



GC

GC(46)/OR.6  
February 2003

GENERAL Distr.  
Original: ENGLISH

International Atomic Energy Agency  
**GENERAL CONFERENCE**

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**FORTY-SIXTH (2002) REGULAR SESSION**

RECORD OF THE SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna  
on Wednesday, 18 September 2002, at 3.10 p.m.

President: Mr. URRUELA PRADO (Guatemala)

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Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARASIA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
CANDU	Canada deuterium-uranium [reactor]
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
INSARR	Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
MOX	Mixed oxide
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSPAR Convention	Oslo-Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic
PATTEC	Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Eradication Campaign
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
RIA	Radioimmunoassay
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SESAME	Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East
SIT	Sterile insect technique
SPECT	Single photon emission computed tomography
SSAC	State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
TranSAS	Transport Safety Appraisal Service
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2001 (continued)  
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1. Mr. FRANK (Israel) said that his region was in a precarious state and co-operation and co-ordination among Member States were therefore essential in the international fight against nuclear proliferation. The international community should vigorously insist on States' compliance with their international commitments in that area, and efforts should be made to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. At earlier General Conferences, Israel had joined the consensus on the resolution on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol, but certain changes introduced in the preceding year had made it impossible for it to continue to do so. Consensus on that resolution was more important than introducing divisive changes.

2. The events of 11 September had highlighted the new terrorist threat. Israel knew from its own experience how devastating such attacks were, and an alarming correlation had emerged between States which were currently seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and those which sponsored terrorism. There was an urgent need for effective measures to block the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups and to States which supported them, and to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radiation sources by reinforcing physical protection. The Agency had an important role to play in that context by assisting Member States with the establishment of a comprehensive physical protection regime. Israel was proud to have joined 78 other Member States in becoming a party to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It also supported the Agency's programme on nuclear terrorism to which it had contributed financially. Export control regimes were another tool for dealing with States which promoted proliferation and supported terrorist groups. Israel was currently finalizing its regulations for control of exports of nuclear and dual-use items, which were based on the NSG regime.

3. In the area of nuclear power, a new balance was needed between addressing proliferation concerns and further development and improvement. In view of the global interest in fostering sustainable energy solutions, nuclear power plants could become more attractive. Some important developments had recently taken place in that respect in Western Europe and North America, and several reports suggested that nuclear energy should assume a growing share of total energy production in the 21st century. Refraining from disseminating nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure and technology could help address the proliferation risks posed by the growth in nuclear power. The challenge confronting the Agency was tremendous and should include not only the promotion of enhanced safeguards, but also the development of international arrangements concerning the supply of fresh nuclear fuel, the removal of spent fuel, and improvement of both the safety and proliferation resistance of nuclear reactors. Israel was confident that the Agency was well equipped to handle that issue.

4. The agenda of the General Conference was well balanced. However, two draft resolutions concerning the Middle East stood out as extraneous to the Agency's Statute and mission. Israel had made no secret of its fundamental reservations regarding the language and relevance of the resolution on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. However, it would join the consensus if it was based on consent because it recognized that a

nuclear-weapon-free zone could eventually make an important contribution to overall peace and security in the region. By contrast, it saw no point and considerable danger in agenda item 21 on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat, an item first introduced by Iraq. There had been many dangerous proliferation developments in the Middle East and other regions in recent years, but none of them involved his country. Israel had neither threatened its neighbours nor acted in defiance of international commitments. Any action on that agenda item would make it impossible for Israel to join any consensus on the resolution on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East.

5. Finally, Israel's Atomic Energy Commission was celebrating its 50th anniversary that year and he thanked the Agency for its fruitful co-operation over the preceding 50 years and looked forward to positive developments in the forthcoming 50 years.

6. Ms. DRÁBOVÁ (Czech Republic) said that the Agency had a key role to play in helping humanity maximize the benefits and minimize the risks from nuclear science and its applications.

7. Her country had been co-operating closely with others to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. The Czech parliament had recently ratified the country's additional protocol and full implementation thereof was one of its highest administrative priorities. She urged those States that had not already to conclude similar protocols with the Agency as soon as possible.

8. Supplier countries had a responsibility to ensure that co-operation activities did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that principle had been reflected in the NPT and in the multilateral export control regimes. The NSG and the Zangger Committee both played an important role in supporting the NPT and non-proliferation in general, and the Czech Republic attached the highest priority to dialogue between the NSG and potential nuclear supplier countries, including those operating unsafeguarded nuclear installations.

9. The Czech Republic supported the Agency's activities aimed at countering nuclear terrorism, in particular by strengthening physical protection of nuclear material and facilities worldwide. It was considering making contributions in kind and financial contributions to the Agency's anti-terrorist activities.

10. It also hoped that the open-ended group of legal and technical experts would be able to conclude its work on a draft amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material by November so that a diplomatic conference could be held to approve it before the end of 2002.

11. Non-power applications of nuclear technology in the fields of human health, food and agriculture, and the physical and chemical sciences could bring distinct economic and social benefits. Czech organizations and individual experts were actively involved in Agency technical co-operation programmes and other Agency-sponsored activities promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and, as in previous years, the Czech Government had again allocated additional financial resources to support the Agency's technical co-operation programme and had offered voluntary contributions to specific projects in Armenia, Georgia

and Ukraine. The efforts that were being made to allocate technical co-operation funds efficiently to indispensable activities under major programmes were also appreciated. The results-based approach used for planning the 2004-2005 programme and budget was an appropriate mechanism for improving financial efficiency.

12. Nuclear power was an important part of the energy mix in the Czech Republic. About 20% of the country's electricity was generated by the four units of the Dukovany nuclear power plant. Two units were also being commissioned at the Temelin nuclear power plant and, when operating at full power, they would double the installed capacity of Czech nuclear power plants. Though both units at Temelin had experienced a number of technical difficulties in the preceding year, mainly in the conventional non-nuclear part, the first unit had reached full power during trial operation in June 2002.

13. The Czech Government attached the utmost importance to the safety of its nuclear installations and its system of nuclear safety assessment continued to be based on the principles of independence and transparency. Peer reviews organized by the Agency were an important part of the safety assessment structure. Agency missions to the Temelin and Dukovany nuclear power plants at the end of 2001 had confirmed the Czech Republic's overall good safety record and had generated a number of ideas for further improvements. The inputs provided by Member States and the Secretariat, particularly the Department of Nuclear Safety and the Department of Technical Co-operation, had been most appreciated.

14. Her country was concerned over attempts to exclude the Agency's peer review services from the regional technical co-operation programme, since they were essential for maintaining and developing safety and security levels. The Agency's unique review services facilitated exchange of information and results among interested groups, such as regulatory authorities or users of similar technology, which was one of the most important missions of the regional technical co-operation programme.

15. Mr. NGANDAJINA (Angola) said that the 46th session of the General Conference was especially important for Angola as it was taking place only a few months after the end of a 27-year armed conflict in his country. The current climate of peace should have a positive impact on the country's socio-economic development. Nuclear science, technology and applications could now make a significant contribution towards sustainable development in Angola and his Government therefore welcomed the Agency's efforts to strengthen its activities in those areas.

16. Angola had received significant assistance from the Agency with the promotion and development of nuclear science and technology, mainly in the area of staff training and the elaboration of legislation and radiation safety regulations. However, although some progress had been achieved, the nuclear energy sector was still at a very early stage of development in his country. He therefore appealed to the Agency and other Member States to help promote peaceful applications of nuclear energy in the fields of health, food, agriculture, industry and the environment in Angola.

17. Angola had submitted two new projects in the areas of health and agriculture for the 2003-2004 technical co-operation programme. It had also requested the extension of the

ongoing nuclear physics teaching laboratory project at the Faculty of Sciences of the Agostinho Neto University. The new projects included one on tsetse fly eradication. Seven out of 18 provinces in Angola suffered from tsetse infestation, which was one of the main obstacles to socio-economic development in Africa. The PATTEC action plan, based on use of the SIT, could solve that problem and he urged the FAO, WHO and IAEA to work together on its implementation.

18. Angola was grateful to the Agency for the assistance it had provided with the safe disposal of abandoned cobalt-60 and caesium-137 radiation sources in radiotherapy equipment.

19. The Angolan Government was planning to approve a legal document during the current year on the establishment of a regulatory authority, the headquarters for which had already been built. The finalization of legislation and regulations had had to be postponed for technical reasons, but it was hoped that that task could be completed in 2003.

