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President: Ms ŽIAKOVÁ (Slovakia)

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Abbreviations used in this record

AAEA	Arab Atomic Energy Agency
ABACC	Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEANTOM	ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy
CNS	Convention on Nuclear Safety
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ENSREG	European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FORO	Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies
GDP	gross domestic product
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova
HEU	high enriched uranium
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
LEU	low enriched uranium
NPP	nuclear power plant

Abbreviations used in this record (continued)

NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSF	Nuclear Security Fund
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
RSA	Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEANWFZ Treaty	Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
SQP	small quantities protocol
TC	technical cooperation
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WMDs	weapons of mass destruction

6. General debate and Annual Report for 2017 (continued) (GC(62)/3 and additional information)

1. Mr LWIN (Myanmar) expressed support for the Agency's valuable contribution to the SDGs, particularly through its TC programme. As a developing country, Myanmar benefitted significantly from the training activities conducted under the TC programme in high-priority sectors ranging from human health and livestock production to nuclear science and technology, radiation safety, environmental monitoring and industrial applications of radioisotopes.
2. To ensure the continued effectiveness of those activities, the Agency had provided support to enhance capacity building, particularly in the areas of cancer care and isotope hydrology in water resource management, and to establish a secondary standards dosimetry laboratory. The Agency's support for his country's national and regional TC programmes was thus making a tangible contribution to its socio-economic development.
3. Under its 2020–2021 national TC programme, Myanmar would focus on establishing a gamma irradiation facility, on building capacities in the area of radiotherapy and running its secondary standards dosimetry laboratory, and on transboundary animal and zoonotic diseases, isotope hydrology for water resources management, and marine environmental radiation monitoring.
4. Myanmar had been fulfilling its obligations and commitments as a responsible Member State, and would continue to contribute to the Regular Budget and the TCF. In July 2018, it had hosted a regional coordination meeting on improving sustainable cotton production through enhanced resilience to climate change. His country looked forward to more such collaboration in the future, which strengthened relations between itself and the Agency.
5. Myanmar strongly supported the Agency's priorities of further strengthening nuclear and radiation safety and emergency preparedness and response, and revising safety standards, so as to minimize the impact of nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies. The development of nuclear safety standards, guidelines and peer review and advisory services assisted Member States in enhancing their capabilities. Myanmar commended the Agency's hard work in building a high-level global nuclear safety and security system. While nuclear safety was the responsibility of individual States, international cooperation would benefit the global nuclear security regime. As a Contracting Party to the CNS and State Party to the CPPNM and its Amendment, Myanmar would further continue to cooperate with the Agency and contribute to global nuclear security.
6. He reaffirmed his country's support for Agency efforts to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism, strengthen measures to detect nuclear trafficking, respond to nuclear security incidents and promote nuclear security education. The e-learning courses on nuclear security provided by the Agency had introduced principles based on the Agency's recommendations and guidance, strengthening Myanmar's capacity in that area.
7. To ensure that nuclear energy was used peacefully and securely, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be achieved on a global scale. In that connection, Myanmar would sign and accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at the related event to be held during the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly.
8. Myanmar was party to the SEANWFZ Treaty and the CTBT, and had concluded a safeguards agreement, an additional protocol and an SQP. In addition, a national nuclear law on safety, security and

safeguards, currently undergoing parliamentary review, was intended to increase the momentum of his country's efforts to pursue its nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament goals.

9. Mr DILEITA (Djibouti) expressed appreciation for the Agency's noble efforts in continuing to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the cause of sustainable development and global peace. In that respect, he welcomed in particular the progress made on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

10. Since becoming a Member State of the Agency in 2015, Djibouti had worked ceaselessly, with the Agency's assistance, to establish the institutional structures and framework required to coordinate joint actions, in particular by strengthening human resource capacities in vital areas such as agriculture, human health, water resources management and the national regulatory authority.

11. Djibouti's CPF assigned priority to strengthening the analytical capacities of its chemistry laboratory, managing radioactive waste and establishing an oncology centre. He expressed particular appreciation to the Secretariat for its support in strengthening his country's institutional, human and technological capacities.

12. As Djibouti was a new Member State, the national committee responsible for monitoring activities with the Agency had visited Morocco in June 2018, in the context of South-South cooperation. Committee representatives had met managers of effectively functioning Moroccan facilities and had explored the prospects for collaboration and partnership with various Moroccan institutions and centres. He thanked Morocco for its willingness to assist his country in strengthening its national scientific research and nuclear technical capacities.

13. Being located on the Bab al Mandab strait, the fourth busiest waterway in the world, Djibouti fully shared the concerns of the regional and international maritime communities regarding the rise in maritime piracy since 2008 in the adjacent Gulf of Aden. Also aware of the risks posed to international security by nuclear terrorism and trafficking in radioactive substances, Djibouti had played its part in strengthening the international nuclear safety and security regime.

14. His country reaffirmed its full support for the ideals of peace and development espoused by the Agency, and would spare no effort in further developing their already excellent cooperation; it was also committed to working towards global peace and stability alongside the international community. In that regard, he welcomed the peace and reconciliation efforts being undertaken in South Sudan and between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and his country and Eritrea.

15. Mr FARAONE MACHADO (Uruguay) said that, as a country located in the world's first NWFZ, established by the Tlatelolco Treaty, and as a State Party to the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Uruguay supported the inalienable right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within the cooperation framework established by the Agency pursuant to its Statute. He reaffirmed his country's unwavering commitment to strengthening global and universal disarmament and the non-proliferation regime. Uruguay's adherence to the multilateral regulatory framework reflected a foreign policy that prioritized and promoted the need to continue making progress on negotiations aimed at ensuring general and complete disarmament under a strict international regime.

16. He urged more countries to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in order to enable its entry into force and turn it into a milestone for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and an instrument for international peace and security.

17. Uruguay encouraged all Member States to comply fully with their arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. It was necessary to strengthen disarmament verification mechanisms and safeguards together in order to effectively address the threats posed by proliferation. Uruguay had concluded an additional protocol as a statement of its commitment to preventing nuclear material from

being used for non-peaceful purposes or from falling into the hands of terrorists. The effective control of nuclear proliferation required greater cooperation between States to combat trafficking by non-State actors in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their delivery systems and related material at all levels worldwide.

