

General Conference

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Plenary

Record of the First Meeting

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Temporary President: Mr BARROS OREIRO (Uruguay)

President: Mr MABHONGO (South Africa)

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¹ GC(57)/24.

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	Lithuania (on behalf of the European Union)
	Japan
	United States of America
	China
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¹The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(57)/INF/13.

Abbreviations used in this record:

Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G8	Group of Eight
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
New START	New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review and Extension Conference	Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OECD/NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
P-5+1	The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany
Paris Convention	Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
PUI	Peaceful Uses Initiative
RANET	Response and Assistance Network

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
TEPCO	Tokyo Electric Power Company
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1963)
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

– Opening of the session

1. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT declared the 57th regular session of the General Conference open.
2. In accordance with Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference, he invited the delegates to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation.

All present rose and stood in silence for one minute.

3. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT welcomed the participation of many ministers and senior officials from Member States. Their presence enhanced the standing of the Agency as the foremost forum for international cooperation on the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy.
4. The General Conference had made tangible progress in the period 2012–2013 in its main areas of work.
5. The prospects for nuclear power generation continued to be good, with an expected increase in capacity, especially in Asia, despite the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the strong reservations that continued to exist because of the ongoing global financial crisis.
6. That positive prognosis had been discussed in June at the highest level, during the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, organized by the Agency in coordination with the Government of the Russian Federation and held in Saint Petersburg. The Conference had indicated the future path of nuclear power generation, reflected in the latest Agency projections of capacity growth during the period until 2030 — a low projection of 17% and a high projection of 94%. The difference was considerable, but the upward trend was clear.
7. In response to requests made by the General Conference, the Secretariat was further increasing the assistance provided by it to Member States about to embark on or already with nuclear power programmes — with a continuing strong emphasis on areas such as energy planning, capacity building, infrastructure development and nuclear waste management.
8. The Fukushima Daiichi accident had made nuclear power plant operators, nuclear regulators, the nuclear industry, governments and the international community as a whole more aware than ever of the importance of nuclear safety.
9. Two years previously, the General Conference had adopted the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, whose implementation presupposed — inter alia — the existence of robust, independent regulatory bodies and effective application of the Agency's nuclear safety standards. He hoped that nuclear safety would continue to receive high priority within the Agency.
10. The Agency's central role in the field of nuclear security had been highlighted in July at the International Conference on Nuclear Security, the participants in which had stressed the need for States to work together still more closely in that field.
11. The Agency, which did important work in the fields of nuclear power generation, nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, was much less well known for the major contributions made by it to the well-being of people in many Member States through its technical cooperation programmes. Accordingly, it sometimes encountered difficulties in mobilizing extrabudgetary resources in support of activities in fields such as human health, agriculture, environmental protection and water resources

management, where it could make unique contributions. He therefore urged Member States and the Secretariat to widely disseminate information on the Agency's important activities in those fields.

12. Agency technical cooperation should not be regarded as a gift of developed Member States to developing Member States, but as part of the process of democratization of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. A political topic of enormous importance for the Agency was the 'Iranian nuclear issue'. The existence of a new Government in the Islamic Republic of Iran constituted an opportunity to turn the page and to advance towards finally achieving an agreement between Iran and the Agency on substantive action to resolve all outstanding issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. Only through serious diplomatic commitment would it be possible to demonstrate that Iran's nuclear activities were for exclusively peaceful purposes. All parties should seize the moment.

14. Pursuant to General Conference resolution GC(56)/RES/12.5, adopted in 2012, the ReNuAL project for the modernization of the nuclear applications laboratories at Seibersdorf had been elaborated, and in recent months it had gathered momentum. Member States now had a clearer idea of how that important project was to be implemented. He urged Member State representatives to visit Seibersdorf in order to see how the project was progressing and Member State governments to support the project with all means at their disposal. The project's realization would be of great importance for all Member States.

15. The Board of Governors had proposed to the General Conference a Regular Budget increase for 2014 of 1.7%. In times of financial difficulties such as those currently being faced, its proposal confirmed the strong international support for Agency activities in areas such as non-power applications of nuclear energy, nuclear applications, nuclear safety and security, safeguards and technical cooperation. He was convinced that the cost-saving and efficiency initiatives already under way and those proposed by the Secretariat for the 2014–2015 biennium, such as the Partnership for Continuous Improvement, would reaffirm the reputation of the Agency as one of the most efficient organizations within the United Nations system.

16. It had been an honour for his country, Uruguay, to provide, on behalf of the Latin American and Caribbean Group, the President of the General Conference at its 56th regular session and for him to preside at that session. He was grateful for the support received by him during that session and the year of intense activity that had followed. He hoped that his efforts and impartiality had been useful and hoped that it had made its modest contribution to the successful conclusion of the Conference's work.

1. Election of officers and appointment of the General Committee

17. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT invited nominations for the office of President of the Conference.

18. Mr OYUGI (Kenya), speaking on behalf of the African Group, proposed Mr Mabhongo (South Africa).

19. Mr Mabhongo (South Africa) was elected President by acclamation.

20. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT congratulated Mr Mabhongo on his election and wished him every success in his task.

Mr Mabhongo (South Africa) took the Chair.

21. The PRESIDENT said that he was grateful to Member States for electing him to preside over the General Conference at its current session and, in particular, to the African Member States for having placed their confidence in him.

22. He had greatly appreciated the sterling work done by Ambassador Barros Oreiro of Uruguay during his tenure as President of the General Conference at its 2012 session. He had no doubt that the Conference would at its current session build on the outcome of that work.

23. The General Conference's sessions offered all Member States an opportunity to review the work of the Agency and take part in decision-making. The fact that a General Conference consisting of representatives of all Member States was provided for in the Statute was an affirmation that the Agency was a Member States-driven organization. The onus was therefore on Member States to use the Conference's sessions to define the Agency's goals.

24. The Agency had been advancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for several decades. Its unique interventions in important areas such as human health, water resources management and agriculture had contributed to socio-economic development, and the Agency would no doubt do more in those areas given the growing number of developing Member States. The Agency's key goal remained accelerating and enlarging "the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world." The Agency was to be lauded for the partnerships that it had established to that end with other organizations belonging to the United Nations family.

25. It was important that Member States continue working together in enabling the Agency to provide even more technical assistance. Member States should do more to increase the resources of the Technical Cooperation Fund. In that context, he had no doubt that the Agency, within its mandate, would contribute to the implementation of the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

26. A number of Member States were increasing the share of nuclear power in their energy mix or adding nuclear power to it, prompted by the imperatives of economic growth, by concerns about energy supply security, by the desire to reduce their carbon footprint and by the need to protect dwindling natural resources. The Agency had provided important support both to newcomer countries and to countries expanding their nuclear power programmes. Many countries did not have the luxury of choosing between different energy sources; nuclear power was therefore seen by them as complementing other sources of energy.

27. The Agency had taken important initiatives relating to nuclear safety in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and Member States had greatly appreciated them. The adoption of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety had been a milestone demonstrating the commitment of the Secretariat and Member States to taking more responsibility for nuclear safety.

28. Ministers gathered in Vienna in July for the International Conference on Nuclear Security had affirmed that, while nuclear security was a responsibility of States, the Agency had a global coordinating role to play.

29. Nuclear verification was another important pillar of the Agency, which had proved to be an independent and impartial organization that implemented safeguards in accordance with agreements with individual States and sought to keep up with relevant scientific and technical developments. Closer collaboration and between Member States and the Secretariat was necessary for success in improving the work of the Agency in the safeguards area.

