

# General Conference

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## Forty Ninth (2005) Regular Session

# Plenary

## Record of the Fourth Meeting

*Held at the Austria Center Vienna on Tuesday, 27 September 2005, at 3.05 p.m.*

**President:** Mr. BAZOBERRY (Bolivia)

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**Abbreviations used in this record:**

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AIDS	acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ARCAL	Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
G8	Group of Eight
GDP	gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
HEU	high-enriched uranium
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
ICTP	International Centre for Theoretical Physics (Trieste)
INIS	International Nuclear Information System
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPCs	national participation costs
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**Abbreviations used in this record (continued):**

NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
NSF	Nuclear Security Fund
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PATTEC	Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
Quadripartite Agreement	Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
RaSSIA	Radiation Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Infrastructure Appraisal
RCA	Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SIT	sterile insect technique
SQP	small quantities protocol
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
TranSAS	Transport Safety Appraisal Service
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WHO	World Health Organization

## **8. General debate and Annual Report for 2004 (continued)** (GC(49)/5)

1. Mr. KING'ORIAH (Kenya) said that, in view of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism, the Government of Kenya was strongly committed to fighting all forms of terrorism. As the victim of recent terrorist activities, his country would continue to support bilateral and multilateral efforts in the war against terrorism. In February 2002, Kenya had acceded to the CPPNM and was in the process of ratifying the recent amendments thereto.
2. Two scanners had been installed at the seaport of Mombasa to detect material intended for malevolent acts, and the radiation protection inspectorate had stepped up its activities to curb illicit trafficking in radioactive material. During the preceding three years, the inspectorate's priorities had included the creation of a national database of radioactive material and the security of such material. Assistance from the Agency and the international community in that regard — for example, to extend scanning activities to other ports of entry — would be appreciated.
3. Effective and comprehensive safeguards were crucial components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for peaceful nuclear cooperation among all States party to the NPT. Kenya had ratified the CTBT and continued to support the establishment of that Treaty's global verification regime. In collaboration with the Government of Kenya, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO had established a seismic and infrasound station in the country as part of that verification regime. His country was making all necessary arrangements to conclude a safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the Agency and also urged all countries to sign and ratify the CTBT if they had not already done so.
4. His country was grateful for the assistance given by the Agency to the Institute of Nuclear Science established at the University of Nairobi in 1983. The Institute's main research activities included trace element analysis in biomedical, environmental, agricultural, geological and industrial samples. Several MSc and PhD students had graduated from the Institute during the preceding decade, making use of laboratory facilities established with the Agency's assistance, and a nuclear instrumentation laboratory had also been established at the Institute. Kenya hoped the Agency would increase its training and equipment support to the Institute, assisting the country to develop a nuclear safety and security culture for the 21st century when it was expected that nuclear energy would play an increasing role in development and nation-building.
5. Kenya had put in place a legal and institutional mechanism for the registration and licensing of activities involving the use of ionizing radiation and related practices. The government had recently more than doubled the number of inspectors attached to the competent authority, the National Radiation Protection Board, and had doubled spending on the Board over the preceding two years. With the help of the Agency, a national reference laboratory for radiation exposure of persons had also been established, allowing intercomparison studies to be conducted both inside and outside the country. In October 2005, Kenya would be hosting a regional training course in collaboration with the Agency on radiation protection in industrial radiography. The country placed special emphasis on the security of radiation sources, especially the mobile sources used in industrial radiography.
6. The Agency's technical cooperation activities in Kenya covered many sectors of socio-economic development, including agriculture and livestock, human health, water resources and industrial applications. His country appreciated the Agency's efforts to refocus on national rather than regional programmes through financial reallocation. Kenya's CPF had been signed by both the Agency and the national competent authority.

7. In the agriculture sector, Kenya was participating in the implementation of a national project on crop improvement and management through the application of nuclear and biotechnology techniques. The results were very encouraging and were assisting with the molecular characterization of crops, which would improve genetic resources indexing and preservation of crop plants and, in turn, would greatly assist the country in addressing food security and poverty alleviation. Molecular and mutation techniques were being applied to develop crop varieties that were tolerant to drought and disease. Another national project had been initiated on isotope techniques for the assessment of nitrogen and fertilizer use efficiency in cowpea and maize intercropping systems in the semi-arid parts of Kenya. Environmental conditions were being addressed through a project on the use of nuclear technology to combat desertification.

8. In October 2005, Kenya would be hosting in Nairobi a regional workshop on combating land degradation and soil infertility in Africa, in close collaboration with the Agency and the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry. It also planned to host another regional meeting on improving nutritious crops through mutation and biotechnology techniques.

9. His country was involved in the implementation of a Model Project aimed at the eradication of tsetse flies in the Lambwe Valley. The project combined conventional tsetse control techniques with the SIT in an area-wide approach. The Kenyan Government had earmarked US \$120 000 per annum for project operations and significant suppression of field tsetse populations had been achieved along with a significant reduction of disease incidence in livestock. Under the project, the Government had also continued to receive equipment from the Agency for upgrading insectaries to enhance tsetse mass rearing, along with expert missions and training for capacity building in area-wide tsetse population management. Kenya was grateful to the Agency for donating a gamma irradiator as part of the project. The arrangements for housing the irradiator had been completed. The project was expected to have a major impact on the implementation of the PATTEC plan of action.

10. Nuclear techniques had played a significant role in the management of major diseases in Kenya and the Agency had provided substantial assistance to the Ministry of Health through the National Council for Science and Technology. The Agency's support had helped with the further integration of isotope techniques in national and other donor-supported programmes pertaining to the monitoring of drug resistance, inter alia in connection with malaria and tuberculosis. HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis were acute problems and all efforts were being focused on sustaining projects for their proper diagnosis and adequate treatment. His country was grateful to the Agency for its continued assistance in combating those diseases. It was actively involved in the implementation of two regional projects: one on the use of isotope techniques to assess nutrition intervention programmes related to HIV/AIDS in Africa and another on HIV-1 molecular epidemiology and immunology in support of the UNAIDS-WHO African AIDS vaccine programme.

11. Kenya had only one public radiation oncology centre, at the Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi, with two cobalt-60 units serving a population of 33 million. Agency assistance with upgrading the centre, and establishing further radiotherapy treatment centres in Kisumu and Mombasa, would be appreciated. The Kenyatta National Hospital Medical Training Centre also needed help with facilities and infrastructure to train radiotherapy technicians and technologists.

12. Since water was scarce in Kenya, it appreciated the important role isotope hydrology techniques were playing in the development and management of water resources under project RAF/8/037, Sustainable Development and Equitable Utilization of the Common Nile Basin Water Resources. The project objective was to enhance participating Member States' capability to meet the shared vision of the Nile Basin Initiative. Kenya had initiated the formulation of a national project concept for implementation in the Agency's 2007–2008 technical cooperation programme cycle.

13. His country appreciated the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear techniques in scientific and development activities. Accordingly, in October 2005, in close collaboration with the Agency, the Government of Kenya would be hosting a national seminar on public awareness of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. The participants, who would include policy-makers, planners, researchers and representatives of public institutions, the private sector, NGOs and community-based organizations, would discuss and adopt a draft constitution for the proposed Society for the Promotion of Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Science in Kenya.

14. In conclusion, he thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for their efforts, and the staff of the Department of Technical Cooperation for its implementation of programmes in his country.

15. Mr. TZOTCHEV (Bulgaria) said that recent developments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation had shown the need for greater international efforts to strengthen the NPT. Bulgaria remained fully committed to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime backed by a strong international safeguards system. The additional protocol should become a verification standard for NPT non-proliferation obligations and his country called on all States party to the NPT to sign and ratify an additional protocol.

16. His country welcomed the joint statement by the participants in the six-party talks, in particular their commitment to a peaceful, verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

17. The early entry into force of the amendments to the CPPNM would be a significant contribution to the efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Bulgaria had initiated the national procedure for ratification of the amendments.

18. Over the preceding year, significant progress had been made in the project on the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Bulgaria. The public hearing organized in January 2005 had shown that there was strong support for continuing the development of nuclear power in Bulgaria. In the light of the conclusions of the environmental impact report and the feasibility study report, in April 2005 the Bulgarian Government had taken the final decision to build the Belene nuclear power plant. The pre-qualification process was finished and the tender procedure for the engineering, procurement and construction contract had begun. The bid winner was expected to be announced in early 2006. He thanked the Agency for the support they had given the Bulgarian counterparts in that process.

19. The Agency played an important role in establishing a global nuclear safety regime and providing technical assistance to Member States. Considerable progress had been achieved in making the technical cooperation programme more effective and efficient. Bulgaria was grateful to the Department of Technical Cooperation, the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security and the Department of Nuclear Energy for their assistance in upgrading the safety of its nuclear facilities, in developing and applying new technologies in the nuclear energy field and in increasing and strengthening the capabilities of the Bulgarian nuclear safety authority. His country participated regularly and actively in the Agency's regional technical cooperation programme, giving high priority to regional projects in the area of nuclear power and nuclear safety.

