IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency

# General Conference

**GC(48)/OR.4**
Issued: February 2005

**General Distribution**
Original: English

**Forty-Eighth (2004) Regular Session**

# Plenary

## Record of the Fourth Meeting

*Held at the Austria Center Vienna on Tuesday, 21 September 2004, at 3.05 p.m.*

**President:** Mr. RÓNAKY (Hungary)
**Later:** Mr. MOYO (Zimbabwe)
Mr. BAHRAN (Yemen)

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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(48)/INF/16/Rev.1.

[*] GC(48)/25.

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## Abbreviations used in this record:

| | |
|---|---|
| AFRA | African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology |
| AIDS | acquired immune deficiency syndrome |
| ALARA | as low as reasonably achievable |
| APCs | assessed programme costs |
| ARCAL | Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean |
| Assistance Convention | Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency |
| Basic Safety Standards | International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources |
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| CPF | Country Programme Framework |
| CPPNM | Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material |
| CTBT | Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty |
| CTBTO | Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| Early Notification Convention | Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident |
| EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| ELISA | enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay |
| EU | European Union |
| Euratom | European Atomic Energy Community |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| G8 | Group of Eight |
| HIV | human immunodeficiency virus |
| ICTP | International Centre for Theoretical Physics (Trieste) |
| INES | International Nuclear Event Scale |
| INIS | International Nuclear Information System |
| INLEX | International Export Group on Nuclear Liability |
| IPEN | Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute |

**Abbreviations used in this record** (continued):

| | |
|---|---|
| IPPAS | International Physical Protection Advisory Service |
| ITER | International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor |
| NGO | non-governmental organization |
| NPCs | national participation costs |
| NPT | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| NPT Review Conference | Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| NPT Review and Extension Conference | Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| OIOS | Office of Internal Oversight Services |
| PATTEC | Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign |
| RCA | Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific) |
| SIT | sterile insect technique |
| TACIS | Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States |
| TCDC | technical cooperation among developing countries |
| TCF | Technical Cooperation Fund |
| Tlatelolco Treaty | Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean |
| TranSAS | Transport Safety Appraisal Service |
| UNIDO | United Nations Industrial Development Organization |
| Wassenaar Arrangement | Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies |

# 7. General debate and Annual Report for 2003 (continued) (GC(48)/3)

1. Mr. DE ESTEBAN (European Commission) said that the Commission continued to attach great importance to security of power supplies. The Euratom Supply Agency continued to monitor the security of supply of nuclear fuel and raw materials, and the uranium market. The great disparity between global consumption and production on the natural uranium market remained a cause for concern; secondary sources were currently being used to address the problem. Thus, a clear security of supply strategy was need, as the Euratom Supply Agency had been advocating for years.

2. Security of supply of nuclear power was directly linked to the safety of nuclear facilities. On 30 January 2003, the Commission had adopted two proposals for directives, one on safety of nuclear installations and one on safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Although those proposals were supported by the majority of member countries, unfortunately they had not attracted the qualified majority needed in the Council for their adoption. The Commission felt it was essential to preserve the legally binding nature of those proposals. Community competence in the nuclear safety area had been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Therefore the Commission had adopted revised versions of the directive proposals on 8 September 2004 incorporating amendments by the European Parliament and elements from discussions in the Council. With regard to the proposal on the safety of nuclear installations, the Commission remained committed to the community-wide application of the rules and principles of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and to the establishment of a common nuclear safety evaluation system in each member country. With regard to the proposal on radioactive waste management, the Commission was committed to making it obligatory for every member country to establish a programme with deadlines for the final disposal of waste, and to strengthening research and development in that area. The Commission hoped that the Council would discuss the amended proposals quickly so that they could be adopted as soon as possible.

3. In the field of transport of radioactive material, the Commission aimed to ensure the safety and security of transport of material and to improve it where necessary, with assistance and support from members. It supported and was following closely the development of the INES scale for transport in the hope that it would provide a simple tool for evaluating incidents. It would be studying carefully the conclusions of the report on refusals to transport radioactive material for medical or industrial use with a view to proposing solutions.

4. Nuclear safety was a high priority for the European Union and had been a key issue in the accession negotiations with the new members. Following discussions with the Commission, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia had committed themselves to the early shutdown of some nuclear reactors which it was thought could not be upgraded at reasonable cost. The Community had provided considerable financial assistance to help those countries prepare for the dismantling of the units concerned. Since 1990, mainly through the Phare nuclear safety programme, the Community had made a significant contribution to international efforts to improve nuclear safety in Central and Eastern Europe. The Phare nuclear safety programme in 2003 had been the last for the new members of the European Union, but Bulgaria and Romania would continue to receive support for some time. Under the TACIS programme, a billion euros had been invested in nuclear safety in CIS countries since 1991 focusing on the promotion of a safety culture, management of spent fuel and nuclear waste and the dismantling of nuclear facilities. The European Union had also contributed to international

initiatives such as the closure of Chernobyl and the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership. It had been the main contributor to the Chernobyl 'Shelter' project and had helped improve the safety of several power plants in Russia and Ukraine. The Commission had worked closely with the Ukrainian authorities on the upgrading of the Khmelnitski-2 and Rovno-4 reactors. That work would be co-financed by Euratom and the EBRD. Close collaboration with the IAEA and international donors had been important for those efforts and greatly appreciated.

5. Since 11 September 2001, concern had increased that nuclear power plants could be targeted by terrorists and the European Union therefore attached great importance to security. Community activities in the near future would focus on harmonizing measures to ensure the security of production facilities and storage of spent fuel, establishing binding legal instruments, monitoring the effective implementation of those tools and harmonization measures at European level, ongoing dialogue with national bodies responsible for security and with operators, and cooperation with international organizations.

6. The Commission shared the international community's concerns about the safety and security of radioactive sources and was convinced that greater vigilance was needed in that area. It had therefore originated a directive on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources which had been adopted by the Council in December 2003. The Commission was ready to work with the Agency to help prevent the damage that incorrect use of radioactive sources could cause to human health, the environment and even the economies of European Union members.

7. The Commission had adopted two proposals for Council decisions in August 2004 with a view to the Community adhering to the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention. Those proposals, which were currently under review by the Council, took account of the Community's competences in the areas of early notification and assistance, and of the mechanism established in 2001 to promote greater cooperation in emergency interventions relating to civil protection. The European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange System had expanded as a result of the enlargement of the Union. It was currently in force in the 25 member countries as well as in Switzerland, Bulgaria and Romania.

8. The Commission and the Agency cooperated most closely in the area of nuclear safeguards. The European Union had finalized the relevant procedures and had announced to the Agency's Director General on 30 April 2004 that its member countries and the Commission were ready to apply additional protocols. The Commission supported the universal implementation of that excellent tool. The next challenge would be the accession of the new members to the European Union safeguards agreement contained in INFCIRC/193 and the protocol thereto, which should begin early in 2005. As part of its ongoing efforts to promote efficiency as well as effectiveness, the Commission continued to modify its inspection effort in the light of the actual risks in order to avoid wastage of resources.

9. European legislation continued to aim for a high level of radiation protection for the public and the workforce through the appropriate application of the Basic Safety Standards.

10. Euratom supported joint research by institutes in Europe in the fields of radioactive waste management (geological disposal, separation and transmutation), radiation protection (for example low-dose effects, emergency assistance management and medical exposure), safety of reactors and innovative reactors. Euratom had joined the Generation IV International Forum. Education and training were also important. Approximately 20 large-scale projects had been launched or were under negotiation under the Sixth Framework Programme for 2002–2006. The programme's total budget allocated €200 million to that sector alone. All R&D activities on nuclear fusion in member countries and in Switzerland had been integrated in a single European programme whose total budget was €750 million.

11. The Commission had always supported international cooperation in the nuclear field. The European Union had concluded bilateral agreements with a number of Agency Member States and was negotiating with many others.

12. The Community had acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 2000. The instruments of accession had included a declaration of competence which had been deposited with the Agency's Director General. A Court of Justice ruling in December 2002 had recognized the additional Community competence in the area covered by the Convention. A new, amended declaration which also announced the enlargement of the Union had been deposited with the Director General in May 2004. The Commission was committed to making an active contribution to the third meeting of the Contracting Parties in March 2005.

13. Negotiations were under way on the implementation of the ITER project among the six countries involved and the European Union hoped the programme would be implemented on an international collaborative basis under conditions that would bring the greatest benefits for all. The assistance provided by the Agency in that regard was greatly appreciated. The Council of the European Union had adopted a joint action on support for IAEA activities under its nuclear security programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in May 2004. That involved a set of projects whose financial implementation would be managed by the Commission and which were aimed at strengthening physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and physical protection of nuclear installations, maintaining the security of radioactive material in non-nuclear applications, and maintaining the capability of States to detect and combat trafficking. That initiative would cost a total of over €3.3 million and it focussed mainly on south-eastern Europe and Central Asia.