18. Uruguay supported the creation of NWFZs throughout the world as an effective means of achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and attached absolute priority to the maintenance of both regional and international peace and security. On the basis of those fundamental principles, his country continued to participate in the Agency's activities. Having been a member of the Board of Governors for the period 2015–2017, it had submitted its candidacy for the period 2019–2021.

19. Uruguay welcomed the recent approval by consensus of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2018–2021, and the progress made in the implementation of the relevant legal instruments, particularly the entry into force of the CPPNM Amendment in 2016.

20. His country faithfully applied its international agreements and attached great importance to radiation safety and protection. It had an independent regulatory authority responsible for monitoring all types of ionizing radiation equipment and, with the support of the Agency and other international organizations, workshops had been conducted on the topics of radiotherapy, quality management, radiological emergencies and regulatory review. Uruguay had approved a national strategy for the safe management of radioactive waste, reviewed its basic radiation protection regulations, developed a process management manual for approval by the Council of Ministers, and revised its radiological emergency plan. He commended the work of FORO to maintain radiation and nuclear safety and security at the highest level throughout the Ibero-American region.

21. Uruguay had benefitted from numerous national and regional projects under the Agency's TC programme. The Agency had provided support in vital areas such as regulatory infrastructure and training in security, inspections, radioactive waste, medical applications and the use of new equipment and supporting technologies. Uruguay used ionizing radiation for the diagnosis and treatment of cancers, and in X-rays. It had acceded to the CPPNM and its Amendment, and adhered to the recommendations contained in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

22. Uruguay had implemented various TC projects under ARCAL and was committed to additional regional and subregional projects, particularly in the areas of nuclear medicine, quality control of food and dairy production. In view of the requirements of Latin American and Caribbean States in the areas of food security, agriculture, human health, the environment, energy, radiation technology and radiation safety, and given that insufficient funds were allocated to those areas, his country believed that the resources of the TCF should not have to depend on voluntary contributions; rather, they must be sufficient, assured and predictable in order to achieve the proposed objectives.

23. It was therefore also important that measures to strengthen nuclear security did not obstruct international cooperation. Given the limitations of the Regular Budget, the Agency's growing activities in the area of nuclear security should be funded primarily from the NSF, thus maintaining a balance between the Agency's promotional and non-promotional activities.

24. Mr APOSTOL (Republic of Moldova) said that, as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT, Moldova was convinced that the NPT remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The application of safeguards by all Member States was a prerequisite for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and, in the longer term, a precondition for nuclear disarmament. His country thus supported the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East as a strategic instrument to strengthen peace and stability worldwide. He called on the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and to cooperate promptly with the Agency in implementing the NPT and Agency safeguards.

25. Moldova recognized the growing threat that terrorism presented to nuclear material and installations. In that regard, it welcomed the Nuclear Security Plan for 2018–2021 as a step in the right direction that provided a road map for assisting Member States to review their nuclear security standards.

26. To increase its capacity to prevent and combat the illicit trafficking of nuclear material, Moldova was establishing a national nuclear forensics laboratory as part of a regional nuclear forensics network. The facility would be used to analyse and characterize seized nuclear and radioactive material. A pilot training course on applying existing capabilities to a nuclear forensics investigation would be conducted in Moldova in early October 2018 with the valuable support of the United States National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence.

27. In recent years, with the assistance of the OSCE, the United States Department of Energy and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, Moldova had regained regulatory control over significant numbers of radioactive sources from abandoned facilities, most of which were located in the territory of Transnistria. It had ambitious plans to take further measures to recover orphan sources in close cooperation with the Agency.

28. Moldova's CPF, which identified priority areas and national development goals, would shortly be approved. In close cooperation with the Agency's Department of Technical Cooperation, Moldova had taken significant steps towards strengthening the capacity of its health care institutions to implement new technologies in nuclear medicine, radiodiagnostics and radiotherapy, reducing the impact of radon on human health, and managing radioactive waste.

29. In December 2018, the Agency would be conducting an IRRS mission at the request of Moldova. The resulting recommendations would serve as a road map for the further development of the country's regulatory framework. Moldova appreciated the Agency's continuous efforts to support Member States in implementing projects to increase the safety and security of radioactive waste. Actions to decommission and refurbish the Moldovan national radioactive waste disposal facility were set out in its action plan to implement the new national strategy on radioactive waste management for the period 2017–2026, approved by Parliament in 2017.

30. Moldova supported the Agency's efforts to build capacities in Member States through education and staff training and had recently hosted the Agency's Regional Workshop on Processing of Radioactive Waste from Decommissioning. Given the importance of that issue for countries in the region, a scientific conference on regional challenges and perspectives in radioactive waste management and decommissioning issues had been held in September 2018 and attended by experts from 22 European countries, the Agency and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The organization of annual regional conferences on radioactive waste management issues was among the main proposals agreed by the conference participants.

31. Moldova strongly supported various bilateral and regional cooperation initiatives, including the European and Central Asian Safety Network, the regional nuclear forensics network and GUAM. He expressed his country's gratitude to the Agency, the United States Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Defense, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and the EU for the support they had provided in that regard.

32. Mr MPAY (Cameroon) said that the Agency's activities in the areas of safeguards and the safety and security of nuclear facilities and radioactive sources clearly demonstrated its commitment to fulfilling its mandate.

In recent years, Cameroon had made significant strides in supporting the Agency's overarching objectives in those areas, having ratified an additional protocol and the CPPNM Amendment.

33. Cameroon had undertaken to review its legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear safety and security and safeguards implementation in order to bring it into line with international legal instruments and the provisions of the conventions to which it was party. That reflected its ongoing commitment to achieving improvement consistent with the international consensus. In that regard, he expressed his country's sincere appreciation for the technical assistance provided by the Agency.

34. He noted with satisfaction that the various reports presented by the Secretariat had made clear the international context that had given rise to the Member State requirements and regional priorities reflected in the Agency's TC programme.

