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President: Mr. RÓNAKY (Hungary)

Contents

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(48)/INF/16/Rev.1.

[*] GC(48)/1 and Corr.1 and Add.1.

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Abbreviations used in this record:

AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARASIA	Regional Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
G-7	Group of Seven
G-8	Group of Eight
HEU	high enriched uranium
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
INSARR	Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
LEU	low enriched uranium
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
OECD/NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
PWR	pressurized water reactor
RCA	Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SIT	sterile insect technique
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
USDOE	United States Department of Energy
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

7. General debate and Annual Report for 2003 (continued) (GC(48)/3)

1. Mr. RUMYANTSEV (Russian Federation) said that the past year had been a difficult one and the world was facing new challenges. Only a month before, a terrible tragedy had taken place in the southern Russian town of Beslan. It was still difficult to comprehend such an appalling crime against the most defenceless in society — children. That and other acts underlined the barbarism and inhumanity of terrorism, which posed a threat to security, democratic values and fundamental human rights and freedoms. Those acts had demonstrated once again that terrorism knew no bounds and had no religious or moral principles. The international community should unite in the fight against it. The threat would increase many times over if terrorists were able to get their hands on WMDs. Nuclear terrorism and the covert spread of nuclear material and technologies were a real risk that Russia, together with other countries, was making every effort to counter. His country had been one of the initiators of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation, which aimed to strengthen international cooperation in the fight against illegal trafficking in WMDs, their means of delivery and the technologies and materials associated with their production.

2. In June 2004, the G-8 Sea Island Summit had adopted an action plan on non-proliferation, containing a list of measures aimed at strengthening international WMD non-proliferation regimes and preventing WMDs and their components from falling into the hands of terrorists. Particular stress was placed on exercising restraint with regard to the export of sensitive nuclear technologies, equipment and materials. The plan also referred to the role of the Agency in countering the new threats and challenges of terrorism, including the disclosure of undeclared uranium enrichment activities in States Party to the NPT. His delegation noted that the Director General had recently established a group of experts to examine possible solutions to problems concerning sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. Another important step was the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, proposed in May 2004 by the United States Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative International Partners' Conference, held recently and organized by the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the Agency, had demonstrated the importance and timeliness of that initiative. The Russian Federation and the United States were already working together on several programmes in that connection.

3. In May 2004, a United States-Russia agreement on cooperation for the repatriation of Russian/Soviet produced research reactor fuel to the Russian Federation had been signed in Moscow. Implementation of the agreement would facilitate nuclear non-proliferation efforts and make high enriched materials inaccessible for illegal trafficking. So far, fresh fuel had been transferred from research reactors in Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria, Libya and Uzbekistan, and transfer from Ukraine and the Czech Republic was under discussion. Spent fuel transfer from Uzbekistan and Serbia and Montenegro was under way. The Russian Federation was actively participating in implementing an Agency-Russia-United States initiative to improve the security of radioactive sources in countries of the former Soviet Union.

4. The Agency's safeguards system had been tested over the past year, and the Agency had demonstrated its ability to fulfil its statutory functions by carrying out highly professional inspections. The revelation of a network of firms involved in illicit trading in nuclear materials, equipment and technologies required decisive action from the international community, principally to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. The additional protocol was the most effective way to increase the transparency of States' nuclear activities and his delegation urged all countries that had not done so to sign one at the earliest opportunity.

5. The year 2004 marked the 50th anniversary of the start-up of the world's first nuclear power plant in Obninsk. To celebrate the event, the International Conference on Fifty Years of Nuclear Power — the Next Fifty Years had been organized by the Agency and the Federal Atomic Energy Agency in Moscow, with the participation of more than 400 people from 39 countries, including the Russian Prime Minister, Mikhail Fradkov, and the Agency's Director General. The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, had noted in the address he had sent to the Conference that atomic energy was a growing sector which actively promoted socio-economic progress in many States. The first nuclear power plant may have had a small output by modern standards, but it had been enough to pave the way for the large-scale use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Fifty years on, nuclear power was undoubtedly a highly developed and technologically advanced field, supplying around 17% of the world's electricity. Since 1954, atomic energy had expanded and in some countries now made a significant contribution. Work was being carried out on renewing licences for extending the operating lifetime of nuclear power plants, and innovative reactor designs with improved economic and safety performance indicators had been developed. Many countries were planning to expand their nuclear power programmes based on existing designs. It had been suggested at the Conference that the Agency undertake a comparative study of the risk factors associated with electricity generation from various sources worldwide, which would provide valuable information on future requirements and help to define a strategy for global energy development. The Conference's main conclusion had been that nuclear energy could and should become the basis of an energy system, for sustainable, environmentally friendly, economically viable and socially acceptable human development in the 21st century.

6. Scientific research and experimental design work on new atomic energy systems would be most effective if carried out on the basis of international cooperation, combining the resources of all participating States. The future of atomic energy depended on successful international cooperation under the auspices of the Agency, which was uniquely placed to undertake that task. At his meeting with the Director General in June 2004 in Moscow, President Putin had underlined the importance that the Russian Federation attached to the Agency. He had said that Russia had always supported its activities, that it had become a prestigious and powerful organization fulfilling a vital role and exercising great authority, and that it acted professionally and without political motivation. Russia would continue to do its utmost to support the Agency.

7. The efforts aimed at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system and to develop integrated safeguards were important. The Russian Federation was willing to participate in establishing a special safeguards committee reporting to the Board of Governors.