14. Mr. SEBETELA (Botswana) recalled that his country had become a member of the Agency in January 2002. It had pursued Agency membership because it was interested in using nuclear science and technology to promote sustainable economic growth and development, in particular by increasing agricultural production, improving health care, providing access to safe drinking water, and promoting industrial development and environmental protection. The Agency also played a vital role in promoting safety and security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Government of Botswana had embarked on an aggressive programme to meet Agency obligations. Thus, the capacity of the Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology had been strengthened, plans were being made to establish a regulatory framework, including an independent regulatory body, and practical steps were being taken to sign the NPT and an additional protocol. Furthermore, an unknown number of radiation sources with unknown specifications existed in Botswana and they had to be registered and strictly controlled in accordance with Agency guidelines. Similarly, the problem of nuclear waste disposal needed to be addressed.

15. The agricultural sector remained an important source of food in Botswana and provided income, employment and investment opportunities for a significant part of the population in rural areas. There were many obstacles to its development, such as drought, insect pests and plant and animal diseases. The introduction of nuclear-based pest control technologies was providing an environmentally friendly solution.

16. His Government attached great importance to the Agency's technical cooperation programme and, in particular, to use of the SIT for area-wide tsetse control. With the Agency's assistance more sensitive tsetse monitoring techniques had been developed. Botswana also continued to benefit from expert missions, the provision of equipment and institutional support and capacity building through fellowships, short-term training, scientific visits and staff secondments.

17. Nuclear medicine was also being developed in Botswana. The Gaborone Oncology Centre was equipped to provide treatment using external beam radiotherapy. However, it lacked facilities for brachytherapy, resulting in patients being referred to South Africa for costly specialist treatment. Diagnostic equipment was also not available. Over 90% of patients passing through the Oncology Centre each year would benefit from nuclear medicine applications. Agency assistance with the establishment of such facilities could greatly improve the health of the population.

18. His country was currently looking into other areas where nuclear technology could help Botswana achieve its development goals. It was discussing possible projects with the Agency in the areas of water resources management, HIV/AIDS management and nutrition.

19. In conclusion, he stressed the importance of human resource capacity building in developing countries to enable those countries to exploit nuclear technology for socio-economic development and to comply fully with Agency obligations.

20. Mr. RAMZY (Egypt) said that global changes during the preceding decade had raised hopes of the emergence of a new world order based on greater justice, security and prosperity, but those hopes had not been realized.

21. The NPT had been concluded on the basis of what might be termed a package deal: the five recognized nuclear-weapon States had committed themselves to moving towards nuclear disarmament and other States to refraining from acquiring a military nuclear capacity in return for an unfettered right of access to advanced nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, that deal had come apart and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime had been critically undermined. Those who clamoured for the channelling of all available humanitarian, technical and financial resources into preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons resisted any move to dismantle their own nuclear arsenals. Indeed some of them were bent on developing new weapons and conferring legitimacy on them. Moreover, some non-nuclear-weapon States had seen fit to join alliances through which they enjoyed the protection of a nuclear umbrella, while States that remained outside such alliances had become more vulnerable.

22. States that wished to acquire nuclear technology for development were facing more and more restrictions. Although the ostensible aim of the systems that restricted exports of such technology was to prevent nuclear proliferation, the fact that they were run by a small number of States, and that their rules were influenced by political considerations, prevented their acceptance by many other States which viewed them as an attempt to perpetuate the developed countries' monopoly over nuclear technology and as a political tool that served the interests of those countries. Moreover, three known nuclear States in two of the world's most politically fraught regions had remained outside the non-proliferation regime, yet the international community remained either indifferent to or incapable of taking any remedial action. As a result of the double standards that were being applied by the great powers, some non-nuclear-weapon States were seeking to obtain nuclear weapons by hook or by crook.

23. The non-proliferation regime could only be saved through multilateral action and renewed respect for its basic principles. Measures to prevent proliferation had to be accompanied by disarmament, transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and universality of the non-proliferation regime. Perhaps the NPT Review Conference to be held in 2005 would provide an opportunity to remedy the existing shortcomings.

24. The Agency had an important role to play in ensuring States' compliance with their safeguards obligations, supporting the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes and sustainable development, and striking an appropriate balance between safeguards and technical cooperation activities. If

the 2005 NPT Review Conference succeeded in renewing the earlier package deal, it was to be hoped that the Agency would implement it with its usual objectivity and professionalism.

25. While welcoming the positive developments in respect of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's nuclear programme, and the Director General's report to the effect that the Islamic Republic of Iran's cooperation with the Secretariat had assisted it in understanding the nature of that country's nuclear programme, he expressed regret over the continuing security imbalance in the Middle East region due to the fact that Israel, the only State with a nuclear military capability, refused to accept the Agency's comprehensive safeguards system on the grounds that it needed such a capability to guarantee its security and the security of its citizens. That misguided belief had turned the Middle East into the most politically tense region in the world.

26. For more than four decades, Egypt had been working hard to contain the worsening security situation in the region and to lay the basis for an equitable regional security regime through the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and the scaling-down of stocks of conventional weapons. Each year it submitted a resolution to the General Conference calling for the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region which was adopted by consensus. However, the attitude of one State, which claimed it was unable to discuss the matter until a comprehensive peace was achieved in the region, prevented implementation of the resolutions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference on the Middle East and General Assembly resolutions on the subject. The example of Europe during the Cold War showed that arms reduction and disarmament talks could achieve results even before a political settlement was reached. It was therefore necessary to start discussing the foundations of a security regime right away so that it could be put it into practice as soon as a comprehensive peace was achieved.

27. Unfortunately, the international community continued to apply double standards, focusing on some issues in the region and ignoring others. Egypt had consistently urged world powers to put the same pressure on Israel as they did on other parties suspected of possessing or trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, with a view to persuading it to engage in serious discussions aimed at the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. In that context, he expressed support for the Director General's proposal to hold a forum on the subject in early 2005. Egypt would take part in that forum and had urged Israel to take its own participation seriously rather than viewing the event as an academic exercise. It also called on other States to play their part in ensuring the success of the forum.

28. The Agency's technical cooperation activities were no less important than its role in the area of verification, although media coverage focused on the latter. The steady increase in the Agency's membership was due to the admission of developing countries that were keen to exploit the potential of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in areas such as health, agriculture, livestock production and water desalination, and to develop their scientific and technical expertise. All Member States should help ensure the continued success of the Agency's role in supporting sustainable development in keeping with its Statute, and in transferring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT.

29. Despite the voluntary nature of contributions to the TCF, Egypt considered that Member States had a political obligation to pay them in full and on time. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had stressed the importance of ensuring that adequate funds were available for technical cooperation activities.

30. Egypt, which had been pursuing a peaceful nuclear programme for more than 44 years, greatly appreciated the Agency's assistance in ensuring the safe and optimal functioning of the country's second multi-purpose research reactor as well as its cyclotron and electron accelerator, in training

human resources in the areas of nuclear desalination technology and radioactive waste management, and in assisting the National Centre for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control.

31. Egypt supported the Agency's Technical Cooperation Strategy, especially the policy of focusing on projects with a tangible output, early consultations with Member States on project details and the development of Country Programme Frameworks. His country looked forward to further cooperation, especially on the topics of increasing crop yields, developing the desert environment, improving production of medicinal plants, livestock and poultry, pest control, and the production of agricultural hydrogel by irradiation of polymer materials. It was also eager to develop cooperation with Arab and African States through the Arab Atomic Energy Agency and AFRA with a view to promoting self-reliance and planning productive projects. It was involved in research on the use of nuclear technology for mine detection, especially on the country's north-west coast.

32. Lastly, he expressed appreciation for the Agency's work in the area of knowledge management, particularly through the development of INIS.

33. Mr. NIEWODNICZAŃSKI (Poland) said that developments in recent years had underlined the importance of nuclear non-proliferation. For nuclear disarmament and international security efforts to bear fruit, a universal non-proliferation regime was needed supported by a credible and effective safeguards system that required States to account for and control nuclear material properly and promptly through the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The NPT and the Agency played a vital role in verifying non-proliferation commitments and providing the international community with assurances regarding the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities.

