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Plenary

Record of the Fifth Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Wednesday, 18 September 2019, at 10 a.m.

President: Ms BUENROSTRO MASSIEU (Mexico)

Later: Mr FARHANE (Morocco)

Later: Mr OSIPOV (Republic of Moldova)

Contents

Item of the agenda ¹	Paragraphs
5 Arrangements for the Conference	1–4
(a) Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items for initial discussion	1–2
(b) Closing date of the session and opening date of the next session	3–4

¹ GC(63)/22.

Contents (continued)

	Paragraphs	
7	General debate and Annual Report for 2018 (<i>resumed</i>)	5–203
	Statements by the delegates of:	
	New Zealand	5–10
	Costa Rica	11–20
	Thailand	21–29
	Bulgaria	30–39
	El Salvador	40–46
	Chile	47–56
	Malta	57–65
	India	66–69
	Switzerland	70–79
	Pakistan	80–86
	Denmark	87–95
	Spain	96–104
	Botswana	105–109
	Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	110–120
	Malaysia	121–132
	Greece	133–142
	Paraguay	143–152
	Turkey	153–161
	Namibia	162–167
	Syrian Arab Republic	168–175
	Australia	176–185
	Israel	186–193
	Portugal	194–203

Abbreviations used in this record

A/CPPNM	Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ARTEMIS	Integrated Review Service for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Decommissioning and Remediation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEANTOM	ASEAN Network of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy
CNS	Convention on Nuclear Safety
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FORO	Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies
HEU	high enriched uranium
ICONS	International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
LEU	low enriched uranium
LWR	light water reactor
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MW(e)	megawatt (electrical)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement

Abbreviations used in this record (continued)

NPP	nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSF	Nuclear Security Fund
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
OAS	Organization of American States
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PET	positron emission tomography
PGEC	postgraduate educational course
PHWR	pressurized heavy water reactor
R&D	research and development
ReNuAL	Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SLA	State-level safeguards approach
SLC	State-level concept
SQP	small quantities protocol
TC	technical cooperation
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USA	United States of America
VVER	water cooled, water moderated power reactor
WMDs	weapons of mass destruction

5. Arrangements for the Conference (GC(63)/INF/6, 7 and 10)

(a) Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items for initial discussion

1. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had recommended that the agenda for the 63rd session should consist of all the items listed in documents GC(63)/1 and Mod.1, except items 2 and 23, and the supplementary items contained in documents GC(63)/1/Add.1 to 3. With regard to the allocation of items for initial discussion, it had recommended that all items be taken up for discussion as indicated in documents GC(63)/1 and Mod.1 and Add.1 to 3. With regard to the order of items contained in documents GC(63)/1 and Mod.1 and Add.1 to 3, the General Committee had recommended that the order should be as set out in those documents.

2. It was so decided.

(b) Closing date of the session and opening date of the next session

3. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had recommended that the Conference should set Friday, 20 September 2019, as the closing date of the 63rd regular session, and Monday, 21 September 2020, as the opening date of the 64th regular session.

4. It was so decided.

7. General debate and Annual Report for 2018 (resumed) (GC(63)/5 and additional information)

5. Ms ROBERTON (New Zealand) paid tribute to Mr Amano, the late Director General, who had served the Agency and its Member States with dedication. He had upheld the highest standards of professionalism, diligence and impartiality, and would be missed.

6. As international tensions were running high, New Zealand wished to reaffirm the Agency's critical contribution to international peace and security, which was not to be taken for granted. In particular, the international safeguards system, which was more relevant to collective security than ever before, had to be comprehensive and up to date. Her country called on all States that had not yet concluded and implemented an additional protocol, the gold standard of safeguards, to do so. In addition, its other tools, such as the SLA, should enable the Agency to be modern, efficient and dynamic, especially as global nuclear capacity grew in volume and complexity.

7. As nuclear and radiological materials posed significant risks that needed to be managed, New Zealand shared the caution expressed by Austria that nuclear energy was not necessarily a risk-free solution to climate change. In a broader context, the highest national and international standards needed to be observed by all, given that national decisions to use nuclear technology could have wide-ranging implications for others. That applied in particular to the transport of nuclear and radiological materials, an issue in which New Zealand continued to take a close interest. Work needed to continue on improving the international nuclear liability regimes and addressing gaps to respond to the concerns of all States — in particular non-nuclear States — that might suffer from a nuclear accident.

