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President: Mr BARRETT (Canada)

Later: Mr PUJA (Indonesia)

Mr HU Xiaodi (China)

Mr ENKHS AIKHAN (Mongolia)

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¹ GC(54)/16.

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Abbreviations used in this record:

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AIDS	acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ARASIA	Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ASSET	Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
Brussels Supplementary Convention	Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
CANDU	Canada deuterium-uranium [reactor]
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CRP	coordinated research project
CT	computed tomography
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
HEU	high-enriched uranium
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
imPACT	integrated missions of PACT

Abbreviations used in this record (continued)

INLEX	International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
LDC	least developed country
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
New START	New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
NPCs	national participation costs
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review and Extension Conference	Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
Paris Convention	Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
PCC	Programme Coordination Committee
PCMF	Programme Cycle Management Framework
PDI	person-day of inspection
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
SPECT	single photon emission computed tomography
SQP	small quantities protocol
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
UPSAT	Uranium Production Site Appraisal Team
WHO	World Health Organization
WWER	water cooled water moderated reactor (former USSR)

7. General debate and Annual Report for 2009 (continued) (GC(54)/4)

1. Mr KAHUURE (Namibia) said that the NPT remained the most viable instrument for achieving a world free from nuclear weapons and all its three pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — were equally important. Nuclear-weapon-free zones helped to foster regional peace and security and his country looked forward to the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Namibia, for its part, had demonstrated its commitment to furthering the Agency's safeguards and verification objectives by signing all relevant instruments including the NPT, a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, the latter of which should be ratified shortly.

2. The inalienable right of all countries to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes should be respected and all Member States must be given the opportunity to utilize nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Namibia commended the Agency's efforts to help developing countries use nuclear technology for their socio-economic development. Under its national development agenda, Namibia was seeking to achieve industrialization through the full utilization of its natural and human resources, including uranium mining. He noted with satisfaction that, under his country's CPF, nuclear technology would make a meaningful contribution to that agenda and the strategies to achieve its objectives. Those strategies included the provision of appropriate education and affordable health care, building of industries in all sectors of the economy in order to add value to natural resources and diversify the economy, and the maintenance of stable, productive and diverse ecosystems. In conformity with its strategic objectives, Namibia had proposed that its technical cooperation programme for 2011–2012 should focus on key areas such as human resources development, health care, energy and food security. As skilled human resources were essential for the successful development and implementation of the technical cooperation programme, his country was proposing the training of a core number of professionals, as well as capacity building at higher education establishments, with a view to sustaining human resources capabilities in the area of nuclear technology.

3. Namibia was a major supplier of uranium, supporting the industries and economies of many countries around the world. It hoped to be able to participate in other high-value parts of the nuclear fuel cycle apart from just mining with a view to accelerating its economic growth. He called on the Secretariat to support his country's proposals and provide the necessary guidance.

4. Noting that cancer killed more people than HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria combined, he said that his country had proposed a national cancer control programme that would adopt an integrated approach to cancer management, including nuclear medicine and radiation therapy. He commended the work of PACT and expressed the hope that it would foster the achievement of important milestones with regard to cancer management in Namibia.

5. Namibia was an arid country and water resources management and food security were important priorities, as was animal health. Given the prevailing climatic conditions, the challenge was to ensure sustainable utilization of available water resources, and the development and adoption of improved soil, water and nutrient management practices to support crop production and enhanced yields. He called on the Agency to ensure that the role of nuclear technology in those areas was maintained and strengthened.

6. His country was committed to ensuring that an effective and efficient regulatory framework was in place to protect people and the environment against the harmful effects of nuclear technology. The Atomic Energy and Radiation Protection Act served as the basis for regulation of all activities involving the use of devices generating radiation, and of radioactive and nuclear material. Efforts had been made over the preceding year to establish and staff the regulatory authority. The challenge was to ensure that the law was responsive to emerging needs. His Government had already launched initiatives to develop the national policy and legislative framework to address the challenges associated with the uranium exploration, mining and milling industry.

7. With regard to the Director General's report on measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety contained in document GC(54)/8, he said that Namibia supported the initiatives to assist Member States in strengthening the effectiveness and sustainability of regulatory programmes, build capacity in Member States embarking on the development of a nuclear power programme, and facilitate regulatory networking to improve safety performance through the sharing of experience.

8. Finally, he noted that the invitations to the Director General and the Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation to visit Namibia remained valid and his country hoped to welcome them in the near future.

9. Mr PARVEZ (Pakistan) said that the Agency's unique role as the world's focal point for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology was assuming greater significance in the wake of the global surge of countries wishing to embark on a nuclear power programme. That posed a variety of challenges to the Agency in terms of the use of its resources, particularly as most such countries looked to the Agency for guidance and support. His country, which had benefited immensely from the expertise made available by the Agency in the form of expert missions under such mechanisms as OSART and ASSET, and through its technical cooperation programme, valued highly its interaction with the Agency.

10. The Agency's technical cooperation programme had brought tangible benefits to many developing Member States in the area of peaceful applications of nuclear technology. Its assistance in human resources development and capacity building had ensured the impact and sustainability of the programme. Pakistan strongly supported the Agency's efforts to make the technical cooperation programme even more useful and more compatible with the changing and growing requirements of Member States, against the odds of resource constraints.

11. In light of the renewed interest in nuclear power, it was important not to underestimate the importance of the safe operation of nuclear power plants. The Agency's safety standards and guidelines were of great value to Member States in that regard, most especially developing countries which might not have the resources or expertise to develop such systems independently.

12. The Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in 2010 had focused attention on nuclear security issues, another area in which the Agency played an important role in assisting Member States.

13. Pakistan had established a strong safety and security infrastructure, including the establishment of an independent regulatory authority — the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority — in the year 2000. In addition, it was party to several relevant international conventions and participated actively in the nuclear safety and security activities and programmes of the Agency, including the Nuclear Security Plan. Also, it was contributing to such Agency databases as the illicit trafficking database, the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale and the International Reporting System for Operating Experience.

14. The Agency's verification responsibilities had been growing in significance. Striking a balance between the organization's role as a promoter of nuclear energy and its responsibility as the 'nuclear watchdog' was a veritable challenge in view of the large number of countries aspiring to use nuclear energy and the Agency's limited resources. Pakistan hoped that the Agency would continue to maintain its principle-based role, assisting Member States on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis in line with its Statute.

15. Recently, his country had been hit by devastating floods affecting not only the lives of more than 20 million people, but also the logistics and economic infrastructure of the entire country. The country's nuclear power plants had kept operating at full power throughout that major catastrophe.

16. Against the backdrop of limited indigenous energy resources, Pakistan had long been a strong advocate of building nuclear power plants. In 1965, when it had embarked on its first commercial plant, it had been the 15th country in the world and only the second developing country to start a nuclear power programme. That plant, the Karachi nuclear power plant, had come on line in 1972. Unit 1 of the second, the Chashma nuclear power plant, built by the China National Nuclear Corporation, had come on line in 2000 and had just celebrated 10 years of safe and successful operation. Unit 2, again built by China under a long-term agreement between the two countries, would be commissioned in 2011.

17. Pakistan now had more than 45 years of safe reactor operating experience, as well as the technical and engineering infrastructure to maintain, and provide technical support to its plants. That, coupled with its know-how in the areas of manpower development, energy planning, reactor siting, safety analysis, and out-of-core as well as in-core fuel management, and the existence of an independent and well developed regulatory regime, provided the necessary ingredients for a sustainable nuclear power programme.

18. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission had been participating in INPRO since its inception. It congratulated the Agency on the 10th anniversary of that very valuable programme.

19. The Commission had been given a mandate by the Government of Pakistan to install 8800 MW(e) of nuclear power capacity by 2030 to alleviate the country's energy shortfall and to support its socio-economic development.

20. In addition to nuclear power, Pakistan had focused on the application of ionizing radiation and radioisotopes in the fields of health, agriculture and industry. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was currently managing 14 nuclear medical centres across the country, catering for some half a million patients every year, mostly free of charge. Another 4 such centres were under construction.

21. Taking advantage of Agency-sponsored programmes, a campaign had been launched in his country to raise awareness about cancer. The Commission planned to build on the upcoming international breast cancer awareness month in October 2010 — which included the global mammogram day — as part of that campaign.

22. The Commission used its research reactor to produce most of the radioisotopes required for the medical centres in the country. A molybdenum production facility had recently been commissioned. That facility would not only meet domestic requirements, but would also have spare capacity for export to other countries.

23. Based on its sizeable nuclear power programme, well trained experts and accumulated experience in power generation, health, medicine, agriculture, biotechnology and industrial applications, Pakistan was now poised to share its knowledge and expertise with newcomer Member States via training placements and expert missions.

24. The relationship between the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the Agency, both of which had been established at about the same time, was founded on mutual respect and cooperation. Pakistan looked forward to that relationship growing even stronger in the future.

25. The Agency's admirable record in terms of outreach was due in large measure to its leadership, the efficiency of its Secretariat and the work of its Policy-Making Organs. The entry into force of the amendment to Article VI of the Statute, once it was ratified by the required number of States, would enhance the representative character of the Board of Governors and thus contribute to making the Agency even more effective.

26. Ms GOICHOCEA ESTENOZ (Cuba) said that her country recognized and supported the Agency's important role in promoting peace and sustainable development. The application of nuclear techniques helped significantly to mitigate soil deterioration, desertification, climate change and other natural phenomena that impinged on food production and human life.

27. Cuba attached the highest priority to cooperation among developing countries. Thus, it was pleased that ARCAL was celebrating its 25th anniversary and congratulated the Secretariat on the results achieved in implementing the action plan for the strategic alliance between ARCAL and the Agency.

28. Her country attached special importance to Agency technical cooperation because it was essential to the promotion of nuclear technologies in developing countries. Cuba's commitment to that activity was demonstrated, inter alia, through its strict compliance with its obligations under the technical cooperation programme, attaining in 2009 a project implementation rate of 85%, which was above the regional average; through its participation in CRPs, with Cuban researchers having participated in 29 research contracts in 2009; and through its timely and full discharge of its financial obligations to the TCF, including all of its NPCs. In addition, in 2009 it had contributed the euro equivalent of US \$800 000 towards the shared cost of procuring a SPECT-CT system under project CUB/6/018.

29. The unjust economic, commercial and financial blockade which had been imposed on Cuba by the United States of America for more than 50 years was having an adverse impact on the Agency's promotional activities on the island and contravened not only the Agency's Statute but also the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The new United States Government, despite its promises, had brought no essential changes to the illegal blockade policy and Cuba's economic losses were estimated, conservatively, at more than \$1154 million at current prices. Other examples of the negative impact of the blockade for the Agency included the difficulties it encountered in purchasing specialized equipment from United States companies and in obtaining visas for Cuban nationals to participate in training organized in the United States. Another area affected was the implementation of cancer-related projects, which was an Agency priority under the new Director General. Her country acknowledged the Secretariat's ongoing efforts to find alternatives and solutions, noting with satisfaction the nuclear and radiation safety activities carried out by the Agency in 2009. She highlighted in particular its efforts to ensure the safe use of radiation sources through strengthening of infrastructure for national radiation and transport safety, radioactive waste management and emergencies.

30. Cuba assigned appreciable human and material resources to nuclear safety. It also contributed to that field in the Latin America and the Caribbean region through the organization of regional activities and projects and by making its radiation protection experts and services available. As a member of the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies, it took an active part in projects in the medical field.

31. Her country welcomed the approval in 2009 of the Nuclear Security Plan and urged the Secretariat to implement it in accordance with the specific requirements of each Member State. In that context, she underlined the support provided to her country by the Office of Nuclear Security.

32. Cuba was a staunch supporter of the Agency as an international leader in the field of nuclear security. In view of its global impact, the issue of nuclear security should be approached in an inclusive way and it required generally accepted solutions. As a consequence, her country recognized only documents of a universal nature promoted by or under the legal auspices of the Agency.

33. She welcomed the fact that, despite the financial crisis, more than 60 countries — many of them developing countries — had expressed an interest in including nuclear power as an option for sustainable energy development.

34. Cuba endorsed the statement made recently to the Board of Governors on behalf of the NAM and the Group of 77 and China on the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurances². Any analysis of that crucial matter should be inclusive and transparent and related decisions should be agreed by consensus. Her country rejected any attempt to use the supply of nuclear fuel as a means of political or economic coercion, as a means of discrimination or as a mechanism for preserving the monopoly of a few.

35. Her country was pleased that the Agency had once again concluded that it had complied strictly with its safeguards obligations, confirming that the country had no undeclared nuclear material or activities.

36. She reaffirmed Cuba's support for and acknowledgement of the Agency as the sole competent authority for nuclear verification, which activity must be carried out objectively on the basis of technical criteria in line with the requirements of the Agency's Statute and the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The Agency should promote peace and international cooperation with a view to achieving global disarmament.

37. The climate of lack of confidence that had arisen with respect to the Agency's verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, as a result of geopolitical interests and double standards, was a cause for deep concern. Verification activities should, above all, respect the sovereignty and national interests of the Member States, and Agency inspectors and staff should act with impartiality and professionalism and not be subject to any pressure. She called on the Secretariat to continue its efforts to foster a climate of understanding, impartiality, confidence and transparency in which a solution could be found once and for all to the safeguards issues under consideration by the Board of Governors and the General Conference. Cuba supported the Director General's efforts to facilitate the supply of fuel for the Tehran research reactor, based on the agreement signed by Brazil and Turkey with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and it urged the Vienna Group to respond positively to that proposal. It also supported denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through a negotiated solution. The elimination and total prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the threat they posed, was the only guarantee for human survival.