20. With the Agency's financial support, Bulgarian specialists in the nuclear field had been able to attend international conferences, symposia and seminars, and exchange experience and knowledge with their colleagues from other countries. Bulgarian research institutes and laboratories had taken part in the research programme through contracts and agreements and had contributed to the implementation of relevant Agency coordinated research projects.

21. Bulgaria also participated actively in the International Nuclear Information System, the Incident Reporting System and the Power Reactor Information System. It welcomed the recent initiative to establish a World Nuclear University and appreciated the Agency's role as founding supporter.

22. His country supported the Agency's proposed budget for 2006. Bulgaria had met its financial obligations to the Regular Budget for 2004 in full and had paid its pledged voluntary contribution to the TCF. Its voluntary contribution to the TCF for 2006 would be \$12 400.

23. Mr. DRAGO (Italy) said that, like other EU Member States, Italy was strongly committed to ensuring the full implementation and strengthening of the NPT. A multilateral approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, was the most efficient way maintaining order, peace and stability. The Agency had a crucial role to play in that regard. The outcome of the recent NPT Review Conference had been disappointing. The EU countries had a common position on the NPT which incorporated, inter alia, the following points: the need for all countries to accede to the Treaty; suspension of nuclear cooperation where the Agency could not provide adequate assurances that a State's nuclear programme was designed exclusively for peaceful purposes; the need to do everything possible to prevent the risk of nuclear terrorism and, consequently, the need to comply with United Nations Security Council resolution 1540; the important role played in the fight against nuclear proliferation and terrorism by the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the G8 Global Partnership Initiative; the need for better control over proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the urgent need to examine the report on multinational approaches to that issue produced by the Agency's expert group.

24. Italy supported all activities performed by the Agency in fulfilment of its statutory obligations in all its three main areas of activity: safeguards and verification, safety and security, and technical cooperation. It welcomed the outcome of the conference which had adopted amendments to the CPPNM and intended to ratify those amendments quickly. Furthermore, it attached great importance to all fundamental activities aimed at preventing nuclear terrorism, a threat which pervaded every sphere of human activity and constituted a severe challenge to the international community.

25. Since compliance with multilateral standards and regulations was essential for their credibility and efficiency, it was vital to be able to verify compliance and detect violations. Optimum use should be made of existing verification mechanisms and systems, but ways of improving them should also be sought. Italy saw additional protocols as an integral part of the safeguards system. It was of the opinion that comprehensive safeguards agreements together with the additional protocols constituted the verification standard and it called for universal adherence to those instruments. Having followed the work of the new Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute, his country was of the opinion that the current safeguards and verification system could be reviewed with a view to its improvement, in view of the increased risk of nuclear weapon proliferation in the modern world.

26. In the wake of the Chernobyl accident, nuclear energy had been at the centre of political debate. Following a referendum in 1987, Italy had begun to phase out its nuclear power plants and was now planning to decommission them, including reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel abroad and the identification of a national repository for the disposal of nuclear fuel and waste. In implementing decommissioning projects, particular attention needed to be paid to 'non-technological factors' such as involving local communities and site redevelopers. A State-run company had been entrusted with the decommissioning programme.

27. Nonetheless, the commitment to research into and development of nuclear energy and innovative nuclear power reactor systems had to be maintained. His country was considering taking part in international cooperation agreements in that field. Public opinion on nuclear issues was changing, especially among the younger generation. While the construction of new nuclear power plants in Italy was not on the Government's agenda, it supported increased cooperation and participation in new European and international nuclear technology programmes and projects.

28. Nuclear safety had to be the highest priority in every country's nuclear programme. International cooperation was essential in that field and all countries should strive constantly to improve safety standards.

29. The safe and secure management of radioactive sources was an international issue of great importance and his country supported the findings of the recent conference on that issue held in Bordeaux, in particular the need for periodic exchange of information on implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources adopted by the General Conference in 2003. His country fully supported the Code of Conduct and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

30. Italy also supported the Agency's technical cooperation activities and the Italian parliament had recently passed a bill granting the Government the necessary resources to fund those activities to the full amount of his country's assessed share. He welcomed the coordination that had been pursued with other organizations, in particular the World Bank and WHO, and the efforts to make technical assistance more fruitful and cost-effective. That trend should be maintained and recipient countries should be encouraged to make a strong commitment.

31. Through UNESCO, Italy contributed more than 80% of the budget of the ICTP, whose activities and programmes aimed at promoting international cooperation among scientists from all countries. It appreciated the Agency's support for the ICTP and felt encouraged thereby to continue and increase its support for the Centre, and to enhance the Centre's role of closing the North-South technological and scientific divide.

32. Much progress had been made with regard to the Agency's budget but well defined priorities needed to be established before any new activities were undertaken. Italy supported the results-based approach which helped identify deviations in programme implementation and provided an opportunity to learn from experience. With regard to staffing, the Secretariat should apply strict recruitment criteria based on competence and scientific and technological expertise.

33. Mr. VIEIRA DE SOUZA (Brazil) acknowledged the Agency's outstanding work in the areas of verification, technical cooperation and nuclear safety. As the discussions on non-proliferation efforts had become central in the international agenda, it was important not to lose sight of the equally pressing need for effective action aimed at the full implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments under the NPT. The nuclear-weapon States had yet to show real readiness to move towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, which they had committed themselves to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The lack of results at the most recent NPT Review Conference and the lack of consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation at the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations were clear signs of the current negative trends, and cause for dismay for countries like Brazil that were fully committed to the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

34. Measures to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime had to be accompanied by measures to accelerate progress towards nuclear disarmament. However, in multilateral disarmament fora, another year had passed without any significant developments. The impasse in the deliberations in the Conference on Disarmament remained and, almost ten years after its adoption, the CTBT had yet to enter into force. He urged all Annex 2 countries that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. He also called on all nations to intensify their endeavours to reverse the current negative trends and ensure that disarmament and non-proliferation commitments were upheld, recalling that all Latin American and Caribbean countries had adhered to the Tlatelolco Treaty establishing the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region of the world.

35. Brazil remained a firm supporter of international efforts to combat all forms of terrorism, including possible malicious acts involving nuclear material. It welcomed the fact that the Nuclear

Security Plan for 2006–2009 stressed that responsibility for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material rested entirely with the State, and that adherence to Agency guidelines and recommendations related to security enhancement was voluntary. The primacy of the State in security issues had to be respected. Noting that the activities foreseen in the Plan would continue to be funded from the Nuclear Security Fund, and that funding from the Regular Budget would continue to be limited, he emphasized the need to ensure that any additional activities relating to protection against nuclear terrorism should not affect the priorities and resources of the technical cooperation programme.

36. Brazil had actively supported the broadening of the scope of the CPPNM. Despite some concerns with regard to certain aspects of the amendments proposed, it had joined the consensus on them.

37. The safeguards system was a major element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. His delegation had been actively involved in the discussions in the Board which had led to the creation of a new committee on safeguards and verification. Brazil was pleased to note that the committee would have advisory status and would operate within the framework of the Agency's Statute. It also appreciated the fact that the committee would comprise all members of the Board and that other Member States would be able to participate in its work.

38. His country welcomed the progress achieved in the cooperation between ABACC and the Agency on the application of safeguards under the Quadripartite Agreement. Significant improvements had been achieved with the establishment of guidelines for joint safeguards activities at several nuclear facilities and procedures for unannounced inspections and for common use of safeguards equipment. Brazil attached great importance to cooperation between ABACC and the Agency and urged both to continue working together, in order to avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort and make safeguards activities more cost-effective.

39. With regard to the resolution on the implementation of safeguards in Iran adopted by the Board on 24 September, his country was of the view that all issues pertaining to international peace and security should preferably be resolved through dialogue and cooperation and that the issue in question should continue to be dealt with within the Agency.

40. Brazil attached great importance to the Agency's technical cooperation programme and continued to support regional cooperative approaches such as ARCAL. The development of a strategic alliance between the Agency and ARCAL, which was currently under discussion, would improve the outcome of regional projects and the provision of technical assistance. He expressed the hope that the restructuring of the Department of Technical Cooperation, and the redesigning of the programme cycle would enhance the Department's capacity to implement the programme.

41. Nuclear safety was essential to promote public acceptance of nuclear power and other nuclear applications. His country had made a political commitment to work towards following the guidance contained in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. It welcomed the number and quality of the safety standards and guides issued by the Agency in 2004, in particular those relating to nuclear power plant design and management of waste from the use of radioactive material in medicine, industry and research. The Agency's work on developing standards for nuclear fuel cycle facility safety was to be commended and the development of such standards should be given high priority.

42. In view of the potential risks to coastal populations and the marine environment in the event of an accident during the maritime transport of radioactive material and nuclear waste, Brazil had supported initiatives aimed at the progressive strengthening of international norms on the issue. The findings of the TranSAS mission to Brazil in 2002 acknowledged that Brazil already had a sound

transport regulatory system in place and identified good practices that could be used as a model for other competent authorities.

43. Brazil welcomed the progress made by the Agency with regard to preservation of knowledge. The scope of activities in that area should be enlarged to cover nuclear science and its applications and nuclear safety. His country attached great importance to the establishment of the Ibero-American Radiation Safety Network, which should help promote the sharing of existing knowledge and expertise among countries. The International Nuclear Information System was also an important tool for enhancing maintenance and preservation of knowledge.