34. The Agency played a crucial role in planning and coordinating efforts to protect against nuclear terrorism and Poland firmly supported its nuclear security activities. His country had actively participated in the drafting of an amendment to the CPPNM and supported the proposal to convene a diplomatic conference to consider that amendment in the near future. The Convention was a valuable tool in the prevention of nuclear terrorism. He welcomed the creation of the Nuclear Security Fund to fund activities in that area. His country intended to make at least an in-kind contribution in the near future.

35. Poland attached great importance to the role of multilateral legal instruments in ensuring the safety and security of nuclear material and facilities worldwide. It therefore welcomed the results of the review meeting of the Contracting parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management held in November 2003, and looked forward to the similar meeting for the Convention on Nuclear Safety planned for spring 2005 for which Poland had already drawn up and submitted its national report. He noted with satisfaction the improved quality of the recently revised nuclear safety standards and expressed support for the two codes of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources and on the safety of research reactors, as well as for other non-binding instruments to strengthen nuclear, radiation and radioactive waste safety. His country also appreciated the progress made in the field of safe transport of radioactive material and welcomed the strengthening of international response to nuclear and radiological emergencies. The Agency also played an essential role in education and training initiatives in the safety and security area.

36. Given the vital importance of knowledge preservation and the availability of qualified manpower for the safe and secure development of nuclear technologies, Poland fully supported the Agency's approach to the maintenance and development of nuclear knowledge. The development of nuclear techniques in many areas would be impossible without the coordinated research programmes, scientific conferences and technical studies organized by the Agency, and without INIS. Poland was

reconsidering the nuclear power option and therefore wished to reactivate its nuclear research and education activities. Initiatives like the regional networks and the nuclear knowledge packages proposed during the recent international conference on nuclear knowledge management held in Saclay, France, could be very valuable in that context. The ICTP also had a vital role to play.

37. Technical cooperation remained an important Agency activity, particularly TCDC. The European region provided a good example of successful technical cooperation and Poland was eager to continue to participate in Agency technical cooperation programmes both at national and regional level. He thanked the staff of the Department of Technical Cooperation for their hard work in assisting Member States in the region.

38. The financing of technical cooperation activities should be assured, sufficient and predictable, and all Member States should demonstrate their commitment to the programme by paying their TCF target shares on time and in full. As in previous years, Poland was prepared to pledge and pay its target share.

39. Finally, at the 2003 regular session of the General Conference, he had signed on behalf of the Polish Government a trilateral agreement with the Agency and the Russian Federation relating to the supply of nuclear fuel for Poland's only research reactor, following the approval of that agreement by the Board of Governors in March 2003. Unfortunately, that agreement had so far not been signed by the other two parties and therefore the decision of the Board had not yet entered into force.

40. Mr. AL-JASEM (Kuwait) said that the role of nuclear power in meeting the growing global demand for energy over the coming decades would be enhanced if progress were made in addressing issues such as nuclear security and safety and radioactive waste management. There had been an accelerating trend towards the use of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, especially in developing countries. It was important to respect the right of those countries, as enshrined in Article IV of the NPT, to choose that option.

41. The Agency's technical cooperation programme played an important role in building the national capacity of developing countries and promoting the transfer of nuclear technology for use in peaceful applications. It was therefore essential to ensure a steady, reliable and predictable flow of contributions to the TCF to finance existing and future projects and programmes, including footnote-a/ projects. Appropriate steps should be taken to prevent shortfalls in the Fund owing to the failure of States to pay their voluntary contributions, and partnerships with international financial institutions should be given the importance they deserved.

42. As one of the main purposes of the technical cooperation programme was to enhance the scientific, technological and supervisory capacity of developing countries, it was important to strengthen their radiation protection infrastructures in accordance with the Basic Safety Standards. Regional training courses in radiation protection were essential to maintain a pool of qualified national manpower. Kuwait planned to host, for the third time, a regional training course on radiation protection and safety, focusing on interventional radiodiagnosis, in October 2004 for participants from nine different countries. He thanked the Agency for its assistance in organizing the courses.

43. Referring to the recommendation by OIOS that the organizational structure of the Department of Technical Cooperation should be made more integrated in order to enhance performance and use of available resources, he stressed the need to preserve the Department's ability to function effectively with existing human resources, especially in the light of the recommendation to merge the existing five regional units into four.

44. In view of the importance of strengthening the nuclear verification system, Kuwait urged all States that had not yet concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency or an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible.

45. Given the strategic importance of the Middle East region, security and stability were not only the fervent aspiration of the countries in that region but also the responsibility of the international community. He called on the Agency to redouble its efforts to promote the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the Middle East with a view to the eventual establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Although those goals were unrelated to the achievement of a peace settlement, the application of comprehensive safeguards would certainly help move the peace process in the Middle East forward and build the necessary trust. He expressed the hope that the forum which the Director General intended to organize would achieve its aim of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and urged the international community to put pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards as a major and necessary step towards ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction.

46. In that context, he welcomed the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's cooperation with the Agency's investigations as a step towards establishing a nuclear-weapon free zone in the region. He also commended the willingness shown by the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate with the Agency and expressed the hope that it would do more to settle outstanding issues. Lastly, he welcomed the continuing six-party talks aimed at reaching a final agreement with the DPRK on compliance with its safeguards agreement and on allowing Agency inspectors to return to the country.

47. In conclusion, he urged the international community to intensify action against the deadly scourge of terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism, by compelling all countries without exception to place their nuclear material and facilities under Agency safeguards.

48. Mr. POPOVIĆ (Serbia and Montenegro) said that, since the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the two republics had embraced a common approach to international relations and, despite differences in their needs and capacities and the complexity of the State structure, had achieved successful cooperation with the Agency.

49. His country strongly supported the Agency's strengthened safeguards system and its verification role which were essential to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Promoting the Model Additional Protocol would undoubtedly help overcome the recent challenges to the NPT. His country had decided to sign an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement and called on others to do the same.

50. In the interests of improving the prevention of illicit trafficking and strengthening the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive material, Serbia and Montenegro was preparing to accede to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and urged others to do the same.

51. Combating nuclear terrorism required coordinated action. His country fully supported the Agency's nuclear security programmes and, recognizing the potential danger of terrorist attacks, had arranged for the removal of the fresh nuclear fuel from the site of the Vinča Institute of Nuclear Sciences near Belgrade to its country of origin, the Russian Federation, for enrichment reduction as part of the Trilateral Initiative of the Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States. The assistance and support of those countries would also be needed for the removal of the spent nuclear fuel from the RA reactor as part of the comprehensive decommissioning programme at the Institute.

52. As one of the Agency's main pillars, technical cooperation should continue to improve. In that connection, he expressed appreciation for the dedicated efforts of the Department of Technical

Cooperation, particularly the Europe Section. His country depended on the assistance it received from the Agency to reach its national and international goals, ranging from decommissioning activities to the establishment and enhancement and mechanisms in such fields as radiation protection and nuclear safety and security.

53. Serbia and Montenegro had reached agreement on their proposed activities for the Agency's 2005–2006 technical cooperation cycle, had successfully concluded a CPF in December 2003 and had submitted proposals for national and regional projects. The proposed projects reflected the needs of both republics and were in accordance with the priorities indicated in the CPF. Apart from the aforementioned decommissioning programme, those priorities included harmonization of safety standards, human health and the environment. In the Balkan region, particular importance was being given to establishing an effective safeguards system, physical protection of nuclear material and prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material.

54. Serbia and Montenegro regularly fulfilled its financial obligations, had paid its contributions to the Agency for 2004 in full and would make every effort to ensure that its contributions for 2005 were paid on time.

55. Ms. BRIDGE (New Zealand) said that, in seeking ways to improve global safety and security, it was imperative that the international community present a united front and coordinate effective responses to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament challenges. The Agency had a vital role to play in that area. The risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists or States that were not fully compliant with international treaties was an issue that required priority attention. A key initiative in that context was the Nuclear Security Fund, to which her country had contributed each year since its establishment. New Zealand had also joined the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, assisting in securing the destruction of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union, and had registered its support for the Proliferation Security Initiative.

56. The year 2005 was a crucial one for the NPT. New Zealand was disappointed at the lack of progress in relation to the undertakings agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The NPT was not just about States forgoing the development of nuclear weapons; it was also about disarmament and ridding the world of existing nuclear arsenals. Calls by States possessing such weapons for other States not to develop them would carry more moral authority if they were accompanied by greater progress towards disarmament. The 2005 NPT Review Conference offered Member States an opportunity to reinforce the Treaty's vital place in the international security regime.