38. In that context, she referred to NAM's proposed action plan — submitted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference — to eliminate and prohibit nuclear weapons by 2025 at the latest. That plan had not been supported by the nuclear powers or by other developed countries that, paradoxically, proclaimed themselves to be champions of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

² See GOV/OR.1283, paragraphs 154–160.

39. Cuba was confident that the Director General would continue his efforts to implement fully the mandates conferred upon him by the Board of Governors and the General Conference concerning the application of comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East and Israeli nuclear capabilities. Her country supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and the convening of an international conference for that purpose in 2012, which had been approved by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, represented an important step in that direction.

40. Her country urged Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and without conditions. Furthermore, Israel should place all its nuclear installations under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The United States Government, if it was truly sincere in its commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, should be at the vanguard of that demand.

41. Humankind stood at a crucial juncture in its history and its survival was at stake. Fidel Castro, the leader of the Cuban revolution, had referred on numerous occasions to those dangers and the need to ward them off through the application of responsible policies that saved lives, reassigned the enormous resources spent on arms to economic and social development and, in particular, led to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of war.

42. In conclusion, she quoted the words of Fidel Castro at the 1996 World Food Summit: “May the truth reign and not hypocrisy and lies. Let us be aware that in this world hegemony, arrogance and egotism must end. The bells that toll today for those who are dying of hunger every day will toll tomorrow for all of humanity if it did not want to, did not know how to, or was not able to be sufficiently wise to save itself from itself.”

43. Mr BERNHARD (Denmark) said his country had been pleased with the successful conduct of the NPT Review Conference earlier in the year and its final document. He urged all States to make implementation of the action plan contained therein a priority, with a view to promoting international disarmament and non-proliferation, and thus peace and security. It was also important to avoid any steps that might jeopardize that work.

44. The Agency would continue to play a central role in the world’s efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. With its highly professional and dedicated staff and its inspection procedures, the Agency verified the peaceful use of nuclear technologies and offered essential assurances in that regard. Through full cooperation with the Agency, its Member States were given the opportunity to clear themselves of any suspicion of wrongdoing. As experience showed, however, the Agency needed to have the necessary tools in place for it to carry out that role effectively. Denmark was convinced that a comprehensive safeguards agreement in combination with an additional protocol constituted the modern verification standard under the NPT. It called for universal accession to and implementation of both instruments.

45. The United Nations Security Council also had a key responsibility with respect to non-proliferation. Denmark welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) and continued to support resolution 1540 (2004), whose adoption had marked a fundamental step forward in that regard. The Security Council had also adopted a number of country-specific resolutions with the aim of upholding the integrity and efficiency of the non-proliferation regime. It was essential that all countries concerned implemented in full the respective resolutions on the DPRK and Iran.

46. With regard to Iran, his country shared the serious concern expressed in a succession of reports by the Director General over Iran’s failure to extend to the Agency the necessary cooperation to allow it to confirm that all nuclear material in the country was in peaceful activities, and to dispel doubts about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. Denmark urged Iran to comply fully with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the Board of Governors, and with its safeguards agreement with the Agency.

47. Denmark also shared the Agency's concern about Syria's failure to cooperate with the Agency sufficiently to allow the Agency to make progress in resolving the outstanding issues surrounding the peaceful nature of that country's nuclear programme. It joined the Director General in urging Syria to bring into force an additional protocol in order to facilitate the Agency's work in verifying the completeness and correctness of that country's declarations.

48. His country was very concerned that the Agency was not being permitted to fulfil its mandate with respect to the DPRK. It strongly supported the calls on the DPRK to comply with its international obligations and to allow an early return of Agency inspectors.

49. Denmark highly valued the Agency's work in the sphere of nuclear security. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit had demonstrated the increasing need for protection against nuclear terrorism and other malicious acts involving nuclear material. Denmark welcomed the work plan adopted at the Summit and would strive to make its own contribution to the promotion of global security.

50. Once again, his country was glad to have been able to contribute to the Nuclear Security Fund and he expressed his country's commitment to ensuring that the Fund had sufficient resources to step up its work to help all Member States to protect themselves and each other against nuclear terrorism. Denmark was also pleased that the Agency's budgets for 2010 and 2011 had moved in the right direction in that regard.

51. Earlier in the year, Denmark had ratified the amendment to the CPPNM and hoped for its early entry into force. In general, his country was keen to increase its involvement in that important field.

52. Turning to the issue of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, his country had taken the decision that nuclear power should not be included in its energy mix because it did not consider it to be a sustainable form of energy. While it was thus not in favour of a promotional role for the Agency in the field of nuclear power, it did respect the choice of other Member States and the Agency's statutory obligations in that regard. Also, it recognized the interest of an increasing number of States in introducing nuclear power and, in that regard, set a high value on the Agency's contribution to ensuring that progress in that direction was made under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions.

53. His country had followed with interest the discussions which had taken place both in Vienna and at the 2010 NPT Review Conference on multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel supply and it had come to the conclusion that such assurances could have important advantages in terms of non-proliferation in view of the growing demand for nuclear power. Denmark, together with its European Union partners, was therefore ready to support a multilateral proliferation-safe mechanism for assurance of nuclear fuel supply for those States which had chosen the nuclear power option. For that reason, it had supported the Russian Federation's initiative to establish a physical reserve of LEU in Angarsk. While recognizing that some Member States still had concerns about the implications of such mechanisms, Denmark believed that the time had come to try to address concerns and solve problems through the practical implementation of a specific project. It hoped that the Board of Governors, on which it was currently serving, would soon come to a positive decision regarding the proposal to set up an IAEA LEU bank.

54. Reaffirming his country's appreciation for the Agency's work in the field of nuclear safety and technical cooperation, he noted that Denmark had again pledged in full its share of the TCF target. It was highly relevant that the Director General had chosen to focus on fighting cancer in developing countries. With regard to safety, Denmark was looking forward to hosting an Agency workshop on safety assessment for decommissioning in October, and to sharing its experience in the field with interested Member States.

55. The world would continue to rely on the Agency for expertise and support in all its fields of activity. Denmark was grateful to the Director General and his staff for their invaluable contribution to building a safer and more prosperous world.

56. Mr HERNÁNDEZ GARCÍA (Spain) said that one of the priorities of his Government's foreign policy was to help strengthen the non-proliferation regime, one fruit of which was the Spanish safeguards support programme.

57. He commended the Director General and Secretariat for their impartiality and professionalism in clarifying the nature of Iran's past nuclear programme and expressed appreciation for their persistence in verifying that country's declared activities and ensuring compliance with its obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement. Spain joined others in calling on the Iranian authorities to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions, display greater transparency, cooperate with the Agency and apply the additional protocol in order to rebuild international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

58. His country was concerned at the dangerous path taken by the DPRK and urged that country to return to the six-party talks, comply with Security Council resolutions, return to the NPT, allow the return of Agency inspectors, halt its plutonium reprocessing activities, and abstain from any other activities that increased tension in the region.

59. Spain thanked the Director General for the information he had provided in his latest report on Syria's willingness to cooperate with the Agency regarding previously unreported uranium conversion and irradiation activities at the miniature neutron source reactor in Damascus, and its additional explanations regarding the presence of natural uranium particles. Syria should continue cooperating fully with the Agency to rebuild the international community's confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

60. The Spanish authorities believed that the most effective way of responding to the threat of nuclear proliferation was the rapid and universal entry into force of the additional protocol. It was therefore cause for concern that — 13 years after the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol — 92 States were still not applying it and 18 NPT State Parties had not yet even concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements. The Agency needed to maintain its efforts to achieve the swift universalization of those instruments. However, Spain appreciated the fact that the Agency was already applying integrated safeguards in 36 States, with the aim of extending their application to all States with additional protocols and comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. The human and financial resources that could be saved as a result were especially important in times of budgetary constraints. The joint declaration signed by the Agency and the European Commission in January 2010, announcing the conclusion of arrangements to apply integrated safeguards in all European Union non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear activities, showed the importance the European Union attached to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

61. The Spanish authorities continued to support the activities of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security aimed at improving the security of nuclear facilities and material and high-activity radioactive sources. Their support for the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013 was demonstrated by their major contribution to the Nuclear Security Fund.

62. Spain also attached special importance to the correct functioning of an integrated national system to ensure security in the nuclear industry and nuclear activities, and prevent illicit trafficking in and improper use of nuclear and radioactive material. It would continue to work together with the institutions of other Member States through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. At the latest Plenary Meeting of the Initiative, Spain had assumed leadership of the group that would prepare the work plan and coordinate all activities of a technical nature. One of its main priorities in that

regard was to develop flexible mechanisms for coordination with the Agency to avoid duplication and promote synergy among all international stakeholders in combating nuclear terrorism.

63. In its important work to promote the development of safety standards in Member States, the Agency had the support of Spain's Nuclear Safety Council, which dedicated part of its extrabudgetary contribution to translating proposed Agency standards into Spanish.

64. Spain welcomed the progress that had been made in negotiating an agreement between the Agency and the European Union to improve cooperation on peer reviews using IRRS missions as a model, the details of which would be presented at an international conference to be held in Brussels in June 2011 under the presidency of the Nuclear Safety Council.

65. The latter collaborated fully with the Agency in implementing such missions and would be holding a workshop on design basis threat in October 2010 to share best international practices, in accordance with the commitments it had undertaken following the IRRS mission in 2008. At the start of 2011, it would receive a follow-up mission to review compliance with the recommendations and suggestions of that mission.

66. The Nuclear Safety Council worked with the regulatory bodies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay within the framework of the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies, which promoted a high level of safety in the region and benefited from the Agency's valuable assistance.

67. Spain had also continued to provide financial and technical support to technical cooperation programmes to strengthen the regulatory structures in the countries of North Africa. In November 2009, the Nuclear Safety Council, together with the Agency, had organized a workshop on regulatory practices for experts from Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.

68. The Council had celebrated its 30th anniversary in June 2010 and thanked the Agency's Director General for his participation in the commemorative activities.

69. Spain recognized the importance of technical cooperation and supported the conclusions of the study on the Millennium Development Goals performed by the Department of Technical Cooperation. It also applauded the Director General's decision to assign high priority in 2010 to PACT, to which it had made significant financial contributions. Spain paid its TCF target in full and contributed additional extrabudgetary funding to projects in Latin America and North Africa, providing experts for specific missions, offering training courses and subsidizing and hosting fellowships and scientific visits to companies in the nuclear sector, in particular the Research Centre for Energy, Environment and Technology (CIEMAT). In that connection, he paid tribute to Mr Juan Antonio Rubio, the Director General of CIEMAT, who had recently passed away and who had enthusiastically promoted cooperation activities with the Agency under ARCAL.

70. With regard to the preparation of the programme and budget for 2012–2013 and the Medium Term Strategy 2012–2017, in view of the budgetary constraints caused by the serious economic and financial crisis Spain advocated zero growth in the budgets of all international organizations in the United Nations system, including the Agency. Any discussions should therefore focus on where cuts could be made while still ensuring compliance with the Agency's statutory objectives, using the 2011 budget as a reference. The Spanish authorities also reiterated their offer of support to the Director General in launching the long anticipated reform of management procedures.

71. Nuclear power continued to play an important role in Spain. The country had eight nuclear power units in operation with an installed capacity of 7728 MW, representing 7.85% of the total installed capacity for electricity generation. In 2009, gross electricity generation from nuclear power had been 52 890 GW·h, which was 17.6% of all electricity generated nationally.

72. Work on selecting a location in Spain for a centralized temporary storage facility for spent fuel and high-level waste was still ongoing. The public was being kept informed of progress via a special website. Once the Government had received a report on the proposals from an interministerial commission set up for that purpose, it would choose one of the eight proposed locations for the facility and its associated technological centre.

73. Mr BAYER (Turkey), summarizing recent developments in the nuclear energy field in his country, said energy demand in his country was projected to double in fifteen years. Ensuring secure, reliable, affordable and environmentally sustainable energy was the core of Turkey's energy policy, and a well balanced energy portfolio was key to improving the security and sustainability of the energy sector. It was a policy priority for his country to include nuclear energy in its energy mix, to meet growing electricity demand while avoiding increasing dependence on imported fuels and adverse impact on the environment. To that end, Turkey had concluded an agreement with the Russian Federation for the construction of four WWER-1200 reactors at the already licensed Akkuyu nuclear site. In addition, an agreement was being negotiated between the Turkish nuclear authorities, the nuclear authorities of the Republic of Korea and companies for the construction of nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 5000 MW(e) at the Sinop nuclear site, at which location detailed investigations were still being performed. His country therefore expected to have an installed nuclear capacity of at least 10 000 MW(e) by the year 2030.

74. Turkey was also enhancing its human resources and nuclear knowledge capacity and updating its existing nuclear legislation, taking into consideration the Agency's latest safety standards. A draft nuclear law reorganizing the existing nuclear regulatory infrastructure and a number of new or revised supporting nuclear safety regulations were also being approved.

75. Construction of a proton accelerator facility — the first of its kind in Turkey — had begun in February 2010 at the Sarayköy Nuclear Research and Training Centre of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority and would be completed by the end of the year.

76. The Agency's nuclear applications assistance to developing countries made a direct contribution to human well-being and helped build broad support for the Agency and its energy, safety, security, and non-proliferation missions. For Member States with no nuclear power reactors, i.e. the majority, technical cooperation in applications of nuclear techniques in agriculture, human health, industry, environment, hydrology, or biological and physical research was a primary benefit of membership in the Agency. Those programmes were therefore crucial to making the Agency relevant to the entire human family.

77. Strengthening the Agency's technical cooperation activities would substantially increase the quality of life throughout the world, particularly in developing countries and in LDCs.

