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President: Mr. URRUELA PRADO (Guatemala)

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[*] GC(46)/19.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(46)/INF/8/Rev.1.

For reasons of economy, this document has been printed in a limited number.
Delegates are kindly requested to bring their own copies of documents to meetings.

Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARASIA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
EU	European Union
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
MOX	Mixed oxide
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Safety Convention	Convention on Nuclear Safety
OSPAR Convention	Oslo-Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic
PHWR	Pressurized heavy water reactor
Quadripartite Agreement	Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
R&D	Research and development
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
WWER	Water cooled water moderated reactor (former USSR)

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2001 (continued)
(GC(46)/2)

1. Mr. FRANIĆ (Croatia) said that his country had always used nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and conducted related activities in full compliance with the Agency's goals. Supporting the statement made by the delegate of Denmark on behalf of the European Union, he said that the 2001 agreement on stabilization and association between the European Union and Croatia had given new impetus to mutual co-operation and fostered the harmonization of Croatian legislation with EU standards.
2. Croatia had been among the first countries to bring additional protocols to their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency into force. It had also been one of the first to accept the amendment to Article VI of the Statute and he called on all Member States that had not yet ratified that amendment to do so to enable its early entry into force.
3. Croatia, aware of how important financial contributions were for the Agency to fulfil its mandate, had again paid its contributions in full and on time.
4. He expressed appreciation for the wide range of projects that were being conducted in Croatia under the Agency's technical co-operation programme. Worthy of special mention was the ongoing project on the use of nuclear technology in landmine detection, which could make a valuable contribution to demining processes worldwide. Croatia had proposed six projects under the technical co-operation programme aimed at making peaceful use of nuclear technologies, reinforcing the infrastructure for nuclear and radiological safety, as well as combating the illegal use of nuclear material and trafficking therein. Also, it had recently concluded a Country Programme Framework, a highly useful project planning tool.
5. Experts at Croatian research institutions and universities were actively co-operating in training activities within the framework of the technical co-operation programme, both at home and abroad. He invited the Agency to make greater use of his country's capacity in that regard. In future, Croatia intended to focus on education in nuclear sciences and the management of nuclear knowledge in order to strengthen its expert base and also to promote public interest.
6. Following protracted disputes over the operation of the Krško nuclear power plant arising from the new independent status of Croatia and Slovenia, the joint owners of the plant, the two countries had signed in December 2001 an agreement regulating the status of - and other legal relations in connection with - investments in and the operation and decommissioning of the plant. While Croatia had already ratified that agreement, Slovenia's ratification was still pending. Given the importance of the agreement's implications for safety, he urged Slovenia to proceed without delay.
7. Ms. MÖLLER (Germany), having associated her country with the statement delivered by the representative of Denmark on behalf of the European Union, said that one year after the terrorist attacks on 11 September the Agency was proceeding with its comprehensive action plan to counter nuclear terrorism. That action plan would help States to

improve and upgrade the physical protection of their nuclear facilities and materials without diminishing in any way the primary responsibility of nations in matters of security. Her country had provided cost-free experts to the Agency in support of the action plan and it hoped to make a major contribution to the special fund in 2003.

8. The nuclear terrorism threat had had an impact on safeguards. The Agency's safeguards system was expected to provide an assurance that nuclear materials remained devoted to peaceful purposes and that clandestine nuclear weapons programmes were not being pursued. The Agency had an important role to play in preventing nuclear material from falling into the hands of terrorists. Her country supported all initiatives to review the Agency's safeguards system, to strengthen it further and to make it more flexible and cost-efficient. Germany urged all States to make the non-proliferation system universal and effective.

9. Noting with satisfaction the reports submitted by the Director General in the field of nuclear safety, she welcomed the progress made towards the establishment of a research reactor safety plan. All States with research reactors should take an active part in enhancing that plan. Also, Germany had followed with interest the implementation of the revised Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources and appreciated the progress made with regard to the safe transport of radioactive materials. It continued to accord particular attention to radioactive waste safety management activities and assured the Secretariat of its full support in organizing the international conference on safe decommissioning for nuclear activities scheduled for October 2002 in Berlin. It was vital that future generations did not inherit such environmental liabilities as nuclear waste which had not been properly and safely managed.

10. Education and training in nuclear safety, including waste safety, were also important and Germany was determined to maintain the level of its contribution to training courses, despite increasing domestic budgetary problems. In spite of those problems, Germany had been able to join the consensus on the compromise proposal for the level of funding for technical co-operation activities.

11. Her Government saw an urgent need for quick and sustainable action in the management of nuclear knowledge, the eradication of disease-bearing insects in Africa and the application of isotope hydrology in Central America. It also supported the INPRO project to which it was providing cost-free experts.

12. In conclusion, she said that Germany would continue its long-standing co-operation with the Agency, which would remain the main partner and reference institution for many of her country's concerns about safety and security at nuclear installations and the safeguarding of nuclear material.

13. Mr. AL-JANABI (Iraq) observing that Iraq had been positively co-operating with the Agency over the years in all its activities, said the Agency should, for its part, comply with its obligations under Article II of its Statute. For example, it had suspended approved technical co-operation projects and failed to provide any assistance for the decontamination

and elimination of the consequences of depleted uranium used in Iraq and for the treatment of radioactive waste, activities which were regarded as priority areas for the Agency.

14. Iraq had fully complied with the requirements contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of section C of Security Council resolution 687(1991). The Director General had stated in his report to the Security Council (contained in document S/2001/337 of 6 April 2001) that the few remaining questions and concerns did not prevent the Agency from moving to the stage of full implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan and that they could be dealt with during implementation of the plan. Similar statements had been made in subsequent reports by the Director General to the Security Council (document S/2002/367 of 16 April 2002) and to the General Conference (GC(46)/13).

