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## Forty-Ninth (2005) Regular Session

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# Plenary

## Record of the Fifth Meeting

*Held at the Austria Center Vienna on Wednesday, 28 September 2005, at 10 a.m.*

**President:** Mr. BAZOBERRY (Bolivia)

**Later:** Mr. WU Hailong (China)

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**Abbreviations used in this record:**

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
CHASNUPP	Chashma nuclear power plant
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
CTBTO PrepCom	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
ERNET	Emergency Response Network
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FBR	fast breeder reactor
HEU	high-enriched uranium
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
KANUPP	Karachi nuclear power plant
LEU	low-enriched uranium
LWR	light-water reactor
NPCs	national participation costs
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**Abbreviations used in this record (continued):**

NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
Nuclear Safety Convention	Convention on Nuclear Safety
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (earlier CSCE)
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PHWR	pressurized heavy water reactor
Quadripartite Agreement	Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
RaSSIA	Radiation Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Infrastructure Appraisal
SAGTAC	Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation
SIT	sterile insect technique
SQP	small quantities protocol
TCDC	technical cooperation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
VIC	Vienna International Centre
WWER	water cooled water moderated reactor (former USSR)

\* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

## **8. General debate and Annual Report for 2004 (continued)** (GC(49)/5)

1. Mr. STRITAR (Slovenia) said that the existence of weapons of mass destruction represented one of the greatest threats to international peace and security, and all States should play an active role against their further spread. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament could not be considered separately and all efforts should be put into pursuing the primary goal, which was to reduce the nuclear threat.

2. Despite high expectations, the 2005 NPT Review Conference had been unable to produce a consensus document. He shared the view that the next session of the Preparatory Committee to be held in May 2007 should take place in Vienna. That would coincide with the Agency's fiftieth anniversary celebrations and would strengthen the Agency's role in universal non-proliferation efforts embodied in the NPT.

3. Comprehensive safeguards agreements should not be the only means of nuclear material control. A thorough analysis should be undertaken to ascertain whether the safeguards system met current needs, and, in particular, how it could be improved. With more countries demanding to have access to the complete fuel cycle, including enrichment, the task of safeguarding nuclear material was becoming increasingly complex. The additional protocol was a crucial instrument for strengthening non-proliferation, and should become the universal verification standard for all countries wishing to demonstrate their adherence to the NPT and the transparency of their nuclear programmes, and to assure the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

4. Recent events had illustrated that nuclear terrorism should be considered as a global threat. Slovenia had already signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and called on all other States to do likewise. The Agency's Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009, which Slovenia supported, had an important role to play in reducing the risk of a successful act of nuclear terrorism. Although it deserved the highest priority, its implementation was dependent on voluntary contributions. Slovenia encouraged all Member States to consider contributing to the Nuclear Security Fund.

5. In the field of non-proliferation, there were regional organizations whose role was complementary to that of the Agency. In that regard, he drew attention to the OSCE, which was currently under Slovenia's chairmanship and was promoting among its members the Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

6. Slovenia had supported the call for a diplomatic conference to consider proposed amendments to the CPPNM, and had actively participated at an expert level in the preparatory work. Internal legal procedures to ratify the amendments to the CPPNM had already been initiated.

7. Slovenia remained interested in the technical cooperation programme, and five of its institutions had expressed their intention to participate in the forthcoming cycle. The CPF had recently been updated to provide guidelines that would serve as a tool for identifying suitable technical cooperation projects. It had provided a fresh and new perspective on Slovenia's participation in the programme, and all potential participants were aware of the shift from a technology-driven to a demand-driven programme.

8. The TCF should be sufficient and predictable to ensure the effective implementation of the technical cooperation programme. Slovenia, for its part, had pledged its full share to the TCF for 2006, and was concerned about those Member States that had not paid their shares in full or at all. All Member States should be aware of their responsibility for financing and strengthening the Agency's technical cooperation activities. The NPCs introduced in 2005, and their advance payment, could be understood as recipient country commitment and shared responsibility, but should not be an instrument for ensuring the financial stability of the TCF.

9. The 4% decrease in the implementation rate from 2003 to 2004 was a concern; that trend should be reversed as soon as possible, as it could jeopardize the technical cooperation programme as a whole.

10. Slovenia attached great importance to international nuclear and radiation emergency preparedness, and welcomed the Agency's new programme on incident and emergency preparedness and response, which was expected to contribute substantially to the unified response system for incidents and emergencies involving nuclear facilities or nuclear and radioactive material.

11. Slovenia had been active through its experts in conceiving the International Action Plan for Strengthening the International Preparedness and Response System for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies, and had acted as a coordinating body between the two meetings of national competent authorities for the Early Notification Convention and Assistance Convention. It was important that Member States decide to join the Agency's emergency response network ERNET, and that the current mechanisms for reporting and sharing information about incidents and emergencies were thoroughly investigated and optimized.

12. Slovenia was expecting to host a follow-up OSART mission in November 2005. The three OSART missions that had taken place in Slovenia in the twenty-year period since the start-up of the Krško nuclear power plant had not only provided an insight into the evolution of working practices and equipment status at that plant, but had also shown the evolution of the OSART process. Slovenia sincerely hoped that all three OSART reports, which had been made public, had also been of benefit to those in the nuclear industry who were willing to learn from the experiences of others.

13. The Third Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety had been extremely positive for Slovenia; the review process had matured and the reporting procedures for the national report and for the rapporteurs had been established in advance of the meeting. Increased transparency for the next review meeting would be achieved if the open-ended working group were to reach a consensus to relax access to country group sessions and to have working documents more widely available to Contracting Parties during the review meeting. There was a danger that the review process for the Nuclear Safety Convention might cover issues already discussed, and it should therefore remain open to new ideas and topics in order to maintain momentum. Observations of particular interest were continuing economic deregulation of energy markets, which brought significant changes in ownership and operating arrangements; and challenges to be faced because of the retirement of experienced staff and the ageing of equipment. Knowledge preservation was a key factor for the safe and reliable future operation of nuclear installations, particularly as almost 65% of the world's operating nuclear power plants were over twenty years old.

14. Slovenia had prepared its second national report under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Slovenian initiative on a regional repository for high-level radioactive waste, which had been presented and discussed during the first review meeting, was still on the table as the most economically viable option for countries with small nuclear programmes. The regional repository was a technically demanding project which required widespread public and political acceptance, and also raised questions with

regard to physical protection, nuclear security and non-proliferation of nuclear materials. Slovenia hoped that interested parties would keep the initiative alive and proceed with an action plan that would address all the advantages and disadvantages of the project in order to produce a feasibility study.