20. Finally, his country also strongly supported the AFRA programme activities.

21. Mr. GRÖNBERG (Finland) said that the programme and budget for 2004 and 2005 should not be based on fine tuning of the previous programme; more radical changes were needed. Constructive development of the regular programme had for a long time been compromised by the balance issue, which had led to a situation where the most important statutory activity, verification, was being financed through huge voluntary contributions. Even then, many important activities could not be implemented owing to a lack of resources. That was not a sustainable solution. Mandatory activities should be financed from the Regular Budget. Changes in the overall priorities of activities should be reflected in programme development, and there should be enough flexibility to transfer resources to new priority activities as needs arose, even between major programmes. In order to maintain the credibility of the safeguards system, a fair amount of additional financial resources should be allocated to the safeguards budget.

22. Security, which had long been on the Agency's agenda, had come to occupy a central position since 11 September 2001. Terrorism was a threat to all nations in the world, not only those which had been openly threatened, and any misuse of nuclear material would have an effect on the whole nuclear community. The slow progress of the work to expand the scope of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was regrettable. Clearly, much remained to be done with regard to the security of radiation sources, but the Agency was doing commendable work on the problem of orphan sources. When assisting Member States to acquire radiation sources or develop radiation facilities, the Agency should take their security plans and practices into account.

23. Finland was one of the countries which believed that nuclear energy would have a place in future energy production. Thus, the Finnish parliament had in principle accepted a proposal to build an additional nuclear power plant unit. The decision had not been easy, and an intensive and comprehensive dialogue had taken place between the various stakeholders; the nuclear safety authorities had provided factual information, without otherwise participating in the discussion. The decision had also not been taken in isolation: two other

important related topics had been debated simultaneously in parliament. One of those had been the decision-in-principle to construct a final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel in Finland, which parliament had taken almost a year before the decision-in-principle on additional nuclear power. The other issue had been the national strategy for achieving the Kyoto target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, where energy issues had been central.

24. The Finnish nuclear power programme had an excellent safety and operational record which helped build public confidence. Even in a small country like Finland, safety authorities and nuclear power companies had to have their own expertise to rely on, but international co-operation was also of great importance. The Finnish authorities, research institutes and power companies had made extensive use of the learning possibilities offered by the Agency.

25. Finally, he welcomed Cuba's decision to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty and to accede to the NPT.

26. Mr. GAISENAK (Belarus) said that, since sustainable development would involve a constant increase in energy consumption, the development of nuclear power might also speed up despite differing views on that subject. As safety and environmental friendliness were of prime importance in that field, his country welcomed the Agency's efforts to develop new-generation reactors and fuel cycles under the INPRO project, in which it participated as an observer, and hoped that the work of the INPRO Steering Committee on the first stage of the action plan would be complete by the end of 2002. The successful implementation of that project was of great significance to Belarus because it was considering developing its own nuclear power programme. He also noted with satisfaction the significant contribution which the Agency continued to make to the use of non-power nuclear technologies in science, industry, medicine and agriculture.

27. The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 had highlighted the importance of security of nuclear and radioactive material. His country highly valued the Agency's efforts to combat nuclear terrorism and welcomed the establishment of the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security and of the extrabudgetary fund for those activities. However, there should be closer co-operation between the Office of Physical Protection and Material Security and the Department of Technical Co-operation so as to avoid duplication. At the same time, more emphasis should be given to the co-ordinated technical support programmes for the Newly Independent States. Experts from Belarus were participating actively in the review of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Belarus hoped that a diplomatic conference could be held soon. As many countries did not have the institutional or financial resources to strengthen their physical protection systems independently, international co-operation would be needed. His country was grateful to Japan, Sweden and the United States of America for the support they had given with the establishment of the physical protection system for the Sosny nuclear centre in 1996. However, support was required from donor countries to keep the system operational.

28. Belarus had been one of the first countries to demonstrate its commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through its voluntary renunciation of such weapons. It had signed both the NPT and a safeguards agreement, under which it fulfilled all its obligations as Agency inspections regularly confirmed. It had been a member of the NSG

since 2000 and had been one of the first to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to which it urged all States to accede, in addition to placing their activities under Agency safeguards.

29. Improving radiation safety was an important task for all countries. Belarus had a State computer system for accounting and control of ionizing radiation sources, and new radiation safety standards had been adopted in 2000. New health regulations had also been adopted, and X-ray machines had been checked with Agency assistance.

30. The population of Belarus had suffered and continued to suffer severe health consequences as a result of the Chernobyl accident. His country therefore found attempts to persuade the international community that the accident had had practically no impact on health regrettable. The scale of the consequences exceeded Belarus' capacity to address them and it was reliant on Agency assistance. Since 2000, the technical co-operation programme had included projects on rehabilitation of contaminated land, and he expressed the hope that further resources could be mobilized for a regional Chernobyl project, and that the Agency would play a more active role in the United Nations inter-institutional task force on Chernobyl. He also welcomed the Director General's Chernobyl forum initiative.

31. His country had ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and would be depositing its instrument of ratification soon. In accordance with its obligations under that Convention, Belarus had established a draft strategy for radioactive waste management which should be approved at the beginning of 2003. It also planned to ratify soon the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.

32. Belarus approved of the partnership in development concept and felt that the commitment and support of States was essential to the success of projects. It strove to contribute to the technical co-operation programme for Europe and was grateful to the Department of Technical Co-operation for the attention it had given to Belarus' problems.

33. In conclusion, despite its financial difficulties, his country would do everything possible to meet its financial obligations both to the Regular Budget and to the TCF.

34. Ms. AL-MULLA (Kuwait) said that the Agency's programmes on transfer of peaceful nuclear technology should strengthen the scientific and technical potential of developing countries through human resource development and activities in the areas of protection of the marine environment, waste management, human health, water resources, food security and agriculture, thus promoting sustainable development.

35. Her country valued highly the work of the Agency, UNEP and the WHO on the environmental impact of depleted uranium remains in Kuwait.

36. Energy was a central issue in sustainable development. It was up to States to choose what energy source they wished to use. One of the factors that might help promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and determine the future of nuclear power was the

establishment of a balance between different energy sources. Nuclear power should be regarded as supplementing and not competing with other sources of energy.

37. Her country welcomed the outcomes of the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, which should be taken into account when defining objectives and concluding partnerships to respond speedily to basic needs such as clean water, drainage, housing, energy, health care, food security and protection of biodiversity.

38. The Agency's work under its technical co-operation programme was commendable. It should continue to select high-quality projects and, through consultation and co-ordination with countries, ensure that quality was maintained.

39. The TCF was crucial to the implementation of technical assistance projects and Kuwait had paid its full share of the Fund for 2002. The purpose of the Fund was to ensure smooth execution of the proposed programmes with a view to promoting transfer of technology to developing countries and their socio-economic development. She welcomed the fact that agreement had been reached on a target for the TCF for 2003 and on indicative planning figures, and hoped that that agreement would be adhered to.

40. Agency training courses and fellowships played a major role in developing national capacities in recipient countries. Kuwait was glad to be hosting a regional training course on radiation protection and safety of radiation therapy. It welcomed the training plan to be implemented by the Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco in a number of Member States, including one event with the co-operation of the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment in Kuwait. Moreover, it looked forward to the implementation of ARASIA and hoped that application of the partnership concept would be widened. In that context, she emphasized her country's support for the SESAME project.

41. The promotion of a global safety culture through the conclusion of international conventions under the Agency's auspices helped advance the attainment of safety objectives. Kuwait was finalizing steps to accede to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

42. Her country attached importance to the Agency's activities to protect against nuclear terrorism which covered physical protection of nuclear material and installations, detection of and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear material, and prevention of incidents or acquisition by individuals or irresponsible parties of nuclear material with potentially dangerous consequences. She commended the work of the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security and expressed the hope that it would take into account the balance of priorities between the Agency's various activities, implementation of the Secretariat's action plan, and the nuclear security-related components of the Agency's 2004-2005 programme and budget.

43. On 7 March Kuwait had joined the Agency's safeguards system. On 19 June it had signed an additional protocol with the Agency and was taking constitutional measures to ratify it. Her country supported the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities and installations. It was essential that all States in the Middle East, without

exception, sign the NPT. Any measure that would help achieve peace and security in the region was important and there was strong support from States in the region for declaring it a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as a first step towards establishing a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.