35. Cameroon had contributed to the implementation of Agency programmes by hosting such events as a regional course for nuclear regulatory bodies on the authorization and inspection of ionizing radiation sources in March and April 2017, attended by 18 participants from 9 African countries, and a regional training course on individual monitoring of external exposure in November 2017, attended by 28 representatives of 20 African countries. Cameroon also appreciated the assistance provided by the Agency in organizing and implementing national capacity-building activities, including a training course for first responders in the event of a radiological emergency, organized by the National Radiation Protection Agency in May 2017.

36. Cameroon was a member of AFRA and the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa, and was party to the Pelindaba Treaty. He called on the Agency to support all such regional mechanisms and actively involve them in the implementation of its programme in Africa.

37. His country attached great importance to nuclear security, particularly as it was preparing to host the 2019 Africa Cup of Nations. Reiterating Cameroon's appreciation to the Agency for the support it had provided in implementing nuclear security measures during the Africa Women Cup of Nations in 2016, he requested further Agency assistance in the context of the 2019 tournament.

38. He expressed his country's hope that the international community and donors would continue to provide support to the regional bodies that promoted and regulated nuclear activities.

39. Cameroon recognized the unique role of the Agency in strengthening the international nuclear safety and security regime and reaffirmed its confidence in the Agency's pursuit of its mission to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of all.

40. Mr PHOMMAVONGSA (Lao People's Democratic Republic) said that, given the ever-increasing use of nuclear energy in a large number of fields, and the various ongoing conflicts that threatened international peace and security, the Agency had a particularly important role to play in ensuring that it was used solely for peaceful purposes, in an effective and secure manner.

41. As a strong supporter of a nuclear-weapon-free world, his country firmly believed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. Moreover, nuclear disarmament should go hand in hand with nuclear non-proliferation. He looked forward to the entry into force of the CTBT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which he hoped would contribute significantly to the international community's efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world.

42. Since joining the Agency in 2011, Lao People's Democratic Republic had continuously underlined the importance of the Agency's promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear technology as an important factor in achieving the SDGs and his country's own socioeconomic development plan. He reiterated its strong commitment to supporting the Agency in those efforts.

43. Given that nuclear technology was a relatively new area for his country, much work remained to be done. It had concluded an RSA in 2014 and become party to the RCA in 2015, resulting in close and effective cooperation with the Agency and countries within the region and beyond.

44. Lao People's Democratic Republic had also been enhancing its national capacities through a number of projects within the Agency's TC framework. Its first CPF, covering the years 2014–2018, identified nuclear technology transfer and technical cooperation as priorities for national development, and various projects had been implemented in the areas of agriculture, health care, energy and water resources.

45. The Agency's assistance to his country had also focused on training professionals in order to strengthen national capacity. For example, the Agency had provided laboratory equipment to the National University of Laos while also offering staff opportunities to take part in meetings, workshops, training courses and educational programmes. Most importantly, numerous Agency missions had been deployed to work closely with local authorities in his country to ensure effective project implementation.

46. The CPF for 2014–2018 had now been successfully implemented and a new CPF for 2019–2023 was being prepared, to ensure continued cooperation with the Agency. Furthermore, Lao People's Democratic Republic was in the process of finalizing a law on radiation protection and safety and had consulted with Agency experts to ensure that it met international requirements.

47. Mr SAICHEUA (Thailand) said that his country recognized the challenges that the Agency faced in its monitoring and verification work in the years ahead.

48. With regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran, his country supported the preservation of the JCPOA, which demonstrated that diplomacy could be used to resolve complex nuclear non-proliferation issues, and commended the Agency's monitoring and verification role thereunder.

49. Thailand welcomed the recent positive developments on the Korean Peninsula and encouraged all interested parties to continue their diplomatic efforts and constructive dialogue to ensure its eventual complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.

50. During 2018, Thailand had made remarkable progress in meeting its international obligations and commitments, by ratifying and acceding to the CPPNM Amendment, the CNS and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. After concluding an additional protocol in November 2017, his country had received its first Agency inspector on a complementary access visit, thus demonstrating its willingness to fully cooperate and show transparency in its nuclear activities.

51. In the area of nuclear security, his country had approved an INSSP with the Agency in April 2018. It was also working to conclude a practical arrangement on nuclear forensics with the Agency, which would serve as a basis for Thailand to extend assistance and cooperation to interested countries in the region. Nuclear applications were an essential component of the programmes aimed at improving the quality of life and general well-being of people and the environment in Thailand. His country therefore appreciated the Agency's trust in designating the Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology as a Collaborating Centre on water resources assessment and management and looked forward to further collaboration in other areas.

52. His country's close relationship with the Agency, particularly through the TC programme, was highly valued. Thailand was not just a recipient but had also hosted 19 Agency capacity-building activities in 2018, on topics such as the sterile insect technique, cancer control, nuclear safety and radiation technology.

53. Regional and subregional cooperation was key to advancing the Agency's developmental work. Thailand stood ready to share its expertise in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology with its immediate neighbours, working with the Agency through trilateral cooperation. On assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2019, Thailand would work closely with the Agency, and looked forward to the formalization of ASEAN–Agency relations, in which ASEANTOM would play an instrumental role.

54. Thailand was firmly committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Agency's Statute and the NPT, and would continue to work closely and constructively with the Secretariat, other Member States and partners towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Noting that the current week marked the first anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, he said that Thailand supported the Treaty and looked forward to its early entry into force, whereupon the Agency would undoubtedly play a significant role in its implementation.

55. In closing, he expressed his country's sincere appreciation to the members of the South East Asia and the Pacific Group for nominating it to serve on the Board of Governors for the period 2018–2020. Thailand was ready to assume that responsibility to ensure the continued progress of the Agency's work.

56. Ms STIX-HACKL (Austria) said that since the adoption of the NPT, the Agency had played a crucial role in verifying its implementation. A careful balance between the two mutually reinforcing objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament lay at the heart of that fundamental Treaty.