15. With regard to the selection of a site in Slovenia for the disposal of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, he said that following the adoption of the detailed plan of national importance for the repository preparation in November 2004, the Agency for Radioactive Waste Management had invited local communities to offer their territory, at first for terrain exploration and later for a repository. Offers from interested communities had been received and were being evaluated. The adoption of the decree concerning measures for determining the amount of indemnities for limited land use because of a nuclear facility was of the utmost importance.

16. In conclusion, the resolution on the national energy programme, which set out the policy for the long-term production of electric energy in the Krško nuclear power plant, considered nuclear energy a viable option in the context of environmental impact, diversification of energy resources, reliability of supply and economical use of energy. It also supported the continuous implementation of measures for assuring nuclear safety, independent surveillance of operations and the provision of adequate public information.

17. Mr. VEJONIS (Latvia) said that two most important developments that had occurred the previous year in the field of security were the adoption of the amendments to the CPPNM and the adoption by the General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Latvia, as a party to the CPPNM, had participated in the Conference to Consider and Adopt Proposed Amendments to the CPPNM, and had already signed the new Convention on Nuclear Terrorism.

18. There had been a large-scale discussion over the preceding months of possibilities for international organizations to adapt to the new situation in international affairs and to meet new security challenges. The topic had been addressed during the 60th session of the United Nations General Assembly. As the Latvian President had pointed out in her speech, rapid progress needed to be achieved on concluding a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. It was very important that all members of the General Assembly were aware of the necessity of reforms in order to increase the capacity of the United Nations to meet new security challenges. Unfortunately, the final resolution had not included all the recommendations initially drafted. However, the willingness to improve performance was a signal for future reforms. The Agency, by improving its capabilities to meet new challenges, was well in pace within the reform process in the United Nations system.

19. It was also important that the Agency continued to preserve its credibility and remained neutral on politically sensitive issues. In that context, he commended the Director General on his efforts to respond in a balanced and measured way to the demands placed upon him.

20. He welcomed the successful implementation of the technical cooperation programme the previous year. The growing number of projects and the increase in the TCF proved that the Agency was on the right track with a view to ensuring the availability of human and financial resources to help countries benefit from nuclear energy. He was proud that Latvia was moving towards increasing its extrabudgetary contributions and away from being purely a recipient country. As he had previously predicted, its contributions could gradually exceed direct support received from the Agency. Latvia noted with satisfaction that countries' arrears had lessened during the past year, and urged all countries to pay their contributions in full and on time for the successful implementation of the technical cooperation programme. Latvia had already used the new simplified procedure for technical cooperation projects when submitting new national projects and had found it to be a rational and comprehensive approach.

21. Knowledge management was an important issue, and his Government had planned to implement several activities to ensure the international transfer of knowledge between generations.

22. The biggest national cooperation project for Latvia was closely related to human health care and applications of nuclear techniques for diagnostics and treatment. The multi-purpose cyclotron centre would serve for medical purposes and open possibilities for participation in scientific research projects, ensuring new challenges and opportunities for scientists to be involved in international activities. Implementation, which was already underway, was a challenging task for Latvia due to the scale of the project. The establishment of a national cyclotron facility demanded considerable human and financial resources, and his Government had therefore included the project in the priority list of activities to be implemented. Without the Agency's expertise and shared experience, which his country appreciated, Latvia would be unlikely to reach the goal it had set.

23. Latvia regarded a universal non-proliferation regime, supported by a strong system of safeguards, as essential for collective security. The importance of the NPT lay in three pillars: nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was therefore regrettable that several States party to the NPT still had to fulfil their basic obligation of ratifying a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. Latvia urged all States to fulfil their obligations under the NPT and to sign and ratify an additional protocol, as those two instruments constituted the modern verification standard.

24. The situation with respect to other international instruments aimed at preventing the proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction needed to be improved. Only a few dozen countries participated in regimes for the import, export and transit control of dual-use nuclear items.

25. Latvia was implementing the decision made several years previously on decommissioning its only research reactor at Salaspils. He welcomed the assistance of the Agency and of all parties involved in the removal of fresh fuel from the reactor premises and its transport to the country of origin, which had occurred in May. His country looked forward to the return of spent fuel.

26. Latvia was facing the difficult task of extending the radioactive waste disposal site at Baldone. It had received a positive conclusion from environmental impact analysts, yet was facing resistance from the municipality and local community. Cooperation and dialogue between the central government and municipalities was essential to reach mutual understanding. His Government considered radioactive waste management to be highly important and would make every effort to bring the issue to a close.

27. Mr. PRAH (Croatia) said that his country attached the utmost importance to the security of nuclear and radioactive sources and non-proliferation efforts, and had recently signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. It had been extremely pleased with the acceptance of amendments to the CPPNM, which all countries should ratify, accept or approve. Croatia, however, regretted that the 2005 NPT Review Conference had not been successful in reaching common conclusions enabling a consensus document to be adopted.

28. It was the obligation of all countries to give the necessary support to the Agency in implementing the safeguards system, comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Croatia had been one of the first countries where an additional protocol had entered into force and been implemented, and called upon those Member States that had not yet concluded or ratified safeguards agreements and additional protocols to do so. Accepting the view of the Director General that SQPs, as they stood, represented a weakness in the safeguards system, Croatia welcomed the Board's decision for changes in the Protocol, while keeping it as a part of the system.

29. Croatia had already completed the internal legal procedure for acceptance of the amendment of Article VI of the Agency's Statute, and invited Member States that had not yet done so to accelerate their internal procedures in order to enable its early entry into force. His country had also established its own independent regulatory body for nuclear safety, and had recently become a member of the NSG.

30. Croatia attached equal importance to all other non-safeguards activities of the Agency. Its close and successful cooperation with the Agency was reflected in particular within the framework of the technical cooperation programme, which played an extremely important role in facilitating the transfer and implementation of nuclear knowledge and practice. Five project proposals for the 2007–2008 project cycle had been prepared on the basis of priorities set out in the CPF. Croatia gave its full support to the Agency's activities for the enhancement of regional cooperation and exchange of knowledge through regional projects. It welcomed the large and growing number of foreign experts under Agency fellowships in Croatian research institutions, and invited the Agency to use Croatian capacities to a larger extent.