44. It was a matter of continuing concern that the Agency's work in Iraq had been in suspension for almost four years. The unconditional return of the inspectors was extremely important to verify that there had been no substantial change in Iraq's nuclear activities and capabilities since 1998. As the Director General had emphasized in his report on the issue contained in document GC(46)/13, the Agency's inspections in Iraq pursuant to that country's safeguards agreement did not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant Security Council resolutions, nor did they provide the assurances that Iraq was in compliance with those resolutions, especially resolutions 687 and 1284. Kuwait had taken note of Iraq's recent declaration permitting the return of the inspectors. She expressed the hope that they would be able to return immediately to carry out their verification mission without hindrance, and that Iraq would faithfully comply with the relevant resolutions.

45. Mr. SHANGULA (Namibia) commended the Agency's efforts to foster international co-operation on the peaceful use of nuclear technology in developing countries and to establish a comprehensive and effective nuclear safety regime and verification system.

46. He noted the establishment of the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security. The primary responsibility for nuclear security rested with individual Member States. Furthermore, the funding of activities relating to the prevention of nuclear terrorism should be voluntary.

47. The recent World Summit on Sustainable Development had set sustainable development goals and several of the Agency's activities could make a significant contribution towards the attainment of those goals. The Summit had given the necessary impetus to the Agency's work in that regard.

48. The Government of Namibia had adopted Vision 2030, a national development strategy which incorporated its Country Programme Framework. Namibia appreciated the assistance it had received from the Agency. In the agricultural sector, technical co-operation was aimed mainly at eradicating the livestock diseases in the north of the country with a view to lifting the ban on animal exports from that region. In the area of water resource development, isotope hydrology was being used to identify underground aquifers and improve groundwater management. His country was also participating in a study on sustainable development of groundwater resources that would provide the data for a regional groundwater model which should prove useful when developing national water supply strategies. Technical co-operation was also helping Namibia develop an adequate human resource base and infrastructure in the nuclear field through the provision of fellowships, the organization of scientific visits, supply of equipment and designing of curricula at the University of Namibia.

49. He commended the Agency on its successful application of the SIT to tsetse eradication and called upon it and donor countries, in close co-operation with the WHO and other relevant organizations, to seriously consider applying that technique to malaria control.

50. His Government attached high priority to ensuring the sustainability of Namibia's marine resources and had instituted various measures to that end. It shared the growing global concern about harmful algal blooms and stood ready to participate with neighbouring countries in the proposed project in the Benguela region to monitor the toxins produced by marine algae.

51. He urged Member States and other donors to continue to support the valuable work done by AFRA. Namibia was grateful to AFRA for the assistance it had provided in the form of equipment, support for radioactive waste management, rehabilitation of an X-ray unit for the treatment of skin cancer, assistance with the development of a national strategy for promoting nuclear energy and sustainability, expert missions in nuclear medicine and workshops, and training events for Namibian nationals.

52. The Agency had played a pivotal role in the introduction of peaceful uses of nuclear technology in Africa and continued co-operation between it, the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development was of crucial importance. However, the Agency could not perform its statutory and promotional activities unless adequate funding was provided by Member States. He therefore encouraged Member States to pay their contributions on time and in full. His country had already paid its full share of the TCF for 2002 and 2003 and he urged all Member States to do likewise.

53. Ms. HALL (Canada) welcomed Cuba's formal decision to accede to the NPT.

54. The previous 12 months had seen the emergence of heightened international concern about nuclear security and safety, sustainable development issues, the environment, climate change and the security of energy supply. Thus, 45 years after its establishment, the Agency was facing challenges which would require it to demonstrate its vision and firm leadership if it was to continue to play a key role.

55. The events of 11 September 2001 had led to renewed concerns about nuclear security and safety. The Agency had played an important role in allaying such concerns by informing the public about its mandate and activities in an open and transparent manner. Canada particularly welcomed the Agency's comprehensive programme to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and would be making an additional contribution in support of the Agency's work relating to IPPAS missions. The threat of nuclear terrorism could be successfully addressed through the combined efforts of the Agency and individual Member States. It was important to acknowledge that nuclear security was the shared responsibility of all States. However, to be sustainable that programme should be included in the Agency's Regular Budget. It was pleasing to note that the Agency's efforts had provided an impetus to complementary initiatives, notably the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in whose development Canada had played a key role.

56. Her country had also been actively involved in the continuing efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The lack of progress in that area was frustrating, and she expressed the hope that the next round of negotiations would be more fruitful.

57. The safety and security of radiation sources had attracted much public attention and, as one of the world leaders in the export of radioisotopes for medical and industrial purposes, Canada believed that national regulatory infrastructures needed to be strengthened to ensure that such sources were safely and securely managed at all times. It therefore welcomed the Agency's work in implementing the revised Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources, particularly the recent meeting to identify ways to strengthen the international code of conduct on that issue. Protecting such sources against unauthorized use should be a priority for all States.

58. Unrelenting work was needed to strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Her country continued to be concerned that three States remained outside the NPT and urged India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to that Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States unconditionally and without delay.

59. While noting that the Government of Iraq had finally indicated that it would co-operate with the United Nations and allow the return of weapons inspectors, Canada continued to be concerned that the Agency had not been in a position to implement its mandate in Iraq under relevant Security Council resolutions since December 1998. It looked forward to the early return of the inspectors, the full co-operation of the Iraqi authorities, and successful verification that all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had indeed been destroyed. Her country was also concerned that, although the DPRK was a party to the NPT, the Agency was still unable to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration pursuant to its safeguards agreement with the Agency.

60. A strong supporter of the Agency's safeguards system, Canada urged all Member States which had not already done so sign and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol as soon as possible. It acknowledged the Director General's concerns regarding the resource challenges faced by the safeguards programme and attached high importance to the development of integrated safeguards. The completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards at the end of 2001 represented a major milestone. Much work remained to be done for integrated safeguards approaches to yield effective and efficient implementation at State level, and her country would pursue its work with the Agency on the development of such approaches through the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, including its safeguards support programme and other avenues, as appropriate. It also encouraged the Agency to proceed in a timely manner with the application of integrated safeguards in States with additional protocols.

61. Her country was particularly concerned over the problems of poverty and sustainable development, and one of the agreements concluded at the Kananaskis Summit had committed the G-8 countries to creating partnerships for the promotion of sustainable development at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. There, world leaders had decided to promote developing countries' access to such basic requirements as potable water, energy, health and food security by developing local capacities and using modern technologies to combat underdevelopment. Nuclear science and technology could play an important role in addressing those renewed commitments.

62. The Agency's Member States, as parties to the NPT, had an obligation to facilitate the exchange of nuclear knowledge and equipment for peaceful purposes. As a strong supporter of and major contributor to the Agency's technical co-operation programme, Canada looked forward to continued progress in the implementation of the programme's results-based management approach. It also encouraged the Agency to focus on continued partnerships with regional organizations and on increased reliance on local capacities. Canada had made a voluntary contribution to the TCF for 2002 of 2.34 million Canadian dollars.

63. International concerns regarding security of energy supply, the environment and climate change, the replacement and life extension of operating nuclear power plants, improved economics and advanced reactor designs all indicated that nuclear power would have an increasing role in the future. Advances and new developments in the medical and industrial applications of nuclear technologies also continued to be beneficial. Innovation was vital to the nuclear industry. One leading example was the advanced CANDU reactor which was being designed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. The objective of the project was to respond to a competitive market demand by achieving a US \$1000 per kW capital cost and a four-year construction schedule. Those developments were directly applicable to the Agency's INPRO project, in which Canada had taken a keen interest from the outset and which it would continue to support.

64. In recent years there had been increasing recognition of the need for nuclear knowledge management, which was vital to the continued safe use of all nuclear technologies. Canada commended the Agency for its efforts to increase awareness of that need and believed that it should continue to play a leading role in facilitating exchange of information and experience, raising awareness and providing assistance to Member States in that area. Canada was introducing a resolution to that effect.

65. With regard to organizational and managerial issues, for the Agency to meet the challenges and respond to the needs of the changing international environment, flexibility in internal programme management and resource allocation was essential so that the Agency's major programme components could become mutually reinforcing. She noted with satisfaction that an external consultant mandated by the Secretariat was currently reviewing the Agency's management practices. Canada had always been a strong supporter of that initiative and would be making an extrabudgetary contribution to ensure that the recommendations made by the consultant were adequately implemented and led to further efficiencies and effectiveness, with a focus on results-based management and the use the performance indicators.