15. Experience showed that the best and only way of resolving problems was to hold unconditional businesslike discussions, and that was what Iraq had been urging for a long time. The United Nations had responded to that call in the present year and three meetings had taken place, attended by Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs and a number of high-level experts. Thereafter an invitation had been issued to the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC to visit Baghdad with a view to arriving at an optimum solution in the matter of finalizing the disarmament requirements contained in section C of resolution 687. In spite of Iraq's good will, both the United States of America and the United Kingdom had persisted in waging a hostile media campaign on the pretext that Iraq was manufacturing weapons of mass destruction using its installations and capabilities, although they knew that those installations had been destroyed by them more than once and been subjected to continued inspections and monitoring over many years. Nevertheless Iraq had invited the British Government to send a technical delegation to visit those installations. The Iraqi National Assembly had also invited the American Senate and House of Representatives to those installations together with any experts they wished. Iraq's letter of 16 September 2002 to the United Nations Secretary-General about permitting the unconditional return of the United Nations weapons inspectors was definite proof of the absence of weapons of mass destruction and of its co-operation in implementing the Security Council resolutions. In return, Iraq asked the Security Council and the international organizations concerned to discharge their obligations towards Iraq under the Security Council resolutions in an effective manner and ensure the lifting of the embargo imposed unjustly on Iraq eleven years previously.

16. The world was trying to eliminate the dangers of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use since they created situations of conflict in many regions. The Middle East was unstable because of the nuclear threat resulting from Israel's failure to heed legitimate international appeals to sign the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. Furthermore, it had undermined the credibility of that Treaty and of the safeguards system when in 1981 it had attacked Iraqi nuclear installations under safeguards. That attack had been condemned by the Security Council in resolution 487(1981) demanding that Israel place its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards. However, Israel had refused to obey that resolution just as it had rejected those of the General Conference. The only solution to the problem of restoring security in the Middle East was to apply paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687(1991) and establish a zone free from weapons of mass destruction.

17. The United States of America was conducting itself according to an immoral code, divorced from the logic of international relations and laws and ignoring national sovereignty and security. For thirteen years it had been subjecting Iraq to daily attacks against civilian installations and inflicting numerous casualties. Was that not a violation of international law and of the principle of respect for the sovereignty of States?

18. Iraq had the right to demand that the Security Council fulfil its obligations by lifting the embargo, giving effect to paragraph 14 of its resolution 687(1991) and eliminating from the Middle East the Zionist threat posed by Israel's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and development of its spy satellite capabilities.

19. The Agency's safeguards statements on the physical inventory in Iraq in 2000, 2001 and 2002 indicated that the nuclear material was secure and that the material inventory was consistent with the records. The Agency should therefore resume normal relations and restore to Iraq its rights and privileges as a member of the Agency, including implementation of the technical co-operation projects approved for 1999-2000 and 2001-2002, which had been suspended by an unfair decision dictated by the United States of America and the United Kingdom to the Security Council Sanctions Committee. It should also respond to Iraq's numerous requests for assistance not only in cleaning up the contamination resulting from the attacks on Iraqi nuclear facilities and the use by United States and British forces of hundreds of tons of depleted uranium missiles in 1991, but also for participation by Iraqis in Agency training courses. The Agency had referred those requests to the Sanctions Committee, which was known for its obstruction of any measure that would benefit the Iraqi people and which, succumbing to United States pressure, applied double standards.

20. The United States was focusing world attention on nuclear terrorism to serve its own political interests, forgetting that it was itself a pioneer in the field. It had used nuclear weapons in 1945, bombed Iraqi nuclear reactors in 1991 and used depleted uranium during its attacks against Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999 causing hundreds of thousands of deaths.

21. The continuation of the unjust embargo against Iraq, the persistently hostile attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom and the position taken by them on the Sanctions Committee had led to import bans on vital medicines and medical supplies, to aggravation of the sufferings of the Iraqi people, to more than 1 670 000 deaths - mostly children, to an increase in mortality from chronic diseases to 100 752 in 2001, compared to 20 224 in 1999, and a higher incidence of cancers owing to serious environmental deterioration. The traces of depleted uranium which had been detected by Iraqi scientists in the bodies of martyrs and injured only added to the suffering inflicted on the Iraqi people.

22. He hoped that the Conference would shoulder its responsibilities in respect of the aspirations of Member States, especially the developing ones which were trying to utilize the benefits of nuclear techniques for development and progress, and also that it would reject the unfair double standards which the dominant States were imposing on the Agency to achieve their hostile political aims.

23. Mr. BAHRAN (Yemen), having reiterated Yemen's strong condemnation of all acts of terrorism, said his country supported all international, regional and national activities to promote the peaceful applications of atomic energy, nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety, and the strengthening of the safeguards system and its expansion to include all States without exception so as to ensure peace and security, justice and equality for all peoples. Yemen supported the measures being taken by the Agency to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radiation sources and to strengthen the physical protection of such material and sources.

24. He expressed particular concern about the physical protection of primary radiation sources, on which subject Yemen had presented a paper at the International Conference of National Regulatory Authorities with Competence in the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Material held in Buenos Aires in December 2000. At the International Conference on the Security of Material held in Stockholm in May 2002, Yemen had proposed a system of identification of primary radiation sources. At the 45th session of the General Conference, his delegation had stressed the need for a new resolution on the topic.¹ It was therefore a matter of satisfaction for Yemen that it was a co-sponsor with - amongst others - all the countries of the European Union and the United States of America, of a draft resolution on nuclear security, which included a reference to orphan sources.²

25. Yemen advocated nuclear disarmament, elimination of the causes of tension and the promotion of mutual understanding and co-operation between States. It endeavoured to remove injustice and to help the weak to secure their legal rights under international law and the United Nations Charter. Reaffirming his country's stand against war and military intervention, he welcomed Iraq's declaration about the unconditional acceptance of Agency inspectors. He hoped that as a result the present crisis would be defused, reason would prevail and the children of Iraq would be saved from the ordeal they had been suffering.

