



*Atoms for Peace*

الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية

国际原子能机构

International Atomic Energy Agency

Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique

Международное агентство по атомной энергии

Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica

Vienna International Centre, PO Box 100, 1400 Vienna, Austria

Phone: (+43 1) 2600 • Fax: (+43 1) 26007

Email: [Official.Mail@iaea.org](mailto:Official.Mail@iaea.org) • Internet: <http://www.iaea.org>

In reply please refer to:

Dial directly to extension: (+431) 2600-24272

**2010/Note 41**

## **Note by the Secretariat**

### **Open-ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts for Sharing of Information on States' Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources**

#### **Report of the Chairman**

##### **Summary**

The Agency held an open-ended meeting of technical and legal experts in May 2010 to promote a wide exchange of information on national implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and to review progress made since the last meeting in 2007.

The meeting was held in Vienna from 17 to 21 May 2010 and was attended by 160 experts from 90 Member States (and one Non-Member State). Also attending were observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Source Suppliers and Producers Association (ISSPA), and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS).

The Chairman's report of the meeting is attached for the information of Member States.

27 July 2010

**Open-ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts for Sharing of Information on States' Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources**

**Vienna, 17–21 May 2010**

**Report of the Chairman**

1. An open-ended meeting of technical and legal experts for sharing of information as to States' implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (the Code) and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources (the Guidance), was held from 17 to 21 May 2010 at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna under the chairmanship of Mr S. McIntosh (Australia).

2. The meeting was attended by 160 experts from 90 Member States of the IAEA (Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe) and one non-Member State of the IAEA (Maldives). The meeting was also attended by observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Source Suppliers and Producers Association (ISSPA), and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS). The Scientific Secretaries for the meeting were Mr H. Mansoux (Division of Radiation Transport and Waste Safety), Mr W. Tonhauser (Office of Legal Affairs) and Mr D. Winter (Office of Nuclear Security).

3. The objective of the meeting was to promote a wide exchange of information on national implementation of the Code and Guidance. In line with the non-legally binding nature of the Code and the Guidance, participation in the meeting and submission of papers and presentations was on a voluntary basis, and the meeting was open to all Member and non-Member States of the IAEA, whether or not they had made a political commitment to the Code and/or to the Guidance. The agenda of the meeting is attached.

4. The meeting was opened by Mr Taniguchi, Deputy Director General of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. In his opening remarks, Mr Taniguchi noted that to date 99 States have made a political commitment to implement the Code, and that 58 of those States have additionally notified the Director General of their intention to act in a harmonized manner in accordance with the Guidance. He recalled the formalized process for a voluntary, periodic exchange of information among States on their implementation of the Code and Guidance. That mechanism, which was endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2006, provided the framework for this meeting, the second in the process (the first was held in 2007). He expressed his satisfaction about the success of

this voluntary, open and transparent process of experience sharing, and called for its continuous improvement. He invited the meeting to reach consensus on concrete action-oriented conclusions by the end of the week in order to broaden the process to a wider spectrum of participants, to deepen the level of sharing of knowledge and experience and to facilitate further the exchange of information.

5. During the meeting, a number of presentations on issues relevant to the safety and security of radioactive sources were made by representatives of the IAEA Secretariat and participants in the meeting. Some presentations covered the latest development of IAEA publications. Other presentations dealt with IAEA and other assistance programs and services, and examples of countries' feedback. Details of those presentations can be found in the attached agenda.

6. During the second and third days, the meeting divided into three country groups (assigned on an alphabetical basis) to facilitate the voluntary presentations and discussion on all aspects related to the implementation of the Code and the Guidance. The country groups were chaired by Ms O. Makarovska (Ukraine), Mr R. Gutterres (Brazil), and Mr G. Emi-Reynolds (Ghana), with the assistance of Mr S. Evans, Mr D. Mroz, Mr J. Rodriguez, Ms V. Kourkouliou, Mr W. Leotwane, Mr D. Winter, Mr E. Reber, Mr T. Hailu and Mr B. Waud from the IAEA Secretariat. Experts from 51 States gave presentations on their implementation of the Code and the Guidance. In addition, 37 States provided papers in advance of the meeting, which were made available to all participants. In total, 68 participating States shared information on their status of implementation of the Code and the Guidance. All information provided by States, as well as presentations made during the plenary sessions, was made available to participants through a dedicated web page.