57. Unfortunately, insufficient progress had been made on disarmament. It was regrettable that existing commitments had not been fulfilled and were being called into question by the words and actions of certain States. It was therefore more urgent than ever to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which Austria had ratified in May 2018, did exactly that. In particular, the new Treaty strengthened and complemented the NPT by providing a legal pathway for the full implementation of Article VI of the NPT and by strengthening the Agency's safeguards system. It reaffirmed the safeguards standard enshrined in Article III of the NPT, obliged States that had already implemented a higher standard to maintain it and encouraged all States to increase their commitment to safeguards. She therefore welcomed the fact that 60 States had signed and 15 States had ratified the new Treaty, and called on all other States to do likewise.

58. Her country's opposition to nuclear power on a global scale remained unchanged: the risk of accidents and their impact on public health and the environment, as well as the unresolved problem of radioactive waste disposal, led Austria to believe that nuclear power was not a viable option for combatting climate change or achieving the SDGs. Austria therefore advocated the phasing-out of nuclear power, the promotion of the use of renewable energy and the enhancement of global energy efficiency and savings. States that nonetheless chose to use nuclear power must implement and continuously improve the highest levels of nuclear safety, security and safeguards, particularly by comprehensively implementing the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety. The Agency could play a crucial role in assisting States in that endeavour.

59. Austria would continue to lend its full support to the Agency and greatly appreciated its outstanding work, and thus would make its full financial contribution to the Agency's TC programme in 2019.

60. Mr EL GHOUL (Palestine) welcomed the vigorous action taken by the Agency to build Palestine's human and infrastructural capacities. The Agency had granted its approval, in principle, for a number of strategic projects for the 2018–2019 cycle, including for the development of the regulatory infrastructure to support the safe and secure use of nuclear energy. Another key project was the establishment of nuclear medical facilities at Khalid al-Hassan hospital for oncology and bone marrow

transplantation. That was high priority because a large portion of the country's GDP was currently allocated to funding medical treatment abroad for patients suffering from cancer and chronic diseases.

61. A large number of national TC projects in the areas of radiation protection, agriculture, medicine and the environment had proved highly successful. Palestine would shortly acquire genetically modified wheat seeds produced by the Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration with Agency laboratories. Other projects addressed radiation monitoring, legislation on the safe use of nuclear energy, groundwater management through nuclear technology, fodder improvement by means of specialized laboratories, and the reduction and prevention of soil erosion. Palestine hoped to implement additional projects in the near future, in areas such as improvement of strategic agricultural products, production of a national radiation map and improvement of children's nutrition.

62. Palestine had acceded to the NPT in early 2015 and had participated in the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference. In March 2018 the Board of Governors had approved a CSA between the State of Palestine and the Agency. Palestine was fully committed to close cooperation on its implementation as soon as the CSA was signed. It also attached great importance to the universalization of the NPT and had participated for decades as an observer State in previous NPT Review Conferences.

63. Given its strong support for all international initiatives aimed at bolstering international and regional peace, safety and security, Palestine underscored the importance of ridding the world of nuclear weapons and other WMDs. It had been one of the first signatories of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in September 2017 and had ratified it in March 2018.

64. Palestine was still occupied by a State that possessed nuclear facilities not subject to a CSA, and which possessed a large nuclear arsenal that posed a direct threat to the safety and security of the people of Palestine, the region and the world as a whole.

65. Palestine was seriously concerned at Israel's growing military nuclear capability and its continued rejection of all calls to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear programmes and facilities under comprehensive safeguards, like all other States in the region had. The denial by some nuclear powers of Israel's military nuclear capability was unacceptable and contradicted by the reality of its hostile behaviour in Palestine and elsewhere. Israel's indiscriminate military assaults on the people of Palestine seriously undermined the contention that it was a responsible State and posed no threat.

66. Palestine regretted that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East, which had been called for in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, had not been convened in 2012, despite the efforts and flexibility of the Arab States. Palestine considered that the five nuclear powers and the States organizing the conference were duty-bound to persevere with their efforts to universalize the NPT and to expedite the establishment of such a zone.

67. In view of the deferral of the 2012 conference, the failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference because certain States had insisted on Israel's exemption from accountability in international forums, and the actions taken to thwart the adoption of a resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities at past sessions of the General Conference, it was essential for the Arab States to conduct a comprehensive review of their nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policies to ensure that the international community shouldered its legal and moral responsibilities and put an end to the policy of double standards.

68. In view of the Agency's key role in promoting the non-proliferation regime and the application of safeguards, retention of the item on Israeli nuclear capabilities on the agenda of the Policy-Making Organs reflected an additional Arab diplomatic effort to prevent Israel from flouting the non-

proliferation regime and from disregarding the relevant UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

69. Mr THOMAS (European Atomic Energy Community) welcomed the comprehensive role played by the Agency in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and other radiation technologies and expressed appreciation for the long and well-established cooperation between the Agency and Euratom.

70. Nuclear safety in the EU was anchored in the principles of meeting the highest standards and aiming for continuous improvement. The EU had given legal force to the objectives of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety through its amended Nuclear Safety Directive, which introduced the objective of preventing accidents and avoiding significant radioactive releases and incorporated topical peer reviews into Euratom law. An initial European topical peer review had been conducted, the findings of which focused on ageing management of key structures and components in NPPs and research reactors. The European Commission, in cooperation with ENSREG, would ensure the implementation and follow-up of recommendations resulting from the review.

71. With regard to ensuring and improving nuclear safety, a key lesson learned from the recent ruthenium release over Europe had been the need to carefully analyse any incident, however insignificant its effects might seem. Only by understanding the causes of accidental releases and by learning lessons and strengthening regulatory frameworks accordingly would future accidents be prevented and public trust in the nuclear safety system sustained.

72. The long-term, safe management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, including decommissioning and the financial aspects of the back-end of the fuel cycle, required increasingly close attention. The European Commission, along with the Agency and other partners, was supporting the implementation of the Strategic Master Plan for Environmental Remediation of Uranium Legacy Sites in Central Asia, which it called on Member States to join. A donors' conference would be organized in London in November 2018.

