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President: Mr MABHONGO (South Africa)

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¹ GC(57)/24.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(57)/INF/13.

Abbreviations used in this record:

AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
Chemical Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
E3+3	France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
EPREV	Emergency Preparedness Review
EU	European Union
G8	Group of Eight
GEF	Global Environment Facility
HEU	high-enriched uranium
INIR	Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review
INIS	International Nuclear Information System
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IRPA	International Radiation Protection Association
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NDT	non-destructive testing
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSF	Nuclear Security Fund
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation (UK)
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PUI	Peaceful Uses Initiative

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

RANET	Response and Assistance Network
SIT	sterile insect technique
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WENRA	Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association

8. General debate and Annual Report for 2012 (continued) (GC(57)/3 and Supplement)

1. Mr STAVYTSKYI (Ukraine) congratulated Mr Amano on his appointment as Director General of the Agency for a second term.
2. Ukraine, which attached great importance to the Agency's activities in support of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the role played by the Agency with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, called upon those States which had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so without further delay.
3. The Chernobyl accident and the Fukushima Daiichi accident had prompted a strengthening of international nuclear safety standards in which Ukraine had been and was still very actively involved.
4. His country welcomed the Agency's activities related to the extension of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants, to the preservation of nuclear knowledge and expertise, to nuclear safety and the strengthening of nuclear regulatory bodies, to safety in the transport of radioactive materials and to the safe management of radioactive waste.
5. His country, which greatly appreciated the Agency's activities aimed at enhancing the security of nuclear and other radioactive material, and at preventing illicit trafficking in such materials, would like the physical protection of such materials to be strengthened given the risk of their being used for the purposes of terrorism. In that connection, it believed that Member States' laws governing the export of such materials should be strengthened.
6. Ukraine, which attached great importance to the Nuclear Security Summit process, had repatriated all the HEU fuel used in its research reactors, and it urged all Member States still using HEU fuel to follow its example.
7. His country, which welcomed the level of technical cooperation between it and the Agency, considered that the strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities attested to the ability of the Secretariat to respond to the main requirements of Member States.
8. Nuclear power would be important for the energy security of Ukraine in the medium-to-long term, as recognized in Ukraine's updated energy strategy for the period until 2030.
9. His country, which possessed considerable scientific potential in the field of nuclear technology and had plans for nuclear power development in the long term, was supporting the Agency's activities relating to innovative and advanced reactor designs.
10. Ukraine was also supporting the Agency's activities relating to the use of ionizing radiation areas such as health care, agriculture and water resources management, and also in the preservation of national and international cultural heritage.
11. His country, which continued to attach great importance to overcoming the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, remained grateful to those countries and international organizations which had provided — and were still providing — assistance in that connection. Construction of the New Safe Confinement to be placed over the destroyed reactor at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant was due to be completed in 2015 — paving the way for the conversion of the destroyed reactor with its Shelter

into an environmentally safe system. His country was counting on further support from the Agency and other organizations in the United Nations system.

12. His country, which was drawing on its experience of the Chernobyl accident in helping Japan to overcome the aftermath of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, believed that safety should be the primary consideration in all activities relating to the use of nuclear energy and that a high level of safety culture was essential for sustainable development worldwide.

13. Ukraine welcomed the joint efforts of France and the United States of America aimed at the establishment of a global regime of civil liability for nuclear damage, and it was thinking of taking considering appropriate action at the national level in that connection.

14. Ms PENTUS-ROSIMANNUS (Estonia) said that her country, which considered the nuclear safety standards established by the Agency to be of paramount importance in ensuring nuclear safety worldwide, supported all measures leading to higher nuclear safety and security levels nationally and internationally.

15. Although Estonia had no nuclear power plants itself, it needed to be prepared for nuclear accidents in other countries abroad, as nuclear accidents did not respect national borders and it was located within close range of operating nuclear power plants. Nuclear safety and security peer review missions organized by the Secretariat and implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety had helped her country to strengthen its radiological emergency preparedness and response arrangements.

16. Estonia, which welcomed the role being played by the Secretariat in the Working Group on Effectiveness and Transparency, established by the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, considered it important to strengthen the Convention and to encourage all countries with a nuclear power programme to become Contracting Parties.

17. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and Japan's continuing struggle with its consequences had proved once again how important it was to have an effective and transparent nuclear regulatory system and good cooperation among stakeholders. On 14 March, Estonia had participated in a Nordic–Baltic nuclear emergency exercise that had provided a good opportunity for practice in regional cooperation and coordination among organizations responsible for nuclear and radiation safety. The exercise had increased her country's confidence in the decision support systems to be used by it in the event of nuclear emergency in a neighbouring country.

18. Estonia attached great importance to the role of the Agency in strengthening the international nuclear security framework by promoting the implementation of relevant international legal instruments, enhancing international cooperation in the field of nuclear security and assisting States in nuclear security capacity-building. It welcomed the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan for 2014–2017 and would continue contributing to the NSF.

19. Estonia, which was considering ways to diversify its energy mix in a manner that was least costly for consumers and least harmful to the environment, was carefully analysing all the different possibilities.

20. Over the years, Estonia had benefited from Agency technical cooperation projects relating to the TCF. That cooperation was of great importance in the improvement of its regulatory infrastructure for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, to medical applications of nuclear techniques, and to radioactive waste management, and it stood ready to share the knowledge gained by it with other Member States.

21. Mr ABDUL-AZIZ (Libya) said that his country greatly appreciated the technical support that it had received through the Agency in recent years, particularly in the areas of human health and groundwater resource management. It was actively participating in activities in those areas, including activities at the regional level, following its absence during the revolution. For the 2014–2015 Agency technical cooperation cycle, Libya had submitted four project proposals, of which the Secretariat had accepted three — relating to the introduction of nuclear power; to the management of naturally occurring radioactive material; and to agricultural pest eradication.
22. His country, which commended the measures that were being taken by the Secretariat to promote international cooperation in nuclear and radiation safety, had established an independent nuclear regulatory authority in conformity with the relevant international norms.
23. Libya, which had acceded to a number of nuclear safety-related conventions, including the Early Notification, had, with support provided through the Agency under a regional project, set up a committee to deal with radiological emergencies.
24. The Agency's Office of Legal Affairs had reviewed Libya's draft nuclear law and made a number of suggestions that the relevant Libyan committee was studying with a view to its making the suggested adjustments.
25. During the current transitional period, Libya would welcome the organization by the Secretariat or technically advanced Member States of training in the use of nuclear technology for Libyan technicians.
26. His country commended the convening, by the Agency, of a number of international experts' meetings on lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It also commended the convening, by the Agency and the Government of Japan, of the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security, in which Libya had participated. As nuclear power was an important source of clean energy for many countries, it was essential to enhance the Agency's role in providing high levels of nuclear safety and security culture and strengthening the international capabilities for responding to nuclear accidents.
27. Libya greatly appreciated the assistance that it had received from Germany with physical protection at the Tajoura Nuclear Research Centre. A technical delegation had visited Germany in October 2012, and a programme of work for enhancing the physical protection of Libya's nuclear facilities had been prepared; the programme was currently being implemented.
28. Libya would also like to thank Argentina for its assistance in upgrading the reactor control and safety systems at the Tajoura Nuclear Research Centre.
29. From 25 to 27 February, Libya had hosted an Agency-organized National Workshop on the Design Basis Threat aimed at strengthening national capacities in the area of the physical protection of nuclear facilities.
30. As Libya was located in a region that suffered from water shortages, it was very interested in seawater desalination by means of nuclear energy. It would therefore like to participate in coordinated research projects relating to seawater desalination conducted within the INPRO framework.
31. Libya, which had adopted a clear position on weapons of mass destruction since the triumph of the revolution, considered it essential to rid the world of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It had fulfilled its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention through the implementation of a detailed chemical weapons destruction programme supervised by inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

32. The elimination of weapons of mass destruction was a particularly urgent aspiration in the Middle East, where the same standards should be applied in that regard to all States. Israel should therefore comply with General Conference resolution GC(53)RES/17 by acceding to the NPT and placing all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards.