31. Although it was a net recipient country, Croatia was continuously fulfilling its financial obligations, having paid its full share of the TCF and fulfilled its NPC obligations in advance. It would continue to provide cost-sharing in order to confirm its full commitment to ongoing cooperation and to facilitate implementation of the approved technical cooperation projects.

32. Mr. KAKODKAR (India) said that nuclear energy was an important and inevitable option for his country, which was pursuing a self-reliant indigenous programme using its own vast thorium resources. While the energy potential available from those resources was immense, India remained committed to the three-stage programme consisting of PHWRs in the first stage, FBRs in the second, and thorium reactors in the third. Nuclear energy had to play an increasing role in India's electricity generation plans, and there was an urgent need for India to enhance its nuclear power production rapidly. Its desire was to attain energy security to enable it to leapfrog stages of economic development at the least possible cost. For that purpose, it would be very useful if India could gain access to nuclear fuel as well as nuclear reactors from the international market, but at present that was not possible because of the nuclear technology restrictive regimes in operation.

33. India's Prime Minister had stated in October 2004 that India was a responsible nuclear power, determined to utilize its indigenous resources and capabilities to fulfil its national interests in a manner that was not contrary to the larger goals of nuclear non-proliferation. He had said that India would not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies and would ensure that those it already possessed were safeguarded. It would continue to remain faithful to that approach in spite of the well-known glaring examples of proliferation that had directly affected India's security interests. The limitations of the present non-proliferation regime should not be further accentuated by artificial restrictions on genuine peaceful nuclear applications. The denial of technology and the closure of avenues for international cooperation in such an important field were tantamount to the denial of developmental benefits to millions of people whose lives could be transformed by the utilization of nuclear energy and relevant technologies.

34. The Prime Minister had called upon other advanced nuclear powers, and all who had a stake in the future of nuclear energy, to engage in a constructive dialogue to develop more effective measures that would stem the tide of proliferation without unduly constraining the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He had said that constraining those who were responsible amounted in effect to rewarding those who were irresponsible, and the international community must face up to the implications of that choice. India was willing to shoulder its share of international obligations provided that its legitimate interests were met. It had actively embraced globalization, and there was no reason why nuclear energy production should be an exception.

35. Noting the statements made by the representatives of the United States of America and France, and the positive and cooperative approach of a number of key countries, he said that India was now feeling the winds of change, and hoped that all the restrictions it faced would soon be lifted. Predicated on its obtaining the same benefits and advantages as other nuclear Powers, India would be prepared to take reciprocal steps with the objective of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with international partners, including safeguards on facilities of a civilian nature, selected by India on a voluntary basis, with the involvement of the Agency.

36. India wanted to see a rapid increase in its nuclear power generating capacity well beyond the planned 20 000 MW(e) by 2020. That capacity could consist of imported LWRs running on imported fuel, domestic PHWRs running on domestic fuel and FBRs. Progressively, reactors running on thorium would be added to the list.

37. India had embarked on the development of the FBR-based second stage of its programme with the start of construction in October 2004 of the 500 MW(e) prototype FBR. The first 540 MW(e) PHWR unit at Tarapur had begun commercial operations some seven months ahead of schedule and the first unit of the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station had been operating continuously for more than a year. One of the most important achievements during 2005 had been the closing of the fuel cycle of the fast breeder test reactor, and the successful reprocessing of its plutonium-rich carbide fuel. The construction of five PHWRs was on schedule, along with two 1000 MW(e) WWERs that were under construction at Kudankulam in collaboration with the Russian Federation. Sites for new nuclear power units were being developed, and work had begun to identify additional sites.

38. The challenge before the international community, and the Agency in particular, was to channel the enormous potential of nuclear energy for world peace and prosperity while preventing its destructive use by irresponsible State and non-State actors. Addressing that challenge successfully would change that perception of the Agency from just a “nuclear watchdog” to a “nuclear kamadhenu”, the Indian mythological cow symbolizing an inexhaustible provider of sustenance for the welfare of humanity.

39. Mr. RAMZY (Egypt) expressed the hope that the General Conference would enhance support for the non-proliferation regime, which had suffered setbacks at the NPT Review Conference, the Millennium Review Summit, the recent meeting of the Board of Governors at which the consensus approach had been undermined by selectivity and double standards, and the failure of the nuclear States to honour the commitments they had entered into at the previous Review Conference. Responsibility for strengthening the non-proliferation regime should not be laid at the door of a single group of countries. The extent of a country’s responsibility depended, in particular, on its technical, scientific and financial resources. The developed countries, especially the nuclear States, therefore had a greater burden of responsibility to bear. Moreover, the Agency had a responsibility to provide Member States with technical and financial support for the strengthening of nuclear safety and the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, so that it could reassure the international community that nuclear activities were not being diverted to military programmes. The developing countries had a responsibility to comply with their obligations under the safeguards regime and to state their needs in that regard.

40. Egypt approved the Agency’s strategy of focusing on projects under the technical cooperation programme that yielded tangible economic benefits and of consulting Member States at an early stage on the details of proposed projects. His country greatly appreciated the Agency’s support for plans to use its second nuclear research reactor for the production of radioisotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes; for operation of the cyclotron, which would be used, inter alia, in the area of nuclear medicine; for pest control, yield enhancement, arid zone, groundwater and seawater desalination projects; and for the training of human resources. Egypt would appreciate additional

cooperation in using nuclear technology for the detection of landmines dating from the Second World War, which impeded economic development in large areas of the country, and for the disposal of radioactive waste.

41. Egypt had engaged in constructive cooperation the previous year with Agency experts and inspectors under its safeguards agreement. It had also benefited greatly from the symposium organized by the Agency in Cairo to raise awareness of international agreements and obligations in that regard. Such cooperation enhanced the Agency's credibility and its ability to offer reassurances to the international community regarding Member States' nuclear programmes.

42. A sound approach to safeguards required, on the one hand, an initial assessment of a country's technical and regulatory capacity with a view to its gradual enhancement, and, on the other, avoidance of political signals that denoted the application of double standards, which adversely affected cooperation and undermined credibility. To ensure that such standards were not applied in the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification established by the Board of Governors, its mandate should be carefully balanced in keeping with the Agency's Statute and the resolutions of the Board and the General Conference. Double standards were also discernible in the decision to amend SQPs and in attempts to universalize additional protocols. Account should be taken of a country's ability to implement certain measures before requiring it to assume increasingly complex obligations under the safeguards regime.