7. After those country group sessions, the three country groups met in plenary to discuss the overall findings. The key issues are summarised below.

#### **Infrastructure for regulatory control for safety and security**

8. It continued to be recognised that the establishment and maintenance of a regulatory body or bodies, effectively independent of other functions with respect to radioactive sources, is one of the most important steps to the effective implementation of the Code and the Guidance. However, it was also recognised that effective independence is not only a matter of the regulatory body's place in the governmental structure. Effective independence is mainly determined by the standards of professional competence of the regulatory staff, their integrity, the availability of adequate financial resources and finally by the establishment of safety and security cultures in both the regulatory body and the licensees.

9. There had been continued strong progress in development of regulatory infrastructure for the control of radioactive sources. IAEA and other assistance programs had played a valuable role in that regard. In particular, development of legislation and regulations relating to security had improved since 2007. Many states had recently established such legislation and regulations, or were in the final stages of their development. Licence conditions regarding security were also widely used. The Nuclear Security Series guidance recently published by the Agency – particularly those relating to the Security of Radioactive Sources and Security during Transport of Radioactive Material – would provide further assistance in developing national security standards.

10. Generally, the regulatory body for safety takes the lead role in ensuring that security requirements are met through the licensing, inspection and enforcement processes, even in those cases where a different government entity is the competent authority for the security of radioactive sources. Furthermore, the importance of cooperation with regard to safety and security of radioactive sources among relevant national organizations is generally recognized. It was recognised that the enactment of legislation and regulations was not enough – it also needed to be supported by the development of safety and security awareness and expertise in the regulatory body, the licensees and other relevant stakeholders (see below).

11. As in 2007, there was some discussion of the relationship between the Code and the European Union (EU) legislation, such as the High Activity Sealed Source (HASS) Directive. It was recognized that there continued to be some difficulties in the simultaneous application by EU Member States of the EU legislation and the Code and Guidance. EU Member States were encouraged to continue discussions with the European Commission and the IAEA to resolve those possible problems.

#### **Facilities and services available to the persons authorized to manage radioactive sources**

12. The meeting was advised that, with the assistance in many cases of IAEA and bilateral programs, many states had enhanced their capability to monitor, detect, handle and characterize radioactive sources, and had upgraded security at facilities where high activity radioactive sources may be used or stored, and of related transport operations. Assistance from such programs continues to be available, and all states needing assistance were encouraged to approach the IAEA and other donors in this regard.

#### **Training of staff in the regulatory body, law enforcement agencies and emergency service organizations**

13. The meeting was advised of the wide range of training courses provided by the Agency and by other national and regional assistance programs. Courses which focus on practical measures – such as utilising radiation detection equipment, or writing facility security plans – were viewed as especially valuable. It was noted that true sustainability of national expertise - particularly in institutions such as customs agencies and law enforcement bodies – could only be delivered by the development of national training strategies developed in full knowledge of local conditions and delivered by local trainers. In this regard, “train the trainers” courses delivered by external assistance programs, in particular those of the Agency’s technical cooperation programme, were vital. It was noted that the effectiveness and sustainability of such training programs could be measured and enhanced by the use of competency-based accreditation approaches.

#### **National register of radioactive sources**

14. Considerable progress in the establishment and maintenance of a national register of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources, as recommended by the Code, was reported. Most States participating in the meeting have now established such a national register, although it was acknowledged that such registers might not capture all legacy sources (sources which were acquired prior to national regulatory structures being put in place). Efforts to ensure that such legacy sources were brought under control, including through inclusion in the National Register, were vital. Some national registers capture sources below Categories 1 and 2 – the Code merely constitutes a minimum standard in this regard. Many states had used the IAEA’s Regulatory Authority Information System (RAIS) as the basis for the development of their National Register.