66. Mr. CHARRY SAMPER (Colombia) welcomed the announcement by the Government of Cuba that it intended to sign the NPT and ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty.

67. The newly appointed Colombian Government was engaged in unprecedented efforts to rationalize operational expenditure with a view to increasing investment and generating employment. Its commitment to implementing a broad-based and strengthened social policy would necessitate co-operation from international agencies.

68. Colombia believed in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the application of nuclear science and technology for development. Furthermore, as a supporter of the principles of collective democratic security and nuclear non-proliferation, it was firmly committed to the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty. It had joined the Agency in 1960 and had benefited from Agency technical co-operation programmes at both the national and regional level, mainly in the fields of human health, mining, radiation protection, agriculture and nuclear medicine.

69. Two units within the Ministry of Mines and Energy in Colombia were directly involved in strategic planning. As of October 2001, the Nuclear Affairs Group in the Department of Energy of the Ministry of Mines and Energy had assumed the role of national liaison office with the Agency responsible for co-ordinating and managing the regular technical assistance programme. That group was also entrusted with national co-ordination of the ARCAL programme and with ensuring compliance with various international treaties, agreements and conventions relating to nuclear material, particularly in the fields of nuclear safety, physical protection, radiation protection, and safeguards. In that connection, the requisite analysis and review had been carried out for the country's Congress to adopt and ratify three important nuclear-related international conventions.

70. Government policy with respect to project proposal and design was guided by national development priorities. The programmes for the 2003-2004 biennium demonstrated how Agency activities complemented national efforts.

71. His country was concerned by the continuing imbalance between security and technology transfer, the latter of which was of fundamental importance to the developing countries. It was essential that a balance be maintained between the three pillars of the Agency's activities.

72. Another matter of concern to Colombia was the transport of radioactive waste. In a statement made on 25 July 2002, the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific had stressed the importance of complying fully with international standards when transporting such waste on maritime routes in the South-East Pacific and of providing timely information on the shipping routes to be used and appropriate compensation in the event of an accident.

73. In the nuclear medicine field, Colombia was making a qualitative leap forward and was introducing positron technology. It would require Agency assistance with that venture, in particular with the training of personnel in positron emission tomography. It was on a par with developed countries in that field and had introduced SPECT gamma cameras. It had a large number of nuclear medicine centres (approximately 50) with a modern infrastructure and highly qualified staff in both the public and private sectors. However, economic difficulties had so far hindered access to more sophisticated systems such as PET. Colombia had a group of nuclear medicine experts which regularly provided services for the Agency both in the region and beyond. Furthermore, the Agency had frequently requested Colombia to provide training in nuclear medicine for fellows from various countries, which it was hoping to continue doing.

74. His country saw the partners in development concept as central to its relations with the Agency. The Agency should continue to support national efforts in such areas as nuclear medicine, mining, hydrology and human resources training.

75. Mr. HASHIM (Malaysia) said the financial situation of the Agency was a matter of concern as the Agency's legal obligations could no longer be met within the existing level of funding. The situation was being compounded by the shortfall in contributions received. In addition, the Agency was faced with the challenge of responding to the heightened threat of nuclear terrorism.

76. While it condemned all acts of terrorism, regardless of the motivation of their perpetrators, and remained fully committed to the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation as a step towards general and complete nuclear disarmament, Malaysia also strongly believed that technical co-operation should continue to be one of the main pillars of the Agency, as stipulated in Article IV of the NPT. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had recognized that the financing of safeguards activities was a common but differentiated responsibility, rather than a purely collective one. Account had to be taken of whether a Member State possessed nuclear weapons, had a significant nuclear power programme, nuclear fuel processing or mining activity, or occupied a designated seat on the Board of Governors, for such States bore added responsibilities in that context.

77. The ultimate solution to the problem of security and prevention of the theft of nuclear weapons was the total and irreversible elimination of all such weapons of mass destruction by all parties. The Agency should not be involved in any response to the theft of a nuclear weapon, as that could be construed as tacit encouragement to the continued possession of such weapons of mass destruction, contravening the spirit of its mandate under the NPT. Any theft of nuclear weapons had a direct and immediate bearing on international peace and security and should be addressed by other multilateral organizations, in particular the Security Council, with the Agency acting only on the mandate of the Security Council as required and on a specific case-by-case basis. Since the Statute of the Agency and other international instruments were generally silent on the matter of the responsibility of the Agency in such an event, it would not be appropriate for it to take on such a new, and potentially financially prohibitive role of its own accord.

78. Any effort to curb the terrorist threat, nuclear or otherwise, should be matched by efforts to find lasting solutions to the root causes of terrorism. Equal emphasis should be accorded to the three main pillars of the Agency's activities, taking into consideration that its non-verification activities, particularly those which were supportive of the sustainable socio-economic development objectives of its developing Member States, could also contribute to preventing terrorism by making life more meaningful for the beneficiaries.

79. His country was concerned that the prevailing heightened emphasis on efforts to mitigate the threat of nuclear terrorism could lead to a dilution of the Agency's activities relating to sustainable development, thereby exacerbating the sense of disenfranchisement in less-developed Member States. It was the benefits to be obtained through the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme that had motivated most of the developing countries to join the Agency. The Director General's assurance that, while the Agency

viewed the improvements in nuclear security as a high priority, they would not be implemented at the expense of other existing high priorities in the technical co-operation programme, was heartening. He also welcomed the fact that the programmes relating to prevention of nuclear terrorism were largely being funded through voluntary contributions.

80. The level of resources made available was a measure of the general political will to support Member States wishing to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The 80.1% rate of attainment for the TCF in 2001 was gratifying. Malaysia would continue to meet its financial commitments to the Agency in full and on time, including those to the TCF and its assessed programme costs, and it was grateful to all Member States that had done likewise.

81. He expressed the hope that Cuba's decision to accede to the NPT would encourage other non-parties to do likewise, thus bringing closer the ultimate aim of universality of the Treaty.

82. Malaysia also welcomed Iraq's announcement that it would grant international inspectors unconditional access to verify its compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. He expressed the hope that it might therefore be possible to lift the sanctions in the near future to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.

83. Mr. SRIWIDJAJA (Indonesia) said that nuclear science and technology and their applications not only served as practical problem-solving tools but also contributed towards sustainable development and, indirectly, by alleviating poverty, helped combat the rise of ideologies linked to terrorism.

84. When properly managed, nuclear power could provide electricity on a large scale with comparatively little environmental impact. Nuclear technology could also make a contribution to many aspects of Agenda 21 and the United Nations Millennium declaration ranging from human health and agricultural productivity to water management, the environment and energy production.

85. During the National Convention on Nuclear Safety held in May 2002, the President of Indonesia had stressed the importance of including nuclear energy in the country's energy mix and the need for Indonesia to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Energy demand in Indonesia was projected to double by 2025. Public information activities were therefore being intensified to promote the benefits of nuclear technology.

86. Over the preceding year, his country had given high priority to education and capacity building, and especially to the development - in co-operation with international organizations - of programmes which directly enhanced people's quality of life. He commended the Agency on its technical co-operation programme and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the establishment of the Regional Office for the RCA. Technology transfer through those mechanisms had enhanced Indonesian scientists' ability to implement peaceful uses of the nuclear science and technology in various fields. Indonesia looked forward to further fruitful co-operation with the Agency under the technical co-operation programme and the RCA.

87. It particularly appreciated the Agency's efforts to establish a nuclear desalination project. That project involved tripartite co-operation between the Agency, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea and was expected to become a model for technical co-operation among developing countries in the future.

88. Indonesian scientists and engineers at G.A. Siwabessy had successfully developed uranium silicide fuel elements as part of the programme to improve operation of the research reactor. An operational test of a full uranium silicide-fuelled core had been conducted recently: criticality had been achieved on 27 August 2002 and full power operation at 30 MW on 6 September 2002. The operational test should be complete by 18 September 2002. Indonesia invited Member States to make use of its multi-purpose reactor and its supporting laboratories.

89. In 19 of its 30 provinces, scientists from Indonesia's National Nuclear Energy Agency, BATAN, were continuing to co-operate with provincial and local government, local universities, small and medium-sized enterprises, co-operatives and NGOs in disseminating and utilizing research products to help people on low incomes overcome the effects of the economic crisis. Some provinces had not only incorporated mutant rice varieties and food supplement technology in their food security programmes but had also used nuclear technology to improve the productivity of arid land.