78. Turkey had always strongly supported the Agency's promotional activities and its technical cooperation programme, the funding of which it considered to be the shared responsibility of all Member States. Turkey had been a non-user of Agency technical cooperation funds for the period 2009–2011 and had financially supported projects in partner countries such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

79. Member States should continue to provide the Agency with adequate resources through the Regular Budget so that it could conduct its statutory functions properly and effectively. In light of the Agency's urgent needs in the near future, Turkey would continue to support all reasonable, balanced and affordable budget increases.

80. The NPT regime was founded on a bargain that rested on the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy. Those three pillars deserved equal attention from all State Parties, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

81. Non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually reinforcing and his country would continue to spare no effort to promote issues of key importance for the long-term sustainability of the NPT, including universalization of the Treaty, further reduction of nuclear weapons and strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system. Those steps, together with the additional protocol, should be regarded as the current universal verification standard.

82. Universalization of the additional protocol would strengthen the non-proliferation regime, increase security throughout the world and, most importantly, significantly increase confidence, allowing international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to reach its full potential.

83. Turkey was concerned that 93 States still had no additional protocol and that, of those, 19 had still not brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency pursuant to the NPT. It called upon those States to sign, ratify and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols without delay.

84. It should be remembered that the NPT assigned responsibilities not only to non-nuclear-weapon States; it also placed important obligations (e.g. under Article VI) on the nuclear-weapon States. Turkey understood the ultimate goal of the NPT to be a world without nuclear weapons, and efforts aimed at non-proliferation should therefore be accompanied by efforts aimed at disarmament. Turkey applauded the recent developments in nuclear disarmament, in particular the New START agreement signed by the Russian Federation and the United States. It looked forward to rapid progress and concrete outcomes in connection with that agreement and called upon the other nuclear-weapon States to take similar steps to fulfil their obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

85. In his country's view, the Agency should have a mandate for the verification of disarmament activities. Concrete efforts toward nuclear disarmament were very important to encourage non-nuclear-weapon States to accept and implement a strengthened safeguards system.

86. Meanwhile, the existence of non-NPT States with nuclear weapons programmes was dangerously undermining the global safeguards system and the NPT and Turkey called on those States to sign the NPT and eliminate totally their military nuclear capabilities and programmes as soon as possible.

87. Turkey was fully committed to the objectives of the NPT based on its three mutually reinforcing pillars which, in its view, were of equal importance and should be addressed holistically. It thus welcomed the successful conclusion of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the unanimous adoption of a balanced and comprehensive final document with a forward-looking approach on each of the Treaty's three pillars. In particular, it welcomed the final document's reaffirmation of the importance of full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the commitment to reduce and eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons; and the reaffirmation of State Parties' commitment to implement effectively the decisions and resolutions of previous Review Conferences, including the right of all State Parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the relevant articles of the Treaty, and the commitment to hold a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

88. Turkey supported the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction wherever feasible, and in particular the establishment of an effectively verifiable zone free of such weapons and their means of delivery in the Middle East. It encouraged all efforts aimed at developing a common regional understanding to that end, with the participation of all parties

concerned. It strongly believed that all countries in the region should become party to all international arrangements for the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly the NPT. Possession of weapons of mass destruction did not provide additional security for any country, but rather further increased instability. Moreover, Israel's non-accession to the NPT and its widely acknowledged possession of weapons of mass destruction undermined international efforts to foster a regional environment conducive to the achievement of lasting peace and security. In that connection, Turkey attached particular importance to the reaffirmation by the 2010 NPT Review Conference of the commitment of the parties to achieve universality of the Treaty, and the concern expressed regarding the lack of progress in achieving that and in implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, which a majority of State Parties believed seriously undermined the Treaty and posed a threat to regional and international peace and security. Thus, his country welcomed the endorsement by consensus by the 2010 NPT Review Conference of the convening of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region. It looked forward to the constructive involvement of all States in the Middle East and the sponsors of the 1995 resolution throughout the preparatory process and beyond.

89. The Agency's international safeguards system was an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and Turkey attached great importance to its effectiveness and appreciated the meticulous manner in which the Secretariat approached verification activities under its mandate.

90. In that context, his country noted with satisfaction that the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, it also noted that the Agency was still unable to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in that country and that concerns were expressed in the Director General's reports in relation to the issues that remain unresolved. Turkey encouraged Iran to continue its dialogue and cooperation with the Agency in order to help clarify those issues, with a view to reaching a common understanding and building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

91. Turkey remained fully committed to a diplomatic solution to the issues relating to the Iranian nuclear file. As a neighbour of Iran, Turkey had been actively contributing to all constructive efforts that would ease the way for dialogue and cooperation.

92. A major diplomatic breakthrough had been achieved with the signing of the Joint Declaration in Tehran on 17 May 2010 by Iran, Turkey and Brazil. Based on the original nuclear fuel exchange proposal put forward by the Agency and supported by the Vienna Group, the Declaration laid out a realistic and achievable plan for negotiating, within specified timelines, the necessary agreements between the parties directly involved for the provision of 120 kg of nuclear fuel needed for the Tehran research reactor, in exchange for depositing 1200 kg of LEU. His country firmly believed that that agreement could serve as a significant confidence-building measure and a basis for negotiations between the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany and Iran. It therefore called on the relevant parties to implement the agreement without further delay.

93. Similarly, on the issue of the implementation of Syria's NPT safeguards agreement, it was essential that all parties display full transparency with a view to assisting the Agency in concluding its verification activities in Syria without further complications. Turkey trusted that continued engagement by and with Syria would help the Agency clarify ambiguities and eventually close that file.

94. His country reiterated its grave concern at the decision by the Government of the DPRK to cease all cooperation with the Agency in April 2009, and at other actions by the DPRK, in particular

the testing of two nuclear explosive devices and the resumption of operations at the reprocessing facility in Yongbyon. Those acts posed a severe threat to international peace and security and undermined the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region. Turkey therefore called on the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete and irreversible manner under Agency verification, to cease immediately all related activities, act strictly in accordance with its international obligations and return immediately to the six-party talks without preconditions.

95. Turkey was following closely the ongoing debate on multilateral approaches to assurance of supply of nuclear fuel. The proposed arrangements had technical, political, legal and economic implications that needed much more discussion. His country was prepared to consider non-discriminatory approaches that would assure uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel in a manner which did not impair the current fuel market, based on objective criteria and without prejudice to the legitimate rights of States to develop their own peaceful nuclear capabilities under the NPT. From Turkey's perspective, those mechanisms should fully convince States that they would be able to obtain nuclear fuel in a predictable, stable and cost-effective manner over a long period without any undue interference.

Mr Puja (Indonesia) took the Chair.

96. Mr TURDIU (Albania) said that his country's foreign policy was strongly marked by its commitment to peace and prosperity not only in Europe, but worldwide. As an active member of the Agency, Albania attached great importance to disarmament and non-proliferation, and to meeting its obligations in that regard under relevant international treaties. It also attached great importance to the implementation of all resolutions adopted by the General Conference and decisions of the Board of Governors, in particular those aimed at ensuring an effective and efficient international safeguards system and universality of that system. Aware as it was of the importance of the additional protocol as a fundamental instrument for achieving the aforementioned objectives, Albania had ratified its additional protocol just a few days previously.

97. In recent years, his country had made tremendous progress in combating organized crime and illicit trafficking. The Albanian Government gave due attention to continued and close cooperation with the relevant international agencies — including the Agency — in the field of nuclear security and the fight against terrorism. Its integrated border management and control was of the highest quality and very efficient at all border checkpoints, as well as along its land and sea borders. As the Nuclear Security Report 2010 (GC(54)/9) showed, the Agency was continuing to assist Member States in developing a sustainable nuclear security capacity. He noted with satisfaction that Albania was part of the Agency's global plan to combat nuclear terrorism and affirmed his Government's commitment to implementing that plan successfully. Most Member States, including his own, participated actively in the Agency's illicit trafficking database and Albania continued to have a strong interest in the Agency's training and educational programmes in that area.

98. Regarding nuclear applications, Albania attached great importance to applications in the areas of energy, health, environment, education, safety and security, in line with its mid- and long-term development priorities. Preparation of the country's new CPF for the period 2011–2015 was progressing well. Following the recent developments in the country, in particular the recent establishment of Albania's National Nuclear Agency, the promotion and introduction of nuclear power was now a priority and one that would be reflected in the new CPF. The proposed programme of technical cooperation with the Agency for the 2012–2013 cycle covered those important issues and the National Nuclear Agency, working closely with the relevant Agency departments, would be developing a suitable infrastructure for the introduction of nuclear power in Albania.

99. His country would continue to be a beneficiary of PACT. The Albanian Government was very appreciative of the Agency's assistance in that regard and was fully committed to strengthening cancer control in the country.

100. With respect to nuclear power and non-power technology applications, nuclear technology transfer and implementation were lengthy processes and the Agency's assistance would be required for many years to come.

101. His Government believed that the Agency could play a crucial role in facilitating nuclear disarmament through verification. In its answer to the Director General's letter regarding resolution GC(53)/RES/16 on the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the Albanian Government had indicated that it viewed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, and in others, as a positive step towards achieving global nuclear disarmament. The 2010 NPT Review Conference's endorsement of the convening of a conference in 2012, with the participation of all relevant Member States, to address the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East afforded a good opportunity to work towards achieving a comprehensive and long-term peace in that region. For the conference to succeed, all of the parties in the region would need to come together voluntarily. It was important therefore that the Agency approach the issue in harmony with the consensus achieved at the NPT Review Conference in New York.

102. In conclusion, he reiterated his Government's full support for the Agency in the fulfilment of all its statutory functions under the guidance of its Director General.

103. Mr LUNDBORG (Sweden) said that 2010 marked an important milestone for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. His country was committed to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and welcomed the consensus reached at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The action plan on all three pillars of the NPT, and the agreement on a process to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, demonstrated the common resolve of all countries to uphold and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and promote disarmament. The Agency's safeguards system was a fundamental component of that regime and played an indispensable role in implementation of the NPT. As had been reaffirmed by the NPT Review Conference, a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol ensured a solid and effective safeguards system. Believing that such a system should also make effective use of State and regional systems, his country welcomed the collaboration between the Agency and the European Union, as demonstrated by their partnership approach and their initiative to conduct joint training of inspectors. Sweden also warmly welcomed the initiative of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to invite the Agency to verify independently the implementation of their agreement on the disposition of plutonium no longer required for defence purposes.

104. Sweden remained convinced of the benefits of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and was willing to continue discussions on the development of such approaches in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner. The European Union would support financially the LEU bank proposed by the Secretariat once the conditions and modalities had been defined and approved by the Board, and he called upon the Director General to update that proposal to reflect prior discussions so that the Board might soon be in a position to take the necessary steps to implement that important project.

105. Iran was failing to cooperate fully with the Agency and continued to defy numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions. Sweden underlined the importance of resolving the issue diplomatically, peacefully and without delay.

106. It was great cause for concern that the Syrian Arab Republic had not cooperated with the Agency since June 2008 on the matter related to the Dair Alzour site, thus preventing the Agency from completing its assessment and determining the nature of the site. His country urged Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency and to bring into force an additional protocol.

107. He reaffirmed his country's support for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. A balanced and consensual approach was needed to enable the Agency and its Member States to contribute positively to that goal. Sweden looked forward to a successful outcome of the 2012 conference on that subject.

108. It was deeply regrettable that the Agency had not been able to implement safeguards in the DPRK since December 2002 and therefore could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding that country.

109. Only effective multilateralism could deal with the threat of nuclear weapon proliferation. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the CPPNM, in conjunction with Agency security and verification activities and national implementation of international instruments, were vital to countering nuclear terrorism and illegal diversion of or trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. The self-assessment and benchmarking offered under the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management had proven to be invaluable in raising national awareness and encouraging the creation of national policies and appropriate legal and regulatory systems, and a higher level of safety and radiation protection.

110. As a prerequisite for embarking on nuclear power programmes, countries should be required to set up the necessary technical and regulatory infrastructures for nuclear safety and security. Relevant nuclear safety and security instruments and the Agency's safety standards and security guidance should be vital tools in such a task, and an independent regulatory body with the necessary powers and human and financial resources to supervise the planned nuclear facilities was an indispensable requirement. Solutions for waste management and decommissioning of facilities also had to be taken into consideration.

111. Sweden welcomed the completion of the reviews of the Euratom safety standards and the Basic Safety Standards, which had taken due account of ICRP recommendations, the Agency's Safety Fundamentals and advances in radiation protection research. The new safety standards were expected to enhance, modernize and harmonize measures taken within the international community to protect human health and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation. The Agency's continued long-term work in that area was important and greatly appreciated.

112. In June 2010, the Swedish parliament had adopted a law lifting the ban on the building of new nuclear reactors. Under the new law, which would enter into force in 2011, it would be possible to build a new reactor to replace an existing reactor that was permanently shut down, on a site where an operating reactor was already located. The Parliament had also passed a new act on liability and compensation in the event of radiological accidents, under which the operator of a nuclear facility had unlimited liability and was obliged to finance that liability up to €1200 million. The act would enter into force once the relevant decision was taken by the Government. Furthermore, Sweden would be acceding to the 2004 amendments of the Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention.

113. Sweden's nuclear power plants were undergoing extensive safety modernization to improve their resistance to malfunctions and incidents, as a result of more stringent requirements imposed by the regulator. Power upgrades were also planned for 8 of the 10 nuclear power plants, thereby adding 1200 MW(e) electrical power. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB)

had selected a site at Forsmark for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel. It would be submitting a licence application for its construction in early 2011, and it was foreseen that the repository would be operational by around 2025. Several safety reviews, additional research and follow-up programmes would be implemented before commissioning the repository. Sweden underlined the importance of international efforts to find a common framework for safe radioactive waste management and disposal.

114. Swedish regulatory activities were characterized by openness, transparency and trustworthiness. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority had requested a full-scope IRRS review of its activities to be carried out in 2012. His country looked forward to that review, the preceding self-evaluation and to benefitting from the regulatory experience and expertise of the international review team members. Sweden supported the IRRS and would continue to provide experts for IRRS teams.