44. Mr. DINH TIEN (Vietnam) said that, recognizing the vital role nuclear energy played in Vietnam's development, over the years his Government had implemented policies on promotion of research into, and development and the uses of nuclear energy, strengthening of nuclear regulatory infrastructure and extension of international cooperation. Nuclear legislation was planned to be submitted to the National Assembly by 2007. The Vietnamese Government was currently reviewing for approval a national strategy on development and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and the final report on a pre-feasibility study on the construction of the country's first nuclear power plant.

45. In order to promote and ensure the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy, a plan was being implemented for the establishment of a national nuclear regulatory infrastructure with a view to capacity-building of the nuclear regulatory body and technical support institutions. Safety and security were an integral part of an effective and comprehensive nuclear regulatory infrastructure and thus Vietnam had participated actively in the Asian Nuclear Safety Network over the preceding year. In April, it had invited an international team of experts to visit the country to hold a seminar on nuclear security, and in August, in cooperation with the Department of Safeguards, it had held a seminar on the additional protocol. In December it would be hosting an IAEA meeting to promote the ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Consideration was also being given to such issues as security of radioactive sources and nuclear installations, and conversion from HEU to LEU research reactor fuel.

46. Vietnam attached great importance to the effective implementation of the technical cooperation programme. The CPF finalized with the Agency in September 2003 identified six ongoing projects in the 2005–2006 cycle and seven new or extended project proposals for the next cycle. His country had fulfilled its obligations and commitments to the Agency in full, including providing the necessary resources for projects, payment of NPCs for the 2005–2006 cycle, Regular Budget contributions and payment of its pledged contribution to the TCF for 2005. In the current year, Vietnam had hosted two non-RCA events and two RCA events and in October it would be hosting a technical meeting on the Asian Network for Education in Nuclear Technology.

47. Through its cooperation with the Agency, Vietnam had made important progress in developing human resources, improving the national radiation safety infrastructure and extending the use of nuclear applications to such areas as the creation of new rice varieties, food preservation, production of radiopharmaceuticals, groundwater management, oil and gas exploration, etc.

48. The Agency was Vietnam's most important source of international cooperation in developing nuclear science and technology and in strengthening its nuclear regulatory capabilities. He thanked the Agency for its valuable assistance and expressed the hope that its technical cooperation programme would be run even more effectively, thereby contributing to socio-economic development and to the improvement of the living standards of people in all Member States.

49. Mr. DAINIUS (Lithuania) said that his country strongly supported United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, had improved its export control system and had provided a comprehensive report pursuant to the resolution. It urged other countries to act likewise.

50. He welcomed the successful outcome of the Conference held to consider and adopt amendments to the CPPNM. Lithuania was preparing to adhere to the amended Convention. It had also introduced new physical protection measures at the Ignalina nuclear power plant and updated existing ones. He urged all States party to the Convention to take steps ensure that the amendments entered into force as quickly as possible.

51. Recognizing the importance of the worldwide fight against nuclear terrorism, his country noted the significant progress made by both the international community and individual States in improving their preparedness to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism, one of the greatest threats to society. That progress had been clearly demonstrated at the International Conference on Nuclear Security held in London in March 2005. In signing the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 16 September 2005, Lithuania had taken another step towards strengthening the global legal framework to counter terrorist threats.

52. His country appreciated the role played by the Agency in the non-proliferation regime, the key element of which was the Agency's safeguards system. Lithuania had been implementing the additional protocol for five years. In both 2003 and 2004, a positive conclusion had been drawn regarding the absence of diversion of nuclear material and of undeclared nuclear material or activities. That provided a good basis for the introduction of integrated safeguards, which it was expected would take place by the end of 2005 or early in 2006. Lithuania urged other States to cooperate with the Agency in the application of safeguards in order to ensure full transparency in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

53. Over the preceding year, his country had participated in and benefited from the Agency's activities aimed at enhancing the safety of nuclear installations, including the preparation of safety standards and other documents, and the dissemination of experience through the Agency's services and numerous international fora. The need for those activities had been confirmed by the third review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, held in April 2005. In line with its obligations under that Convention and the Agency's standards, Lithuania continued to improve the safety level of its nuclear installations and the capabilities of its national nuclear regulator.

54. In implementation of Lithuania's international obligations following its accession to the European Union, the first unit of the Ignalina nuclear power plant had been shut down. The safety of the unit was being assured via the usual procedures. A large number of documents needed to be prepared and approved for the decommissioning. One of those documents, the final decommissioning plan, had been approved on 4 July 2005. Programmes for defuelling both reactors and the unit's spent fuel ponds, and for developing radioactive waste management facilities were being prepared. The successful implementation of those programmes in the years to come would enable work to begin on dismantling the unit equipment and structure. Lithuania was grateful to the Agency for the support it had provided in elaborating the necessary documentation. The safety of the only unit of the Ignalina nuclear power plant still in operation, Unit 2, had been significantly upgraded in 2004. To ensure a high safety level — including operational safety — while one of the two reactors was being decommissioned, a full-scope OSART mission should be carried out in 2006.

55. With the assistance of the Agency and the European Commission, his country was devoting significant resources to further enhancing and strengthening the regulatory infrastructure for control of radiation sources, exposure to ionizing radiation and radiation emergencies. It had informed the Director General of its political commitment to supporting the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

56. Lithuania appreciated the expert missions sent by the Agency in 2004 and was committed to implementing the recommendations made by the experts on the elaboration of a national strategy for

improving control of radioactive sources, including orphan sources, improving the radiation safety regulatory infrastructure and occupational exposure control.

57. His country was making every effort to coordinate the assistance it received from the Agency with the help provided by other donors, including the European Commission, thanks to which a quality system had been created at the radiation protection centre and its testing laboratory had been accredited.

58. It was also playing an active part in the Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE). The effective implementation of radiation protection optimization had resulted in significant reduction of occupational exposure at the Ignalina nuclear power plant.

59. Implementation of quality systems in hospitals was important for control of medical exposure. Further assistance from the Agency would be needed to establish or improve substantially the system of exposure control in diagnostic radiology, radiotherapy and nuclear medicine, through the development of appropriate quality assurance and quality control programmes and optimization of radiation protection of patients.

60. The safe management of radioactive waste was attracting increasing attention throughout the world. Several international initiatives were under way to develop, improve and harmonize approaches to assessing and demonstrating the safety of waste disposal facilities. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management obliged the Contracting Parties to assess the safety of waste management facilities prior to their construction and operation and to review the safety of existing facilities. The Lithuanian Radioactive Waste Management Agency was continuing with the selection and characterization of a site for construction of a near-surface repository for short-lived low- and intermediate-level waste. The environmental, social and economic consequences of radioactive waste disposal near the Ignalina nuclear power plant were being considered and consultations with neighbouring countries were being held. Therefore, his country would like the Agency to organize a peer review which could offer advice on whether the programme was consistent with international standards and good practices in other national disposal programmes.

61. It was obvious that no global goal could be achieved without close cooperation among States. For over a decade, Lithuanian organizations had been actively participating in and benefiting from Agency regional and national technical cooperation projects in the areas of nuclear power and nuclear safety, physical protection and nuclear security, radiation protection, radiotherapy and waste management. Six national projects were planned to be ongoing throughout the 2005–2006 biennium. In view of the forthcoming decommissioning process at the Ignalina nuclear power plant, his country had a particular interest in increasing the decommissioning skills and knowledge of Lithuanian specialists and was grateful to the Agency for the recently initiated regional project on that subject. Enhancement of regulatory infrastructure and authorities, and training in nuclear and radiation safety had to be done in parallel. Lithuania looked forward to participating in projects in those areas not only as a recipient but also as an information donor. It appreciated the active cooperation with the Agency in organizing fellowships, workshops, seminars and training courses, and providing other technical support that enhanced the infrastructure of the regulatory authorities and other competent institutions and increased the skills and knowledge of Lithuanian specialists.

62. The Agency's technical cooperation programme had grown substantially in size, complexity and the number of participating States. His country appreciated the new, more transparent and efficient approach to the programme cycle management framework and hoped that it would improve the quality of projects and help meet Member States' needs.

63. Mr. CARRERA DORAL (Cuba) said that his country had condemned the fact the United Nations was no longer operating in accordance with the principles and objectives enshrined in its Charter. Today, the more powerful nations were only striving to ensure the United Nations could be controlled more effectively in line with their political interests, without recognizing the right to peace and development of States that did not belong to their group. To that end, those States had unscrupulously turned to such measures as interventions and preventive wars.

64. Cuba's position on the need for complete, unconditional and verifiable nuclear disarmament was well known. Many States that shared that view placed their hopes in the NPT but Cuba, which had demonstrated its commitment to non-proliferation and which had used and would continue to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful uses, had always considered the NPT to be inadequate and discriminatory with respect to the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. However, to demonstrate its commitment to multilateralism and to show political goodwill, Cuba had acceded to the NPT and had ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty and, since the entry into force of its comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, it had rigorously complied with all its obligations in that regard.

