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President: Dato' Adnan OTHMAN (Malaysia)

Later: Ms ALIFERI (Greece)

Mr BATJARGAL (Mongolia)

Mr ZAROUG (Sudan)

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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(60)/INF/6.

Abbreviations used in this record:

2030 Agenda	2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
AAEA	Arab Atomic Energy Agency
AFCONE	African Commission on Nuclear Energy
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ANNuR	Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators
AP	additional protocol
ARASIA	Co-operative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Regional Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ARSN	National Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority
ARTEMIS	Integrated Review Service for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Decommissioning and Remediation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEANTOM	ASEAN Network of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy
BR2	Belgian Reactor 2
BSS	Basic Safety Standards
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CEA	Atomic Energy Commission
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CFA F	African Financial Community franc
CNS	Convention on Nuclear Safety
COP22	Twenty-second Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CSC	Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EDF	Electricité de France
EPR	emergency preparedness and response
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FINAS	Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System
FORO	Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies
GICNT	Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
GNSSN	Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network
HEU	high enriched uranium
HRD	human resource development
ICERR	International Centres of Excellence Based on Research Reactors
ICSANT	International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
INFCIRC	information circular
INEX	International Nuclear Emergency Exercise
INIR	Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review
INSARR	Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors
INSEN	International Nuclear Security Education Network
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
IRSRR	Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
ITDB	Incident and trafficking Database

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
Joint Division	Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture
LEU	low enriched uranium
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MYRRHA	Multi-purpose Hybrid Research Reactor for High-tech Applications
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDT	non-destructive testing
NPP	nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSF	Nuclear Security Fund
NSS	nuclear security summit
NUSIMS	Nuclear Security Information Management System
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
OECD/NEA	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
P5+1	the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus German
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PUI	Peaceful Uses Initiative
RASIMS	Radiation Safety Information Management System

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ReNuAL	Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratory
SARIS	Self-Assessment of Regulatory Infrastructure for Safety
S&T	science and technology
S&T&I	science and technology and innovation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALTO	Extrabudgetary Programme on Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation of Water Moderated Reactors
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
Seventh CNS Review Meeting	Seventh Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety
SIT	sterile insect technique
SLC	State-level concept
SMRs	small modular reactors
SQP	Small Quantities Protocols
SLC	State-level concept
TC	technical cooperation
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
TCP	Technical Cooperation Programme
TRIGA	Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
VETLAB	Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory
Vienna Declaration	Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety
WMDs	weapons of mass destruction

7. General debate and Annual Report for 2015 (continued) (GC(60)/9 and additional information)

1. Ms RUDD (Canada) said that nuclear power was a safe, clean, secure and low-emission form of energy that could help to meet global climate change commitments, in particular those made in Paris in 2015.
2. From uranium extraction to the development of reactor technologies and the provision of decommissioning services, Canada was a world leader in nuclear S&T. The heads of several key companies and the Canadian Nuclear Association formed part of the country's delegation to the General Conference. Furthermore, significant investments were being made in nuclear S&T to enhance collaboration and serve commercial customers better. An investment of \$800 million would be made in the national nuclear laboratory infrastructure, and the country had undertaken to double its investment in clean energy technologies. As Canada wished to work with other countries to push the boundaries of nuclear energy technology development for the benefit of all, it was building its network of nuclear partners and expanding cooperation with governments, relevant laboratories, regulators and industries in other States.
3. Commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and recognition that nuclear applications contributed to the attainment of the SDGs were key pillars of Canada's nuclear policy. Canada was therefore proud to contribute \$2.3 million for the ReNuAL project through PUI to fill funding gaps and support the modernization and refurbishment of the Agency's Insect Pest Control Laboratory and Flexible Modular Laboratory.
4. Canada took its safety, security and non-proliferation responsibilities seriously and had demonstrated its commitment thereto through domestic action and international leadership. It was an honour that Canada had been selected to preside over the Seventh CNS Review Meeting. During its presidency, it would advance openness and transparency in nuclear safety; it was confident that the Review Meeting would be a success and would advance CNS objectives.
5. Canada believed in the benefits of the Agency's peer review missions. Its experts had participated in and led such missions, and it continued to host missions, thus strengthening global nuclear safety through cooperation, accountability and transparency.
6. In 2015, it had welcomed the public release of the Director General's Fukushima Daiichi accident report. The following logical step would be the development of a multi-year nuclear safety strategy to ensure that the lessons learned from the accident informed a culture of continuous improvement.
7. Canada appreciated the Director General's commitment to holding a meeting of points of contact of States Parties to the amendment to the CPPNM in 2016, to which it planned to contribute actively.
8. At the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington earlier in the year, leaders had reaffirmed the central role of the Agency in strengthening the global nuclear security architecture. Canada applauded the Agency for its efforts to assist Member States in fulfilling their nuclear security responsibilities. Since 2004, it had provided expertise and technical support to other Member States and had contributed more than \$31 million to the NSF. It was committed to continuing its support in such a critical area.

9. Canada had hosted during the previous week the first meeting of the Nuclear Security Contact Group, which would work to promote the implementation of nuclear security commitments and to strengthen global nuclear security. It urged States that had not yet joined the Contact Group to consider doing so.

10. The forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security would provide an important opportunity to take stock of developments and would allow participants to focus on the commitments and action needed to address new threats and challenges to nuclear security and to mitigate the threat of nuclear terrorism. It would also provide further guidance to the Secretariat in formulating the nuclear security plan for 2018–2021.

11. Canada welcomed efforts to enhance Member States' understanding of the SLC, under which the Agency would maintain and improve efficiency and effectiveness while concentrating on areas of greater safeguards significance, in close consultation with Member States, to strengthen the safeguards system and ensure that it remained sustainable and cost effective.

12. Canada strongly condemned the fifth nuclear test conducted by the DPRK earlier in the month, in contravention of international law and gravely threatening regional and international peace and security. It called on the international community to be steadfast in its resolve to prevent such actions, while continuing to focus on enhancing the positive benefits of nuclear applications. The DPRK's efforts to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities undermined the global non-proliferation regime and demonstrated a callous disregard for the safety and security of its own people and those of neighbouring States. Canada unequivocally condemned the DPRK's repeated attempts to develop a nuclear weapon delivery system and called on the DPRK to comply immediately and fully with its international obligations, including the relevant UNSC resolutions, to comply with the NPT, fulfil its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks and resume dialogue to find a peaceful diplomatic solution. Canada supported the Agency's efforts to monitor the nuclear situation in the DPRK and its preparedness to resume verification activities. Canada would continue to support the Republic of Korea, Japan and other partners in the region and would consider further action jointly with the international community.

13. In regard to Syria, while acknowledging that the current security and humanitarian situation in Syria was grave and of deep concern, Canada considered that more could be done by the Syrian authorities to rectify the country's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, as reported regularly by the Secretariat to the Board. Canada therefore called on the Agency to remain seized of the matter, until unresolved questions relating to Syria's past activities had been answered definitively, and on Syria to cooperate with the Agency and comply fully with its NPT obligations.

14. Canada thanked the EU and the P5+1 for their leadership in the issue concerning the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and welcomed the progress made since the implementation of the JCPOA. It hoped that such progress would continue for the duration of the agreement and that Iran would provide the Agency with the access required to provide assurances of the non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared activities. The Agency had a key role to play in verifying Iran's compliance with its JCPOA commitments, thus building confidence that Iran's nuclear activities were exclusively peaceful in nature. Canada welcomed Iran's provisional implementation of the AP and noted that its early ratification would serve as an important confidence building measure within the international community.

15. Mr VERWAERDE (France), noting that the year had been marked by the implementation of the Vienna agreement on the verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear activities, called for sustained vigilance to ensure that all provisions of the agreement were implemented rigorously over time. While the Parties and the Joint Commission had special responsibilities therein, it was for the entire

international community to ensure that the agreement was duly implemented. France urged the IAEA to provide in its reports and technical briefings all of the information required so that Iran's commitments could be monitored accurately and precisely. Transparent implementation of the Vienna agreement was the best guarantee of its viability and the most assured means of rebuilding trust.

16. The increase in unacceptable acts of provocation by the DPRK, in particular the nuclear tests conducted on 6 January and 9 September 2016, had given cause for great concern and reflected the DPRK's determination to acquire a nuclear and ballistic stockpile in violation of UNSC resolutions. France called for every endeavour to be made to secure the DPRK's agreement to the immediate and unconditional return of the Agency's inspectors so that action could be taken to dismantle the DPRK's nuclear programme completely, irreversibly and verifiably.

17. France considered that efforts to persuade Syria to cooperate with the Agency on the non-proliferation front should be continued because the instability within the country had heightened the risk of dissemination of material, knowledge and skills; it also considered that the item on Syria must remain on the agenda to avoid conveying a message of impunity to proliferating States, thus weakening the non-proliferation regime.

18. Accordingly, it highlighted the importance of a sound international non-proliferation regime and stressed the duty to do the utmost to strengthen it by universalizing the safeguards system as a priority. It therefore appealed to all IAEA Member States to conclude and implement both a CSA and an AP, for only those two instruments together could inform sufficient assurances that nuclear energy was being used for exclusively peaceful purposes.

19. France fully agreed that the IAEA had a crucial role to play in strengthening the international nuclear security architecture and hoped that issues would not be politicized when that goal was being formalized at the International Conference on Nuclear Security. The goal of enabling Member States to put nuclear security systems in place in order to take up contemporary challenges effectively must be achievable under the Agency's new nuclear security plan, but the definition and implementation of security measures were the preserve of States, which would ensure that measures were effective and that obligations relating to the confidentiality of related information were recognized. Accordingly, France commended the Agency for its accomplishments in such areas as training, advisory services and peer review and announced that it had requested the conduct of an IPPAS follow-up mission in 2017.

20. France had participated fully in IAEA-led cooperation among States and with other international organizations, with priority being given to the security of radioactive sources, which were of genuine nuclear security concern although they attracted less attention. It called on the Agency to play a key role in promoting international legal instruments and for the universalization of the amendment to the CPPNM.

21. As the Fukushima Daiichi accident had shown that nothing could be taken for granted in nuclear safety, France called for follow-up action to be taken on the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety on the basis of the methodology first devised by the Agency. Considering that the strengthening of nuclear safety entailed the universalization of legal instruments thereon, it called on all Member States with nuclear installations, in particular power reactors, to accede without delay to all of the nuclear safety conventions, there being no justification for them not to be covered by international nuclear safety and liability instruments. Noting that the Agency's wide-ranging services, missions and peer reviews had contributed to the promotion of safety culture, France announced that it would host an OSART mission at Golfech NPP, it would submit its CIGEO project to a safety options dossier peer review in 2016 and had requested an ARTEMIS mission in the second half of 2017 to review its spent fuel and radioactive waste management policy.

22. Good progress was being achieved in the re-organization of the French nuclear industry through which, in 2017 and subject to approval by EU competition authorities, EDF's and AREVA's nuclear reactor design, marketing, construction and maintenance activities would be merged. Two thirds of the capital of the new entity would be held by the State and the remainder by strategic investors.

23. France commended the Director General for the theme selected for the Scientific Forum, considering that the Agency had daily demonstrated the benefits to be reaped from the responsible use of nuclear energy. France stood steadfastly by its policy of support for States wishing to initiate or strengthen their nuclear power programmes, as demonstrated by the implementation of the ICERR project by its CEA and by the granting of IAEA collaborating centre status to its Nuclear Science and Technology Institute for education and training in nuclear technology and industrial and pharmaceutical applications.

24. France appealed to States to ratify the Paris Agreement so that it could enter into force before the opening of COP22; it commended IAEA Member States that had already done so. Once in force, the Agreement would be crucial to enabling nuclear energy, under the auspices of the Agency, to contribute fully to the achievement of the SDGs.

25. Mr DELLA VEDOVA (Italy) said that his country highly valued all of the Agency's activities which it would continue to support financially and through various forms of cooperation. He emphasized the significant role of the Agency in strengthening capacities worldwide for the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology in various sectors, in line with the 2030 Agenda; Italy contributed annually to the TCP in support of such activities.

26. The Agency's safeguards system was fundamental to international security and to achieving NPT goals. Italy strongly supported the Agency's key verification and monitoring role under the JCPOA, and had accordingly contributed to such activities in the 2015–2016 biennium. The implementation of JCPOA commitments by all Parties would underpin the sustainability and success of that agreement, thereby contributing significantly to regional and international stability and peace.

27. Italy strongly condemned the nuclear tests conducted in 2016 by the DPRK as threats to international peace and security; it would contribute to the international community's firm and cohesive response to such irresponsible and illegal behaviour.

28. It was committed to promoting universal accession to nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation and disarmament agreements, and called for the goal of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and of other WMDs to be pursued. It would continue to support operations to dismantle all types of WMD-related facilities and initiatives to relaunch inclusive dialogue among Middle East countries on the establishment of such a zone.

29. It had been one of the 54 States in which integrated safeguards had been implemented in 2015 and, noting that the Agency had verified that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities in 67 States, called on all Member States to assist the Agency in raising that figure gradually.