#### **National strategies for gaining or regaining control over orphan sources, including arrangements for reporting loss of control and to encourage awareness of, and monitoring to detect, orphan sources**

15. Many participants reported on their States’ strategies for searching for and regaining control over orphan sources. Such strategies include the conduct of awareness campaigns, searches at likely sites, amnesties for unauthorized holders of sources who declare them to the regulatory body or other authorities, and the introduction of toll-free telephone numbers by regulatory bodies. The development of such strategies is sometimes mandated by national law.

16. The meeting noted that when such sources are discovered, it is important that the national strategy include a recovery strategy, including the identification of facilities where they can be safely and securely stored. In addition, the State should investigate who is responsible for the source. Should such an investigation be unsuccessful, the cost of the long-term management of the source normally

falls to the state, as part of its role in protecting the health of its citizens – either via the regulatory body or via another national nuclear organisation.

17. Participants noted that many states have installed portal monitors and other radiation detection devices at borders, which was viewed as good practice. Participants further recalled that the 2009 Technical Meeting on Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources with Regard to Long Term Strategies for the Management of Sealed Sources had discussed, without resolution, the fate of orphan sources intercepted at borders (see paragraphs 36-37 of the report of that meeting). Whilst it was universally acknowledged that the safety and security of the radioactive source involved should be a primary consideration, the issues surrounding custody and ownership of such sources are likely to be technically, financially and legally complex. The meeting recommended that the matter should be examined further by the Agency with the objective of developing some guidance, taking into account the views of regulatory bodies, customs authorities, consignors, consignees and shippers. That examination might benefit from consideration of the ways in which regimes covering the transport of other hazardous materials address this issue.

18. Participants recalled that the issue of incidents of sources being melted down in scrap metal had been discussed at the 2009 meeting, and that it continued to present a challenge in many countries. Good practices in this area - including the “Spanish Protocol for Collaboration on the Radiation Monitoring of Metallic Materials” – were discussed during the meeting. In general, it was recommended that scrap recyclers should not rely only on a single portal monitor at the gate to their facility, as the shielding effect from other metal in the shipping container might well render a source undetectable at that point. The use of monitors at other points within the recycling process – such as on internal conveyer belts or at the point of exit of the reconstituted metal – was encouraged. It was also noted that consideration should be given to the implementation of monitoring programs at other waste management or recycling facilities.

19. The Secretariat advised that in July 2010, it would be holding a Consultants’ Meeting to develop an initial draft proposal for an international agreement concerning the transboundary movement of scrap metal containing radioactive material. That Consultants’ Meeting would follow up the recommendations of the International Conference on Control and Management of Inadvertent Radioactive Material in Scrap Metal held in Tarragona, Spain from 23 to 27 February 2009. Participants in this meeting recommended that the Consultants’ Meeting take into account the provisions of the Code regarding the monitoring of scrap, the implementation of which would significantly reduce the incidence of contamination. It also noted that the Consultants’ Meeting was likely to discuss the issue of clearance levels. It will be important to ensure that the development of any such instrument takes account of the existence and content of the Code, given the potential overlap.

#### **Approaches to managing sources at the end of their life cycles**

20. The issue of the management of disused sources was extensively discussed at the 2009 meeting. Given that discussion and the limited time available at this meeting, participants focused on a limited number of topics. In general, it could be said that return of disused sources to the supplier was a preferred management strategy in many states. However, it was recognised that some sources would not be able to be returned to the supplier, and that all states should therefore develop and implement national strategies for end-of-life management of radioactive sources. In the development of such national strategies, the state should consider the need for the development of facilities for the long-term storage or disposal of radioactive sources for which no further use was foreseen.