30. Those and other matters would be discussed during the next few days, and the General Conference would be called upon to take decisions on some of them. He counted on Member States to express their views so that the work of the Agency might continue to be guided by their priorities and needs.

31. He was convinced that, with the willing support of Member States, the Conference would engage in fruitful discussions and reach a consensus on the numerous important issues on its agenda.

32. Pursuant to Rules 34 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference had to elect eight Vice-Presidents, a Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and five additional members of the General Committee, resulting in a General Committee of 15 with himself as its Chairman. However, since the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole at the Conference's current session was to be from the North America group, which traditionally had only one representative on the General Committee, a Vice-President, he proposed that, following past practice, the Conference suspend Rules 34 and 40 in order to elect only seven Vice-Presidents — and six additional members so as to ensure that the General Committee had 15 members.

33. The President's proposal was accepted.

34. The PRESIDENT proposed that the delegates of Chile, Estonia, France, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Philippines, Thailand and Zimbabwe be elected as Vice-Presidents, that Mr Stratford of the United States of America be elected as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and that the delegates of Bulgaria, Denmark, Lebanon, Mexico, the Netherlands and the Russian Federation be elected as additional members of the General Committee.

35. The President's proposals were accepted.

36. The PRESIDENT proposed that the General Conference take up items 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its provisional agenda, in that order, pending receipt of the General Committee's recommendation on the agenda.

37. The President's proposal was accepted.

2. Applications for membership of the Agency (GC(57)/11 and GC(57)/23)

38. The PRESIDENT drew attention to documents GC(57)/11 and 23 containing applications for membership by Brunei Darussalam and the Commonwealth of the Bahamas respectively. The applications had been endorsed by the Board of Governors, which had also submitted, in those documents, two draft resolutions for adoption by the General Conference.

39. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the two draft resolutions by acclamation.

40. It was so decided.

41. The PRESIDENT congratulated Brunei Darussalam and the Commonwealth of the Bahamas on having been approved for membership of the Agency.

3. Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations

42. Mr FEDOTOV (Executive Director, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) read out the following message:

“I am pleased to convey my greetings to the fifty-seventh session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

“I have full confidence in the capacity of the IAEA to help ensure nuclear safety and security and to strengthen nuclear safeguards. When I convened a high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security in 2011 following the Fukushima accident, I urged world leaders and the nuclear industry to revisit policies and standards for maximum safety. Significant progress has been made in this regard.

“As the recent International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century reaffirmed, many States continue to regard nuclear power as a crucial component of their energy policies.

“While recognizing the importance accorded to nuclear energy, we must also bear in mind the solemn responsibilities associated with its use. History has shown that nuclear accidents recognize no borders. Nuclear safety must be robust and effective. The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety is central to improving the safety standards adopted by different countries.

“The IAEA is committed to ensuring that any expansion of nuclear power takes place in a way that results in maximum safety, reliability and efficiency, while also guarding against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA is continuing its dedicated efforts to strengthen the implementation of safeguards. The majority of States now have additional protocols in force.

“However, I remain deeply concerned about the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. I call upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to demonstrate its commitment to verifiable denuclearization. I also call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to fulfil its pledge to enhance the transparency of its nuclear programme.

“Substantial progress has also been made in strengthening nuclear security worldwide, including through greater adherence to multilateral instruments and the effective coordination of voluntary measures. But more needs to be done.

“The risk of nuclear terrorism continues to pose a threat to international security. The Nuclear Security Summits have contributed to reducing the risks of terrorists obtaining nuclear materials. But the momentum for progress needs to be sustained and expanded to involve all States.

“That was the objective of Director General Amano’s initiative in convening the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts.

“While the responsibility for nuclear security rests primarily with each State, we must recognize the importance of international cooperation and the central role of the IAEA in this regard.

“I commend Director General Amano and the IAEA staff for their work and I look forward to further strengthening the close partnership between the IAEA and the UN Secretariat. Together let us keep working for future progress in achieving our common goal, a world free of nuclear weapons.

“Please accept my best wishes as you address the challenging issues on your agenda.”

4. Statement by the Director General

43. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that on 8 December it would be 60 years since President Eisenhower had given his historic “Atoms for Peace” speech before the United Nations General Assembly. In that speech, he had called for the establishment of an international atomic energy agency to put nuclear material to use to “serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind”.

44. President Eisenhower’s vision had become a reality four years later, in 1957, when the Agency had begun work in Vienna.

45. The Agency had worked hard to bring the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology to all parts of the globe and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

46. The world had changed enormously in the past 60 years, but the “Atoms for Peace” mission had lost none of its relevance. The Agency had successfully adapted to changing times and the evolving needs of Member States.

47. When he had taken office, nearly four years previously, he had pledged to pursue the multiple objectives of the Agency in a balanced manner.

48. His goal had been to ensure that the Agency was an effective, well-managed technical organization, with high ethical standards, that delivered concrete results and made a real difference to its Member States.

49. It was touching to meet ordinary people — such as farmers, fishermen and cancer patients — whose lives had improved because of the work of the Agency — work in which all Member States could take pride.

50. He was very grateful for the support which he and the Secretariat received from the Agency’s Member States — support that had made solid achievements possible in all areas of the Agency’s work.

51. The Agency gave high priority to assisting developing countries, through its technical cooperation programmes, in using nuclear techniques in areas such as cancer control, food and agriculture, and water management. Those areas had been highlighted in the Agency’s annual Scientific Forums.

52. Access to modern science and technology was essential for achieving all the MDGs. By making nuclear technology available, the Agency was making a unique contribution to their achievement.

53. The eight nuclear applications laboratories at Seibersdorf played an essential role in the Agency’s work. However, they had become old and rather dilapidated, so the Secretariat was now planning to modernize them. It hoped that the project would be completed in 2017, and it would be grateful for financial assistance from Member States.

54. In the field of nuclear verification, the Agency had taken a firm and objective position on major safeguards issues involving Iran, Syria and the DPRK.

55. It had upheld the principle that all countries must comply fully with their safeguards obligations and with other relevant obligations.

56. A new Clean Laboratory had been built at Seibersdorf, on schedule and under budget, and the new Nuclear Material Laboratory building had been completed.

57. After 11 years of consultations with relevant countries, he had convened a Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East.

58. In the field of nuclear power, the Secretariat had stepped up its assistance to so-called newcomer countries. At the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century held in June in Saint Petersburg, one of the key messages had been that, for many countries, nuclear power would play an important role in achieving energy security and sustainable development goals.

59. The Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 2011 had been a global wake-up call as regards nuclear safety, and it had been followed by unprecedented efforts to strengthen nuclear safety everywhere. In September 2011, the General Conference had approved the ambitious IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which was now being implemented.

60. Steady progress had been made in strengthening the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear security in response to the wishes of Member States. In July, the Agency had hosted the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts — the first such conference, at ministerial level, open to all Member States. At it, ministers had reaffirmed the Agency's central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework.

61. He had taken a close interest in improving the management of the Secretariat. He had shortened decision-making processes, stressed the importance of management accountability and improved the flow of information to Member States.

62. The Secretariat's new method of preparing budget estimates had been welcomed by Member States, and the Secretariat had successfully adopted the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). The External Auditor had released an unqualified opinion on the Agency's financial statements.

63. Nuclear power generation was the best-known peaceful application of nuclear energy. The Agency's latest projections pointed to continued growth in the global use of nuclear power in the coming 20 years, especially in Asia. The Agency would continue to accompany users of nuclear power, both new and experienced, at every stage of their journey.

64. A strong safety record would be essential for the future of nuclear power generation, so the Agency would continue to play its unique role in helping governments, nuclear power plant operators and nuclear regulators to adopt the relevant international standards and best practices.

