by the Treaty.

210. While the Treaty and its additional protocols ensured the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, preventing what could have become a dangerous arms race there and contributing to global peace and security, greater progress would be made if a standard in international law could be established as a *jus cogens* prohibiting the use and threat of using such weapons. The Tlatelolco Treaty had set a good example, leading to the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in the South Pacific, South East Asia and Africa. The four zones covered some 110 States, over half of the international community, and negotiations were under way to establish a fifth zone in the Central Asian republics. Mutual co-operation among the zones and with the United Nations, the various disarmament fora and the IAEA was needed in order to establish a common policy towards potential owners of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, OPANAL believed it would be useful and important to hold an international conference of States party to nuclear-weapon-free zones, with IAEA participation.

211. The main objective of the Tlatelolco Treaty - to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities were only used peacefully - could not be met without an effective system of control, safeguards and verification. Such a system was provided for in the Treaty and in the bilateral or multilateral agreements with the IAEA required by it. In the spirit of the greater co-operation with the IAEA sought by OPANAL, a regional seminar to promote additional protocols for strengthened safeguards had been held in Lima the previous year.

212. OPANAL applauded the efforts made by the IAEA to improve nuclear security in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001. For its part, OPANAL's General Conference had adopted a resolution calling on the Latin American and Caribbean States to take measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials for terrorist and other non-peaceful purposes and to increase the security of their installations and nuclear material.

213. OPANAL also welcomed the decision to hold an International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, a matter of great importance to several States in the region, and he was sure that the conference would contribute towards filling legislative gaps in that area.

The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.