115. His country continued to be active in the field of international nuclear safety and security cooperation. In 2009, the annual budget for Sweden's bilateral engagement had amounted to €6 million and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority had implemented some 50 projects. Sweden welcomed the initiative of the United States to host a Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010. It had participated and reported on its engagement within the framework of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and other fora for international cooperation on nuclear safety and security.

116. Mr LABBÉ VILLA (Chile) underlined the importance of the Agency's non-proliferation, verification, technical cooperation and nuclear safety activities.

117. Promoting and facilitating research, development and the practical application of atomic energy was one of the Agency's central functions, carried out through the Department of Technical Cooperation and specific projects implemented with Member States. Availability of resources was vital to those activities and he announced that Chile had paid its full share of the TCF.

118. The current technical cooperation programme cycle had begun in January 2009 and his country was implementing 14 national projects and participating in 57 regional and interregional projects, including 24 ARCAL projects, four of which Chile would lead.

119. Chile had continued to study the possibility of integrating nuclear energy into its national electricity grid. For three years, the Agency had been collaborating with it in various studies to provide objective answers to the complex questions that nuclear power raised for an informed, democratic society.

120. Over the preceding year, a group of young professionals had been established within the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission. The Commission's role was to undertake similar studies and address particularly sensitive areas such as public acceptance of nuclear power. Although no political decision had yet been taken on the introduction of nuclear power in Chile, the possibility was being discussed and it remained an option. He expressed appreciation for the Agency's support in studying the possibilities and in helping Chilean professionals attend training courses, technical meetings and seminars.

121. With regard to radiation safety, the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission had organized a course on front-line response to radiological emergencies in August 2010 in collaboration with the Agency. Forty representatives of various national bodies, including the fire, police and customs services, the army, and the Ministry of Health, had participated in the course, the main aim of which had been to train leaders to deal with a radiological emergency and equip them with the necessary tools to fulfil their function as front-line responders. They had also received training in peer education and the establishment of action groups to respond to such events.

122. Work had continued on a storage facility for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, with significant assistance in the design phase from the United States Department of Energy.

123. In line with its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, Chile had decided to eliminate all existing HEU fuel from its research reactors. Under the global initiative to reduce use of HEU fuel, Chile's fuel had been sent to the United States. Careful planning had allowed the operation to be completed successfully and without incident.

124. In February 2010, Chile had suffered an earthquake measuring 8.9 on the Richter scale, the fifth strongest since the scale had been introduced. Although the earthquake had reached a magnitude of 8.3 in the area of the country where its nuclear research reactors were located, neither reactor had sustained any damage. One reactor had been in full operation and its safety systems had worked perfectly, shutting it down and maintaining it in a safe mode. The Agency had immediately offered to send an expert mission to assess the situation on the ground. A mission organized by the International Seismic Safety Centre, comprising experts from the Agency, Japan, the United States and Chile, had evaluated the situation and held a seminar on both the Chilean earthquake and experience in other countries. He thanked the Agency for its rapid response in the face of a natural disaster on such a scale.

125. The Agency's nuclear security programme had gained particular prominence over the preceding year thanks to various multilateral events, including the International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems held in December 2009, the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the successful 2010 NPT Review Conference, which, from their different perspectives, had all helped to highlight the overarching nature of the Agency's work and the valuable advisory services it provided to States. Chile was party to multilateral instruments relating to nuclear and radiation safety, emergency assistance, civil liability for nuclear damage and physical protection of nuclear material.

126. In his introductory speech, the Director General had recalled that over 60 countries had expressed interest in national nuclear programmes, between 10 and 25 of which were hoped to have taken concrete steps by 2030. In that situation, it was vital to strengthen the multilateral legal framework, enhance international cooperation and consolidate the safety culture. In all those areas, it was the Agency's job to provide support in accordance with its Statute and the mandate given to it by Member States, in particular responding effectively and promptly to the latter's requests for assistance.

127. His country attached high priority to the safe transport of nuclear material, an issue it raised frequently in international forums. The nuclear industry could not be completely risk-free. Within the Agency, Chile would continue to support actively such initiatives as the annual resolution submitted to the General Conference on strengthening the transport safety regime. A culture of transparency, notification and cooperation between States and relevant international bodies was needed in that area. Consultations between coastal and shipping States within the General Conference helped to build confidence and encourage dialogue, improving communication on the safe maritime transport of radioactive material. He expressed appreciation to the Secretariat for supporting the meeting on that issue earlier in 2010, which had included a simulated incident.

128. Chile supported general and complete disarmament and all global and regional efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was an active party to all relevant international instruments, which it wished to see universally applied, and to various multilateral and intergovernmental agreements. It had ratified the CTBT, the entry into force of which was essential for progress in nuclear disarmament. He therefore urged all States that had not yet ratified that Treaty, particularly Annex 2 countries, to do so.

129. As a member of the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area, his country supported the establishment of such zones in other parts of the world, notably the Middle East.

130. Article III of the NPT entrusted the Agency with a vital role in verification. The additional protocol enhanced the Agency's ability to provide assurances regarding the non-existence of undeclared nuclear activities in a country. Though it was still a voluntary instrument, it became binding once ratified and its provisions helped strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Universal adherence to it would allow for substantial improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.

131. The annual report on safeguards implementation presented an encouraging picture of how Member States were meeting their commitments, but some areas of concern remained. The lack of progress in efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula was regrettable. Chile deplored the 2009 nuclear test by the DPRK and the fact that the Pyongyang regime was not allowing the Agency access to its nuclear facilities, thereby preventing the Director General from reporting adequately on the nature and scope of that country's activities. His country hoped that the DPRK would return to the six-party talks and rejoin the NPT. Chile would once again be sponsoring the draft resolution on that issue submitted to the General Conference. It had also consistently supported the Agency's verification work in the Islamic Republic of Iran and recognized that country's collaboration in safeguards activities. Nevertheless, it was an objective fact that there was still a lack of confidence in the non-existence of a military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme, and Iran should cooperate fully with the Agency to dispel the international community's doubts. Iran must meet its international commitments if it wished to occupy its deserved place in the community of nations.

132. He underlined the need for all organizations, including the Agency, to maintain sufficient flexibility and resources to meet the challenges of an ever changing world. The 2005 World Summit of the United Nations had affirmed the interdependence of and synergies between the three pillars of the multilateral system: safety, development and human rights. The Agency contributed to achieving the Millennium Development Goals through its work in the areas of power, agriculture, mining and other industrial applications, health and the environment. The nuclear renaissance was also due to the undeniable advantages of atomic energy in preventing climate change. It was in the interests of all countries for the Agency to be strong, with the human and other resources it needed to carry out its mandate. Chile would continue to support the Agency's work in all areas.

133. Mr SABBAGH (Syrian Arab Republic), in connection with the issue of the application of safeguards in his country, thanked those Member States that had expressed understanding and support for Syria's position. He expressed regret at the statements of some States, in particular their failure to condemn the Israeli act of aggression against Syrian territorial sovereignty in September 2007 which constituted a flagrant violation of international law and for which Israel had never been held to account.

134. As regards Syria's cooperation with the Agency, he pointed out that it had allowed an Agency team to visit the site of the destroyed building in Dair Alzour in June 2008, to move around freely and to take samples without hindrance. Also, Syria had provided the Agency with information and replies to all its questions that were sufficient to prove the nature of the site. Recently, it had reached an agreement with the Secretariat on a plan to clarify some questions related to the results of the analysis of the samples taken from the miniature neutron source reactor, with a view to closing that issue and returning to routine safeguards implementation. Syria was committed to continuing its cooperation with the Agency in accordance with its obligations under the Statute and its NPT comprehensive safeguards agreement.

135. On the longstanding issue of the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, he noted that all States in the region were now within the framework of the NPT regime except for Israel, which still refused to accede. Syria, which had long striven to make the region a nuclear-weapon-free zone, had submitted a draft resolution to that end, on behalf of the Arab Group, to the United Nations

Security Council when it had been a member in 2003. Unfortunately, the resolution had failed to secure the approval of the States that supported Israel.

136. The final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference had called for the convening of a conference in 2012 aimed at ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons. His country considered that to be a step towards the establishment of useful mechanisms, if Israel demonstrated the clear political will to take that path. In the past, the intransigence of successive Israeli Governments had undermined the chances of success of such initiatives. Great responsibility was borne by the nuclear-weapon States to help achieve the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. They needed to fulfil their obligations under the NPT, particularly the commitment to refrain from supplying Israel with nuclear material and technology.

137. The successful adoption of resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities the preceding year had sent a clear message expressing the concern of a large section of the international community regarding Israel's continued efforts to develop its nuclear capabilities outside any international control. The resolution had also stressed the importance of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Director General's report on the topic was disappointingly lacking in content. It simply annexed letters from Member States without any attempt to analyse or comment on them. Also, the report contained no assessment of Israeli nuclear capabilities, especially those of a military nature. Syria had hoped that the report would set forth the vision of the Agency — as the sole international organization responsible for preventing nuclear proliferation — vis-à-vis the concerns of States in the region about the existence of Israeli reactors outside international control. The report did not put forward any proposals regarding verification of Israeli activities or measures to deal with Israel's refusal to implement relevant United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, as well as resolutions of the General Conference, or its refusal to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear installations under Agency comprehensive safeguards, thereby realizing the goal of universality of the NPT in the Middle East.

138. In that connection, Syria called for support for the draft resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities which was being submitted by the Arab Group to the current session of the General Conference and it appealed to States which had abstained or voted against the resolution the preceding year to reconsider their positions.

139. Syria welcomed the recent examination by the Director General of the need to respect the confidentiality of information the Agency received from Member States, and the measures taken with respect to the obligation of officials not to divulge confidential information even after they ceased working for the Agency. That was a matter which impinged on the Agency's credibility and the rights of Member States and his country looked forward to further steps in that regard.

140. Syria valued the Agency's efforts to focus support on strategic plans for training and education in the area of radiation, transport and waste safety. His country wished to strengthen its cooperation with the Agency and, in that connection, he mentioned the training course on radiation protection organized by the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria in cooperation with the Agency which, in the 11 years for which it had existed, had produced some 260 graduates from Arab States. In addition, the Commission had recently inaugurated a science and technology training centre which would help build competencies in all peaceful applications of atomic energy at both national and regional level.

141. The Syrian Arab Republic, through its competent bodies, provided a great deal of support to the technical cooperation programme, not only under ARASIA but also through other regional activities conducted by the Agency, to consolidate the principle of regional cooperation and partnership.

142. As regards Syria's national technical cooperation programme, his country had now finalized and would soon sign its CPF for 2010–2015. It looked forward to that document laying the foundation for closer cooperation with the Agency in future cycles.

143. In 2010, his Government had held the first national conference on energy to discuss available options for meeting the global growth in energy demand. The conference had recommended considering nuclear power as one possible energy option for the future. Syria was cooperating with the Agency regarding the necessary infrastructure and nuclear safety issues and had received an Agency expert review mission under a technical cooperation project on the construction of its first nuclear power plant. Also, the relevant national bodies were preparing the corresponding national plans. In that connection, Syria valued highly the Agency's efforts to prepare guidance documents and training courses to assist States which had decided to embark on nuclear power programmes in drawing up their national plans.

144. In conclusion, his country looked forward to further efforts by the Agency in the field of nuclear science and technology, particularly in view of the growing need of developing States for practical solutions to the development problems they were facing.

145. Mr SYCHOV (Belarus) said that the role of nuclear power in the socio-economic development of States was growing. The range of peaceful applications of atomic energy was very broad: from electricity generation to medicine. The importance of the Agency as the coordinator of global use of nuclear energy and a provider of technical assistance and advice to Member States was growing similarly.

146. His country had announced its interest in developing a national nuclear power programme and had taken the decision to construct its first nuclear power plant, a project that would require ongoing collaboration with the Agency. Belarus was also establishing the necessary infrastructure for nuclear power. A law on the utilization of atomic energy had been adopted in 2008 and it defined the legal basis for the safe development of nuclear power, outlined the powers of State and local authorities and regulated matters connected with nuclear facilities and material. Belarus has also approved a strategy document in 2010 for the development of its electricity generation capacity up to 2020, which included a list of legislative and regulatory documents that would need to be adopted for a nuclear power plant to be constructed.

147. A great deal of work had gone into a national assessment of the environmental impact of planning and constructing a nuclear power plant in the country. In October 2009, public hearings had taken place near the site of the future nuclear power plant with participation by experts, academics, the public and representatives of foreign States. Information on the environmental impact assessment had also been sent to States that had expressed the intention of participating. In 2010, public hearings and interorganizational consultations had taken place in Austria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. Critical comments and proposals were being taken into consideration in producing the assessment document.

148. Belarus was also actively involved in international cooperation in connection with its nuclear power plant project. In 2009, an intergovernmental agreement had been signed between Belarus and the Russian Federation on cooperation on the peaceful use of atomic energy. The agreement defined areas of cooperation in the development, planning, construction and operation of the plant, supply of nuclear fuel, nuclear and radiation safety, and scientific collaboration and staff training issues. Belarus had signed a similar agreement with China.

149. It would be impossible to undertake such a large-scale nuclear power project without the involvement of the Agency, and his country greatly appreciated its close cooperation on a wide range of issues related to the programme. The role of the Agency in supporting States considering or

adopting nuclear power should be strengthened. Agency assistance had also been important in developing Belarus's nuclear culture, including through the seminar on nuclear power development issues held in Minsk in February 2010 and attended by high-level State officials and Agency experts.