8. As part of Russia's process of administrative reform, the former Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom) and the Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority (Gosatomnadzor) had been replaced by the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) and the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor), respectively. Greater vigilance than ever would be exercised over all issues connected with the safe use of atomic energy. Also, his country would continue to support all Agency efforts to strengthen international cooperation on nuclear and radiation safety. Of particular importance in that regard was the safety of radioactive sources and the strengthening of national controls over licensing and permits for work involving such sources and their production, accounting systems, transport, and import and export. Russia had informed the Agency in writing of its political commitment to the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* and supported the Agency's efforts to develop a global export control regime for radioactive sources.

9. All countries needed to preserve and use their accumulated knowledge of nuclear technologies in the establishment of nuclear energy systems and the associated safety culture. He expressed satisfaction with the Agency's activities to preserve nuclear knowledge and said that Russia was

collaborating in a number of projects on that topic with the Agency. That work had begun well, judging by the results not only of the International Conference on Nuclear Knowledge Management: Strategies, Information Management and Human Resource Development, held in Saclay, France from 7 to 10 September 2004, but also of the Agency's working groups on the subject. His country supported international efforts aimed at developing international criteria and standards for nuclear education and also the World Nuclear University.

10. The first nuclear power plant with its five megawatt output had become the symbol of a new energy era in the 20th century. Large-scale peaceful use of atomic energy could and should become the symbol of the 21st century.

11. Mr. ZHANG Huazhu (China) said that, in the 20 years since his country had joined the Agency, it had actively supported the Agency's activities to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and safeguards in accordance with the Statute. It had cooperated with the Agency and its Member States in the areas of nuclear power, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear safety, radiation protection, nuclear technology applications and training. It was estimated that, by 2003, China had sent more than 2000 people to other Member States for training and scientific visits and had received much expert help through the Agency's technical cooperation programme. That had had a positive impact on nuclear power development, the establishment and improvement of a nuclear safety regulatory system and the application of nuclear technologies in his country. In return, China made very effort to support Agency activities by means of human, material and financial resources. Also, by the end of 2003, it had made voluntary contributions totalling $13 million, had provided training for and expert services to other Member States and hosted more than 200 Agency meetings. It had actively participated in RCA activities and was the leading country in nuclear agronomy cooperation, contributing to regional development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

12. He announced that his Government had decided to make an extrabudgetary contribution to the Agency of $1 million in support of technical cooperation for developing countries and for strengthening nuclear security.

13. China was an unswerving supporter of the non-proliferation of WMDs, including nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as a means of maintaining international and regional peace and stability. It was in favour of the comprehensive ban and complete destruction of nuclear weapons and took an active part in international cooperation aimed at non-proliferation. In recent years, his Government had taken effective measures to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorist activities.

14. China supported the Agency's efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards regime. In 2002, it had been the first nuclear-weapon State to ratify an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement and, in 2003, it had produced a White Paper entitled *China's Non-proliferation Policies and Measures*. Having confirmed its commitment to the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* in March 2004, China had drawn up corresponding laws and regulations and established a national regulatory system. It had played a constructive role in drafting revisions to the CPPNM and hoped that signatory States would soon reach agreement on those amendments.

15. China's accession to the NSG in May 2004 was further evidence of its support for a multilateral non-proliferation regime. It had joined all the relevant international organizations and had signed all the international treaties and conventions with respect to nuclear non-proliferation. China would fulfil its international commitments conscientiously and ensure that its domestic laws were in compliance with international practice. That included its regulations on nuclear materials export control and on nuclear dual-use materials and related technology export control, which were currently under revision.

16. With regard to the nuclear issues in the DPRK and the Islamic Republic of Iran, China maintained that they should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic and cooperative means. China believed that the Korean Peninsula should be free from nuclear weapons in order to ensure peace and stability. A peaceful settlement of the issue through dialogue and negotiations would satisfy the DPRK's legitimate concerns for safety and was in the interests of not only those directly involved but also the region and the international community. His Government would continue its efforts to promote the six-party talks on the matter. With regard to Iran, China believed that the matter should be resolved, through dialogue, in the framework of the Agency.

17. Nuclear power was an important part of China's energy strategy and its share of the total energy supply was increasing. By July 2004, there were 9 units in operation on mainland China, with a total installed capacity of 7010 MW(e). Construction of the Tianwan nuclear power plant, scheduled to go into operation in 2005, would raise that capacity to 9130 MW(e). Nuclear power accounted for more than 13% of the total electricity supply in the Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces and had made a considerable contribution to local economic and social development. The units were operating under good safety conditions and radiation in the surrounding areas had been kept to the natural background level. In an attempt to accelerate nuclear power development, the Chinese Government had recently approved the construction of two more 1000 MW(e) PWR units each in Sanmen, in the Zhejiang province, and Lingao, in the Guadong province. Proposals for the Yangjiang project in Guangdong and the expansion of Qinshan Phase II in Zhejiang were under review. Preliminary figures suggested that China's nuclear power capacity would reach at least 36 000 MW(e) by 2020, accounting for 4% of the country's total installed capacity. Nuclear power was becoming particularly important in coastal areas where the economy was developed and there was a high demand for electricity.

18. China planned to adopt advanced technologies to ensure high safety levels and economic performance in its nuclear power plants. Although its basic aim was to achieve self-reliance in the construction of its large-scale plants, it would look favourably on competitive suppliers from all countries.