65. The 2005 NPT Review Conference had provided an opportunity to make progress on non-proliferation, disarmament, international cooperation on peaceful uses and verification, which were inseparable from one another. However, the Conference had been a failure. Some nuclear-weapon States had not been willing to take concrete steps towards disarmament and had, in fact, moved openly into an advanced phase of vertical proliferation while daily trying to impose more restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States. Aggressive acts had been justified on the pretext of nuclear proliferation, based on evidence that had proven to be false. Such a course was extremely dangerous, was not conducive to nuclear disarmament and put in jeopardy the Agency's role in the verification of non-proliferation commitments.

66. Cuba had taken note of the Director General's reports to the Board on the implementation of NPT safeguards agreements and the Board's related resolutions. It had fully supported the statements made on behalf of the NAM which had expressed concern regarding the content of those resolutions and the methods by which they had been adopted, while acknowledging the professional and impartial attitude of the Agency's Secretariat and welcoming the progress made. In that connection, he wished to reaffirm Cuba's position on several issues.

67. First of all, every State had an inalienable and sovereign right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. No State could be required to restrict its use of such technology for peaceful purposes unless it had been demonstrated that that State had violated its NPT obligations.

68. Secondly, only the Agency had the authority and mandate to verify a State's nuclear programme or draw conclusions on its nature on the basis of objective and accurate information.

69. Thirdly, Cuba denounced any manipulation of information relating to the Agency's verification processes. Nobody had the right to prejudge a country's nuclear programme or to politicize the issue. Neither did they have the right to interpret the Statute in such a way as to create a supposed violation of NPT commitments, providing a basis for referring a case to the Security Council.

70. Fourthly, there should be a clear distinction between a State's legal obligations and voluntary political commitments made as a demonstration of goodwill. Referral of a case to the Security Council in connection with a State's failure to comply with voluntary commitments was not permissible.

71. Any other approach would have a serious negative effect on the Agency's authority, efforts to strengthen the safeguards system and the Agency's Statute. Cuba hoped that technical issues relating to nuclear verification would not become a political issue leading to another international crisis. Furthermore, it strongly supported political and diplomatic efforts to reach solutions that were

acceptable to all parties, that remained within the framework of the Agency and that respected the sovereignty of all States and the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

72. Today more than ever there was a need to strengthen the Agency and achieve a proper balance between its various statutory activities. In particular, technical cooperation should be given the importance and support it deserved. That activity was a very high priority for Cuba, as was shown by the high efficiency and effectiveness indicators for the implementation of its technical cooperation programme with the Agency, the high project implementation levels, the growing number of its experts involved in cooperation with other countries, and its strict compliance with its financial obligations vis-à-vis the TCF and its NPCs.

73. Cuba welcomed the entry into force the ARCAL agreement, which was the best way to promote cooperation and exchanges between countries in the region in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

74. A strong and efficient Department of Technical Cooperation was essential to implement successfully the Agency's technical cooperation strategy. It was therefore important to finish the restructuring process as soon as possible.

75. His country continued to pay special attention to nuclear and radiation safety activities, including physical protection. It had continued to strengthen its infrastructure and human resources training in that area. In 2004, it had received a mission to review the effectiveness of its regulatory authority, the results of which had confirmed that the safe use of radiation sources and the safe management of radioactive waste were assured.

76. Cuba had played an active part in the process to amend the CPPNM. That Convention was an appropriate mechanism to strengthen physical protection, as long as its implementation did not lead to any form of discrimination and it was understood that the exclusion of armed forces from its scope could under no circumstances be used as a pretext by a State to attack nuclear facilities owned by another.

77. Mr. ALI (Bangladesh) said that his country stood ready to join any multilateral initiative under the aegis of the United Nations to combat terrorism. It had recently acceded to eight international counter-terrorism conventions, including the CPPNM. It supported Security Council resolution 1373 and had already enacted national laws to combat terrorism, including laws related to money laundering and financing.

78. Bangladesh was an unequivocal supporter of the NPT regime. It was firmly committed to disarmament and had consciously renounced the option to go nuclear. As a signatory of the NPT and the CTBT, it was fully conscious of its obligations to maintain transparency under its safeguards agreement and additional protocol. He urged those States party to the NPT that had not already done so to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency.

79. The nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility: they had a moral obligation to rid the world of their nuclear weapons. States that did not possess such weapons should renounce them completely.

80. His country had a longstanding association with the Agency and Bangladesh made a modest contribution through the provision of experts and training facilities. The Agency's technical cooperation programme in Bangladesh had always been very important. The Agency had provided support for an irradiator plant, and use of X-rays, gamma rays and radioactive isotopes had increased in medicine, industry, hydrology and food preservation, often with Agency assistance. Scientists from the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Agency were always trying to promote and ensure the controlled and safer use of radioactive devices.

81. His country remained concerned about the potential nuclearization of the Middle East. The application of comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East could contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, which his country supported.

82. There was a strong link between disarmament and development, and the insistence on retaining or developing nuclear weapons would not only have implications for international peace and security but also for development. While countries should have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he urged States to recommit themselves to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

83. Mr. POLOZANI (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that his country had signed a safeguard agreement and an additional protocol and had joined the CPPNM and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which were crucial instruments in international efforts to strengthen both the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities and the non-proliferation regime.

84. The international community should give the highest priority to the prevention of nuclear terrorism and his country continued to support the Agency's activities to improve nuclear security. It had implemented protection measures at all border crossings. Further upgrading of equipment and training of staff would be required. The country had been identified as a recipient country under the EU joint action in support of the Agency's nuclear security programme and a fact-finding mission was to be dispatched soon to identify measures for further upgrading of the security of sources.

85. The Agency was assisting his country with the development of a comprehensive legal framework for radiation protection and nuclear safety in compliance with international radiation safety standards. An independent Radiation Safety Directorate had been established. Further assistance was required for the directorate to become operational, in accordance with the recommendations made by the recent RaSSIA mission.

86. He commended the support and efficient assistance the Agency had provided through its technical cooperation programme. Proposals had been submitted for the 2007–2008 project cycle based on a joint evaluation with the pre-project formulation mission sent by the Agency. The selected projects were in line with the CPF and aimed at upgrading diagnosis and treatment in nuclear medicine and oncology, improving food safety standards and strengthening radiation protection services. He welcomed the simplified procedures for planning technical cooperation projects. Despite scarce resources, his country had paid its full share to the TCF and shared costs for proposed national projects, demonstrating its commitment. It also actively participated in the European technical cooperation programme and welcomed the continuation of the regional programme on strengthening of regulatory control, from which it had benefited a lot. It strongly supported the PACT initiative. Three out of its five proposed national projects were related to further improving diagnosis and radiotherapy treatment of cancer patients. It hoped that PACT would address many issues of concern and would help make its own institute a centre of competence.

87. Mr. SCHALLER (Switzerland), speaking also on behalf of Liechtenstein, said that, since the preceding General Conference, there had been very marked development in the areas of non-proliferation, disarmament and cooperation.

88. The recent NPT Review Conference had been unable to agree on a substantive final statement. The declaration of the Summit of Heads of State and Government convened for the 60th anniversary of the United Nations contained no reference to nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, Switzerland welcomed the joint declaration launched at the latest Conference held pursuant to Article XIV of the CTBT and still believed that only an approach that took account of the security interests of all would allow the NPT to be strengthened. Those interests were linked, for some, to proliferation risks and, for

others, to fears of not being able to take advantage of new technologies essential for their development and to the slow pace of nuclear disarmament.

89. The NPT Review Conference had also allowed for an extensive exchange of views on all questions concerning access to sensitive technologies in the nuclear fuel cycle. Switzerland particularly welcomed the substantial work undertaken by the Director General on that topic and felt that the proposals in the report of the expert group on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle (document INFCIRC/640) constituted an interesting basis for discussion. However, Switzerland could not agree with proposals that fundamentally contradicted the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy granted by Article IV of the NPT. A State's access to sensitive nuclear technologies should be conditional on its adherence to the NPT and compliance with all of its provisions.

90. Switzerland had noted the latest Agency report of 2 September 2005 on Iran's nuclear programme, which had contained both positive elements and some that were still unsatisfactory. The resumption of uranium conversion activities by Tehran was not conducive to restoring the confidence of the international community. Suspension of all activity considered sensitive, as provided for in the Paris agreement, was a temporary but necessary confidence-building measure. In that connection, he welcomed the efforts of France, Germany and the United Kingdom and expressed the hope that the appeal launched by the Board of Governors on 24 September to pursue dialogue and strengthen collaboration would be heeded.

91. His country was glad to see that the efforts of States engaged in the six-party talks aimed at finding a solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula had resulted in a promising joint statement. It welcomed the consensual approach adopted by all of the participating States and particularly commended China for its intense diplomatic efforts. It encouraged the participants to continue in that spirit so that the commitments in the joint statement could be implemented as quickly as possible.