30. In view of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Italy appreciated the Agency's efforts to take a sustainable strategic approach to nuclear safety by drawing on the principles of the 2015 Vienna Declaration in order to prevent accidents with radiological consequences.

31. Italy would continue to implement its national policy on the decommissioning of nuclear installations and the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Consultations had been held and a national programme had been drawn up in accordance with the relevant Euratom directives. It looked forward to the IRRS mission scheduled to assess and advise the National Institute for Environmental Protection and Research, which was overseeing the programme.

32. It remained fully committed to strengthening the international nuclear security framework. It had participated actively in the NSS process and looked forward to the Agency's International Conference on Nuclear Security. Education, training and capacity building in nuclear security remained major priorities. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Italy had promoted a new and more focused Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres, fostering a culture of scientific advancement. It regularly financed the International School on Nuclear Security held jointly by the Agency and the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste.

33. Italy encouraged the States Parties to the CPPNM that had not yet done so to ratify without delay the amendment to the CPPNM, by which it set great store.

34. Its Parliament had ratified ICSANT and the instrument of ratification would be deposited shortly. In November 2016, it would host a meeting of GICNT's Nuclear Forensics Working Group and a tabletop exercise under the Proliferation Security Initiative.

35. Various Italian institutions had been involved in successful cooperation in the nuclear field. In Rome in May 2016, the Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and the Environment (ENEA) had organized jointly with the OECD/NEA an international workshop entitled 'Five Years after Fukushima: Finding the Balance'. The Elettra laboratory in Trieste, a collaborating centre, was playing a leading role in the Agency's work on accelerator physics, synchrotron light and free electron lasers. The National Institute of Nuclear Physics was working on two Agency research projects and was conducting experiments with the Agency as part of a project on environmental radioactivity monitoring for earth sciences. In November 2016, the University of Pavia would host an Agency regional training course on seismic safety for nuclear installations. The National Institute of Health was following the Agency's activities on public protection from ionizing radiation and the use of ionizing radiation for medical purposes.

36. The synchrotron accelerator of the National Centre for Oncological Hadron Therapy was producing proton and carbon ion beams for the precise and specific treatment of different kinds of tumours resistant to conventional radiotherapy or requiring a selective release of energy. Moreover, the laboratories of the National Institute of Nuclear Physics had treated several hundred patients with eye tumours.

37. Mr KIM Hong Kyun (Republic of Korea) said that, in his culture, the Agency's 60th anniversary had a special significance because it was associated with longevity and maturity, the completion of the first, and the beginning of the following, life cycle. The Agency had been commendably committed to *Atoms for Peace* and to making a difference in the world, and would play a greater role as nuclear energy became indispensable to the international community's efforts to achieve the SDGs and uphold the UNFCCC. In leading the way by promoting *Atoms for Peace and Development*, the Agency should harness the vast potential of peaceful nuclear technologies for health, the environment, agriculture and other areas, while preventing nuclear proliferation.

38. The Republic of Korea commended the Agency for its role in addressing the Iranian nuclear issue and for the full implementation of the JCPOA. It was concerned that the DPRK had conducted yet another nuclear test in 2016, disregarding repeated warnings by the international community, and welcomed the statement issued by the Friends of the CTBT condemning DPRK's nuclear tests in the strongest terms.

39. In view of the assertion by the DPRK's Minister for Foreign Affairs before UNGA that neither the Charter of the United Nations nor any other international instrument referred to nuclear and ballistic rocket activity as a threat to international peace and security, the Republic of Korea considered that such bellicose rhetoric and serial violations of relevant UNSC resolutions had raised questions as to whether the DPRK was a peace-loving Member of the United Nations. The DPRK had

not allowed any Agency safeguards and inspections since 2009 and had continued to develop its nuclear capabilities, the 5MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon and its reprocessing activities, as evidenced by the high yield of the September 2016 nuclear test and the decreasing intervals between tests, spending millions of dollars on its nuclear and missile programmes and ignoring its people's welfare. It had developed delivery vehicles, as evidenced by the firing of 22 ballistic missiles of all types in 2016 alone. The nuclear and missile tests had showed that the DPRK was at the final stage of nuclear weaponization.

40. The DPRK had threatened publicly to use its weapons, effectively blackmailing the international community by threatening to launch pre-emptive nuclear strikes and expatiating at UNGA on its national "going nuclear" policy. Its nuclear aspirations threatened the very survival of the Republic of Korea, undermined the international non-proliferation regime and threatened peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

41. The Republic of Korea called on the international community to send a firm message, with a renewed sense of urgency, to the DPRK that its possession of nuclear weapons would never be accepted. It called for a stronger resolution on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK and for a new and stronger UNSC resolution, and stressed that the DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons and programmes completely, verifiably and irreversibly in accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions and that it must fulfil its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreements.

42. The Republic of Korea, which faced a daily existential threat from the DPRK, had always sought to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime by upholding safeguards, security and safety and the belief that the advent of a nuclear weapon-free world would begin on the Korean Peninsula. It stressed that extraordinary threats required extraordinary measures and that, unless the international community thwarted the DPRK's nuclear ambitions, it would lose the opportunity to bring the DPRK back to the path to denuclearization through tougher sanctions and heightened pressure.

43. The Republic of Korea, which had voluntarily applied the updated SLA in September 2015 and had introduced unannounced inspections in May 2016, supported the Agency's ambitious initiatives to upgrade the safeguards system and hoped that such cooperation would help the Agency to respond to evolving proliferation challenges and conduct its verification activities more effectively.

44. As the 2016 NSS process had come to an end, the Agency would play a central role in building an enduring nuclear security architecture. The ministerial segment of the International Conference on Nuclear Security would garner international support to sustain the momentum of the past six years to strengthen nuclear security. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea would act as President of the Conference. The Republic of Korea attached great importance to building international capacity for cybersecurity and had contributed US \$3 million to the NSF and for international training programmes on cybersecurity.

45. Nuclear safety was essential to sustainable development and public receptiveness of nuclear energy. The Agency had played a central role in raising awareness by formulating concrete measures and promoting international cooperation on nuclear safety since the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Pursuant to the CNS and the Vienna Declaration, the Republic of Korea had established a legislative and regulatory framework that stipulated legal responsibility for nuclear accident management. It recognized the entry into force of the CSC as an important milestone in the establishment of a global nuclear liability regime and was holding internal discussions on accession to the CSC.

46. In the previous 60 years, the Republic of Korea had built its nuclear capacity from zero to 24 reactors, which produced one third of the country's total power supply. Another two NPPs had

been approved for construction in 2016. The Republic of Korea was exporting nuclear technology, namely the APR-1400 and the System-Integrated Modular Advanced Reactor (SMART), to newcomer countries. It had managed radioactive waste safely and efficiently and was making preparations for the decommissioning of Kori-1 NPP. In building up its capacity for safe decommissioning, it hoped to cooperate closely with the Agency and its Member States.

47. It called on the Agency to provide strong and effective leadership for its Members and to fulfil its *Atoms for Peace and Development* mission. It would support the candidacy of the Director General, whose guidance and accomplishments in the previous seven years had been exemplary, for a third term at the helm of the Secretariat.

48. Mr PHAM Cong Tac (Viet Nam) said that his country highly appreciated the Agency's achievements in safety and security, science and technology, and safeguards and verification. Owing to effective cooperation between the Member States and the Secretariat, the Agency had played an important role in promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy and the development of nuclear technologies in support of the SDGs.

49. Viet Nam had made considerable achievements in implementing its national Strategy for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy up to 2020, which had contributed to its socioeconomic development, with the assistance of the Agency, the Member States and other international organizations.

50. In the field of health care, many hospitals currently provided nuclear medicine, diagnostic radiology and radiotherapy services using advanced equipment and techniques, radioisotopes and new kinds of tracer kits to relief pain caused by metastatic bone cancer were being produced and imaging was being used to diagnose and treat head and neck cancers. In agriculture, hardy new rice and soybean mutant varieties with disease-resistant characteristics had been developed and the Agency had provided support for the development and application of SIT.

51. Under the Agency's TC projects, NDT techniques had been used in industrial contexts, such as oil and gas, shipbuilding and construction. Simulation techniques and NDT had been used to evaluate the structural ageing of thermal power plants and would prove useful in the national energy industry. Irradiation facilities in Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Noi, operating at full capacity, were being used to sterilize medical equipment, preserve frozen foods and prepare fruit for export. Nuclear techniques were being used to assess water, soil and air pollution and to conduct environmental radioactivity monitoring. Three regional stations had been established to monitor environmental radiation and to strengthen the national network. National staff had been trained to draft nuclear law and regulations that were consistent with the Agency's safety and security standards. The Agency had assisted in building the national regulatory body's technical capacity in line with international standards and in drafting Viet Nam's INSSP. Owing to the Agency's TC projects and INIR mission, timely and efficient HRD had been provided, plant sites had been assessed, legislative and regulatory frameworks had been drawn up and nuclear safety and security had been assured. The Agency's recommendations on sustainable national nuclear infrastructure development had been most useful.

52. Viet Nam's CPF for 2016–2021, signed in 2015, reflected the extensive and effective cooperation between Viet Nam and the Agency. Recognizing that nuclear S&T played an important role in sustainable development, Viet Nam wished, under its Strategic Orientation for Sustainable Development, to strengthen cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the Agency, the Member States and other international organizations.

53. Viet Nam was a Party to nearly all international treaties and conventions on nuclear safety, nuclear security and non-proliferation and had fully met its obligations and commitments to the Agency. It had deposited its instrument of accession to ICSANT and was making preparations for its accession to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, while reviewing the

CSC. It had attended all of the Nuclear Security Summits. It supported international cooperation on nuclear energy, in particular with States that were nuclear technology leaders, and would provide nuclear techniques and experts to the Agency's new Member States in Asia and Africa.

54. Mr LINHART (Austria) said that his country was proud to host the Agency — an international organization with a unique mandate and programmes that contributed to international peace and stability. Applauding the Agency's ability to build on its achievements and develop new activities that benefited its Members, Austria undertook to pay its TCF contribution for 2017 in full and on time.

55. Austria strongly condemned the September 2016 nuclear test conducted by the DPRK in violation of several UNSC resolutions and commended the Director General for the report on the application of safeguards in the DPRK and the Agency for its readiness to play an essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme. It called on the DPRK to cooperate promptly with the Agency in order to implement its safeguards agreement fully and effectively.

56. As the Agency's verification expertise was indispensable to upholding the non-proliferation provisions of the NPT, in particular Article III, Austria fully supported the Secretariat's approach to safeguards implementation involving comprehensive evaluations based on relevant information on States' nuclear and nuclear-related activities.

57. Austria welcomed the Agency's role in verifying JCPOA implementation and ascribed the utmost importance to the Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's compliance with its JCPOA nuclear-related commitments.

58. The forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security would provide a global platform for improvements in the crucial area of nuclear security. Highlighting the importance of the CPPNM, Austria welcomed the entry into force of the 2005 amendment.

59. Austria advocated the controlled phasing out of nuclear power production worldwide and supported efforts to make full use of renewable energies and to enhance energy efficiency and energy savings. It considered that while States had a sovereign right to opt for nuclear power, they were duty bound to construct, operate and decommission their plants in accordance with all relevant international conventions and safety standards, to give due consideration to the interests of neighbouring countries, to engage in open dialogue and to share operational experience for the entire nuclear cycle.

60. Austria took note of the Director General's report contained in document GOV/INF/2016/10 and appreciated the Agency's intention to apply a distinct methodology for systematic analysis and prioritization in order to identify priority areas for the Agency's activities. It looked forward to receiving proposed priorities, milestones and core elements of the Agency's nuclear safety strategy complementary to its strategic approach to nuclear security. Noting the momentum built in implementing the Vienna Declaration and the Secretariat's active contribution, Austria supported the Seventh CNS Review Meeting and believed that implementation of the principles of the Vienna Declaration would improve nuclear safety permanently.

61. Considering the TCP to be an integral part of the Agency's activities, Austria had contributed to the regular budget and to the TCF and had provided infrastructure in Vienna and in Seibersdorf and, despite its reservations about nuclear power generation, it fully supported the Agency's activities on the peaceful non-power applications of nuclear S&T and considered the operation of the Agency's eight laboratories in Seibersdorf, which provided for training, collaboration and the conduct of research in the manifold aspects of nuclear technology, for the benefit of the Agency's Member States, to be crucial. Austria fully supported the Agency's ambitious ReNuAL project and commended the Group of Friends of ReNuAL for their tireless efforts to raise the requisite funds. The Animal Health

and Production Laboratory had been collaborating with the BSL3 laboratory of the Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety in Mödling since August 2015.

62. Mr SANTANA (Cuba) said that the Agency's 60th anniversary marked a milestone in its ongoing efforts to contribute to world peace and to the achievement of the SDGs. Although the Agency had been established to ensure international peace and security and protect future generations from the scourge of war, military spending had grown unabated, and the stockpile of more than 16 000 nuclear weapons posed an existential threat.