90. In addition to establishing a programme for designing and manufacturing nuclear medicine instruments, his country continued to develop products for diagnosis and treatment for both domestic use and export. Currently, 90% of the national demand for radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals, excluding long-lived radioisotopes, was supplied from that source. Furthermore, renographs, thyroid uptake apparatus, X-ray machines and RIA counters were now being made locally and used in hospitals. Tissue bank centres had been established in four hospitals, producing a total of 9000 packs used by 30 hospitals in 8 provinces. The production of sterilized biomaterial from synthetic material was being clinically tested, a National Committee on Radiation Safety had been established and an action plan was being put in place to protect patients from radiation contamination.

91. BATAN was using its non-destructive testing laboratory for quality control of casting products for export. It was also developing public awareness campaigns to increase acceptance of radiation processing of food, especially raw and frozen products, and packaging materials. Nuclear techniques had also been used for troubleshooting at an oil refinery installation in West Java and for the fertilizer industry in East Kalimantan.

92. Nuclear and related techniques had recently been used to study the safety and sustainability of the Jatiluhur dam, to investigate water pollution and leakage around a solid municipal waste dumping site in co-operation with the government of Jakarta, and to manage the Kamojang and Lahendong geothermal fields.

93. Indonesia was currently launching programmes on reactor ageing, emergency core cooling systems, control rod design and engineering, and control instrumentation systems. It was also working towards the implementation of integrated safeguards, especially for research

reactors and critical assemblies. In so doing, it would be the second country in the world to implement integrated safeguards.

94. His country had ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety and had issued new government regulations on the safe transport of nuclear material and the management of radioactive waste. Those regulations, in addition to existing regulations, would speed up the process of implementing the new International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources in Indonesia.

95. An IAEA-Indonesian regional workshop on physical protection and material security to combat illicit trafficking had been organized with Agency assistance which had been attended by participants from countries party to the South East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone and their neighbours, as well as one workshop on the organization and implementation of a national regulatory programme for the control of radiation sources and another on radiation protection in radioactive waste management.

96. Indonesia shared some of the concerns of coastal States regarding nuclear transport safety, especially the increasing danger of accidents caused by natural phenomena, human error or criminal acts. Nuclear security should be one of the world's priorities and he urged all parties concerned do their utmost to support efforts to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety.

97. The Agency's verification system was of the utmost importance to Indonesia. The universality, consolidation and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including specific steps to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, were more important than ever for the continuing sustainability and credibility of that regime.

98. The prevailing political situation in the Middle East, which had prevented the Director general from making further progress in fulfilling his mandate pursuant to General Conference resolution GC(45)/RES/18, was cause for concern. All States in the region should accept the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure, with a view to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

99. He welcomed Iraq's announcement that it intended to grant United Nations inspectors unconditional access. That decision should be implemented as soon as possible in order to prevent the situation in the region from worsening still further.

100. Finally, in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol, care should be taken to ensure that the resources available for technical assistance and co-operation did not decrease.

101. Mr. PROMPOJ (Thailand) welcomed Iraq's recent decision to accept the unconditional return of United Nations weapons inspectors and expressed support for any further actions in that regard within the framework of the United Nations.

102. He noted with satisfaction the Agency's successful work in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation, safety and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy over the preceding year. Thailand continued to be committed to co-operating with the Agency in strengthening technical co-operation among developing countries and it hoped that the benefit States gained from the Agency's activities would promote greater global understanding of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for sustainable development.

103. As a strong supporter of strengthened safeguards, his country had established a sub-committee on safeguards in March 2002 to consider the verification issue with a view to ratifying an additional protocol. An SSAC would be established at a later stage. The establishment of collaboration on safety and safeguards issues between the Agency and the South East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone was also one of Thailand's priorities. Equally, it was ready to co-operate with the Agency and Member States in the implementation of the Agency's activities to protect against nuclear terrorism, in particular those on capacity building and preparedness in South East Asia.

104. The restructuring of Thailand's Office of Atomic Energy for Peace had been a major development. The country was actively participating in two Model Projects on upgrading of radiation protection infrastructure (RAS/9/026 and RAS/9/027) to help support the re-structuring and develop effective management techniques for the new organization, and to assist with the drafting of new nuclear legislation. He called on the Agency to continue working closely with Member States to develop national safety regulatory infrastructures and to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. Thailand appreciated the expertise and resources the Agency provided in that field, but it could be more innovative in co-ordinating its technical co-operation mechanisms to optimize delivery, inter alia under regional co-operative arrangements.

105. His country had contributed to technical co-operation programmes by receiving fellows and scientific visitors for on-the-job training in the fields of agriculture and medicine. Furthermore, 150 copies of a book on tissue banks had recently been donated to the Agency for reference and distribution to its Member States. He encouraged the Agency to incorporate the areas of safeguards, safety regimes and the peaceful application of atomic energy in agriculture, health, education and training in its technical co-operation programmes. It should also identify specific programmes on radiation protection infrastructure, quality assurance in medical applications, food safety, the application of isotopic and nuclear techniques in nutrition research and water resource development, public information and knowledge management as part of its core activities.

106. Finally, Thailand was pledging \$180 148 to the TCF for the year 2003.

107. Mr. HOFFMANN (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 1996 had reached universal status with 166 signatories, 94 of which had deposited their instruments of ratification, including 31 of the 44 States whose ratification was required for the Treaty to enter into force. In the fifth year of its existence, the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat were actively preparing for the effective implementation of the Treaty.

108. The CTBT provided for the establishment of a unique global verification regime consisting of an international monitoring system, a consultation and clarification process, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures. The data from monitoring stations all over the globe were processed and analysed by the International Data Centre in Vienna. Member States had the final responsibility for analysing the data.

109. The programme budgets approved by the Commission since 1997 for establishing the monitoring system included the costs of the site surveys, purchase of equipment, installation, final certification, and operation and maintenance of the facilities. Thus far, 135 stations had been completed and 104 were under construction.

110. The International Data Centre supported the verification responsibilities of Member States by providing the products and services needed for effective global monitoring through the establishment and testing of facilities which would receive, collect, process, analyse, report on and archive data from the monitoring stations. Its work on the design, implementation and management of information security was progressing.

111. The International Data Centre's applications software was being tested under near-operational conditions. Reviewed Event Bulletins were issued and, currently, about 70 stations were contributing to those bulletins, including 33 which were sending data through the organization's global communications infrastructure.

112. The signatory States were interested in acquiring their own copies of the virtual gamma spectroscopy laboratory tool. An initiative had been launched to study cosmic-ray effects in spectra, and a major project to review the International Data Centre's nuclide library had begun. Data requirements for noble gas monitoring had been worked out and presented at a workshop held in January in Tahiti, and testing of data from the prototype noble gas stations was in progress. Work on significantly improving the software for beta-gamma noble gas measurements had started and other developments and enhancements of the radionuclide monitoring software were already under way. Software integration work had continued in the areas of software development, maintenance and configuration management.

113. The atmospheric transport area had developed strongly. A four-layer concept had been formulated with the underlying idea that all computer-intensive work would be done outside, at renowned meteorological centres, and at the International Data Centre. Then fairly simple post-processing routines would be used to create the products of interest to States, either at the International Data Centre or at national data centres. For the first module dealing with continuous meteorological data feed, there had been substantial progress towards an agreement with the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. The co-operation agreement with the World Meteorological Organization had been a useful vehicle in that connection and for the preparation of the global communications infrastructure workshop to be held in Vienna in October, which would deal with how the Secretariat would obtain independent analyses from worldwide meteorological centres in cases where more than one relevant level-5 radionuclide had been detected.

114. The global communications infrastructure transferred the monitoring data to the International Data Centre and disseminated those data and the Centre's products to signatory

States through a closed and secure satellite communications network. When fully operational, it was expected to carry some 11 gigabytes of data daily. The programme of very-small-aperture terminal installations had continued. So far, more than 110 such installations, out of a planned 234, had been made. Secure internet connections were also used as an alternative to such connections.

115. The preparation of the draft on-site operational manual in 2002 remained a priority task. The Secretariat would continue to provide, upon request, all necessary support for that process. The eighth on-site inspection workshop, held in Vienna in 2002, had concentrated on the preparation of the draft manual, noble gas measurements and the results of a field experiment in Slovakia.

116. The Secretariat had a staff of about 270 from 69 countries, of whom about 170 were in the Professional category. There were 46 women in Professional positions. An ad hoc steering group on human resources was working on a number of matters of importance to the staff.