57. The DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT was of deep concern to her country, which would continue to urge the DPRK to meet its NPT responsibilities and to resume cooperation with the Agency as soon as possible. She welcomed the multilateral talks to address the problem and looked forward to an expansion of the common ground between the six participating countries in future meetings, leading eventually to a comprehensive and durable solution. She also noted with appreciation China's constructive facilitating role in the process.

58. New Zealand encouraged the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to maintain its transparent and proactive cooperation with Agency inspectors.

59. The nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to be of concern to New Zealand, since the Agency was still unable to verify that that programme was intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. She urged that country to recommit itself to full suspension of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and to abide by the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors in the preceding week.

60. New Zealand was fully committed to the principles and objectives of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. It was also encouraged by the progress made on the safety and security of transport of radioactive material since the international conference on that subject held in July 2003. The Secretariat should pursue implementation of all areas of the action plan on the latter topic, including those relating to liability and communication, and Member States should cooperate fully with the Secretariat to that end. In that connection, she welcomed the TranSAS mission to France in March 2004 and Japan's request for a TranSAS mission. New Zealand looked forward to the continuation of the work of INLEX on the overall liability regime, including its examination of any serious gaps in the regime. New Zealand and other countries in the region remained concerned about the possibility of an incident causing serious environmental damage and, even without a release of radiation, significant economic loss. An effective global liability regime had to make provision for adequate compensation in such a situation. Coastal States should also be provided with advance information about shipments of radioactive material, since such information could contribute to the safety of shipments and the effectiveness and timeliness of any response to an incident.

61. One of the 13 practical steps to disarmament agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference had been the early entry into force of the CTBT. New Zealand, which remained fully committed to that Treaty, was concerned that the prospects for its entry into force had not improved. As a further demonstration of its support for that objective, it would be signing the Joint Ministerial Declaration in support of the Treaty during the current week in New York.

62. New Zealand supported the NPT principle that others should have access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses, especially civilian applications. However, it did not believe that nuclear power was compatible with the concept of sustainable development, given the long-term financial and ecological costs of nuclear waste. Although New Zealand was aware of its commitment under the Agency's Statute to support all pillars of the Agency's mandate, there was currently no mechanism to ensure that contributions to the technical cooperation programme would not go towards projects that promoted the use of nuclear power as an energy option. Nevertheless, her Government had announced earlier that year that, for the first time, it would contribute to a footnote-a/ project related to research into use of the SIT to combat malaria. In that way, New Zealanders could be assured that their money was not being used to promote nuclear power.

63. Mr. DAINIUS (Lithuania) said that nuclear energy was becoming increasingly attractive for developing countries and evolving market economies because of their pressing need to satisfy rapidly growing demand and ensure security of energy supply. The Agency was to be commended for assisting Member States with the elaboration of energy studies. Major factors such as environmental impact and waste disposal, safety performance, physical threats and nuclear security, risks to the public and public acceptance thereof needed to be taken into account when deciding on future energy strategies. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had benefited from Agency assistance in elaborating the Baltic region energy study.

64. The Ignalina nuclear power remained the main producer of electricity in Lithuania, accounting for 80% of all electricity generated in the country. The national energy strategy had determined the terms and conditions for the plant's early closure in accordance with the international commitments undertaken by Lithuania. The early closure and decommissioning of the plant was a huge challenge in both economic and safety terms and Lithuania therefore highly appreciated the assistance being provided by the Agency and donor countries, particularly France and the United States. Lithuania's updated national energy strategy provided for continued nuclear energy generation at nuclear power plants that complied with modern safety requirements. Investment in the construction of a new unit using the existing infrastructure of the Ignalina plant would therefore be fully supported.

65. His Government was taking the necessary measures to ensure that a high level of safety was maintained at Unit 1 of the Ignalina plant during its operation and decommissioning. In June 2004, the preparation and review of the safety analysis report for Unit 2 had been completed. An in-depth safety assessment of Unit 2 had been performed in close cooperation with international experts and the Lithuanian nuclear power safety inspectorate had granted the Unit a long-term operating license. Safety improvements at Unit 2 were set to continue with the installation of the diverse shutdown system.

66. In its safeguards statement for 2003, the Agency had concluded that there was no indication of diversion of nuclear material or of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Lithuania. Lithuania's additional protocol had come into force in July 2000 and, with further efforts from the Agency, the national authority and the operator of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, it looked forward to the early implementation of integrated safeguards in the country. He encouraged countries that had not yet done so to bring additional protocols into force at an early date.

67. His country's approach to non-proliferation challenges was guided by the European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction adopted in December 2003. Lithuania strongly advocated the universalization of non-proliferation standards and the halting and reversal of any proliferation programmes. It welcomed the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and would implement its provisions in full. It also took note of the objectives set out in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Strengthening export controls, including through informal export control regimes, was of crucial importance. In 2004 his country had joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group. It also looked forward to joining the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

68. In cooperation with the Agency and other Member States, Lithuania was undertaking all necessary measures to improve its national physical protection regime. It highly appreciated the assistance provided by the Government of the United States of America with comprehensive security enhancement at five oncology clinics and with the installation of a security and monitoring system at the radioactive waste repository. It also welcomed the Global Threat Reduction Initiative announced by the United States Secretary of Energy and looked forward to further developments in that area. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania had expressed his Government's full support for the Agency's efforts to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources in a letter dated January 2004 and amendments had been made to national legislation. The country was implementing the provisions of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and, in that connection, it was important that the Agency continue to provide training and equipment to State border control and, customs authorities, and other State institutions responsible for the detection and control of illicit trafficking in radioactive material and for the recovery of orphan sources.

69. Lithuania also fully endorsed the plan of activities to protect against nuclear terrorism recently approved by the Board of Governors and fully supported the convening of a conference to consider amendments to the CPPNM.

70. With assistance from the Agency and the European Commission, Lithuania had allocated significant resources to enhancing and strengthening the regulatory infrastructure for control of radiation sources and exposure to ionizing radiation. The Lithuanian Radiation Protection Centre had established a national training centre. Through regional projects, Lithuanian experts had shared their experience in improving radiation protection at nuclear power plants and, through effective implementation of the optimization principle, occupational exposure at the Ignalina nuclear power plant had been reduced significantly. The country participated actively in the Information System on Occupational Exposure. In that connection, the implementation of quality systems in hospitals was vitally important to control medical exposure. Further Agency assistance would be needed to establish

or improve substantially the system for control of patient exposure in diagnostic radiology, radiotherapy and nuclear medicine through the development of appropriate quality assurance and quality control programmes. Lithuania appreciated the Agency's active cooperation in organizing fellowships, scientific visits, workshops, seminars and training courses in Lithuania and welcomed the Agency's support for the Central and Eastern European ALARA network.

71. Lithuania had ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and, in accordance with the requirements of Article 12 thereof, was assessing its past practices and re-evaluating the safety of its existing radioactive waste management facilities. The Lithuanian radioactive waste management agency had successfully completed the site selection process for a near-surface repository for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, with assistance from the Agency and Sweden. The establishment of such a repository would remove the need for interim waste storage, reduce the costs of decommissioning the Ignalina plant and increase safety. A national programme was also being implemented to assess the possibility of constructing a deep repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and long-lived radioactive waste.

72. For over a decade the Agency had been assisting Lithuania with the establishment, enhancement and maintenance of its national infrastructure and capabilities in such areas as nuclear safety, radiation protection, radiotherapy and waste management. In 2003–2004, particular attention had been given to regional and national technical cooperation projects on nuclear safety and nuclear power, nuclear security, decommissioning, radiotherapy and improvement of the regulatory infrastructure.

73. The Agency was to be commended for the assistance it provided to Member States with the preservation of nuclear knowledge, nuclear education and training in all areas of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. His country looked forward to further elaboration of the Agency's strategy for the development of effective nuclear knowledge management based on the outcomes of the international conference on nuclear knowledge management held in September 2004 in Saclay, France.

74. In the near future, an increasing number of countries would be faced with the problems of decommissioning large-scale facilities and, in that connection, Lithuania fully supported the International Action Plan on the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities.

75. His country had a strong interest in continued cooperation with the Agency through national and regional programmes, particularly in such areas as nuclear safety and security, radiation protection, radiotherapy and waste management.

76. In conclusion, he announced that the Lithuanian Government would pledge and pay its recommended target share of the TCF.

**Mr. Moyo (Zimbabwe), Vice-President, took the Chair.**

77. Mr. TOMŠIĆ (Croatia) offered condolences to the families of the victims of the recent terrorist attacks in the Russian Federation and to the Russian Government. Such acts highlighted the importance of making the fight against terrorism a priority.