19. The world's first nuclear power plant in Obninsk had ushered in the era of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the 1950s. The Agency had always played a positive role both in that domain and in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China hoped that it would maintain a balanced development of both activities as mandated in its Statute so that nuclear energy could continue to benefit mankind.

20. Mr. RUSKO (Slovakia) said that, as the recent terrorist attacks in Spain and the Russian Federation had shown, issues relating to international terrorism and WMDs regrettably still dominated the international agenda. In spite of the unprecedented efforts of the international community in the fight against those threats, there was still a long way to go.

21. Global non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the fight against nuclear terrorism required strong international support, cooperation and a willingness to find solutions. The recent challenges to the NPT regime demonstrated that it must be applied universally. Slovakia called on those States not party to the NPT to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. His country continued to support the Agency's programme on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the cost efficiency of the safeguards system through the development of integrated safeguards. As a new Member State of the European Union, Slovakia had completed its constitutional requirements with regard to the entry into force of a safeguards agreement and additional protocol. He urged the significant number of States that had not yet done so to sign and bring into force safeguards agreements and additional protocols without further delay.

22. His Government attached great importance to the revision of the CPPNM and welcomed the Director General's initiative to convene a diplomatic conference with a view to amending that Convention.

23. There were encouraging results with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many more Member States were now recognizing the important role of nuclear energy in ensuring energy independence and promoting the health and prosperity of mankind. The Agency's work in that area was indispensable.

24. The safe use of nuclear energy was of the utmost importance and was the responsibility of the entire nuclear community. In recent years, regulators and operators had been exchanging experience and technical information on nuclear safety related matters in a number of forums. The Agency had a crucial role to play in supporting those activities and making its services available to Member States. Slovakia supported cooperation by the Agency with other bodies in the United Nations system, with institutions of the European Union and with other international organizations, such as the OECD/NEA and WANO.

25. Nuclear energy remained an important source of energy in Slovakia in the medium term and safety was a prerequisite for its use. On the basis of operational performance, regulatory assessments and inspection results, the national nuclear regulatory authority considered the operation of all nuclear installations in Slovakia to be safe, reliable and in line with the relevant regulations and international good practices. The Agency was the most appropriate organization for the establishment of safety standards and for providing safety services, which ensured essential independent feedback.

26. In its more than 10 years of Agency membership, Slovakia had participated in a number of national, regional and interregional technical cooperation projects. As a new member of the European Union, it felt that technical cooperation would remain one of the most important areas of cooperation with the Agency and would welcome a transition period of two years within that new framework before becoming a donor. As in previous years, Slovakia would continue to provide experts and training facilities and accept fellows and scientific visitors sponsored by the Agency. Technical cooperation relating to safety, strengthening the regulatory infrastructure, long-term nuclear power plant operation, decommissioning and nuclear medicine was an important source of information transfer and necessary for strong national development. Slovakia had, in cooperation with the Agency, successfully implemented a national project for the development of a nuclear medicine centre and would appreciate continued support from the Agency in similar projects that were being planned for the future.

27. Mr. VALECA (Romania) said that nuclear power generation made an important contribution to the national electricity supply in his country. To enhance systematic planning in the nuclear sector, his Government had adopted a CPF, in line with Agency recommendations.

28. Economic growth in Romania in recent years would inevitably lead to an increase in demand for power and so the Government had important decisions to make about the further development of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant. A consortium, comprising Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Ansaldoenergia (Italy) and the Romanian company Nuclearelectrica, was constructing Cernavoda Unit 2, which was scheduled to enter commercial operation at the end of 2006. The project would be partly financed by a Euratom credit. Nuclear fuel, heavy water supplies and nuclear equipment covering over 50% of the investment would be provided from the national infrastructure. It was planned to build Cernavoda Unit 3 on the basis of a public-private partnership using bilateral financing agreements such as BOT (build-operate-transfer). The first stage of the feasibility study had been completed by Nuclearelectrica, AECL, Ansaldoenergia and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (Republic of Korea), and the second stage was scheduled for mid 2005. As a result of the high

standards of nuclear safety achieved at Cernavoda Unit 1, extension of its operating licence had been approved. An OSART mission to the plant was planned for 2005 and would be another step towards achieving excellence.

29. Romania, which was concerned about the threat to global security posed by vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material, was determined to participate in all international initiatives to prevent terrorism. It would therefore continue to support the actions initiated under the NPT safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In that context, Romania endorsed the Global Threat Reduction Initiative launched by the United States of America and welcomed Agency participation in several associated programmes. One such, a footnote-a/ project financed by the United States and the Romanian Governments, was for the conversion of the TRIGA research reactor at Pitesti from HEU to LEU. Romanian funds for the project were available, a contract had been concluded for the manufacture and delivery of the LEU fuel and 400 TRIGA fuel rods were scheduled for delivery by 2006. The Pitesti reactor was one of the most powerful TRIGA research reactors in the world used in post-irradiation materials research and radioisotope production. Its radioisotope programme for medicine and industry had been developed in cooperation with the national laboratories of the USDOE.

30. The decommissioning plan for the Romanian VVR research reactor, which had been shut down in 2002, was in progress. The fresh fuel had been shipped to the Russian Federation in 2004 on the basis of a successful partnership between the Agency, the United States, the Russian Federation and Romania, and an agreement had been signed between the USDOE, the Romanian Nuclear Agency and the Romanian regulatory authorities in July 2004 as the first step towards the return of the spent fuel. That showed the great potential of international partnership projects.