63. As the TCP was the primary medium for promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, TC activities deserved to be given priority, and the human and financial resources of the substantive department should be bolstered. Cuba, which had attained an 87.9 per cent national project implementation rate in 2015, had completed several active national projects, had participated in many regional projects and CRPs, had conducted more than a dozen training courses in the form of scientific fellowships and visits, and had attended dozens of courses and meetings. Its experts had travelled on international missions and it had hosted foreign scholars and researchers and regional events. Cuba supported ARCAL as a good mechanism for promoting cooperation in the nuclear field in Latin America and the Caribbean. It ascribed great importance to nuclear technology applications beneficial to the economy, society and health. It commended the Agency for its support, under interregional and regional projects and for the use of SIT to combat Zika virus disease; it would implement its own national project.

64. Cuba welcomed the forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security and the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM. It had cooperated with the Agency on projects to improve nuclear security at border control points, which had included the implementation of Phase II of the INSSP and the hosting of a regional nuclear security workshop in Havana in 2016.

65. Cuba recognized the Agency's efforts to ensure that radiation sources were used safely by improving the radiation safety infrastructure, transport, radioactive waste management and national emergency preparedness and response, and by supporting national regulatory bodies. Agency-led projects conducted by FORO had made a significant impact regionally and internationally, by improving nuclear and radiological safety and security. Through greater synergy with the Agency, FORO's contributions could be available worldwide.

66. The progress achieved in implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety had been most commendable, as had been all action taken to strengthen the global legal nuclear liability framework and national regulatory bodies. Cuba had received double certification for nine consecutive years and the results of the Agency's inspections had been satisfactory. Cuba called on the Secretariat to maintain its impartiality and professionalism in order to uphold the credibility of the Agency's safeguards activities, stressing that the principle of confidentiality in those activities must always be strictly observed and that wholly voluntary decisions must not be deemed to be obligations. It supported the efforts to improve the efficiency of safeguards so long as such efforts did not affect States' legitimate rights or establish discriminatory or selective practices, and considered that safeguards activities must never be promoted to the detriment of the TCP.

67. Cuba welcomed the conclusion of the JCPOA and the road map as outcomes that clearly showed that dialogue and negotiation were optimal means of settling disputes and of concluding agreements satisfactory to all. It reaffirmed its support for the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East and regretted that no conference had been convened for that purpose.

68. Considering that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could be precluded only by prohibition and elimination, Cuba had supported the report by the Open-ended Working Group on multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations and its recommendations on the prohibition of nuclear

weapons with a view to their total elimination as a major step towards achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.

69. In view of the Agency's major contributions relating to climate change, desertification, food security and health, Cuba believed that the Agency's 60th anniversary was a welcome opportunity to strengthen commitments and intensify the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

70. Ms BITADZE (Georgia) said that the Agency's contributions in the form of experts, training courses, workshops and technical and financial resources were very important to her country, which was eager to ensure that it fully met international standards. Under the Agency's TCP, Georgia had laid the foundations for greater nuclear and radiation safety and security by identifying priority areas and national development goals in its second CPF, which had been signed in 2015. The 2015 INSSP had been crucial to strengthening the national comprehensive nuclear security regime and to meeting international standards, requirements and obligations.

71. In addition to the forthcoming mission to assess education and training in radiation protection and safety of radiation sources, Georgia had requested an IRRS mission for 2017. It considered that the Agency's RASIMS and SARIS were means of improving the national regulatory environment and the effectiveness of international cooperation and had updated information in RASIMS by adding the most recent amendments to its nuclear and radiation systems.

72. The Agency had contributed greatly to Georgia's legislative and institutional reforms in nuclear and radiation safety and had established an independent Agency of Nuclear and Radiation Safety under the Ministry of Environment in accordance with IAEA standards. The National Framework Law on Nuclear and Radiation Safety had been amended to provide the legal basis for detailed regulations for BSS implementation in medicine, industry and education, the maintenance of the national register and quality assurance and control.

73. The Law passed on radioactive waste and the related technical regulations were of great importance to Georgia, which exercised full control over national radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities. A radioactive waste disposal facility had been fully renovated and its security and technical features had been improved for the first time in 30 years. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority had assisted Georgia in drawing up a national radioactive waste management strategy and a 15-year action plan.

74. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the President of Georgia had highlighted the crucial importance of full compliance with relevant international treaties and the universality of already agreed mechanisms. Accordingly, Georgia would deposit its instrument of accession to the Assistance Convention in the near future. It highlighted the importance of the MOU signed by the United States NRC and Georgia's Agency of Nuclear and Radiation Safety at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.

75. Georgia, a nuclear-weapon-free State that was fully committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons, had removed 1.83 kg of HEU from its Breeder-1 neutron source facility in December 2015 pursuant to the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, with the assistance of the Agency and the USA, thus demonstrating its sense of responsibility in fulfilling its international obligations.

76. It had been the first partner country of the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative to adopt a national CBRN Threat Reduction Strategy and Action Plan for 2015–2019 and it had hosted global events such as the CBRNe Science and Consequence Management in 2014 and in 2016.

77. Under the joint action plan to counter nuclear smuggling that it had signed with the USA in 2007, Georgia had made significant improvements to its technical capabilities. It acknowledged the

international nuclear security regime as the only means of addressing challenges posed by actors wishing to use nuclear power for unlawful purposes and would therefore continue to share relevant information through the ITDB. Its successes in detecting trafficking in the previous decade comprised cases involving the occupied territories. It called on the international community to address the issue of those territories which belonged to it but were not under its control.

78. Ms VÁSQUEZ SOTO (Costa Rica) hoped that the admission to membership of new States from the Caribbean would be mirrored by greater and better attention being accorded to TC and other activities involving States in Latin America and the Caribbean, and called for the geographical and gender representation of the Agency's staff to be equally representative of its growing membership.

79. Costa Rica welcomed the Director General's readiness to serve for another term and appreciated his participation in January 2016 in an exchange, with Costa Rican institutions active in the nuclear sector, on ways and means of strengthening bilateral cooperation with the Agency.

80. The Agency had made a positive impact in many areas during its sixty-year lifetime. It was better known for its monitoring and surveillance activities, but the importance of its contributions to research and development cooperation under its *Atoms for Peace and Development* motto had been mirrored by the growth in membership.

81. Costa Rica considered that the SDGs constituted a frame of reference for the allocation of resources to meet the world's most pressing needs and achieve sustainable development. It welcomed the focus of the Scientific Forum on nuclear technologies for the achievement of the SDGs and looked forward to the International Conference on the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, scheduled for 2017.

82. It had participated actively in the TCP through more than 80 national and 250 regional projects and, in particular, activities upholding the principle of nuclear energy and applications for the purposes of peace and development only. Costa Rica was in favour of boosting the efficiency of such activities and their impact on living conditions and technological and scientific progress in the region, and accordingly stressed the importance, to developing countries in particular, of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology transfer.

83. Costa Rica's implementation rate of 99.7 per cent should be taken into account in TCP planning for the 2018–2019 cycle and thereafter. Its projects in 2015 had been fully aligned with the goals set in the National Development Plan and National Science, Technology and Innovation Plan 2015–2021. Under the national project on the strengthening of good agricultural practices for food safety and security and environmental protection, capacity had been built for environmental water and food sample analysis. On completion of the national project on the establishment of gamma irradiation capabilities at the Costa Rican Institute of Technology for the use of radiation processing technology, Costa Rica had gained access to a wider range of biomedical, biomaterial and agricultural applications. Owing to the national project on the consolidation of a national reference laboratory for the measurement of greenhouse gases, the analytical capacities of the Environmental Pollution Research Centre of the University of Costa Rica had been built through training and infrastructure improvement. On completion of the national project in support of biological control of stable flies (*Stomoxys calcitrans*), *Spalangia endius* Walker parasitoids of the stable fly had been mass reared in order to control that pest. The new national projects implemented during the 2016–2017 cycle covered water resources management, cancer management and environmentally-friendly agricultural practices. Costa Rica, which had contributed €122 500 through government cost-sharing in 2015, stressed that the Agency should be provided with the necessary resources to meet all of its statutory obligations and that those resources should be apportioned among the three pillars of its mandate in a balanced manner

to meet the needs of its growing membership. Costa Rica urged all Member States to contribute the amounts pledged to the TCF for 2017 and to continue their efforts to contribute to the TCF.

84. Costa Rica supported the Agency's application of safeguards and its conduct of other nuclear verification tasks that were essential to the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, for its stability and sustainability were closely tied to the integrity, impartiality and technical objectivity of the safeguards system. Costa Rica was following the implementation of the JCPOA because restoration of the international community's confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme was crucial to international stability, peace and security. It welcomed the conduct of the Agency's monitoring and verification activities, for the JCPOA had rekindled hope that the international community could and would take meaningful steps to build a nuclear-weapon-free world and thus achieve the overarching goal of complete, verifiable and enduring nuclear disarmament set in the NPT.

85. Costa Rica, condemned the fifth nuclear test conducted by the DPRK, which had seriously threatened regional and international peace, stability and security. As it had traditionally conducted a national policy that promoted peace and disarmament, it would implement the measures contained in relevant UNSC resolutions nationally and would support further action internationally.

86. In view of the potentially catastrophic humanitarian consequences of voluntary or accidental use of nuclear weapons, it was in favour of negotiations on a legally binding universal instrument that completely prohibited the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, storage, transfer, use or threat of use of such WMDs.

87. It called on those countries that had not yet concluded both a CSA and an AP to do so in furtherance of the objectives of the Agency's safeguards programme, for it considered that only universal application of those two instruments together could ensure that Member States' nuclear facilities and material were used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Costa Rica considered that the Agency's safeguards and nuclear verification were fully meaningful only in the context of the international community's desire for worldwide, comprehensive, complete, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament.

88. Mr MOKOTEDI (Botswana) said that Agency-funded national TC projects on animal disease diagnosis and control, food safety and environmental radioactivity monitoring had made a significant socioeconomic impact on his country. Botswana had honoured its financial obligations to the Agency in support of its mandate and had paid its annual contributions for 2016 in full. While recognizing that the Agency had limited financial resources to meet the growing demand for assistance in the safe use of nuclear technology for development, Botswana required such assistance in its endeavour to achieve the SDGs.

89. Botswana, which was celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of its independence, was committed to using nuclear technology to improve the lives of its people. SDGs had been incorporated into Vision 2036, its national strategy, to address food security, cancer management, energy and animal health. A radiotherapy centre had been established in Botswana, which provided sustainable, cost-effective and convenient cancer treatment. It had responded to the shortage of cancer management expertise through HRD. As it was situated in the drought-prone SADC region, it required support in the development of crop varieties that were productive in a low-nutrient environment. Botswana commended the Agency for its support in fruit fly management.

90. Botswana, which had received support from the Agency for regional projects and the transfer of scientific and technical knowledge through fellowships, scientific visits and workshops and had gained considerable experience in some fields, welcomed professionals from other countries on scientific visits and fellowships. It had also received support in the use of nuclear technology under AFRA in the

form of expert missions, training courses and workshops, and had thus built capacity in agriculture, human health, energy development, radiation protection and safety, food and nutrition.

91. It was committed to implementing its INSSP and had already appointed the Nuclear Security Committee. Furthermore, it was reviewing national legislation to address nuclear security and security requirements in full and was committed to implementing relevant international instruments on nuclear safety, security and safeguards. It was pursuing ISO 9001 accreditation for its regulatory body to strengthen the effectiveness of its management system and would host in 2017 an IRRS mission designed to boost the effectiveness of its regulatory infrastructure.

92. The Agency was to be commended for its role at the centre of the international safeguards system because effective safeguards contributed to maintaining public confidence. Botswana strongly advocated a total ban on nuclear testing and joined the international community in condemning nuclear weapon testing by the DPRK, which had threatened and undermined peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

93. Mr MUONGPAK (Lao People's Democratic Republic) said that the Agency's 60th anniversary was an occasion to commemorate its outstanding contributions to peace, security and development. Lao PDR fully supported the Agency's performance of its mandates and its contribution to the attainment of the SDGs.

94. Since becoming a Member in 2011, Lao PDR had concluded various nuclear-related agreements with the Agency, including the CPPNM, the Early Notification Convention, the Assistance Convention and an AP to its safeguards agreement. Ratification of the AP and of the amendment to the SQP was being processed and procedures for their effective implementation were under consideration. Lao PDR would acquire sufficient capacity to fulfil its commitments and international obligations by taking action to ensure appropriate infrastructure improvements, capacity building and HRD.

95. Lao PDR's TC with the Agency had been aligned with its CPF for 2014–2018 and its RCA. The Agency's TC projects and training courses on HRD, infrastructure development, human health, food safety and security had all contributed to Lao PDR's socioeconomic development. Emphasis had been laid on achievement of the goals set in its Eighth Five-Year National Socioeconomic Development Plan, Agricultural Development Strategy 2025 and Vision 2030, which included green growth, sustainable development, steady economic growth, poverty reduction and graduating from LDC status. Lao PDR still faced many HRD and infrastructure development problems, which would be overcome with the international community's support.

96. As the 2016 Chair of ASEAN, Lao PDR had promoted the implementation of SEANWFZ and was committed to working closely with ASEANTOM to promote high nuclear safety, security and safeguards standards in the region and with the Agency for peace, security and prosperity.