73. The European Commission attached great importance to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and deeply regretted the withdrawal of the United States of America from that plan. Ongoing support for civil nuclear cooperation contributed to building long-term confidence and increased transparency as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. However, the Commission's support for the Islamic Republic of Iran was based not only on confidence, but also on evidence that the country was respecting its obligations under the JCPOA. The framework for cooperation between the EU and Iran had been set out in high-level seminars on international nuclear cooperation and governance, the third of which would be taking place in Brussels in late November 2018. EU projects provided support to the Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority and its nuclear operator, including through a feasibility study on the planned Nuclear Safety Centre and stress tests at Bushehr NPP. The cost of ongoing EU intervention in the implementation of civil nuclear cooperation in Iran currently stood at €10 million, and further activities were in the pipeline.

74. The European Commission was paying particular attention to the preparations for the first review conference of States Parties to the CPPNM Amendment. It had continued its collaboration with the Agency in the fields of nuclear material detection, nuclear forensics and training of front-line officers. The EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence continued to operate on a regional basis. The EU was committed to minimizing the use of HEU for civil purposes and significant quantities of HEU had been shipped to the USA for down-blending. The medical radioisotope processing facility at Petten, in the Netherlands, had been converted from HEU to LEU and other facilities were following suit.

75. The European Commission cooperated closely with the Agency in implementing nuclear safeguards in the EU and welcomed the Agency's successful work to update State-level approaches

applied in the EU. It also cooperated with the Agency outside Europe. Euratom provided expert and technical support to Agency safeguards activities through the European Commission Cooperative Support Programme.

76. Technical collaboration with the Agency on nuclear power applications had developed rapidly over the previous year. The EU continued to support the advancement of nuclear and radiation sciences and technology in various fields including medicine, industry and research, and was developing a strategic agenda for medical, industrial and research applications of nuclear and radiation technology. Under the Euratom Research and Training Programme for 2021–2027, an overall budgetary envelope of €2.4 billion had been allocated for nuclear fusion and nuclear fission, safety and radiation protection. Together with France, the EU continued to play a leading role in the ITER project. The European Commission had recently accepted a European contribution of €6.07 billion to the project for the period 2021–2027.

77. Mr ANDERSON MACHADO (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) recalled that Latin America and the Caribbean had been the first region to commit to using nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes and to declare itself free of nuclear weapons through an international legal instrument, namely the Tlatelolco Treaty. That Treaty had inspired four more regions to legally prohibit nuclear weapons. NWFZs were now a key element in the multilateral approach to issues related to non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was important to highlight the legal nature and political reality of NWFZs, which currently covered 116 countries. Of the five treaties that had established NWFZs, the Tlatelolco Treaty was the only one to have founded an international organization, namely OPANAL.

78. It was important to bear in mind the dual role of OPANAL. Firstly, it ensured the functioning of the control system established by the Tlatelolco Treaty to ensure that the zone remained effectively and verifiably free of nuclear weapons. Pursuant to Article 14 of the Treaty, the Contracting Parties had to submit to OPANAL six-monthly reports stating that no prohibited activity had occurred in their respective territories. Secondly, OPANAL was a political intergovernmental organization whose Member States regularly engaged in consultations on the aims, measures and processes established by the Treaty.

79. The effectiveness of the Tlatelolco Treaty was thus ensured by continuous contact and coordination between Contracting Parties through OPANAL. However, the control system, which ensured the compliance of the Parties with their obligations, could not be effective without the Agency's participation. Articles 13 to 18 of the Treaty therefore recognized the important role played by the Agency.

80. Pursuant to the Treaty, all 33 Contracting Parties had concluded safeguards agreements with the Agency, and the Agency was authorized to conduct special inspections at the request of any Contracting Party, with the involvement of the Secretary-General and subject to the approval of the Council of OPANAL. In October 1972, OPANAL and the Agency had signed a cooperation agreement.

81. To ensure that the zone remained free of nuclear weapons, it was vital for the nuclear-weapon States to assume legal obligations respecting it. It was also crucial for extra-regional States that possessed, de jure or de facto, territories inside the zone to respect its status of military denuclearization. That was the objective of the two protocols additional to the Tlatelolco Treaty, which had been ratified by all States eligible to sign them. However, some of those States had made interpretive declarations constituting reservations that reduced the effectiveness of the NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean. Such declarations had long given cause for concern, and OPANAL was now addressing the problem by proposing modifications to those States with a view to clarifying their reservations and achieving mutual understanding.

82. The States of the Latin America and Caribbean region would remain committed to strengthening the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and looked forward to maintaining the strong relationship between OPANAL and the Agency.

83. Mr SARAIVA MARZO (Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) said that ABACC was the only bilateral agency for nuclear safeguards in the world. Its mission was to verify that Argentina and Brazil were complying with their commitments under the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. That mission required the conclusions on the verification of nuclear materials in all the facilities of both countries to be independent, highly credible and based on solid technical activities.

84. Given that ABACC's annual budget of approximately US \$5 million had remained virtually unchanged for the past three years, the search for efficiency was an ongoing concern. In 2017, priority had also been given to the training of ABACC inspectors, the updating and increased use of equipment and technologies for measuring nuclear material and containment and surveillance systems, and the introduction of new verification procedures that reduced inspection efforts without reducing effectiveness.

85. In 2017, ABACC had conducted 99 inspections at nuclear facilities in both countries and 20 technical missions for the installation and maintenance of measurement, containment and surveillance systems. An average of four inspectors a day were conducting inspection missions. On the basis of its verification activities, ABACC could confirm that in 2017, Argentina and Brazil had complied with their basic commitments regarding the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

86. The nuclear activities of Argentina and Brazil continued to grow steadily. ABACC faced important challenges in the near future, some of which were similar to those that it had successfully faced more than 25 years previously when first managing the safeguards verification approaches of sensitive facilities in the two countries. ABACC was ready to respond to those challenges by exploring and proposing mechanisms and concepts for the development of suitable verification approaches for new nuclear facilities, including modular reactors and reactors for radioisotope production.

87. In closing, he emphasized that Argentina and Brazil remained committed to and supportive of ABACC's activities, and to providing the human and financial resources that allowed its effective operation. He was pleased to announce that Ms Elena Maceiras had been appointed Argentine Secretary of ABACC in September 2018, and was the first woman to occupy that position.