65. In December, at the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, the Co-Presidents had stressed that strengthening nuclear safety was a continuous process and that there should be no complacency in safety matters. That message had been well understood.

66. He had visited nuclear power plants in many countries and had seen serious efforts being made to enhance nuclear safety, with tangible results.

67. The leakage of contaminated water at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station urgently needed to be addressed. The Agency would soon be sending a second international peer review team to Japan.

68. As regards nuclear security, the Secretariat now provided Member States with a broad range of services aimed at helping to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive material and nuclear facilities were properly protected.

69. However, there was an important item of unfinished business in the field of nuclear security: the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM. Eight years after its adoption, the amendment had

still not entered into force. He would like to see many more States ratifying the amendment so that it might enter into force soon.

70. Through its technical cooperation programmes, the Agency was providing support to 125 countries and territories, helping them to use nuclear technology in addressing development needs. It had been working more closely with organizations such as WHO and FAO in order to achieve more effective programme implementation.

71. The Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT) had been recognized by Member States as a flagship Agency programme and, subject to approval of the programme and budget for 2014–2015 by the General Conference, additional staff and funding would be allocated to it in the next biennium.

72. The Agency was working closely with the African Union to help create tsetse-free zones in Africa, using the sterile insect technique and other methods.

73. Together with 13 countries in the Sahel region, the Agency was endeavouring to alleviate the severe water shortages that had caused a humanitarian crisis there.

74. The nuclear programme of the DPRK remained a matter of serious concern. The Agency had been unable to carry out verification activities in the DPRK since 2009, so its knowledge of the country's nuclear programme was very limited. The DPRK should comply fully with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, cooperate promptly with the Agency in implementing its safeguards agreement and resolve all outstanding issues.

75. The Agency was continuing to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement. However, Iran was not providing the cooperation necessary in order to enable the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Agency therefore could not conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities. Iran should fully implement its safeguards agreement and its other obligations and engage with the Agency in resolving all outstanding issues.

76. There remained fundamental differences of view in the Middle East regarding the application of Agency safeguards there, so that it had not been possible to make further progress in fulfilling the mandate entrusted to him by the General Conference in that connection. He would continue his consultations.

77. The Agency was continuing its efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards implementation — for example, by considering States as a whole rather than, as it had done in the past, focusing primarily on declared nuclear material and facilities. That State-level approach was indispensable if the Agency was to discharge its safeguards responsibilities under the budget constraints that it was experiencing. The Agency was continuing to consult fully with Member States on that matter.

78. He was grateful to Mr Nackaerts, Deputy Director General for Safeguards, who would be retiring soon, for his distinguished service to the Agency.

79. The programme and budget for 2014–2015 identified the main priorities for the Agency during that biennium: technical cooperation, nuclear safety and security, and the modernization of the nuclear applications laboratories at Seibersdorf. The statutory function relating to nuclear energy would remain a high priority. Against a difficult global economic background, the Agency would focus on areas identified by Member States as being important.

80. He and the Secretariat remained committed to taking vigorous efficiency and cost-saving measures and hoped that Member States would continue to support key activities with extrabudgetary contributions, where required.

81. The Secretariat would seek new sources of funding and endeavour to maximize the benefits from partnerships between the Agency and other international organizations.

82. The 2013 Scientific Forum, which would start the following day, was entitled “The Blue Planet — Nuclear Applications for a Sustainable Marine Environment”. He hoped that many delegation members would participate in it.

83. Looking ahead, he would continue to stand firm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He would do his utmost to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through constructive dialogue with the new Iranian Government.

84. Science and technology were playing an increasingly important role in development, and the Agency was helping developing countries to benefit from nuclear science and technology through its technical cooperation programmes as part of its contribution to the MDG process. The modernization of the nuclear applications laboratories at Seibersdorf was essential if the Agency was to continue doing so.

85. As nuclear technology continued to be used widely, including for power generation, the highest standards of safety must be ensured by Member States. The Agency would continue helping Japan to overcome the effects of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. In addition, it was important that nuclear and other radioactive materials be properly secured so that they could not be used with malicious intent.

86. The Agency was playing a central role in many areas and, to do its work effectively, it must be properly resourced and well managed. The Secretariat would continue to use the resources entrusted to it prudently and effectively, for the maximum benefit of Member States.

87. He was very grateful to Member States for their support of the Agency’s work and for the confidence which they had placed in him as Director General.

88. He was also very grateful to Austria for being a model host country.

89. Lastly, he was very grateful to all of the Secretariat’s staff for their hard work and dedication.

The Director General left the meeting.

6. Approval of the appointment of the Director General (GC(57)/7)

90. The PRESIDENT, referring to document GC(57)/7, declared that, pursuant to Article VII.A of the Statute, the Board of Governors had decided in March 2013 to appoint Mr Yukiya Amano to serve as Director General of the Agency for a term of four years from 1 December 2013 to 30 November 2017 and had requested the General Conference to approve that appointment by adopting the draft resolution contained in that document.

91. He took it that the General Conference wished to adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(57)/7.

92. It was so decided, and the Conference confirmed the appointment of Mr Amano to the post of Director General by acclamation.

At the invitation of the President, Mr Amano re-entered the meeting.

93. The PRESIDENT informed Mr Amano that the General Conference had approved his appointment to the post of Director General for a further four years. He was pleased to be the first to congratulate Mr Amano on behalf of the General Conference and to wish him a successful tenure. He invited him to take the oath of office.

94. Mr AMANO took the following oath:

95. “I solemnly swear to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to discharge these functions and to regulate my conduct with the interest of the Agency only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any government or other authority external to the Agency.”

96. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that he was deeply honoured by the decision of the General Conference to renew his mandate for a further term. He humbly accepted the reappointment and was grateful to Member States for the trust that they had shown him. He would continue to manage the Agency in an impartial and transparent manner under the authority and subject to the control of the Board of Governors and for the benefit of all Member States. He looked forward to continuing to work in close cooperation with all Member States so that the Agency might continue to carry out its mandate effectively.

7. Contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund for 2014 (GC(57)/21)

97. The PRESIDENT, recalling that on 31 July 2013 the Board of Governors had recommended a figure of US \$90 250 000 (equivalent to €69 221 750) as the target for voluntary contributions to the TCF for 2014, drew attention to the table in document GC(57)/21 showing the contribution that each Member State would need to make in order to meet its share of that target.

98. The early pledging and payment of contributions to the TCF greatly helped the Secretariat in planning the Agency’s technical cooperation programmes, and all delegations that were in a position to do so were therefore urged to notify the Secretariat during the Conference’s current session of the contributions that their governments would be making for 2014.

99. He would report at the end of the session, under a later agenda item, on the contributions which had been pledged up to that time. He hoped to be able to report favourably on the percentage of the 2014 TCF target figure already pledged.

8. General debate and Annual Report for 2012 (GC(57)/3 and Supplement)

100. Mr KIRIENKO (Russian Federation), congratulating Director General Amano on his reappointment, said that the Agency had done good work under his leadership and that his experience and professionalism would undoubtedly continue to strengthen the Agency's standing.

101. In June, the Russian Federation had hosted, in St. Petersburg, the Agency-organized International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, and it was very grateful to the Secretariat and the Director General in that connection.

102. The Conference, which had brought together 500 participants from 87 countries, had been an excellent opportunity for leaders in the nuclear power sector and representatives of countries just embarking on nuclear power programmes to consider the role that nuclear power would play in the decades to come.