78. The Republic of Croatia fully supported international activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening security of nuclear and radioactive material and was one of the countries that had requested the Director General to convene a diplomatic conference to consider the proposed amendment to the CPPNM.

79. Recent Board discussions relating to the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, Iran and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had confirmed the importance of the Agency's safeguards activities.

Recognizing as it did the key role of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, his country had been one of the first where an additional protocol had entered into force and had been implemented. It welcomed the forthcoming conclusion of additional protocols by the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Mauritius and the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and called upon Member States which had not yet done so to do likewise.

80. Croatia had also been one of the first ten countries to complete the internal legal procedures for the acceptance of the amendment of Article VI of the Agency's Statute and invited other Member States to follow suit.

81. His country valued and followed the guidance contained in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. It had established a State office for radiation protection as an independent regulatory body and planned to establish a similar office for nuclear safety.

82. Croatia valued the Agency's technical cooperation activities and was grateful for the assistance the Agency had provided through a broad range of successful projects. Croatia continued to increase its level of cost sharing having contributed US $260 000 in 2004, thus reaffirming its commitment to the implementation of approved technical cooperation projects. He expressed special appreciation to the staff of the Europe Section in the Department of Technical Cooperation for their valuable assistance, support and efficiency in implementing projects in Croatia. An example of efficient regional cooperation was the assistance the Agency had provided to Croatia and Slovenia with the decommissioning of the Krško nuclear power plant.

83. Croatian experts were attending seminars and training courses abroad, and a growing number of foreign experts had been offered Agency fellowships to participate in training courses and scientific visits at Croatian institutions, including the University of Zagreb. In 2004, Croatia had accepted 12 experts and 7 of those visits had already taken place. He invited the Agency to strengthen such activities in the future.

84. The ability of the Agency to meet the requests and needs of Member States depended on financial contributions and Croatia had once again met all of its financial obligations in full and on time. The shortfall in payments, especially to the TCF, was worrying and endangered technical cooperation activities. Although it was important to take into account the ability of recipient States to meet their financial obligations, other criteria were also relevant when considering the allocation of funds for technical cooperation, such as the rate of attainment, or payments of NPCs or arrears in APCs. His country was of the opinion that there should be a correlation between payments (of TCF contributions and NPCs) and approved technical cooperation projects or funds allocated to a recipient State.

85. Mr. KERIMOV (Azerbaijan) said that his country was committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and universal disarmament. It had therefore acceded to the main international treaties and agreements on nuclear safety and non-proliferation.

86. Azerbaijan had joined and was an active participant in the international coalition against terrorism. It had experienced terrorism at first hand in Nagorno-Karabakh where many thousands had died at the hands of the Separatists. As a result of Armenian aggression, 20% of Azerbaijan's territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other regions, were not under control of the Government of Azerbaijan. The existence of such areas, which were also not subject to international verification mechanisms, created favourable conditions for trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material and the unsanctioned use of such material, including for terrorist ends. All actions undertaken by Azerbaijan in cooperation with the Agency to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material by strengthening customs and border controls might be in vain unless the occupied areas were liberated and control over them re-established.

87. While his country appreciated the Agency's efforts to ensure nuclear safety, it urged it to continue strengthening measures to prevent all possible threats to global peace and stability. Member States bore a large part of the responsibility in that area and it was important to strengthen their national radiation safety infrastructures, to improve control mechanisms, to establish reliable physical protection systems and to inventory nuclear and radioactive material. The Agency's role in providing assistance in that regard could hardly be overestimated. Coordination with Member States and harmonization of Agency national priorities promoted involvement and helped ensure that available resources were used effectively to meet the objectives set.

88. The Agency continued to provide assistance to Azerbaijan through its technical cooperation programme with the upgrading of its infrastructure for radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources. With the active participation of Agency experts, an accounting and control system for radioactive material had been set up, measures had been implemented for the physical protection of radiation sources, regulatory and legal documents on the handling of radioactive material had been prepared and approved, licensing had been put in place for activities, general State standards and regulations for radiation safety had been prepared and measures to improve the qualifications of the staff of the regulatory bodies were under way.

89. Under national projects, a national INIS centre had been established and was in operation, equipment was being supplied to customs services for the effective control of trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material, and work was under way to provide equipment and improve radiotherapy methods at the National Oncology Centre. Substantial financial resources had been provided by the Agency for those projects, but the training opportunities and seminars it provided for young specialists were even more valuable. The Government of Azerbaijan showed how it valued the assistance provided through national and regional technical cooperation projects by cooperating closely with the Agency and meeting its financial obligations in full and on time.

90. Azerbaijan's cooperation priorities for the near future included radiation monitoring, including of water resources in rivers and the Caspian Sea basin, further work to equip and upgrade the existing long-term storage facility for radioactive waste and material and to construct new ones, and the introduction of modern radiation technologies in various sectors such as agriculture, medicine and environmental protection.

91. In conclusion, while scientific and technical progress could be a deadly weapon in the hands of terrorists, science could also be used to combat the threat and the Agency had an important role to play in promoting peace.

92. Ms. FREIRE DE NAVE (Guatemala) said that her country's Government remained committed to lasting peace founded on socio-economic development for the benefit of all. Thus, the new administration hoped to build a safer, more transparent Guatemala with modern, effective public institutions, where the most vulnerable members of society were protected, with equal opportunities for all, a good investment climate, new businesses, sustained development and prosperity. That would require accelerated and sustained economic growth and access to energy supplies. Thus, new projects were being established to develop cleaner energy, utilizing Guatemala's great potential for renewable energy sources. That initiative would also favour the continued promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

93. The Agency had proved a loyal ally in Guatemala's development efforts. As a signatory to the Early Notification Convention and the Tlatelolco Treaty, the country was committed to fostering global peace, security and nuclear disarmament. Radiation safety was a priority interest and the national body responsible for regulating ionizing radiation, backed by appropriate legislation and the authority to penalize offenders, monitored the safety of radiation sources entering or leaving the

country, the security of radioactive material and good practice in handling radioactive material. The Agency's Model Projects in the radiation protection field had strengthened Guatemala's regulatory authority through the support they had provided for the legislative framework governing radiation protection, ionizing radiation and the transport of radioactive material. The secondary standards dosimetry laboratory had also been strengthened and served as a reference laboratory for the Central American region, currently providing calibration services to El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic for radiotherapy.

94. During the current year, Guatemala had hosted various activities supported by the Agency, including a regional training workshop on implementation of the international code of practice for medical dosimetry in radiotherapy where Agency experts and medical physicists from countries such as Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela had shared their experiences. The most recent audit mission to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and control of occupational exposure had produced recommendations to strengthen the country's monitoring systems which had been fully implemented. She encouraged the Agency to continue conducting such audits.

95. With regard to technical cooperation, Guatemala had held a seminar-workshop on strategic planning to strengthen the country's nuclear sector. National and regional Agency projects had enabled Guatemala to enhance its institutional capacity and the expertise of its human resources, to use nuclear technology to solve problems in the areas of health, agriculture, industry and the environment, and to exploit its geothermal and oil resources, contributing to improving the population's quality of life. The Agency had assisted the health sector by providing equipment and training for medical physicists and had helped with the introduction of quality assurance programmes in radiotherapy at the National Cancer Institute. Under a regional project on geothermal energy and its environmental management, staff from the National Institute of Electricity had received training. Guatemala's geothermal fields had been evaluated and it hoped to achieve an overall output of 430 MW from its known geothermal areas. With help from the United States and Mexico, and the support of the Agency and the FAO, the medfly had been successfully controlled and fellowship holders from all over the world had been trained in the SIT. That programme had been classified as a centre of excellence by the Agency and 1850 million sterile pupae were produced per week. The Petén department in the north of the country had been declared a medfly-free zone, which had also had a favourable impact on the national economy. In the medium term, Guatemala intended to focus on activities aimed at eliminating poverty and promoting rural development. Finally, at the fifth session of the ARCAL Technical Coordination Board held in her country, Guatemala had been elected President. After 20 productive years of ARCAL, the Government of Guatemala was very supportive of that type of regional cooperation.

96. In conclusion, she urged all Member States to continue to pay their financial contributions to the technical cooperation programme and announced that Guatemala was making every effort to meet its obligations.

97. Mr. STEINMANN (Switzerland) said that the failure of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the forthcoming NPT Review Conference to agree on a work programme for the conference was further evidence of the current difficult climate in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The current emphasis on non-proliferation should not be allowed to obscure the equal importance of disarmament for national and collective security.

98. Switzerland welcomed such positive developments as Libya's decision to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons and the Agency's conclusions regarding the absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. The latter example had strengthened his country's determination to support the Agency as the only credible multilateral monitoring authority in the nuclear field.