117. The Secretariat had continued to play the role of a clearing house, maintaining interaction with signatory States on their potential needs and capabilities in Treaty technologies, so as to enable the timely establishment and operation of the verification system.

118. Mr. ALEXANDRIS (Greece) said that the threat of nuclear terrorism had highlighted the importance of the NPT. Indeed, terrorism multiplied the dangers inherent in nuclear weapon proliferation and jeopardized the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Despite its sinister appearance, the situation presented new challenges and opportunities to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The complexity of the challenges called for a meticulous implementation of the Agency's recommended norms and practices.

119. Countries which possessed nuclear weapons and fissile material had a special responsibility to reassure the international community that measures were being taken to prevent proliferation, unauthorized use and criminal activity. At the same time, multilateral action was needed to build a universal network against nuclear terrorism.

120. Greece had always played an active role in all aspects of nuclear safety. It had joined the incident reporting system for research reactors, had ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety and had participated in the second review meeting under that instrument.

121. It supported the Agency's efforts to develop safety standards covering the whole spectrum of fuel cycle facilities and to establish and maintain a global safety regime. It also noted the Director General's interest in decommissioning planning as part of the back end of the fuel cycle and encouraged him to step up the Agency's efforts in that regard.

122. He commended the revised Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources. The Greek Atomic Energy Commission would be hosting postgraduate courses on radiation protection of sources starting the following year.

123. His country appreciated the Agency's efforts to establish a comprehensive internationally accepted safety regime for research reactors. An INSARR mission had been conducted in Greece to review operational safety aspects.

124. Greece was especially interested in the Agency's studies on the consequences of the use of depleted uranium, since it lay close to places where that material had been detected. The Greek Atomic Energy Commission had already collected and evaluated environmental samples from neighbouring areas and continued to take part in the United Nations Environment Programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

125. He welcomed Cuba's decision to sign the NPT. His country remained committed to a universal non-proliferation regime.

126. Greece welcomed the completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards, but remained concerned over the slow progress with the conclusion of additional protocols. The evaluation of information about a State's nuclear programme was becoming an integral part of the safeguards conclusions process. He noted with satisfaction the progress made in expanding the Agency's remote monitoring system. The Agency's verification role should be strengthened. The changes in the geopolitical environment which had resulted from the end of the Cold War, and the recent terrorist activities underscored the need to reinforce the role of multilateral institutions. The Agency's verification system was the only system available to the international community to monitor and verify nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Universal application of safeguards remained one of the basic components of international nuclear security.

127. His country was disappointed at the lack of progress with the drafting of an amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It was voluntarily participating in the Agency's illicit trafficking database and was involved in the ongoing regional technical co-operation project in Europe devoted to training customs officials, border guards and police officers.

128. Greece appreciated the contribution Agency technical co-operation made to enhancing the scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities of participating countries through technology transfer and capacity building. Active participation by the States themselves was essential to those efforts, and the building of strategic partnerships with Member States and other specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations. Greece would be contributing its full share of the TCF for 2002 and 2003, amounting to around \$750 000. It also offered training opportunities in its laboratories for Agency fellowship-holders.

129. Ms. ŽIAKOVÁ (Slovakia) said that, following the events of 11 September 2001, the Government of Slovakia had adopted a package of organizational and technical measures to combat terrorism, including enhanced physical protection of nuclear installations. Her country welcomed the Agency's quick and comprehensive response to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

130. Slovakia supported the efforts of the group of technical and legal experts that had recently met to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and

hoped that the negotiations would yield a result which attracted broad adherence by the international community.

131. Encouraging progress had been made in the Agency's efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. To reach the final goal of effective and efficient global safeguards, it was of the utmost importance that safeguards were applied on a non-discriminatory and universal basis, and that the verification of information was neither mechanistic nor systematic. Slovakia had signed a new safeguards agreement with the Agency, and an additional protocol which it was preparing to bring into force. She urged States which had not already concluded safeguards agreements and additional protocols to do so as soon as possible.

132. Slovakia remained deeply concerned about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq. The full implementation of those resolutions without further delay and without any preconditions, including the resumption of Agency inspections, was important to the peace and security of the region.

133. With respect to the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK, her country recognized the need for continuing inspection activities to monitor the freeze, but the issue of the DPRK's initial declaration remained unresolved. She urged the DPRK to fulfil its responsibilities under its safeguards agreement without delay.

134. The completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards was an important milestone. Her country stood ready to support the Agency in those activities by working closely with SAGSI and in co-operation with other Member States. With regard to the implementation of safeguards in Slovakia, all nuclear power plant fuel was stored exclusively at the plant sites and all nuclear facilities in the country, as well as all nuclear material, were subject to comprehensive safeguards. The country's nuclear regulatory authority performed regular inspections at facilities in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Act.

135. With regard to the safe use of nuclear energy, over recent years regulators and operators had had the opportunity to exchange experience and technical information in a number of fora. The Agency played an indispensable role in supporting those activities and in making its services available to Member States. Slovakia welcomed the Agency's co-operation with other bodies within the United Nations, with the institutions of the European Union and with other international organizations, such as the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD and the World Association of Nuclear Operators. It was the responsibility of the nuclear community to promote global nuclear safety and her country therefore strongly supported those Agency initiatives which contributed to a global nuclear safety regime through networking, integration of its safety evaluation activities, and promotion of adherence to international safety conventions. Safety was an essential precondition for the use of nuclear energy in Slovakia, which would remain an important source of energy in the medium term according to the country's energy plan. The main challenge for future years would be the implementation of the nuclear power plant safety improvement and modernization programme, which should be complete by 2008. The second review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety had commended the positive results Slovakia had achieved in improving

the safety of its nuclear power plants. It would have further achievements to report at the third review meeting.

136. The safety of nuclear installations had also been the subject of very useful bilateral meetings with neighbouring States. The Centre for Nuclear Safety had been established in Bratislava in April 2002 to enhance co-operation in the region. It was being supported by the Swiss and Slovak Governments with the aim of creating a network of nuclear safety experts to support the regional nuclear regulatory authorities.

137. Slovakia's nuclear regulatory authority had invited the Agency's International Regulatory Review Team to conduct a follow-up review in November 2002 to confirm that it had successfully addressed all the review team's findings, and it welcomed the valuable insights for further improvements that could be derived from an international peer review. It had also been a strong and active supporter of the Operational Safety Review Teams in Slovakia and other Member States. Slovakia encouraged all Member States to utilize that important safety service to strengthen the operational safety of nuclear power plants further in the interests of the safe use of nuclear energy.

138. The competent Slovak authorities viewed the Agency's expert services an essential part of international co-operation which supported the national regulatory decision-making process. Like other countries in the region, Slovakia believed that long-term regional planning was the best way of accommodating the needs of individual countries effectively and efficiently, so the possible exclusion of peer review services from regional technical co-operation would be of concern to it.

139. In the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, her country continued to co-operate with over 20 Member States and a number of international organizations, chief among them the Agency. One national project on radiochemical facilities for producing medical radionuclides was of the utmost importance to Slovakia, which had made a national contribution to it of \$1.45 million. In future, emphasis should be placed on the transfer of nuclear techniques. The recent World Summit on Sustainable Development had emphasized the need to reinforce sustainable development efforts. The Agency could make a valuable contribution to that work. For example, the application of nuclear techniques in such areas as human health and agriculture had clear environmental and economic advantages.

140. The Slovak Government was also co-operating with the Agency to organize workshops for experts from all over the world. Based on the positive feedback from participants, her country was prepared to host further Agency activities and would continue to accept Agency-sponsored fellows and scientific visitors in order to share its wide-ranging experience in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also intended to contribute to the TCF.

141. Mr. ALI (Bangladesh) said that, of the areas in which his country was already deriving benefits from nuclear technology, one in particular required increased Agency involvement: the provision of safe drinking water. For some years water drawn from underground aquifers had been used to supply 90% of the population with drinking water, but Bangladeshi scientists had recently discovered that those aquifers were contaminated with unusually high concentrations of arsenic. More than 30 million people were affected, and it

was becoming clear that the long-term effects could be much more severe than anticipated. Technological support was needed not only to mitigate the problem, but to help understand its complex dynamics. Neutron activation analysis and other analytical techniques could be useful to detect arsenic concentrations in water, food and human organs, and isotope hydrology studies to map groundwater reservoirs throughout the country. He appealed to the Agency for urgent help to address the problem.