43. In the Middle East it was unreasonable to require all States not only to join the NPT and implement safeguards agreements but also to assume additional and ever-increasing voluntary commitments, while Israel remained outside the non-proliferation, safeguards and disarmament regime and indulged in sterile arguments regarding the need for confidence-building measures and a different attitude on the part of the peoples of the region as a precondition for the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

44. With regard to the application of safeguards in the Middle East, Egypt was eager to assist the Director General in fulfilling the mandate assigned to him in successive General Conference resolutions, also with regard to the convening of an international forum to draw on the expertise of other regions in creating an NWFZ in the Middle East, provided that the forum focused on practical means of establishing such a zone and was not a mere theoretical exercise dealing solely with the advantages of and justifications for such a project. He urged the Director General to pursue his efforts to persuade the party that was preventing the establishment of an NWFZ to demonstrate its goodwill by complying with international resolutions that concurred in the view that such a zone would consolidate world peace and the non-proliferation regime. Egypt would continue to submit a resolution to the General Conference in that regard and hoped that the consensus regarding its content would be translated into practical action. The first step towards confidence-building and the achievement of a comprehensive peace consisted in renouncing nuclear weapons, ridding the region of all weapons of mass destruction and placing nuclear activities in all countries of the region under Agency safeguards, especially since the lack of international verification of the safety of many such activities and of the safe disposal of nuclear waste could result in an environmental disaster.

45. In that connection, he called on States with nuclear activities to abide by the principle that radioactive waste should be managed in such a way as to ensure that possible effects on human health and the environment beyond national borders were taken into account, and by all other Agency principles of radioactive waste management set forth in the Safety Requirements publication on the geological disposal of radioactive waste.

46. Egypt had just signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and would immediately initiate procedures leading to its ratification.

47. His country undertook to pay all its financial contributions to the Agency and would also endeavour to make available its expertise in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to African and Arab countries either under the AFRA programme or through the Arab Atomic Energy Agency.

48. Mr. BUTT (Pakistan) said that in the fifty years since it had realized the enormous potential of nuclear energy for sustainable socio-economic development, Pakistan had developed numerous facilities for nuclear applications in a wide variety of fields, including power generation, health and agriculture. It had benefited a great deal from Agency activities, and looked forward to continued cooperation.

49. The overall implementation rate for technical cooperation activities in Pakistan had reached a record high of 75.8% in 2004, and his country was one of the top beneficiaries of Agency assistance. Pakistan, for its part, had made a modest contribution by providing experts, lecturers and training. It was prepared to offer its experience and expertise to other developing Member States under the Agency's TCDC programme, and welcomed the advisory role of SAGTAC in strengthening the technical cooperation programme. Voluntary contributions to the TCF were vital, and he expressed his country's appreciation to those countries that honoured their commitments to support technical cooperation activities. Having urged all countries to pay their contributions in full and on time, he pledged Pakistan's full share of the target for 2006.

50. The Agency's promotional activities were just as important as its safeguards and non-proliferation activities, and the Agency had to be careful in maintaining a balance between those areas of its work. The public perception of the Agency simply as a 'nuclear watchdog' needed to be corrected, and its increasing role in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology re-emphasized.

51. Nuclear power was a promising option to help prevent the escalating generation of CO<sub>2</sub> and resulting global warming. He hoped that the supplier countries would have the vision not to confine the flow of nuclear power technology to selected countries only, since CO<sub>2</sub> avoided anywhere was CO<sub>2</sub> avoided everywhere.

52. Pakistan was in the process of carrying out modifications and replacements to the KANUPP plant under an Agency-assisted re-lifing programme. Unit 1 of the CHASNUPP plant was operating very well, and in the one and a half years since its previous refuelling outage, it had achieved an availability factor of 96.3% and a capacity factor of 93.3%. Good progress was being made in the construction of CHASNUPP Unit 2, and Pakistan was grateful to the Chinese Government for having supplied the power plants as a demonstration of South-South cooperation.

53. Pakistan's economy was showing a remarkable growth rate, reaching 8.4% the previous year. In order to meet the ever-increasing demand for electricity, his Government had launched an energy security plan envisaging an increase in nuclear electricity generation from 425 MW(e) to 8800 MW(e) by 2030. In order to meet that target, Pakistan needed to import nuclear power plants, and hoped that it would benefit from the recent liberal trend of export and exchange of nuclear technology. In order to address proliferation concerns, Pakistan had been proposing the establishment of nuclear power parks whereby nuclear power plants would be constructed in specified areas, and Agency safeguards and other security controls made applicable. Pakistan welcomed the Agency's efforts to promote proliferation-resistant nuclear power plants and was participating in INPRO activities.

54. A much expanded role for nuclear energy was foreseen in Pakistan. The Agency-assisted programme to set up a nuclear desalination plant at the KANUPP plant was progressing well; it was expected to be operational by 2007.

55. Pakistan attached great importance to achieving and maintaining a high level of safety and security of radioactive sources, and had established mechanisms for effective and continuous regulatory control. It had been among the first to ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and had been subject to peer review. Pakistan's independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority was now well established and had developed an aggressive plan to address the recommendations of the Agency's IRRT and RaSSIA missions. The Regulatory Authority, together with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, was endeavouring to apply Agency safety standards in the licensing of CHASNUPP Unit 2. He hoped that the supply of safety equipment would not be restricted.

56. Pakistan's four nuclear agriculture centres were helping farmers to grow and harvest more and better crops. The country's first commercial food irradiation plant was under construction and was due to be operational by the end of the following year. The 13 nuclear medicine and oncology centres operated by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission continued to provide facilities for more than a third of a million patients a year. Work on as many as five more nuclear medicine centres was in progress. The Government had already approved a plan to set up Pakistan's first positron emission tomography facility, and Pakistan welcomed the assistance it had received from the Agency in those areas.

57. Reaching agreement on amendment of Article VI of the Statute had been a landmark achievement. However, the mechanism formulated to expand the representation on the Board of Governors had not yet been implemented due to the lack of the required number of ratifications. Pakistan hoped that the situation would be rectified, with a view to enhancing the efficiency and representative character of the Board, and looked forward to its next term on the Board of Governors.

