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Nuclear Security

Resolution adopted on 26 September 2014 during the ninth plenary meeting

The General Conference,

- (a) <u>Recalling</u> its previous resolutions on measures to improve the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and on measures against the illicit trafficking of these materials,
- (b) <u>Taking note</u> of the Nuclear Security Report 2014 submitted by the Director General in document GC(58)/14, of the report on the implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013 GC(58)/INF/8 and of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2014-2017 approved by the Board of Governors in September 2013,
- (c) <u>Recalling with appreciation</u> the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts organized by the Secretariat in July 2013 and its related Ministerial Declaration, and <u>taking note</u> of valuable technical expert discussions later reflected in the President's Summary Report,
- (d) <u>Asserting</u> that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State, and <u>mindful of</u> the responsibilities of every Member State, in accordance with its respective national and international obligations, to maintain effective nuclear security of all nuclear and other radioactive material.
- (e) <u>Recognizing</u> the importance of maintaining a dialogue, as appropriate, between government bodies and the nuclear industry at national level on strengthening nuclear security,
- (f) <u>Reaffirming</u> the central role of the Agency in facilitating international cooperation in supporting the efforts of States to fulfil their responsibilities to ensure the security of civilian nuclear and other radioactive material.
- (g) <u>Recognizing</u> that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium in all their applications require special precautions to ensure their nuclear security and that it is of great importance that they be appropriately secured and accounted for, by and in the relevant State,
- (h) <u>Recognizing</u> the importance of minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and using low enriched uranium (LEU) where technically and economically feasible,

- (i) <u>Noting</u> United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373, 1540, 1673, 1810 and 1977, United Nations General Assembly resolution 67/44, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and international efforts in conformity with these instruments to prevent access by non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction and related material,
- (j) <u>Reaffirming</u> the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and of its 2005 Amendment extending its scope, <u>recognizing</u> the importance of acceptance, approval or ratification by further States, and <u>recognizing</u> the importance of the entry into force of the amendment at the earliest possible date,
- (k) <u>Noting</u> the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) relating to nuclear security,
- (l) Recognizing the need to strengthen and improve cooperation in, and the coordination of, international efforts in the field of nuclear security in order to avoid duplication and overlap,
- (m) <u>Recognizing</u> the Agency's central role, as emphasized for instance by the 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held in August 2012, in developing comprehensive nuclear security guidance documents and, on request, providing assistance to Member States in order to facilitate their implementation,
- (n) <u>Emphasizing</u> the need for the involvement of all Member States of the Agency in nuclear security-related activities and initiatives in an inclusive manner, and <u>noting</u> the role that international processes and initiatives, including the Nuclear Security Summits, could play in the area of nuclear security,
- (o) <u>Recalling</u> that UN General Assembly Resolution 67/44 on "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" states that progress is urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism, and <u>acknowledging</u> the need to make further progress towards achieving nuclear disarmament,
- (p) Recognizing that nuclear security and safety measures have the common aim of protecting human health, society and the environment, while acknowledging the distinctions between the two areas, and reaffirming the importance of coordination in this regard,
- (q) Noting the recommended requirements for measures to protect against sabotage of nuclear facilities and unauthorized removal of nuclear material in use, storage and transport included in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), using inter alia a graded approach, and looking forward to the preparation by the Agency of further guidance on their implementation, including during the process of construction and maintenance of nuclear facilities,
- (r) <u>Reaffirming</u> the importance and the value of the non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as approved by the Board of Governors in 2003, and <u>underlining</u> the important role of the revised supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, as approved by the Board of Governors in 2011,
- (s) <u>Noting</u> the importance of security of transport of nuclear and other radioactive material and <u>stressing</u> the need to take effective measures to protect nuclear and other radioactive material during transport against unauthorized removal or sabotage,