103. It was gratifying that the Conference had concluded that, for many countries, nuclear power was a proven, clean, safe and economical technology that would play an increasingly important role in the achievement of energy security and sustainable development goals in the 21st century.

104. The Conference had adopted a final document that, in his country's view, should be reflected in future Agency programmes and budgets and perhaps in an action plan.

105. For its part, Russia had already made a strategic choice; it would, as President Putin had emphasized in his address of welcome to the Conference, expand the place of nuclear power in its energy mix and step up the introduction of state-of-the-art and innovative power reactor designs.

106. In 2014, it would be 60 years since the world's first power reactor — in Russia — went into operation. On 27 June 1954, in Obninsk (near Moscow), the 5-MW(e) AM-1 reactor — AM standing in Russian for 'peaceful atom' — had begun producing electricity on an industrial scale. It had operated successfully for 48 years. Today, there were in Russia 33 power reactors in operation, and ten under construction.

107. In May, Russia had hosted the 12th Biennial General Meeting of WANO, in Moscow, where WANO had been founded on 15 May 1989.

108. In India, Unit 1 of the Kundankulam Nuclear Power Plant, which Russia was building with its Indian partners, had started operating. It was equipped with a double containment, a passive heat removal system and a molten core catcher, which were post-Fukushima requirements and provided for an unprecedentedly high level of safety.

109. Russia had concluded agreements for the construction of power reactors with Belarus, Turkey and Viet Nam, and it was constructing Units 3 and 4 of the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant, in China. It was starting work at the site where Bangladesh's first nuclear power plant would be constructed. It was looking into the possibility of becoming a stakeholder in the construction of the Hanhikivi 1 power reactor in Finland.

110. Russia, which believed that nuclear supplier countries needed to adapt flexibly to the needs of each individual partner, could handle turnkey projects and build-own-operate projects.

111. His country, which attached great importance to stability in the supply of fuel for power reactors, was building a nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Ukraine, implementing uranium mining projects in eight countries and supplying nuclear fuel to 12 countries.

112. Infrastructure complying with Agency safety standards was important for nuclear power programmes, and Russia was a dependable provider of assistance with the establishment of such infrastructure, particularly in countries where the power reactors were to be based on Russian technology.

113. Qualified human resources were also important for nuclear power programmes, and Russia had established a centre where training was already being provided to specialists from Viet Nam, Turkey, Belarus, Bangladesh and other countries.

114. Russia was a leader in the development of fast-neutron reactors. Its BN-600 reactor had been operating successfully for many years, and the construction of an 800-MW prototype fast-neutron reactor would be completed in 2014. An experimental fast neutron reactor based on Russian technology and constructed with Russian assistance was operating successfully in China.

115. The Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dmitrovgrad was constructing a multipurpose fast-neutron research reactor to replace its BOR-60 fast breeder, and Russia had decided to establish an international research centre based around the new research reactor.

116. In Russia's view, the future of nuclear power in the long term lay with fast reactors and closed nuclear fuel cycles, and his country was pleased that many of those attending the St Petersburg Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century had agreed with it. The development of fast reactors and closed fuel cycles was one of the main areas of INPRO activity.

117. The main lesson from the Fukushima Daiichi accident — safety first and foremost — had been learned quite well by all working in the nuclear power sector.

118. The year since the General Conference's previous session had been marked by serious efforts within the framework of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Russia, which had been a very active participant in those efforts, was helping with the preparation of the Agency's comprehensive report on the accident and with a number of projects relating to implementation of the Action Plan, which it was supporting financially.

119. Russia, which was continuing to implement the medium- and long-term plans for increasing nuclear safety that had been drafted on the basis of the results of the comprehensive stress tests carried out at its nuclear power plants, attached great importance to the independent review missions organized by the Secretariat in the area of nuclear safety.

120. In two months' time, Rostekhnadzor, the Russian body responsible for — inter alia — the supervision of safety in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, would receive an Agency review team tasked with assessing its implementation of the recommendations made in November 2009 by a previous team.

121. Nuclear technologies offered tremendous opportunities for facilitating the use of the Arctic and Northern Sea Route. Russia already had a large number of nuclear-powered icebreakers, and it had begun building two more.

122. As regards the Agency's technical cooperation activities, Russia was currently, within the framework of regional projects, providing advanced training in radiation oncology for medical physicists from other CIS countries. Together with the Secretariat, it was designing projects relating to the remediation of uranium mine tailings sites and to mitigation of the effects of climate change.

123. His country attached great importance to the Agency's role in facilitating cooperation between States in the area of nuclear security. At the same time, it believed that — as reaffirmed in July at the International Conference on Nuclear Security — the responsibility for nuclear security lay with States,

and it called upon those States which had not yet signed and ratified the CPPNM and the Amendment thereto and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism to do so at the earliest possible date.

124. Russia considered effective and efficient safeguards to be essential for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, and it would welcome improvements to the Agency's safeguards system. As regards the conceptualization and development of safeguards implementation at the State level, it was of the view that much remained to be done. It was also of the view that changes to the methodology for safeguards implementation should be based on decisions of the Board of Governors.

125. The Russian Federation would continue to support the Agency's activities politically, financially and through the provision of expertise.

126. Mr NEVEROVIC (Lithuania) speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Moldova and Georgia associated themselves with the statement he was about to make.

127. The European Union was grateful to the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial work during the past year. They could continue to count on the European Union's support.

128. The European Union, which was committed to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, attached the utmost importance to universalizing the NPT. It called upon those States which had not yet acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States to do so.

129. The European Union, which considered nuclear non-proliferation to be of vital importance, was contributing to the global efforts being made to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT and in a manner that promoted international stability and was based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

130. Since the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration, in 1995, the European Union was fully committed to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It therefore regretted the fact that the envisaged 2012 conference on the establishment of such a zone had been postponed. It was supporting the current preparations for the conference and greatly appreciated the tireless efforts of the conference facilitator, Mr Jaakko Laajava. It called upon all States of the Middle East to engage proactively with him and the conference co-conveners with a view to the convening of the conference soon and on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region.

131. The 2010 NPT Review Conference had reaffirmed the importance of the Agency's role in verifying the compliance by States with their safeguards obligations and also the importance of responding resolutely and effectively in cases of non-compliance.

132. The European Union, which was deeply concerned about the protracted and serious challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime posed by Iran, the DPRK and Syria, considered it important to bear in mind that the Security Council had a mandate to take appropriate action in the event of non-compliance with obligations arising out of the NPT.

133. It was essential that Iran, which was in blatant breach of six Security Council resolutions and 12 resolutions of the Board of Governors, comply with those resolutions. Iran must suspend its enrichment activities and heavy water-related projects, implement the modified Code 3.1 in the

General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its safeguards agreement with the Agency and bring into force the additional protocol to that agreement.

134. The European Union deeply regretted the fact that, owing to the continued failure of Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving all outstanding issues, including those relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme, the Agency was not able to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.

135. The European Union's objective remained the achievement of a negotiated comprehensive and long-term settlement that would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme while respecting Iran's legitimate right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with the NPT and in full compliance with Security Council and Board resolutions.

136. The European Union attached great importance to the ongoing diplomatic efforts — led by its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, together with China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America — to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. It urged the new Iranian leadership to engage constructively in meaningful negotiations as soon as practicable.

137. The nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes of the DPRK and its decision to cease all cooperation with the Agency remained a cause of grave concern to the European Union, which had condemned the DPRK's latest nuclear test and had urged the DPRK to refrain from further provocative actions.

138. The European Union would continue to work with key partners and the wider international community in an effort to demonstrate to the DPRK, including through the full implementation of United Nations sanctions, the consequences associated with its continued violations of Security Council resolutions.