33. While a number of States had been reluctant to support the convening in 2012 of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, the Arab States had cooperated with the conference facilitator and the co-conveners, making a number of constructive proposals. Moreover, they had refrained from submitting a draft resolution on “Israeli nuclear capabilities” at the 2010 and 2011 sessions of the General Conference so as not to offer a pretext for the cancellation of the conference.

34. Universality of the NPT and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East were aims not inconsistent with demands for a political and military balance in the region. Those aims would not be achieved, however, unless the necessary action was taken by Israel.

35. Libya greatly appreciated the efforts of the Director General to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. According to his most recent report to the Board, the Agency was still unable to clarify many aspects of the Iranian nuclear programme. While his country believed that there was a need for closer cooperation and greater transparency on the part of Iran, it also believed that all States parties to the NPT had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in accordance with their obligations under the NPT. Libya, which would like to see intensive consultations between Iran and a number of concerned countries, with a clear timetable, proposed that the Board send a high-level delegation to Tehran as soon as possible to consult with the new Iranian leadership. Such action would enhance the Board’s political role in support of the Secretariat’s technical role.

36. Progress in resolving international differences was not achieved by means of threats to impose sanctions on States or by the use of force, as the adverse impact of sanctions was felt by ordinary people rather than decision-makers and the use of force promoted extremism. His country therefore advocated dialogue rather than confrontation.

37. Libya urged the new Iranian leadership to seize the opportunity existing at present and to allay the international concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. It hoped that the round of talks between representatives of Iran and the Secretariat due to take place on 27 September 2013 would lead to agreement on a structured approach document.

38. Libya, which was concerned about the announcement by the DPRK that it had conducted an underground nuclear test on 12 February, considered it important that the Six-Party Talks be resumed, with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

39. His country commended the efforts being made to increase the number of Secretariat staff members from developing Member States, but it regretted the fact that no tangible progress had been made. It would like to see the Secretariat doing more to recruit nationals of developing Member States, including Libya, to senior posts, especially as many persons in those Member States possessed the necessary expertise.

40. Ms RISLAKKI (Finland) said that nuclear power was a major component of her country’s energy mix, accounting for almost 30% of electricity production. Currently, Finland’s fifth power reactor was under construction and, once it was in operation, nuclear power would account for 40%.

41. In addition, decisions to permit the construction of two further power reactors had been taken by the Government and endorsed by Parliament in 2010. The entry into service of those two power reactors would not only ensure Finland’s self-sufficiency in electricity production for the first time in decades, but also be an important step towards carbon emission-free energy generation.

42. A diversified and sustainable energy mix was the goal of Finland's energy policy, as had been stated in the latest update to the National Energy and Climate Strategy, approved by the Government in March. Renewables now accounted for more than 30% of Finland's primary energy consumption, and the strong promotion of renewable energy sources and of improved energy use efficiency and greater self-sufficiency were important elements of that strategy.
43. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Finland had conducted — first on its own and later in combination with the European Commission — a thorough assessment of the risks to its nuclear power plants arising from extreme natural events. The results had shown that there were no immediate safety concerns at Finland's nuclear power plants. However, some areas had been identified where safety improvements would be made, and work on making them was under way.
44. Finland welcomed the adoption of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and would like all States concerned to participate in its implementation. It was important that the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident be duly taken into account in the further development of Agency safety requirements documents.
45. In countries with — or just embarking on — nuclear power programmes, it was essential that the relevant legislation and the responsibilities of all stakeholders be clear and that the nuclear regulatory bodies have the necessary authority and resources, be independent in their decision-making, and enjoy the confidence of the general public.
46. The Secretariat was to be commended for the assistance with the development of sound safety infrastructures provided by it to Member States embarking on nuclear power programmes, and Finland had made experts available in support of Secretariat activities in that connection. In her country's view, however, the prime responsibility for nuclear safety — and security — lay with the nuclear facility operators.
47. Finland intended to participate very actively in the deliberations of the Working Group on Effectiveness and Transparency established by the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
48. The security of nuclear materials and facilities was accorded high priority by Finland, which had ratified the Amendment to the CPPNM. Her country regretted that the Amendment had still not entered into force and would like to see many more Member States ratifying it.
49. The Agency was to be commended for convening the International Conference on Nuclear Security held in July, and the number of participants had been a clear indication of the importance of having an Agency-wide forum for exchanges views on nuclear security. Finland welcomed the initiatives aimed at strengthening the role of the Agency in coordinating international nuclear security efforts.
50. Finland was continuing to provide financial and in-kind support of Agency nuclear security activities. It was a long-standing contributor to the NSF and had participated very actively in the work of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) and in developing documents for the IAEA Nuclear Security Series. It would host an Agency workshop on nuclear security culture in October, and it stood ready to host Agency events on topics such as cybersecurity.
51. Finland was making a great effort to further improve security at its nuclear power plants, and a new design basis threat, addressing physical and cybersecurity issues, had entered into force in May.
52. The Finnish nuclear fuel cycle was based on the once-through option. Spent nuclear fuel was viewed as radioactive waste, which, by law, had to be disposed of on Finnish territory. The construction of a rock characterization facility (called Onkalo), that would be part of the final

repository for spent fuel had been completed, with excavation to the planned depth of the final repository — more than 400 metres below the ground surface.

53. Posiva, a company owned jointly by the two existing nuclear power plant operators, was responsible for the spent fuel final disposal project. At the end of 2012, it had submitted an application for a licence to construct an encapsulation plant and the final repository. The Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy had started the licence application review process, and the first public hearing had already been conducted. Spent fuel disposal was scheduled to start in 2020.

54. The construction of further power reactors in Finland would significantly increase the demand for experts in the nuclear sector and the retirement of existing experts might create a shortage. The Ministry of Employment and the Economy had in 2012 released the results of an extensive survey of nuclear energy competence in Finland. It was estimated that some 4500 experts in various disciplines would be needed by 2025, meaning that some 2400 new experts would be needed. In the light of that estimate, new educational programmes had been established and the development of a new nuclear research strategy had been initiated.

55. Nuclear weapons proliferation continued to be a serious concern, and it was essential that the international community take appropriate measures in cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in order to preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime and of its cornerstone, the NPT in whose implementation the Agency's safeguards system played an indispensable role. Finland favoured further development of the Agency's safeguards system on the basis of the State-level approach; its own experience of the implementation of integrated safeguards had been very positive.

56. Finland, which regretted the postponement of the Helsinki conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, considered that it was important to keep the end goal in sight. It was pleased that all States in the Middle East had expressed willingness to continue discussions on how to progress towards the shared vision of such a zone. It would like to see the regional States engaging with each other in a constructive spirit before, during and after the Helsinki conference.

57. Public acceptance of nuclear power needed to be continuously earned. A major nuclear incident, anywhere in the world, could have a significant impact on public acceptance worldwide — hence the importance of improving nuclear safety and security globally. The continued safe operation of nuclear power plants was essential; there could be no exceptions in any State.

58. In Finland, there was political and public acceptance of and support for the expanded use of nuclear power. The manner in which the nuclear waste management approach had been developed, with public hearings and local government veto rights, had contributed to the public acceptance of nuclear power in Finland.

59. Mr SHAABAN (Egypt) said that his country, which attached great importance to peaceful applications of nuclear energy, was interested in the use of nuclear reactors to ensure reliable supplies of electricity and water at a time when oil resources were insufficient for that purpose. Also, the construction of nuclear reactors and their use for that purpose would contribute to the development of scientific research programmes in Egypt and to the modernization of Egyptian industry.

60. In October 2007, Egypt had announced the launching of a programme for the construction of four nuclear power plants. Numerous steps had been taken since then to create the requisite legislative, institutional and organizational infrastructure, including the restructuring of the Supreme Council for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (chaired by the President of the Republic), the enactment of Nuclear Law No. 7 of 2010 and its implementing regulations, and the establishment of the independent Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority. The invitation for tenders had been finalized in 2011,

but, in view of the internal political situation related to the democratic transition following the revolutions of 25 January 2011 and 30 June 2013, it had been decided to postpone the issuing of the invitation for tenders until the necessary bill was adopted by the Egyptian Parliament to be elected within the next few months, so as to ensure the parliamentary support that such a long-term programme required.