31. Expressing gratitude to the Secretariat for the continuous support offered through its technical cooperation programme, he said he hoped that the Agency would continue to use Romanian nuclear facilities for its cooperation projects. Romania was considering a follow-up to the successful regional pilot course on techniques for counteracting nuclear threats that it had organized in conjunction with the Agency in February 2003. The course was evidence of Romania's commitment to the Agency's action plan on nuclear terrorism. Also, his country had contributed more than $50 000 to the Nuclear Security Fund.

32. Following the IPPAS mission to Romania, work had started on upgrading its nuclear physical protection systems. Also, as a result of the INSARR mission to Romania, a national project on research reactor safety had been initiated.

33. The European Union's approach to nuclear non-proliferation took into account the dynamic, and not necessarily purely military, character of the nuclear threat and emphasized the need for a new strategic culture in the international problem-solving process. Regional security was a key issue that should be achieved through local solutions in the framework of bilateral and regional agreements.

34. In the light of that, Romania had stepped up its efforts to bring its nuclear legislative framework into line with the latest European Union and Agency standards. Its law on nuclear safety had been amended so as to allow the establishment of technical support organizations and to create greater financial flexibility in using extrabudgetary resources. Also already in place was a law on the promotion of nuclear activities and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which established the governmental body for coordinating both internal and external cooperation in the nuclear domain. To ensure nuclear and radiation safety it was essential to develop an effective and efficient regulatory framework and instruments and to provide the necessary human resources and the associated supporting and technical infrastructure. A process was therefore under way, with the support of the Agency and the European Union, to strengthen the national regulatory body's activities. The new

national agency for radioactive waste management (ANDRAD), established under a law adopted in 2003, was at the institutional development stage. Romania's nuclear strategy also included measures to ensure that its nuclear sector had the human resources it needed, which included graduate and post-graduate training programmes.

35. Finally, he said that Romania would assist and support the Agency with respect to the implementation of its additional protocol, which was in force, and any other nuclear non-proliferation tasks in accordance with the Agency's Statute.

36. Mr. AL-ATHEL (Saudi Arabia) welcomed the Agency's efforts to preserve nuclear knowledge and skills and commended the progress already made in promoting training courses in universities and specialized scientific institutions with a view to bringing forth a new generation of professionals in all relevant branches.

37. With regard to nuclear applications, he stressed the importance of the Agency's assistance to developing countries in drawing up development plans that focused on promoting technology transfer and building scientific, technical and supervisory expertise in such key areas as agriculture, food, health care, chemical applications, water supply and environmental protection. He urged the Agency to seek more effective ways of identifying the requisite funding sources and to encourage Governments to share the costs of development projects. The most realistic and practical way of ensuring the predictable and timely financing of the TCF, and hence the full implementation of the technical cooperation programme, would be to make the Fund part of the Agency's Regular Budget.

38. In the area of nuclear security, he noted with satisfaction the Agency's measures aimed at preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism and at dealing with incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials as well as the development of a database on such trafficking.

39. The inspections conducted by the Agency in the context of the NPT and its safeguards agreements were effective and credible. It was regrettable that the Agency's appeal to some States with advanced nuclear programmes to accede to the NPT and to apply comprehensive safeguards had fallen on deaf ears. He was particularly concerned about the situation in the Middle East, where the Agency had been unable to implement resolutions adopted by previous sessions of the General Conference and by other relevant international bodies aimed at making the Middle East a NWFZ. He called on the Agency to redouble its efforts in that regard. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia attached great importance to the goal of non-proliferation and reiterated its call for a zone free of all WMDs, especially nuclear weapons, comprising all States in the Middle East without exception, because of the threat posed by such weapons to international security and peace.

40. Saudi Arabia, as a party to the NPT and a non-nuclear-weapon State, had begun negotiations with the Agency on the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

41. With a view to combating nuclear terrorism and preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials, Saudi Arabia had stepped up national oversight and supervisory measures, using appropriate technology. He drew attention in that context to the Agency's technical and advisory role in developing national capacities and legislation pertaining to oversight and to the security of radioactive sources.

42. With respect to peaceful applications of nuclear energy, he expressed satisfaction at the ongoing cooperation between his country and the Agency in nuclear education and medical, agricultural and industrial applications, although the number of projects had declined in recent years.

43. Mr. BOUTALEB (Morocco) reiterated his country's commitment to the Agency's statutory objective of using atoms for peace and to the Agency's three pillars: verification, safety and security, and technology transfer. The Agency could contribute, within its sphere of competence, to

consolidating world peace and security, achieving sustainable development and protecting the environment. To that end, it must be given not only the necessary assistance and financing, but also the political and moral support of all Member States.

44. The Agency's verification work played a vital role in preserving international peace and security. The latest NPT Review Conference had reaffirmed that the Treaty, of which the Agency's safeguards system was the essential instrument, was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

45. Alive to the need to ensure respect for international legality, Morocco had supported all initiatives to limit the proliferation of WMDs, and it had encouraged all activities aimed at achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and at setting up a credible verification system under the Agency's auspices. The credibility of the safeguards system was based not only on its ability to detect illicit activities but also on its universal, transparent and just implementation. With that in mind, Morocco called on all States which had not already done so to accede to the NPT and the Agency's safeguards regime without delay so as to ensure universality and not leave breaches, which jeopardized progress made in the area.