**Mr. WU Hailong (China), Vice-President, took the Chair.**

58. Ms. KELLY (Argentina) said that States should have the right to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear technology with respect to all stages of the fuel cycle, in compliance with related international obligations. Any attempt to alter the delicate balance of the obligations set forth in the NPT, calling into question the right of States to develop technologies for exclusively peaceful purposes, could undermine the widely-accepted NPT regime. Any proposal for modification that was not seen to be fair and was aimed at establishing universal rights and obligations ran the risk of weakening the international non-proliferation regime that Argentina strongly supported. That would include any initiative that sought to limit State sovereignty and the independent ownership and control of a key technological sector, such as the nuclear fuel cycle, restricting the potential commercial benefits of those activities and technologies to a small number of countries.

59. It was regrettable that the 2005 NPT Review Conference had concluded without a substantive outcome. There were serious risks associated with failure to reach agreement, and specific measures should be taken to rectify the situation.

60. The peaceful development of nuclear technology required a climate of unequivocal mutual trust, which could be built only through complete transparency in all actions. The Agency had an obligation to continue seek solutions to the problems of proliferation and to ensure that all peoples were able to benefit from nuclear power. In that connection, she welcomed the new safeguards agreements and additional protocols that had been signed during the previous year.

61. Nuclear energy had an important role to play in development and, in particular, in electricity generation since it did not produce greenhouse gases. A number of States had taken decisions to extend the operating lifetime of power plants, restart plants that had been out of service, begin the construction of new plants, and make joint international efforts to develop new generation reactors and fuel cycles with greater operational safety that produced much less radioactive waste and ensured that there was no risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Argentina supported and participated in such

international initiatives, and had provided cost-free experts and extrabudgetary contributions for INPRO.

62. Her Government had decided to complete, as soon as possible, the construction of the Atucha-2 nuclear power plant, which had been delayed for a decade for financial reasons. The original contract had been renegotiated, the Arroyito Heavy Water Production Plant had been requested to provide the initial inventory, and a fiduciary fund had been set up to guarantee funding for the project. In addition, it had been decided to extend the life of the Embalse nuclear power plant, and to take steps to strengthen the capacities of power reactor engineers, with a view to their active involvement in the design of new nuclear power plants.

63. In line with the conclusions of the 2004 Global Threat Reduction Initiative International Partners' Conference, Argentina was converting the core of the RA-6 reactor — the only HEU research reactor in operation in Argentina — to LEU, and had negotiated the return to the State of origin of almost all uranium enriched to 90%.

64. In the area of nuclear medicine, a new centre for diagnosis and complex therapy that used the latest equipment, including a positron emission tomograph, had been established. New experimental treatment applications for cancer treatment using boron neutron capture therapy had been developed.

65. Progress had been made in Argentina's six science and technology programmes that made up the national strategic plan and covered projects and developments with respect to power and research reactors, the fuel cycle, spent fuel and radioactive waste management, nuclear energy applications, as well as relevant research and development.

66. Argentina remained open to establishing and strengthening cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, both multilaterally and through active participation in the Agency's technical cooperation programme and ARCAL; it had specific bilateral cooperation agreements with 31 States. The joint efforts of Latin American countries and the Secretariat to optimize the use of existing research reactors were commendable.

67. Argentina placed great importance on efforts by Member States and the Agency to strengthen international cooperation with respect to nuclear and radiation safety, and the safe transport and management of waste. She drew attention to the steps taken to strengthen national regulatory infrastructures concerning the control of radioactive sources, and information and communication networks for nuclear and radiation safety, in particular the activities of the Ibero-American Forum of Nuclear Regulators. The Agency's cooperation activities in the area of physical security helped to promote coordination of relevant national and international efforts. In implementing those activities, however, the Agency should bear in mind the different treatment to be given to nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive material, and the importance of dealing with that issue in a balanced manner so as to avoid any negative impact on peaceful nuclear activity.

68. Argentina welcomed the amendments to the CPPNM, which would strengthen the protection of nuclear material on a global scale. Her country had taken an active part in the amendment process and encouraged all Member States to adhere to the amendments as soon as possible.

69. The Agency's verification system was a mechanism to provide assurances of the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes. Argentina would encourage the Secretariat to strive for greater efficiency in the application of safeguards, and noted that a profound cultural change was required for the adequate design and implementation of integrated safeguards. She reaffirmed the importance of the Argentine-Brazilian Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, noting that cooperation between ABACC and the Agency would continue to be consolidated for the more effective and efficient application of safeguards in connection with the Quadripartite Agreement.

70. Lastly, Argentina welcomed the efforts of the Secretariat and Member States concerning education and training, radiation protection and nuclear safety. Argentina had continued to develop its role as a regional centre in that regard, through the postgraduate course that it had run for over two decades.

71. Mr. SKOKNIC (Chile) said that, as a country that supported global nuclear disarmament, Chile had signed and ratified all the instruments relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It shared the views of other States in the Latin American and Caribbean region regarding the use of nuclear energy and agreed that the NPT, the Tlatelolco Treaty and the CTBT should provide the legal framework for the action of all peacefully-minded States. Countries that had renounced the use of nuclear power for non-peaceful purposes should not be prevented from conducting research and development on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which remained the right of all States, without exception.

72. Chile was also party to a number of international instruments in the areas of nuclear and radiation safety, assistance in the event of an emergency, civil liability for nuclear damage, and the physical protection of nuclear material. It had welcomed the recent Conference to Consider and Adopt Proposed Amendments to the CPPNM. The consensus text adopted sent a clear signal to the international community at a time when setbacks with respect to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation had occurred. He looked forward to the ratification process and noted that steps were already being taken in Chile to modify the law on nuclear security with a view to incorporating the amendments approved at the Conference.

73. In the area of safeguards, it was important to ensure that more countries signed and ratified an additional protocol. Chile would assist those efforts in any way it could in line with the relevant action plan. Since its additional protocol had entered into force in April 2004, Chile had submitted all of the relevant declarations. He was pleased to report that the annual safeguards inspection visit to the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission undertaken in December 2004 in accordance with the protocol had yielded satisfactory results.

74. With regard to the DPRK, Chile welcomed the joint statement issued recently by the participants of the six-party talks. It commended the People's Republic of China for its tireless efforts and thanked the other parties to the talks for the flexibility they had shown.