8. Although the global nuclear non-proliferation framework was solid, there were still some major challenges of concern, not least in relation to Iran and the DPRK. A firm supporter of the JCPOA, New Zealand continued to believe that all Member States had a stake in its success. Deeply disappointed by the USA's decision to withdraw, her country was equally concerned at Iran's continued erosion of its conformity and urged Iran to quickly return to full compliance with all aspects of the JCPOA. Reiterating her country's hope that all parties would refrain from placing any further unnecessary strain on the JCPOA, she said that New Zealand called on Iran to expeditiously address the concerns regarding its safeguards declarations raised by the Agency in recent weeks.

9. It was also deeply disappointing that over the previous year the DPRK had made no progress towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. New Zealand remained committed to supporting diplomatic efforts to resolve the long-standing challenges on the Korean Peninsula and encouraged all parties to do their utmost to build the trust required to resolve the issue. Her country urged the DPRK to fully comply with its international obligations as set out in relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to return to compliance with the NPT and to re-engage with the Agency to allow inspectors to return.

10. Turning to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, she noted that disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses had been bound together 50 years earlier in the NPT. The Agency's work under the non-proliferation and peaceful uses pillars should be reinforced at the 2020 NPT Review Conference through progress in implementing the disarmament pillar. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons made a strong contribution to the NPT by providing the legal framework for a nuclear-free world — a necessary step towards implementing Article VI. With 26 States Parties, and more ratifications and signatures expected at the UN General Assembly, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was over halfway towards entering into force. New Zealand looked forward to discussions on the implications of the Treaty for the Agency's work.

11. Mr SOLANO ORTIZ (Costa Rica) expressed deep regret at the passing of Director General Yukiya Amano, whose legacy was permanently embodied in the motto 'Atoms for Peace and Development'. In 2016, Mr Amano had stressed the importance of improving lives through nuclear science and technology and contributing to international security by ensuring that nuclear material was used for peaceful ends. Costa Rica hoped to see the most suitable candidate appointed in his place.

12. As a country without armed forces, Costa Rica considered that international law was a mechanism for dispute resolution. Through its activities the Agency contributed to the peaceful development of nuclear energy, and his Government highly appreciated the assistance, technology transfer and capacity building it provided. As a TC partner since 1965, Costa Rica had achieved exceptional rates of attainment, implementation and cost-sharing in its projects.

13. His country's universities acting as IAEA Collaborating Centres — such as the University of Costa Rica's Research Center in Environmental Pollution, a regional reference laboratory for environmental protection and the proper use of agricultural pesticides — made a valuable contribution to the achievement of SDG targets. Furthermore, the Plasma Laboratory for Fusion Energy and Applications, part of the Costa Rica Institute of Technology, was set to become the world's first Collaborating Centre in the field of plasma and nuclear fusion. It had recently commissioned its new facilities and, in November 2019, would host the first Training Workshop in Fusion for the Latin American region.

14. As a co-chair of the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology: Addressing Current and Emerging Development Challenges, held in 2018, Costa Rica welcomed the General Conference resolutions that would institutionalize the organization of ministerial conferences on promotional topics.

15. Throughout 2019, training events for Latin American and Caribbean countries that applied modified SQPs and additional protocols had been held in Costa Rica jointly with the US Department of Energy. His country had also benefited from the OLA training event on nuclear law for State officials in the context of drafting new legislation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to upgrade the 1969 regulations. In a good example of triangular cooperation with the Agency, a Costa Rican expert was working with Indonesia on the genetic management of animal diseases, management of reproduction and nutrition of small- and medium-sized ruminants, and mitigation of outbreaks of animal diseases in communal farm systems.

16. Costa Rica strongly supported the Agency's enforcement of the application of safeguards and the conduct of other nuclear verification activities, which were fundamental for the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Costa Rica was paying close attention to the implementation of the JCPOA, as it was crucial to international stability, peace and security. It was regrettable that Iran had announced that it would gradually cease meeting its commitments despite calls from the international community for it to adhere to the plan. There should be insistence on confidence-building and security measures, rather than unilateral actions that jeopardized international security.

17. Costa Rica continued to support the international community's combined efforts aimed at the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK.

18. Costa Rica believed firmly in international multilateral verification and the Agency's safeguards system as means to bring about non-proliferation. It called on all States to honour their disarmament and non-proliferation obligations to ensure the effectiveness of international agreements. It also maintained its full support for the Agency's central role in the impartial and objective implementation of safeguards measures.