139. The European Union continued to attach great importance to the Agency's playing a verification role in the DPRK.

140. The European Union, which had fully supported the adoption by the Board, on 9 June 2011, of the resolution contained in document GOV/2011/41, in which the Board had decided to report the non-compliance of Syria with its safeguards agreement to the Security Council and the General Assembly, deeply regretted the fact that Syria had still not remedied its non-compliance. Syria should start cooperating transparently with the Agency as a matter of urgency and sign, ratify and, ultimately, bring into force an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement as soon as possible.

141. The Agency's safeguards system was a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and played an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT, and the measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol were a fundamental component of that system. Comprehensive safeguards agreements together with additional protocols constituted the current Agency verification standard, and the European Union called for the universalization of those instruments without further delay.

142. From the outset, the European Union had supported the evolution towards safeguards implementation at the State level, which was more objectives-based and took account of all safeguards-relevant information about a State, as safeguards implementation at the State level would enable the Agency to focus on areas that were of greater safeguards significance and where the concerns about diversion of nuclear material were greatest.

143. In the European Union's view, the close cooperation between Euratom and the Agency made for effective and efficient safeguards and allowed the European Union's member States to demonstrate continuing respect for their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The European Union was supporting the Agency's safeguards system through the European Commission's safeguards support programme and had, with several of its member States, financially supported the modernization of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) at Seibersdorf.

144. On 25 January, senior officials of the European External Action Service, of various European Commission services and of the Agency's Secretariat had met in Brussels to consider ways of improving cooperation between the European Union and the Agency in all key areas. A second such meeting was planned for early 2014.

145. One outcome of the 25 January meeting was a memorandum of understanding on nuclear safety that the Director General and the European Union's Commissioner for Energy would be signing the following day.

146. The European Union, which attached great importance to nuclear safety, called on all Member States that had not yet signed and ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Early Notification Convention, the Assistance Convention and the Joint Convention to do so without delay. Also, it encouraged all Member States to participate in the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, particularly by availing themselves of the Agency's peer review services in the nuclear safety area.

147. Within the framework of its strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the European Union was supporting the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009) and international initiatives such as the G8's Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Nuclear Security Summit process. More than €100 million of the €260 million allocated to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation worldwide had been allocated to the European Union's regional CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative.

148. The European Union, which had participated in the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts as a cooperating organization, was, together with individual member States, among the main contributors to the Nuclear Security Fund, having contributed around €30 million to date.

149. The effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities was extremely important, and the European Union therefore urged all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the CPPNM and ratify the 2005 Amendment thereto.

150. The European Union, which was convinced of the benefits of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, had pledged €25 million in support of the establishment of the IAEA LEU bank, of which €20 million had already been paid. It hoped that the Host State Agreement with Kazakhstan would be concluded soon.

151. The European Union commended the Agency for organizing, together with OECD/NEA and the Russian Federation, the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century held in June in St. Petersburg, which had given the participating States an opportunity to present their long-term energy policies.

152. The European Union, which attached the utmost importance to the Agency's technical cooperation activities, each year made some €150 million available in support of those activities and of its own technical cooperation with third countries in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

153. In further support of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, the European Union had allocated around €560 million during the period 2007–2013 for the promotion of nuclear safety, radiation protection and efficient and effective safeguards implementation in third countries.

154. The European Union looked forward to continuing with its strong support for the essential activities of the Agency.

155. Mr YAMAMOTO (Japan), welcoming the reappointment of Director General Amano, said that under his leadership the Agency had done much to promote not only nuclear power generation but also applications of nuclear energy in areas such as cancer therapy and water management.

156. As regards the contaminated water leakage at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, which had been attracting international attention, countermeasures were being taken as a matter of urgency. As stated by Prime Minister Abe, the entire Japanese Government would continue to throw its full weight behind the action being taken to resolve the contaminated water issue while enhancing the dissemination of accurate information to the international community. On 3 September, the Government had adopted a “Basic Policy for the Contaminated Water Issue”, in line with which it had decided to allocate 47 billion yen to projects such as the building of an impermeable frozen-earth wall and the installation of more advanced multi-nuclide removal equipment.

157. As regards the impact of the contaminated water, increased radioactivity had been detected within the port of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, over an area of less than 0.3 km². No significant increase in radioactivity levels had been detected outside the port, and they and the radioactivity levels in the open sea remained below the level set by WHO in its Guidelines for drinking-water quality.

158. Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Japan had, in line with international guidelines, been applying extremely high food and water quality standards, with strict monitoring. The safety of food and water in Japan was therefore guaranteed.

159. The reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station had been cooled down and stabilized by the end of 2011, and a significant reduction in radioactive releases had been achieved. His Government and TEPCO were taking steps in preparation for the decommissioning of the reactors. The removal of spent fuel from the spent fuel pool was scheduled to begin in November.

160. Decommissioning the reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and resolving the contaminated water issue were unprecedented tasks, and a mechanism for bringing together the relevant technology, expertise and wisdom available in Japan and the rest of the international community, including the Agency’s Secretariat, was needed. To meet that need, Japan had in August established the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID). In addition, Japan was setting up an online forum to collect suggestions and recommendations from the general public.

161. A second Agency-organized decommissioning mission, to address the contaminated water issue, would take place soon, and Japan was planning to receive a follow-up Agency-organized remediation mission in October.

162. Japan would deal with the contaminated water issue and conduct the decommissioning activities in an internationally open manner, and it would welcome recommendations from and cooperation with the rest of the international community, including the Secretariat. Delegates to the current session of the General Conference would be welcome at Japan’s side event on the present situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, including the contaminated water issue.

163. Japan's present Government, which had taken office in December and was determined to prevent further accidents like the Fukushima Daiichi accident, intended to review the former Government's "zero operation of nuclear power stations by the 2030s" policy and to pursue a responsible policy that would ensure a stable energy supply and reduce energy costs. It hoped to have formulated a new medium- and long-term energy policy, with a role for nuclear power, by the end of the year.

164. Japan would restart the nuclear power stations that were currently shut down once their compliance with the recently enacted more stringent safety regulations had been confirmed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the acceptance of the relevant local governments had been obtained.

165. As regards other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, Japan would continue to reprocess spent fuel and to recycle plutonium as fuel, while ensuring transparency.

166. Japan, which was determined to continue sharing the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, had in December hosted the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in cooperation with the Agency. It was grateful to the Malaysian Government for providing a Co-President of the Conference, to the participating Member States for their participation and to the Agency's Secretariat for its invaluable contribution to the Conference's success.

167. The Japanese people were grateful for the support extended to Japan by other Member States and by the Secretariat.

168. Japan would cooperate with the Secretariat in the preparation of the Agency's comprehensive report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

169. Japan attached great importance to the cooperative projects that were being implemented by the Secretariat, the Fukushima Prefecture and the Fukushima Medical University. It also attached great importance to steady implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

170. Japan, which welcomed the success of the International Conference on Nuclear Security that had taken place in July, was continuing to play a responsible role in the field of nuclear security. It had requested IPPAS missions and was taking accelerated action to ratify the Amendment to the CPPNM.

171. As regards Agency safeguards, Japan would continue, in cooperation with the Secretariat, to promote the universalization of additional protocols. It welcomed the fact that five States had concluded additional protocols in 2012.

172. North Korea's nuclear programme was a serious threat to peace and security not just in East Asia but worldwide. The nuclear test conducted by it in February and the two ballistic missile launches carried out by it in 2012 had shown clearly that North Korea was developing weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Its behaviour was totally unacceptable.