Ms Aliferi (Greece) took the chair.

97. Mr CHUQUIHUARA CHIL (Peru) said that the Agency's nuclear S&T accomplishments in the preceding six decades had benefited all humankind, while its verification activities had furthered world peace and security.

98. Peru considered that, while responsibility for nuclear safety and nuclear security lay with individual States, the Agency held responsibility for assisting States, when requested and in accordance with its Statute. Furthermore, Agency-led efforts to improve nuclear security and nuclear safety should not undermine international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Peru noted the Agency's endeavour to draw on the 2011 IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, the experience gained by States in implementing the Action Plan, the IAEA Fukushima Report and

the principles set out in the Vienna Declaration in formulating its nuclear safety strategy and work programme. The Seventh CNS Review Meeting would afford an opportunity for further progress.

99. Peru was implementing the Agency's recommendations and participating in programmes to enhance nuclear safety culture in line with the CPPNM and the amendment thereto. It welcomed the entry into force of the amendment and commended the Agency for its contributions to nuclear security through the nuclear security plan 2018–2021, capacity-building workshops, IPPAS missions, NSGS activities and the ITDB. It was committed to strengthening the nuclear security regime, which encompassed non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and it called for greater nuclear security at all levels in order to prevent malicious acts; it looked forward to the International Conference on Nuclear Security.

100. Peru stressed that, in the drive to achieve the SDGs, the Agency should adapt the TCP to meet Member States' most pressing needs. It looked forward to the International Conference on the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in 2017, noting that cooperation with the Agency had covered the development of crop varieties resistant to extreme Andean conditions, fruit fly eradication, genetic characterization of alpacas in order to boost their resistance to disease and improvement of the safety and production of radiopharmaceuticals used to treat cancer at the RP-10 nuclear research reactor. A three-year project was under way to build national cancer diagnosis and treatment capacity through PACT and a cell and tissue bank had been established to support the treatment of severe burns.

101. Peru, which had conducted training activities jointly with the Agency for experts in the region, considered that such knowledge management activities were crucial to national capacity building and to maximizing the benefit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It highlighted the Agency's cooperation on regional projects through ARCAL and FORO and the ongoing ReNuAL project, which would have a significant impact on development cooperation in Latin America. Cooperation between Peru and the Agency in S&T and the application of nuclear technology for development had been strengthened by the Director General's visit to Peru, which supported the Director General's candidacy for a third term.

102. Peru was particularly grateful to the Director General for his role in the JCPOA implementation process. It commended the Agency for its long-term monitoring and verification of full JCPOA implementation by Iran, welcomed Iran's efforts to collaborate and implement transparency measures, and urged Iran to continue to cooperate with the Agency.

103. Peru condemned in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 9 September 2016, which, together with previous such tests, ballistic missile tests and apparent uranium enrichment activity at Yongbyon, constituted a serious violation of the DPRK's international obligations under UNSC resolutions, seriously threatened international peace and security and was an urgent wake-up call for the international community. It called on the DPRK to honour its international obligations, to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes completely, verifiably and irreversibly, to terminate all related activities and to resume the six-party talks. It urged the Director General to continue to seek cooperation with the DPRK on the application of safeguards and to update the Agency's detailed plan for the implementation of monitoring and verification activities in the DPRK.

104. Mr FOO (Singapore), noting the progress achieved in strengthening the global nuclear security framework and the international non-proliferation regime, said that Singapore was committed to implementing the amended CPPNM and welcomed the progress achieved in implementing the JCPOA.

105. Singapore voiced deep concern at the nuclear and missile tests conducted by the DPRK during the year, flagrantly breaching UNSC resolutions and disregarding the concerns of the international

community. It urged the DPRK to abide by its international obligations, resume dialogue on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, cooperate with the Agency in implementing the DPRK's CSA, comply with the relevant UNSC resolutions and re-accede to the NPT. It stressed that peaceful dialogue was the only means of easing tensions and securing the DPRK's security and economic interest.

106. Considering the NPT to be the cornerstone of the international nuclear legal framework, Singapore called for reflection on the disappointments of the previous year's NPT Review Conference and for collective efforts to ensure a positive outcome in 2020. It would support all efforts in favour of global disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and sovereign States' right to the safe, secure and safeguarded peaceful use of nuclear S&T. It had always supported the Agency's nuclear verification and safeguards implementation roles.

107. It called on the Agency to monitor and counter the growing threats of cyberattacks and nuclear terrorism by collaborating closely with Member States. The Agency's role in ensuring a strong and sustainable nuclear safety framework was crucial, and nuclear safety concerned all States, not merely those with nuclear installations. The Secretariat's commitment to greater attention for the safety aspects of NPP lifetime extensions, decommissioning, high-level radioactive waste disposal, innovative technologies such as fast reactors and SMRs, stronger safety standards and assistance in building Member States' capabilities had been most welcome.

108. It also called on the Agency to develop its nuclear safety strategy further in order to retain the emphasis on nuclear safety and ensure timely implementation of projects launched under the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and systematic application of lessons learned from such projects and the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It would cooperate in strengthening international and regional nuclear safety standards.

109. Singapore commended the Secretariat for making nuclear S&T available to Member States in order to achieve the SDGs and take up other challenges. It reported on action taken to provide technical assistance in conjunction with the Agency to developing Member States through scientific visits, fellowships and training. Under a new MOU, workshops had been held on nuclear law and on SIT for mosquito control, and professional attachments in nuclear medicine had been offered.

110. Singapore supported capacity building in the region through the Agency and ASEANTOM generally and, in particular, under TC projects on the establishment of a regional environmental radioactivity database and an EPR framework. Group scientific visits would be conducted in order to gain a thorough understanding of the specifics of the establishment and maintenance of radiation monitoring networks, further to the assistance provided by the EU in developing decision-support tools for analysing data collected by such networks.

111. Stressing that nuclear-weapon-free zones designed to strengthen global peace and security must be aligned with the object and purpose of the relevant treaties and protocols, Singapore reaffirmed its commitment to resolving outstanding issues with nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the SEANWFZ Treaty.

112. Singapore called for emphasis to be laid during the year-long activities to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Agency on *Atoms for Peace and Development* in order to highlight the Agency's positive contributions to development and to the SDGs.

113. Mr QUIÑONES (Dominican Republic) congratulated the Agency on its 60th anniversary, for it had achieved a great deal by striving to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity worldwide.

114. The Dominican Republic, a founding Member, was committed to maximizing the benefits of nuclear applications in order to achieve national SDG, to using related technology responsibly in order to protect its population and to collaborating with the international community in order to use nuclear energy safely and peacefully.

115. The forthcoming CPF would cover matters such as the strengthening of the regulatory authority, medical applications, agriculture, the environment and preservation of the cultural heritage. The TCP had been crucial to building national capacities to use nuclear technology in health, agriculture, the environment and the regulatory infrastructure.

116. In health, great progress had been achieved in radiotherapy services following the opening of a radiotherapy centre for cancer treatment and the acquisition of cyclotron technology for the production of radiopharmaceuticals. Action had been taken to combat Zika virus disease by fogging *Aedes aegypti* breeding grounds and raising the people's awareness of the danger to which they were exposed. Under a TC project, the Agency had provided training and nuclear techniques for the early detection and thus treatment of Zika virus disease and the control the *Aedes aegypti* vector of dengue, chikungunya and Zika.

117. The application of nuclear techniques to agriculture had been most appreciated on account of its positive impact on the national economy, the agricultural exporting sector and rural communities. SIT had been used to eradicate the Mediterranean fruit fly, sterile insects had been released and nation technicians had been duly trained. The Dominican Republic could therefore certify that the produce that it exported was safe.

118. Support had been provided to the Dominican Republic in preserving its coastal and marine environment, with nuclear techniques being used to identify factors that could contribute to the extermination of harmful algal blooms.

119. Great strides had been made in waste management, owing to the Sierra Prieta store for radioactive waste and disused sources. The store was under military control and the required safety systems were in place; it thus constituted a reference model for the region.

120. The Dominican Republic commended ARCAL, which had been extended, for promoting and coordinating training and R&D activities in nuclear S&T in the region under IAEA-sponsored projects in areas such as health, industry, energy, food safety and radiation safety.

121. As a Party to most international agreements and treaties on the safe and peaceful use of nuclear S&T, the Dominican Republic was strengthening its legal framework, with welcome assistance from the Agency. It had ratified the amendment to the CPPNM and was committed to preventing, and prosecuting the perpetrators of malicious actions involving nuclear material and installations, in order to bolster international security and prevent terrorism.

122. It commended the Agency for promoting nuclear material transport safety and the dialogue between coastal and shipping States, for it was a coastal State situated athwart the route used by such ships.

123. It held the presidency *pro tempore* of CELAC, and accordingly supported the commitment of CELAC Heads of State to press for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and their decision to declare Latin America and the Caribbean to be a zone of peace. It also supported celebrations to mark International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, stressing that the region had been the first to become an NWFZ and that both OPANAL and the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been political, legal and institutional beacons for the establishment of NWFZs in other world regions.

124. Mr STUART (Australia) said that the IAEA had continued to play an indispensable role in furthering the peaceful use of nuclear science and in supporting global nuclear safety, security, safeguards and non-proliferation, some 60 years after its establishment for the purposes enshrined in Article II of the Statute. Australia welcomed the Director General's availability for a third term of office.

125. Australia welcomed and supported action taken to promote peace and development and to link the Secretariat's work to the SDGs. It had consistently supported the TCP and would contribute its share of the 2017 target in full and on time, and encouraged other countries to follow suit. It had made in-kind and extrabudgetary contributions regularly to the Agency's work, including under PUI. Its active assistance and regional cooperation programme included RCA support, the hosting of fellowships and scientific visits, support for Pacific neighbours and active participation in meetings and consultancies.

126. Australia's new large-scale molybdenum-99 processing plant, with capacity to meet some 25 per cent of world demand and fully based on LEU technology, would be fully operational in 2017. The co-located Synroc waste treatment plant would demonstrate Synroc's viability for molybdenum-99 and other waste streams.

127. Australia believed that confidence in the non-diversion of nuclear material and technology to non-peaceful uses was the essential pre-condition for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and as IAEA safeguards were fundamental to the global non-proliferation regime and helped to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation. It urged all Member States to work together to ensure that the safeguards system was effective, independent, credible, adequately resourced and universal in coverage. It supported the Agency's efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system. It considered that a CSA together with an AP constituted the international standard for verification and it encouraged all States to develop and implement effective safeguards, including through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network and the Australia Safeguards Support Programme.

128. Australia welcomed the report that Iran was provisionally applying its AP and was cooperating with the Agency in implementing the JCPOA, which provided verifiable assurances to the international community that Iran's nuclear activities would remain exclusively peaceful; Australia encouraged Iran to continue to meet its commitments.

129. Australia had strongly condemned the DPRK's nuclear programme, in particular the two nuclear tests conducted during the year in violation of many UNSC and IAEA resolutions. Australia stood firm with its allies and regional partners in calling on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear and missile programme completely and verifiably, resume full cooperation with the Agency, implement its safeguards obligations and comply with UNSC and IAEA resolutions.

130. Australia acknowledged the Secretariat's and Member States' efforts to enhance nuclear safety and it welcomed the Director General's report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the adoption of the Vienna Declaration. It supported the Agency's further work on radioactive waste safety and ascribed the utmost importance to the safe and secure use and end-of-life management of radioactive sources.

131. Australia welcomed the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM as a fundamental component of the global nuclear architecture and hoped that the Agency would continue to assist Member States in implementing the amended CPPNM. It had participated actively in the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, at which it had co-chaired the working group on the role of the IAEA in global nuclear security, and it looked forward to the second International Conference on Nuclear

Security as an opportunity for Member States to build the momentum to enhance nuclear security in the light of emerging threats.

132. In expanding its network of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, Australia had negotiated an agreement with Ukraine and looked forward to its entry into force. The Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and its associated Administrative Arrangement had entered into force in November 2015.

133. Mr SRISAMOOT (Thailand) said that for 60 years the Agency had played a crucial and evolving role in promoting the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear technologies and applications and in enhancing cooperation among Member States in those areas, thus contributing to their social and economic development and directly supporting the SDGs.

134. Thailand considered that nuclear safety must remain high on the national and international agenda because a nuclear or radioactive incident would have catastrophic impacts on the environment and on people's livelihoods. The Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi accidents were constant reminders of the real danger at a time when several States were considering nuclear power as a means of meeting future energy needs.

135. Thailand had devoted considerable resources and effort to building its interrelated and mutually reinforcing nuclear safety and nuclear security capacities. It had complied strictly with IAEA guidelines, its standard operating procedures had been revised continuously and it had been mindful of nuclear security issues and threats of nuclear terrorism when adopting its National Security Policy, its National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan and its National Preparedness Strategy. Through ASEANTOM, it had conducted technical nuclear safety and security activities such as workshops on nuclear forensics, environmental monitoring and biodosimetry.