21. As noted in the 2009 meeting, one obstacle to the return of sources to a supplier may be difficulties in arranging transportation of the source, whether because of denial of shipment by the carrier or because the source itself, or the container in which the source was originally transported, is now out of certification. The Secretariat was encouraged to consider the feasibility of developing and publishing a list of containers currently approved for the transport of high-activity sources. States were

encouraged to allow the use of special arrangements for the one-off transport of disused sources in such circumstances. The United States advised that they are continuing with the development of a new design Type B container which could be used to transport a wide variety of types of sources. It is hoped that the container will be available for use within two-three years.

22. The meeting discussed the application to disused sources of provisions in national law which forbid the importation of radioactive waste – even if those sources were originally exported from the state in question. Some states, and ISSPA, noted that in the normal course of events, a disused source is returned to the manufacturer. The manufacturer then examines the source to determine whether it can be practically and economically reused or recycled. If, following that examination, the manufacturer determines that the source cannot be reused or recycled, it then becomes radioactive waste. Under that process, the return of a disused source would not be considered to be the importation of radioactive waste. It was noted that, likewise, a state which is exporting a disused source should refrain from designating the source as radioactive waste. At the same time, it was recognised that decisions on the timing of the designation of disused sources as waste depend to a large extent on the provisions of national legislation.

23. Participants recalled the previous year’s discussion on the imposition of financial guarantees at the time of receipt of a source. Such financial guarantees may be used to cover the costs of return to the supplier and/or the costs of the long-term storage or disposal of the source should return to the supplier be impossible. The method of calculation of such guarantees varied, but was generally based on an estimate of all the cost of disposal of the source, and periodic updates. Such schemes are being increasingly used in a number of countries. On the other hand, it was noted that the imposition of such requirements on the users of sources in developing countries had the potential to make use unaffordable for facilities such as hospitals, and that national governments may therefore, as part of their national strategy for the management of disused sources, prefer to take responsibility for the source at the end of its useful life if return to supplier was not possible. Such a strategy would be taken into account in licensing decisions.

24. In recent years, a number of states have developed central waste storage facilities, often with the assistance of the IAEA or bilateral programs. This was viewed as good practice, provided that the state concerned had the regulatory infrastructure and expertise required to ensure the safe and secure operation and maintenance of the facility. In the longer term, disposal of long-lived sources would still be required, and borehole disposal would be an option for some countries. It was noted that regional facilities for the management of disused sources, however desirable in practice, were unlikely to eventuate in the near term, and that their possible future creation should not be an excuse not to develop and implement national strategies for end-of-life management of radioactive sources.

25. The IAEA’s assistance programs in this area were widely welcomed. In particular, the development and deployment of a mobile hot cell for the conditioning of high activity sources for transport and storage was welcomed.

#### **Experience with implementation of the import and export provisions of the Code and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources**

26. The implementation of the Guidance on a harmonised and consistent basis continues to be a challenge. The meeting encouraged the development and use of bilateral or other administrative arrangements to facilitate the implementation of the Guidance. A number of areas where the Guidance or its implementation might be enhanced were identified in discussions.

27. The meeting noted delays in responses to requests for consent hampered the beneficial use of sources and imposed considerable costs on suppliers – costs which would ultimately be passed on to users. The meeting recalled the discussion at the 2008 “Open-ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts on the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Lessons Learned from Implementing the Supplementary Guidance on Import and Export Controls” concerning the role

of the Points of Contact. It was felt that some of the problems in relation to the implementation of the Guidance – particularly instances where there had been no response to requests for consent to the export of Category 1 sources – may have been caused by a lack of awareness of the role of Points of Contact, or the nomination of inappropriate points of contact. It was therefore suggested that the Agency should prepare a short document setting out the role of Points of Contact under the Guidance. Such a document would assist States in nominating an appropriate Point of Contact, and those points of contact in performing their duties.