173. North Korea had in April announced its intention to restart the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, although restarting those facilities would violate the commitments entered into by North Korea within the framework of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. To prevent the further development of North Korea's nuclear programme and the further procurement and proliferation by North Korea of nuclear weapons-related material and equipment, it was essential that the international community unite in supporting the steady implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and express its firm resolve never to acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear-weapon State.

174. On 27 September, representatives of the Agency and Iran would hold the first round of talks since President Rohani had assumed office. Japan, which hoped that the talks would be fruitful, urged

Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving all outstanding issues connected with the Iranian nuclear programme, in order that the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme might be restored.

175. Japan believed that the benefits of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy should be enjoyed by the largest possible number of Member States. It therefore welcomed the Director General's initiatives aimed at promoting non-power applications of nuclear energy. It considered technical cooperation to be a practical way of promoting them and consequently, besides contributing to the TCF, it had each year since 2011 contributed \$3.5 million in support of the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI).

176. Japan would be making a contribution of €500 000 in support of the renovation of the Agency's nuclear applications laboratories at Seibersdorf.

177. Japan, which welcomed the fact that the 2013 Scientific Forum would be focusing on the marine environment, considered protection of the marine environment to be an essential aspect of the efforts being made to address global challenges, including climate change. It greatly appreciated the establishment of the Ocean Acidification International Coordination Centre in Monaco, and it had arranged for \$150 000 of its 2013 PUI contribution to be used in support of the Centre.

178. Mr MONIZ (United States of America) read out the following message from President Obama:

"I send greetings to all those gathered for the 57th International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference. The United States supports the important work of the IAEA and is strongly committed to the Agency's goals of ensuring the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy while steadfastly preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"In Berlin this June, I reaffirmed America's commitment to pursuing the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This is a long-term goal, but we must remain dedicated to the task. In the past four years, the United States has taken significant, concrete steps towards achieving that goal by reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.

"Today, the United States is working successfully with Russia to implement the New START treaty, which will result in the lowest levels of deployed nuclear weapons since the 1950s. But our work is not done. As I said in Berlin, we can ensure the security of America and our allies while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one third below the New START level. And I will seek to negotiate further reductions in nuclear weapons with Russia.

"As we move toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, we must ensure that the IAEA has the resources and is able to use all its authorities to verify compliance with safeguards agreements. Member States must also bolster the IAEA's work to foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a safe and secure manner, consistent with international non-proliferation norms. I welcome, and encourage all Member States to fully support, the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, including a call for steps to establish a global nuclear liability regime.

"Securing vulnerable nuclear materials to prevent nuclear terrorism remains a global priority. I am pleased that the IAEA has increased its focus on nuclear security and commend the Agency for hosting its International Conference on Nuclear Security in July of this year. Next year, the Netherlands will host the third Nuclear Security Summit, and I look forward to continuing this momentum by hosting a fourth Summit in 2016.

"Though we face continued challenges, let us take this opportunity to rededicate ourselves to strengthening the IAEA and its vital role in preventing proliferation, addressing

non-compliance, and expanding access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I wish everyone all the best for a productive and successful General Conference.”

179. Sixty years ago, President Eisenhower had presented his “Atoms for Peace” proposal to the United Nations General Assembly. Under his vision, “experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities [and] a special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world.”

180. President Eisenhower’s vision for nuclear power had proved to be prophetic. Today’s global population was 7 billion — more than double the population of 1953 — and the demand for energy was growing rapidly. But President Eisenhower did not anticipate the arrival of an equally powerful challenge: climate change.

181. The evidence was overwhelming and the science was clear: climate change was one of the most pressing dangers of the present generation. A changing climate was a threat-multiplier: from causing more severe droughts and fires, to intensifying storms, to breeding new conflicts over displacement and resources. The costs were large in terms of lives lost and economic impact.

182. When one looked at the challenge of working to reduce carbon emissions while facilitating global development, one saw clearly that nuclear energy had a role to play. In that regard, his suggestion was that one should begin looking beyond the era of “Atoms for Peace” towards a model of “Atoms for Prosperity”.

183. The Member State representatives in the room had the world’s population as their constituency. Ensuring that the basic needs of the planet’s residents were met while working to reduce carbon emissions was a daunting test both of compassion and of the ability to innovate. Technological cooperation was at the centre of the response.

184. Some were rising to the challenge; the United States was grateful to the Director General for his outstanding leadership in the effort to direct resources and attention towards the attainment of global economic development goals, and it welcomed the partnership of 16 countries that had supported the IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) to the benefit of more than 120 Member States.

185. Together, the PUI donors — including the United States, which had pledged \$50 million over five years — had helped to alleviate the effects of sustained drought in Africa, improve agricultural productivity, ensure food safety, and better manage water resources worldwide. Also, the United States had supported the IAEA’s Environment Laboratories in Monaco, which were working to preserve a healthy marine environment — the topic of the 2013 Scientific Forum.

186. The United States commended the European Union in particular for its recent generous PUI contribution, but more resources were needed. It encouraged other Member States to make PUI contributions so that the Agency might respond with speed and flexibility to urgent and unanticipated needs in resource-deprived parts of the world.

187. With its low carbon footprint, nuclear power could and should remain an important contributor to the global energy mix, but, for nuclear power to remain viable and politically sustainable, Member States and the Secretariat must continue to ensure that nuclear energy was used safely and securely for the “arts of peace”.

188. The burden of improving the safety of nuclear power should be shared. The Fukushima disaster had made clear that a nuclear accident anywhere had global implications. All stakeholders — from government agencies to the nuclear power industry — should work together in order to reduce the likelihood that such a high-consequence event would occur again and to ensure that the response would be quick and effective if nuclear or radiological emergencies arose.

189. The United States had worked hard to enhance the safety of its existing nuclear power reactors, and it was constructing new ones that incorporated passive safety systems. Also, United States companies were developing designs for small modular reactors that could be deployed in the next decade. The United States Department of Energy, which had already committed over \$100 million in support of the engineering development and licensing of a passively safe small modular reactor, intended to provide additional funding in the near future. The United States strongly urged countries that might embark on nuclear power programmes to consider passively safe reactor designs.

190. The United States and France had recently signed a joint statement affirming their commitment to promoting efforts to achieve a global nuclear liability regime based on treaty relations among countries that might be affected by a nuclear accident. In the joint statement, they urged other countries to adhere, as appropriate for each country, to the Revised Paris Convention, the Revised Vienna Convention and — with a view to bringing it into force — the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. The United States had ratified the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which was the only existing international nuclear liability instrument that it could ratify, and it would like to see the Convention entering into force before the 2014 session of the General Conference.

191. In times of emergency, it was critical to be able to draw on the best expertise and technology. That was why the United States was in the process of registering additional capabilities with RANET and becoming a RANET capacity-building centre.

192. The danger of nuclear terrorism remained one of the greatest threats to global security. The best way to stop individuals who would use nuclear material for malicious acts was to secure and eliminate it. Since President Obama had laid out his nuclear security agenda, just over four years ago, the United States and its international partners had made significant progress towards that end. They had eliminated the use of HEU at 25 civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities, removed all remaining HEU from 11 countries, and removed or confirmed the disposition of nearly 3000 kilograms of vulnerable HEU and plutonium. Also, they had raised the awareness of the dangers of WMD-related knowledge proliferation and the importance of an enhanced nuclear security culture.

193. The Agency was to be congratulated on convening the International Conference on Nuclear Security that had taken place in July, which had demonstrated that there was a shared commitment to ensuring that the international community's worst fears did not materialize.