75. On 24 September, the Board of Governors had adopted a resolution calling on one Member State to return to the negotiating process and to implement transparency measures in its consultations with the Agency. Chile trusted that the desired results could be achieved through cooperation with the international community.

76. Chile agreed that strengthened safeguards should also cover SQPs, which, as they currently stood, were not an effective instrument. The Agency should be given greater authority for its verification activities.

77. No State was immune to the threat of terrorism, and nuclear activities were some of the most vulnerable. In addition to the national steps taken, international agreements were of immense value for promoting international cooperation. Chile, for its part, had recently signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

78. Chile attached high priority to the safe transport of nuclear material and had insisted that the subject remain on the Agency's agenda. Any framework for such transport should include clear legislation covering the protection of the marine environment and setting out clear guidelines to prevent contamination; appropriate information on maritime routes, including the frequency of their use and the amount of cargo. Chile was pleased to note that the Action Plan for the Safety of Transport

of Radioactive Material approved by the Board of Governors in 2004 had addressed some of those areas.

79. The dialogue between representatives of coastal and transporting States that had been taking place within the framework of the Agency was proving very useful, and he trusted that it would continue.

80. Consideration had to be given to the resources to be used to satisfy the demand for electricity generation in Chile, and nuclear power was one of the options being considered. As a first step, a seminar involving international experts was being organized, with the support of the Agency, providing the authorities with the opportunity to consider the advantages and disadvantages of different energy sources.

81. The technical cooperation programme had a strong emphasis on the agricultural sector, including land reclamation and the use and management of pesticides. With regard to the export of agricultural products, he said that the priority was to meet the demands of the exporting market in terms of product quality and safety, in particular with respect to the use of chemicals. Those areas were of increasing importance given the free trade agreements that Chile had signed with a number of countries. Furthermore, new methods were being used to increase the effectiveness of the SIT to keep the country free of the medfly. In the area of health, he drew attention to the project for new cyclotron-produced radiopharmaceuticals that were to be used primarily in the early diagnosis of breast cancer.

82. Turning to regional cooperation, he said that Chile participated actively in ARCAL projects, not only as a country transferring technology through the education and training of fellowship students, but also as a recipient country. Through ARCAL, regional groups of experts in different fields and designated centres had been established. In order to strengthen the relationship between the Agreement and the Agency within the existing legal framework, a strategic alliance with the Agency was being established in order to define, with Agency assistance, the needs and priorities of the members of ARCAL with respect to cooperation.

83. Lastly, with regard to horizontal regional cooperation, he drew attention to the initiative aiming at better use of research reactors in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

84. Ms. KAUPPI (Finland) said that nuclear weapons proliferation, including potential proliferation to non-State actors, was a serious concern: hence the importance of full compliance with all NPT provisions and the relevant safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The international community must take the appropriate measures in cases of non-compliance in order to preserve the integrity and authority of the system.

85. The past year had again shown that the nuclear non-proliferation regime was facing a number of difficult challenges. Finland regretted that the NPT States Parties had been unable to agree on any substantive outcome at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Similarly, the United Nations World Summit had fallen short of addressing issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation: a disappointing result. The NPT remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Finland would continue to promote universalization of the Treaty, strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system, strengthening of export controls, early entry into force of the CTBT, the immediate start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its early conclusion. It welcomed the report of the Agency's expert group on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and looked forward to discussing it.

86. Finland strongly supported the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system. The Agency's capability and legal authority to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities needed to be reinforced. All States that had not yet done so should promptly conclude and bring into

force additional protocols. The comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the additional protocol, was the current verification standard.

87. The implementation of Finland's additional protocol had started in 2004 in cooperation with the Agency and Euratom. The relationship between the Agency and Euratom was of vital importance, since the new safeguards approaches of Euratom had also to meet the Agency's inspection needs. In order to test their practical implementation, Finland had offered to carry out a field trial at a Finnish nuclear facility.

88. The Finnish programme of support to the Agency's safeguards activities contributed to the training of safeguards inspectors and carried out exercises on the implementation of the additional protocol. In addition, the programme was developing new verification tools for the Agency's use.

89. Finland welcomed the considerable progress achieved in the field of nuclear security in 2005. Finland had been among the first States to sign the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and called upon all States to ensure the early ratification of the amendments to the CPPNM. It welcomed measures taken against illicit trafficking, most notably Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

90. Finland welcomed the Nuclear Security Plan that had just been adopted by the Board. Her country had provided in-kind support for the Agency's activities and was pleased to announce another voluntary contribution to the NSF. Like many other States, Finland had written to the Director General expressing full support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

91. A high level of nuclear safety was of paramount importance to her country, which was a party to all international safety conventions and had participated actively in the recent review meetings. Finland called upon all countries to accede to the safety conventions and apply the resulting obligations in full.

92. Finland greatly appreciated the work the Agency had done in setting up modern safety standards. The preparatory process was valuable and beneficial to many other governments as well. When developing standards, it should be borne in mind that safety, security and safeguards formed an increasingly interwoven system, each element of which was essential for the use of nuclear power.

93. Finland attached great importance to the Agency's technical cooperation programme and agreed that the funding of those activities should be the responsibility of all Member States. Finland had always paid its share in full and on time, both to the Regular Budget and to the TCF. Technical cooperation projects should be fully within the Agency's terms of reference and based on national development strategies.

94. Nuclear energy had played a major role in Finnish electricity production since the early 1980s, and 25% of the total electricity consumed was produced with nuclear power. Currently, there were four nuclear power plant units in operation in Finland. The fifth reactor had been approved by Parliament in 2002 after a thorough preparatory process and discussion. Increased nuclear power production promoted long-term energy supply and enhanced Finland's possibilities in meeting the greenhouse gas emissions target of the Kyoto Protocol. The construction licence for the fifth reactor had been granted by the Finnish Government in February 2005, and the construction work was now under way.

95. According to the plans of the national utility company, operation of the 1600 MW unit would begin in 2009. The project was the largest industrial investment of all time in Finland, and the biggest ongoing investment in Europe in that field. So far contracts had been concluded with more than 600 suppliers and subcontractors. The main components were manufactured in several countries. The

Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority was closely supervising the project as an independent regulatory agency. The safety objectives were higher than in the current generation of nuclear power plants and the vendor had developed many novel technical solutions.