46. Morocco had been one of the first States to ratify the NPT and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. In 2000, it had ratified the CTBT and the CPPNM. It had also contributed to the Agency's efforts to strengthen safeguards and had signed the Pelindaba Treaty creating a NWFZ in Africa. Also, it had been one of the first countries to notify the Director General of its acceptance of the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*, and it was working actively to put in place the infrastructure needed to apply the Code's provisions. His delegation was pleased to announce that Morocco was about to sign an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the Agency, thereby once again demonstrating its transparency and commitment to non-proliferation and nuclear safety and security.

47. His Government shared international concerns about the persisting threat of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Morocco, which had actively supported GC(47)/RES/13 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, was disappointed that no substantial progress had been made towards its implementation. Israel was still refusing to adhere to non-proliferation regimes and to submit all its nuclear facilities and activities to Agency safeguards. That attitude constituted a serious obstacle to the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East and the achievement of a just and lasting peace, the sole guarantee of safety and security. Israel should consider adhering to the NPT without delay and accepting Agency control and verification of all its nuclear facilities. If all the nuclear facilities and activities in the region were under Agency safeguards, confidence would be built and efforts to establish a NWFZ facilitated. In that connection, Morocco supported the Director General's efforts to hold a forum with the participation of all the countries of the region in order to learn from the experiences of other regions in establishing such a zone.

48. The threat of nuclear terrorism must be taken very seriously. All States should receive the cooperation they needed to put in place nuclear security infrastructures. To prevent the malicious use of nuclear energy, Morocco appealed to all countries to work closely with the Agency on both the physical protection of nuclear materials and equipment, and on the fight against illicit trafficking.

49. The Moroccan authorities attached importance to the creation of a national nuclear strategy, with the Agency's assistance, for setting up the legislative and regulatory infrastructure needed for the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy. His delegation welcomed the developments in the field of safety since the 47th General Conference. They were crucial to public acceptance of nuclear energy. Morocco supported the activities being carried out to promote the safety culture concept and encouraged the Secretariat to pursue its efforts in that area. Training and the exchange of information were essential in that regard and Morocco, as part of its cooperation with the Agency, continued to

provide training in radiation protection to specialists from French-speaking Africa. A second post-graduate course was due to begin in Rabat in October.

50. Member States must provide adequate financial resources so that the Agency could meet the ever-growing needs of the developing countries. Also, it was particularly important to maintain the delicate balance between the Agency's statutory activities. He urged all Member States to honour their financial commitments to the Agency and contribute generously to the TCF so that the financing of cooperation was adequate, predictable and assured. He reiterated Morocco's support of the Agency's technical cooperation programme, which enabled the international community to benefit from the contribution of atomic energy in such socio-economic areas as health care, hydrology, agriculture and energy. Interest was growing in nuclear power as the cost of traditional energy resources rose.

51. Although adopted by the Board of Governors in 1998, the amendment to Article VI of the Statute had still not entered into force. To date, only 36 countries, including Morocco, had deposited their instrument of acceptance of that amendment, which aimed to strengthen the representativity, and thus the authority, of the Board of Governors. The slow rate of acceptance was delaying its entry into force, and that was prejudicial to the ideals of the democratization of international bodies. His delegation urged the Member States to deposit their instruments of acceptance so that the amendment could enter into force as quickly as possible.

52. Mr. BONOU (Burkina Faso) said that the objectives of the NPT were being weakened by the pursuit of WMDs, which was putting international security under increasing threat. Burkina Faso welcomed the measures the Agency had already taken to prevent nuclear or radioactive materials being used for criminal or terrorist purposes, particularly through the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*. His country was an active member of the group of friends promoting the additional protocol and had co-organized with the Agency a regional seminar, held in Ouagadougou in February 2004, on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons for member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. The ECOWAS countries had been urged to adhere universally to the Agency's strengthened safeguards system as a confidence-building measure in support of the non-proliferation regime. Burkina Faso welcomed the decisions taken by Algeria, Benin and Mauritius to sign additional protocols, and itself supported the proposed amendments to CPPNM.

53. A bill on radiation protection would shortly be placed before the Burkina Faso parliament as part of national efforts to improve the legislative and regulatory infrastructure in that field. In spite of its limited resources, Burkina Faso made an effort to contribute to the TCF and was an active participant in AFRA activities. It welcomed the considerable support given by the Agency with a view to achieving sustainable development and greatly appreciated the training that had been given to its own officials. It strongly supported the African Group's draft resolution on the development of the SIT for the eradication of malaria and, like some other countries in the west and north Africa subregion, was concerned about the appearance of migratory locusts which threatened crops and pastures. It would be highly desirable for the Agency to give its support to the countries concerned in finding a lasting solution to the problem.

54. In conclusion, he thanked the Director General for all the work the Agency had done in support of world peace and security and urged Member States to collaborate closely to that end.

55. Mr. TULUB (Ukraine) said that in his country the development of nuclear energy formed the basis for meeting the demands of a growing economy. A high priority for Ukraine, which had 14 nuclear power units in operation, was to improve the reliability and safety of its nuclear reactors and to resolve issues concerning the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

56. 2004 had seen the start-up of new units at the Khmelnitski and Rovno nuclear plants, each with a capacity of 1 million kW(e). Ukraine was grateful to all the international organizations that had collaborated in their construction, including the EBRD and Euratom. That achievement was important not only for his country, but also for the entire nuclear power community, as it showed renewed trust in nuclear energy and in Ukraine's nuclear power development programme.