92. It was pleasing that the project for a global partnership between India and the United States might help overcome a stalemate that had lasted too long. However, that project could seriously destabilize the NPT as it would implicitly recognize an additional nuclear-weapon State, creating a precedent which would be difficult to accept for non-nuclear-weapon States that had accepted the original NPT compromise and the subsequent restrictive development of the non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the project was emerging just as action was being taken at various levels to get more restrictive measures adopted regarding access to sensitive technologies. Before evaluating whether the initiative involved greater risk of destabilization than potential for cooperation, the parties involved should provide more information, particularly on the practical implications.

93. The decision to site ITER in France opened up a new period of research and development in the area of nuclear fusion. All parties to the project had expressed a wish to conclude the joint implementation agreement and begin construction of the reactor as quickly as possible. As a member of Euratom's fusion research programme, Switzerland welcomed that decision. It had been involved in fusion activities since the second Atoms for Peace Conference in 1958. His Government was convinced that, under the ITER project, progress would be made toward demonstrating that fusion energy was sustainable and exploitable. It was thus giving a final push to plans for an extraordinary contribution running to tens of millions of francs to accelerate construction of ITER.

94. With regard to events relating to Switzerland, a new law on nuclear energy had entered into force on 1 February 2005. It opened up the possibility of constructing new nuclear power plants, without limiting a priori the lifetime of existing plants. It also introduced a 10-year moratorium on new spent nuclear fuel reprocessing contracts and an extension of the people's rights to submit to an optional referendum the authorization to construct new nuclear installations.

95. The Swiss authorities had taken advantage of the law's entry into force to ratify the country's additional protocol. At the end of July, Switzerland had submitted its initial declaration allowing the Agency to reassess all of its nuclear activities. It was expecting a speedy introduction of integrated safeguards and a significant reduction in monitoring expenditures. It had decided to ratify the additional protocol in the knowledge that the Agency would be developing a system of integrated safeguards which would avoid the useless and counterproductive application of both comprehensive safeguards and additional protocol measures, and that the new measures would not be applied in a mechanical and systematic way.

96. In the area of long-lived high- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, the Swiss authorities were assessing the documentation making a case that safe storage was feasible and that a site where such waste could be stored existed. A decision was not expected before 2006 and broad consultation of affected communities was envisaged before then. International collaboration on a multinational high-level radioactive waste storage project had not been abandoned.

97. During the preceding year, the five reactors had met approximately 40% of the country's electricity needs under good safety and security conditions.

98. Mr. AQRAWI (Iraq) said that he wished to present an optimistic picture of Iraq to the General Conference despite the difficult circumstances it was currently experiencing. His country needed all the help it could get from people of goodwill to build a new Iraq. Many years had been lost and resources wasted in the pursuit of misguided scientific goals under the former regime at the expense of genuine development. The regime had also spoiled Iraq's relations with other countries, leaving it isolated and unable to play a creative role in the international community.

99. The environment in Iraq was plagued with a multitude of problems. International assistance was urgently needed to deal with contamination at nuclear and industrial sites. Such assistance should include expertise, equipment and technical training, with a view to eliminating contamination from radiation sources once and for all, in cooperation with the Agency. To that end, the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology had established the Iraqi Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority (IRSRA), which had published standards and regulations based on the Agency's guidelines to protect the health, safety and security of the Iraqi people. It had also established the Iraqi Non-Proliferation Programs Foundation (INPF) to retrain former scientists and engineers involved in weapons programmes for participation in peaceful civilian activities, to prevent the proliferation of weapons in Iraq as required by various Security Council resolutions, and to implement programmes aimed at import and export control, border security and prevention of illicit trafficking in non-conventional material and equipment, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540. The Ministry of Science and Technology bore an enormous burden of responsibility. In addition to decontaminating Iraq's destroyed nuclear installations and buildings, it had to apply itself to the task of using nuclear energy for peaceful civilian purposes and provide advice and expertise in order to solve existing problems. It would be unable to succeed without the Agency's support for the speedy implementation of technical projects to address the following needs: decontamination of destroyed sites; selection of sites for the burial of radioactive waste; safe transport of contaminated materials; equipment for monitoring the transport of radioactive sources; joint research projects in the areas of health, agriculture, water and engineering resources and environment; training, scientific visits and participation in Agency conferences and symposia.

100. The new Iraq was determined to turn over a new leaf and to forge solid scientific relations based on transparency with all countries and organizations. It would seek to strengthen international peace and security through the creation of a world free of weapons of mass destruction. It was committed to implementing all relevant international treaties, particularly the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the Agency. It was to be hoped that the international community would take action to rid all

regions of weapons of mass destruction, including the Middle East, and that the nuclear powers would support that aim, urging parties in the Middle East that had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so with a view to supporting efforts to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

101. Mr. PILLAY (Seychelles) said that the Agency had an ever increasing role to play in reducing the threats posed by the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and in supporting the promotion of a culture of safety and security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It should retain its vital role by strengthening its capabilities for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities. His country supported the Agency's continued work to strengthen nuclear safeguards and to encourage the adhesion of non-Member States to the additional protocol and to the NPT. It also appreciated the Agency's initiatives addressing the threats of proliferation and terrorism by enhancing the safety and security of nuclear material and radiation sources, and the important role of the Agency in moving the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda forward. The Government of the Seychelles was committed to the fight against terrorism and would continue to support bilateral and multilateral efforts. The National Assembly had passed an Anti-Terrorism Act.

102. Since becoming a Member State of the Agency, his country had ratified three important bilateral agreements: its safeguards agreement, the SQP and its additional protocol. It also supported the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The Seychelles had also ratified a number of relevant international treaties including the NPT, the CPPNM, the CTBT, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. It was currently reviewing ratification of the amendment to the CPPNM.

103. His country endorsed the Agency's regional programmes on strengthening of national regulatory infrastructures for the control of radiation sources, development of technical capabilities for the protection of the health and safety of workers exposed to ionizing radiation, and education and training in support of radiation protection infrastructure. It looked forward to receiving the Agency's support for its participation in those programmes.

104. The technical cooperation programme was one of the main instruments for transferring nuclear science and technology to Member States to promote social and economic development. When tailored to recipient States' needs and priorities, those initiatives helped in the fight against poverty, in improving health and in supporting sustainable development. Such peaceful applications of nuclear techniques could contribute to addressing problems such as the management of drinking water supplies, the production of crops with an improved yield or greater salt tolerance in arid climates, the eradication of disease-bearing and other harmful pests in an environmentally beneficial way, and the effective diagnosis and treatment of diseases, in particular radiation oncology and therapy.

105. The number of cancer patients was soaring, yet the resources and equipment to diagnose and treat the disease were very limited or even lacking in developing countries such as the Seychelles. Nearly 13 % of all deaths worldwide were caused by cancer and the greatest increase over the coming decade was expected to be in developing countries, as had become increasingly evident in his country which looked forward to working with the Agency, in particular to develop much needed radiotherapy facilities and to train technicians in the provision of radiotherapy, dosimetry and monitoring. Those services were currently unavailable in the country and offering patients treatment abroad added to costs.

106. He thanked the members of both missions sent by the Agency's technical cooperation programme to his country in 2005 to assist with the development of project proposals, to develop essential dosimetry and medical radiation programmes and to assist with the assessment of radiation

safety and security and water management needs. The Seychelles looked forward to continued cooperation, including the development of a CPF which it hoped to finalize as soon as possible.

107. It was also grateful to the Agency for the assistance it had provided to enable a number of technicians to receive training in safeguards and monitoring, and looked forward to expanding that assistance as it put in place the appropriate safeguard mechanisms and legislative framework.

108. Mr. CRISTEA (Republic of Moldova) stressed the importance of the Agency remaining an authoritative and independent source of quality information, knowledge, capacity-building and expert resources to support the use of nuclear and radiation technologies for peaceful purposes. Cooperation with the Agency allowed his country, which was relatively small and had limited capacity, to access new innovative technologies in various fields, which it would not have been able to accomplish on its own even over several decades. The Republic of Moldova had signed the Agency's Statute at the end of 1997, but cooperation with the Agency had begun in 1994 in the context of a UNDP project aimed at creating a national radiation and nuclear safety infrastructure. Technical cooperation had begun in mid-1998.

109. In his country, consensus between the ruling party and the opposition had been achieved in parliament for the first time since independence. It was based on the acceptance of a declaration on subsequent integration into the European Community and the resolution of the issue of reintegrating the country exclusively within the framework of the constitution in force. Both the political parties and the public were aware that the country's future lay solely in the EC. Therefore, the country was using EC legislation as a model in developing national legislation. Membership of the Agency and adherence to major conventions and agreements were regarded as legitimate conditions for the country's subsequent integration into the European and world communities.

110. The structural changes in the country also affected regulatory bodies for activities involving radiation sources and radiation safety. President Voronin had initiated a full-scale reform of high-level national authorities in the light of the recommendations of EC experts on reducing bureaucracy and increasing the accountability of civil servants to the public, and of recommendations by Agency experts on reducing the number of regulatory bodies. In introducing those changes, account would be taken of the achievements realized with the Agency's help in creating an infrastructure for radiation protection and source safety. A new draft law on safe implementation of nuclear activities and activities involving ionizing radiation sources had been drawn up in July and sent to the Agency for expert review. Suggestions for its improvement would be appreciated.