61. In addition, the Fukushima Daiichi accident had prompted the Egyptian authorities to use the intervening period to review the specifications for the first nuclear power plant and integrate lessons learned from the accident, so as to ensure the highest possible nuclear safety standards.

62. Egypt's technical cooperation with the Agency was not confined to nuclear power; it extended to areas such as agriculture, industry, water management and human health, especially cancer control.

63. His country's Atomic Energy Commission, acting in close cooperation with the Agency, ensured the full transparency of all research activities and applications related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and full compliance with the relevant safety and security standards.

64. Egypt greatly appreciated the assistance provided through the agency in support of the operation of its two research reactors and related facilities.

65. The Atomic Energy Commission had sought assistance through the Agency with the development of a radioisotope production capability.

66. Egypt had benefited from the Agency's peer review services in implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. A peer review team had visited the second research reactor in March and concluded that the radiation protection programme complied with the Agency's safety standards and was being implemented in a satisfactory manner.

67. The operation of Egypt's first research reactor, launched in 1961, had been suspended for more than two years. Egypt had in April requested the Secretariat's assistance in assessing the feasibility of its reactivation.

68. In response to a request from the Atomic Energy Commission for support in increasing the expertise of Egyptian personnel in the area of preparedness for and response to a radiological emergency, the Secretariat had agreed to hold training courses and workshops in Vienna in September and October and to assist with the preparation of a national radiological emergency plan and with the establishment of arrangements for communicating in the event of a radiological emergency.

69. Egypt attached great importance to the efforts of the Secretariat in the area of nuclear security, but it believed that they should not be allowed to interfere with the Secretariat's support for Member States that were using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

70. Egypt also believed that, in the interests of nuclear security, the Agency should give high priority to nuclear disarmament; the best way of dealing with the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction was to eliminate them, and the General Conference had, in resolutions on nuclear security, acknowledged "the need to make further progress towards achieving nuclear disarmament".

71. Egypt, which had participated in the drafting and reviewing of Agency nuclear security guidance documents, endeavoured to reflect the guidance in its legislation. Since April it had been drafting a comprehensive nuclear security plan in cooperation with the Secretariat. It was a member of both the International Nuclear Security Education Network and the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres.

72. Egypt, which greatly appreciated INIS, considered that INPRO should be supported from the Regular Budget.

73. As Egypt belonged both to the African continent and to the Arab world, it was eager to share its nuclear expertise with all African and Arab countries.

74. During the current session of the General Conference, his country would sign the Strategic Action Plan for the implementation of a project of the Agency, the UNDP and the GEF on the joint management of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System by Chad, Egypt, Libya and Sudan.

75. Egypt, which attached great importance to AFRA, was supporting the participation of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency in activities conducted within the AFRA framework.

76. In the Middle East, it was essential to guarantee the right of the peoples of the region to protection against the threat of nuclear weapons on the basis of equal security for all. A role in that connection should be played by the Agency, whose Statute required — inter alia — that it conduct its activities “in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament”.

77. Egypt, which considered that the Agency’s credibility was closely related to the approach adopted by Member States to the issue of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the region, was disappointed at the failure to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction that had been scheduled for 2012.

78. Egypt was again submitting to the General Conference a draft resolution on “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East”, the aim being to bring about the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the region and universalization of the NPT. It hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus.

79. Archbishop MAMBERTI (Holy See) conveyed the best wishes of His Holiness Pope Francis to all participants in the General Conference’s current session.

80. The Holy See had always greatly appreciated the Agency’s efforts aimed at improving the living conditions of countless members of the human family throughout the world.

81. One of the Agency’s main tasks was to ensure that nuclear energy was used not only peacefully but also safely. Safety remained one of the greatest challenges in the use of nuclear energy. The Holy See followed with close attention the Agency’s efforts in strengthening nuclear safety culture globally by assisting with the establishment of legally binding international agreements and non-binding safety standards and by providing safety services.

82. In Italy, at the World Youth Day celebrations in Brazil, Pope Francis had made “an appeal to those in possession of greater resources, to public authorities and to all people of good will who are working for social justice: never tire of working for a more just world, marked by greater solidarity! [...] The culture of selfishness and individualism that often prevails in our society is not what builds up and leads to a more habitable world: rather, it is the culture of solidarity that does so; the culture of solidarity means seeing others not as rivals or statistics, but brothers and sisters. And we are all brothers and sisters!”

83. In the spirit of Pope Francis’s words and the culture of solidarity, the Holy See commended the Agency for its technical cooperation activities, which were a great example of practical solidarity with those in need. Those activities took account of the fact that the well-being of the human person was and should be at the centre of all scientific research and development.

84. The assistance provided in the field of medicine, especially for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer and other non-communicable diseases, helped numerous people, particularly in those regions

— unfortunately, still so many — where modern forms of diagnosis and treatment were not yet available on a large scale. Reaching out to those in need was one of the most important aspects of the Agency's work and revealed one of the best sides of human nature.

85. The Agency's activities relating — inter alia — agriculture, the fight against insect pests, nutrition and food security, soil and water management, and air pollution in some large cities had produced positive results in many cases and should certainly be continued. As should the Agency's activities relating to the world's seas and oceans; given the impact of ocean acidification on fisheries and aquaculture, the theme of the 2013 Scientific Forum — nuclear applications for a sustainable marine environment — was very appropriate.

86. Agency technical cooperation should not be a one-way process. For it to be really fruitful in the long run, beneficiary countries should endeavour to pass on the knowledge gained by them to neighbouring countries with similar problems. Such cross-border technical cooperation among developing countries testified to a true spirit of solidarity in pursuit of the common good.

87. The current year marked the 50th anniversary of the Encyclical Letter *Pacem in Terris* of Pope John XXIII, which, in the midst of the nuclear arms race in the second half of the 20th century, had contained an important message that was still valid: "There is a common belief that under modern conditions peace cannot be assured except on the basis of an equal balance of armaments [...]. If one country is equipped with atomic weapons, others consider themselves justified in producing such weapons themselves, equal in destructive force. Consequently people are living in the grip of constant fear. [...]. While it is difficult to believe that anyone would dare to assume responsibility for initiating the appalling slaughter and destruction that war would bring in its wake, there is no denying that the conflagration could be started by some chance and unforeseen circumstance [...]. Hence justice, right reason, and the recognition of man's dignity cry out insistently for a cessation to the arms race. [...]. Nuclear weapons must be banned. A general agreement must be reached on a suitable disarmament program, with an effective system of mutual control [...]. Everyone, however, must realize that, unless this process of disarmament be thoroughgoing and complete, and reach men's very souls, it is impossible to stop the arms race [...]. Everyone must sincerely co-operate in the effort to banish fear [...]. True and lasting peace among nations cannot consist in the possession of an equal supply of armaments but only in mutual trust".

88. Although those words had been written 50 years ago, they seemed to reflect the situation at the beginning of the 21st century. There were still States in possession of nuclear weapons, and not all of those States were parties to the NPT, and the possibility of nuclear terrorism was very real. The question remained whether today's world was more secure and safe than the world of some decades ago.

89. The Holy See shared the thoughts and sentiments of most men and women of good will who aspired to a total elimination of nuclear weapons. It therefore once again called for an end to nuclear weapons production and the transfer of nuclear material from military to peaceful activities. There was a need for universal and unconditional adherence to and implementation of the NPT and the CTBT. Global security must not rely on nuclear weapons. The Holy See, which had signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the Agency some time ago, intended to encourage the conclusion of additional protocols in the interests of greater international transparency.

90. Verification was becoming increasingly important in the efforts of the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, in order to be credible, it needed to be carried out through impartial international inspections. If the world was to be more secure, however, verification was insufficient; the nuclear disarmament process needed to be reinvigorated, with real progress in the dismantling of nuclear weapons.

91. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were essential also from a humanitarian point of view. On the occasion of the first and the second sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Holy See had co-sponsored a “Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”, in which the sponsors had expressed deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any possible use of such weapons. In that context, it commended Norway for hosting a conference in March on that issue, which deserved serious consideration by and greater dedication on the part of all, and it welcomed the offer by Mexico to host a follow-up meeting.