150. His country was actively involved in Agency technical cooperation in areas of major socio-economic impact such as nuclear power infrastructure development, rehabilitation of land affected by the Chernobyl accident, and health. Since 2009, the Agency had been providing assistance for the establishment of nuclear power in Belarus and further cooperation was planned in the training of staff for the nuclear power programme and the development of the country's nuclear safety regulatory system.

151. The cooperation between Belarus and the Agency to rehabilitate land contaminated by the Chernobyl accident was fully in line with the United Nations Chernobyl strategy, which envisioned the transition of the affected land to sustainable socio-economic development. Belarus expected the Agency to be actively involved in the United Nations plan for the decade of recovery and sustainable development for areas affected by Chernobyl.

152. Belarus was among the countries that had submitted project designs for the 2012–2013 technical cooperation cycle. The projects focused on further nuclear power infrastructure development, strengthening of the nuclear and radiation safety system, application of nuclear energy in medicine, and rehabilitation of areas affected by the Chernobyl accident.

153. His country strongly supported the strengthening and expansion of the technical cooperation programme. Funding for the programme should be more predictable and assured. For a number of years, Belarus had pledged and paid its voluntary contributions to the TCF in full and on time. It would be doing so again in 2011 and called on all Member States to follow that example.

154. Belarus supported the Agency's work on nuclear and radiation safety, a subject to which it gave a high priority. In that connection, he stressed the importance of the universalization and effective implementation of international legal instruments like the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

155. The Agency's work on nuclear security was equally deserving of appreciation. Belarus and the Agency had begun work on a draft Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan. An expert meeting on the issue had been held in Minsk in June 2010. The plan was awaiting final approval.

156. In 2010, Belarus would be holding a national seminar on issues related to implementation of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 protocol amending that Convention, with a view to meeting its obligations under those instruments.

157. Belarus was committed to the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It accorded great importance to the strengthening of Agency safeguards and fully implemented its own obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement. By the end of 2010, it expected to have completed the internal governmental processes needed to ratify its additional protocol.

158. He stressed the inalienable right of all Member States under the NPT and the Agency's Statute to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was essential to ensure equal, non-discriminatory access to nuclear energy for all interested countries.

159. In the current global economic situation, the limited resources available to the Agency must be used with the greatest efficiency, focusing on priorities which were based on the needs and interests of Member States. The welfare of many people depended on the Agency's effective implementation of ambitious, long-term projects in conjunction with Member States.

160. Mr FERUTA (Romania) said that his country had continued to explore and evaluate ways of maintaining nuclear power as a significant option in meeting its future energy needs and environmental goals. Continued growth in the nuclear power contribution to the national energy mix was an objective of the national energy strategy.

161. The global financial crisis had affected prospects for major investments, but the Romanian authorities were pursuing their plans for the commissioning and operation of Units 3 and 4 of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant. The Government was looking into ways of attracting new investors and a number of options were under consideration, including a reduction in State participation in several projects to below the majority shareholder level. Work on a new nuclear power plant, expected to become operational in the next decade, was in progress; a preliminary site selection study was being conducted.

162. The national strategy for medium- and long-term management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste called for the construction of a surface repository for low- and intermediate-level waste generated by the Cernavoda plant.

163. With regard to the promotion of non-power nuclear energy applications for sustainable development, Romania was focusing on the areas of human health and the environment, as well as nuclear science and technology.

164. His country planned to introduce new medical and industrial image analysis and processing systems. Expansion of early diagnosis and cancer treatment centres throughout the country that made use of positron emission tomography remained a priority.

165. Technical cooperation projects were also planned in the area of nuclear medicine with a view to training medical personnel and transferring expertise, with a particular focus on a new generation of physicians specialized in early prevention and monitoring of cancer. He referred in that connection to the fruitful discussions which the Romanian authorities had had with the Director General during his visit to the country earlier in the year, and he commended the Director General for the emphasis he had placed on the Agency's role in combating cancer.

166. The preceding year had seen the completion of a project related to the new control-command console for the TRIGA reactor at the Pitesti Nuclear Research Institute. Commissioned in 1980, that reactor, which was the most powerful TRIGA reactor ever built, had been the world's first reactor to be fully converted — in 2006 — from HEU to the more proliferation-resistant LEU under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Programme. The modernization of all the control-command systems, including the reactor operation and safety systems, had taken into account operating experience and IAEA guidance.

167. The Pitesti TRIGA reactor was essential for fuel characterization and implementation of new fuel cycles for Cernavoda Units 3 and 4 and the new power plant planned. Nuclear research would also be further developed in the field of radioisotopes, advanced materials technologies and irradiation techniques with applications in industry, agriculture, medicine, environmental and civil protection, and research.

168. In implementing the national nuclear programme, efforts were also being made to attract human resources and strengthen nuclear knowledge management. Romania looked forward to cooperating with IAEA expert missions to address the impending loss of critical knowledge and skills and promote human resources training and retention. With a view to expanding its national nuclear programme, his country would be stepping up its participation in INPRO projects focusing on new power technologies, as well as studies and simulations for a synergic approach to different fuel cycles.

169. Romania had consistently paid its contribution to the TCF and was in the process of becoming a technical assistance donor State, offering its experience and expertise in preparing and organizing international and regional activities, and in the field of capacity building and peer reviews for nuclear newcomers. The Romanian regulatory body planned to create a regional centre of excellence in the nuclear field to provide training courses for Romanian and foreign experts and organize fellowships and visits under the technical cooperation programme.

170. In keeping with its commitments under the NPT, Romania actively supported non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The NPT was an essential instrument for collective security. Its three interconnected pillars were the appropriate framework for preserving and strengthening international peace and security, while spreading the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference was balanced and pragmatic and reflected the firm commitment of the international community to strengthen the global nuclear regime. The real challenge would be to ensure implementation of the action plan.

171. Over the years, his country had actively promoted Agency activities in the area of nuclear safety and security. International cooperation and adherence to the relevant instruments in the field remained crucial to promoting the global nuclear safety framework. Romania complied with all international conventions on nuclear safety and applied the Agency codes of conduct and safety standards. It commended the Agency for its work in the nuclear security field and would continue to support it.

172. Integrated safeguards were currently being applied in Romania at major facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle. His country met its obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, to which it had been a party since the 1970s, and under its additional protocol. As of 1 May 2010, it would be applying the safeguards agreement and additional protocol concluded between Euratom, European Union non-nuclear-weapon States and the Agency.

173. Romania felt honoured to be guiding the process for preparation of the Agency's Medium Term Strategy 2012–2017 on behalf of Member States. The current year, which had seen many important events in the nuclear field, from the Nuclear Security Summit to the NPT Review Conference, offered Member States an opportunity to elaborate a more robust and relevant strategy that would guide the Agency's activities effectively for the next three biennia.

174. Finally, he stressed the importance his country attached to consolidating a culture of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through joint international efforts and active global diplomacy.

175. Mr DÍAZ (Mexico) said that the Annual Report for 2009 duly reflected the Agency's achievements in promoting international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and its efforts to promote effective nuclear safety, security and verification. Mexico noted with satisfaction that the Agency had focused in 2009 on assisting Member States in meeting their energy needs, responding to concerns about climate change, promoting food security and access to drinking water, and using nuclear technology to improve health care.

176. The international community was facing a number of challenges in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The first challenge related to efforts to secure a successful supply of energy for development, use of renewable forms of energy and the fight against climate change, on the one hand, and maintenance of international peace and security, on the other. The international community needed to have a clear awareness of common goals and ensure that its goals were not mutually exclusive. The second challenge related to closer coordination of the various components of the international nuclear regime which, owing to their diverse legal and political nature, could sometimes lead to problems of manageability. The third challenge facing the international community was the

need to finish consolidating the individual instruments and mechanisms, especially those that were legally binding, in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. That should be done the basis of the mandates of the organizations concerned.

177. The Agency should continue to adopt a balanced and equitable approach in the areas of cooperation, safety and security, and verification in order to achieve its core objectives, especially since events during the preceding two years had created a climate conducive to disarmament and non-proliferation.

178. The Agency's role as the principal intergovernmental forum for technical and scientific cooperation in support of peaceful uses of nuclear technology should be continuously enhanced. Mexico attached great importance to the technical cooperation programme and to all measures designed to ensure optimum use of resources in that area, especially in the fields of human health, food and agriculture, and the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation. Thus, it had prepared a CPF that would shortly be signed.

179. As an active promoter of technical cooperation among developing countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region, his country continued to support activities under ARCAL. The current week marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of ARCAL. Mexico would continue to demonstrate its support for ARCAL by hosting technical meetings, training fellows and sending experts to other countries in the region.

180. Mexico's relations with the Agency were governed by the concept of partners in development. In addition to seeking the Agency's assistance in areas where it required international support, his country would continue to make available its knowledge and experience in the field of peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology to the international community in general and to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in particular.

181. His country had gained considerable experience in recent years in the use of food irradiation as a quarantine treatment and was willing to transfer the knowledge it had acquired through courses, workshops, fellowships and scientific visits.

182. As nuclear energy was a clean and safe source of energy that did not generate greenhouse gases, Mexico would continue studying the possibility and appropriateness of expanding its nuclear facilities. The Laguna Verde nuclear power plant was continuing with the power upgrade of its two reactors. The capacity of Unit I had been upgraded to 800 MW(e) and pre-operational tests were under way. Work on Unit II would be completed in 2011.

183. The Mexican Academy of Engineering had published a very detailed paper in 2010 on nuclear power in Mexico, and the Senate had held a seminar on the subject in April 2010 which had been attended by national and foreign experts and representatives of international organizations, including the Agency.

184. Mexico appreciated the Agency's work under the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013 and took note of the Nuclear Security Summit that had been held in Washington earlier that year. While nuclear security was primarily the responsibility of individual States, the Agency played a vital role in the nuclear security regime. His country therefore reiterated its support for Agency efforts to promote physical protection of nuclear material and facilities and of radioactive sources, and to strengthen State legislation and regulations with a view to preventing nuclear terrorism. It also supported the application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

185. He noted with concern that 222 incidents had been reported to the illicit trafficking database during the preceding year, 21 of which had involved activities such as unauthorized possession of and

attempts to sell or smuggle nuclear material or radioactive sources, and 61 of which had involved the theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive material. He further noted that, in 58% of the latter incidents, the recovery of the material had not been reported.

186. His country was grateful to the Agency for the assistance it gave to Member States with improving protection against possible nuclear attacks, such as the support it had given to Colombia during the IX South American Games and to South Africa during the FIFA World Cup earlier in the year. The Agency had also launched a programme of nuclear security assistance to Mexico in preparation for the XVI Pan American Games to be held in Guadalajara in October 2011.

187. The additional protocol to the safeguards agreement between Mexico and the Agency had been submitted to the Senate for consideration. It was hoped that its ratification would shortly be approved.

188. The Agency continued to support, at Member States' request, the replacement of HEU fuel in research reactors. At the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, President Calderón had therefore announced the Mexican Government's decision to replace the HEU in the TRIGA III research reactor at the National Nuclear Research Institute with LEU, and to convert the reactor prior to its replacement.

189. The NPT Review Conference held in May 2010 had recognized the importance of ensuring the highest possible level of nuclear security and had urged State Parties to promote exchange of best practices in nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector.

190. At the recent Nuclear Security Summit, his country had reaffirmed its commitment in that area. The Summit had reaffirmed the Agency's essential role in the international nuclear security framework.

191. Mexico had held the office of Vice-President at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and had played a prominent role in the small group of States that had negotiated the final document, which referred to the three pillars of the Treaty, namely disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The document consisted of two main sections: a review of implementation of the Treaty, and conclusions and recommendations for follow-up action. The Conference had reaffirmed the essential role of the Agency in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, developing safety guidelines, and promoting technical cooperation and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through its safeguards system. It clearly demonstrated States' commitment and the fact that agreement could be reached notwithstanding differences of opinion. Mexico welcomed the fact that the Conference had agreed to hold a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. In his country's view, the 64 actions contemplated in the final document laid a solid foundation for achieving the shared goals of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mexico was a strong advocate of disarmament and non-proliferation and believed that the two were complementary. It would therefore continue working to bring about the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the use of which contravened all norms of international humanitarian law.

192. The Agency's efforts to establish a safeguards system that ensured effective compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime would never succeed in the absence of political will on the part of States. Mexico had made significant efforts in the area of non-proliferation and strongly supported all steps taken by the Agency to establish an effective international safeguards system.

193. His country continued to urge the resumption of the six-party talks aimed at promoting the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the reincorporation of the DPRK in the NPT regime.

194. It also called once again on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate effectively and without delay with the Agency, and to take steps to resolve all outstanding issues in a transparent and expeditious manner with a view to contributing to international peace and security.

195. Lastly, he urged Member States to reaffirm their commitment to all NPT rights and obligations in order to strengthen the three pillars of the Treaty for the benefit of all.

Mr Hu Xiaodi (China) took the Chair.

196. Ms MACMILLAN (New Zealand) said that the successful conclusion of the NPT Review Conference had provided an opportunity and an incentive to make progress towards the goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, and the opportunity had to be seized. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons through the implementation of safeguards under the NPT was a fundamental pillar of the Agency's work, and her country welcomed the recognition given to that fact and to the Agency's broader mandate in the final document of the Conference. The Agency had a crucial role to play in moving the non-proliferation agenda forward. An important outcome of the Conference had been the reaffirmation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the agreement to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the region; that was a highly significant agreement that all must play a part in supporting.