111. The Republic of Moldova had signed an agreement on technical assistance in 1998 and a framework programme for cooperation with the Agency in 2005. Its participation in national and regional technical cooperation projects over the preceding seven years had contributed to improving its national legislative and standardization infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety regulation. Up-to-date experience had been obtained on the implementation of programmes on radiation safety, radioactive waste management, development of normative documents and solving of licensing problems, and on the development of training programmes on radiation protection, radiation safety, emergency response and inspection practices.

112. With the Agency's assistance, the quality of diagnostic radiology and radiotherapy for cancer patients had been improved. Work was continuing on quality assurance and control in those areas, and efforts to upgrade equipment in national nuclear medicine centres and maternal and child health centres were ongoing.

113. The country had mastered isotope technology for assessing the quality of dams to prevent accidents. That methodology should, in future, allow underground drinking water reserves, their recharge sources and contamination to be assessed. The country was working on transferring radiation

technologies to industry, in particular the medical industry, for sterilization of parapharmaceutical products and cosmetics and surgical instruments. The same technology could be used in the future to treat seeds and seedlings before planting. The Republic of Moldova was grateful to the Agency and the United States Government for the support it had received with ensuring the safety of powerful radiation sources. That work had been completed and source storage met international standards.

114. Changes had taken place in the world as regards international terrorism and separatism which, if those involved were to obtain access to nuclear technology or weapons, could alter life in ways that could not be foreseen. In that connection, he welcomed the initiative put forward by the President of the Russian Federation at the 60th session of the United Nations General Assembly regarding the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which his country had signed. The Republic of Moldova was participating in all of the Agency's regional projects on the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear material. Assistance had been received from the Agency and other countries, including through other international projects on strengthening border controls. The radiation safety situation in the region near the Dniester river, where there had been radiation incidents, was cause for concern. That part of the border was not controlled by the country's central authorities and that situation favoured illicit trafficking in strategic material, equipment, narcotics, etc. In that connection, he called upon the international community to support his country's reintegration efforts and thanked the EC for its readiness to begin monitoring the Moldovan-Ukrainian border in the near future. That step should help resolve the conflict in the Dniester region and enhance safety.

115. His country fully supported the goals of the Medium Term Strategy for 2006–2011. Its own priorities in the area of technical cooperation with the Agency were medicine, radiation technologies in industry, nuclear technologies in agriculture, radiation safety, management of radioactive waste, and emergency response. It felt that nuclear safety, radiation protection and scientific support should be incorporated in all projects.

116. Mr. ERTAY (Turkey) said that the international security environment had changed dramatically in recent years: non-State actors, terrorists and States in violation of non-proliferation obligations, together with insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament, posed challenges to the delicate balance struck by the treaties system over the preceding four decades. The Agency's safeguards system remained an indispensable component of the global non-proliferation regime, the success of which depended not only on the adoption of treaties but also on their effective implementation. Turkey therefore recognized the need to strengthen further the effectiveness of Agency safeguards and supported the idea that the Model Additional Protocol should be adopted as the universal norm to verify compliance with the NPT.

117. Peaceful nuclear technology, in particular know-how related to the nuclear fuel cycle, could be used to initiate a nuclear weapons programme. Diversion of peaceful nuclear technology and material to covert and illegal weapons programmes should be prevented by all legal means available. However, it was necessary to ensure that the inalienable right of all parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the NPT, did not fall victim. The issue needed to be urgently addressed with a view to finding acceptable ways of meeting both objectives. Turkey took note of the Director General's proposals for multilateral controls on the nuclear fuel cycle.

118. His country was concerned that the problem over Iran's nuclear programme remained unresolved. Having supported the negotiations between Iran and the three European countries, it had been disappointed when the talks had been suspended. He hoped that the Board resolution adopted on 24 September 2005 would lead to the resumption of dialogue and an early settlement of the issue.

119. With regard to the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, he welcomed the recent statement by the participants in the six-party talks and looked forward to the early fulfilment of the commitments they had made.

120. His country welcomed the adoption by consensus of the amendments to the CPPNM. Those amendments would further strengthen international efforts to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, thus helping combat nuclear terrorism. Their adoption was a clear demonstration of the international community's solidarity and its resolve to address new threats to the nuclear non-proliferation regime in a timely manner. His country also welcomed the recent Board decision approving the Director General's proposal to extend the Nuclear Security Plan for another four years.

121. Nuclear power's share of world electricity production had remained stable in recent years, yet world demand for energy was constantly rising. Developing countries, striving to raise the living standards of their growing populations, would account for the greater part of the increased demand. With fossil fuel prices constantly rising and the call for cleaner and renewable energy sources becoming ever stronger, nuclear power stood a better chance of capturing a greater share in meeting energy needs. In that connection, Turkey welcomed the findings of the international ministerial conference on nuclear power held in Paris in March 2005.

122. Increased energy demand stimulated by fast economic growth and the rising level of welfare had made energy supply security ever more important for Turkey. Securing the country's energy supplies required not only the use of domestic resources to the greatest possible extent, but also diversification of imports in terms of source and variety. Plans were already at an advanced stage to make nuclear power a major component of the country's supply mix in the medium to long term. Nuclear power was also expected to enhance Turkey's strategies for reducing environmental emissions from the power sector. A long-term nuclear power programme had been developed to put in place a legal, institutional, industrial and manpower infrastructure, to foster research and development and to encourage private sector participation in the development of nuclear power projects. Those measures were in line with Turkey's efforts to liberalize the electricity market. Recognizing the Agency's pivotal role in facilitating the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, ensuring compliance with peaceful use undertakings, assisting States to maintain high levels of safety and security, and informing the public about the merits of nuclear energy, Turkey would continue to cooperate fully with the Agency in all those fields.

123. Safety of nuclear and radioactive material remained a priority for the international community and the credibility of nuclear technology very much depended on the strength of safety measures. Turkey therefore encouraged the Secretariat to continue to step up its efforts relating to nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety, with special focus on mandatory activities and technical areas, and on regions where improvement was most needed. It also requested the Agency to continue the current programme of legislative assistance to Member States to help them improve their national infrastructures for nuclear installation, radiation, transport and waste safety.

124. His country welcomed the results of the third review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, including the amendments to the rules and guidelines and the recommendations adopted by the Contracting Parties. The large number of participants and quality of the national reports indicated the interest in and importance attached to achieving and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety worldwide.

125. Nuclear science, technology and applications addressed a wide variety of basic socio-economic human development needs of Member States in such areas as energy, industry, food and agriculture, human health and water resources management. The Agency played an important role in facilitating

the implementation of effective programmes in all those areas. Turkey encouraged the Secretariat to continue its efforts which contributed to a greater understanding and a well-balanced picture of the role of nuclear science and technology in a global, sustainable development perspective.

126. Preserving and enhancing nuclear knowledge and ensuring the availability of qualified personnel were vital for the safe and secure use of all nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes in the future. He welcomed the Agency's efforts to seek creative methods and approaches in education and training in order to ensure that the knowledge, skills and abilities of the current generation of experienced nuclear professionals were effectively transferred to the workforce of the future.

127. His country attached the utmost importance to the Agency's technical cooperation activities which were an important element in the process of sustainable economic development. There was a continuing need to provide adequate financing for the technical cooperation programme and to maintain a balance between the Agency's promotional activities and its other statutory functions. Since technical cooperation should be funded in accordance with the concept of shared responsibility, all Members should strive to make just contributions to financing and enhancing those activities. Though it was voluntary, financial support for technical cooperation activities was a political responsibility of Member States. Turkey was working to increase its 2006 TCF contribution above its assessed share. It welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to strengthen activities and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of programmes by adapting them to meet the requests and needs of Member States. It encouraged the Agency to continue its efforts to strengthen the technical cooperation programme together with all parties, including the competent agencies of the United Nations system, multilateral financial institutions and other relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies.

128. Mr. DAOUAS (Tunisia) said that his country attached high priority to closer collaboration with the Agency with a view to developing the science and technology sector and supporting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology for development. Commending the many achievements of the Agency in recent years, he called on the international community to offer it unstinting support so as to enhance its performance still further. The Agency had funded a number of technical cooperation and training projects in Tunisia under national, regional and international programmes. He trusted that it would also extend full support to his country's cooperation programme for 2007–2008.

129. Tunisia's foreign policy was based on a commitment to dialogue and interaction. It worked hard to strengthen scientific and technological cooperation with other Arab countries bilaterally and within the framework of the Arab Maghreb Union and the League of Arab States. He urged the Agency to build up a strong partnership with the Arab Atomic Energy Agency based in Tunis and to assist it in implementing its programmes.

130. Tunisia was the first country to ratify the AFRA agreement. It hosted AFRA scientific meetings and training courses in cooperation with the Agency and made its expertise available in support of the AFRA programme as a contribution to South-South cooperation. He urged donor Member States of the Agency to support AFRA, whose membership included 30 of the Agency's 34 African Member States. His country had hosted five workshops in 2005 and had participated in the implementation of 18 technical cooperation projects.