92. The Holy See, which was deeply concerned about the recent tragic developments in the Middle East, attached great importance to the efforts being made to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were the best affirmation that peace and security could exist without the possession of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all States in the Middle East would contribute greatly to the security of the entire region.

93. As to the most recent developments in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, the Holy See was convinced that the present difficulties could — and must — be overcome through diplomatic means and that it was necessary to remove the obstacles to mutual trust.

94. At a time when humankind found itself at a difficult crossroad characterized by increasingly economic, political, social and environmental interdependence, it was necessary to ask whether the use of force represented a sustainable solution to any problem. The use of force seemed only to increase mutual distrust and to create a distorted sense of priorities, with significant resources committed in a short-sighted manner. The temptation to address new situations with old concepts must be rejected. Priorities needed to be redefined so that resources might be redirected towards moral, cultural and economic development, because such development and solidarity and justice were nothing other than the real name for a lasting peace.

95. Mr MARTINS (South Africa) said that his country remained firm in its commitment to nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It supported the Agency as the only internationally recognized competent authority for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements.

96. South Africa, which had a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, was pleased that for the 2012 safeguards evaluation period the Agency had once again drawn the broader conclusion for it.

97. South Africa, which attached great importance to the efforts of the Secretariat to strengthen the Agency’s safeguards system, had welcomed the recent discussions in the Board on the implementation of safeguards at the State level. It looked forward to engaging with the Secretariat and with other Member States in the consideration of the Director General’s comprehensive report on that issue — expected before the General Conference’s next session.

98. The conclusion of an additional protocol was a voluntary measure, but the implementation of additional protocols was crucial for enabling the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. South Africa would like all States to have an additional protocol in force.

99. His country, which welcomed the Agency’s efforts to strengthen the global nuclear safety framework, was thinking of acceding to one of the nuclear liability conventions.

100. South Africa had submitted its national report for the Sixth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In August 2012, at the Second Extraordinary Meeting of

the Contracting Parties to the Convention, it had presented a report on the implications of the Fukushima Daiichi accident for the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station and the Safari-1 research reactor.

101. His country, which was supporting the Secretariat's efforts in strengthening nuclear safety, had participated very actively in the work of the Agency's safety standards committees. In November 2012, it had hosted the Agency-organized Technical Meeting on Safety Culture during Pre-Operational Phases: Practical Working Methods to Increase Safety, which had been attended by 140 participants from 25 Member States.

102. At the regional level, South Africa was continuing to play an active role in the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA). In August, it had hosted an Agency-organized Regional Workshop on Siting and Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations that had been attended by participants from African countries planning to embark on nuclear power programmes, such as Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria.

103. At the national level, safety reassessments performed at South Africa's nuclear facilities had identified the need for certain improvements to the facilities and to the country's regulatory framework. South Africa was carrying out an emergency preparedness self-assessment in accordance with the EPREV Guidelines, and it planned to host a full EPREV mission in 2014.

104. His Government, which recognized the importance of energy security for sustainable development and poverty alleviation, had approved an Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2010–2030. The IRP provided for a nuclear power contribution of 9600 MW (23%) to the country's energy mix by 2030. A cabinet-level committee headed by President Zuma had been established to oversee the implementation of the country's nuclear power programme; it would be responsible for taking new build decisions.

105. In order to assess its readiness for a new nuclear build programme, South Africa had in February hosted an INIR mission, the decision to request it being prompted by the fact that in the 30 years since the construction of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station there had been considerable advances in the nuclear power plant sector.

106. The Agency's technical cooperation activities were of great importance for the African continent, and South Africa therefore considered it essential that the resources of the TCF be sufficient, assured and predictable.

107. The programme of the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) for assessing the feasibility of using the SIT, as an alternative to insecticides, for combating malaria-carrying mosquitoes was making good progress.

108. Through the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund, South Africa had initiated a project for the improvement of veterinary laboratory capacities in sub-Saharan African countries that was being implemented by the Agency's Animal Production and Health Laboratory at Seibersdorf and supported by Japan and the United States of America. Thanks to the project, veterinary laboratories in Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire and Ethiopia were now able to perform serological and molecular diagnostics using nuclear techniques.

109. South Africa attached great importance to the modernization of the Agency's nuclear applications laboratories at Seibersdorf and would like to see all delegations represented at the side event on the modernization of the laboratories being organized by the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications.

110. South Africa's iThemba Laboratory for Accelerator-Based Sciences was continuing to conduct high-quality research and provide high-quality training and services. Its accelerator mass spectroscopy

facility, from which South African universities benefited, was being used in areas such as biomedical research, diagnostics, materials science and chemistry.

111. With a track record of over 30 years, South Africa was continuing to produce molybdenum-99 through LEU-based processes. NECSA, the world's second-largest producer of molybdenum-99, had recently announced its participation in a joint venture for the commercial-scale production of radioisotopes in its Safari-1 reactor and Australia's OPAL reactor using an LEU-based process.

112. South Africa remained convinced, however, that the issue of the minimization of HEU use should be addressed within the context of the long-outstanding negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. It had advocated that those negotiations commence within the Conference on Disarmament without further delay.

113. While nuclear security remained the responsibility of individual States, South Africa welcomed the progress made in strengthening nuclear security at the international level through the important work of the Agency. Consultations were under way in his country on the question of its ratifying the Amendment to the CPPNM.

114. Under NECSA's nuclear forensics programme, the construction of a national nuclear forensics laboratory, which had started in 2012, was progressing well and was expected to be completed by the end of the current year.

115. South Africa, which had accepted the amendment to Article VI of the Statute, attached great importance to improving the representation of Africa on the Board of Governors and would therefore like to see the amendment entering into force soon.

116. The representation of women in the nuclear energy-related areas was still very limited. South Africa therefore welcomed the role being played by Women in Nuclear (WiN) in addressing the challenges faced by women in those areas and all measures aimed at improving the gender balance.

117. From 5 to 10 October, South Africa would host WiN-Global's 2013 conference, and it commended the Agency for supporting the participation in that conference of four women from African States.

118. From 9 to 13 May 2016, South Africa would host, in Cape Town, the 14th IRPA International Congress, the theme which would be "Practising Radiation Protection — Sharing the experience — New challenges". The Congress would be the first IRPA International Congress to take place in Africa.

119. Mr STEINMANN (Switzerland) said that the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference held in Geneva had been very positive. It had emphasized the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, an issue raised by his country at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and 80 States parties to the NPT had issued a joint declaration.

120. However, the positive atmosphere had, unhappily, been marred by the fact that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had not taken place as planned in 2012. Switzerland hoped that the States concerned would demonstrate the required flexibility and that the intensive efforts deployed since October 2011 by the conference facilitator, Mr Jaakko Laajava, would soon bear fruit.

121. There had been no progress during the past year with regard to the Syrian nuclear issue and the Iranian nuclear issue. Switzerland, which hoped that the spirit of openness which the world had shown towards the new Iranian Government would lead to real progress with regard to the latter issue, agreed with Iran that diplomacy was the only way to resolve it.

122. In July, the States that had participated in the Agency-organized International Conference on Nuclear Security had called upon all States to take nuclear material being used for military purposes into account in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security since those efforts would be seriously hampered if they did not. Switzerland would continue to emphasize that message in the run-up to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, due to be held in The Hague.

123. Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident the Agency had done a great deal to strengthen the international nuclear safety regime, including the launch of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. His country congratulated the Secretariat on what had been achieved and urged it to continue its efforts. It would like the implementation of the Action Plan to be speeded up, and it called upon the Secretariat to keep Member States informed of the progress being made. Also, it would like all Member States to issue progress reports on how they were implementing the Action Plan at the national level.

124. In order to improve nuclear safety globally, the Swiss nuclear safety authority was endeavouring to bring about, at the national level, optimization of the review and assessment of nuclear power plant operating experience in the light of lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and, at the international level, the establishment of harmonized nuclear safety assessment standards reflecting the latest state of science and technology. It would continue doing so within the framework of the Agency and of WENRA. Switzerland considered that more attention should be paid to the safety recommendations derived from international peer reviews and that the recommendations should in due course be made public in a transparent manner.