142. His country was a party to three major nuclear safety conventions and was determined to strengthen its regulations in the radiation, transport and waste safety field. The Agency should devote additional resources to safety matters, inter alia in the areas of the nuclear fuel cycle and waste management. Nuclear and radiation safety laws and regulations were already in place in Bangladesh. The authorities had conducted a survey of ionizing radiation sources and was in the process of issuing licenses to regulate their operation. His Government was aware of its obligations in respect of the attainment of the milestones relating to personnel and workplace monitoring, and of the need to separate regulatory aspects from promotional aspects in relation to the use of nuclear technologies. A central radioactive waste processing and storage facility was also being developed for intermediate storage of radioactive waste generated in the country. He thanked the Agency for the assistance it was providing.

143. Less than one fifth of the Bangladeshi population had access to electricity, and the annual per capita generation of electricity was only about 90 kWh. Energy was crucial to sustainable development. Without an uninterrupted power supply it was impossible to make headway, especially as energy demand grew exponentially with economic progress. Although many countries were phasing out nuclear energy, the inadequacy of its indigenous primary energy resources had led Bangladesh to consider building a nuclear power plant to meet its growing energy needs. It had attached the highest importance to safety issues at all phases of the project, and was looking forward to further collaboration with the Agency.

144. The Agency technical assistance programme in Bangladesh focused on the country's needs. Projects were also being implemented under the Agency's research contract programme and he welcomed the thematic co-ordinated research project to promote research on nuclear technology in developing countries. Bangladesh was actively involved in various RCA projects which were providing opportunities for region-wide sharing of experience. Those activities should be extended as they helped countries respond to the challenges of development. Member States were taking on greater responsibilities in terms of formulating, managing and implementing RCA programmes and projects. The establishment of a regional RCA office in the Republic of Korea was a welcome move.

145. Nuclear technology had great potential for improving socio-economic conditions in the developing countries. Reliance on market forces alone would, however, not be sufficient and international co-operation and commitment were essential to bring technology to developing countries. The Agency should take on a more proactive role in that regard.

146. As a party to the NPT and CTBT, and having recently signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement, his Government wished to reiterate its firm and full commitment to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to the establishment of a lasting global nuclear safety regime. Bangladesh remained confident in the future of nuclear energy and

looked forward to further collaboration with the Agency, particularly where its promotional activities were concerned.

147. Mr. MURPHY (Ireland) said that his country had long regarded the Agency as a key asset in efforts to attain the aims and objectives of the NPT. However, it was also opposed to any international expansion of the nuclear industry, including the linking of nuclear energy with sustainable development. His Government was not persuaded that nuclear energy provided a solution to concerns about global warming, climate change and the need for sustainable development. Rather, it felt that the perceived benefits of nuclear energy were far outweighed by the public health, safety and environmental risks. Irish concerns had been brought into sharp relief only recently, as a shipment of MOX fuel had just passed through the Irish Sea.

148. The horrific events of 11 September 2001 had increased the danger of a major disaster occurring at a nuclear power plant. Its own proximity to the United Kingdom's nuclear facilities made Ireland fear the health, safety, environmental and economic consequences of a terrorist attack on those facilities. All countries which had rejected nuclear energy firmly believed that they should not be exposed to the associated risks and dangers. In the current climate, it would be folly for any country to contemplate expanding its nuclear energy activities. He commended the Agency on its prompt response in establishing a programme of measures aimed at combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. His country would be making a financial contribution to the Agency's anti-terrorism fund.

149. Turning to the transport of radioactive material, he emphasized that the concerns he had mentioned earlier were shared by a number of other countries whose coastlines lay close to the maritime routes used for such shipments.

150. The serious risks and the potential for catastrophic damage associated with an accident related to nuclear activities, including shipments of radioactive materials, made nuclear liability an important issue. His Government was concerned about the effectiveness and adequacy of the compensation available under existing international nuclear liability instruments. An effective international regime was needed to ensure the provision of enhanced and appropriate levels of compensation, and the availability of a speedy and impartial mechanism for settling claims. Ireland therefore attached particular importance to the forthcoming international transport conference.

151. Nuclear waste disposal was another area of concern. A solution that would be acceptable from both a scientific and public standpoint appeared to be no nearer now than it had been at the beginning of the nuclear era. A number of other countries were concerned about reprocessing activities and radioactive discharges and waste. The many dangers and risks which reprocessing posed to public safety and health and to the environment significantly outweighed the perceived economic benefits.

152. Nuclear energy was simply not sustainable, economically or otherwise, especially when one added the high research and capital costs, including decommissioning, and the additional security costs, to the aforementioned risk factors. Thus, his Government had initiated legal

proceedings under the OSPAR Convention and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with regard to the MOX plant at Sellafield.

153. In the wider context, existing nuclear reactors which could not be upgraded quickly to the highest possible safety standards should be closed and decommissioned. Ireland was opposed to any proposals for promoting the expansion of nuclear fission power or extending the life of existing reactors already operating beyond their original design lifetime. It strongly supported the steps taken by the Agency, the European Union and the Nuclear Energy Agency to improve safety standards and promote an effective regulatory regime in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the States of the former Soviet Union.

154. In recent years, his country had paid its full share of the TCF and hoped to continue to do so. However, it did not wish the TCF to be used for promoting the expansion of nuclear energy. At a time when certain developed countries were phasing out their nuclear facilities, it would be a mistake to encourage developing countries to include nuclear energy in their national energy mix. Ireland supported the Agency's initiatives under the TCF in such areas as radiation protection and nuclear safety in developing countries, and staff from Ireland's national regulatory authority for radiation protection would continue to be directly involved in implementing such initiatives.

155. Finally, his country greatly appreciated the Agency's work, especially where it related to the creation of a global nuclear safety culture and the enhancement of international standards. It would continue to give its full support to activities in those areas.

156. Mr. SHKOLNIK (Kazakhstan) said that the concept for development of the uranium industry and nuclear power which his Government had recently approved reflected its intention to develop further uranium ore processing with a view to producing higher quality uranium products, including nuclear fuel. Kazakhstan had recently joined the NSG. Since first developing a nuclear export control system, it had been guided by the Group's recommendations which had been incorporated into its national legislation and regulations.

157. In regulating nuclear activities, significant attention had always been given in Kazakhstan to the control of radioactive material, including the use and movement of ionizing radiation sources. With Agency assistance, measures were being implemented to strengthen the existing system, combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, and improve efficiency. Nevertheless, effective control of radiation sources remained a serious problem in the country and he welcomed the initiative of the Agency, Russia and the United States aimed at restoring control over sources throughout the former Soviet Union. Weakened control over radioactive material could lead to radiological incidents with an impact on the environment and public health. The Agency should consider setting up a system to control transfers of radiation sources between States similar to the one in place for transfers of nuclear material. His country welcomed the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

158. In June 2002, the Kazakhstan parliament had ratified a seven-year extension to the agreement with the United States on the destruction of intercontinental ballistic missile launching silos, furthering the efforts to destroy infrastructure associated with weapons of

mass destruction and increase control over nuclear activities. Work was under way to eliminate the consequences of nuclear testing and to destroy the associated infrastructure, with specialists from Kazakhstan, Russia and the United States working in close co-operation. It was hoped that Kazakhstan would soon be able to sign an additional protocol, since the required procedures had almost been completed.

159. Research was continuing in the country on nuclear and radiation safety, and work on optimization of the nuclear fuel cycle. His country was also interested in participating in activities related to innovative reactor technologies. Kazakhstan was also working on controlled fusion, and design documentation for a Kazakh materials science tokamak had been elaborated.

160. In conclusion, he confirmed his country's support for the Agency's activities relating to the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind, the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and the improvement of safety.

161. Mr. ABDENUR (Brazil) said that, as a founding Member State of the Agency, Brazil had always devoted its best efforts to supporting its statutory mission to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to worldwide peace, health and prosperity. Consistent with its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy - a fundamental principle of its foreign policy which was enshrined in its Constitution, Brazil remained convinced of the potential benefits to be derived from the responsible use of nuclear technology. With its unique body of expertise, the Agency was well placed to provide its Member States with valuable inputs and tools for implementing their national development policies and goals. He reaffirmed his country's support for the Agency's activities, and for its outstanding contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to the use of nuclear energy for sustainable development.