131. Tunisia had paid its contribution to the Agency's Regular Budget for the current year and its arrears in respect of the technical cooperation programme. He urged other Member States to pay their contributions so that the Agency could discharge its mandate to the full. His country also requested assistance in honouring its commitments under its additional protocol once it entered into force.

132. All States should accede to and comply with international instruments pertaining to nuclear safety and security and take action against illicit trafficking in nuclear material. Tunisia strongly

supported the Agency's activities in that area. It had also called on many occasions for the establishment of international mechanisms to prevent the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to unlawful uses and had acceded to the Pelindaba Treaty. His country had joined in all international efforts aimed at consolidating the safeguards and non-proliferation regime. Tunisia had ratified the CTBT and signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. It was also involved in international efforts to counter nuclear terrorism.

133. His country was concerned at Israel's continued refusal to accede to the NPT and supported ongoing efforts to have Israeli nuclear installations placed under Agency safeguards as a confidence-building measure and a contribution to the peace process in the Middle East. It also supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

134. The President of Tunisia had decided gradually to increase spending on scientific research, technological development and the development of expertise from 1% of GDP in 2004 to 1.25% in 2009. His country's proposal in 1998 to convene a World Summit on the Information Society, and its decision to host the second phase of that Summit in Tunis in November 2005, reflected its commitment to working for a global community in which everyone had access to knowledge, particularly in the area of science and technology, thereby bridging the divide between the countries of the North and South.

135. The Agency had the potential to play a major role in promoting cooperation and combating extremism and terrorism by spreading knowledge, promoting the transfer of technology and training specialists in developing countries, especially in the areas of food security, water resources management, health care and environmental protection.

136. Mr. DE VISSER (Netherlands) expressed concern about the lack of outcome of the NPT Review Conference. It was also unfortunate that no agreement had been reached at the United Nations World Summit on disarmament or measures to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The NPT remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. An opportunity had been missed to create a more positive climate in which further steps could have been taken on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the CTBT, the additional protocol, safeguards agreements and the multilateral nuclear approach.

137. In the preceding week, his country's delegation to the CTBT Article XIV Conference in New York had reiterated its strong commitment to the early entry into force of that Treaty. The Netherlands was very disappointed that that had not yet materialized. Those States that had ratified or signed the Treaty should do their utmost to keep it alive and allow for completion of the international verification network.

138. The Agency's international safeguards system was an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Netherlands favoured a further strengthening of the system and advocated its universal adoption and implementation. He called on all Member States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which constituted the verification standard. The Netherlands also agreed to the modification of the standardized text of the SQP and called upon all Member States to address that issue at the current session of the General Conference. To guarantee the integrity of the NPT and the Agency's inspection regime, and ensure the credibility of the safeguards system, a strong policy was needed on non-compliance. If necessary, cases of non-compliance should be referred to the United Nations Security Council.

139. His country welcomed the recommendations of the expert group on a multilateral nuclear approach and was ready to begin discussions on them.

140. The Netherlands attached great importance to the Agency's technical cooperation activities. Adequate and predictable resources were a prerequisite for executing those activities efficiently and effectively. He urged all Member States to contribute to the TCF on time in accordance with their target shares. His country was pledging its full target share for 2006 and hoped that other Member States would follow suit.

141. He complimented the Secretariat on the excellent work it had done in revising the technical cooperation programme cycle and expressed the hope that it would soon bear fruit, and that the rate of implementation of the TCF would reach a level considerably higher than in the preceding year.

142. His country continued to question the increasing practice of attaching conditions to voluntary contributions. Unconditionality should remain the rule and under no circumstances should conditions be accepted that impeded the Agency's integrity and impartiality. Activities financed from the TCF should also remain demand-driven. The Netherlands was therefore reluctant to accept a de facto ceiling for financing of activities in the field of nuclear security. That was both detrimental to the principles of technical cooperation and potentially damaging to its functioning.

143. The Nuclear Security Fund was a very useful instrument through which nuclear safety could be improved worldwide. His country was in favour of a financing mechanism via which NSF activities were financed from the Regular Budget. However, it accepted that voluntary extrabudgetary contributions remained necessary for the time being, calling upon all States to contribute to the NSF unconditionally, since practice in the current year had shown that implementation had been hampered by the conditions attached to some contributions. The Netherlands had been willing to donate to the NSF generously and without conditions in the past, and would consider making similar contributions in the future.

144. He looked back with satisfaction at the successful review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in April. Peer review should continue to be the main goal of those meetings. The same applied to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, with respect to which his country looked forward to an equally successful outcome of the second review meeting in May 2006.

145. His Government welcomed the agreement reached at the CPPNM amendment conference to improve the Convention by extending its scope to cover physical protection of nuclear facilities and domestic transport, storage and use of nuclear material. The Netherlands had participated actively in the Conference and was in the process of ratifying and implementing the amendment. All States should take the necessary steps without delay to ensure the early entry into force of the amendment.

146. On 8 July 2003, the Minister for Economic Affairs of the Netherlands had submitted the Energy Report 2005 to parliament. The report focused on two major challenges the Netherlands faced together with many other countries, namely how to guarantee the security of energy supply and how to address global climate change. It suggested a number of measures for dealing with those challenges, such as striving for an energy efficiency rate of 1.5% per year, establishing a share of renewable energy sources of 10% by 2020 and continuing to promote fuel diversification. A greater reliance on nuclear energy could not be ruled out. Investments in new nuclear power stations were unlikely, but the Government would review national laws and regulations to ensure that there was clarity about the conditions under which nuclear power stations could be built in the future. Special consideration would be given to the question of responsibility for and financial consequences of waste, as well as measures needed to prevent terrorist attacks on nuclear installations. In order to maintain and promote further existing nuclear expertise, his country would also continue to support nuclear energy research at EU level.

147. The Netherlands had already decided to postpone the closure of the nuclear power plant in Borssele until the end of 2013. Recently, negotiations had started between the Government and the owner of the Borssele nuclear power plant to look into the possibility of yet another extension of the facility's operating life, in exchange for investments by the owner in the field of renewable energies, energy conservation and clean fossil fuels.

148. The Netherlands attached the utmost importance to the Agency's role in strengthening disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, and advancing nuclear technology for the benefit of all, and it would continue to support the Agency and its Director General.

149. Mr. ELAMIN (Sudan) expressed appreciation for the Agency's contribution to the development of cooperation among African countries through the Model Project on radiation protection and enhancement of capacities through coordination of legislation and human resources development.

150. He urged the States party to the NPT to honour their obligations under that Treaty and to enhance awareness of the relationship between the articles on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His country noted with satisfaction Iran's constructive cooperation with the Agency to reassure the international community regarding the nature of its nuclear programme and strongly supported its right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Both Iran and the EU should demonstrate the sincerity of their intentions by continuing to engage in dialogue so as to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme did not deviate from its peaceful course.

151. Sudan strongly supported the Agency's efforts to promote the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East as a necessary step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the prevention of a dangerous arms race in the region. The fact that Israel, the only State in the region with nuclear weapons, refused to accede to the NPT was a major threat to regional security. Sudan was deeply concerned at the international community's failure to respond to Arab initiatives aimed at creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

152. His country welcomed the Agency's partnerships with international and regional development organizations to promote African development, especially in the areas of agriculture, trade, human resources development, and the fight against malaria, the tsetse fly and AIDS. Fighting malaria was a priority health policy goal in Sudan. Isotope techniques had been used successfully for early detection of disease vectors, reducing the incidence of malaria during the dry season by 63.3% in a village where a study was carried out. African countries needed additional financial assistance and technical expertise to ensure coordinated and effective action against the disease. If the Agency's experiments in the application of the SIT proved successful, the disease could perhaps be eradicated once and for all.

153. Trypanosomosis was a major impediment to economic and social development in Africa. The Agency's scientific and technical assistance to African countries under an action plan aimed at eradicating the tsetse fly was therefore highly appreciated. In particular, he thanked the Agency for its sponsorship of the bilateral agreement on tsetse fly eradication between Sudan and Ethiopia. With the advent of peace and reconciliation in southern Sudan, steps would be taken with the Agency to carry out studies aimed at eradicating the pest in that part of the country.

154. He welcomed the partnership between the Agency, the UNDP and the GEF in support of the countries that shared the strategic Nubian sandstone aquifer, i.e. Sudan, Egypt, Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. He expressed the hope that those joint efforts would result in a rationalization of the use of water resources in the Nubian basin.

155. The AFRA agreement had proved immensely successful in a number of areas, particularly human resource development, food security, health, and nuclear safety and security. Sudan strongly supported AFRA's plan to develop nuclear knowledge management programmes.

156. The Agency had supported the establishment of regional programmes and the collection of data that would have been difficult to access without its assistance. Referring to the Asian Network for Education in Nuclear Technology, he called on the Agency to set up additional education and training networks and to assist countries with nuclear knowledge management. Sudan had set up an Academy of Sciences specializing, inter alia, in nuclear science. Its recently developed curriculum for a master's degree in medical physics would constitute the cornerstone of the country's nuclear medicine and radiotherapy services. There were also courses leading to bachelor's, master's and doctoral degrees in nuclear science. Newly qualified scientists would thus be trained to take the place of those who retired, and to assist in planning for the wider use of nuclear energy in development programmes.