194. Despite the tremendous progress that had been made, however, much remained to be done; the attention devoted to nuclear security should be commensurate with the threat. The Netherlands would be hosting the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, and President Obama intended to host a fourth Nuclear Security Summit in 2016. The continuing strong focus on nuclear security should be reflected within the Agency, which was why the United States supported the upgrading of the Office of Nuclear Security to the status of a division.

195. Verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes yielded tangible benefits. Safeguards helped to bring about an international security environment suitable for movement towards nuclear disarmament; they built confidence among neighbours, thereby contributing to regional peace, and among nuclear suppliers, thereby facilitating trade; and they sent up warning flags in the case of countries that would skirt the rules in order to develop nuclear weapons.

196. The world had repeatedly called upon Iran to resolve all outstanding issues related to its nuclear programme, including by addressing the evidence of its possible military dimensions. Regrettably, Iran continued to violate Board and Security Council resolutions and to take provocative actions that raised legitimate concerns about the nature of that programme, as had been outlined in the Director General's most recent report to the Board on the Iranian nuclear issue.

197. North Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons and nuclear programme and return to the NPT and Agency safeguards. The United States remained committed to authentic and credible negotiations, but North Korea must demonstrate a clear commitment to denuclearization.

198. The Assad regime had refused for years to cooperate with the Agency in remedying its non-compliance. The United States called upon Syria to provide the Agency with access to all relevant locations, materials and persons connected with the Dair Alzour site, as required by the Board.

199. Those three cases, and other ones, demonstrated that the Agency must have the tools, access and resources necessary for detecting and deterring undeclared nuclear programmes. In that regard, the United States believed that the combination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol was the international standard for safeguards verification, and it therefore called upon all States that had not yet done so to bring a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol into force as soon as possible.

200. His country, which, along with 20 other Member States, had a safeguards support programme, would like to see many more Member States supporting Agency safeguards financially and technically.

201. His country greatly appreciated the Secretariat's continued efforts to make the implementation of safeguards more effective and efficient, and it welcomed the Director General's recent report on the conceptualization and development of safeguards implementation at the State level.

202. Achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons would take sustained commitment to a practical, step-by-step approach. In June, in Berlin, President Obama had expanded upon his vision in that regard — his Prague Agenda, and the United States would work with the rest of the international community for the realization of that vision.

203. In the meantime, the United States would continue to meet its existing obligations. In the course of meeting those obligations, it had disposed of excess, weapons-origin fissile material by downblending approximately 140 metric tons of HEU; as a transparency measure, it had, in cooperation with the Secretariat, allowed international monitoring of the downblending of 50 metric tons of that material.

204. His country remained firmly committed to eliminating, under Agency verification, 34 metric tons of weapons-origin plutonium pursuant to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as no Longer Required for Defence Purposes and Related Cooperation.

205. Later in the current year, his country and Russia would celebrate a monumental accomplishment: the final shipment of LEU from Russia to the United States under the 1993 US-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. The final delivery of material under that agreement would result in the permanent elimination of 500 metric tons of Russian weapons-origin HEU — roughly the equivalent of 20 000 nuclear weapons.

206. The seminal "Atoms for Peace" speech made by President Eisenhower had produced a memorable legacy, but Member States needed to learn hard lessons from events that had occurred since he made that speech. Pursuing humanitarian goals while addressing threats that ranged from nuclear accidents and nuclear weapons proliferation to climate change was as serious as any challenges that had been faced in human history. But recent human history taught that adversity could be a catalyst for innovation.

207. The Agency had an important role to play in that regard, but it would require the support of its Member States, with their collective resources. Member States should ensure that all countries that played by the rules could enjoy the fruit of peaceful nuclear cooperation and that cheating did not go unpunished. Strengthening the Agency was worth the effort if it meant that future generations might live in a world of peace and prosperity where nuclear dangers were a distant memory.

208. Mr MA Xingrui (China) said that during the past four years, under Director General Amano's leadership, the Agency had done much to promote the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, enhance global nuclear safety and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China, which greatly appreciated the efforts made, would continue to support the Agency and its Director General.

209. In the two years since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, nuclear power generation had continued to grow worldwide, albeit somewhat more slowly than before. Nuclear power remained an important option for countries with substantial nuclear power programmes, and also for a good number of newcomers in the field. The International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century held in St Petersburg in June 2013 had made that very clear.

210. His Government had never wavered in its determination to support the expansion of nuclear power generation in China. With the first unit of the Hongyanhe Nuclear Power Plant starting commercial operation in June, the number of operating power reactors in mainland China now stood at 17, with a total installed capacity of 14.69 GW(e). All of them had a good safety record, and their major operating performance indicators were on a par with those of the world's front-runners.

211. China currently had 28 power reactors under construction; they would have a total installed capacity of 30.57 GW(e) — larger than the future total installed capacity of all the power reactors under construction elsewhere in the world.

212. According to China's medium- and long-term nuclear power development plan, published at the end of 2012, the country would have 58 GW(e) of installed capacity in operation and 30 GW(e) under construction in 2020.

213. China was conducting basic research in nuclear science with a view to the development of advanced nuclear power technology and of indigenous nuclear power equipment manufacturing capabilities, to the achievement of nuclear fuel supply security and to the establishment of a closed nuclear fuel cycle.

214. During the past 40 years, China had acquired a wealth of experience in operating power reactors of different types. Also, it had independently developed a third-generation pressurized-water reactor with advanced safety and other technical features and a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor with fourth-generation nuclear power technology features that might meet the needs of countries just embarking on nuclear power programmes. China would like to share its nuclear power development experience with other countries.

215. His Government had expressed great concern about the leakage of radioactive water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and had urged Japan to do more to minimize the longer-term consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, to be more transparent and to keep the international community accurately informed in a timely manner.

216. The Fukushima Daiichi accident had been yet a further reminder that nuclear safety was by no means a trivial matter — that one should be as cautious about nuclear safety as if one were stepping onto thin ice or standing at the edge of an abyss.

217. On the basis of comprehensive nuclear safety inspections conducted nationwide in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, his Government had promulgated a "2020 Vision for Nuclear Safety

and the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Contamination” (the Nuclear Safety Plan). Also, in June it had promulgated a revised National Nuclear Emergency Response Plan based on the experience gained in recent years and the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

218. His Government had provided the public with information on the policies and regulations concerning nuclear safety and nuclear emergencies and with the basic facts of nuclear science and technology, thereby increasing public confidence in the safety of peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

219. China, which was firmly opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, advocated their prohibition and destruction. It was committed to a policy of not supporting, encouraging or engaging in nuclear weapons proliferation and not assisting any country with the development of nuclear weapons.

220. China, which was supporting the efforts of the Secretariat to increase the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency’s safeguards system, had in 2002 become the first of the five nuclear-weapon States to ratify an additional protocol. In 2004 it had joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and in 2009 it had deposited its instrument of ratification of the Amendment to the CPPNM. In April, it had hosted a regional workshop on facilitating adherence to and the implementation of the Amendment.

221. China had put in place a nuclear materials management and export control system with strict regulatory requirements.

222. China, which was supporting the Agency’s activities in the field of nuclear security, had made several contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund and had donated to the Agency some equipment that could be used for nuclear security capacity-building.

223. China, which had accumulated some experience of converting research reactors from HEU fuel use to LEU fuel use, stood ready to help other Member States with the conversion of their research reactors.

224. His country was cooperating with the United States and other parties in the establishment, in China, of a Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security that would serve the entire Asia-Pacific region.