26. In accordance with its obligations under the NPT, Yemen had recently ratified the safeguards agreement it had signed with the Agency in 2000. It considered it important that all the world's nuclear installations should be under Agency safeguards. In that context, Yemen reiterated its demand that Israeli nuclear activities should be subject to international norms and that no double standards should be applied. Recalling the suffering of the Palestinian Arab people under the merciless Israeli occupation, he said there was no justice when 120 000 olive trees had been uprooted, 3576 homes demolished and 40 000 Palestinians expelled in the course of just one year. Nor was it justice to fire bullets at children and unarmed people, to deprive civilians of food, water and electricity, to detain people in concentration camps, to prevent ambulances from reaching their destination, to wipe out Palestinian villages, and to destroy churches and mosques. Israel possessed every weapon of mass destruction.

27. Yemen highly valued the Agency's technical co-operation activities. In particular, it welcomed the establishment of ARASIA, uniting countries with common problems.

¹ See document GC(45)/OR.3 para. 51.

² Subsequently adopted as resolution GC(46)/RES/13.

28. Mr. KAKODKAR (India) noted that the balance the Agency maintained among its statutory functions was central to the universal support it enjoyed.

29. With reference to the recent World Summit on Sustainable Development, he expressed regret that unfounded misconceptions still prevailed about nuclear power. Its great potential for meeting long-term worldwide energy needs without any significant environmental impact made it an inevitable option in view of the present state of development of energy technologies. Policy and opinion makers should realise what a positive contribution nuclear energy could make before it was too late.

30. India, whose people constituted a sixth of the world's population, had accorded high priority to the self-reliant development of nuclear power and had a strong indigenous capability in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Eight reactors were under construction, including four 220 MW(e) and two 540 MW(e) PHWRs of Indian design and two 1000 MW(e) WWER units being set up in co-operation with the Russian Federation, altogether adding a further 3960 MW(e) to the grid. Construction was ahead of schedule and the design, construction and operation of all nuclear power plants in India was currently performed by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, one of the best managed companies in the country. The 14 units already in operation had registered an impressive 85% overall average annual capacity in 2001 and had maintained an excellent safety record. Four of those reactors had been subject to a WANO peer review. The Indian 220 MW(e) units were the smallest commercially competitive units on the market and could be of interest to some developing countries. Also, India had signed a contract to supply a small quantity of heavy water to the Republic of Korea and its track record with respect to export controls and the fulfilment of its international obligations had been so exemplary that India had been described as a classic non-proliferator. India was making efforts to accelerate the development of nuclear power in the light of the need to reduce global carbon dioxide emissions. The restrictive export policies of certain countries could hinder those efforts and increase dependence on fossil fuels with the associated damage to the global environment. Proliferation concerns regarding external supplies to India were unfounded as such supplies would come under facility or supply specific safeguards.

31. Turning to safety, he said that India had a good track record and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board ensured that safety measures in all activities conformed to international standards. The Board had set up its own Safety Research Institute to supplement inputs from other national laboratories. Safety could not be divorced from technology, a link understood by experts while formulating the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Unfortunately, technologies continued to be denied even for systems important to safety. India had been one of the early signatories to that Convention and hoped that conditions would soon become conducive for it to go ahead with ratification.

32. INPRO was an appropriate and timely activity to enhance nuclear power for the sustainable development of the world. India was convinced that innovative solutions would provide superior, cost-effective and comprehensive alternatives to the current approach which dealt with technology, safety and safeguards separately. India had taken an active part in INPRO and had also provided cost-free experts. The Indian Nuclear Society would dedicate a

special session to INPRO during its 2002 annual conference and his delegation was happy that several Agency experts would be participating. The time had come for the INPRO programme to be funded from the Agency's Regular Budget and not from extrabudgetary resources.

33. The Agency had responded promptly to nuclear security needs following the events of 11 September 2001, including setting up an Advisory Group on Nuclear Security. Though the prime responsibility for the security and safety of nuclear and other radioactive materials must rest with States themselves, the Agency's additional activities could contribute meaningfully to protection against nuclear terrorism. Care should be taken to prevent undue apprehension about the safety of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

34. India had acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, reinforcing its commitment to international instruments against terrorism. Strict physical protection measures for nuclear material during its use, storage and transport had been in force in India for over four decades and were monitored by a multidisciplinary expert group. Those measures were being upgraded as technology advanced. An internal physical protection service also existed, with an appropriate human resource development programme.

35. Orphan sources in many countries were a cause for concern. He was pleased that gamma radiation monitoring instruments developed and manufactured in India had been useful to the Agency in its operation to recover sources in Georgia. India had collaborated with the Agency in providing not only equipment, including an aerial gamma survey system, but also expert services for ground and aerial surveys to find orphan sources.

36. Noting that technical co-operation was vital to the Agency's relevance to many developing countries and that the Board of Governors had recently completed its negotiations on the TCF for 2003-2004 and the indicative planning figures for 2005 and 2006, he said it was essential that the TCF grew at least the same pace as the Regular Budget and that the budget formulation process be identical. Needless to say, India had always paid its contribution to the TCF target in full and on time.

37. Knowledge management was an important issue and it was an appropriate one for the Agency to address. He had participated in a high-level meeting held by the Agency on that topic earlier in the year. It was also the subject of the 2002 Scientific Forum. The nuclear knowledge pool in India was very large and was growing in proportion to the development of the country's nuclear energy programme. A knowledge-based holistic approach to the nuclear technology-society interface was needed. Also, the connections between society, industry and the national programme should be visible to higher education students so that they recognized the challenges and were motivated to find solutions. The distinction between the benefits of knowledge transfer on the one hand and technology transfer, which was subject to commercial constraints, on the other, should be made clear.