96. The use of nuclear power required a robust and reliable solution for the final disposal of highly active and long-lived nuclear waste. In 2001, the Finnish Parliament had ratified the Government's landmark decision on the construction of a final repository site in Finnish bedrock. That meant that all nuclear waste generated in Finland would be handled, stored and permanently disposed of in Finnish territory. The excavation of a deep underground facility had started in 2004. The facility was likely to form part of the final underground repository for spent nuclear fuel. A depth of 520 metres should be reached in 2009 and the repository should be operational in 2020.

97. The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel with the aim of making nuclear materials permanently inaccessible represented a new challenge for the Agency's safeguards, and a completely new type of safeguards approach was needed for geological disposal sites. Finland was fully committed to continuing support to the Agency in order to develop appropriate safeguards measures for the facility under construction. The deep underground facility in Finland was the first of its kind in the world. Similar projects would follow in other countries, and the Agency needed to be involved. Hence the importance of allocating adequate resources from the Agency, both human and financial, to safeguards implementation and to safeguards approach development. Enhanced cooperation between the Agency and national safeguards systems and early implementation of integrated safeguards would lead to greater efficiency and cost effectiveness.

98. Mr. KONATE (Burkina Faso), noting that the world was afflicted by a wide range of threats, particularly the proliferation of various types of weapons, said that his delegation deplored the breakdown in negotiations at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

99. Extensive accession by States to the Agency's strengthened safeguards system would heighten the level of trust between States and the Agency, as well as among States themselves. Such an atmosphere would undoubtedly promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

100. Burkina Faso attached great importance to the three pillars of the Agency's work, and had always supported the Agency's efforts to promote peace and security. It welcomed the adoption of amendments to the CPPNM which gave the Convention a wider scope, including physical protection of nuclear material and installations used in activities domestically. International cooperation under the Convention had likewise been strengthened. His country had begun the process of ratifying the amended Convention and encouraged other countries to ratify or accede to it.

101. Burkina Faso also welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which his country had just signed. The Agency could provide technical support within that framework.

102. On 13 and 14 September 2005, his country had hosted an Agency meeting to promote in Africa the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Although his country had no nuclear power plants, it was making its contribution to the international community's efforts to find an appropriate legal framework, and remained convinced that the meeting's objectives would soon be met.

103. In April 2005, Burkina Faso had adopted legislation on nuclear safety and protection against ionizing radiation. It now looked forward to Agency support with a view to facilitating the functioning of the national regulatory body responsible for radiation protection and nuclear safety. His country welcomed the considerable efforts made by the Agency to help it achieve sustainable development.

Technical cooperation programmes were currently under way in Burkina Faso in areas including agriculture, human and animal health, capacity building, radiation protection and the fight against tsetse fly and malaria.

104. With a population bordering on 12 million, Burkina Faso still lacked facilities for radiotherapy. Cancer treatment was thus one of the main reasons for the transfer of patients to Europe. Despite a lack of reliable national statistics, the Yalgado Ouédraogo University Hospital Centre at Ouagadougou was cataloguing a steady increase in the number of new cases of cancers for which radiotherapy represented the best form of treatment. Despite the steady increase in cancer prevalence, provision of treatment remained weak and inconsistent, for a number of reasons, including insufficient knowledge among general practitioners; lack of multidisciplinary teams capable of providing comprehensive treatment; lack of future vision about a disease for which the risk factors were steadily growing; and lack of national technical structures that were well enough equipped. Burkina Faso therefore supported PACT, which would help to promote public awareness, training and the strengthening of technical capacity, and ultimately result in a favourable framework for radiotherapy.

105. With regard to animal health, his delegation noted the progress that the Agency had made in conformity with resolution GC(48)/RES/13.B concerning support to the African Union's Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign. Heavily hit by trypanosomosis, his country attached great importance to the Agency's actions in the struggle against that scourge and encouraged it to keep up its support. For its part, Burkina Faso had already taken the necessary steps to mobilize resources for carrying out its programme.

106. Efforts remained to be made in terms of strengthening national capacity for energy analysis and planning. His country's poor electricity coverage was due to some extent to the high cost of electricity production at thermal power plants. Burkina Faso therefore hoped that the Agency would incorporate within its technical cooperation activities efforts to support countries in the acquisition of infrastructure for electricity production and supply.

107. Mr. FRANK (Israel) said that the possession of advanced nuclear technology was increasingly recognized as carrying with it an especially heavy burden of accountability to new internationally promulgated norms, which had been motivating the action of all responsible States. For its part, Israel had intensified its efforts in recent years to bring its traditionally stringent nuclear non-proliferation policy, as well as its standards of safety and security, into conformity with the evolving global arrangements, treaties and norms. It had also been striving to meet the growing national and international expectations of it, as of every democratic country, to meet the ever-increasing exacting standards of good practice in the nuclear domain.

108. Israel's efforts had manifested themselves in a number of areas. It had adhered to the norms and policies of the NSG by putting in place new export control legislation and by adopting the NSG control lists. It supported the non-proliferation of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, and in that context welcomed the recommendations of the expert group to explore multilateral approaches in that area. Israel welcomed Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which was aimed at preventing proliferation, especially to terrorists, and it would be submitting a report on the steps it had taken in that area. Israel had also endorsed the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources; the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; the amended CPPNM; and would be making a modest contribution to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund early in 2006. Israel was also launching an effort to upgrade the security of its international border crossings against the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials, and that effort had been greatly facilitated through cooperation with the United States Department of Energy. His country also endorsed the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and had been exploring ways of participating in specific projects under that Initiative, including discussing

the return of spent fuel from the Soreq Research Reactor to the United States of America. Finally, Israel was supporting and actively working within the framework of the CTBTO PrepCom, and called upon other States not to carry out nuclear test explosions, in line with the Treaty's basic obligations, pending its entry into force.

109. Israel had long supported strengthening the Agency to allow it to focus on proliferation challenges, and welcomed the establishment by the Board of Governors of the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification, which could provide a good example of constructive activity. Unfortunately, the same could not be said with regard to the agenda item on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. There had been many alarming proliferation developments in the Middle East in recent years, but none of them had involved Israel, though all of them challenged its security. There was no basis for the agenda item, whose sponsors were motivated by extraneous considerations that were also evident in their efforts to challenge Israel's credentials. Both actions were politically and cynically motivated, and had little to do with the Agency's objectives or mandate. They inevitably cast serious doubt on the sincerity of the sponsors and their willingness to make any real progress towards cooperative security in the Middle East. Israel therefore called upon all Member States to reject such proposals outright. If any action were taken on that item, Israel would not be in a position to support the agenda item on application of safeguards in the Middle East.