136. Owing to its appeal as a cost-efficient source of energy, nuclear power had been included as a future option in its Power Development Plan 2015, and action had been taken to raise the people's awareness and understanding of the use of nuclear energy. Thailand highlighted the importance of knowing and understanding the risks and cross-border impacts of nuclear incidents and of establishing national and regional preparedness and response plans, and called on the Agency to assist ASEAN Member States in building national and regional capacities to promote global nuclear safety and security. Its Prime Minister, at the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, had reaffirmed Thailand's commitment to enhancing nuclear security and to combating nuclear terrorism. As nuclear education was crucial to HRD in nuclear fields, its Chulalongkorn University had taken the lead in ASEAN by offering postgraduate courses in nuclear security and safeguards.

137. Thailand supported endeavours to enhance nuclear safety and security worldwide and commended the Agency for its follow-up action on the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, for taking up invaluable lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and for the International Conference on Nuclear Security scheduled for December 2016.

138. It commended the Agency for its TCP, under which more than 30 national projects had been implemented, national experts had attended training courses held by the Agency and assistance had been received in human-capacity and physical-infrastructure building in order to maximize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology in areas such as radiotherapy, nutrition and plant mutation. Thailand was committed to supporting the Agency by hosting regional meetings, workshops and training courses, by accepting fellowship holders and scientific visits and by serving as a regional hub for regional TC activities and IAEA collaborating centres or centres of excellence. In view of the great benefits that Member States could reap from the wide range of civilian applications of nuclear technology, Thailand appealed for TCF contributions to be made in full and on time. It supported PUI

as a means of financing unfunded TC projects and new projects designed to respond to regional or international emergencies.

139. It also commended the Agency for its central role in nuclear safeguards and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It supported the JCPOA and called for it to be effectively implemented in full in furtherance of cooperation for regional and international peace and security. It had supported the Agency's monitoring and verification activities in Iran through its regular budget contribution.

140. Voicing deep concern at the nuclear and ballistic missile tests conducted by the DPRK during the year, Thailand urged the DPRK to comply with its obligations under the various UNSC resolutions, to cooperate fully and promptly with the Agency and to resume negotiations in accordance with the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks.

141. Thailand reaffirmed its commitment to its obligations under the NPT and the IAEA Statute; it had taken action to accede to the CPPNM and the amendment thereto, to the CTBT, ICSANT and the AP to its CSA.

142. Noting the growing international recognition and contributions of the Agency under the current Director General, Thailand supported his candidacy for another term in order to ensure continuity of leadership and uninterrupted progress in the Agency's work.

143. Mr CHACÓN ESCAMILLO (Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of) congratulated Colombia and its people on the historic peace agreement signed on the previous day, in which the United Nations and the Governments of Norway and Cuba had played pivotal roles.

144. Venezuela was indisputably a peaceful country committed to upholding the principles of general, complete and non-discriminatory disarmament. It had been designated in its Constitution, which provided expressly for the promotion of nuclear disarmament and cooperation among States, as a zone of peace in which the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons were prohibited. Venezuela complied strictly with the NPT, the CTBT and the Agency's Statute. It was a Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, under which Latin America and the Caribbean had been declared an NWFZ. It feared the terrible humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, which would have harmful effects on health, the environment, the infrastructure, food safety, the climate, development, social cohesion and the world economy, and it had accordingly signed the humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, as enshrined in UNGA resolution 70/48.

145. Venezuela commended the Agency for its achievements in promoting the development of nuclear technology, facilitating the transfer of such technology to developing countries, in promoting the highest nuclear energy safety standards and in verifying through the safeguards system that nuclear energy was used for peaceful purposes only.

146. It ascribed special importance to the TCP, which had contributed to the country's development through projects on human and animal health, food, agriculture, the environment and industry, with some projects conducted through ARCAL. Projects during the 2016–2017 cycle focused on molecular biology, clinical radiobiology, application of isotopic analysis and occupational radiation monitoring of extremities and the lens of the eye. Venezuela considered that such assistance was crucial to States' development and prosperity and must therefore not be tied to any political, economic or military conditions that were incompatible with the Agency's Statute. It also considered that the TCP must be funded from the regular budget because TCP activities were statutory activities for which funding must be sufficient, assured and predictable.

147. It had revised its Atomic Energy Bill to include the promotion and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; it had drawn up draft standards on the transport of radioactive material

and the regulation on the authorization, registration and control of ionizing radiation in industry and research. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident had been published in the official gazette.

148. About 80 per cent of radioactive sources currently in use had been registered and categorized by risk, registration procedures for sealed disused sources and radioactive waste were being drawn up, as was a national radiation EPR plan, and information workshops on radioactive material detection had been held.

149. Venezuela supported action taken under the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and called on the Agency to retain the lead in drawing up international regulations, standards and codes to ensure that nuclear technology was designed, commissioned, used and decommissioned to the most rigorous and stringent safety standards. It accordingly considered that the Agency must continue to give priority to nuclear-safety capacity building.

150. Venezuela called on the Agency to support States that required assistance in discharging their State responsibility for nuclear security. It acknowledged the Agency as the sole authority for the conduct of verification and safeguards activities on the basis of purely technical and objective considerations free from the politics and discrimination that could be levelled against States wishing to exercise their right to conduct peaceful nuclear programmes. It strenuously defended the right of States to be assisted in developing nuclear S&T for peaceful purposes and supported action taken by the Agency under Article II of the Statute. It welcomed the verification and monitoring activities conducted under UNSC resolution 2231 (2015) and noted the willingness of the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement the JCPOA.

151. It had always supported the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East as an effective means of contributing to regional peace and stability, and called for its establishment without further delay, quoting the first part of paragraph 4 of the final declaration of the seventeenth summit of the NAM.

152. Venezuela believed that nuclear energy must be used for the benefit of humanity and not for nuclear weapons or for the destruction or domination of peoples. It therefore called for general and complete nuclear disarmament as the only means of warding off the danger posed by the existence of nuclear weapons to the achievement of peace worldwide. It also called for negotiations on a universal and legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons under a multilaterally agreed time scale and ultimately eliminate such weapons transparently, irreversibly and verifiably. The Agency could play an active role to those ends by informing Member States on disarmament matters in order to strengthen the disarmament regime and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

153. Venezuela stressed that CELAC Heads of State and Government had reaffirmed, at the fourth summit in January 2016, the inalienable right of all States to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which was one of the three NPT pillars, the other two being disarmament and non-proliferation.

154. Ms PLEJIĆ MARKOVIĆ (Croatia) said that the applications for membership of the Agency by Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the Islamic Republic of Gambia attested to the significance of the Agency.

155. The Agency's safeguards were key to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. All nuclear material in Croatia was used under integrated safeguards exclusively for peaceful activities. During the year, its Parliament had ratified the agreement between the non-nuclear-weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the IAEA pursuant to Article III 1. and Article III 4. of the NPT.

156. Croatia was fully committed to implementing the international nuclear safety and security treaties and conventions to which it was a Party. Accordingly, it welcomed the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM and had already prepared its report for the Seventh CNS Review Meeting.

157. Krško NPP had continued to operate safely under a joint venture between Slovenia and Croatia and was an example of successful cooperation between two States on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, redounding economically and ecologically to the benefit of both. Croatia was committed to the safe and secure operation of Krško NPP in accordance with the bilateral agreement and to meeting all obligations, including the safe management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Designated bodies had already drawn up the programme for implementing the strategy for the management of radioactive waste, disused sources and spent fuel in accordance with the Joint Convention and with Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom. All international obligations, including public information, consultation of neighbouring States and public hearings, had been honoured and the highest safety standards for environmental and human-health protection had been met in conducting the strategic environmental assessment of a likely radioactive waste storage site.

158. As it attached great importance to bilateral cooperation on nuclear safety and security, Croatia had continued to cooperate with Slovenia and Hungary under the Agreement for the Early Exchange of Information in the Event of a Radiological Emergency. A bilateral agreement on cooperation between regulatory bodies of Croatia and Serbia was being signed.

159. Croatia set great store by the Agency's work on the peaceful application of nuclear technology. Its regulatory body for radiological and nuclear safety and security had begun to revise laws and regulations in accordance with IRRS recommendations and suggestions issued in 2015.

160. Croatia commended the Agency for its successful cooperation under the TCP, both nationally and regionally. The national TC project implemented during the 2016–2017 cycle covered the introduction and utilization of various techniques in medicine, the upgrading of dose management in medicine and isotope investigation of groundwater–surface water interaction, while one regional and six national projects consistent with the TC priorities set in the 2014 CPF were under consideration for the 2018–2019 cycle.

161. Mr Van de VOORDE (Belgium) said that observance of stringent safety criteria was central to the sustainable use of nuclear energy and that Belgium's operator and control agency performed to maximum levels of transparency in notifying the general public of each incident and in proposing joint inspections in medical and industrial installations in neighbouring countries as means of building transparency and mutual trust. The Doel 3 and Tihange 2 reactors, which had remained in operation within very broad safety margins after faults had been found in the vessels, would be inspected again at the end of the forthcoming operating cycle. Belgium commended the Agency for its expertise and support, stressing that two SALTO reviews had been conducted in Belgium in the previous five years. Belgium would halt electricity generation from nuclear power in 2025, but would continue to give priority to the improvement of nuclear safety. It intended to encourage the harmonization of safety standards internationally inasmuch as rigorous application thereof was the mainstay of the nuclear sector.

162. Belgium had witnessed at first hand in 2016 the new trends in international terrorism in which the nuclear sector was a potential target. It had taken full responsibility in those new circumstances and had drawn on IPPAS recommendations to improve further its avowedly robust physical protection system. It had deployed soldiers to its nuclear sites, pending the dispatch of trained, armed police officers. As the NSS process had come to an end, it was for the Agency to continue to raise the standard of nuclear security in practice as coordinator, best practice promoter and provider of technical assistance. Belgium considered that timely and practical information exchange among States was

crucial and that goals could be achieved by combining experts' technical approach with the necessary political stimulus. It would contribute \$300 000 to the NSF and would continue to be involved politically and technically. It would be represented by the speaker at the International Conference on Nuclear Security scheduled for December 2016.

163. Calling for a holistic approach to nuclear energy, Belgium considered that alternative technologies were a solution in some cases and accordingly requested the Agency to remain attentive to new innovative/alternative medical and industrial technologies that could replace nuclear technology or significantly reduce the use of high-activity sealed sources. A level playing field was indispensable in order to encourage the development of such alternatives.

164. Belgium commended the Agency for its verification of the implementation of JCPOA commitments and announced a €300 000 extrabudgetary contribution for JCPOA implementation. Acknowledging the long-run toil involved, Belgium was certain that the Agency would ensure maximum transparency, report on its conclusions and provide information to Member States on general trends and on field interaction with Iran. It was gratified by the Agency's professional approach to its verification mission and its modernization of the various instruments, and urged the Agency to continue to search actively and systematically for efficiency gains, which were crucial to enabling the Agency to cope sustainably with the increase in its verification tasks. The introduction of unannounced IAEA inspections in Belgium was but one such gain.

165. Belgium was very active in nuclear research and in the training of future generations of cutting-edge experts and it was a major radioisotope producer, embarking on new applications amid heightened security. The conversion of BR2, a research reactor, and the installation of medical radioisotope treatment targets were under way, as were further development of MYRRHA and negotiations with international partners. It had just published the first edition of its national spent fuel and radioactive waste management programme and considered that international cooperation on nuclear waste management was indispensable in order to avoid excessive constraints on future generations. It had accordingly responded positively to Luxembourg's request for assistance in managing its radioactive, industrial and medical waste by signing an intergovernmental agreement on the management and final storage of Luxembourg's radioactive waste in Belgium.

166. The decision to halt nuclear power generation would not alter the nature of Belgium's relations with the Agency, which would remain a key partner in building international peace and security, supervising States' development of nuclear energy and providing targeted TC, for which Belgium had contributed more than €800 000 to the TCF. Belgium would continue to provide expert services by participating in technical committees and expert missions and by conducting joint training initiatives. Its research centres, institutes and firms active in the sector would continue to draw on the Agency's expertise and to contribute to its work. It hoped that the application submitted by its centre for nuclear energy studies to join ICERR would give other Member States access to a relevant cutting-edge skills-boosting research infrastructure.

167. The Agency could always rely on Belgium's support when setting its priorities, when endeavouring to ensure good management and when seeking to accomplish its missions.

168. Mr BATJARGAL (Mongolia), congratulating the Agency on its 60th anniversary, said that it had made a valuable contribution to the maintenance of peace and security worldwide, to the promotion of Member States' economic and social development through the development and dissemination of nuclear S&T and to meeting the challenges of climate change. Mongolia stood ready to cooperate with the Agency, which it supported fully.

169. Mongolia considered the theme of the Scientific Forum to be most apposite inasmuch as the SDGs were closely connected with the Agency's activities in energy, food security, nutrition, health,

the environment and water resources. It announced that it had submitted its instrument of ratification of the Paris Agreement on climate change to the United Nations Secretary-General.

170. Mongolia was fully committed to nuclear non-proliferation and considered the Agency's safeguards system to be crucial to international peace and security. It welcomed the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM and looked forward to the International Conference on Nuclear Security scheduled for December 2016.

171. It attached particular importance to the achievement of disarmament and nuclear proliferation and, considering that the nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK during the year had adversely affected the international community's efforts to ensure international peace and security, called for international dialogue conducive to peace and security in North-East Asia.