125. It also considered that features should be incorporated into the design of nuclear power plants that prevented accidents and, if a serious accident did occur, ensured that radioactive contamination was limited to the nuclear power plant site. In addition, it considered that States should exchange information about their nuclear regulations and share experience in order to improve the design of nuclear power plants.

126. In his country's view, there was a need to further improve the international exchange of information in the event of a nuclear accident and the Agency had an essential role to play in that respect. The experiences of WENRA and the Heads of the European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities Association (HERCA), which had established a system of mutual assistance in the area of nuclear safety, might also be useful.

127. Regarding both the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, his country would have wished to see more binding commitments taken.

128. He emphasized that regulatory authorities and nuclear research institutes would have credibility only if they were completely independent in the exercise of their functions, their opinions were consistent with the latest advances in science, technology and research and they employed generally recognized principles of good management.

129. He noted that the amendment to the CPPNM had still not entered into force, despite the convening of the International Conference on Nuclear Security and the Secretariat's efforts. He called upon all States that played a major role in nuclear affairs to ratify the amendment, so that the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague could note a significant increase in the number of States which had adhered to key international instruments in this area. He thanked the Secretariat for its efforts to implement the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013. In preparing the next plan, it would benefit from the guidance given by the conference the preceding July.

130. States alone were responsible for maintaining an effective nuclear security system and were responsible for its weaknesses and their consequences. High levels of nuclear security in individual countries added up to a high level of nuclear security globally.

131. Switzerland drew a clear distinction between international collaboration related to nuclear security and that related to nuclear safety, owing to the unique characteristics of the former. The issue was not one of security standards, but of levels of protection: while Switzerland made use of the Agency's advisory services, such as IPPAS, for reasons of confidentiality it would not entertain peer reviews. When the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017 was implemented, Switzerland hoped for assistance from the Secretariat in coordinating its security approach in those areas of nuclear installations where nuclear security and safety overlapped.

132. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Switzerland had suggested ways of enhancing the safeguards system by reducing the workload and costs involved in monitoring those States which showed the greatest transparency in their nuclear operations, i.e. those which had adopted comprehensive safeguards agreements and had an additional protocol in force. It welcomed the Secretariat's report on the State-level approach, which clarified some aspects of the issue, but felt that it needed further exploration. More intensive consideration of the future development of the safeguards system was required, taking account of its direct effects on States and nuclear operators. The aim must remain to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the system as a whole.

133. In Switzerland's view, specific approaches and methods should be devised for each category of State and a comparable level of controls established for all States in a given category. His delegation welcomed the Secretariat's resolve to implement the State-level concept for those States which had a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force and requested the Secretariat to keep States informed of progress in developing the concept in an addendum to its report. In its consideration of the issue, the Secretariat should take into account the need to monitor military material passing into civilian use and the transfer of sensitive civilian materials (HEU and plutonium) from non-nuclear-weapon to nuclear-weapon States.

134. Switzerland's nuclear safety authority had started to put into practice the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. Work was under way to measure and improve the resistance of Swiss nuclear plants to seismic risks, flooding and extreme weather events and his Government had decided that the country's nuclear power plants would not be replaced when they reached the end of their service life. It had therefore drawn up a new energy strategy, "Strategy 2050", which had just been submitted to Parliament. It would take about a year for a new energy law to be prepared, taking Parliament's decisions into account. The new strategy covered three main areas: foreign energy policy, energy research and the energy project. The energy project included such as transport, buildings, energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energy.

135. Turning to the question of nuclear waste, he said that, following a public enquiry, the Government had approved the updated waste management programme of the National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste (NAGRA), first adopted in 2008. The programme laid down the procedures to be followed, from planning to the sealing of deep geological repositories, and included data on the origin, type and quantity of waste to be stored. NAGRA was expected to propose at least two storage sites for each category of waste by 2016.

136. Mr RANAWAKA (Sri Lanka), reviewing the IAEA Annual Report 2012 and other documents on thematic issues, commended the Agency on its continued proactive role at all levels, consistent with its statutory mandate to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.

137. The Government of Sri Lanka was conscious that, to keep pace with new and emerging trends in the nuclear field and to better respond to future challenges, the role of technology and research should be strengthened and their capacity and contribution improved. That gave particular relevance to the Ten Year Horizon Development Programme representing the vision of the President of Sri Lanka. Developing nuclear science and technology, including nuclear applications, for national advancement was a distinct component of the country's programme to deliver on that vision. The objective was to promote and harness civil nuclear applications, as an integral part of Sri Lanka's progress towards an innovation economy.

138. No programme could be realized without sustained support from Sri Lanka's partners, in particular, the Agency. For a programme to be successful, it would require an enabling framework, including in the legal sphere. Sri Lanka had benefited considerably from assistance from the Agency in that area. In recent months, the Office of Legal Affairs had assisted Sri Lanka in its efforts to revise basic nuclear law and in enhancing its capacity for the analysis of radioactivity and for the application of nuclear medicine. The framework of nuclear law, which was currently under revision, would cater to current needs while responding to the challenges of the future. It was underpinned by a coherent national nuclear policy. The Atomic Energy Authority Board and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Commission would be part of that new arrangement, reflecting emerging international standards concerning nuclear use and application.

139. The International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, held in St Petersburg in June 2013, and the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, held in Vienna in July 2013, had yielded consensual, pragmatic outcomes and, through enhanced cohesion, clarity and convergence, had helped to strengthen the practical framework, for addressing new and emerging challenges in those two important arenas. Those forums had shown how synergies could be achieved at different levels.

140. Nuclear security was a growing concern and a challenge that the international community must be prepared to face. In that regard, he expressed appreciation for the focus placed on national capacity building in the Nuclear Security Report 2013. The Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017 was a welcome step in that direction. Its emphasis on increasing Member States' involvement in Agency activities through the establishment and reinforcement of collaborative networks and mechanisms was commendable. As Sri Lanka prepared for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Colombo in November 2013, the Agency's contribution to one of the most important phases of the preparatory process — namely, ensuring nuclear security, working with, and training of, local scientists, technical staff and security personnel — had been highly appreciated.

141. Just as concerns over nuclear security were growing, so was the demand for nuclear energy. The high projection was for 94% growth by 2030, which would make nuclear power a significant component in the national energy mix of many countries. It was inconceivable, however, that nuclear energy should be discussed without referring to nuclear safety and safeguard measures. The exploration and use of nuclear energy must be considered together with nuclear safety and nuclear safeguards. They were essential not just for the safety of the facility, materials and processes, but in particular for the health of all human and other beings on Earth, the environment and geological systems. It was important therefore that countries not yet party to the NPT should ratify or accede to the Treaty and accept the Agency's comprehensive safeguard arrangements.

142. While the peaceful application of the atom still remained a potent force for progress, the Fukushima Daiichi accident had clearly illustrated its downside. Nuclear safety and the attendant issues of emergency preparedness, emergency response and impact mitigation were among the important lessons that had been learned over the period following the accident.

143. Sri Lanka appreciated the announcement by the Government of Japan of a basic policy to tackle the most recent challenge posed by the leakage of contaminated water, and for showing resolve, matched by action, to respond to new challenges, using its high technological capabilities and following the recommendation of the Agency's peer review mission.

144. The State-level concept, on which the Director General had reported at the current session, was worth exploring further. He would welcome a continuing discussion on that important topic since it concerned States in their entirety, rather than focusing primarily on declared nuclear materials and facilities.

145. Fully cognizant of the importance of nuclear safety and safeguards, his Government was in the process of achieving much needed capacity building in human resource development and in the use of the Agency's energy planning tools for national needs. Sri Lanka was closely studying the new and emerging trends and developments in that important area. In addition, following the conclusion of its baseline data survey on maritime safety, Sri Lanka was proceeding to the strengthening of its radiological emergency preparedness.

146. As a non-nuclear State with no nuclear facilities, Sri Lanka had put in place regulatory procedures of high standards and was continuing to improve and upgrade those procedures.