110. Israel supported the principle of converting the Middle East into a zone free of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, but had taken issue with the modalities of the preceding year's resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East, as well as with its portrayal as an end in itself rather than as a desirable outcome of a fundamental regional political transformation of relations. However, Israel had been willing to join the consensus on the resolution, while recognizing that there was no substitute for reconciliation, leading to direct negotiations and freely reached agreements among all States of the region.

111. Furthermore, as a gesture of goodwill, Israel had proposed to the Director General, during his visit to Israel in July 2004, that a forum be convened to learn from the experience of other regions in establishing an NWFZ. A framework for that forum had been agreed by key Middle Eastern parties. Regrettably the agenda item had been rejected by another State in the region.

112. The Agency deserved much credit for its outstanding activities in another crucial area of its remit — the promotion of the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind — and Israel was grateful for the assistance it had received in that regard. The interregional project on insect pest control using the SIT had created a good platform for productive and continuing collaboration in the region that could serve as a model for additional projects in the areas of health and radiotherapy. Recently, Israel had launched an effort to promote the Agency's assistance in training at the Augusta Victoria Hospital in Jerusalem, which treated mainly Palestinian patients from the West Bank.

113. Israel worked to promote peaceful applications of nuclear energy in the areas of health, agriculture and industry, and had recently hosted an Agency mission to discuss its CPF. It had modestly increased its contribution to the TCF, and hoped to be able to sustain that trend in the future.

114. Ms. ŽIAKOVÁ (Slovakia) said that her country continued to support the Agency's efforts to develop integrated safeguards, and had, in April 2005, deposited its instrument of ratification of its safeguards agreement and additional protocol. It urged the significant number of States that had not yet concluded safeguards agreements and additional protocols to sign and bring them into force without further delay. Slovakia welcomed the successful outcome of the diplomatic conference to amend the CPPNM, and had begun the internal process of approving the amendments.

115. More than half of Slovakia's electricity production was from nuclear power, which would remain an important source of energy for the country in the medium term. The security of nuclear fuel supply was a precondition for meeting Slovakia's increasing electricity demand and maintaining economic growth, and in that connection Slovakia encouraged the Director General to facilitate a discussion on the report of the expert group on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle in order to find acceptable solutions that would be of benefit to all. In recent years, regulators and operators had been exchanging experience and technical information on nuclear safety related matters in a number of forums. The Agency, as the competent body for the establishment of safety standards, had a crucial role to play in supporting those activities and making its services available to Member States. It was the responsibility of the entire nuclear community to promote global nuclear safety. Slovakia's Nuclear Regulatory Authority considered the operation of all nuclear installations in the country to be safe, reliable and within the national legal framework — a view confirmed by the outcomes of the Third Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The review of Slovakia's national report had identified a number of good practices.

116. Technical cooperation with the Agency was important for Slovakia, which had been involved in dozens of national, regional and interregional technical cooperation projects. One important area of activity had been the establishment of a tsetse research and mass rearing facility at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, and Slovakia was ready to offer its expertise in that field to the Agency and interested Member States. It was also willing to continue providing its experts and training facilities and would continue pursuing its general policy of accepting fellows and scientific visitors sponsored by the Agency.

117. Technical cooperation with the Agency with regard to human resources development, safe long-term operation of nuclear power plants, decommissioning of nuclear facilities and nuclear medicine were important areas for the future transfer and exchange of information. The expert services of the Agency were an essential element of international cooperation and assisted the national regulatory decision-making process. Slovakia had fulfilled its obligations to the TCF, and had taken measures to do likewise in 2007.

118. Mr. TOTH (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that the CTBT was becoming increasingly universal in its status, having been signed by 176 States and ratified by 125. The ratifiers included 33 of the 44 States whose ratification was required for the Treaty to enter into force.

119. The Treaty provided for the establishment of a unique global verification regime, consisting of an international monitoring system, a consultation and clarification process, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures. Data from monitoring stations around the world were processed and analysed by the International Data Centre in Vienna, and all data and products from the International Data Centre were made available to Member States. That information was also useful for civil and scientific purposes such as rapid notification of the size and location of earthquakes, scientific studies of the earth and early detection of volcanic eruptions. At the end of July 2005, 89 secure signatory accounts had been established, with a total of 712 users authorized to access data and products and receive technical support.

120. The Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat had made significant progress in preparing for the effective implementation of the CTBT. The building of monitoring stations and other elements of the verification system had continued, and coordination of operation and maintenance further developed. An operations centre had been established to supervise the entire data acquisition process. Installations for 210 monitoring stations had been completed, with over half already involved in International Data Centre operations. The Provisional Technical Secretariat was

building up a complete and accurate set of minimum information for each monitoring station, which was stored in the Secretariat's database and made available using the experts communication system.

121. The performance testing phase of the first progressive system-wide performance test had taken place in April-June 2005, covering approximately half of the complete monitoring system. The test had provided a framework and data for further evaluation and assessment of the verification system.

122. An alternative programme for the development of on-site inspection awareness was being developed as a high priority at the level of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. The related integrated field exercise would help to improve operational awareness and future inspection capabilities after the Treaty's entry into force.

123. The provision of training courses was an important activity. A total of 55 station operators from 32 signatory States, mostly developing countries, had attended training courses. The Preparatory Commission also promoted cooperation among signatory States to facilitate exchanges concerning the technologies used in connection with the CTBT and national capacity for its implementation.

124. Currently, the Provisional Technical Secretariat had approximately 270 staff members from 70 countries, some 175 of them in the Professional category. It was committed to a policy of equal employment opportunities. Over 26% of Professional staff were women, and further efforts were being made to promote the employment of women and developing-country nationals. It continued to cooperate with the other VIC-based international organizations on the provision and management of joint services.

125. The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, attended by some 120 States in September 2005, had issued a final declaration recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions constituted an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. It had further noted the significant progress made in signing and ratifying the CTBT, and had stressed the importance of building up an effective global verification regime to ensure compliance with the Treaty, which could also bring benefits for science and civil society, including early-warning systems for tsunamis and other natural disasters.

**The meeting rose at 1 p.m.**