99. On the other hand, the lack of a solution to the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula continued to cause concern. In that connection, he expressed the hope that the collaboration between the Republic of Korea and the Agency would allow the latter to clarify the situation in that country as soon as possible. The Agency also still lacked information on several aspects of Iran's nuclear programme and, in that regard, his country supported the resolution adopted in the preceding week by the Board of Governors. The worrying discovery of illicit trafficking in nuclear technology also could not be ignored in view of the growing threat of terrorism.

100. The comments of Member States should be reflected in the Agency's draft programme and budget for 2006-2007 which would be submitted to the Board of Governors in November 2004. His country would be reviewing the draft budget in the light of the budgetary basis adopted at the preceding year's General Conference by consensus. The costs of a possible second phase of strengthening the security of Agency buildings should be integrated in the Regular Budget.

101. His Government had recently decided to ratify the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement and its entry into force would coincide with that of a new law on nuclear energy planned for 2005. That decision had been taken on the understanding that the introduction of integrated safeguards would avoid the useless and counterproductive situation where comprehensive safeguards measures were implemented in addition to additional protocol measures, and that the new measures introduced would not be applied mechanically or systematically.

102. The integrated safeguards system should help improve monitoring efficiency and reduce costs. The recent large increase in the safeguards budget had prompted reflection and SAGSI had been consulted. Switzerland looked forward to hearing the Director General's views on that matter at the November meetings of the Board.

103. His country supported the Director General's efforts to ensure that the manufacture of nuclear material for civil and military purposes and the storage of radioactive waste and spent fuel from nuclear reactors did not increase proliferation risks. It also welcomed the Director General's decision to establish a group of international experts to reflect on certain multilateral aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Regional cooperation in that field would only strengthen mutual confidence among States. However, the expert group's recommendations should not run contrary to the letter and spirit of Article IV of the NPT.

104. The work carried out in recent years to improve the CPPNM had been fruitful and his country was satisfied with the revision proposed by the States party to the Convention. He encouraged all States to support the holding of a diplomatic conference to amend the Convention. Any outstanding issues could be discussed during the preparations for the conference.

105. He welcomed the launch of the Agency's Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. The Agency was right to draw attention to the foreseeable catastrophic increase in the number of cancer victims in the developing world.

106. Over the preceding year, Switzerland's five reactors had operated under good safety and security conditions and had met 40% of the country's electricity needs. Under the new law on nuclear energy, new power plants could be built, no a priori limit was imposed on the service life of existing plants and a moratorium of 10 years was imposed on new contracts for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The law also gave the public the right to vote on the construction of new nuclear facilities in a referendum. The Agency's recommendations, particularly those concerning safety, had played a very important role in the elaboration of the new legislation.

107. His country's authorities were evaluating the documentation arguing in favour of the possibility of safe storage of long-lived intermediate- and high-level waste. A decision on that subject was not

expected before 2006 and the local population affected would be consulted extensively in the meantime. However, international collaboration on a multinational project on storage of high-level waste had not been abandoned. Following the rejection two years previously of a project for underground storage of low- and intermediate-level waste, the site selection process had been restarted.

108. Mr. PORTUGAL (Peru) said that, since the preceding session of the General Conference, his country had made significant progress in using nuclear science and technology to address a number of national problems. It had conducted successful projects on training of human resources, archaeology, environmental conservation and mining and had participated in various research contracts and in technical events organized by the Agency to disseminate nuclear knowledge and introduce effective standards for the safe use of nuclear energy.

109. With Agency assistance, the Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute (IPEN) had drawn up a medium-term strategic plan for the nuclear sector identifying new areas for research into and the development and application of nuclear science and technology, such as materials science, molecular biology, biomining and hydrology, which should enhance the country's socio-economic development. The projects submitted for the 2005–2006 technical cooperation cycle stemmed from that plan. Also under the plan, IPEN was conducting a campaign to disseminate knowledge and was offering services and products in order to promote interest in academic training and scientific research, facilitate exchange of experience among Peruvian and foreign scientists mainly through annual scientific meetings, and promote better links with production sectors in the interests of using nuclear science and technology more effectively to meet various human needs.

110. Besides obtaining financing for a footnote-a/ project on nuclear medicine from the preceding biennium, Peru wanted to implement four national projects and two regional projects.

111. The most important of the national projects would use genetic, molecular and radioisotope techniques to restore and preserve alpaca biodiversity and to improve the highly productive varieties. It would benefit an association of farmers with small and medium-sized herds in Puno, one of the poorest regions of southern Peru. Besides increasing the farmers' income, the project would benefit the clothing and textile industries, and the assistance of UNIDO had been enlisted to market the products, a clear example of a synergy with a non-traditional donor. Under the second project, biomolecular and radioactive techniques would be used to recover varieties of white cotton and other natural colours. The availability of different types of cotton would enhance the country's export capacity on the organic fibre market, which was highly lucrative, and would particularly benefit the semi-arid coastal areas. The third project, involving mining companies, would use the prompt gamma method and neutron activation analysis to estimate the copper content in wide diameter bores in Peruvian opencast mines. Peru was one of the main producers of copper. The fourth project would focus on the environmental rehabilitation of abandoned mines.

112. Of the two regional projects, the first related to the peace agreement between Peru and Ecuador and involved characterizing the river Zarumilla aquifer to ensure it was managed in a sustainable way by both countries. The second project related to diagnosis of malaria and analysis of antimalarial drug resistance in four Andean countries. The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria would add 26 million dollars to the one million required from the Agency for that project.

113. Peru also attached great importance to the strengthening of south-south and interregional cooperation which brought added value and additional resources to the Agency's technical cooperation programme, in particular through contributions of new resources, goods and services and through cost sharing. Peru hoped to be both a recipient and a donor for six cooperation projects under ARCAL.

114. Given the Agency's mission to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he urged it to ensure that reliable, predictable and adequate resources were available for the technical cooperation programme so that it could be fully implemented, including footnote-a/ projects, thus maintaining a balance among the Agency's main activities.

115. With regard to radiation safety, Peru had participated actively in the preparation of the action plans for the safe transport of radioactive material and for the strengthening of the international preparedness and response system for nuclear or radiological emergencies which sought to enhance the application of Agency standards and guidelines and to address gaps in such areas as the liability regime.

116. Turning to the security of nuclear facilities and material, he noted that Peru had received a second IPPAS mission in 2003. IPEN had involved the national police force, the national civil defence system and the Ministry of Defence in implementing the IPPAS recommendations. A comprehensive physical protection action plan was also being coordinated with the IAEA and a national workshop had been held to evaluate possible threats. It was also planned to review the national physical protection system for the RP-0 and RP-10 research reactors, to evaluate compliance with the recommendations from the previous IPPAS mission, to continue exchanging experience and to evaluate the possibility of establishing an international cooperation programme on physical protection.

117. The Agency had not found any discrepancies in the safeguards reports submitted by Peru in 2003 nor any evidence of undeclared activities or diversion of nuclear material. His country was concerned that, while material subject to safeguards had remained in peaceful activities in States with safeguards agreements, a number of States were not part of the comprehensive safeguards regime and did not have additional protocols. The Agency had also recently identified further shortcomings in the safeguards system. Appropriate mechanisms needed to be sought to strengthen the safeguards regime in a spirit of dialogue and cooperation.

118. Mr. KING'ORIAH (Kenya) said that his Government was strongly committed to combating all forms of terrorism, having experienced the devastating effects thereof itself, supported bilateral and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism and had published its own anti-terrorism bill for debate by parliament.

119. Kenya had acceded to the CPPNM in February 2002. It had also ratified the CTBT and had been working with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to establish seismic and infrasound stations in Kenya as part of the global verification regime.

120. Effective and comprehensive safeguards were crucial components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and provided an essential foundation for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Kenya was making arrangements to conclude a safeguards agreement and a small quantities protocol with the Agency.

121. To detect any material that might be intended for use in malevolent acts, two scanners had been installed at the port of Mombasa. The Radiation Protection Inspectorate had stepped up its efforts to curb illicit trafficking and had prioritized both the creation of a database of radioactive material in the country and the security of such material. Assistance in those areas from the international community and the Agency would be deeply appreciated, including the extension of scanning activities to other ports of entry.

122. The Institute of Nuclear Science at the University of Nairobi had been established in 1983 and was conducting research in various areas. Laboratory facilities established at the Institute with Agency assistance had been used by several students in the MSc and PhD programmes there. A nuclear instrumentation laboratory had also been established.