38. In conclusion, he said that all technologies had associated problems. However, the solutions to those problems also lay in technology. That had already been demonstrated in such areas of human endeavour as energy, transport, material processing, food and human

health. The work of the Agency demonstrated the immense potential of the use of nuclear knowledge and technology for sustainable development, and Member States shared a collective responsibility for ensuring the continuity of that work for global peace and prosperity.

39. Mr. FIGUEROA (Argentina) said his country valued its co-operation with the Agency, which was a centre of excellence.

40. Argentina was currently concentrating all of its efforts in the nuclear field on preserving - and even improving - the highly trained human and all the other resources it had accumulated in the hopes of more domestic favourable economic conditions and a renaissance in worldwide nuclear activity in the near future.

41. The National Atomic Energy Commission had recently considerably increased the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial use, which had previously been imported, with a view to satisfying national demand. The production of cobalt-60 sources had also increased and were being sold on the international market. Also, the Commission had finalized a national radioactive waste management plan which would be submitted to the National Congress for approval. It was continuing to implement the six main scientific and technological programmes comprising its strategic plan, which included projects and developments with respect to nuclear reactors, the fuel cycle, radioactive waste management, non-power energy applications and R&D in fundamental sciences and in nuclear related engineering and technology.

42. Argentina's two nuclear power plants, both of which used domestically produced fuel elements and heavy water, were continuing to operate successfully. Although they accounted for only 5% of installed power, they contributed approximately 10% of the country's total electricity production.

43. Collaboration under the Agency's technical co-operation programme and ARCAL was ongoing. Argentina sponsored courses, workshops and scientific meetings, and provided not only training for Agency fellows and visiting foreign scientists but also many experts and lecturers.

44. Argentina supported the Agency's nuclear security activities which aimed to prevent acts of terrorism. International co-operation was vital to deal with that problem. Adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation regime was another essential requirement for better international security. In that context, the safety and security of radiation sources and radioactive materials was paramount and implementation of the Agency's Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources was of great importance. He welcomed the fact that the Agency was convening an International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material in 2003, which would facilitate international discussion of that issue.

45. Argentina continued to co-operate actively in areas connected with the strengthening and integration of international safeguards. Truly integrated safeguards were essential, and not simply a combination of current measures and those included in the additional protocol.

The Agency should increase its co-operation with regional and national safeguards systems, particularly regarding traditional safeguards, in order to obtain a more effective and efficient system.

46. ABACC had continued its verification activities with great success and transparency, and Argentina hoped that existing co-operation with the Agency would be strengthened.

47. Progress had been made with regard to the additional protocol, with highly informative meetings having been held in conjunction with the Secretariat on its possible scope in the context of the Quadripartite Agreement. Clearly, application of that protocol would require due preparation by the parties concerned.

48. Finally, he requested that there be no increase in the Regular Budget since many countries, like Argentina, were experiencing economic difficulties affecting their ability to pay contributions to the international organizations.

49. Mr. BENDJABALLAH (Algeria) said that his country was committed to the efforts of the international community to combat terrorism following the events of 11 September 2001. The African Union, at a high-level intergovernmental meeting on terrorism held in Algeria the previous week, had adopted a pan-African plan of action against terrorism and had decided to establish a centre for terrorism studies and research in Algiers. Algeria supported the Agency's plan in that regard, adopted by the Board of Governors in March 2002, particularly the strengthening of measures for better protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Commitment by all Member States to the rigorous application of nuclear safety and security standards by acceding to and ratifying the relevant instruments would contribute to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. However, his delegation believed that Agency nuclear terrorism activities should not be implemented to the detriment of resources allocated to technical co-operation.

50. In the light of the recent World Summit on Sustainable Development, Algeria commended the Agency's efforts to ensure international recognition of the role that nuclear power could play in sustainable development, and to promote the application of nuclear techniques in such key areas as water resources, health, agriculture, industry and the environment.

51. Determined to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, Algeria had just ratified the CTBT and was about to deposit the instruments of ratification.

52. Algeria attached great importance to the Agency's activities in the areas of nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. In that connection it had begun the process for acceding to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and was preparing to ratify the Early Notification and the Assistance Conventions.

53. Concerning technical co-operation, the recent visit of the Director General to Algeria had provided an opportunity for identifying ways of strengthening mutual ties and of

improving the country's human and material capabilities. That co-operation would be strengthened through the preparation of a Country Programme Framework and special emphasis was being placed on the management of water resources.

54. The AFRA programme had developed significantly over the past year. In collaboration with the Agency, Algeria had organized several regional events in the areas of human health, radioactive waste management, non-destructive testing and the use of research reactors. It had also been responsible for organizing the 13th meeting of the AFRA Technical Working Group, and was now chairing the steering committee. The AFRA programme could prove an enriching and strengthening instrument for NEPAD.

55. Algeria, which considered the Agency's safeguards system to be one of the surest means of preventing the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, confirmed its intention to conclude subsidiary arrangements pursuant to its safeguards agreement with the Agency as soon as possible.

56. His delegation deplored the fact that for a number of years there had been no progress made in the matter of the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East. That impasse had occurred because Israel, unlike all the other countries in the region, refused to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. It was very important that the Agency should do all it could to induce Israel to do so. He urged the Director General to continue his efforts aimed at organizing a forum for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East.

57. His delegation welcomed the recent developments with respect to Iraq, particularly the Iraqi authorities' readiness to readmit Agency inspectors without conditions.

58. Algeria, which had already deposited its instrument of acceptance of the amendment to Article VI of the Agency Statute, urged all States which had not already done so to proceed with ratification in order to speed up its entry into force.