147. The Government placed increased emphasis on civil nuclear cooperation, under the concept of Atoms for Peace and the Peaceful Uses Initiative, and the country had set in place the necessary procedures to ensure the civil and peaceful nature of nuclear applications. There was currently great potential for the use of civil nuclear applications in Sri Lanka and there were rapid developments in all related sectors. Convinced of the continuing validity and importance of the peaceful exploration and use of nuclear energy, Sri Lanka had taken a number of initiatives voluntarily, and in cooperation with other States, in that area. Its continued and effective contribution to the PUI manifested Sri Lanka's clear and unflinching commitment to ensuring global peace and security.

148. The PACT programme, the projects on the use of isotope hydrology for water resources management and the development of approaches to supporting infrastructure development for nuclear power were among many instances of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. They were highly beneficial for such countries as Sri Lanka as the demand for civil and peaceful nuclear applications continued to rise. As Sri Lanka was experiencing a high incidence rate in cancer, the early diagnosis, control and treatment of cancer had become an important social requirement. With the progress already made in the implementation of the previous impACT missions, Sri Lanka now sought assistance from PACT over the coming year for that purpose.

149. The Agency's assistance was also crucial to strengthening the country's capabilities in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful applications. Sri Lanka greatly appreciated the assistance that it had received from its international partners, encompassing the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

150. He thanked the Director General and also the Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation and his staff for the constant support that they had extended to Sri Lanka over the years, one example of which had been the provision of expensive diagnostic medical equipment on a cost-sharing basis. Progress continued in other areas, supported by the Technical Cooperation Programme, including the establishment and operationalization of various national centres and facilities, such as the Multipurpose Gamma Irradiation Facility and the National Centre for Non-Destructive Testing. Sri Lanka was pleased that technical assistance would be forthcoming for the setting up of national centres for nuclear agriculture and for the prevention of marine environmental pollution under the biennium programme from 2014.

151. The Gamma Irradiation Facility was nearing completion and he cordially invited the Director General to attend its opening later that year. Those activities, together with others that had been proposed, including a radioactive waste disposal facility, a study on sedimentation in Colombo port and an investigation of chronic kidney disease, would be covered by the CPF for 2014–2017, which was currently being negotiated.

152. With the return of peace to Sri Lanka and the acceleration of its economic growth, the country had become a preferred hub for various international and regional activities of a beneficial nature. Over the past 12 months alone, the country's Atomic Energy Authority had hosted five international events organized under the auspices of the Agency. While contributing to the development of knowledge and skills of international participants, Sri Lankan scientists had benefited from the exposure and the interactions provided by those events. Two more activities were scheduled before the end of 2013 and Sri Lanka was willing to host more in the future.

153. His delegation welcomed the progress made over recent years in the professional staffing of the Agency. It was important that the Agency should always be made up of a professional workforce drawn from all Member States in an equitable manner. Sri Lanka was currently less represented on that workforce and its scientists and management professionals should be accorded more posts in the Agency.

154. Mr BADIA (Monaco) reaffirmed Monaco's full support to the Agency in its work to counter the major threats of the day, primarily environmental degradation, but also poverty and cancer. Monaco remained attentive to the essential work of the Agency in the areas of nuclear safety and security, and intended to play its full part in efforts by the international community to develop peaceful nuclear applications. Monaco hoped to see the nuclear sector develop its peaceful applications, in particular to the benefit of environmental research and health.

155. The seas and oceans were in a critical situation, and relations with the marine environment, and how activities in it were conducted therefore had to be urgently rethought. Sustainable development of the marine environment was a priority for the international community, which had to combine and coordinate its efforts to that end. His country was pleased that the Agency had made that endeavour the subject of its Scientific Forum that year. The Head of State, Prince Albert II, was unfortunately not able to attend in person, but he set great store by his participation and would deliver a message to the participants of the forum, which would be broadcast the following morning.

156. Nuclear applications had a strategically important contribution to make in the areas of food security, tourism and the protection of marine biodiversity, and also in energy, in response to which Monaco had undertaken to promote scientific research. He reiterated Monaco's commitment to the scientific community, whose work lay at the very heart of any action to benefit the marine environment.

157. Monaco was particularly proud to welcome on its soil a United Nations Centre of Excellence, the IAEA Environment Laboratories. Under the leadership of Prince Albert II, and following its traditional commitment, Monaco was redoubling its efforts to promote knowledge about and to safeguard the seas, given their essential role in achieving sustainable development.

158. Together with the Scientific Centre of Monaco, the International Laboratory of Marine Radioactivity, set up under the auspices of the Agency, had been conducting significant research over a period of some thirty years, primarily studying radioactive marine pollution, and developing methods to prevent and combat it.

159. His Government welcomed the establishment of an ocean acidification international coordination centre at the IAEA Environment Laboratories in Monaco. That platform for cooperation

would help improve understanding of the phenomenon of acidification, open up new areas of research and make it possible to track developments in the respective regions of the world, which were not all affected in the same way, and would also lead to solutions for the most vulnerable organisms, including shellfish and corals.

160. The campaign against cancer was an imperative, notably for the countries most at risk. Cancer was a global health issue and its prevalence was increasing considerably, in particular in developing countries. According to Agency estimates, by 2020, cancer could kill more than 10 million people per year throughout the world, more than the victims of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria combined. A large proportion of those deaths were occurring in the developing countries.

161. Radiotherapy had a fundamental role to play in treating cancers because it was a tried and tested technique and the facts showed that it was suited to more than half of all patients. In line with its strategy of international cooperation to aid the least favoured countries, Monaco actively promoted such measures as projects to improve the quality of radiotherapy, and to facilitate access to radiotherapy in countries where it was not available.

162. Monaco had committed itself enthusiastically to the Agency's PACT programme to bolster cancer therapy, for which it had entered into a partnership agreement with the Agency. That programme, specifically, had been given sustained attention by Monaco because it offered both a means of developing and improving the quality of care provided in partner countries, and an opportunity to bring together science and technologies which Monaco was fortunate to have at its disposal.

163. To strengthen its action in that area, in 2012 Monaco had enthusiastically joined the PUI, demonstrating its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Through that initiative, which brought together such major powers as the United States of America and Japan, together with smaller countries, such as Monaco, it was possible to see real progress in the areas of cancer control, agriculture, access to drinking water and the preservation of the marine environment. Accordingly, Monaco called on all Member States of the Agency to contribute to the PUI, whatever the nature and scale of their contribution.

164. Baroness VERMA (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) said that, unsurprisingly, the role of nuclear energy across the world continued to provoke major debate at the local, regional and global levels. To meet the growing demand for energy — and to meet climate change goals through reduced carbon emissions — posed one of the world's main challenges.

165. It was estimated that, by 2050, the global population would increase by 2 billion, to a total of 9 billion. In addition, energy consumption per capita would inevitably grow with economic growth in the developing world. As the global debate on the security of energy supply became more intense, more immediate and more high-profile, many States were affirming or reassessing the role that nuclear energy could and should play in helping to meet that energy demand safely, reliably and consistently.

166. In that regard the United Kingdom commended the leadership of the Director General and the strong effort of the Secretariat. The demands placed upon the Agency to fulfil its role in the future development of nuclear energy were becoming increasingly complex and intense, and the United Kingdom had a high regard for the way in which it was responding to those pressures.

167. The United Kingdom remained fully committed to safe nuclear power, as part of a secure, low-carbon energy mix. Commercial interest in investing in new nuclear power stations had strengthened over the previous year, covering five of the eight sites identified as potentially suited for new nuclear power stations up to the end of 2025. Discussions between the Government and the potential investor in a new plant at Hinkley Point, Somerset, on a contract for difference or strike price

— effectively the guaranteed price for nuclear-generated electric energy — were at an advanced stage. That emphasized the commitment by the United Kingdom to secure long-term commercial investment in a competitive nuclear industry without government subsidy.

168. Equally important, the United Kingdom had taken steps to enhance its nuclear regulatory framework, to ensure that it remained world class and had the flexibility to address future challenges. Under the Energy Bill currently before Parliament, the Government would finalize the legal position of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), created in 2011 as an independent statutory body.