28. The meeting also recalled that the 2008 meeting had stressed the preferability of nominating a position or an institution (with a generic e-mail address or facsimile number) rather than a named individual as the national Point of Contact. The meeting also noted that alternatively States could put in place arrangements to ensure that the absence of the named individual would not cause problems and delays. The meeting welcomed the recent action by the IAEA Secretariat in sending out a request to all states to review and update as necessary their Point of Contact details, and recommended that the Secretariat do so on an annual basis.

29. The meeting was of the view that control over sources being exported from one state to another would be enhanced if the exporting state were to be advised by the importing state that the source had been received at its destination and was now under the regulatory control of the importing state. A draft form for that purpose was circulated by the Secretariat, and should be discussed further.

30. The meeting recognized the benefits of a harmonized approach by exporting States to assessing whether an importing State has the appropriate regulatory and technical capacity and resources to safely and securely manage the source. Improved access to information on the regulatory and technical capacity of the importing State would enable exporting States to grant export authorizations more promptly and consistently and for the benefit of the importing State. Under the Guidance, the exporting State has the final responsibility for making the assessment, and may give different weights to specific factors in the assessment. The Meeting encouraged the Secretariat to examine, by way of the consultancy meeting referred to in paragraph 34, possible ways in which the IAEA could provide assistance with the assessment of importing State system of controls – for example, by way of the provision of a summary or a portion of the results of IAEA assessment missions if consent is provided by the State involved.

31. The meeting recalled the discussion at the 2008 Meeting concerning the Self-Assessment Questionnaire. A number of suggestions to amend the Questionnaire were made. In particular, it was noted that the Questionnaire is not very detailed, and that it refers to a technical cooperation project which is no longer in existence. The meeting agreed that there is a need to update and revise the Questionnaire to enhance its effectiveness.

32. The meeting further recalled that at the 2008 Meeting, concerns had been raised as to whether regulatory bodies were being notified of every transit or transshipment of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources across their territory. At that time, it was noted that the IAEA Transport Regulations contain provisions regarding the notification of states of transit of shipments of radioactive material (including radioactive sources). However, it was also noted at that time that the thresholds for provision of notification under the Transport Regulations differ from the categorization of sources used under the Code and Guidance, potentially meaning that the notification provisions under the Regulations might not apply to all Category 1 and 2 sources.

33. The meeting was reminded that the imposition of additional requirements on transit or transshipment would exacerbate existing problems in many countries with denial of shipment. It was further advised that the recently published IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 9, Implementing Guide on Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material, recommends that transit states be advised of all transits of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. The meeting therefore concluded that, should States adopt the provisions of the Implementing Guide, there would be no need to amend the Code and Guidance to address this issue.

34. Taking into account the discussions above, the Meeting recommended that a process for the review of the Guidance be put in place. That process would consider all issues raised above, and might result in some amendments to the Guidance or its Annex. Such a process should involve an initial consultants' meeting, with the recommendations of that meeting to be put to an open-ended meeting in mid-2011. It was noted that changes to the Guidance may mean that the process of political commitments to the Guidance would need to be restarted.

### **Review of the formalized process**

35. Participants in the Meeting expressed their general satisfaction with the current process and stressed the benefits derived from the exchange of knowledge and experience in implementing the Code and Guidance. In particular, they noted that persons other than staff of the regulatory body – for example, users, waste management organisations and staff from customs authorities - could also benefit from participation in the meetings. Whilst states could already include such persons in their delegations, they were encouraged to give active consideration to the possibility when deciding on the composition of delegations to future meetings. On a separate issue, it was recommended that, given the value of the exchanges in the country groups, the next information exchange meeting should include two and a half days for country group meetings. Those country group meetings might allocate specific time for topic discussions in addition to national presentations (this had already happened informally).