123. His Government had recently more than doubled the number of inspectors attached to Kenya's regulatory authority, the Radiation Protection Board, and it was spending $750 000 to upgrade the physical facilities of the Radiation Protection Inspectorate. Through collaborative efforts with the Agency, a national reference laboratory for radiological exposure had also been established, making intercomparison studies of personal monitoring services within and outside Kenya possible.

124. In May 2004, in collaboration with the Agency, Kenya had hosted a two-week training course on radiation protection in diagnostic and interventional radiology which had given thirty participants from the African region first-hand experience of using quality assurance and control kits at medical radiological facilities.

125. The Agency's technical cooperation activities in Kenya cut across many sectors of socio-economic development and his country appreciated the Agency's efforts to reallocate funds from regional to national programmes. Kenya's CPF for 2004–2009 had been finalized and was awaiting signature.

126. Kenya was participating in a project on crop improvement and management through the application of nuclear and biotechnology techniques. The results achieved were encouraging and were proving useful in the molecular characterization of crops, which should improve genetic resource indexing and storage of crops, and help address food security and poverty alleviation issues.

127. The Agency had assisted the Central Veterinary Laboratories and the National Veterinary Research Centre in Nairobi with the introduction of the ELISA technique, improving their capability to diagnose and monitor animal diseases.

128. His Government was contributing $120 000 per annum for the implementation of a Model Project to eradicate tsetse flies from the Lambwe Valley. The project incorporated conventional tsetse control techniques and the SIT in an area-wide approach and had already achieved a significant suppression of the tsetse population and a significant reduction of disease incidence in livestock. The Agency continued to provide equipment to upgrade insectaries for tsetse mass rearing, as well as expert missions and training. It had also procured a gamma irradiator. The project was being implemented within the framework of PATTEC.

129. The use of nuclear techniques had played a significant role in providing relevant data for the management of major diseases in Kenya. The Agency had provided substantial assistance to the Ministry of Health through the National Council for Science and Technology, facilitating further integration of isotope techniques in national and other donor-supported programmes pertaining to monitoring of drug resistance in such diseases as malaria and tuberculosis. His country was grateful to the Agency for its continued assistance in combating those diseases and HIV/AIDS. Agency assistance was also needed to help establish other radiotherapy centres in Kisumu and Mombasa and to provide the Kenyatta National Hospital's Medical Training Centre with the facilities and infrastructure to train radiotherapy technicians and technologists.

130. Isotope hydrology techniques played an important role in the overall development and management of Kenya's water resources. Under project RAF/8/037 on sustainable development and equitable utilization of the common Nile basin water resources, a one-week training course on data evaluation had been held in collaboration with the Agency in Kisumu in June 2004.

131. The Government of Kenya, would be hosting a national seminar on public awareness of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology later in 2004 in close collaboration with the Agency. The participants, who would include policy makers, planners, researchers and representatives of public institutions, international research institutions, the private sector, NGOs and community-based

organizations, would also be discussing and adopting a draft constitution for the proposed Society for Promotion of Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Science in Kenya.

132. In conclusion, he thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for their efforts and commended the Department of Technical Cooperation in particular on the high implementation levels in Kenya.

**Mr. Bahran (Yemen), Vice-President, took the chair**.

133. Mr. HORVÁTH (Hungary) said that, recently, the Agency's safeguards system had been placed under unprecedented strain. Several cases of concern had been brought to the Agency's attention and needed to be addressed in a manner which upheld the integrity and authority of the safeguards system, including, if warranted, referral to the Security Council and General Assembly. He commended the professionalism and objectivity with which the Agency had carried out its verification activities in countries whose safeguards implementation was under continued scrutiny. Experience clearly demonstrated the value of the additional protocol, which should become a standard for all countries party to the NPT if the Agency was to fulfil its verification responsibilities in a credible manner.

134. Hungary was one of 19 States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force in which the Agency had found no indication of diversion of nuclear material or of undeclared nuclear material or undeclared nuclear material and activities. In the case of Hungary, that conclusion had been reached more than a year ago and his Government stood ready to take the next step and move towards the early introduction of integrated safeguards.

135. One of the major events in 2003 had been the first review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. While preparing for and participating in the meeting, the Contracting Parties, including Hungary, had demonstrated a strong commitment to fulfilling the obligations they had accepted in adhering to the Convention. The review meeting had helped further improve the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste and his country hoped that a wider range of Member States would be represented at the next review meeting. He commended the excellent support provided by the Secretariat before and during the review meeting, and its efforts in promoting the Convention.

136. As everyone was aware, an unfortunate event had occurred on 10 April 2003 at the Paks nuclear power plant. A description of the event, a summary of the lessons learned and an outline of the planned improvement measures had been included in Hungary's third national report prepared pursuant to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. That report was already available on the Internet. Investigations had been promptly initiated by the plant and the regulatory body, and the Agency had been invited to send an expert mission. The investigations and the expert mission had identified the main causes of the incident and the resulting recommendations had served as a starting point for major improvements. It was essential to prevent recurrence of such a challenge to nuclear safety. However, the event had not involved the technological systems responsible for normal plant operation and had in no way affected the nuclear safety of the plant. A thorough inspection and refuelling had been carried out at Unit 2, it had been started up again very recently and was expected to be operating at full power by the end of the year. During the same period, the country had also had to cope with the licensing issues related to the recovery of the damaged fuel assemblies. In view of the unusual circumstances, it had requested assistance from more experienced regulators in Russia and the United States. It was grateful for the support received, and to the Agency for providing the requisite framework. The actual removal of the damaged fuel was expected to take place in 2005.

137. Hungary attached great importance to the Agency's technical cooperation activities, in particular regional cooperation. Its accession to the European Union should not change the current status of the Agency's technical cooperation activities in the region. At the same time, it was

determined to increase gradually its contribution to the TCF in several ways and had already begun to do so. Hungary had continued to provide strong financial and technical support to regulatory activities and had hosted Agency fellowship and training programmes. It would be pledging its full target share of the TCF for 2005 and urged all other Member States to pay their share in full and on time.

138. The Hungarian Parliament had ratified the proposed amendments to Article VI of the Agency's Statute, regarding the enlargement of the Board of Governors, and to Article XIV, on the move to a biennial budget. His country strongly encouraged all Member States to ratify the proposed amendments without delay in order to attain the two-thirds majority needed for the amendments to come into force.

139. Ms. MELIN (Sweden) expressed sympathy for the victims of the terrorist attacks in Beslan and Madrid.

140. The existence of weapons of mass destruction remained one of the greatest threats to international peace and security and all States should act jointly and effectively to prevent their proliferation. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually reinforcing and both had to be pursued energetically. In the run-up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, States should recall that threats to international security could only continue to be addressed if the NPT was treated as a legally binding agreement whose delicately balanced commitments were complied with by all.

141. The Agency played a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The world would be a safer place once the NPT was universally applied and fully implemented, which would require the entry into force of additional protocols in all States. Additional protocols gave the Agency enhanced authority to provide assurances that States were complying with their non-proliferation commitments and, together with comprehensive safeguards agreements, constituted the verification standard for NPT safeguards. The 2005 NPT Review Conference therefore needed to make the additional protocol mandatory under Article III of the Treaty. Sweden's own additional protocol had entered into force in April 2004 and implementation measures were well under way. She called on all States that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force additional protocols with the Agency.

142. Increased international attention was again being directed to proliferation-sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Sweden looked forward to seeing the report by the independent expert group recently set up by the Agency to examine that issue. Any measures adopted needed to be broad-based, aimed at strengthening multilateral control, and non-discriminatory in assuring supplies of nuclear fuel and material for peaceful purposes. Negotiations should also begin on an internationally verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty to halt the production of plutonium and high-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

143. She commended the Agency on its activities to date to protect against nuclear terrorism. A combination of national and Agency efforts would yield the most effective results in such areas as physical protection and the fight against illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

144. Sweden remained deeply concerned over the DPRK's position with respect to the NPT and the Agency and strongly supported the pursuit of intensive and constructive efforts to find a solution within the framework of the six-party talks. Any solution would have to include the dismantlement of all the DPRK's nuclear weapons programmes.

145. Her country had supported the most recent resolution adopted by the Board on the implementation of Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement, as it did the Agency's untiring efforts to reach a conclusion regarding the character of the Iranian nuclear programme. Iran should cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues and should resume the full suspension of its enrichment activities.

146. The CPPNM provided a unified approach to the protection of nuclear material and it was time to complete the amendment process. Her country was grateful to Austria for having initiated a consolidated effort to implement the proposed amendments to the Convention and supported the holding of a diplomatic conference for that purpose.