169. The ONR brought together the functions of civil nuclear safety, security, safeguards implementation, radioactive materials transport and health and safety on nuclear sites, providing a model of an effective, open and transparent regulator and its website was worth inspecting. One of its current tasks was to undertake a generic design assessment of a reactor design that would be new to the United Kingdom — the United Kingdom Advanced Boiling Water Reactor that Hitachi had proposed for its sites at Wylfa and Oldbury. That process would enable the comprehensive pre-approval of potential reactor designs before site-specific authorizations were applied for, with benefits in terms of cost, time frames and risks.

170. The ONR was also taking active steps to change the way that it regulated civil nuclear security arrangements at sites. A best practice guide, put together by the Office, industries and the Government, identified key attributes of an excellent nuclear security culture, together with recommendations about how that could be achieved. It was clear that nuclear safety must remain the top priority and there was never room for complacency.

171. In the period after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the United Kingdom had eagerly participated in the EU stress test exercise, and had also undertaken separate reviews of its own safety arrangements. It was working to put in place measures to address the beyond-design-basis issues as identified by the EU stress test and taking other actions to strengthen its nuclear safety arrangements.

172. The United Kingdom particularly welcomed the production of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. While the Action Plan did not specifically require States to report on progress with implementation, the United Kingdom had submitted a progress report on its own actions. Other States had done the same or were planning to do so, and she commended such a step. Only through an open and transparent approach could States ensure that the public remained confident in their ability to deliver safe nuclear power.

173. Like many other States, the United Kingdom had also taken a fresh look at its arrangements for emergency planning and response, to ensure that they remained fit for purpose in the light of experience and changing risks.

174. The United Kingdom had implemented a new national emergency planning and response programme, under which the Government worked closely with the nuclear sector and the regulator, to ensure that emergency planning arrangements at all levels — including at nuclear sites, in local areas surrounding those sites, and at national and international levels — were robust and fit for purpose.

175. The United Kingdom was also taking steps to strengthen international cooperation on nuclear emergency planning. In 2012 it had joined the Agency's global nuclear emergency assistance network, RANET, and was now helping the Agency to further strengthen that important facility. Working closely with its French colleagues, the United Kingdom was also preparing a joint United Kingdom–France emergency planning and response framework to build on practical cooperation between the two countries.

176. In addition, under the United Kingdom's presidency of the G8 in 2013, emergency planning had been made the key focus of the G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group. In that context, she warmly

invited all participants to a side event on emergency planning and nuclear non-proliferation which she would be opening the following day.

177. Turning to nuclear security, she said that the United Kingdom continued to attach great importance to understanding and countering the threat posed by those who sought to acquire and use nuclear and other radioactive material for terrorist and other malicious purposes. Accordingly, the United Kingdom congratulated the IAEA on holding the first ever International Conference on Nuclear Security at ministerial level in July 2013, and welcomed the Ministerial Declaration of the Conference reaffirming the essential role of the Agency and the intention that it should continue to have the necessary resources and expertise to carry out its vital work in that area.

178. In 2013, her Government had already made an extrabudgetary contribution of £3 million to the NSF, making the United Kingdom the second largest Member State contributor to that fund. The United Kingdom looked to the Agency to make use of funds contributed effectively and, subject to the satisfactory conclusion of discussions with the Agency on the reporting of the use of funds, was considering making a further contribution of up to £3 million within the next few months.

179. The United Kingdom also called upon States to adhere to the amendment to the CPPNM and welcomed planned Agency activities aimed at promoting its early entry into force. In June 2013, the United Kingdom had deposited with the Agency an updated report outlining the national laws and regulations which gave effect to the Convention and its 2005 amendment. The United Kingdom encouraged all parties to the amendment that had not deposited a report with the Agency to do so.

180. The United Kingdom also looked forward to the Agency's continuing implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan. As Chair of the Global Partnership Working Group in 2013, the United Kingdom was promoting international cooperation in a very practical way — by bringing together Partnership members with project ideas, and those with resources and expertise to encourage collaboration. Further partnerships could be achieved if States with an INSSP requiring assistance authorized the release of relevant parts of their INSSP. That would allow the IAEA and international partners to ensure that resources were used in a coordinated and targeted way.

181. The United Kingdom also recognized the essential role that the Agency played in verifying States' compliance with their safeguards obligations. It called on all those non-nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol and, where relevant, to amend their small quantities protocol. Only when a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol were in force could the Agency provide credible assurances of both the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The combination of the agreement and the protocol therefore represented the current verification standard.

182. However, it was essential for Agency safeguards to develop continuously, both to address new challenges and to learn from experience gained. The United Kingdom strongly supported the State-level concept, which made greater use of the Agency's ability to consider the State as a whole. That would increase the efficiency of safeguards implementation and strengthen its effectiveness. The State-level concept was applicable to all States within the terms of the specific safeguards agreement concerned, and her delegation looked forward to its application in the United Kingdom.

183. Tackling the issues of nuclear safety, security and safeguards was fundamental to the safe growth of nuclear energy in the future. As a nuclear-enabled State, the United Kingdom took its commitments under the NPT very seriously indeed.

184. Those included a clear commitment to the action plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Despite being agreed upon over three years previously, it had set a clear framework of

deliverables in order to carry forward the fundamental objectives of the NPT. One issue underpinned many of those actions: the commitment to cooperate with other States Parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy. The United Kingdom had a record of strong and enduring cooperation with other countries since the early days of its civil nuclear programme in the 1950s. That covered many relevant areas, from the purely technical through to environmental and regulatory considerations; the United Kingdom intended to extend and develop those areas of collaboration over coming years.

185. With regard to Iran, the Director General's latest report again highlighted progress. However, the United Kingdom was extremely concerned that Iran was continuing to increase its stockpile of near 20% enriched uranium and to expand its capacity for further enrichment at an alarming rate.

186. The United Kingdom noted President Rouhani's remarks on greater transparency and urged Iran to translate those words into concrete actions to address international concerns over its nuclear programme. It urged Iran to implement the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its safeguards agreement and to bring into force its additional protocol.

187. However, in the areas where the international community wanted to see progress, there had been no progress at all. Nearly two years had elapsed since the Agency had first highlighted its concerns about the possible military dimensions to the Iranian programme. Iran had given no substantive answers to the Agency's questions and had not yet agreed on the process by which they would be answered. The United Kingdom continued to fully support the Agency's approach and the significant time which the Agency and the Director General were committing to efforts to resolve the issue. Substantial progress on the substance of the Agency's concerns needed to be seen at the next round of talks scheduled for 27 September 2013 in Vienna. The November Board meetings would provide an important opportunity to assess the issue and determine what further action might be needed from the Board should no progress have been made.

188. Resolving that issue remained one of the United Kingdom's top priorities and it was committed to working with its partners in the E3+3 and the EU High Representative and playing its part in finding a negotiated solution. The E3+3 hoped to meet the new Iranian negotiating team soon and hoped too that Iran would use the opportunity to engage seriously in talks.

189. Full cooperation by Member States with the Agency was essential to supporting the important safeguards work that the Agency undertook. That was why, two years after the resolution by the Board of Governors on Syria's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, the United Kingdom continued to urge Syria to give the Agency full disclosure and the cooperation that it had promised.

190. Lastly, the United Kingdom continued to be deeply concerned by the DPRK's continued lack of cooperation with the Agency, particularly in the light of its satellite launch using ballistic missile technology in December 2012 and nuclear tests in February 2013, both of which were in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The United Kingdom called again on the DPRK to resume cooperation with the Agency, comply immediately with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and refrain from any further provocative actions. The United Kingdom continued to view the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as vital for peace and stability in the region and beyond.

191. Mr YAMANI (Saudi Arabia) said that diverse peaceful applications of nuclear energy were of great benefit to society and contributed to economic development. The Agency's Member States had assembled at the General Conference to find ways of promoting such applications, while at the same time developing and implementing effective safety measures, making a commitment to transparency and applying Agency safeguards to all nuclear facilities and material.