59. Mr. HASSAN (Sudan), having thanked the Director General for visiting his country in December 2001, commended the Agency's promotional work in the areas of health, agriculture, industry and water management, and its efforts to combat nuclear terrorism by promoting the conclusion of international agreements and compliance therewith. Sudan, which condemned terrorism in all its forms, welcomed the progress made on measures to protect against nuclear terrorism, as reported in document GC(46)/14. However, it was not in favour of financing such activities at the expense, or to the detriment, of the technical co-operation programme.

60. The conclusion and ratification of additional protocols to safeguards agreements under the NPT were among the most important items on the Agency's agenda, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001, and his country looked forward to progress being made in that regard. A universal approach was needed and Israel, the only nuclear State in the Middle East, should sign a safeguards agreement. To date it had provided only unconvincing excuses

for not doing so. That would strengthen the efforts to establish in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.

61. One factor detracting from the credibility and effectiveness of the international organizations was the exercise of a policy of double standards. In that context, his delegation welcomed Iraq's response to the calls made by the Secretary-Generals of the United Nations and of the League of Arab States, by the Arab and Islamic countries and by other States to accept the unconditional return of the inspectors to carry out their functions. He hoped that that step would lead to a final solution based on dialogue and finally remove the spectre of a military solution. Sudan called on the Iraqi Government to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. It also urged the United Nations, the international community and Iraq to work together to achieve a solution at without delay that preserved the integrity and sovereignty of Iraq, that did not threaten security and stability in the region, and that put an end to the suffering of the Iraqi people as soon as possible.

62. Sudan commended the Agency's technical co-operation work, which was particularly beneficial to the developing countries. It welcomed efforts to increase the budget of the technical co-operation programme and hoped that the latter would be financed from more assured resources under the Regular Budget instead of being dependent on donors' contributions. He urged the donor countries to contribute more to the TCF and hoped for greater contributions from other regional and international funds to support Agency projects in developing countries.

63. Noting the contribution of the Agency's technical co-operation programme to improving capabilities in the areas of medicine, health, water, environmental health and nuclear and radiation safety, he said Sudan attached particular importance to regional sterile insect technique projects to eradicate the tsetse fly and the planning of a campaign against malaria-transmitting mosquitoes in all parts of Africa where they had a negative effect on socio-economic development. Its commitment had been demonstrated by the fact that a Sudanese technical group had participated in a regional meeting held in Vienna from 29 July to 2 August 2002 to discuss the progress of the tsetse fly eradication project. No longer affected by war, Sudan and Ethiopia were co-ordinating the start of work on eradication in areas near their common border, thus demonstrating that the prospects for regional co-operation between African countries were bright. His Government was willing to continue hosting African regional meetings under the technical co-operation programme.

64. It was vital that all Member States met their financial obligation to the Agency. For its part and despite its difficult economic situation, Sudan was about to pay half of its assessed arrears and intended to pay the remainder before the end of the year.

65. Mr. WALTHER (Norway) expressed support for the Agency's action plan to combat nuclear terrorism. Norway had contributed US \$130 000 to activities under that plan related to nuclear and radiation emergencies and had made experts available to the Agency. He stressed the importance of each Member State taking steps at the national level to secure nuclear and radioactive materials and to prepare for emergencies.

66. The Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention formed the basis for international co-operation in the event of a nuclear emergency. As the first step in enhancing the implementation of those Conventions, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority had convened a meeting in Oslo in May 2002 where a plan of action had been prepared to guide competent authorities and international organizations in following up the main recommendations from the first competent authorities' meeting held in Vienna in June 2001. His delegation urged other authorities to nominate experts to the working groups and to allocate resources to help the groups accomplish their tasks. Norway would be submitting a draft resolution to the General Conference on the enhanced implementation of both Conventions and hoped it would gain broad support.³

67. Norway was concerned that the Agency had been unable to provide any assurances regarding Iraq's compliance with its obligations and hoped that the letter from Iraq's Foreign Minister to the United Nations Secretary-General would lead to such assurances being provided.

68. There was a clear need to develop a framework for the protection of the environment from ionizing radiation and the Agency could play an important role in such work. In that context, Norway supported the omnibus resolution entitled "Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety".⁴

69. The challenges in north-west Russia were among Norway's main concerns in the area of nuclear safety. Russia, which was decommissioning a large number of nuclear-powered naval vessels and safely conditioning and storing the radioactive waste and spent fuel, needed a new infrastructure for that purpose, requiring huge investments. Norway was participating in projects in the region and co-operating with the Russian authorities. Under the Agency's auspices, a nuclear clean-up strategy for Russia was being drawn up with the co-operation of the Russian authorities within the Contact Expert Group. Support and assistance were being sought for a spent nuclear fuel and radwaste clean-up at the Andreyev Bay storage site in the Murmansk region. Norway had already started several infrastructure projects in the Andreyev Bay on a bilateral basis.

70. Norway, the United States of America, the European Commission and a number of European Union countries had since 1999 been working on the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for the provision of assistance to nuclear safety-related projects in Russia through the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme for Russia. That Agreement would be vital for the multilateral funding and implementation of larger nuclear clean-up projects in the region and he therefore hoped that it would be concluded as soon as possible.

71. Norway joined the United States of America in underlining the importance of new and expanding co-operation projects to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues. It therefore welcomed the newly established G-8 Global

³ Subsequently adopted as resolution GC(46)/RES/9.D.

⁴ Subsequently adopted as resolution GC(46)/RES/9.

Partnership which had pledged up to \$20 billion for such projects and was willing to co-operate with the Partnership on nuclear safety and security projects in Russia.

72. As a coastal nation dependent on the sustainable harvesting of living marine resources and on market confidence in the quality of those products, Norway attached great importance to the 1998 OSPAR Convention, which provided for progressive and substantial reductions in discharges of radionuclides into the ocean. Norway welcomed the fact that several parties to the Convention had now submitted their national plans for achieving the objectives of the OSPAR strategy with regard to radioactive substances but was concerned that the onset of reductions might be deferred for several years. Discharges of radionuclides such as technetium-99 would remain high, or even increase, for several years so Norway urged Member States which were also parties to the Convention to take the necessary measures to reduce their discharges of technetium-99 and other radioactive substances into the marine environment sooner rather than later.