162. The Agency's role in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and at the same time preventing its diversion for the production of nuclear weapons, had taken on even greater importance in view of the current prospects for full implementation of the nuclear disarmament commitments enshrined in Article VI of the NPT. The preparatory process for the 2005 NPT Review Conference had recently been launched, and it was hoped that that event would lead to enhanced international peace and security through further disarmament and non-proliferation measures. However, there were worrying signs that the objectives of Article VI would not be achieved, and that progress would not be forthcoming in other fundamental areas of multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts, such as the Conference on Disarmament and the entry into force of the CTBT.

163. Having committed themselves unequivocally at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, certain nuclear-weapon States had made no genuine effort to fulfil their undertaking and were even indicating that they might consider developing new nuclear weapon systems and revising existing nuclear doctrines. Though the planned reductions in the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by the two major nuclear-weapon States was a positive step, the streamlining of nuclear arsenals could not by itself induce the international community at large to adopt further nuclear non-proliferation measures. Countries such as Brazil, which was fully committed to the exclusively peaceful

uses of nuclear energy, could only note with concern that new roles for nuclear weapons were being considered.

164. Global co-operation leading to agreement on effective disarmament measures based on verifiable and non-discriminatory obligations was an essential prerequisite for a stable and secure international system. He therefore appealed to all nations to step up their efforts to reverse the current negative trends by fighting to preserve disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and commitments entered into by consensus at international level, and other fundamental instruments such as the CTBT which should be brought into force as soon as possible. In that context, he welcomed Cuba's decision to accede to the NPT and ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty; those decisions contributed to the universalization of the NPT and had the important effect of bringing the last remaining Latin American and Caribbean country under the umbrella of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which had established the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone. The New Agenda Coalition, to which Brazil belonged, had recently issued an important declaration on its views on disarmament and non-proliferation matters in New York.

165. Brazil remained committed to international efforts to combat all forms of terrorism, including possible malicious acts involving nuclear material. It also fully shared the concerns about the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, which further reinforced the need to work towards nuclear disarmament. However, the discussions of measures to combat such eventualities should not be allowed to provide any justification, even implicit, for States' indefinite retention of such weapons.

166. The Agency's safeguards system was a major element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, whose universality his country strongly supported. By providing assurances as to the non-diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful uses, the safeguards system contributed significantly to international security. Brazil welcomed the progress achieved in integrating traditional and new safeguards measures, as well as the efforts to achieve more effective and efficient safeguards implementation. It was convinced of the usefulness of the collaboration between ABACC and the Agency as a means of avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts, and looked forward to continued fruitful co-operation between the two organizations.

167. He commended the Agency on its outstanding work in delivering its technical co-operation programme and, in particular, welcomed the initiatives being undertaken to address the issue of generation and transfer of knowledge, and preservation of nuclear knowledge. Projects should continue to meet priorities identified at national level, in accordance with each country's views of its own needs in terms of co-operation for development. Priority should be given to projects that related to the Agency's core areas of competence. He noted with satisfaction the Board's decision on the very important question of the financing of technical co-operation for the coming years and expressed the hope that an appropriate balance among the Agency's statutory activities would be maintained.

168. The ARCAL programme had contributed effectively to identifying, bringing together and prioritizing regional interests, and to promoting further interaction and co-operation among countries in the region. In the context of the efforts to mobilize nuclear technologies

for sustainable development, the components of technical co-operation implementation most likely to achieve a cost-effective outcome were TCDC and the further utilization of regional resource centres in developing countries.

169. The future of nuclear energy in national development plans depended on the extent to which the public's doubts and fears concerning the safe management, storage, transport and disposal of nuclear material, nuclear waste and radiation sources could be allayed. Safety was of paramount importance, and Brazil highly appreciated the assistance the Agency provided to Member States with the promotion of a safety culture. The international conference on safety culture in nuclear installations which was due to take place in Rio de Janeiro at the end of the year would lend further momentum to those efforts.

170. In view of the potential risk to coastal populations and the marine environment, it was high time to strengthen the international regulatory framework governing the maritime transport of radioactive material and nuclear waste. In tackling the issue, the General Conference should seek to build upon agreed concepts and guidelines, so as to address the legitimate concerns of countries situated along the routes of such transport operations. Brazil appreciated the efforts undertaken by major shipping countries to achieve transparency in relation to that issue, in particular the TranSAS mission carried out recently in the United Kingdom. Brazil itself had received a TranSAS mission earlier in the year, which should help improve specific aspects of the national system for licensing and control of radioactive material transport operations. He expressed the hope that the issue would be discussed in a comprehensive manner at the forthcoming international conference on the safe transport of radioactive material in 2003.

171. The commencement of operation of the ANGRA II power plant in 2000 had increased the national installed nuclear power capacity to 2000 MW, half the power generated in the State of Rio de Janeiro. In view of Brazil's growing energy needs, feasibility studies were being conducted for the ANGRA III power plant; those studies also covered the environmental impact and the financial aspects. A new commercial uranium enrichment plant was due to be commissioned by the end of 2002.

172. Brazil also continued to invest in the production of radiopharmaceuticals, seeking constant improvements in that area, as well as in the application of nuclear techniques in industry, agriculture and the environment.

173. Mr BORG (Malta) called on the Agency to continue and possibly intensify its already considerable activities contributing to sustainable development, in particular by promoting technologies which increased productivity in agriculture and enhanced water resource management.

174. His country had noted with interest the progress made by the Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco with the development of new techniques for the detection and study of nuclear and non-nuclear marine pollutants both in the laboratory and the field. The possible application of those techniques to the Mediterranean Sea should be studied in depth, which would require co-operation between the European, African and possibly Asian regions of the Agency. Co-operation with UNEP might also be beneficial, and Malta was prepared to

collaborate in any way it could. It was also prepared to collaborate in any exercise involving the preparation of an emergency response plan for a possible nuclear emergency in the Mediterranean.

175. As a small island State with limited natural resources, Malta relied heavily on investment in human resources, which had to be made on a continuous basis, in order to secure a decent standard of living for present and future Maltese generations.

176. The transfer of technology for capacity building played a crucial role in the sustainable development of developing countries and small States. With Agency assistance, Malta had managed to secure access to nuclear scientific and technological information in the fields of treatment planning and quality assurance for radiotherapy, groundwater management, and food contaminants of animal origin.

177. His country was in the process of formulating a national radiological emergency response plan which called for a high degree of institutional capacity building and co-ordination among the various public entities involved. An advisory committee headed by the Civil Protection Department had already been established with the aim of formulating such an emergency plan, which should form part of a master plan for the Maltese Islands to address nuclear, chemical, biological and other emergencies. In view of the limited local experience in the field, Agency technical assistance and institutional capacity building was deemed crucial to the project.

178. Over the coming biennium, with Agency assistance, Malta would be embarking on a project aimed at establishing a comprehensive quality control and assurance and patient dosimetry system in radiology, including radionuclide imaging at the national general hospital. Another project would enhance the development of national capabilities for personal and workplace radiation monitoring at the Malta National Laboratory, which was in the process of upgrading and relocating. It would also be participating in a number of regional projects which promoted training opportunities for government and other officials.

179. Malta was in the final stages of adopting legislation to regulate the use, management, storage and disposal of radioactive substances. That legislation would establish a Radiation Protection Board and, once adopted, would put the Government in a position to accede to the relevant Agency conventions, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

180. There could be no sustainable development without peace. The Agency's readiness to contribute to the resolution of the Iraqi situation in a peaceful manner through the implementation of Security Council resolutions should continue to remain a priority.

181. Although Malta did not possess the necessary expertise to participate in the comprehensive review of all Agency activities relevant to protection against nuclear terrorism, it appreciated that initiative and commended the Director General for establishing an Advisory Group on Nuclear Security. It was confident that the specific proposals incorporated in the action plan would contribute substantially to the national measures taken by Member States.

182. Mr. ERPUL (Turkey), exercising his right of reply, said that he was compelled to respond to certain politically motivated and completely unfounded allegations against Turkey made by the Armenian representative. The Armenian delegation's allegations of a blockade by Turkey were not only groundless but a further example of Armenia's aggressive attitude towards some of its neighbours. Turkey had encouraged Armenia to become integrated in regional economic arrangements and activities and had invited Armenia to become a member of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization. Moreover, the Armenian aviation companies "Armenian Airways" and "Armavia" both ran several flights a week to Turkish airports and used Turkish air corridors for their international connections, demonstrating that the allegation of a blockade was false.

183. His country sincerely hoped that the General Conference would remain a venue for exchanging ideas and discussing topics related to the Agency's mandate.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.