- (t) <u>Noting</u> the contribution of Member States' systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material to preventing loss of control and illicit trafficking and to deterring and detecting the unauthorized removal of nuclear material,
- (u) Recognizing physical protection as a key element of nuclear security,
- (v) Recognizing nuclear forensics as an important element of nuclear security,
- (w) <u>Underlining</u> the importance of Agency programmes for education and training in nuclear security, as well as other international, regional and national efforts to this end,
- (x) <u>Commending</u> the work done by the Agency in providing, upon request, technical assistance and expert support to countries hosting major public events, and
- (y) <u>Stressing</u> the essential importance of ensuring the confidentiality of information relevant to nuclear security,
- 1. <u>Affirms</u> the central role of the Agency in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security, while avoiding duplication and overlap;
- 2. <u>Calls upon</u> the Secretariat to continue to implement Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017 (GC(57)/19 and Corr.1) in a comprehensive manner and in close coordination with Member States;
- 3. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle, as well as protecting sensitive information;
- 4. <u>Calls upon</u> Member States that have not yet done so to establish and sustain a competent authority or authorities responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework, which is or are functionally independent in its or their regulatory decision-making from any other bodies that deal with the promotion or utilization of nuclear or other radioactive material, and which has or have the legal authority and the human, financial and technical resources necessary for fulfilling its or their responsibilities;
- 5. <u>Calls upon</u> all States to ensure that measures to strengthen nuclear security do not hamper international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, the production, transfer and use of nuclear and other radioactive material, the exchange of nuclear material for peaceful purposes and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and do not undermine the established priorities of the Agency's technical cooperation programme;
- 6. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States to consider providing the necessary support to international efforts to enhance nuclear security through various arrangements at the bilateral, regional and international levels, and <u>recalls</u> the decision of the Board of Governors on support for the Nuclear Security Fund;
- 7. <u>Encourages</u> Member States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), <u>calls upon</u> all Parties to the Convention to ratify, accept or approve its 2005 Amendment as soon as possible, <u>encourages</u> all Parties to the Convention to act in accordance with the objectives and purposes of the Amendment until such time as it enters into force, and <u>further encourages</u> the Agency to continue efforts to promote the entry into force of the Amendment to the CPPNM at the earliest possible date;

- 8. <u>Encourages</u> all Member States that have not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible;
- 9. <u>Calls upon</u> the Secretariat to further develop, with coordination and priority-setting by the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC), the publication of Nuclear Security Series guidance documents to facilitate the implementation of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations, and <u>encourages</u> further efforts of the Secretariat to enable representatives of all Member States to participate in the work of the NSGC;
- 10. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat, while recognizing the distinction between nuclear safety and nuclear security, to continue facilitating, in close cooperation with Member States, a coordination process to address their interfaces, and <u>encourages</u> the Agency to develop safety and security publications accordingly;
- 11. <u>Encourages</u> all Member States to take into account, as appropriate, the Nuclear Security Series publications, in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security;
- 12. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat to continue, in coordination with Member States, to play a constructive and coordinating role in other nuclear security-related initiatives, within their respective mandates and memberships, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and to work jointly, as appropriate, with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions, and <u>welcomes</u> regular exchanges of information in that regard;
- 13. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat to promote international exchanges of experience and good practices as regards ways to develop, foster and maintain a robust nuclear security culture compatible with States' nuclear security regimes;
- 14. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, to consider ways of further promoting and facilitating the exchange, on a voluntary basis, of information on the implementation of the international legal instruments relevant to nuclear security;
- 15. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat, in cooperation with Member States, to continue its training and train-the-trainers programmes taking account of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, and to adapt the courses as appropriate, within its mandate, to meet the needs of Member States, and <u>further encourages</u> ongoing initiatives of Member States, in cooperation with the Secretariat, to foster nuclear security culture through nuclear security education and training, dialogue with the nuclear industry and collaborative networks, as appropriate, including through centres of excellence, Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSCs) and the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN);
- 16. <u>Recognizes and supports</u> the Agency's continuing work to assist, upon request, States' efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, to fulfil their obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, provided that the requests are within the scope of the Agency's statutory responsibilities;
- 17. <u>Recognizes and supports</u> the Agency's continuing work to assist, upon request, States' efforts to ensure the security of their nuclear and other radioactive material, including through the offer of assistance in the implementation of Agency Nuclear Security Fundamentals and recommendations when radioactive material is supplied by the Agency, and through the provision of such assistance when requested;
- 18. <u>Encourages</u> States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, where such assistance is needed and requested, including, as appropriate, through the establishment of Integrated

Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs), and <u>similarly encourages</u> States in a position to do so to make available such assistance;