73. Norway attached great importance to the safety and security of radioactive material transport, not least because such material was a potential target for terrorist attacks. It was also concerned about the effectiveness of liability mechanisms in the event of an accident during the maritime transport of radioactive material and called for further efforts to strengthen the relevant measures and regulations.

74. The Model Additional Protocol made an important contribution to the enhancement of nuclear non-proliferation. The additional protocol to Norway's safeguards agreement with the Agency had entered into force in May 2000 and the Agency had now decided to introduce the integrated safeguards system, making Norway the second country after Australia to use that system. Given that additional protocols had entered into force for only 28 States, he called on more countries to sign additional protocols and to speed up their ratification procedures in order to make the enhanced safeguards system as universal as possible.

75. Export controls were also vitally important to nuclear non-proliferation. The Nuclear Suppliers Group's requirement for full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply was a major step forward. National export controls were an important means of preventing non-State entities and terrorists from acquiring sensitive nuclear material and technology. Norway had taken several steps at the national level to strengthen its export control system.

76. The Agency must continue to play a leading international role in managing and implementing legal instruments in the nuclear, radiation and radioactive waste safety fields. Norway had participated in the second review meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and welcomed the substantial safety improvements made since the first review meeting. The Convention and its review process were important instruments for enhancing international nuclear safety. The Joint Convention was another important legal instrument and Norway looked forward to participating in the first review meeting to be held in 2003.

77. Information exchange and strong international instruments were very important for the security of nuclear facilities and materials and other radioactive materials. Norway strongly

supported the work being carried out to amend and strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and hoped that it would soon reach a successful conclusion.

78. Norway continued to support the TCF, paying its amount of the share of the target for voluntary contributions on time and in full. It urged all other countries to do the same. Technical co-operation projects were vital to the recipient countries and were part of the global effort to create a better balance between countries with respect to technical development. The main focus of activities should be on nuclear applications in such fields as agriculture, water resource management, human health and medicine, while nuclear power projects should concentrate on safety and security and the problems of waste and spent fuel.

79. Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium) said the Agency had once again demonstrated dynamism and expertise in executing its mandate within the resources available. It would continue to play an extremely important role for a long time notwithstanding the decision taken by certain countries to move away from nuclear energy in the short or medium term. Nuclear applications still provided the only effective solution to certain problems, especially in the field of medicine. Also, phasing out nuclear energy generation would have consequences for safety, radiation protection, security and non-proliferation. Moreover, current research to develop new reactors could open new horizons; reactors which produced less waste and were safer, more economical and more proliferation-resistant should mean a greater share for nuclear energy within a sustainable context, protecting the world for future generations.

80. The second review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety had been a success. It had shown that safety levels had risen in most States and had enabled greater transparency regarding national situations and difficulties encountered. The comparison of different national practices proved that diverse approaches could be taken to achieve common security objectives, a point that should be taken into account in future work.

81. Safer management of nuclear installations meant paying particular attention to the ageing of nuclear power plants and to the preservation of knowledge. The ongoing Scientific Forum would be helpful in that respect.

82. The results of the review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Nuclear Safety Convention served as a useful example for the first review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention, to be held in November 2003. Belgium was pleased to announce that it had ratified the Joint Convention on 2 August 2002.

83. The NPT was the cornerstone of a universal and responsible security policy and Cuba's recent decision to accede to it was therefore encouraging. It was reassuring that, in 2001, the Secretariat had found no indication of diversion of nuclear material placed under Agency safeguards nor of misuse of facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards. Such assurance was necessary both to develop the peaceful uses of the atom and to ensure collective security.

84. Belgium took note of Iraq's decision to allow the return of United Nations inspectors without conditions and saw it as an encouraging response to the efforts of the Secretary-General to take all possible steps to avoid military action. Belgium continued to hope that a political solution could be found which would have a positive influence on relations between Iraq and the Agency, allowing the latter to discharge the mandate given to it by the Security Council.

85. It was a matter of extreme urgency that the Agency start verification activities in the DPRK. Not only were they a fundamental obligation under the safeguards agreement, but they were also a prerequisite for delivery of the main nuclear components under the KEDO project.

86. Belgium continued to attach particular importance to strengthening of the Agency's safeguards regime, provided that did not lead to an increase in inspection effort. He therefore welcomed the finalization in 2002 of a conceptual framework for integrated safeguards, enabling consistent and non-discriminatory application in States with similar nuclear programmes.

87. Belgium urged all States which had not already done so to sign and implement an additional protocol as soon as possible. The draft law for the ratification of Belgium's additional protocol had been adopted by its parliament and was currently awaiting signature by the Head of State.

88. His country appreciated the Director General's swift response to the General Conference's request for a thorough review of the Agency's activities and programmes with a view to strengthening work relevant to preventing acts of terrorism (resolution GC(45)/RES/14.B). The various measures foreseen by the Agency did not attempt to substitute the primary role of States, rather to supplement the measures they had already taken or, where necessary, to assist States in identifying and implementing such measures. His delegation wished to be regularly informed about implementation of the action plan and its budgetary implications.

89. As an active participant in the work of the expert group responsible for amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Belgium regretted that the group had not yet completed its task. He hoped that a consensus would be reached at the group's forthcoming meeting in November.

90. Nuclear electricity generation in Belgium in 2001 was more than 44 TWh (58% of total electricity production). The slight fall in production was due to an overhaul outage of 63 days at Tihange Unit No. 2. Three steam generators had been replaced in 17 days, something of a world record. The operational record of Belgian nuclear power plants remained excellent.

91. For example, in 2001 the average load factor of all its plants was 88.1%, and on 31 December 2001 Doel Unit No. 2 had been operating for 1317 days without an emergency shutdown.