88. Mr HAMDI (Arab Atomic Energy Agency) said that the AAEA, which had 15 member States, undertook activities in 22 member States of the Arab League aimed at developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It promoted bilateral and multilateral scientific cooperation in support of economic and social development and had succeeded in developing human resources by means of training courses, workshops, seminars, study groups and conferences.

89. Nine years previously, the AAEA had begun to implement a strategy for peaceful uses of nuclear energy until 2020, with emphasis on international and regional cooperation, including with international organizations. The Agency had provided valuable technical and financial support to the AAEA and had been an excellent partner in the conduct of joint activities. The cooperation programme for 2019 was currently being finalized.

90. As the Arab States, which were located in both Africa and Asia, shared the same language, culture and history, they could be treated as a single regional group in terms of the Agency's TC projects. Eleven Arab States based in the two continents had submitted a project concept under the Agency's TC programme for 2020–2021 entitled on an Arab environmental radiation monitoring and early warning

network. The aim was to develop such networks in the Arab States in order to address any accidents occurring internally or abroad and resulting in environmental radiation pollution and threats to the local population from ionizing radiation, and to enhance preparedness for an effective response to radiation and nuclear emergencies.

91. The AAEA hoped that developed countries would further assist the Arab States in training and capacity building for peaceful uses of nuclear energy; it would cooperate fully with such initiatives.

92. Some Arab States were planning to build NPPs on account of their high power output and the need to circumvent oil and gas price fluctuations and use such resources sensibly in order to preserve the rights of future generations. The Arab States also required scientific and technical support from the Agency and countries with developed nuclear industries to extend nuclear applications to health care, industry, agriculture, the environment, water resource management and livestock development.

93. As most Arab States were located in desert areas beset by shortages of safe drinking water, nuclear energy could play an important role in ensuring a reliable supply of electricity and water. The AAEA therefore held regular conferences to explore the strategic use of nuclear energy for power generation and seawater desalination.

94. Recognizing the importance of regulating all nuclear and radiation-related activities, the AAEA endeavoured to develop the infrastructure of Arab States' regulatory authorities so that they were independent, efficient and equipped with the necessary human and financial resources. The AAEA had collaborated with the Agency in establishing the Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators, a platform for exchanges of experience, lessons learned and sound practices among regulatory authority staff, for regulatory capacity building, for the development of nuclear and radiation legislation, and for the establishment of emergency preparedness and response systems. The Agency had commended the Network as a mainstay of the global nuclear safety and security regime.

95. The AAEA commended the Republic of Korea on the assistance that it had provided to the Arab States in capacity building for nuclear and radiation regulatory staff. It also commended the USA, the EU and China for their support and for sharing their expertise.

96. During the period from 2010 to 2017, the AAEA had organized numerous training programmes, expert meetings, seminars and conferences on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in industry, agriculture and health care, in close cooperation with the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, the Agency and other relevant international organizations. Some 4200 trainees from AAEA member and non-member States had attended 131 training courses and 63 workshops. Many scientific visits by expert delegations and technical meetings had also been organized.

97. The AAEA distributed its quarterly journal on the role of the atom in development to specialized bodies and arranged for the translation of relevant books and leaflets. It also organized a biennial Arab conference on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, at which some 200 Arab researchers, academics and students presented their work. The 14th conference would be held in Egypt in late 2018. Since 2010 the AAEA had also regularly convened Arab forums on the outlook for power generation and seawater desalination in order to facilitate discussion and exchanges among experts and decision makers from Arab States.

98. As the Arab States aspired to establish an NWFZ in the Middle East similar to those in Africa, Asia and South America, they urged all States in the Middle East region without exception to take the necessary steps to establish such a zone in order to build confidence and guarantee the safety of its peoples.

99. Mr WANG (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that each year, the General Conference offered an insight into the invaluable work

carried out by the Secretariat in providing the Agency's Member States and other stakeholders with a wide range of support and services that upheld its noble mandate.

100. While the CTBTO's mandate was not as broad, the Organization drew strength to a large extent from its simplicity: to prohibit all nuclear explosions.

101. To ensure that States lived up to their undertakings, the CTBT had established two major verification pillars: an international monitoring system comprising 300 facilities around the globe that collected and transmitted data to the International Data Centre in Vienna; and an on-site inspection regime designed to confirm on the ground whether a nuclear explosion had taken place — making it the final verification measure under the Treaty.

102. Over 90% of those facilities had been built and were transmitting data, allowing Member States to draw an independent conclusion on the nature of events detected by the system and to ultimately determine whether a nuclear explosion had occurred. That corresponded to approximately 12 TB of data per year, making the CTBT second to none when it came to monitoring and better understanding the planet.

103. In addition to using the data to verify compliance with the Treaty, States had sought to explore the benefits derived from the civil and scientific applications of CTBT data and technologies, which included disaster risk mitigation, climate change and sustainable development. There was no better way to address those issues than collectively and by bringing together scientists and policy makers from around the world.

104. In the same vein, the CTBTO actively collaborated with a number of scientific and academic institutions and participated in mechanisms around the world, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. It was also a member of the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies.

105. The Organization had also sent its experts to contribute to the recent 2018 Scientific Forum on Nuclear Technology for Climate: Mitigation, Monitoring and Adaptation, a welcome initiative by the Agency.

106. The CTBTO shared the Agency's vision of the safe and peaceful use of the atom, which excluded, by definition, the explosive testing of nuclear weapons. It also shared its emphasis on science-based verification as the foundation of its non-proliferation work and condition of its credibility.

107. The monitoring system established by the CTBT had been tried and tested on numerous occasions. In each case, the Organization's timely response had demonstrated its readiness to fulfil its mission. A case in point was the nuclear test announced by the DPRK in 2017. Data had been collected from over 125 seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound stations to determine the magnitude of the event and calculate its location, resulting in an error ellipse of only 110 km² — less than that estimated for each of the five previous nuclear tests.

108. Welcoming the recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, the CTBTO was particularly heartened by the DPRK's commitment to the denuclearization of the Peninsula. If successful, it could open a new chapter in the efforts to promote peace and security in the region. It was the CTBTO's sincere hope that those developments would lead to a comprehensive and verifiable agreement that would include the signature and ratification of the CTBT by the DPRK, thus bringing nearer the Treaty's entry into force.