172. It supported the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, welcomed the measures taken by the Agency to implement the 2011 IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and called for high priority to be given to nuclear safety on account of its importance to all States, in particular those seeking to make peaceful use of nuclear energy. It had adopted the Concept of Sustainable Development–2030, under which 30 per cent of its energy mix would be derived from renewable sources of energy, and preparations had been made to use nuclear power by 2030.

173. It had taken action to build the capacity of its regulatory bodies to be consistent with international standards, drawing on the Agency's twelve safety standards.

174. It commended the Agency for its prevention of the illegal transfer of nuclear and radiological material, institutional capacity building, identification of training needs and nuclear security measures. It welcomed the exchange of information on safety and security under the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Communication Network.

175. It appreciated the Agency's invaluable contribution through the TCF to the implementation of its development plans and to its social and economic development, environmental protection, food security, technological progress and national capacity building. Its CPF for 2016–2021 was being implemented effectively, and the assistance provided under PACT in improving the oncology service infrastructure and cancer patient care had been most welcome. Mongolia stood ready to cooperate on the ReNuAL project. As Chair of the RCA, Mongolia had hosted the 38th meeting of RCA national representatives in Ulaanbaatar.

Mr Batjargal (Mongolia) took the chair.

176. Mr BENEDEJČIČ (Slovenia) said that in the previous six decades the Agency had contributed to a safer world through its verification activities. It had advanced the efficient and safe use of nuclear power, contributed to progress in nuclear science, technology and applications and strengthened international nuclear safety and security standards; it had thus made a unique contribution to world peace, security and development.

177. Slovenia considered nuclear power to be a clean energy source capable of meeting future needs without carbon emissions and atmospheric pollutants. Krško NPP was one of the country's major producers of electricity, its post-Fukushima safety upgrading would be completed in 2018 and the bunkered building in 2021, and the Agency and the four neighbouring States had participated in an INEX 5 nuclear energy exercise earlier in the year. Its TRIGA research reactor at the Jožef Stefan Institute had continued to operate safely and was suitable for benchmark experiments owing to its well-defined neutron flux. It had been visited by an INSARR follow-up mission, which had found that the previous mission's recommendations and suggestions had been implemented and which had declared most issues closed.

178. Slovenia had adopted a management programme for the safe disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel. It had drawn up for submission to the CNS Review Meeting its seventh national report outlining the current situation and action taken to implement the Vienna Declaration.

179. It was satisfied with the broadening scope of the TCP and commended the Secretariat for its good work. It would accept as many IAEA fellowship holders as possible and would organize scientific visits for persons wishing to learn from its experts and practices. The Agency's capacity building through courses, workshops and meetings was vital to any country dealing with nuclear technology or radiation techniques.

180. Slovenia welcomed the Agency's decision to contribute actively to the achievement of the SDGs. It also welcomed Iran's implementation of its JCPOA commitments and commended the Agency for its verification and monitoring activities. Slovenia supported universal accession to and full implementation of all non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions, in particular the NPT.

181. Mr HENNIS (Netherlands) said that the Agency had made invaluable contributions to global health, prosperity, peace and security, and he heralded in the celebrations to commemorate the Agency's 60th anniversary by expressing gratitude and continued support for the Agency work.

182. The Netherlands, which gave priority to progress on nuclear disarmament and to strengthening non-proliferation, considered that the NPT was the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and that only the Agency had the support, capacity and experience to conduct the safeguards verification activities that were central to the regime; it could thus play a crucial role in supporting international peace, security and stability. Although the 2015 NPT Review Conference had not adopted a consensus outcome document, it had agreed on a great deal and, as Chair of the preparatory committee for the 2017 NPT Review Conference, the Netherlands looked forward to a positive start to the new NPT review cycle.

183. The Netherlands called on the Agency to be impartial, independent and objective in order to provide robust assurances against nuclear proliferation. As a technical organization, it must resist all attempts to politicize its safeguards system. While decision-making power rested with Member States, the Secretariat must perform its assigned tasks effectively, without being micromanaged, in particular in its action to update the safeguards system. The Secretariat must be left to build on its experience and knowledge to implement nuclear safeguards in the manner that it considered to be most effective and efficient.

184. The Netherlands supported the universalization of the AP and therefore called on States to conclude an AP if they had not yet done so. It considered that only a CSA together with an AP met the standard of verification enshrined in Article III of the NPT. It supported the further development of State-level approaches to the implementation of safeguards and encouraged the Secretariat to make further progress on the SLC.

185. It was gratified that all parties had met their JCPOA commitments but counselled continued vigilance in monitoring and verifying compliance. It announced that it would commit an additional €1 million in extrabudgetary funds for the JCPOA implementation.

186. The Netherlands called on the Conference to achieve consensus on the nuclear security resolution in order to send a strong signal of shared determination to continue to improve nuclear security and reinforce the Agency's central nuclear security role.

187. The Netherlands considered that the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM was crucial to building capacity to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and called on Parties to implement the provisions of the Convention as amended, while calling on States that had not yet done

so to accede to the CPPNM as amended. It encouraged all Member States to sign INFCIRC/869 and thus demonstrate their commitment to improving nuclear security. The Netherlands thanked the USA for hosting the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington earlier in the year, welcomed the holding of the International Conference on Nuclear Security later in the year and commended the Republic of Korea and Nigeria for their efforts as co-Chairs. A strong political declaration would drive progress on the nuclear security front.

188. The Netherlands attached great importance to the CNS and to the Vienna Declaration, and it looked forward to the Seventh CNS Review Meeting as an important opportunity to share information on the implementation of the CNS. It had continued to improve its robust domestic framework for nuclear safety in accordance with its international obligations. It invited peer review missions regularly to its nuclear facilities and it participated in international reporting systems, such as IRSRR and FINAS, in which information on unusual events and incidents was collected and analysed.

189. Given the need to provide the Agency with the appropriate political, technical and financial resources to perform its fundamental role of advancing peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all, the Netherlands pledged its full target TCP share for 2017. It commended the Agency for its TCP contribution to sustainable socioeconomic development and stressed the need to uphold high standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards in conducting those activities.

190. The Netherlands was honoured to sit again on the Board of Governors. As a Member, it would give pride of place to good governance and would focus on gender balance in the Secretariat, the benefits of public-private partnerships and sustainable and reliable financial resources for the Agency's key activities in the long term.

191. Ms EDUARDS (Sweden), affirming Sweden's strong commitment to the Agency's work, said that an effective multilateral approach and international cooperation were essential to the furtherance of peace, security and development, in which the Agency played an indispensable role.

192. Sweden welcomed the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM and looked forward to its universalization, urging all States that had not yet done so to accede to, and ratify and implement, the amendment. Considering that nuclear security remained high on the international community's agenda and that significant progress had been achieved through the NSS process, Sweden commended the Agency for its key role in strengthening the nuclear security framework and for holding the ministerial conference in December 2016. TC had been a crucial means of fostering nuclear safety and security, and Sweden's cooperation with Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine on nuclear safety and security had been of long standing.

193. Sweden considered that the CSA and the AP together constituted the basis of a robust, effective and efficient safeguards system and the verification standard under Article III of the NPT, and it accordingly encouraged Member States that had not yet done so to bring their NPT safeguards agreements and APs into force without delay and to ensure that their SQPs were consistent with the current standard. It called on Member States to support the Agency in verifying that Member States' declarations were correct and complete, and on the Agency to retain its staff competence in order to use safeguards verification resources efficiently and effectively. It welcomed the IAEA's efforts to apply the SLC to all Member States with a safeguards agreement in force, as part of the continuing development of global safeguards implementation.

194. Sweden strongly supported action taken by the Agency to verify JCPOA implementation, thus further enhancing dialogue with Iran and strengthening the NPT. It had accordingly increased its extrabudgetary contribution under that head, and stressed the importance of early ratification by Iran of its AP to successful JCPOA implementation.

195. Sweden urged the DPRK to cease provocative actions that jeopardised international peace and security and, rather, to fulfil its international obligations, respect UNSC resolutions and CTBT principles and cooperate promptly with the Agency in implementing comprehensive safeguards completely and effectively. It welcomed the Agency's readiness to resume its verification work in the DPRK.

196. Highlighting the importance of international cooperation and the development of common approaches to nuclear safety, Sweden reaffirmed its commitment to implementing the principles and objectives of the Vienna Declaration and urged all CNS Contracting Parties to make the Seventh Review Meeting a success. A final decision on a licence for the construction of Sweden's spent nuclear fuel repository was pending.

197. Sweden, which strongly believed that peer review mechanisms strengthened nuclear safety and security and built confidence, had hosted in 2016 a follow-up mission to the 2012 IRRS mission. The team had concluded that Sweden's nuclear safety and radiation protection system was solid and that good progress had been achieved. The advice provided by the 2011 IPPAS mission had been most apposite and Sweden had requested the follow-up mission scheduled for later in the year. It urged Member States to invite such missions regularly, take action on their findings and generously share the results.

198. Sweden attached great importance to full implementation of gender mainstreaming in the Agency's programmes and operations and to gender equality within the Secretariat, for both were beneficial to the Agency and its Member States. It encouraged the Secretariat to hasten progress on those fronts.

199. Sweden supported the TCP, through which the Agency would contribute through nuclear S&T to human health, food security and water management in implementing the 2030 Agenda. It had made voluntary contributions to PUI activities such as water resource management in the Sahel. To ensure success, Sweden called for the views and needs of project stakeholders, such as women, to be taken into consideration in TC projects.

200. Mr MÜNT (Estonia) acknowledged the IAEA's invaluable role in the non-proliferation regime and in ensuring that nuclear material and technology were used for peaceful purposes only. The IAEA safeguards system was essential to the implementation of the NPT, which built confidence conducive to international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

201. Estonia welcomed the implementation of the JCPOA and called on Iran to honour its JCPOA commitments and to cooperate with the Agency in the conduct of its verification and monitoring activities in Iran and thus gradually ease tensions in the region. Estonia had made two contributions to enable the Agency to perform those tasks and would consider a further voluntary contribution in support of the Agency's long-term mission.

202. Estonia had condemned in the strongest possible terms all nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK. It called on the DPRK to comply with its international obligations and on the General Conference to adopt a strong resolution on the matter.

203. Estonia supported all measures that enhanced nuclear safety nationally and internationally. It acknowledged the Agency's and the Member States' achievements in implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and thus enhancing nuclear safety measures in several countries. It called on all IAEA Member States to ensure the highest levels of safety at nuclear facilities that would directly affect their own territory and neighbouring countries. Transparency was required before construction and during the operation of nuclear facilities.

204. Estonia, which had no operating nuclear power reactors, announced that the nuclear submarine training centre previously used as a radioactive waste storage facility would be decommissioned safely and that a final radioactive waste depository would be built by 2040 for the safe long-term storage of radioactive waste.

205. It attached great importance to the improvement of nuclear safety and thus to the regular review and updating of its nuclear safety regulatory framework. A new Radiation Act would enter into force in the country on 1 November 2016, and the EU's BSS Directive and Nuclear Safety Directive would be incorporated into its national law.

206. The IAEA's safety peer review missions had proven to be invaluable tools in supporting national nuclear and radiation safety arrangements. An IRRS mission had been concluded successfully on 14 September, and its final report was awaited. Estonia encouraged all IAEA Member States to take full advantage of such missions.

207. It acknowledged the Agency's central role in strengthening the international nuclear security framework by promoting international legal instruments, enhancing international cooperation and building States' nuclear security capacity. Estonia supported such activities by providing cybersecurity expertise and by contributing yearly to the NSF. It looked forward to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security and its outcomes. It welcomed the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM, which would improve world nuclear security, for it required information sharing and appropriate physical protection regimes for nuclear material.

208. It gave pride of place to the TCP, which enhanced the responsible development of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, contributed to socioeconomic development worldwide and furthered the achievement of the SDGs. It had reaped the benefits of TCF-funded projects for 20 years and had gained invaluable knowledge that it could share with Member States. It had hosted and supported several IAEA workshops and training courses, including the radon workshop and a training course on radiation protection in diagnostic radiology earlier in the year.

209. During its presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2017, Estonia would promote high standards in the Agency's activities.

210. Mr OUATTARA (Côte d'Ivoire) said that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire was fully confident that the Director General would be re-elected for a third term of office, for the Agency's activities had taken a decisive turn under his stewardship to give effect to the *Atoms for Peace and Development* motto a reality.

211. Côte d'Ivoire commended the Agency for the action taken to attain the main objective of promoting the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies consisting in enhancing international cooperation on nuclear safety and security by boosting international cooperation on nuclear safety and security, radiation safety, transport safety and security, and nuclear waste management, and by strengthening the Agency's activities in nuclear S&T and applications.

212. Côte d'Ivoire had ratified the AP and had acceded to the CPPNM and approved its INSSP. It supported the non-proliferation regime and the promotion of the safe and secure use of nuclear material. It would contribute to the success of the International Conference on Nuclear Security. It had demonstrated its determination to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology and to contribute to the strengthening of international security by passing its law on nuclear safety and security; it had sought to ensure protection against ionizing radiation by establishing the operational mechanisms of its ARSN and by appointing the ARSN Director General.