92. Under previously agreed reprocessing contracts, 104 MOX fuel assemblies had been fabricated and supplied to two Belgian nuclear power plants. However, the Government had now established a moratorium on the conclusion of new contracts and so measures had had to be taken to ensure the safe storage of spent fuel. Specialized buildings had been constructed at the Doel and Tihange sites; dry storage had been continued at Doel whereas wet storage had been chosen for Tihange.

93. Belgium continued to seek solutions for the disposal of its radioactive waste. The storage of low-level or short-lived waste would be integrated into overall regional development using local partners in communities willing to accept such waste. With regard to medium- and high-level or long-lived waste, the PRACLAY project had demonstrated the economic and environmental feasibility of storing waste in clay.

94. The Belgium Government had recently approved a draft law on phasing out nuclear electricity generation. It contained four important provisions: nuclear power plants would be decommissioned 40 years after their commissioning date; no new nuclear power plants could be constructed and/or put into operation; the electricity and gas regulatory commission (CREG) was responsible for supervising the security of the electricity supply and for formulating recommendations if that supply was jeopardized; and in the event that the security of supply were threatened, measures would have to be taken, without calling into question the decision to abandon nuclear energy, except in the case of force majeure.

95. Following the liberalization of the electricity market, the Government had also taken a certain number of supplementary measures to ensure that the provisions for dismantling nuclear power plants and managing irradiated fissile material at those plants would, at the appropriate time, be both available and adequate. To that end, a draft law had been submitted to the Belgian parliament.

96. The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, which had become operational on 1 September 2001, held responsibility in the fields of nuclear safety, radiation protection, safeguards and physical protection. Its establishment had allowed regulations in those areas to be updated in line with European Union directives and/or relevant international standards.

97. In conclusion, he said that, in addition to its well-established role as a technical organization the International Atomic Energy Agency also had an essential part to play in ensuring peace and security in the world.

98. Mr. TOUQ (Jordan) commended the Agency's efforts to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the areas of medicine, agriculture, water, food, industry and energy, and nuclear non-proliferation and the contribution it made to international co-operation through, for example, the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions, and safety issues related to spent fuel and radioactive waste management. He also commended the positive role the Agency had played at the recent Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development.

99. He highlighted eight areas where the Agency should make greater efforts at the regional and international levels to enhance international co-operation. Firstly, it should prepare and put into effect international plans to strengthen the safety of nuclear material, reactors and other nuclear installations. Secondly, it should support training programmes on radiation protection by promoting the international action plan for the radiological protection of patients contained in document GC(46)/12, support States in their efforts to implement that action plan, and make greater efforts in the area of protecting the environment and human health against the hazards of radioactive contamination. Thirdly, the Agency should assist its Member States in controlling radioactive contamination of foodstuffs, structural material, agricultural products and consumer goods and in setting reference limits acceptable to consumers and industry. Fourthly, it should continue its training and qualification programmes for radiation and nuclear workers to develop their knowledge about radiation protection and other relevant areas. Fifthly, it should promote awareness programmes for laymen and decision-makers about nuclear energy and applications and co-operate with other competent international bodies to that end. Sixthly, the Agency should strengthen international co-operation in nuclear security with a view to preventing acts of terrorism which might use or be directed against nuclear and radiation devices or installations. The control and inspection bodies concerned in Member States needed help in operating radiation monitoring units capable of detecting transboundary smuggling or the presence of nuclear material that might be used for terrorist purposes. One way of achieving that objective was to establish regional or interregional projects on nuclear and radiation safety and security along the lines of the model projects on radiation protection and waste safety which were being implemented in many regions. While Jordan commended the Agency's efforts in the area of combating nuclear terrorism, those activities should not be allowed to have a detrimental affect on the technical co-operation programme. Also, they should be financed on a voluntary basis outside the Regular Budget. Seventhly, the Agency should increase its efforts in the area of the safe transport of radioactive material. Jordan was looking forward to participating in the 2003 International Conference on the subject to be held in Vienna in July. Lastly, the Agency should continue to provide and ensure prompt assistance to Member States in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. He was grateful to the Secretariat for the useful work it had done in that area in the preceding year, enabling States to take appropriate protective measures.

100. As the Agency could carry out its functions only if the necessary financial support was provided and it had assured funding for its technical co-operation activities, he urged Member States to honour their financial obligations and meet the targets set.

101. Jordan supported efforts to apply comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the Middle East with a view to establishing a zone free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Israel was the only State in the region which still refused to sign NPT and to accept full-scope safeguards for its facilities. That exposed the region to the dangers of a race to develop nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and jeopardized international peace and security. Jordan hoped that the Director General's commendable efforts in that regard would meet with success, leading to a strengthening of peace and the non-proliferation regime.

102. Believing that Iraq should comply fully with the relevant Security Council resolutions, Jordan welcomed that country's decision to allow an unconditional return of inspectors. It was a positive step towards the resumption of a constructive dialogue between the United Nations and Iraq, which should lead to the lifting of the sanctions, defuse the present crisis and spare Iraq and the region the calamity of war and destruction.

103. The Agency's safeguards system was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Jordan had fulfilled all its non-proliferation commitments by signing and ratifying both the NPT and the CTBT. Furthermore, it had signed an additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement. He urged all States which had not yet ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement to do so as soon as possible.

104. He stressed the importance of the Agency's technical co-operation activities to improve the scientific and technical capacities of the developing countries, and to achieve sustainable development. In that context, Jordan was looking forward to Agency support for the SESAME (Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East) project, which had been approved by UNESCO as an interregional project. The Bessy-1 facility had now reached Jordan from Germany and his Government was bearing the full cost of construction of a special building.

105. Welcoming Agency approval of ARASIA, which would help the participating States develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensure its contribution to sustained development, he expressed the hope that the Agreement would fulfil its objectives.