57. Ukraine adhered strictly to its nuclear safety obligations and was implementing programmes to modernize, and enhance the safety of, its power plants. Also, it had passed a law on financing the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Ukraine's third national report, submitted under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, showed the significant work it was carrying out to improve safety with efforts focusing particularly on the safe operation of nuclear power plants, extending their operational lifetime on the basis of adequate safety levels, the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel, decommissioning the Chernobyl plant and transforming the Shelter into an environmentally safe system. The forthcoming Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Nuclear Safety Convention would show how much progress had been made in raising nuclear and radiation safety levels in nuclear power plants since the second Review Meeting. His delegation appreciated the Agency's activities in the safety area, including the establishment and review of safety standards, which were used as the basis for Ukraine's domestic regulatory documents.

58. Ukraine supported the Agency's efforts to increase the effectiveness of its safeguards system. In the light of new threats to security, all Member States should make every effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the diversion of nuclear technologies for military purposes. The NPT was a key instrument in preventing nuclear proliferation. Ukraine's decision to renounce its nuclear arsenal and accede to that Treaty ten years previously had been an important contribution to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and increasing global security. An important element in that regime was the additional protocol and Ukraine was taking steps to ratify its additional protocol. Implementing the additional requirements under the protocol would incur substantial costs and he appealed for help from the Agency's technical cooperation programme in that regard.

59. Concerned about the new global security threats, Ukraine called for wide international cooperation in preventing the use of nuclear and radioactive materials for terrorist purposes. It upheld the conclusions of the Global Threat Initiative International Partners' Conference just held in Vienna and had also contributed to the Nuclear Security Fund. Ukraine appreciated the Agency's activities in support of international initiatives to increase the security of nuclear and radioactive materials and prevent illicit trafficking in them and was in favour of strengthening the system for the physical protection of nuclear material. That was a matter of particular significance for Ukraine, which held large quantities of fuel-holding masses in the destroyed Chernobyl nuclear power plant and of radioactive material in the Chernobyl zone. The Agency's participation, along with wide international cooperation through bilateral and multilateral programmes, should be enough to resolve the complex problems posed at the Shelter site and in the Chernobyl zone. Ongoing Agency technical cooperation projects in Ukraine were providing considerable help in solving those problems.

60. Ukraine had declared its endorsement of the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*. Measures it was undertaking to strengthen the security of radioactive sources included the creation of a State system for registering, accounting for and controlling sources, legislative changes aimed at strengthening export control and also at strengthening the requirements for the physical protection of ionizing radiation sources. Ukraine also supported the expansion of Agency activities under its action plan for the safety and security of radiation sources.

61. Coping with the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster and decommissioning the Chernobyl nuclear power plant remained priorities for Ukraine and accounted for a significant part of the State budget. Many foreign companies had been helping in the work and their efforts were greatly

appreciated. However, there had been serious problems, in particular a substantial delay in construction of the spent nuclear fuel storage facility, which had led to significant additional costs. His delegation asked the donor countries to the EBRD Nuclear Safety Account to provide aid to solve the problem. Although the Shelter was close to becoming an environmentally safe system, the building costs exceeded the resources available through the Chernobyl Shelter Fund. Such a large and complex project needed guaranteed resources for its completion. Ukraine had fulfilled all the obligations it had undertaken to shut down the plant in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Ottawa. He trusted that the countries of the G-7 and the European Union would do the same and, in particular, that additional resources for the Chernobyl Shelter Fund would be mobilized in the near future.

62. The results of the Agency's technical cooperation programme demonstrated the Agency's capacity to respond efficiently to the needs of its Member States. The programme enabled Ukraine to benefit from the best experience and expertise in the world, and also to share its own experience with other Member States. The regional coordination meeting held in May had identified issues requiring special Agency attention, namely management of equipment operating lifetime in nuclear power plants, decommissioning of nuclear power plants, preservation of nuclear knowledge and experience, the safety of research reactors, physical protection, and radioactive waste management.

63. Ukraine also supported the Agency's activities to strengthen cooperation in the nuclear science field. In the long term, nuclear energy would play a key role in the energy supplies of many countries, including Ukraine. It was therefore very important to lay the foundations for future development, in particular through INPRO.

64. Mr. KORBI (Tunisia) said that cooperation with the Agency in developing the science and technology sector and in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology was a high priority for his country.

65. The Agency's technical cooperation programme had helped fund projects in the framework of national, AFRA and international programmes, and had provided Tunisian nationals with training opportunities to develop their expertise in a variety of fields. He noted in that connection that the Technical Centre for the Mechanical and Electrical Industries in Tunis had been declared a regional oversight centre for the AFRA group. Tunisia counted on the Agency's continued support for the development of its scientific and technological expertise in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, inter alia under the country's technical cooperation programme for 2005–2006.

66. Tunisia also continued to pursue peaceful scientific and technological cooperation with other Arab States, bilaterally and within the Arab Maghreb Union and the League of Arab States. He urged the Agency to collaborate more closely with the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, which had its headquarters in Tunis, since the two bodies shared the same goals and principles.

67. In line with its aspiration to make the Mediterranean a zone of peace and solidarity, Tunisia had hosted the 5+5 summit, which had forged closer political, economic, social and cultural ties between States on the two shores of the Mediterranean. Tunisia would also host the 2005 World Summit on the Information Society, which would provide a further opportunity to close the North-South digital gap.