36. It was noted that the formalized process envisaged that there would be regional meetings as well as international meetings. However, few such meetings had actually been held to date. The potential benefits of such meetings were widely recognised. The meeting encouraged the Secretariat to play a more active role in organising such regional meetings, while recognizing existing budgetary constraints. The potential role of extrabudgetary contributions in this regard was recognized.

37. The Meeting recognized the value of the topical meetings which had been held in 2008 and 2009, and encouraged their continuance. As noted in paragraph 34, the next such meeting in 2011 would consider the possible revision of the Guidance.

38. These enhancements to the process can be accommodated without amending the formalized process endorsed by the Board of Governors in 2006.

### **Synergies between the Code of Conduct and the Joint Convention**

39. The Secretariat recalled its earlier advice that the experience of parties to the Joint Convention would be beneficial to the Code of Conduct meetings. To that end, it was organising a meeting in October 2010 in Portugal to discuss the issue further. The Meeting agreed that it would assist participants' preparation for future Code of Conduct meetings if Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention which attend the Code of Conduct meeting provided them with relevant parts of their National Reports to the preceding Review Meeting under the Joint Convention.

### **Status of the Code**

40. Participants expressed general satisfaction with the current status of the Code. The open and inclusive process which had been adopted was of great benefit to all participating countries. A decision to change the status of the Code could have consequences for that process. Notwithstanding that general view, it was acknowledged that at some future time States might wish to consider the development of a binding legal instrument in this area. It might be possible for such development to proceed in parallel with the continued implementation of the Code.

### **Conclusions**

41. A number of conclusions were reached:

- 41.1. There is widespread international support for the Code and the Guidance. States that have not yet made a political commitment to the Code and/or the Guidance were encouraged to consider doing so.
- 41.2. The adoption and implementation of the Code by States, and the Agency's technical cooperation program and bilateral assistance programs have produced significant improvements in regulatory infrastructure and capability in relation to radioactive sources in many States.
- 41.3. The implementation of the Guidance had proven effective in reducing the incidence of orphan sources. At the same time, some practical implementation issues had arisen, and relatively minor revisions to the Guidance might therefore be desirable.
- 41.4. National registers of sources had proven to be an essential element of the regulatory control process.
- 41.5. Orphan sources detected at national borders need to be managed in a safe and secure manner. This matter would benefit from further multilateral discussions.
- 41.6. The importance of sustainability of implementation of all areas of the Code was emphasised. Such sustainability required the development of national expertise and training capacities within all States, and ongoing international, multilateral and bilateral support and cooperation.
- 41.7. Participants agreed that the Meeting achieved the objective of facilitating the exchange of information between States. The self-assessment process involved in the preparation of papers had also been of benefit. Participants appreciated the open nature of the discussions, and looked forward to future Information Exchange Meetings, as well as to regional meetings and to intersessional topic meetings.
42. In relation to the funding of meetings organized in the framework of the formalized process, it is recalled that the regular budget of the Agency does not contain the necessary funds. Therefore, the implementation of the process relies mainly on extra budgetary funding. This year again, the specific donations by Australia, Canada, Denmark and the United States allowed the participation of experts from States that otherwise could not have attended. Member States are encouraged to positively consider providing such funding on a voluntary basis.
43. As foreshadowed in the mechanism approved by the Board, experts suggested that the Director-General submit this report to the Agency's policy-making organs for their information.

### **Recommendations**

44. The meeting recommended that:
- A process for the review of the Guidance, as set out in paragraph 34, be put in place by the Secretariat;
  - The Secretariat organise a consultancy meeting to discuss the issue of the management of orphan sources detected at national borders. Such discussion should take into account the issues raised in paragraph 17;
  - States take the Nuclear Security Series guidance into account in developing their national source security frameworks; and
  - The IAEA convene an international conference to follow up the findings of the International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Towards a Global System for

the Continuous Control of Sources throughout their Life Cycle, held in Bordeaux in 2005. Such a Conference might be held in conjunction with the next Open-ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts for Sharing of Information on States' Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

Steven McIntosh

Chairman

21 May 2010