106. The Arab Atomic Energy Agency provided valuable assistance to its Member States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, it was suffering from a lack of resources, and he hoped that the Agency would provide support and co-operate with that body in order to help it implement its programmes.

107. Mr. AL-ATHEL (Saudi Arabia), commending the Agency's achievements in 2001, took note of the Secretariat's view that maintaining zero real growth in the budget did not allow for any expansion of programme activities. Thus, activities would have to be planned and implemented on a realistic basis in line with the financing abilities of Member States.

108. In view of the fact that some advanced countries had given up their nuclear power option because of public apprehensions about the safety of nuclear installations and the safety of waste management, the Agency must continue both its safety-related work in order to restore the credibility of nuclear power and its comparative assessment of different energy resources for sustainable development.

109. The technical co-operation programme was a means whereby the Agency achieved the basic purpose for which it was set up. It was a tool for disseminating scientific knowledge, transferring technology and creating national capabilities in Member States to facilitate peaceful nuclear applications. The method of financing the TCF did not, however, provide an assured volume of resources. Financing the TCF from the Regular Budget, as his country had

proposed in the past, was a way of achieving that objective. Saudi Arabia, for its part, would continue to support the Fund by paying its assessed programme costs, and for 2003 it had made a voluntary contribution of \$50 000 to the Fund.

110. While the Agency's efforts to strengthen the safeguards system and its appeal for universal application had met with a positive response from many States, there were still a few States which had not yet responded.

111. In connection with the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, his delegation shared the Director General's regret, expressed in his report contained in document GC(46)/9, that he had been unable to fulfil the mandate given to him by the General Conference, pursuant to resolution GC(45)/RES/18 and decision GC(44)/DEC/12, to continue consultations with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. The Director General had attributed that to the prevailing political situation in the Middle East and had pointed out that the difficulties in his discussions with the States concerned in the region had been due to differences in their views about the mechanisms for nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the Director General should not relax his diligent efforts. Saudi Arabia was confident of a positive outcome once Israel saw reason and refrained from opposing world opinion with regard to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. It was also difficult to continue the discussions on peace in the Middle East against the background of the repression and aggression being carried out by Israel in the Palestinian autonomous areas. One effect of the resulting escalation of tension was that it had prevented the meetings of the multilateral working group on arms control and regional security from being held on a regular basis since 1994.

112. Over the past year, the Agency had expanded its activities to include the prevention of nuclear terrorism, leading to an increase in a number of programme activities and advisory services relating to strengthening the physical security of nuclear installations and materials, assistance in the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, and the safe management and disposal of nuclear waste. It was recognized however, that the primary responsibility for combating nuclear terrorism lay with States themselves. His country hoped that the necessary extrabudgetary resources would be provided for the Agency's action in that regard and stressed that those activities should under no circumstances be at the expense of its technical co-operation programme.

113. Mr. LAANEMÄE (Estonia), having noted that the global fight against terrorism had dominated the international situation over the last year, said the Agency had an important role to play in the fight against nuclear terrorism. His country welcomed the Secretariat's prompt action in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks to elaborate proposals for protection against nuclear terrorism, and applauded those countries which had contributed to those activities. The additional activities were not new, simply an extension of existing nuclear safety and security activities. Bearing in mind, the Agency's limited resources, the Director General should ensure full co-ordination between the relevant departments of the Secretariat and, in their turn, Member States should pay their Regular Budget contributions in full and on time.

114. His country greatly appreciated the Agency's technical co-operation programme, and intended to continue paying its contributions to the TCF. Estonia endorsed the key elements of successful technical co-operation as set forth in the 2002 Technical Co-operation Strategy Review (contained in document GOV/INF/2002/8), particularly Government commitment, consultations between Member States and the Agency during the planning stage and the conclusion of Country Programme Frameworks. Estonia's Country Programme Framework, concluded in October 2001, laid down three priorities: strengthening of the regulatory infrastructure and activities; upgrading of radioactive waste management and radiation protection; and improving nuclear safety in medicine. His country intended to follow its provisions closely.

115. He welcomed the Agency's ongoing training activities in radiation protection, especially the safety of radiation sources and radioactive waste management. His country would continue to work towards implementation of the Agency's safety standards in that area.

116. Estonia continued to participate in the Agency's technical co-operation activities. A regional training course on nuclear cardiology for nuclear medicine physicians had been held in the capital, Tallinn, in October 2001. A regional workshop on the development of national legislation to fulfil States' obligations under the additional protocol had been held, also in Tallinn, in January 2002. The regional and subregional scope of the courses had allowed participants from different countries to exchange views and learn from both Agency experts and one another. Estonia would like to see further training made available in emergency preparedness, radiation and waste safety, and nuclear applications in medicine.

117. Estonia was reviewing its legislation governing various aspects of the use of radioactive materials before it entered the European Union. It would fill in any gaps, eliminate duplication and bring the legislation into line with the country's international obligations. It had received valuable assistance in that task from the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, the Swedish Nuclear Non-Proliferation Assistance Programme and the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute.

118. Significant progress had been made in the rehabilitation of the former Soviet nuclear submarine training base in Paldiski. The conditioning of solid operational radioactive waste and the solidification of liquid operational waste had reached completion. Alara, the company in charge of the site, was now dismantling the former liquid radioactive waste processing plant.

119. Estonia was still concerned about storage conditions in the two reactor compartments covered by sarcophagi. In 1999, a project on evaluation of management routes for the Paldiski sarcophagi had begun under the auspices of the European Union. Experts from Technicatome (France) and British Nuclear Fuels Limited (United Kingdom) had prepared an assessment of the status of the sarcophagi and proposed four different options for their future management. A group of experts would analyse those options and submit a strategy and action plan to the Government in due course.

The meeting rose at 1.00 p.m.