197. As a strong supporter of the NPT, New Zealand endorsed the principle that nuclear technology should be available for peaceful uses in conformity with Articles II and III of the Treaty, but with the expansion of the use of nuclear energy came a growth in the associated risks. It was her country's belief that safeguards, safety, security and waste management should be an integral part of the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There was a need to ensure that nuclear technologies were accessible to all, while at the same time ensuring that such technologies were managed safely and securely and did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

198. New Zealand attached importance to ensuring that the Agency had all the tools it needed to provide robust assurances to the international community that nuclear activities undertaken by States were solely for peaceful purposes. Current proliferation challenges meant that a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone was not sufficient to provide the Agency with the necessary authority to carry out its verification mandate fully. The additional protocol constituted the contemporary verification standard and should always feature as a condition in new supply arrangements for nuclear and associated material. In that context, her country welcomed the decision of the NPT Review Conference to encourage all State Parties which had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

199. Her country recognized the paramount importance of ensuring the safety of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and welcomed the Agency's work to support Member States in strengthening nuclear, radiation, transport and radioactive waste safety and emergency preparedness. The safe maritime transport of radioactive material remained of fundamental importance to New Zealand. Shipments must take place against a backdrop of the highest possible safety and security standards. Appropriate information must be provided to coastal States in advance of any shipments. Proper emergency response systems must be in operation, and there must be an effective liability regime in place to protect against harm to human health and the environment, and possible economic loss due to an incident or accident during the transport of radioactive material. New Zealand was pleased that some progress had been made in many of those areas but noted that there was scope for further positive developments. In that context, she welcomed the continued dialogue between coastal and shipping States, in particular on exchange of information regarding shipments. The most recent such

meeting on the preceding day had dealt with the issue of emergency preparedness and response. New Zealand strongly supported the work of INLEX, in particular its examination of gaps and ambiguities in the nuclear liability regime.

200. New Zealand concurred with the assessment that the possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material remained a grave threat and believed it was of paramount importance to maintain stringent standards of physical protection for nuclear material and nuclear facilities. It recognized the Agency's important role in helping Member States improve the global nuclear security framework. Although her country welcomed the inclusion in the Agency's Regular Budget of some funding for nuclear security activities, it noted with concern that uncertainty made it difficult for the Agency to plan and prioritize its activities in that area. It was therefore pleased to announce that it would be making a further contribution to those activities during the current year.

201. The NPT Review Conference had underscored the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the Agency's Statute and Member States' respective legal obligations, and she highlighted the decision of the Conference to call for Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.

202. New Zealand condemned the nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK, and its refusal to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions and cooperate with Agency inspectors. It urged the DPRK to refrain from further destabilizing acts and to refocus its efforts on peace and dialogue, including its six-party talks commitment to abandon its existing nuclear programme.

203. Her country shared the international community's concerns about the questions that remained with respect to Iran's nuclear programme and it urged that country to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions and suspend its enrichment and heavy water-related activities. It was concerned at the late disclosure of the nuclear facility at Qom, and Iran's decision earlier in the year to enrich uranium to 20%, and it urged Iran to implement fully its safeguards agreement and other obligations, including the modified Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements and the additional protocol.

204. New Zealand also called on the Syrian Arab Republic to be more cooperative and transparent in its provision to the Agency of information about and access to the Dair Alzour site and other related locations, and it encouraged Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency on the outstanding issues at the miniature neutron source reactor in Damascus.

205. The challenges facing the international non-proliferation regime were numerous, and only likely to grow. It was important for the international community to work together to agree upon and coordinate effective responses to meet those challenges. The Agency had a vital role in that collective response, working with Member States to safeguard and secure nuclear material for exclusively peaceful purposes to the benefit of the global family.

206. New Zealand welcomed and supported the Agency's work in applying the benefits of nuclear technology to the fields of human health, water quality, crop enhancement, and pest control. It also welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to develop national capacity in Member States, and promote regional and international cooperation in those areas. Such issues needed urgent action on a global scale, and progress in that regard would make a considerable difference and, over time, would benefit many millions of people.

207. Mr VALLIM GUERREIRO (Brazil) pledged his country's full support for the objectives of the Agency as defined in its Statute. Brazil was fully committed to the safe and secure promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Its nuclear programme was expanding. The construction of its third nuclear power plant with a 400 MW light-water pressurized reactor was in progress and it was expected to be operational by 2015. The Brazilian nuclear programme envisaged the construction of

eight additional nuclear power plants for which site studies had already begun. Fuel cycle activities were also expanding. Earlier in the year, an UPSAT mission had visited the uranium mine in Caeté for the first time. The commercial enrichment facility in Resende was being rapidly enlarged. Although Brazil's enrichment capacity still fell far short of current and future needs, the aim was to become self-sufficient in all stages of the fuel cycle by 2015. Work would begin shortly on the construction of a conversion facility.

208. All Brazilian nuclear facilities, both civilian and military, were under Agency and ABACC safeguards. Brazil cooperated fully with the Agency in the field of safeguards, as was demonstrated by the accreditation of the Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry of Brazil's National Nuclear Energy Commission as the first laboratory in the developing world in the Agency's network of safeguards laboratories.

209. All those activities were being carried out in accordance with Agency requirements and standards. Over the years, Brazil had developed a strong and effective regulatory authority, the National Nuclear Energy Commission. The Commission exercised full control over tens of thousands of radioactive sources in Brazil and kept them in safe storage facilities after their use by industry or hospitals. The lessons learned from the 1987 Goiânia incident, which had been the result of carelessness on the part of the owners of a medical clinic, had been instrumental in the development of the regulatory authority currently in place for the control of sources.

210. The current session of the General Conference was being held shortly after the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The NPT established rights and obligations. It did not create an institutional machinery entrusted with overseeing the Treaty's implementation. One pillar of the Treaty was overseen by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The other two — non-proliferation and peaceful uses — fell within the mandate of the Agency. If all of the pillars of the NPT were considered in conjunction with one another, the ultimate objective of the Treaty — a world free of nuclear weapons — would be closer.

211. There was a widespread misconception that the Agency was the guardian of the non-proliferation provisions of the NPT. That was simply not so. The Agency's mandate under the Treaty was to apply safeguards to source, and especially fissionable material in non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT. Beyond that, prying into activities of States which might be relevant to the nuclear field in one way or another was not part of the job description of the Agency, unless the State concerned agreed to allow it to do so. Brazil did not accept what many perceived as the Agency's jurisdiction creeping into areas which went beyond the scope of comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153.

212. His country was convinced that the main focus of the Agency's activities should be the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the enhancement of the well-being of humankind. That objective could only be achieved if requirements relating to safety, security and safeguards were met. However, the ultimate objective was the use of nuclear energy itself. Without the necessary safety requirements in place, the use of nuclear energy would defeat its own purpose. For example, the damage which might be caused by the unsafe operation of a power or research reactor would clearly outweigh its benefits. Safety was therefore of intrinsic importance. Security and safeguards, on the other hand, had been devised to guard against the evil side of human nature and were no less important.

213. In the more than fifty years of its existence, the Agency had had to adapt to new realities and find the means to meet new challenges. With the expected increase in the use of nuclear energy, the Agency would have to strike a balance between universal rules and procedures, and issues of a regional or national character. One size clearly did not fit all. However, the Agency also could not

afford to be accused of discrimination and double standards. In some parts of the world, the precepts upheld by the Agency might be well reflected in the domestic legal framework but might not be implemented effectively, and the opposite might also be true. Hence the importance of critical judgment, common sense and as wide a knowledge as possible of diverse realities.

214. His country was pleased at the way the new Director General had discharged his responsibilities in his first year in office. The Brazilian Foreign Minister had had a thoughtful exchange of views with the Director General during his visit to Brazil in March when he had visited the headquarters of ABACC. Brazil appreciated the cooperation between ABACC and the Agency and hoped that efforts would be redoubled in that area to avoid unnecessary duplication of work. One of the objectives of Argentina and Brazil was the strengthening of ABACC, as stated by the Presidents of the two countries in the recent Joint Declaration of San Juan.

215. The current session of the General Conference would have to address important and sensitive matters, some of which were controversial in nature. His country was confident that a spirit of compromise, and understanding for the concerns of others, would ultimately prevail. It was up to everyone to make the Agency a more effective institution that carried out its mandate in accordance with the Statute.

216. Mr DE LA PENA (Philippines) said that the 2010 NPT Review Conference had underlined the Agency's important role in helping countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals through its technical cooperation programme and its activities in nuclear power and non-power applications. The Philippines had chaired the Conference and looked forward to working with others in moving forward on the follow-up actions related to the Agency's work contained in the final document.

217. Through its cooperation with the Agency, the Philippines had been developing the necessary human resources and physical infrastructure for the use of nuclear technologies to help meet challenges in such areas as food security, environmental resources management and human health.

218. With regard to human health, his country welcomed the focus placed by the Director General on cancer control in developing countries. It looked forward to receiving an impACT mission to assist it in finalizing a draft national action plan on cancer control and identify ways in which it could further contribute to the network of cancer training centres in the region.

219. In the area of the environment, the Philippines had achieved significant milestones in the use of stable isotopes and environmental radiotracers in water resources management, and was participating as the pilot Member State in the implementation of the Agency's water availability enhancement project, which aimed to enhance the capacity of Member States to undertake water resources assessment. It was also working as an IAEA collaborating centre with the IAEA Environment Laboratories in Monaco on algal bloom studies.

220. In food and agriculture, irradiation technology had been used in support of the country's national agenda on food security for mutation breeding work, with a view to making some agricultural products drought-resistant and helping them gain access to the export market, and for disinfection of agricultural equipment to control the spread of infectious animal diseases. The Philippines welcomed the FAO decision in 2009 to extend and strengthen the work of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture, which had helped enhance the delivery of nuclear technologies for crop improvement, livestock production, soil and water management and food safety.

221. As countries were turning increasingly to the Agency for assistance with the development or expansion of nuclear power programmes, Member States should enhance their political and financial support for the organization's programmes in that area. The Philippines was working on the infrastructure components for launching a nuclear power programme, including the establishment of

the requisite regulatory framework, and was working with the Agency on human resources development; it was also refining a communications plan aimed at enabling the public to arrive at an informed decision on nuclear power. It had noted the information provided by the Agency on increasing public confidence in nuclear power in recent years, and it encouraged sustained efforts by the organization to address outstanding concerns that posed obstacles to the expansion or initiation of nuclear power programmes. It called on the Agency to enhance its efforts to facilitate bilateral and multilateral funding support for nuclear energy projects. The nuclear renaissance gave rise to challenges in terms of nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards; confidence in the use of nuclear energy hinged on the continuous improvement and strengthening of safety and security.

222. The Philippines continued to benefit from Agency assistance with the development of a safety infrastructure for a nuclear power programme, particularly in human resources development and the long-term management of radioactive waste. Knowledge networks and regional cooperation in nuclear safety were of great importance, especially in the light of the transboundary effects of a nuclear accident. The Philippines participated actively in the Asian Nuclear Safety Network and believed that a regional approach to capacity building through the creation of networks of national capacity building centres could help ensure the sustainability of national human resources development programmes.

223. His country shared the Agency's objective of attaining global nuclear security. With Agency assistance, it had finalized its national nuclear security plan in 2009 and had accepted the Agency Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan for the Philippines in March 2010. It was also collaborating with the Agency and bilateral partners on capacity building in nuclear security and radiological emergency preparedness and response.

224. Another challenge posed by the nuclear renaissance was the increasing risk of nuclear proliferation. The Philippines had ratified the additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement on 26 February 2010 and had submitted its initial report. The conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and provision of the Agency with the tools and resources to implement a credible verification system effectively, would go a long way towards reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

225. The Philippines had consistently stressed the importance of addressing the longstanding concern of developing countries with respect to maintaining a balance between the Agency's promotional activities and its verification activities. It looked forward to the resumption of discussions in the working group on financing the Agency's activities, which it hoped would address issues relating to the TCF and reach concrete and implementable outcomes. The final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference had emphasized that the financing of technical cooperation should be in line with the concept of shared responsibility, and that NPT State Parties were called upon to make every effort and take practical steps to ensure that Agency resources for technical cooperation activities were sufficient, assured and predictable.

226. With regard to the implementation of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran, his country remained concerned over the lack of substantive progress towards resolving the remaining issues that would enable Iran to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It was important to continue constructive dialogue and cooperation among all parties concerned to find a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the issue. The Philippines called on Iran to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Board and the United Nations Security Council.

227. Turning to the issue of the DPRK's nuclear programme, he recalled that, in the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, States Parties had deplored the nuclear test explosions announced by the DPRK in May 2009. Considering its proximity to the Korean Peninsula, the Philippines remained seriously concerned over the DPRK's acts of intransigence, which were serious

threats to peace and stability in the region and international norms on non-proliferation, and constituted a clear violation of commitments under the six-party talks and of obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. His country had consistently advocated a peaceful and just solution to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and was committed to helping create an environment of trust and confidence conducive to the DPRK's engagement with the international community.

228. On the issue of the implementation of safeguards in the Syrian Arab Republic, he expressed concern at the lack of progress in clarifying the substantive issues that had been raised in the Director General's most recent report. The Philippines urged all parties concerned to extend full cooperation to the Agency to enable it to complete the verification process and allow Syria to clarify the nature of its nuclear programme.

229. The Philippines shared the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons in which nuclear energy was used only for peaceful purposes. It strongly supported the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones as a way to contribute to international peace and security. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations had established the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and the Philippines encouraged the nuclear-weapon States and other partners in the region to accede to the treaty establishing that zone. It also supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference put forward concrete follow-up actions that States could pursue to help achieve that goal.

230. The challenges and issues confronting the Agency were complicated by political realities. Differences had to be overcome in order to advance common objectives, and the Philippines was committed to working with Member States in a spirit of mutual respect, trust, transparency and constructive dialogue.