68. As the first State to ratify AFRA, Tunisia had hosted seminars and training courses in cooperation with the Agency, which had provided valuable support for AFRA projects. He noted that 30 of the 34 African Member States of the Agency were now AFRA members and he urged donor Member States to support its programmes.

69. He was pleased to announce that Tunisia had honoured its obligations to the Agency by paying its assessed contributions for the current year and was on schedule with the payment of its arrears in

respect of technical cooperation projects. He called on all Member States to pay their contributions so that the Agency could fully implement its programmes.

70. Expressing support for the Agency's efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security, he urged all States to join the relevant international instruments, to comply with their provisions and to take action against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Tunisia had acceded to the Pelindaba Treaty and had been working towards strengthening of the safeguards regime, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a ban on nuclear testing. He reiterated Tunisia's willingness to sign an additional protocol aimed at strengthening the safeguards regime and to comply fully with its provisions. He noted with satisfaction that an increasing number of States had ratified such a protocol or expressed their intention to cooperate with the Agency to that effect.

71. Tunisia was concerned at Israel's continued refusal to accede to the NPT and called on that country to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in accordance with relevant resolutions as a contribution to confidence-building and to the Middle East peace process. Tunisia also reiterated its support for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

72. International solidarity was the best way of countering all forms of extremism and fanaticism. The Agency could play a major role in that regard through the dissemination of skills, knowledge and technology transfer, by supporting national capacity-building in developing countries, especially in the areas of food security, water resources management, human health and environmental protection, and by its activities to promote continued advances in nuclear science and research, and the prevention of terrorism.

73. Mr. BAHRAN (Yemen) expressed support for the Agency's efforts to strengthen international cooperation in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

74. Areas of particular interest to Yemen with respect to nuclear and radiation security and safety were the security and safety of radioactive sources, waste safety and the safety of transport of radioactive materials. The safety and security of radioactive sources were two sides of the same coin and a basic prerequisite for the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. He also drew attention to strengthening of the international safeguards regime and its application to all States in the interests of justice and equality. Yemen supported the Agency's measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources. The *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* was an important document and the guidance it contained could serve in the medium and long term as the basis for international instruments that would close the present gap in international law in that area. Although it would not be easy to achieve agreement on such an instrument, it should be possible through joint action and clarity of purpose. Yemen, whose interest in the subject dated from the late 1990s, had joined with other countries in submitting a number of draft resolutions on the safety and security of radioactive sources. Its goal was to protect human beings and the environment from a variety of hazards, including the risk of illegal acts for malicious purposes.

75. Yemen also attached importance to the transfer of appropriate nuclear technology to the developing countries for peaceful economic and social purposes related, amongst other things, to agriculture, industry, medicine, hydrology, the environment, energy production, water desalination and scientific research. The Agency's technical cooperation activities had a direct impact on people's daily lives and on the prospects for future generations, and he urged Member States that could afford to do so to step up their contributions to the technical cooperation programme. In Yemen, Agency assistance had made possible the establishment of the country's first cancer radiation treatment centre. Also, he called on the Agency to increase its support for ARASIA.

76. His country was a strong supporter of general nuclear disarmament and elimination of the nuclear threat to people and the environment in accordance with the NPT. All nuclear facilities in

every country should, without exception, be placed under the Agency's international safeguards regime. Thus, Israel should accede to the NPT and sign a safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Israeli nuclear activities constituted a major threat not just to the region but to the whole human race; that was an open secret and a staple news item in the local, regional and international media. Standards of nuclear safety and security in Israel were the lowest in the world because that country's Government was concerned only with war and destruction and was indifferent to peace.

77. Mr. CHRISTENSEN (Denmark) said that efforts should continue to be made to strengthen international cooperation in preventing the spread of WMDs, especially into the hands of terrorists. That challenge had to be at the top of the global agenda.

78. A universal nuclear non-proliferation regime backed by a strong international safeguards system was an essential basis for efforts to pursue nuclear disarmament and to maintain collective security. Denmark considered that the additional protocol should become the standard for all countries that were parties to the NPT, and therefore strongly encouraged all non-nuclear-weapon States to sign and bring into force their respective safeguards agreements and additional protocols. While the NPT acknowledged the inalienable rights of all parties to it to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty, it had to be absolutely clear that possible misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for military purposes must be excluded. Effective verification was a prerequisite, and hence it was of the utmost importance that all States Party to the NPT subscribe to the full range of verification instruments, in particular those of the Agency. The case of Iran's clandestine nuclear programme and the Agency's continuing efforts to gain a full understanding of it proved how necessary those measures were. The resolution adopted by the Board on 18 September 2004 on implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, contained in document GOV/2004/79, should be heeded, especially the need for Iran to suspend all its enrichment-related activities.

79. Denmark, which attached a high priority to nuclear safety, commended the Agency for the way in which it had quickly reoriented and reinforced its activities regarding protection against nuclear terrorism. However, it had to be emphasized that it was the responsibility of States engaged in peaceful nuclear activities to make sure that they were conducted within the highest possible safety standards. In the contest of the threat of nuclear terrorism, his country supported the convening of a diplomatic conference to amend the CPPNM. Also, it welcomed the various international initiatives to identify, control, secure, recover or facilitate the disposal of vulnerable high-risk nuclear and other radioactive material, including the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

80. Denmark also welcomed the action plan on the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The decommissioning of Denmark's nuclear research reactors and related facilities would begin in the autumn of 2004 and take 15 to 20 years. In preparing for it, the Danish authorities had relied on recommendations and advice from the Agency. It looked forward to sharing its experience with others as the process went on. Denmark also welcomed the action plan for strengthening the international preparedness and response system for nuclear and radiological emergencies.