109. The CTBTO was in a unique position to make available its expertise, technology and monitoring to any international process seeking to confirm the irreversible closure of the Punggye-ri nuclear test

site. If invited to do so, and with the approval of its Member States, the Organization was ready to contribute to the implementation of any agreement between the parties involved.

110. The CTBT enjoyed near-universal support. After decades of arduous negotiations and technical challenges, it was the most practical and achievable step towards a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons.

111. Despite the wide non-acceptance of nuclear testing, the spectre of nuclear test explosions remained a dangerous reality in the 21st century. There was an urgent need for the international community to put in place a definitive and legally binding ban on nuclear testing. The leadership of the Agency could make a difference in that regard by bringing about the early entry into force of the CTBT, thus making the world a better and safer place.

112. Mr DONÁ (Sovereign Order of Malta) said that the peaceful uses of nuclear technology continued to play a pivotal role in improving the lives of the least privileged peoples around the world, particularly in the area of health care in developing countries. As the development of health care was also a central aim of the Sovereign Order of Malta, it fully supported the Agency's work in that regard.

113. The Sovereign Order of Malta was a recognized subject of international law, headquartered in Rome. It maintained bilateral and multilateral relations at ambassadorial level with over 100 countries, most of which were Member States of the Agency, and with the European Union and the United Nations, where it held permanent observer status. As a long-standing institution with a mission to provide care without discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, origin or age, the Sovereign Order of Malta was neutral, impartial and non-political and was able to play a mediation role. It provided a unique humanitarian network which served both as an example of its sovereignty and as an operational instrument for its humanitarian activities, which it referred to as 'humanitarian diplomacy'.

114. The Sovereign Order of Malta conducted charitable missions around the world. Malteser International, its international medical and humanitarian relief organization, was particularly involved in providing aid in countries troubled by civil war and in assisting refugees and migrants. It supported the Agency's 2018 Scientific Forum, which had highlighted how nuclear science and technology could contribute to addressing the challenges of climate change, following the adoption of the SDGs in 2015 and of the Paris Agreement in 2016, by improving people's health and promoting well-being.

115. For almost six decades, the Agency had played an important technical role in promoting peace, security and development, and helping countries use nuclear science and technology to address development challenges. The Sovereign Order of Malta remained committed to achieving those goals. The global community must work together to promote a better and safer environment for all.

116. Mr HALL (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and responding to references by Member States to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, said that it was their view, as well as that of 35 other Member States that had made statements at the meetings of the Board of Governors the previous week, that the Agency was not the appropriate forum for discussion of the Treaty. They would not sign it and would not be bound by it, and they considered that the Treaty would have a detrimental effect on the global non-proliferation architecture under the NPT.

– **Restoration of voting rights**
(GC(62)/INF/9)

117. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had met earlier in the day to examine the request from Libya set out in in document GC(62)/INF/9 for the restoration of its voting rights under Article XIX.A of the Statute. The Committee had recommended that Libya's rights to vote in the Agency be restored at the current session of the General Conference for a period of one year, ending prior to the commencement of the next annual session of the General Conference.

118. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference accepted the recommendation by the General Committee.

119. It was so decided.

22. Examination of delegates' credentials
(GC(62)/20)

120. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had met earlier in the day as a credentials committee to examine the credentials of all delegates, as provided for in Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure. The Secretariat had since received credentials in due form for the delegates of the Central African Republic and Kenya. After discussion, the Committee had recommended that the General Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in paragraph 8 of its report, contained in document GC(62)/20, with the reservations and positions expressed therein.

121. Mr MHAISEN (Jordan) said that his country's approval of the Israeli credentials did not by any means constitute recognition of Israel's occupation of the 1967 territories, which included East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The borders of Israel were limited to those set out within the Peace Agreement between Israel and Jordan.

122. Mr ALI ABADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his country had joined the consensus on the draft resolution and taken note of the report by the credentials committee, but that should not by any means be construed as recognition of the Israeli regime.

123. Mr YOUSSEF (Egypt) said that his country took note of the delegates' credentials submitted to the present session of the General Conference. He stressed the fact that Egypt's approval of Israeli credentials did not by any means constitute recognition of Israel's occupation of the 1967 territories, which included East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The borders of Israel were limited to those set out within the Peace Agreement between Israel and Egypt.

124. The PRESIDENT took it that, with the observations and reservations expressed, the Conference was prepared to adopt the draft resolution contained in paragraph 8 of document GC(62)/20.

125. It was so decided.

7. Election of Members to the Board of Governors (GC(62)/7 and 16)

126. The PRESIDENT recalled that in 1989 the General Conference had approved a procedure under which no secret ballot would be held when there was agreement on the candidate or candidates from a particular area. Balloting would take place only in respect of those areas for which there was no agreed slate. That procedure considerably facilitated the efficient use of the Conference's time but required that Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure be suspended in respect of the areas for which no secret ballot would be held.

127. She announced that all area groups had reached agreement on their candidates for the vacancies to be filled and, after thanking all area groups on behalf of the Conference, drew attention to document GC(62)/7, containing the designations of Member States to serve on the Board from the end of the 2018 regular session of the Conference until the end of the 2019 regular session.

128. Recalling that, under Rule 83 of the Rules of Procedure, the presiding officer must indicate to the General Conference those elective places on the Board which must be filled, she referred to document GC(62)/16, paragraph 2, which indicated, for each geographical area, the number of Member States that must be elected so that the Board would be constituted in accordance with Article VI.A of the Statute. There were 11 seats to be filled: 3 for Latin America; 2 for Western Europe; 1 for Eastern Europe; 2 for Africa; 1 for the Middle East and South Asia; 1 for South East Asia and the Pacific; and 1 floating seat — it being the turn of Africa to fill the floating seat.

129. Document GC(62)/16, paragraph 3, listed the 24 Member States that had been either elected by the General Conference in 2017 in accordance with Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, and which would therefore continue to serve on the Board until 2019, or designated by the Board in June 2017 for membership of the Board pursuant to Article VI.A.1 of the Statute for the one-year period 2018–2019.