213. The Agency had contributed to Zika virus disease control by building the country's practitioners' capacities for epidemic prevention and management of the vectors of human diseases such as dengue and chikungunya.

214. The TCP had been crucial to the mobilization of resources and regional experts and to AFRA, which had been extended. Côte d'Ivoire received multiform support from the Agency through bilateral cooperation on human resource capacity building in areas such as agriculture, the environment, animal health and production, scientific research, energy planning, radiopharmacy, radiotherapy, radiation protection and nuclear medicine. The Agency had assisted Côte d'Ivoire in acquiring a gamma camera, housed at the Nuclear Medicine Institute in Abidjan, for precise and detailed diagnosis relating to the thyroid, heart and lungs.

215. The Agency had supported Côte d'Ivoire's project on the establishment of a radiotherapy and medical oncology centre. It had previously conducted feasibility studies for the construction of a radiotherapy centre equipped with two linear accelerators. Another centre would be built under an MOU between Côte d'Ivoire and the Republic of Korea, and the IsDB had been approached for the construction of two radiotherapy centres in the interior. Côte d'Ivoire called on the Agency to assist in building the country's capacities and in training the various categories of staff required for those new centres.

Mr Zaroug (Sudan) took the chair.

216. Mr SEOKOLO (South Africa) said that the Agency had for six decades been at the forefront of the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that the 60th anniversary was a unique opportunity to take stock and highlight the Agency's contribution to nuclear S&T. South Africa was marking the 25th anniversary of its accession to the NPT and of the signing and entry into force of its CSA and the 20th anniversary of the Treaty of Pelindaba establishing an NWFZ in Africa.

217. The shift in emphasis to the contributions of nuclear S&T to socioeconomic development had been much appreciated by South Africa and a great deal had been achieved in enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity worldwide.

218. South Africa had decided to raise the share of nuclear energy from 5 per cent to 23 per cent of its energy mix by adding 9600 MW to its national grid by 2030.

219. It commended the TCP for its vital contribution to human health, food, agriculture and water resource management in support of Member States' national and regional development plans and, considering that the TCP funding must be sufficient, assured and predictable to ensure sustainability, called for greater efforts in order to strike a proper balance in resource allocation for the Agency's promotional and non-promotional activities, while urging Member States to pay their assessed TCF contribution in full and on time. South Africa would pay the recommended amount for 2017.

220. Welcoming the collaboration between the Agency and the African Union in eradicating mosquitoes and tsetse flies in order to control associated human and animal diseases, South Africa commended the Agency for its efforts, through VETLAB, to strengthen regional and national laboratories for the early detection of zoonotic diseases in wildlife and livestock. South Africa called for VETLAB, for which it had allocated US \$1.5 million in 2012, to be funded under the regular budget to ensure continuity and sustainability.

221. While expressing gratitude to Member States and AFRA for their contributions to the implementation of ReNuAL, South Africa drew attention to the additional resources required for the second phase of the ReNuAL project and appealed to Member States to make contributions.

222. South Africa, which supported the implementation of the safeguards system in all Member States in accordance with their international legal obligations, had introduced the integrated safeguards approach and had maintained its broader conclusion. It called on the Agency to assess the implementation of integrated safeguards under the SLC and to share lessons learned with all Member States openly and transparently.

223. South Africa called for a multilateral approach to be taken, with the Agency playing a central and coordinating role, in addressing the nuclear security risks inherent in the continued existence of nuclear weapons, nuclear terrorism, the illicit nuclear network, criminal acts and use of nuclear or other radioactive material for malicious acts. It looked forward to the International Nuclear Security Conference and would contribute to the finalization of the ministerial declaration. It commended the Secretariat for its efforts to facilitate accession to international nuclear security instruments and welcomed the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM, which was being ratified by South Africa.

224. It had continued to fulfil its CNS obligations by demonstrating a high level of nuclear safety. Preparations under way for the Seventh Review Meeting would provide an opportunity for South Africa, which had established a Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Safety and Security, to update its activities in compliance with the CNS, with emphasis on capacity and skills building. It would review the effectiveness of its regulatory infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety and would host an IRRS mission in December.

225. Mr AHMED (Ethiopia) said that that 60th anniversary afforded an opportunity to share views on the challenges faced by the Agency in the previous six decades and to plan for its future by crafting a shared vision as the basis for cooperative action to preserve and promote international peace and security.

226. Ethiopia considered S&T to be crucial to the achievement of its vision of becoming a middle-income country by 2025 with a strong industrial base. To that end, it must build its S&T&I capacity rigorously and ensure effective technological applications conducive to its economic transformation in sectors such as agriculture, food security, health, water resource management, the environment, radiation protection and industry.

227. Owing to its success, STEP, the flagship project under which Ethiopia had used SIT to free a 25 000 km² area from tsetse fly diseases for use as arable and livestock farmland, would be rolled out to cover 240 000 km², into which sterilized males would be released. Its experience could constitute good practice that other States could emulate.

228. It had increased the number of nuclear medicine and radiotherapy centres in order to meet the rising incidence of cancer and the need to improve the accessibility and availability of diagnostic and therapeutic services. It had contributed US \$10 million for the construction of nuclear medicine and radiopharmacy facilities at St Paulos Hospital. The Agency's fellowships, training courses and expert missions were crucial to human resource capacity building in order to staff the new facilities. To meet its human resource requirements, Ethiopia had initiated formal postgraduate training for medical doctors, nurses and radiotherapy technologists and would shortly launch similar training courses in clinical nuclear medicine and nuclear medicine imaging technology and, subsequently, in radiopharmacy and *in vitro* nuclear medicine.

229. It was committed to working closely with the Agency in order to achieve the SDGs and considered that development could not be viewed in isolation from the population's safety assurance. It had thus taken safety and protection measures consistent with international BSS and had amended the statute establishing its Radiation Protection Authority in order to strengthen the implementation of its objectives.

230. In availing itself of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology in order to transform its economy, Ethiopia had used nuclear techniques and tools to assess the linkage between aquifer and groundwater resources; it had also used NDT for training and research and in support of its construction and manufacturing industry.

231. Action had been taken to prime the two public universities that promoted nuclear S&T to become centres of excellence by attaching them to the Ministry of Science and Technology. Concrete results had been achieved in socioeconomic areas to which S&T contributed significantly, and Ethiopia was convinced that the application of S&T was absolutely necessary to its economic growth and attainment of the SDGs.

232. Mr ZONGO (Burkina Faso) said that the Director General's visit to his country in March 2016 had reflected the determination to strengthen cooperation between the Agency and Burkina Faso. He congratulated the Agency on its 60th anniversary and on the progress achieved to the benefit of the Member States.

233. Joint action by the Agency and Burkina Faso had contributed substantially to the country's development efforts, through various CPFs. Emphasis had been laid in the forthcoming CPF on the peaceful use of the atom and on related safety and security measures in agriculture, health, nutrition, water resources, energy, regulation and monitoring, which would have positive effects on key socioeconomic areas.

234. With the Agency's support, Burkina Faso had drawn up its first cancer control programme and had laid the first stone for an oncology centre in Ouagadougou, for which CFA 5 billion had been earmarked and for which the Agency had awarded five specialized training fellowships for radiotherapists and nuclear doctors. Burkina Faso was determined to promote nuclear medicine and had accordingly held a seminar on the subject earlier in the month. Owing to the introduction of nuclear medicine at the teaching hospital, fewer medical evacuation costs had been incurred and treatment had been provided for patients from neighbouring West African States.

235. Great strides had been made in agriculture, owing to the successful use of sterile insects from the insectarium at Bobo-Dioulasso; SIT would be rolled out against the vectors of malaria and dengue and crop pests such as the mango white fly. Isotope and nuclear techniques had led to great progress in boosting the productivity of cattle and small ruminants and in the use of local ingredients for domesticated ruminants; equipment had been provided for a molecular genetics laboratory, at which doctoral students from the subregion had been trained. The project on the integrated and sustainable management of shared aquifers and basins in the Sahel had been implemented successfully.

236. The operational capacities of Burkina Faso's ARSN had been strengthened, with IAEA and AFRA support. Owing to assistance provided by the Agency under previous TC projects on regulatory infrastructure building in order to monitor radiation sources and on the design of software in order to monitor occupational exposure, the country had attained level 3 for the control and monitoring of sources of ionizing radiation. The regional INSSP and NUSIMS workshops, scheduled for November 2016, were indicative of the interest in nuclear security and capacity building sustained by Burkina Faso, which hoped that the forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security would contribute significantly to the collective effort to strengthen nuclear security worldwide.

237. As nuclear S&T could play a preponderant role in the implementation of the SDGs, Burkina Faso called on the Agency and Member States to make concerted efforts to implement TC projects conducive to the achievement of those internationally agreed goals. It also called for nuclear power projects to be continued in order to achieve viable alternatives to energy problems and the challenges of climate change.

238. As terrorism was one of the major concerns of all States, Burkina Faso called for urgent action to be taken to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring and using radioactive sources and to support efforts to those ends by States in the region. It welcomed the entry into force of the CPPNM amendment that it had ratified out of commitment to combating all forms of nuclear terrorism.

239. African States' efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology had been most commendable and their commitment to international peace and security had been illustrated by the entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba and the establishment of AFCONE. Burkina Faso therefore called for constant support to be given to institutions dealing with such matters in Africa, in particular AFRA and AFCONE, so that the goals of development through the peaceful use of nuclear technology could be achieved.

240. Mr SLAQUI (Morocco), congratulating Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the Islamic Republic of the Gambia on their admission to membership, said that the growth in the number of Members attested to the relevance of the multidimensional action taken by the Agency to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

241. Morocco considered that the session marking the 60th anniversary of the Agency was an opportunity for in-depth reflection on the Agency's past and on its future role under an appropriate model and that the Agency's activities were wholly consistent with its *Atoms for Peace* motto, owing in particular to the Agency's TCP and the unstinting endeavours of the Agency's and Member States' experts to develop nuclear S&T in furtherance of peace and sustainable development.

242. Morocco ascribed particular importance to the TCP as a medium for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and for the sustainable development of developing Member States in accordance with Article IV of the NPT. It contributed regularly to the TCF, defrayed its national participation costs and considered that TCP financing must be assured, predictable and sustained for optimal TC project implementation. Moreover, TC activities burnished the Agency's image, somewhat tarnished by the 'watchdog' epithet, and both the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement afforded TCP opportunities for establishing the Agency's role in achieving those ambitious goals. The theme of the Scientific Forum was therefore most apposite.

243. Morocco would host COP22 at Marrakech and had given pride of place to the concerns and expectations of developing countries, with emphasis on the implementation of the Paris Agreement in order to achieve adaptation, mitigation and funding goals, while focusing on capacity building and technology transfer. It was convinced that nuclear energy and applications would be crucial to adaptation to and mitigation of climate change and that opportunities would thus abound for the Agency to participate in the implementation of the Paris Agreement and in the achievement of the SDGs.

244. Partnership with the Agency had resulted in infrastructure and human capacity building, through which Morocco had capitalized optimally on nuclear applications in vital sectors such as agriculture, health, nutrition, water resource management and environmental protection, in which it had developed national expertise. Its Centre for Nuclear Energy, Science and Techniques had become an IAEA water resource management collaborating centre, which attested to the great strides made in attaining its leadership and expert position internationally; the Centre would continue to support the implementation of TC projects worldwide.

245. Morocco was committed to carrying out the various activities and programmes scheduled under AFRA and had agreed to its extension for another term. It held the presidency of AFRA for the current year and had demonstrated its commitment to building the capacities of African States by organizing fellowships, scientific visits and postgraduate courses on the safety and control of radiation sources. It was willing to share its experience of nuclear applications for peaceful purposes with all

French-speaking African States in the context of South–South and triangular cooperation. Four AFRA-designated regional centres were active in Morocco in regional capacity building and knowledge sharing in radiation protection, oncology, nutrition and water resource management.

246. Morocco called for greater cooperation geared to facilitating access by countries of the South to nuclear power through assistance in capacity building and infrastructure development consistent with international standards. It had hosted in October 2015 an INIR mission that had reported conclusively in February 2016 that Morocco’s legislative framework was consistent with international standards and that the country had made great strides in terms of nuclear knowledge, experience, best practices and HRD. An integrated action plan was in place.

247. Morocco commended the Agency for learning lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and urged it to continue to draw on related reports, on the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and on the Vienna Declaration in formulating strategies on nuclear and radiation safety and on transport and waste safety.

248. Morocco’s legislation and regulations were updated and strengthened constantly to meet its international nuclear safety and security commitments, and the Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Security Agency of Morocco (AMSSNuR) had accordingly been established as an independent, efficient, credible and transparent regulatory body. It had been tasked with developing and maintaining a sustainable national nuclear safety and security infrastructure consistent with the country’s international commitments, while building and maintaining public trust in the safety and security of nuclear applications and providing a platform for regional cooperation geared to knowledge sharing in Africa.