192. Saudi Arabia had taken significant steps to meet the goals of its national nuclear energy programme in accordance with the agreed schedule, in particular through the establishment of infrastructure, development of human resources and the requisite legal and economic framework, and the creation of new institutions, focusing on transparency and regional and international cooperation, and taking into account sustainability requirements by developing basic research and development capacities. He was pleased to announce that the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy planned to launch the second stage of its study of possible sites for the construction of nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia.

193. In line with its commitment to the highest international standards, the King Abdullah City had begun to implement the results of the self-assessment study, using for comparison the standards applied by the Agency. A study of the recommendations of the nuclear regulatory and monitoring authority had also been completed. It would be followed by detailed studies aimed at bolstering the authority's work in terms of its human resources, material facilities, the establishment of an independent legal mandate and the introduction of operating mechanisms.

194. The King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy was also taking steps to develop the capacity of the national industrial sector with a view to enabling it to manufacture a large proportion of the components required for nuclear power plants and infrastructure.

195. A programme of action for training human resources in nuclear technology either locally or through international cooperation programmes was being developed so as to enable local staff to complete top-level training courses within the shortest possible period of time. In addition, a national nuclear research centre with a nuclear research reactor was being established in the Kingdom.

196. As Saudi Arabia attached great importance to communication with the general public and national partners, it had organized numerous workshops and seminars that had played a major role in designing the strategy for the national nuclear energy programme.

197. During the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety held in December 2012, some delegations had been given the opportunity to visit the power plant and examine the ongoing rehabilitation measures. The Conference had had a significant impact and had reinforced the participants' determination to prevent the recurrence of such an event in the future by developing nuclear safety to the highest possible standard. While his Government agreed that the responsibility for safety lay with individual States, it supported endeavours to promote a global safety culture and an effective and sustainable regulatory system, to adopt binding legal instruments and guidelines for the safe use of nuclear energy and sources of ionizing radiation, and to promote international cooperation and sharing of experience in that regard. His delegation looked forward to the publication of the Agency's detailed report on the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant so that the necessary conclusions for the safety of existing and future nuclear power plants could be drawn from the lessons learned.

198. A high-level delegation from Saudi Arabia had attended the General Meeting of the World Association of Nuclear Operators in Moscow in May 2013. The King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy wished to become a full member of the Association.

199. Saudi Arabia was following the Agency's development of a nuclear security strategy for 2014–2017, taking into account the outcome of the International Conference on Nuclear Security held in Vienna in July 2013.

200. His country had paid its contribution to the 2013 Regular Budget in full, together with its share of the TCF, notwithstanding its well-known position regarding the manner in which the TCF was financed. His delegation welcomed the decision by the Board of Governors to set up a Working Group

on Financing the Agency's Activities and encouraged Member States to make effective contributions to its work.

201. Turning to safeguards and verification, he said that the Agency was the sole international entity mandated to oversee States' compliance with their safeguards obligations and to verify non-proliferation of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Saudi Arabia supported the Agency's efforts to strengthen and improve the safeguards regime in order to guarantee the peaceful nature of nuclear activities in the States concerned. However, the Agency should not take any additional steps that could alter the scope of its verification activities without providing a full description of such measures and obtaining the approval of the General Conference.

202. Saudi Arabia, like most other countries, subscribed to the principles of nuclear disarmament. The NPT was still the sole international instrument that legally bound all States to eliminate nuclear weapons and take measures to prevent their proliferation. It was therefore vital to ensure that all States parties complied strictly with their obligations under the Treaty. The 2010 NPT Review Conference held in New York had decided, in its conclusions and recommendations on implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

203. The Arab States had refrained from submitting a draft resolution concerning Israeli nuclear capabilities at the last two sessions of the General Conference in order to facilitate the convening of the 2012 conference in Helsinki and to ensure that it was attended by all States in the Middle East. However, Israel's intransigence and insistence on modifying the terms of reference adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference had led to the postponement of the conference scheduled for December 2012. As the convenors of the conference had not fixed a new date and there were no indications that Israel had changed its position, the Arab States had decided to resubmit a draft resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities in order to alert the international community to the risk posed by Israeli nuclear terrorism to security and stability in the Middle East region. His delegation urged all Member States to reaffirm their opposition to nuclear proliferation by voting in favour of the draft resolution.

204. Ms HAMBISA (Ethiopia) said that the Government of Ethiopia remained fully committed to the Agency's objectives as defined in its statutes and to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in a safe and secure manner.

205. The Agency had been lending Ethiopia important support in the agricultural, health, water and industrial sectors, where the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology were vital.

206. The Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture was working on a project to eradicate tsetse flies from the fertile agricultural land of the Ethiopian Southern Rift Valley. That was the largest project being undertaken by Ethiopia with the Agency and it had been accorded the highest priority by the Government. The procurement of an industrial irradiator for the project had reached its final stage. The Government appreciated the capacity-building support provided by the Agency for the implementation of the project.

207. The promising efforts made in the suppression and mass rearing of tsetse flies should continue in order to finalize activities that had not been fully accomplished. Additional support from the Agency would be required to eradicate tsetse flies from Ethiopia. The Director General had held fruitful discussions on that issue with senior Ethiopian officials during his visit to Ethiopia in 2012.

208. In the area of human health, Ethiopia was witnessing an increasing number of cancer patients, especially those with cervical cancer. The Agency had been providing assistance in radiotherapy and nuclear medicine, which had strengthened the capacity of the Black Lion Hospital to attend to patients. She thanked the Director General for his strong support for the campaign against cancer.

209. Cancer and three other non-communicable diseases had been included in her country's health sector development plan. The Government had transferred the ownership of a nuclear medicine and radiotherapy expansion project to five regional university hospitals and was upgrading the existing nuclear medicine and radiotherapy services with a view to training specialists locally.

210. One of the teaching hospitals in south-west Ethiopia was preparing to build a radiotherapy and nuclear medicine facility. A local radiation oncology residence training programme had been started in cooperation with the Norwegian Radium Hospital at Oslo University. A curriculum had been designed for the local clinical training of radiotherapy technicians and candidates were being submitted from regional hospitals.

211. Assistance given by the Agency and development partners was highly necessary for producing the bankable project document developed with the Agency to strengthen the existing radiotherapy and nuclear medicine services at the Black Lion Hospital and expand it to five regional centres through the construction of new facilities.

212. As part of the national agriculture-led industrialization strategy, emphasis was being placed on the development of the metal and engineering industry subsector. Enterprises in Ethiopia had not yet started investing in NDT for quality control and inspection services.

213. The Government had allocated the necessary funding and infrastructure to the sector. Technical assistance had been received from the Agency in training the NDT centre staff, enabling them in turn to conduct local training in NDT for industries and technical and vocational instructors. She called for support from the Agency in strengthening the NDT centre in her country.

214. The Agency was to be highly commended on its support for the use of isotope hydrology techniques for assessing underground water resources, with a view to developing and implementing comprehensive strategies and plans to increase rural water supplies.

215. In recent years the application of isotopes in water resources evaluation in Ethiopia had been on the increase. The Agency had played an important role in establishing the National Isotope Hydrology Laboratory, at Addis Ababa University. The laboratory played an important role by analysing both surface water and groundwater samples for different stakeholders. Enhancing the laboratory's capacity and hydrological and hydrogeological expertise was of paramount importance for the development of sustainable water resources. In that context, the Agency had undertaken a range of capacity-building activities but Ethiopia still needed its support for the further strengthening of the laboratory.

216. All the activities that she had mentioned were being carried out in full compliance with Agency requirements and standards. Ethiopia was convinced that the main focus of attention of the Agency's activities should be the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the enhancement of human well-being. Ethiopia was also convinced that that objective could be achieved only if the necessary safety, security and safeguards requirements were met.

217. Like other developing countries, Ethiopia was putting in place an effective legal and regulatory framework for nuclear technology applications. The many challenges notwithstanding, considerable progress had been made in that endeavour. Taking into account the particular situation of developing countries, the Agency should continue to provide all the necessary assistance for the application of nuclear science and technology, in particular in critical areas such as agriculture and health.

218. Her delegation encouraged the Agency to continue its efforts to provide support and assistance to Member States in establishing and maintaining adequate safety regulations and infrastructure, with due regard to the needs of those States.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.