130. In order to facilitate the election, an informal note had been distributed to delegates, showing the results of consultations among the area groups regarding their candidates for the vacant seats. She stressed that the note was purely informal in character and for information purposes only.

131. The PRESIDENT, suspending Rule 79 of the Conference's Rules of Procedure, requested Member States to formally elect candidates.

132. The PRESIDENT took it that the General Conference wished to elect Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay to the three vacant seats for Latin America.

133. Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay were duly elected.

134. The PRESIDENT took it that the General Conference wished to elect Italy and Sweden to the two vacant seats for Western Europe.

135. Italy and Sweden were duly elected.

136. The PRESIDENT took it that the General Conference wished to elect Azerbaijan to the one vacant seat for Eastern Europe.

137. Azerbaijan was duly elected.

138. The PRESIDENT took it that the General Conference wished to elect Morocco and Niger to the two vacant seats for Africa.

139. Morocco and Niger were duly elected.

140. The PRESIDENT took it that the General Conference wished to elect Pakistan to the one vacant seat for the Middle East and South Asia.

141. Pakistan was duly elected.

142. The PRESIDENT took it that the General Conference wished to elect Thailand to the one vacant seat for South East Asia and the Pacific.

143. Thailand was duly elected.

144. The PRESIDENT took it that the General Conference wished to elect Egypt to the one vacant floating seat, which for that year would be filled by Africa.

145. Egypt was duly elected.

146. The PRESIDENT congratulated the 11 Member States elected to the Board and recalled that, under Article VI.D of the Statute, they would hold office from the end of the 62nd regular session of the General Conference until the end of its 64th regular session.

– **Interim oral report by the Chair of the Committee of the Whole**

147. Mr GLENDER RIVAS (Mexico), Chair of the Committee of the Whole, reported on the outcome of the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole on agenda items 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20 and 21.

148. Under item 8, ‘The Agency’s Financial Statements for 2017’, the Committee had recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(62)/5, on the Agency’s financial statements for 2017.

149. Under item 9, ‘The Agency’s Budget Update for 2019’, the Committee had recommended that the Conference approve a regular budget figure for 2019 of €371 791 015 for the operational portion of the Regular Budget and €6 214 868 for the capital portion of the Regular Budget and accordingly adopt draft resolution A set out in document GC(62)/2, on the Regular Budget appropriations for 2019; that the Conference approve a target for voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund for 2019 of €86 165 000 and accordingly adopt draft resolution B set out in document GC(62)/2, on the Technical Cooperation Fund allocation for 2019; and that the Conference approve the level of the Working Capital Fund for 2019 at €15 210 000 and accordingly adopt draft resolution C set out in document GC(62)/2, on the Working Capital Fund for 2019.

150. Under item 10, ‘Amendment to Article XIV.A of the Statute’, the Committee had recommended that the Conference adopt the decision set out in document GC(62)/L.3.

151. Under item 11, ‘Scale of assessment of Member States’ contributions towards the Regular Budget for 2019’, the Committee had recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution appearing on page 3 of document GC(62)/9.

152. Under item 12, ‘Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety’, the Committee had recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(62)/L.1.

153. Under item 13, ‘Nuclear security’, the Committee had recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(62)/L.6.

154. Under item 14, ‘Strengthening of the Agency’s technical cooperation activities’, the Committee had recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(62)/L.2.

155. Under item 15, ‘Strengthening the Agency’s activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications’, the Committee had recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolutions set out in document GC(62)/L.5 in the following way: A. Non-power nuclear applications; 1. General; 2. Development of the sterile insect technique package for the management of disease-transmitting mosquitoes; 3. Support to the African Union’s Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign; 4. Plan for producing potable water economically using small and medium-sized nuclear reactors; 5. Strengthening the support to Member States in food and agriculture; 6. Renovation of the Agency’s Nuclear Applications Laboratories at Seibersdorf; B. Nuclear power applications; C. Nuclear knowledge management.

156. Under item 20, ‘Promotion of Efficiency and Effectiveness of the IAEA Decision Making Process’, the importance of maintaining and promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency’s decision-making processes and strengthening the Agency and its governing bodies had been highlighted. Attention had been drawn to the expansion of the membership of the Board of Governors, the need to enhance the role and authority of the General Conference and the Board of Governors, and the importance of maintaining an appropriate balance between the two bodies. The importance of the direct engagement and participation of all Member States in the decision-making process on issues related to the Agency’s work had been emphasized. The relevance and importance of the process currently under way for the timely ratification of the amendment of Article VI of the Agency’s Statute had been highlighted and views and suggestions had been expressed in that context. Some Members had raised the issue of the use of electronic voting in the Agency’s General Conference and suggested that the example of the UN General Assembly in that regard might be followed.

157. Under item 21, ‘Elections to the Agency’s Staff Pension Committee’, the Committee had recommended to the General Conference that Venince Allen Carillo of the Philippines be elected as an alternate member to represent the General Conference on the Agency’s Staff Pension Committee.

158. The PRESIDENT complimented the Chair on the manner of his work.

8. The Agency’s Financial Statements for 2017

159. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(62)/5 was adopted.

9. The Agency’s Budget Update for 2019

160. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, draft resolutions A, B and C set out in document GC(62)/2 were adopted.

10. Amendment to Article XIV.A of the Statute

161. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the decision set out in document GC(62)/L.3 was adopted.

11. Scale of assessment of Member States' contributions towards the Regular Budget for 2019

162. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution on page 3 of document GC(62)/9 was adopted.

12. Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety

163. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(62)/L.1 was adopted.

13. Nuclear security

164. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(62)/L.6 was adopted.

14. Strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities

165. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(62)/L.2 was adopted.

15. Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications

166. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolutions set out in document GC(62)/L.5 were adopted.

20. Promotion of efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA decision-making process

167. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report by the Chair of the Committee of the Whole.

168. It was so decided.

21. Elections to the Agency's Staff Pension Committee

169. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, Mr Carillo of the Philippines was elected as an alternate member to represent the General Conference on the Agency's Staff Pension Committee.

170. The PRESIDENT said that the General Conference had completed consideration of the matters on which the Chair of the Committee of the Whole had provided his interim report.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.