147. Sweden supported the action plan for strengthening the international preparedness and response system for nuclear and radiological emergencies recently adopted by the Board. The action plan had its foundations in the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention, which constituted an important legal framework for international cooperation and coordination in the event of radiological emergencies. The competent authorities identified under the Conventions had recognized the need for united efforts to strengthen and harmonize current international response arrangements. Sweden would play an active part in the future implementation of further compatible and coordinated international arrangements.

148. In a letter addressed to the Director General in March 2004, the Swedish Government had expressed its political support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and had announced that it was working towards implementing the guidance contained therein. The Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources recently approved by the Board was an important step towards further improving safety and security and should be endorsed by the General Conference.

149. Her country strongly supported the Agency's work in the field of research reactor safety and looked forward to the swift resolution of the outstanding issues relating to the draft safety requirements for such reactors with a view to their being approved by the Board in November 2004. The Swedish national report to the third review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety would cover aspects related to research reactors.

150. Sweden also strongly supported the Agency's initiative to prepare an action plan based on the findings of the International Conference on the Protection of the Environment from the Effects of Ionizing Radiation held by the Agency in Stockholm in 2003. It encouraged the Agency to continue its valuable work in that area.

151. Sweden's advanced programme for nuclear waste aimed at total transparency in all areas. In that connection, it highly valued such international reference material for post-closure safety as was foreseen in the draft safety standards for geological disposal of radioactive waste. It also supported the Agency's ongoing preparatory work on the conservation and the intergenerational transfer of repository information. The Swedish repository for spent fuel had reached an advanced stage. A license application for the spent fuel encapsulation plant was expected in 2006 and one for a national repository for encapsulated spent fuel in 2008. It was essential for the Agency to complete its development of a safeguards approach for such back-end facilities in a timely manner so that Sweden and other Member States with advanced repository programmes could incorporate that approach into their facility designs. In doing so, the Secretariat should take full account of the development possibilities offered by the provisions of the additional protocol.

152. Finally, in recognition of the importance that it attached to the Agency's technical cooperation programme, Sweden had pledged its full share to the TCF for 2005.

153. Mr. YAMKATE (Thailand) said that his country attached great importance to peace and security, especially in south-east Asia, and was of the view that States, in joining the United Nations system, reaffirmed their commitment to global peace and security.

154. Since the preceding session of the General Conference, Thailand had made major progress in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation, safety-related issues and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

cooperating closely with the Agency which was to be commended on the constructive role it had played. Thailand had also contributed to the strengthening of TCDC. It had hosted several workshops, meetings and training courses in Bangkok and would be holding a train-the-trainers meeting from 22 to 26 November 2004 on radiation protection in medicine under the regional Model Project on the development of technical capabilities for sustainable radiation and waste safety infrastructure.

155. His country was prepared to cooperate with the Agency and Member States in the implementation of nuclear safety activities, particularly those related to capacity building and preparedness in south-east Asia. He called on the Agency to continue working closely with Member States to develop national safety regulatory infrastructures and to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. Thailand appreciated the support and assistance the Agency provided in that field but felt it could be more innovative in coordinating its various technical cooperation mechanisms to enhance delivery, including mechanisms under the RCA.

156. Thailand continued to support Agency fellowships and scientific visits for on-the-job training in agricultural and medical applications. It also attached great importance to the promotion of a global safety culture and encouraged the Agency to include projects on safeguards and safety regimes in its technical cooperation programmes. The Agency should also identify specific programmes on radiation protection infrastructure, quality assurance in medical applications, food safety, the application of isotopic and nuclear techniques to nutrition research and water resource development, public information and knowledge management as part of its core activities. His country had greatly benefited from projects on plant mutation breeding and food irradiation. It was giving priority to programmes for the development and promotion of integrated resource management and building of human resources capacity in livestock production. The SIT and related technology had been used to combat fruit flies. Moreover, for many years it had been supporting the project to establish a new nuclear research centre at Ongkharak in Thailand. Unfortunately, that project had been delayed because of public concerns over the safe operation of the reactor, but the Government had decided to revive the project with a view to completing it by 2007.

157. Deeply concerned about nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear material, Thailand was committed to working closely with the Agency and the international community to confront those threats. The success of international cooperation to address the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could be seen in the unanimous adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on 28 April 2004.

158. His country was preparing to endorse the Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, was reviewing its domestic law and regulations with a view to bringing them into line with the Code and was strengthening its physical protection measures to meet international standards. It was also preparing to accede to the CPPNM in 2005.

159. As a State party to the NPT and an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, Thailand fully supported the strengthened safeguards system. The Government of Thailand was committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and was currently preparing to conclude an additional protocol.

160. Thailand strongly supported the Agency's efforts to implement NPT safeguards in Iran and the DPRK. It encouraged Iran to cooperate with the Agency's inspectors and to provide full clarification and transparency regarding its uranium enrichment programme. It also urged the DPRK to consider resuming safeguards activities with the Agency and to allow inspectors into its nuclear facilities as soon as possible, and looked forward to progress in the new round of six-party talks.

161. In conclusion, he announced that Thailand would be pledging $156 550 to the TCF for 2005.

162. Mr. ALI (Bangladesh) said that the Agency's technical cooperation programme was the main vehicle for transferring nuclear science and technology to developing countries where their peaceful application helped to promote development. His country was fully committed to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

163. Bangladesh had a broad range of peaceful atomic energy programmes which addressed problems faced by sectors of its national economy. In line with the United Nations Millennium Declaration and Bangladesh's development goals, the country's priorities included poverty reduction and improving access to clean drinking water and sanitation. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission had contributed, for example, to efforts to tackle the problem of widespread arsenic contamination of groundwater by conducting element analyses of water samples and biological matrices. Bangladesh was also collaborating with other agencies in studies of underground aquifers employing isotope hydrology techniques.

164. In the agriculture sector, a country-wide investigation of pesticide residues in some items of the food chain was under way. Other important activities included pest control using the SIT, improving the shelf life of various agricultural products and the sterilization of medical products using gamma rays. In the health sector, 14 nuclear medicine centres were currently providing diagnostic and other services to about 150 000 patients annually. A small unit which processed human tissues for use in healing burns, treating ulcers and surgery had been developed and there were plans to develop a full-scale tissue bank.

165. Activities in nuclear safety and radiation control focused on regulatory control, including licensing and enforcement, strengthening of the regulatory infrastructure, development of human resources including both practitioners and regulators, and preparation of regulatory guides on various practices. Efforts were also under way to strengthen the regulatory framework by ensuring the independence of the regulatory authority. Bangladesh intended to meet the five Agency milestones and was encouraged by the observations made by the peer review mission regarding its achievements over the preceding few years.

166. The Agency's technical assistance programme had always been very important to Bangladesh and it was particularly grateful for the support it had received in human resources development and project-oriented technical assistance, which it hoped would continue and increase. Bangladesh intended to improve the capacity utilization of existing facilities by diversifying their activities and adding new ones. It planned to establish a nuclear training institute and add a number of experimental facilities.

167. The RCA was a powerful mechanism for addressing the needs of its member countries. It provided an environment which promoted the sharing of resources, experience and expertise on a regional basis. It had expanded its activities and had been responsive to Bangladesh's needs over the years. A number of RCA events had been hosted in Bangladesh.

168. While it was a strong supporter of the non-proliferation regime, his country felt that a balance had to be maintained between the Agency's promotional and regulatory activities and would like to see that reflected in future Agency budgets.

169. His country had noted with concern the Director General's statement about the status of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. It was convinced that universal adherence to those instruments and the NPT could help achieve the goal of non-proliferation and pave the way towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As a party to both the NPT and the CTBT, and signatory to an Agency safeguards agreement and additional protocol, Bangladesh urged all States which had not yet done so to sign those instruments and bring them into force as soon as possible. The current challenges to the non-proliferation regime made it even more important for the Agency to continue its

efforts to achieve universal adherence to the safeguards system. The NPT Review Conference in 2005 would provide another opportunity to renew commitments and take effective action to bring about nuclear disarmament.

170. The situation in the Middle East continued to cause concern. All countries in that region which had not already done so should accede to the NPT and place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards as soon as possible. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime would be strengthened by the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. In that context, he welcomed the Director General's efforts to organize a forum in the coming year on experience in other regions with such zones.

171. In conclusion, the threat of nuclear terrorism posed a great danger to the international community. Bangladesh condemned all acts of terrorism and remained committed to fighting it in all its forms. It also supported the Agency's efforts to combat nuclear terrorism in line with the objectives enshrined in its Statute.

**The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.**