231. Mr KONGSTAD (Norway) recalled that, at the NPT Review Conference in May, States party to the NPT had reached agreement on a final document setting out 64 concrete actions to strengthen disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the Treaty. Although his country believed that the document could have been more ambitious, it would do its utmost to contribute to the implementation of the 64 actions, including the commitment to convene in 2012 a conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

232. For several years, Iran had not cooperated with the Agency in a satisfactory manner regarding possible non-peaceful dimensions of its nuclear programme, nor had it met its obligations under its safeguards agreement. Its enrichment and heavy water-related activities were continuing and expanding, and no adequate assurance could be provided that all nuclear material in the country was for peaceful purposes. While no one was questioning Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Norway — which had supported the Agency's cooperation with Iran to strengthen the Iranian regulatory authority and the safety of the Bushehr reactor — expected Iran to meet its international commitments and its responsibilities as an Agency Member State.

233. For a number of years, the DPRK had refused to cooperate with the international community. It must refrain from any further provocation and return to the six-party talks immediately and without preconditions. His country called on the DPRK to abandon and dismantle completely any nuclear weapon-related programme in a prompt, verifiable and irreversible manner.

234. While Norway welcomed the recent action plan between Syria and the Agency to resolve outstanding issues relating to the miniature neutron source reactor site, Syria's lack of cooperation regarding the Dair Alzour site and related locations was regrettable. He called upon Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve the remaining questions concerning its nuclear programme.

235. Syria, Iran and other States that had not yet done so should sign and ratify without delay the additional protocol, since it was only through that instrument that the Agency could provide the requisite assurances regarding a nuclear programme, without which non-proliferation, common security and the ability to expand peaceful nuclear cooperation would be jeopardized. All States should join the NPT, sign safeguards agreements and work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, they should support the convening of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

236. Although commitment to nuclear security had been confirmed at the highest levels, slow progress was being made in adhering to the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM. All States should sign and ratify the global conventions on nuclear security, and cooperate with the Agency in their implementation. Norway had pledged \$3.3 million at the Nuclear Security Summit in April to strengthen the Agency's nuclear security assistance to developing countries.

237. The Agency had a critical role to play in reducing the risk of nuclear accidents, which was likely to increase given the anticipated growth in the use of nuclear energy. However, for too many years the Agency had suffered from a lack of resources, which had serious consequences for those States requiring assistance from the Agency. Norway had long argued that the Regular Budget of the Agency must increase in proportion to the organization's tasks. Despite some rise in budget levels, that was far from being the case. Pending adequate funding, Norway had offered to support the Agency's work to strengthen the safety capabilities of developing countries, and had formalized an agreement with the Agency for the allocation of €2.5 million over four years. The Agency's efforts in recent years to strengthen nuclear safety in Bulgaria and Romania had been supported by Norway and had generated a number of recommendations of relevance to other countries.

238. Efforts should be made to develop national capacities for emergency preparedness, and he emphasized the Agency's role in promoting international cooperation and facilitating coordination and communication in that regard. The recommendations contained in the international action plan for strengthening the international preparedness and response system for nuclear and radiological emergencies should be implemented by all.

239. With regard to cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, concern over possible disruptions in fuel supplies was an important matter for the Agency. Norway remained convinced that an Agency fuel bank would be an important step towards the development of an equitable and sustainable international nuclear fuel supply regime. It would uphold Member States' right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and would not require countries to renounce their normal sources of fuel supply or their right to develop a national fuel production capacity. It would only add to the options available to countries choosing to develop nuclear energy and would help to further non-proliferation. Norway welcomed the decision taken the preceding year to establish a uranium reserve in Russia, and the generous offer of Kazakhstan to host a future Agency fuel bank. Noting that funding to cover start-up costs had already been secured from more than 30 countries, including his own, he commended the work of the Secretariat thus far and requested the Director General to update the Secretariat's proposal for an Agency fuel bank to facilitate a decision by the Board of Governors.

240. Norway welcomed the fact that the Scientific Forum in 2010 was addressing the issue of cancer in developing countries and commended the Agency's contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goals through the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His country fully supported the technical cooperation programme and welcomed experts on scientific visits to Norway.

241. Mr ZOGRAFOS (Greece) said that his country had a strong interest in the Agency's ever expanding nuclear safety and security programmes, attached particular importance to a high level of nuclear safety and security worldwide and recognized the Agency's leading role in enhancing the

global security framework. The organization's safety standards were fundamental to any nuclear activity and should continue to enjoy high priority.

242. Greece strongly supported implementation of the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013, including activities under the EU Joint Action IV agreement. It saluted every effort aimed at strengthening safety requirements and the establishment of independent regulatory authorities in all countries in order to control and manage radiation sources.

243. In the field of nuclear safety, Greece had submitted its national report within the framework of the forthcoming fourth review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In the same field but at European level, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission had prepared a draft Presidential decree transposing into national legislation European Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations.

244. The International Seismic Safety Centre launched by the Agency several years previously was of great importance in assessing the specific needs of countries considering nuclear power reactor programmes.

245. In the nuclear security area, his country was continuing to make use of the equipment installed at its borders, and the hand-held equipment distributed to customs, police and coastguard officers, among others, and it was sharing the experience gained with other countries. Further activities had been agreed within the framework of a practical arrangement concluded between the Agency and the Greek Atomic Energy Commission, including the organization of around three regional training courses each year on response and detection techniques.

246. The Agency's activities in support of national efforts should be further strengthened to ensure the prevention of nuclear terrorism through effective physical protection. Greece was participating in the Agency's illicit trafficking database and was assisting in the drafting of relevant Agency recommendations and guidance documents. It encouraged the Agency to supply nuclear detection equipment to all States in need thereof.

247. The fact that the nuclear security challenge was global and thus required a global response had been recognized at the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington earlier in the year. His country appreciated the Agency's efforts to provide nuclear security services, and its willingness and availability to contribute to national nuclear security programmes.

248. The successful outcome of the recent NPT Review Conference had enhanced international confidence in the non-proliferation regime. The Agency had a very substantive role to play through its verification activities. Greece fully supported all the elements contained in the final document of that Conference.

249. The continuing success of Agency safeguards depended to a great extent on political support at the international and regional levels to ensure compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Greece supported all efforts aimed at further strengthening the Agency's role. Clear goals should be set for the implementation of integrated safeguards and information-driven safeguards, and it was vital that the safeguards system continue to be effective. All NPT States should conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in order to achieve a global verification standard.

250. It was important for the Agency to expand implementation of up-to-date safeguards technologies for measurement and remote monitoring. Also, it should assist Member States with implementation of safeguards agreements and other relevant instruments.

251. It was equally important that more States ratify the CTBT and negotiate and bring into force a non-discriminatory and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

252. In his latest report on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Director General had once again pointed out that Iran had not provided the necessary cooperation to allow the Agency to confirm that all the nuclear material in the country was being used for peaceful activities. The Agency was also still unable to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or facilities. Greece was concerned that Iran was violating binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council and was withholding cooperation in connection with the alleged military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

253. It was regrettable that Iran had been reluctant to respond in time to the proposal put forward by the Agency in October 2009, following consultations with Iran, France, Russia and the United States of America, concerning fuelling of the Tehran research reactor. Instead, Iran continued to enrich uranium and had almost doubled the amount of LEU it had produced.

254. Against that background, his country hoped that Iran would engage immediately in diplomatic negotiations with the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany to resolve all the outstanding issues. Iran's recent objection to the designation of two Agency inspectors and its questioning of the professionalism and impartiality of the Secretariat were not contributing to the required transparency.

255. In the same vein, Greece called on the Syrian Arab Republic to improve its hitherto insufficient cooperation with the Agency.

256. As for the DPRK, his Government deplored the recent tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the lack of full implementation by the DPRK of all its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, jeopardizing all the efforts that were being made within the framework of the six-party talks to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK's continuing policy of keeping Agency inspectors out of the country rendered it impossible for the Agency to perform its crucial role in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement and Security Council resolutions.

257. Greece supported the Director General's efforts to mobilize all available resources in order to increase the Agency's activities in the area of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology in food and agriculture, water management, the environment, and disease prevention and control.

258. It was important to note that efforts were being made to increase cooperation not only with the scientific authorities of Member States, but also with other international organizations on projects of common interest in the field of natural sciences. One such example was the strengthening of PACT and the partnership agreements concluded with international cancer organizations and agencies, including close cooperation with the WHO. A number of countries in Africa and Latin America had received assistance through that programme.

259. The Greek Atomic Energy Commission was recognized as an Agency regional training centre for radiation protection and nuclear security. It organized and hosted on a regular basis the upgraded postgraduate course on radiation protection and the safety of radioactive sources. The next course was due to start in October 2011.

260. The successful cooperation between the Agency and the Commission in the field of education and training was expected to be reflected in a long-term agreement establishing the terms of reference for the Commission as a regional training centre in Europe for nuclear, radiation, transport and waste

safety. In March 2010, the European Conference on Individual Monitoring of Ionizing Radiation had been held in Athens. It had been organized by the Greek Atomic Energy Commission under the auspices of the European Commission in cooperation with the Agency and the European Radiation Dosimetry Group.

261. In 2009, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission had applied for an IRRS mission, the first part of which involved a self-assessment.

262. Greece fully supported the Agency's technical cooperation programme, the pillar of the Agency's activities which had a socio-economic impact on Member States. That programme was directly related to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, in that it effectively addressed the major challenges facing the developing world. He stressed the need for an improved technical cooperation strategy that reflected new trends and realities worldwide. Activities under the technical cooperation programme should contribute to enhancing nuclear and radiation safety and security.

263. With regard to management of the technical cooperation programme, additional efforts should be made to achieve a high level of coordination with all related United Nations organizations, and to address the new challenges at the international and regional levels. Interdepartmental cooperation remained a high priority, and interaction between the Secretariat and Member States and their institutions was also necessary to facilitate cooperation on agreed objectives at national and regional levels.

264. Greek scientists were participating actively in the Agency's technical cooperation programme, inter alia through expert missions, scientific visits and hosting of fellows at Greek laboratories free of charge. There was increasing participation by Greek scientists in regional projects and Greece was looking forward to the forthcoming technical cooperation cycles.

265. The continued expansion of nuclear energy and use of sensitive technologies and materials required vigilance, full cooperation with the Agency and intensive international collaboration so as to minimize the risks of proliferation.

266. Mr KUBELKA (Croatia) welcomed the adoption of the final document by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which demonstrated the joint commitment of all Member States to work together on the three pillars of the NPT, namely the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, non-proliferation and disarmament. Croatia also appreciated all the international efforts made during the year with respect to nuclear security and non-proliferation, in particular the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington and the New START agreement signed between the United States and the Russian Federation.

267. Turning to events in his own country, he said that, on 1 April 2010, a new radiological and nuclear safety act had come into force in Croatia establishing the State Office for Radiological and Nuclear Safety, which would take over from the State Office for Radiation Protection and the State Office for Nuclear Safety when it became operational later in the year.

268. At the end of 2009, his Government had declared the existing storage facility located at the Ruđer Bošković Institute the central national radioactive waste storage facility. The financial resources needed for operation of the facility had been secured and the storage facility would be improved through an ongoing technical cooperation project. Moreover, the project to improve the conditions for radioactive waste storage at the Ruđer Bošković Institute proposed under the European Union 2010 Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance programme was awaiting approval.

269. As part of the national energy strategy approved by the Croatian parliament in October 2009, the Croatian nuclear energy programme had been launched. A decision by the Croatian Government on the construction of a nuclear power plant was expected by the end of 2012.

270. Nuclear proliferation, in particular the acquisition and use by non-State actors of nuclear material, was a continuing threat. Croatia, which was implementing integrated safeguards and used all its nuclear facilities for exclusively peaceful purposes, supported efforts to strengthen the verification system and called upon all States to conclude and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol.

271. Every country should have the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in full compliance with international safety, security and non-proliferation instruments. Croatia had established relevant institutional capacities for the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. Radiation detection portal monitors procured within the framework of the European Union PHARE 2006 project had been installed at main border crossings, and several other border crossings would be equipped through the United States' Second Line of Defense Program. Countries in south-east Europe, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had agreed to notify each other of incidences of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. Croatia had also been participating actively in all activities relating to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

272. One of the most important aspects of collaboration between Croatia and the Agency was technical cooperation, and his country was grateful for the assistance it had received under the technical cooperation programme. In the 2009–2011 cycle, five national projects based on the priorities set out in the country's current CPF were being implemented, covering applications of radiation in medicine, improvement of nuclear and radiation safety infrastructure, and implementation of nuclear techniques in environmental protection. For the 2012–2013 cycle, Croatia had submitted eight project proposals which had been prioritized in accordance with the CPF, taking into account Croatia's new energy strategy.

273. Croatia fully supported the Agency's activities to enhance regional cooperation and exchange of knowledge through regional projects. It actively participated in regional projects, in particular through the organization of meetings and workshops in research institutions and other relevant institutions in Croatia. A significant number of foreign experts had been trained in Croatia under the Agency's fellowship programme. Croatia strongly supported the goals of the technical cooperation programme in Europe and welcomed the adoption of the regional strategy for technical cooperation in Europe.

274. Budgetary issues were of particular importance in the light of the global financial crisis. Without adequate funding, the Agency would be unable to fulfil its statutory tasks. Croatia had continued to fulfil its financial obligations to the Agency and expected all Member States to do likewise.

275. Mr D'UJANGA (Uganda), said that the Government and the people of his country were grateful for the Agency's ongoing support in the areas of health, water, agriculture and industry, where the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology were of vital importance.

276. Uganda was experiencing an increase in the incidence of cancer, especially cervical cancer. The Agency was providing assistance in radiotherapy and nuclear medicine services, which had enhanced the capacity of the Ministry of Health to provide care for all patients. He thanked the Director General for his strong support in the fight against cancer.

277. Access to drinking water continued to be a major problem in many developing countries, including Uganda, and the country greatly valued the Agency's ongoing support for the use of isotope hydrology to assess underground water resources and develop and implement comprehensive water supply strategies for rural and emerging urban areas.