249. Morocco, which would host the last meeting of the Mediterranean radioactive material transport safety network in October 2016, had striven to promote a sound nuclear safety and security culture by holding workshops for national and international students and professionals; five of its universities were active members of INSEN, which it currently chaired. It would report to the International Conference on Nuclear Security on the *Gate to Africa* exercise, in which a response to an act of terrorism during the maritime transport of a radioactive source from a port in southern Spain to a port in northern Morocco had been simulated.

250. Welcoming the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM, which it had already ratified, Morocco called for its universalization in order to strengthen nuclear security worldwide. It noted that the Agency’s central role in strengthening the international nuclear security architecture, in coordinating nuclear security activities between international organizations and other international initiatives and in providing technical assistance at Member States’ request had been acknowledged during the NSS process.

251. Morocco had always encouraged action in favour of total disarmament, a nuclear-weapon-free world and a credible verification system under the auspices of the Agency. It had contributed to action taken to limit the proliferation of WMDs and called for the entry into force of the CTBT as a mainstay of the non-proliferation regime.

252. Morocco deplored the non-implementation of the resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and Israel’s continued refusal to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear installations and activities under the Agency’s safeguards, considering that Israel’s stance seriously impeded the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East and the advent of a just and lasting peace. It also deplored the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East and the lack of consensus on a final document at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Morocco commended Palestine for acceding to the NPT and for taking action to sign a CSA.

253. Morocco called on the Director General to take all steps to shed light on the question of Israeli nuclear capabilities and appealed to Member States to join in those efforts in furtherance of international peace and security for which all yearned. It also appealed to the international community to weigh seriously and fairly the concerns triggered by the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and stated its readiness to contribute to Agency-led efforts to establish an NWFZ there. In-depth reflection on the subject was of the essence on the eve of the first preparatory meeting of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, for the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, which must be seen to be just and universal in order to build trust among neighbouring States, was at stake.

254. Mr BADDOURA (Lebanon) said that his country had been beset by economic, political and security problems owing to years of violent conflict in the Middle East, which had become a breeding ground for an increasingly global and devastating form of terrorism that had triggered an unprecedented refugee crisis. The region was at risk of being torn apart and its people of being uprooted from their culture and consigned to oblivion.

255. Nevertheless, Lebanon remained proudly and steadfastly committed to membership of the Agency and all that membership entailed. It continued to participate in the Agency's activities and policy-making organs, to shape Agency policies as a Member of the Group of 77 and China, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group, and to honour its moral, material, financial and legal obligations to the Agency.

256. Projects implemented in close and transparent TC with the Agency had met health-care, agricultural and industrial needs, and Lebanon's competent authorities had striven to enhance legislation, standards and technical expertise in nuclear applications and to adopt the highest nuclear safety and security standards. It had regularly achieved a TC project implementation rate of nearly 100 per cent, owing to the Agency's guidance, field visits and cooperative staff. It commended the Agency for supporting projects implemented through ARASIA, which it currently chaired and strongly supported as a framework for regional cooperation. Lebanon called on the Agency to provide greater support for the implementation of ARASIA projects.

257. Lebanon commended the Agency for its cooperation on the implementation of the INSSP, which had covered the repatriation of radioactive and disused sources to the State of origin, the enhancement of physical protection at the building housing the Lebanese Atomic Energy Commission and the orphan source store, HRD for detecting and combating trafficking in radioactive material, the promotion of nuclear safety culture and the provision of training in information protection and security systems. Lebanon nonetheless recognized the need for additional steps to leverage the Agency's services fully, update its legislation, ratify specific conventions, uphold the absolute independence of its regulatory bodies, ensure openness to PACT and build human capacity in science.

258. Lebanon was fully aware that membership of organizations such as the Agency entailed not only rights and benefits but also obligations. Member States' failure to honour those obligations would undermine the Agency, its credibility and its activities. States were under an obligation to the Agency to provide it with the necessary budgetary resources in order to implement its major programmes and ensure that TCF resources were sufficient, assured and predictable inasmuch as TC was key to States' development for the benefit of their people.

259. It urged Member States to observe the Agency's standards and guidance and to cooperate with the Secretariat in upholding its independence, which entailed balanced geographical distribution of the staff and participation by all Member States in the policy-making organs, in particular the Board, under the principle of equality of States Members of international organizations.

260. Considering that it was ill advised to take a selective approach to, and interpret piecemeal, the Agency's founding principles and values, Lebanon called for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and

for the principle of non-proliferation to apply to all equally, noting that decades of experience had shown the contrary to be the case. The most glaring example was Israel's independently reported possession of at least 200 nuclear bombs, primed for use against the people of the region, clearly flouting the NPT, NPT Review Conference resolutions and the Agency's guiding principles. Lebanon regretted that certain influential States hypocritically fell silent whenever the matter of Israel's clandestine nuclear programmes was raised. The failure to hold Israel to account, ask questions and ensure transparency ran counter to international law and the NPT and seriously threatened the non-proliferation regime and nuclear safety and security in the embattled Middle East.

261. Lebanon welcomed the sincere political will and diplomacy that had prevailed in the quest for a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and the satisfactory outcome achieved. As that solution was being implemented successfully, Lebanon called for a similar approach to be taken in order to bring Israel to the negotiating table, establish an NWFZ in the Middle East and banish fear and tension for the people of the region.

262. Noting the importance of nuclear disarmament to all States committed to international safety, Lebanon was keenly interested in international initiatives to break the disarmament deadlock caused by certain States' non-observance of NPT provisions, NPT Review Conference resolutions and the practical steps approved in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Failure to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, States' continued development of nuclear weapons and their rejection of the 'no first use' principle seriously challenged the non-proliferation regime.

263. The safeguarded use of nuclear energy was important to establishing a good energy mix and it was therefore crucial that the Agency build on its services in that area and that States improve their nuclear safety arrangements continuously and independently of political or financial considerations in order to mitigate the risk of accidents and ensure sustained public confidence in nuclear power.

264. The various crises worldwide were mutually reinforcing and threatening human existence because States could not find bold cross-cutting solutions. The international organizations, led by the Agency, were ideally placed to restore balance to the world.

265. Mr THOMAS (European Atomic Energy Community), congratulating the Agency on its 60th anniversary, said that the Agency had played a comprehensive role in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and in advancing global nuclear safety and security. Cooperation between the two bodies had been of long standing and was well established.

266. In 2016, the European Commission and the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group had assessed the progress achieved in the implementation of action plans established by EU nuclear operators after the comprehensive stress tests conducted in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Under the new Nuclear Safety Directive that would enter into force in 2017, a topical peer review was required every six years for all EU NPPs and research reactors. National programmes and reports on spent fuel and radioactive waste management had been submitted to the Commission by each EU State pursuant to new EU legislation on radioactive waste management, and a report containing the Euratom Community's opinion thereon would be submitted to the Council and European Parliament later in 2016. Action had been taken to involve stakeholders, in particular civil society, in all nuclear safety activities in order to receive input, raise awareness and increase the effectiveness of measures taken.

267. Under the Energy Union Strategy, a new Nuclear Illustrative Programme, with emphasis on investments in post-Fukushima safety upgrades and the safe operation of existing facilities, had been adopted. The European Commission, which had cooperated closely with the Agency in implementing nuclear safety projects in non-EU States and had provided support under the Agency's TCP and IAEA

Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, had disbursed a further €3.5 million in 2016 for IAEA-implemented nuclear safety projects in non-EU States.

268. The JCPOA had provided a sound basis for cooperation with Iran on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the EU was accordingly contributing to its implementation through projects on nuclear safety and nuclear governance and through greater cooperation on nuclear research. It called for continued efforts to implement the Vienna Declaration in full.

269. The Euratom Community welcomed the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM, which it, too, had ratified. It considered the forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security to be of paramount importance. The EU had participated and contributed actively to the NSS process and planned to remain engaged in that area.

270. In implementing safeguards in the EU, the European Commission had relied on its strong mandate, as enshrined in the Euratom Treaty, and had cooperated closely with the Agency. It would continue its well-established safeguards approach and would place particular emphasis on efficiency gains through closer internal collaboration and knowledge sharing. The Euratom Community continued to provide technical support for IAEA safeguards under the EU's cooperative support programme.

271. EPR was a priority both for the Agency and for the Euratom Community, necessitating greater cross-border cooperation within the EU. Workshops would be held and dialogue with civil society would be intensified in preparation for the implementation of the BSS Directive.

272. The EU supported the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the advancement of nuclear science in fields such as medicine, industry and technology; a bilateral agreement with the Agency on technical collaboration under those heads was being finalized. An international conference on the challenges faced in those areas would be held in early 2017, and an EU strategic agenda for medical and industrial research on nuclear and radiation technology was being drawn up.

273. The research and training programme for 2014–2018 covered nuclear safety, security, standardization and radiation protection, for which €315 million had been budgeted. The Euratom Community played a leading role in ITER — the way to new energy, which promoted fusion as a sustainable and secure source of energy. It had demonstrated consistent leadership in fusion energy and was hosting the ITER site at which the first Tokamak reactor was being constructed. It had made, with its six international partners, intensive efforts to ensure that the project delivered on First Plasma.

274. As nuclear safety, security and safeguards were matters of concern to the entire international community, including States that did not use nuclear power, the Euratom Community called for close cooperation in order to resolve the relevant issues on which a common understanding was essential, particularly in regard to new builds and to installations for which lifetime extensions had been granted. It called for full advantage to be taken of the Agency's 60 years of accumulated experience and continuous contribution to developing nuclear power safely and sustainably.

275. Mr MAHJOUB (Arab Atomic Energy Agency) said that the AAEA had made great efforts to develop peaceful nuclear applications in its 15 Member States and to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation on S&T in order to address social and economic issues in developing countries, such as the Arab States. It had met some of its objectives, including HRD through training, workshops, symposia, study groups and conferences.

276. Seven years previously, the AAEA had begun to implement the strategy approved at the 2009 Arab Summit for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy until 2020, with emphasis on regional and international cooperation, including with international organizations. The Agency had provided valuable material and technical support to the AAEA to that end and had been an excellent partner in

the conduct of joint activities. The cooperation programme for 2017 was being finalized. The AAEA hoped that developed countries would similarly assist the Arab States in training and capacity building and it would consider all avenues of cooperation.

277. Some Arab States had made plans to build NPPs on account of their high power output, oil and gas price fluctuations and the need to use those resources sensibly to preserve them for future generations. The Arab States required support from the Agency and countries with developed nuclear industries in order to extend nuclear applications to health care, industry, agriculture, environmental protection and water resource management. As the shortage of potable water in the arid conditions prevailing in the Arab States could be addressed by using nuclear energy, the AAEA had held regular conferences and meetings to explore the strategic use of nuclear energy for power generation and seawater desalination.

278. The AAEA hoped that greater interest in nuclear safety and security worldwide, in reactor design in particular, would lead to the highest standards of quality and safety in the next generation of reactors, which would allay public fear of nuclear energy and promote nuclear applications for the development and betterment of humanity.

279. Recognizing the importance of regulating nuclear and radiation-related activities, the AAEA had made efforts to bolster the Arab States' regulatory authorities, preserve their independence and provide them with the necessary material and human resources. The AAEA had collaborated with the Agency in establishing the ANNuR, which was a platform for the exchange of experience, lessons learned and good practices, for regulatory capacity building, the drafting of nuclear and radiation legislation and the establishment of emergency preparedness and regulatory systems; it had become an important part of the GNSSN.

280. The AAEA commended the Republic of Korea for assisting the Arab States in human capacity building in nuclear and radiation regulation. It also commended the USA and the EU for supporting ANNuR and for their commitment to implementing joint programmes. It commended China for providing invaluable and much needed assistance and expertise and for collaborating with the AAEA in drawing up a joint programme to strengthen relations between the Arab States and China.

281. From 2006 to 2010, the AAEA had implemented training programmes and had held expert meetings and conferences on peaceful applications of nuclear energy in industry, agriculture and health care in close cooperation with the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, the Agency and other international organizations. Such activities had laid the groundwork for the Arab States' acquisition of nuclear knowledge and techniques and had strengthened infrastructure for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

282. Some 3800 trainees from AAEA Member States and non-Members had attended the 68 training courses, 50 workshops, 15 scientific visits and 28 technical meetings conducted in the preceding seven years, while 51 Arab experts had been sent on mission and approximately 200 experts from the Agency and supporting countries had been received.

283. The AAEA distributed its quarterly journal on the role of the atom in development to specialist bodies, translated books and guidance on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and held a biennial Arab conference on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, at which some 200 Arab researchers, academics and students presented their research. It occasionally held a forum on the outlook for power generation and seawater desalination in order to facilitate discussion among experts and decision makers from Arab States on the potential for nuclear energy to meet growing demands and to facilitate the exchange of information and expertise in those areas.

284. As Israel's nuclear capabilities posed a clear and present danger to the States in the Middle East, pressure must be brought to bear on Israel to place all of its facilities under Agency safeguards, to accede to all non-proliferation agreements and to embark on the path of peace and security. The Arab States remained fully committed to the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, as in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Accordingly, the AAEA called on all States in the Middle East to take the necessary steps to establish such a zone and to undertake to build confidence and peace.

The meeting rose at 8.20 p.m.