157. Mr. SHANGULA (Namibia) commended the work of the Secretariat in pursuit of the objectives articulated in Security Council Resolution 1540, which would assist Member States still lacking capacity and resources to respond effectively to the proliferation of nuclear material and to prevent such material from falling into the hands of non-State actors.

158. The Namibian Government was committed to the socio-economic well-being of its citizens and that commitment was reflected in the Namibia Vision 2030, the Second National Development Plan and the country's CPF. Using those instruments, Namibia hoped to achieve the targets of the Millennium Development Goals, to reduce poverty, to provide quality health care and to empower the Namibian people economically, inter alia. The Agency had been and remained a reliable partner in those endeavours through technology transfer relating to the application of nuclear techniques. In particular, it supported national projects on human resources development and nuclear technology support which strengthened capacity and had a positive impact on ongoing and future technical cooperation projects.

159. Livestock farmers in northern Namibia did not have access to international meat export markets owing to periodic occurrences of animal diseases in the region. The Government had instituted measures that would eventually open up international meat markets to those farmers. The Agency's support for the expansion of diagnostic services for control of animal diseases at the Central Veterinary Laboratory was welcome and appreciated.

160. Food self-sufficiency was critical for any country to achieve meaningful socio-economic development. The soil in northern communal areas was of low quality and the Agency's project on increasing crop productivity aimed to improve soil nutrients and water management in that millet/sorghum-based farming system.

161. The Agency was collaborating with the Ministry of Health and Social Services to expand nuclear medicine capability through the establishment of a nuclear medicine facility at Oshakati State Hospital, and to upgrade the nuclear medicine capacity at Windhoek Central Hospital. A highly sophisticated tele-linked system was planned to connect those two hospitals in order to improve the quality of services and convenience for patients.

162. Namibia was the driest country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus it was logical that it should explore other ways of supplementing water resources, as water was indispensable for socio-economic development. The Agency had provided technology to facilitate a better understanding of underground water quality and the recharge and flow mechanisms of Namibia's aquifers. Such a comprehensive understanding would enhance the Government's capacity to manage underground water resources and to provide clean and safe water for human consumption. He took note with satisfaction of the Agency's work on seawater desalination, which would increase understanding of the technical and

economic potential of using nuclear technology to produce potable water from seawater. Namibia would study the viability of that technology further.

163. His country was following developments in the possible use of the SIT to control the vectors responsible for malaria and trypanosomosis, and it was eager to see nuclear techniques applied in the early identification of drug-resistant malaria.

164. Regional and interregional projects, such as those under AFRA, made an immense contribution and Namibia continued to benefit from them. The success of technical cooperation depended on the availability of sufficient human and financial resources. That called for an increase in funding for the technical cooperation budget. The TCF made an important contribution to sustainable development in developing countries and he urged the donor community to support and increase contributions to the Fund. Namibia would continue to honour its financial obligations to the Agency and pledged its full share of the TCF for 2006.

165. When implementing technical cooperation projects employing nuclear energy, attention had to be paid to the importance of nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management, and to guarding against any detrimental effects on humans and the environment. His country welcomed the Director General's reports in that regard and supported measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management. In that connection, he also welcomed the projects aimed at upgrading radiation protection infrastructure in Member States. Those projects offered an effective mechanism to address Member States' common needs with regard to meeting the principal requirements of the Basic Safety Standards.

166. In addition, attention should also be paid to the security of nuclear and radioactive material, which was a matter of global concern. Namibia had put in place stringent measures to control the movement of radioactive sources and nuclear material, which had been strengthened by the Atomic Energy and Radiation Protection Act 2005.

167. His country had committed itself to honouring its obligations under its safeguards agreement and additional protocol. The additional protocol would be ratified when the statutory requirements were in place. A national system for nuclear material accounting and control was being set up.

168. Finally, the possession of nuclear weapons did not contribute to world peace and security and nuclear energy should only be used for peaceful purposes. Those States that possessed nuclear weapons should submit to a rigorous verification process, in accordance with the NPT.

169. Mr. KERIMOV (Azerbaijan) said that the events that had taken place over the preceding year demonstrated fully the complexities of the process of ensuring nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism around the world. They had reconfirmed the need to create a legal, political and technological basis that would help achieve nuclear non-proliferation goals. Although the NPT was an essential instrument, its effectiveness depended on the willingness of all States without exception to cooperate constructively with the Agency and the international community in strengthening the nuclear security regime.

170. Azerbaijan was taking all necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in order to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. It had had some success in developing and strengthening its physical protection system, introducing guidelines for the handling of radioactive material and organizing measures for the detection, accounting and storage of radiation sources and prevention of illicit trafficking.

171. His country was concerned that Armenia occupied 20% of its territory. Azerbaijan had repeatedly called the attention of the international community to the problem of uncontrolled territories. As a result of aggression and the illegal occupation of Azerbaijan's territory, a significant

section of the State's borders with Iran and Armenia were not under governmental or international control, which posed a serious global security threat. Azerbaijan hoped that the Agency would take a more active position on the strengthening of measures to prevent the spread of nuclear material and technologies.

172. Azerbaijan participated actively in the Agency's technical cooperation programme and valued the results achieved in recent years. It was interested in increasing further the effectiveness and level of cooperation.

173. Technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Agency was linked in many ways to the creation of an effective and reliable radiation safety system. Ongoing work in that direction helped strengthen the national infrastructure for control, accounting and storage of radioactive material. Azerbaijan was interested in developing the technical cooperation mechanism further in the field of protection and safe management of radioactive waste. However that could only be achieved if all countries adhered to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Agency was also providing valuable assistance under regional projects related to orphan sources and the creation of a radiation risk early warning system.

174. Another regional project his country valued was the one on sustainable energy options and energy supply security. Azerbaijan was entirely dependent on natural oil and gas reserves and an analysis of the long-term prospects was highly important.

175. Preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material was one of the main areas of technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Agency. The country welcomed the Agency's efforts to provide border and customs control points with up-to-date monitoring equipment and to train the staff working there.

176. He noted with appreciation the role of the Agency and the staff of the Department of Technical Cooperation in modernizing the National Oncology Centre and providing essential therapeutic equipment.

177. Clearly, one major factor in ensuring nuclear safety was the Agency's work on the preservation and enhancement of nuclear knowledge, which was crucial to the development of safe nuclear technology and the further development of nuclear power. His country appreciated the Agency's projects aimed at preserving and enhancing intellectual potential and improving nuclear education in its Member States. It was interested in participating in such projects, as shown by its successful work with INIS.

178. The effectiveness of regulatory bodies for the safe management of nuclear and radioactive material was dependent on the training and constant retraining of appropriate specialists. In that connection, Azerbaijan supported the Agency's efforts to develop a strategic approach to education and training in radiation and waste safety. However the education and training courses organized by the Agency needed to be more practical in emphasis.

179. Azerbaijan attached particular importance to the Agency's initiatives aimed at strengthening technical cooperation within the framework of national and regional projects. Since joining the Agency, it had fulfilled all its commitments, including the financial commitments upon which implementation of the technical cooperation programme depended. It was committed to paying its TCF contributions in the future and called on all Member States to provide the necessary financial resources for the Fund.

180. Mr. BRAUN (Luxembourg) said that the role given to the Agency by the NPT, which rested on the three pillars of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, was of major importance and should be further developed. It was in that spirit that, at

the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the EU, under the presidency of Luxembourg, had suggested that the Preparatory Committee meeting in 2007 could be held in Vienna.

181. On 25 April 2005, the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs had adopted a common position on balanced and concrete proposals to strengthen implementation of the NPT at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Regrettably, the Conference had not been successful, despite the efforts made by a large number of State Parties to reach a consensus on fundamental matters of substance.

182. An efficient safeguards system had existed since 1997 combining comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In the past, some non-nuclear-weapon States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency had managed to develop clandestine weapons programmes that had not been detectable by inspections under comprehensive safeguards agreements alone. Only with the implementation of the additional protocol could the Agency provide credible assurances that no undeclared nuclear activities were being carried out.

183. Eight years after the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol, despite the agreement reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and appeals made at Agency General Conferences, 123 State Parties had still not implemented the additional protocol.

184. The universal implementation of additional protocols would strengthen the international non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime and would contribute to the security of all States. A credible safeguards regime would promote the mutual trust crucial to international cooperation in the field of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Luxembourg supported the relevant recommendations made in the report of the United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The Board should recognize comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols as the current Agency safeguards standard. Luxembourg hoped that the General Conference would accept a recommendation and adopt a draft resolution on that issue. In that connection, the Government of Luxembourg was pleased that the EU had decided to take concerted action to promote the universal implementation of additional protocols.

185. He drew attention to the fact that 37 States Party to the NPT still had no comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. The Agency could not provide assurances for such States. He called on those States to act promptly to remedy that situation.

186. Finally, Luxembourg, along with other members of the EU, fully supported the cooperation between the Agency and the European Commission to ensure that safeguards inspections in the 25 countries of the EU continued to be of exemplary efficiency and credibility.

**The meeting rose at 7.05 p.m.**