225. China, which advocated the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, continued to be of the view that the DPRK nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation and with account taken of the DPRK’s legitimate security concerns. His Government was working hard to bring about a resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

226. China believed that the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved through dialogue within the framework of the Agency, which should remain objective and continue playing a constructive role.

227. As 1.3 billion Chinese embarked on the realization of their “China dream”, every effort was being made in China to promote political, economic, cultural, social and ecological progress. Nuclear power generation held out a bright future for China, since it was supportive of socio-economic development, made for a better environment and contributed to optimization of the energy mix.

228. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a shared aspiration of the people of the world, and China would therefore like to see all Member States standing together in support of the non-proliferation efforts under way globally and in support of the safe and sustainable development of nuclear power generation and of the other peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

229. Mr SALEHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the election of President Rohani in Iran had paved the way for more constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries and with international organizations.

230. The General Conference's annual sessions provided an opportunity to evaluate the efforts of an organization that had been established primarily in order to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world pursuant to Article II of its Statute.

231. Technical cooperation was the most important vehicle by means of which the Agency made such efforts, in response to the increasing needs of developing Member States. However, the Agency's developing Member States were concerned about the fact that the imbalance between the promotional and the non-promotional activities of the Agency was continuing to be overlooked.

232. Iran stood ready to contribute in the field of technical cooperation. While continuing with its peaceful nuclear activities under Agency surveillance, his country had made considerable advances in various areas of nuclear science and technology in recent decades, and it was prepared, within the framework of the NPT, to cooperate with other Member States under the auspices of the Agency. At the same time, it expected to benefit from Agency technical cooperation activities in support of various peaceful nuclear applications.

233. The bitter experience of nuclear accidents like the Fukushima Daiichi accident had proved that released radioactive particles did not recognize national borders. Nuclear safety was therefore a global concern. However, nuclear safety standards should take due account of the circumstances in and characteristics of different regions of the world. The Secretariat should therefore give experts from all Member States an opportunity, without any discrimination, to contribute to the drafting process in the Agency's safety standards committees.

234. Despite the constraints imposed on his country during the past three decades, the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) had been commissioned and connected to the national grid; it would soon be handed over to the local operator and his people's aspirations finally fulfilled. The BNPP, which had been upgraded to meet the latest Agency nuclear safety standards, had been licensed and was being supervised by the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority. An Agency IRRS team that had visited Iran in March 2010 at Iran's invitation had confirmed the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority's qualifications for applying the relevant Agency nuclear safety standards at the BNPP. In bringing the BNPP into operation, his Government had carefully complied with all safety requirements in order to ensure the safety of the Iranian people, especially those residing adjacent to the BNPP, and of the inhabitants of the other Persian Gulf States. Iran had begun the constitutional process for accession to the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

235. Although responsibility for nuclear security lay entirely with individual States, the Secretariat could help Member States to establish effective nuclear security systems through capacity-building and knowledge sharing. The Nuclear Security Guidance Committee had a significant role to play in that connection, but all Member States should be given an equal opportunity to participate in its work.

236. Undoubtedly, the best guarantee of nuclear security would be a world free of nuclear weapons. A clear time frame, with a target date of 2025, for the full implementation of Article VI of the NPT, as proposed by NAM at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, was imperative.

237. As emphasized by NAM at its 16th Summit of Heads of State or Government, held in Tehran from 26 to 31 August 2012, "measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes without discrimination.” Also, all Member States should be involved in nuclear security-related activities and initiatives in an inclusive manner.

238. One crucial issue relating to nuclear security was cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities jeopardized the health and safety of people and should be condemned by the international community. Although Iran had, thanks to its cyber-security environment, been able to ward off cyber-attacks, it urged the Secretariat, in collaboration with Member States, to perform further cyber-security assessments and report on the results.

239. As regards the conceptualization and development of safeguards implementation at the State level, in Iran’s view the State-level concept was still vague and there were several ambiguities in the Director General’s recent report to the Board on the subject; there was certainly a need for elaboration and clarification. His country therefore greatly appreciated the Secretariat’s decision to prepare a supplementary document, and it urged the Secretariat to engage in more extensive consultations with Member States on the subject.

240. Despite repeated calls by the international community, made in — for instance — the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension Conference and in related resolutions of the General Assembly, the Agency’s General Conference and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Zionist regime, confident of the political and military support of certain permanent members of the Security Council, had neither acceded to the NPT nor placed its secretive nuclear facilities under full-scope Agency safeguards. In his report on the “Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East” (GC(57)/10), the Director General stated that “All States of the Middle East region except for Israel are parties to the... NPT and have undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards.” Israel’s prohibited nuclear activities seriously threatened regional peace and security and endangered the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, the failure of the Security Council — imposed on it for several decades — to address the well-documented nuclear weapons programme of Israel had emboldened the Zionist regime to explicitly acknowledge its possession of nuclear weapons, a fact that had been condemned by NAM. The unilateral decision by one of the conveners to postpone, on illusory pretexts, the conference scheduled for 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had been taken solely in order to protect Israel from international condemnation. That unreasonable decision was incompatible with the unanimous decision taken by the 2010 NPT Review Conference and undermined the credibility of the NPT and of the NPT review process. His country advised the conference conveners to honour their commitments and to organize the conference speedily and without any preconditions.

241. The Islamic Republic of Iran, given its religious tenets and international commitments, had never sought and would never seek to develop nuclear weapons. At the same time, it would never compromise on its inalienable right to engage in peaceful nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, under comprehensive Agency safeguards. As stated by its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, at the 16th NAM Summit: “I reiterate the Islamic Republic has never been after nuclear weapons and that it will never give up the right of its people to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Our motto is: ‘Nuclear energy for all and nuclear weapons for none.’ We will insist on each of these two precepts, and we know that breaking the monopoly of certain western countries on production of nuclear energy in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is in the interest of all independent countries, including the members of the Non-Aligned Movement.”

242. In recent years, Iran had cooperated with the Agency with full transparency in the application of safeguards to its nuclear material and facilities. Under the country’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, all peaceful nuclear activities and facilities in Iran were subject to Agency safeguards, including containment and surveillance measures. Since 2003 more than 8000 person-days of inspection, including 100 unannounced inspections, had been conducted by the Agency’s inspectors at

Iran's nuclear facilities. According to the Agency's Safeguards Implementation Report for 2012, Iran had also dispatched more than 4000 accounting reports to the Agency without delays. Iran now ranked as the second-most inspected country in the world, after Japan, and the inspections had confirmed non-diversion in a manner unprecedented in the Agency's history. According to reports by the former and the current Directors General, all verification activities had been carried out without any obstacle, and no evidence of diversion of nuclear material for prohibited purposes had been found. With regard to the baseless allegations of a so-called possible military dimension, on which negotiations were under way, Iran had already declared its readiness for continued constructive interaction with the Agency in order to resolve possible ambiguities.

243. Iran's new Government had already announced its international policy based on mutual confidence-building and constructive interaction. Such an approach was creating a conducive environment and an opportunity for a positive response from the P-5+1.

244. He had come with a message from the recently elected President of Iran aimed at further enhancing and expanding his country's cooperation with the Agency and closing the Iranian nuclear file. It was to be hoped that the new approach would be reciprocated by the other side. Iran was optimistic about the outcome of its forthcoming meeting with the P-5+1 provided that the two parties acted with good intentions and with the aim of closing the Iranian nuclear file in a win-win manner. In view of the numerous crises that had been afflicting the international community, it was incumbent on all concerned to do their utmost to alleviate as many of the crises as possible. The President of Iran, for his part, had already undertaken to do his utmost.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.