81. Denmark, which had demonstrated its support over the years by paying its contribution to the TCF in full and on time, considered that the agreement reached on the level of the Fund for the next two years constituted a good basis for technical cooperation. Technical cooperation activities must be demand-driven and enjoy strong financial and substantive support from the recipient countries, which must also ensure that such activities took place in an environment of verifiable nuclear and radiation safety as well as nuclear security.

82. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ANINAT (Chile) said that, as a country that supported global and verifiable disarmament, Chile had signed or acceded to all the instruments relating to the non-proliferation of

WMDs. It shared the views of other States in the Latin American and Caribbean region regarding the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes in that international non-proliferation instruments should not be used to restrict the freedom for research and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The NPT presented certain difficulties to Chile since the mere possession of nuclear weapons implied a degree of instability and a threat not compatible with the United Nations Charter.

83. Chile was also party to a number of international instruments in the areas of nuclear and radiation safety, assistance in the event of an emergency, civil liability for nuclear damage and the physical protection of nuclear material. As a ratifying State of the CTBT, it called on all States to commit themselves to that Treaty in the interests of confidence-building and a safer international environment.

84. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was contributing more and more to sustainable development in the areas of power generation, food, agriculture and human health. The Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN) was playing an important role in the promotion and control of nuclear energy in Chile. One achievement had been eradication of the medfly using the SIT, leading to savings of $200 million each year.

85. As many countries were discovering, nuclear power could be used to guard against an energy deficit when conventional sources no longer sufficed or prices on the international market were too volatile. However, a number of complex technical aspects had to be addressed, such as the acquisition of radioactive material for nuclear fuel fabrication, the recycling of waste fuel and the treatment of radioactive waste. The fact that waste, however it was treated, remained radioactive was a cause for concern.

86. With regard to the maritime transport of nuclear material, there was as yet no effective way of recovering nuclear material spills on the high seas or of recovering containers. Other matters of serious concern included liability in the event of an accident and environmental damage. Chile had engaged in a number of diplomatic initiatives to improve international standards for such transport and recommended that transporting countries take every possible step to ensure that cargoes were as safe as possible using, as a minimum, Agency and IMO safety standards. There was a need to improve the relevant legislation and to approve international standards relating to the transport of radioactive materials, in particular as regards contamination of the marine environment, timely and appropriate information on maritime routes, including the frequency of their use and the amount of cargo in each shipment, the communication of contingency plans in the event of an accident, and the undertaking of commitments to recover radioactive waste in the event of spillage or loss. Furthermore, verification mechanisms should be put in place to ensure adherence to the safety standards and a liability regime established for nuclear damage. The action plan for the safety of transport of radioactive material approved by the Board of Governors in March 2004 had incorporated some of Chile's ideas, such as liability for damage in the event of an accident, timely notification and the application of more rigorous standards for transport safety. The subject should be included on the agenda of the General Assembly with a view to the convening of a diplomatic conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument on the international transport of radioactive material consistent with the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

87. One of the most pressing challenges for the international community was the strengthening of verification under the international disarmament instruments. For Agency safeguards that was achieved through the additional protocol to NPT safeguards agreements. Chile, for its part, had signed and ratified an additional protocol. It would assist in any way it could to increase the universality of the additional protocol in line with the relevant action plan. It was time to move on to elaboration of the second phase of that action plan. In the current climate of terrorist attacks and heightened security concerns there was a greater need for control over arms production and sale, including sensitive or

dual-use technologies and products. Chile had supported a number of initiatives in that regard, such as Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) relating to measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials. It had also participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an international response to the growing challenge posed by WMDs.

88. Turning to technical cooperation, he said that nuclear technologies were having an economic and social impact in Chile in such areas as health, agriculture, industry, mining, fishing, water resources and the environment. For example, new diagnostic techniques were being used to study and evaluate the impact of agricultural pesticides on the environment and human health and to improve agricultural produce. Furthermore, the Institute of Innovation in Mining and Metallurgy had developed two prototypes of instruments, currently being tested, to measure the copper content in extraction processes. In addition, nuclear techniques were being used to combat the harmful marine algal blooms known as red tide and, in the health area, to diagnose cardiovascular diseases and cancers. Chile had also benefited from Agency fellowships, scientific visits and workshops. The increasing professional and technical competence of its citizens was being recognized with the number of foreign fellowship students increasing to 29 in 2003–2004. Chile's proposals for technical cooperation projects for the 2005–2006 biennium aimed to increase its foreign trade potential in order to gain access to the new markets that had been opened up through recent free trade agreements with the European Union, the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.

89. Chile was one of the first countries to implement the new payment mechanism, the national participation costs (NPCs), for the 2005–2006 biennium. It would also be making a significant contribution to the TCF for 2005.

90. Nuclear power would grow in importance to meet future energy challenges provided that steps were taken to address the perceived obstacles, namely the possession of nuclear arsenals, which reduced confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear power, new policies which, in clear contradiction to international law, considered the use of nuclear power to repel possible armed attacks, and the potentially catastrophic consequences for humanity of nuclear terrorism. Public acceptance was vital, and the Agency should make every effort to highlight the benefits of nuclear technologies and reverse entrenched public perceptions. Chile would support the convening of a conference at an extraordinary session of the General Assembly to that end.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.