- 19. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat to assist Member States, where such assistance is requested, in the development of implementation strategies of their INSSPs in close consultation with the concerned Member State;
- 20. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat to further develop, in close consultation with Member States, a voluntary mechanism to match Member States' requests for assistance with other Member States' offers of assistance, highlighting, in cooperation with the recipient State, the most urgent needs for assistance, with due regard to the confidentiality of information relevant to nuclear security;
- 21. <u>Invites</u> States that have not yet done so to make political commitments to implement the non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the revised supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and <u>encourages</u> all States to further implement these instruments to maintain effective security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle;
- 22. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States to ensure that there is adequate provision for safe and secure storage and disposition pathways for disused radioactive sealed sources so that such sources within their territories remain under regulatory control, and <u>further encourages</u> all Member States to develop arrangements, as practicable, to permit the return of disused sources to the supplier States;
- 23. <u>Strongly encourages</u> all States to improve their national capabilities to prevent, detect and deter illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material throughout their territories and to meet their relevant international obligations, and <u>calls upon</u> those States in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;
- 24. <u>Notes</u> the utility of the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) as a mechanism for the international exchange of information on incidents and illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, <u>encourages</u> the Agency to further facilitate, including through designated Points of Contact, the timely exchange of information including through secured electronic access to information contained in the ITDB, and <u>encourages</u> all States to join and participate actively in the ITDB programme;
- 25. <u>Encourages</u> States to continue efforts on their territory to recover and secure nuclear and other radioactive material that has fallen out of regulatory control;
- 26. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States to continue to take appropriate steps, consistent with the national legislation and regulation, to prevent, detect, and protect against insider threats at nuclear facilities;
- 27. <u>Notes</u> the Agency's efforts to raise awareness of the threat of cyber-attacks, and their potential impact on nuclear security, <u>encourages</u> States to take effective security measures against such attacks, and <u>encourages</u> the Agency to make further efforts to improve international cooperation, to develop appropriate guidance and to assist Member States, upon request, in this area by providing training courses and hosting further expert meetings specific to the computer security of nuclear facilities;
- 28. <u>Welcomes</u> the Agency's work of promotion and support in the field of nuclear forensics, including through the development of guidance, <u>further requests</u> the Secretariat to assist interested Member States, upon their request, through the provision of education and training, and <u>encourages</u> Member States to share experiences in nuclear forensics with due regard of the principle of confidentiality, and, if they have not yet done so, to consider establishing, where practical, national nuclear material databases or national nuclear forensics libraries;

- 29. <u>Encourages</u> the Member States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian stocks and use low enriched uranium (LEU) where technically and economically feasible;
- 30. <u>Encourages</u> Member States to voluntarily use the Agency's nuclear security advisory services for exchanges of views and advice on nuclear security measures, <u>welcomes</u> the increased recognition of the value of IPPAS (International Physical Protection Advisory Service) and INSServ (International Nuclear Security Advisory Service) missions by Member States, and <u>notes with appreciation</u> the organization by the Agency of meetings to allow interested Member States to share experience and lessons learned, with due regard of the principle of confidentiality, and to make recommendations for improvements of IPPAS and INSServ missions;
- 31. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat, in cooperation with Member States, to continue to develop and promote self-assessment methodologies and approaches that are based on Nuclear Security Series documents and can be used by Member States on a voluntary basis to ensure effective and sustainable national nuclear security infrastructure;
- 32. <u>Supports</u> the steps taken by the Secretariat to ensure confidentiality of information relevant to nuclear security and <u>requests</u> the Secretariat to continue its efforts to implement appropriate confidentiality measures in conformity with the Agency's confidentiality regime and to report as appropriate to the Board of Governors on the status of the implementation of the confidentiality measures;
- 33. Requests the Director General to submit an annual Nuclear Security Report to the General Conference at its fifty-ninth (2015) regular session on activities undertaken by the Agency in the area of nuclear security, and on external users of ITDB and on past and planned activities of educational, training and collaborative networks, as well as highlighting significant accomplishments of the previous year within the framework of the Nuclear Security Plan and indicating programmatic goals and priorities for the year to come;
- 34. Requests the Secretariat to report on the preparation, in close consultation with Member States, of the next International Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in December 2016 in accordance with paragraph 24 of the Ministerial Declaration of the International Conference on Nuclear Security adopted in July 2013; and
- 35. <u>Requests</u> the Secretariat to implement the actions called for in this resolution in a prioritized manner within available resources.