278. The work of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture to develop disease- and drought-resistant varieties of crops and improve animal production had gone a long way towards improving food availability in Uganda and other developing countries. The Agency's contribution to the development of improved crop varieties to cope with a growing population and climate change were likewise appreciated.

279. Access to reliable and affordable energy was essential for economic and social development. Fossil fuels and renewable energy sources such as hydroelectric, geothermal, biomass, and wind power would eventually be insufficient to meet the energy demands of a rapidly growing population, and other energy sources, such as nuclear power, would need to be included in the energy mix. The use of nuclear technology for civilian purposes, such as the generation of electricity, was the right of every country and would help mitigate global warming and climate change.

280. For the aforementioned reasons, Uganda was putting in place capacity to develop a peaceful nuclear power programme under Agency safeguards and safety regimes and greatly appreciated the Agency's support — through both the Department of Technical Cooperation and the Department of Nuclear Energy — to countries interested in launching nuclear power programmes.

281. His Government urged all countries to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Those that had such weapons should work to get rid of them under an internationally agreed and verifiable treaty, and those that did not have them should not seek to acquire them.

282. Like other developing countries, Uganda was putting in place an effective legal and regulatory framework for nuclear energy applications, and considerable progress had been made despite many challenges. The Agency should approach the peculiar situation of developing countries with understanding and give them the assistance they required in connection with nuclear science applications, especially in critical areas such as radiotherapy.

283. In conclusion, he expressed appreciation for the Agency's support, which had enabled his country to provide appropriate services in the areas of food and agriculture, water resources development, energy resources development, human health and the development of national radiation safety and protection infrastructure. Uganda would continue to support the Agency and all its activities, believing that through the joint efforts of Member States and the Secretariat the Agency would be able to fulfil its missions and contribute further to the peaceful use of atomic energy.

284. Mr NYAPHISI (Lesotho) noted the important developments that had taken place over the preceding year in moving towards a nuclear-free world, namely the Nuclear Security Summit that had been held in Washington in April 2010 and the NPT Review Conference organized by the United Nations in New York in May 2010. His country welcomed the consensus reached on the action plans related to nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful application of nuclear energy, as well as the proposed convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

285. Lesotho strongly supported the work of the Agency to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards regime. In that regard, he was pleased to inform the Conference that the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho had signed an additional protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement in April 2010.

286. Recognizing the importance of regional cooperation as an important means of accelerating economic growth and its development agenda, Lesotho had just acceded to AFRA.

287. Furthermore, his country had acceded to the CPPNM, had ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism at the 2010 Treaty Event held at United Nations Headquarters in New York, and would be signing the Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning

the Provision of Technical Assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho in Vienna in the coming days.

288. His country was grateful to the Agency for all the support and guidance it had provided. Following the successful advisory and fact-finding missions to Lesotho earlier in the year, it was considering joining the relevant international instruments for promoting safety, facilitating cooperation, and for exchange of experience. It had also embarked on a programme to draw up legislation for the establishment of a nuclear regulatory authority.

289. Preparations were under way, with Agency support, for Lesotho's CPF, and his country was looking forward to further Agency guidance in the formulation of projects for the 2012–2013 technical cooperation programme cycle.

290. Finally, he reaffirmed Lesotho's support for and commitment to the Agency's mandate to use atoms for peace, health and prosperity.

291. Mr AL-ERYANI (Yemen) reaffirmed his country's support for all the activities undertaken by the Agency, especially those in the areas of radiation protection, health, agriculture, electricity generation, water desalination, industry, science and technology. He urged Member States to make use of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy for the benefit of their peoples under the umbrella of the non-proliferation regime, including Agency comprehensive safeguards. The Agency's role should be strengthened with a view to achieving equality among States as well as international peace and security.

292. Yemen was grateful for the Agency's generous support for the dissemination of peaceful nuclear technology through its technical cooperation projects. He underlined two areas in particular where the Agency's assistance had been of crucial importance: firstly, in the establishment of radiation oncology centres in Sana'a and in Aden, and in training medical staff working in those centres; and secondly, in drafting Yemen's nuclear law in line with Agency-approved standards. Work on that law would continue in cooperation with the main technical partner in Yemen, the National Atomic Energy Commission.

293. His country upheld the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as provided for in the NPT, which right was not subject to any political limitations. It also underscored the need for strict compliance with Agency comprehensive safeguards and for strengthening of the Agency's role as the main pillar of the NPT.

294. His country was engaging in initiatives aimed at controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons and creating regions free of weapons of mass destruction, especially in the Middle East where uncertainty reigned on account of the imbalance of power among its States and the presence of nuclear activities not subject to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

295. While all the Arab States had acceded to the NPT and reaffirmed their continuing readiness to take steps towards the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, Israel continued to defy the international community by refusing to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear installations under Agency comprehensive safeguards. It also rejected all international initiatives aimed at achieving universality of the NPT and nuclear disarmament in the region. That increased instability in the region and made an arms race more likely, potentially with dire consequences.

296. General Conference resolution GC(53)/RES/17, adopted the preceding year, expressed the concern of Member States over Israeli nuclear capabilities and called upon Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under Agency comprehensive safeguards. The final document of the

2010 NPT Review Conference had referred to that resolution. Both documents reflected fears over the threat posed by Israeli nuclear capabilities to peace and security in the Middle East.

297. Referring to the Director General's report — contained in document GC(54)/14 — on implementation of the aforementioned resolution, he expressed regret that Israel remained outside the NPT. The report did not address any of the concerns of Member States, including those set forth in his own country's response to the Director General's letter, nor did it present the Agency's vision with respect to implementation of the resolution.

298. In light of the above, he called upon Member States to support the draft resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities which was being tabled by the Arab Group at the current session of the General Conference, and appealed to them to resist any attempts to thwart it or to circumvent the call on the major international powers to shoulder their responsibility vis-à-vis the exacerbation of the situation in the Middle East. Those countries should exert pressure on Israel to heed the repeated calls about its nuclear capabilities and should eschew any application of double standards. Yemen firmly believed that stability and security in the Middle East were contingent upon freeing the region of nuclear weapons and that Israel's repeated refusal to accede to the NPT proved that it harboured no genuine desire to achieve peace in the region.

299. Mr RAJEMISON RAKOTOMAHARO (Madagascar) welcomed the recent initiatives of the international community aimed at fostering nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and the Agency's efforts to promote the peaceful and safe uses of nuclear energy for development, including in the fight against cancer. His country attached great importance to accession by all countries to the NPT and to the universalization and strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system. Madagascar had acceded to the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol and the modified SQP. It was committed to cooperating closely with the Agency in fulfilling its commitments under those instruments. As a party to the Pelindaba Treaty, it fully supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means of promoting international peace and security.

300. Nuclear applications made an essential contribution to sustainable development and the eradication of poverty, and his Government hoped to strengthen its cooperation with the Agency in order to improve its scientific, technological, regulatory and human resources capacities. Noting the strategic importance of national technical cooperation projects for poverty eradication, he thanked the Agency for the assistance his country had received in such areas as cancer control, agriculture, animal reproduction, water resources management, the environment, radiation protection and radioactive waste management. Madagascar particularly welcomed the Agency's efforts under PACT and it was beginning to derive benefit from that programme. It looked forward to further cooperation to strengthen the capacity for cancer treatment in the country, which still fell short of needs.

301. Noting the importance of technical cooperation activities, he pointed out that Madagascar had agreed to the renewal of the AFRA agreement for a further five years. It hoped that AFRA would play an active role in the establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy to be set up now that the Pelindaba Treaty had entered into force.

Mr Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia), President, took the Chair.

302. Mr BACELA (Mozambique) welcomed the decision by Swaziland, a neighbouring country of Mozambique, to join the Agency, as that provided enabling conditions to include nuclear technology utilization programmes within the framework of bilateral cooperation, which currently covered several areas of common interest for both countries.

303. His country appreciated the Agency's commitment to its mission to promote the peaceful and safe use of nuclear technologies for socio-economic development, contributing to fighting poverty and

improving the welfare of the citizens of Member States, particularly in developing countries. The number of ongoing projects of a socio-economic nature in various countries testified to that commitment.

304. The Agency had been contributing to the socio-economic development of Mozambique through technical cooperation and coordinated research projects. His country was currently implementing projects in such fields as radiotherapy and nuclear medicine, soil fertility, animal health and production, tsetse fly and trypanosomosis control, and mineral resources.

305. Mozambique's newly established regulatory authority, the National Atomic Energy Agency, had been working actively on drafting a comprehensive nuclear law and had already initiated actions aimed at regulatory infrastructure development.

306. Like many other developing countries, Mozambique was faced with a high incidence of cancer all over the country. As the number of cancer patients increased, there was a concomitant increase in demand for radiotherapy for both curative and palliative purposes. His Government was seriously committed to developing the required radiotherapy capacity to ensure that oncological treatment reached most of the country's citizens and that the number of patients seeking treatment abroad was reduced.

307. One of the success factors in the utilization of nuclear technologies was development of human resources. Mozambique had a shortage of appropriately trained and qualified professionals in the relevant fields and was unable to take full advantage of nuclear technology-driven programmes. It therefore appreciated the fact that Agency assistance had focused on the development of human resources, as well as support for the Government in establishing basic nuclear infrastructure. Though promising progress had been made so far, it was imperative that such cooperation continue in the future.

308. His country believed that the action plan agreed upon at the 2010 NPT Review Conference was an important sign of hope for many countries in the world where nuclear technologies could make a difference by contributing to various aspects of socio-economic development, including food security and capacity building in the sphere of medicine.

309. He assured the Conference of Mozambique's continued support for the Agency in its noble mission to promote the peaceful and safe utilization of nuclear technology for the benefit of humanity.

310. Mr OLIVEIRA (ABACC) said that currently his institution was applying safeguards on all nuclear material at approximately 70 nuclear facilities in Brazil and Argentina through the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, and was carrying out about 110 inspections per year, under the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Agency and ABACC which had entered into force in 1994. Thanks to the dedication and expertise of all concerned, Argentina and Brazil had carried out their activities in the nuclear field in full compliance with their safeguards and non-proliferation commitments.

311. The decision of the Governments of Argentina and Brazil to reactivate their respective nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes, including joint undertakings, not only gave rise to an expectation of growth in the nuclear sector in both countries, it also opened up new opportunities and broadened ABACC's responsibilities. As the first fully operational binational organization created by both countries, ABACC had acquired much experience in the management of interactions and problem solving, which could be very useful in that context.

312. The Presidents of Argentina and Brazil had recently held a working meeting in San Juan, Argentina, to review progress in bilateral cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. They had highlighted the specific role played by ABACC in ensuring that all nuclear activities in their countries

were under safeguards, thus building mutual and international confidence. In addition, they had pointed out ABACC's unique contribution to the international non-proliferation regime, a regime that should promote cooperation and allow free access by Argentina and Brazil to sensitive technologies in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thus, they had decided that the ABACC safeguards system must be continuously enhanced and strengthened.

313. The ABACC Secretariat was ready to face new challenges, in line with its internal guidelines, including constant improvement of its technical and administrative activities.

314. Reporting on events in the preceding year, he highlighted the visit that had been made by the Agency's Director General to ABACC headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. That occasion had reinforced the understanding between the two agencies as regards the importance of mutual cooperation in the application of safeguards. One example of such cooperation had been the decision to implement new verification techniques at uranium enrichment plants and in the unattended monitoring systems that would be applied in various Brazilian and Argentine facilities, demonstrating the willingness of both countries to apply innovative technological approaches to safeguards.

315. In 2009, ABACC had received a special invitation to participate in a consulting group meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In its presentation, emphasis had been placed on the tasks it performed and the contribution of the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials as an essential tool for the verification of nuclear activities in Argentina and Brazil.

316. Also, ABACC had participated in the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Its statement at the plenary session had stressed the originality of ABACC's model and the atmosphere of mutual confidence that prevailed between the two countries. At the end of the conference, ABACC had given an institutional presentation as a side event.

317. The search for excellence had been an abiding concern at ABACC. Thus, a policy had been developed for the qualification of its officials and team of inspectors. In those endeavours, it had cooperated with the Agency, the United States Department of Energy and Euratom, particularly in the areas of non-destructive analysis, containment and surveillance, training courses and safeguards approaches. ABACC encouraged participation of foreign instructors in that initiative as well as its own officials and national specialists, and he drew special attention to the participation of specialists from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

318. A regional course on systems for national accounting and control of nuclear material had been held in Rio de Janeiro in November 2009. The aim of that course, which was organized periodically by the Agency, was to disseminate international safeguards procedures among facility operators and inspectors in national safeguards systems.

319. With regard to cooperation with other agencies, ABACC and Euratom were currently developing cooperation projects for the application of more modern technologies, such as the use of three-dimensional laser images to verify design data and the use of ultrasonic seals. Another project under development related to the analysis of procedures for the common use of equipment during joint inspections with the Agency.

320. There had been technical cooperation between ABACC and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Control relating to exchange of information on short-notice random inspections and new systems and equipment for CANDU-type reactors.

321. One way to face future challenges related to the expanded use of nuclear reactors would be to create independent and reliable regional systems to be applied in coordination with the Agency, thus optimizing use of available resources. The successes achieved during ABACC's almost 20 years of experience could serve as guidance. While regional geopolitical factors and cultural differences would

not allow for the direct transposition of models, the concept of developing regional agencies merited consideration.

322. It was pertinent to recall that, in addition to its permanent technical and administrative staff, ABACC's model included a team of highly specialized inspectors with a thorough knowledge of the social, economic and political conditions in the region. That was a significant advantage when performing an overall analysis of the safeguards- and non-proliferation-related aspects of the situation in the countries concerned.

The meeting rose at 8.25 p.m.