19. Two years after the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had opened for signature, 70 States had signed it and there had been 26 ratifications and accessions. The implementation of disarmament obligations under the NPT, however, was unsatisfactory: existing commitments had not been fulfilled and the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime urgently needed strengthening. States should strive for consensus at the 2020 NPT Review Conference, an opportunity to avoid past mistakes and undertake to honour the obligations that were the mainstay of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the basis of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons strengthened that international architecture, complementing the NPT with a legal framework for the implementation of Article VI and reinforcing the Agency safeguards system. It also reaffirmed the safeguards standards enshrined in Article III of the NPT by encouraging all States to further commit to the application of safeguards.

20. Costa Rica again called on the Agency to improve geographical representation among its staff and to increase the use of Spanish in its work as proof that it put multilingualism into practice. His country hoped to see greater promotion of gender equality in a cross-cutting approach to full implementation of SDG 5.

Mr Farhane (Morocco), Vice-President, took the Chair.

21. Ms SRISWASDI (Thailand) conveyed her delegation's deepest condolences on the passing of Director General Amano, whose dedication and unwavering passion in promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy worldwide had been a hallmark of his tenure. She expressed Thailand's hope that his vision and legacy would be honoured and continued.

22. The Agency's role of strengthening global security was more crucial than ever. In particular, she reiterated Thailand's support for the JCPOA and called on Iran to return to full compliance and ensure

the necessary means for the Agency to effectively carry out its mandate. Her country also called on all parties concerned to work together constructively and in good faith to address the issue.

23. With regard to the DPRK, Thailand welcomed the efforts of all parties to engage in dialogue and hoped that work to achieve a denuclearized Korean Peninsula would continue in good faith and deliver tangible results. Thailand appreciated the Agency's readiness to return to the DPRK under its verification mandate once a political solution had been found.

24. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, currently making good progress towards entry into force, was an important instrument that would complement and reinforce efforts under the NPT, contributing to the implementation of Article VI. The Agency would be instrumental in implementing the Treaty once it entered into force.

25. Thailand was committed to stepping up cooperation with the Agency to ensure the safe, secure and peaceful uses and applications of nuclear technology. Mindful, however, that those activities must be accompanied by vigilant nuclear safeguards and safety and security regimes, Thailand ensured that it implemented those regimes in line with international standards and its commitments under the multilateral instruments to which it was a party.

26. Thailand had submitted its first national report under the CNS following its accession in February 2018 and had ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in May 2019. It had also concluded with the Agency Practical Arrangements on cooperation in the area of nuclear forensic science and was finalizing Practical Arrangements on voluntary exchange and visualization of routine radiation monitoring data on the International Radiation Monitoring Information System. A reflection of Thailand's commitment to its international obligations, those developments served as a basis for it to assist and cooperate with interested countries in the region.

27. Over the previous two years, Thailand had hosted a number of TC projects covering areas such as nuclear medicine, food safety and radiation technology. It remained committed to paying its full share to the TCF and looked forward to further technical cooperation with the Agency and its regional partners.

28. As the current Chair of ASEAN, Thailand welcomed the signing of Practical Arrangements between ASEAN and the Agency on cooperation in the areas of nuclear science and technology and applications, nuclear safety, security and safeguards, which showcased ASEAN's determination to strengthen its partnership with the Agency on the 'nuclear for peace' agenda. Thailand also appreciated the Agency's support at the sixth ASEANTOM meeting, which it had hosted in July 2019, and looked forward to stronger cooperation between ASEAN and the Agency in areas of mutual interest.

29. Lastly, her delegation wished to thank the Ambassador of Italy, Ms Accili Sabbatini, for helping to solve the long-standing issue of the due account mechanism.

30. Mr KOSTOV (Bulgaria) expressed sadness at the untimely demise of the Director General, a professional diplomat under whose leadership the Agency's role had been strengthened worldwide.

31. Bulgaria was strongly committed to the international community's efforts to achieve nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. For almost 50 years, the NPT had been the cornerstone for those efforts and for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As the Agency's safeguards mechanism was a key to its implementation, Bulgaria reiterated its call for the universalization of the NPT and additional protocols.

32. Bulgaria fully supported the establishment of a zone free of WMDs in the Middle East. Only through cooperation and mutual understanding could the desired consensus be reached and progress

made towards implementing the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

33. Problems concerning Iran's nuclear programme could be settled only through diplomacy. The JCPOA had successfully strengthened the NPT and the Agency played a key role through its monitoring, verification and regular reporting on Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments.

34. Bulgaria urged the DPRK to engage seriously in negotiations with a view to abandoning its nuclear weapons programme and delivery systems in a comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible manner, to bring about lasting peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Bulgaria hoped the DPRK would return to compliance with its NPT and CSA obligations and sign and ratify the CTBT.

35. Bulgaria appreciated the Agency's continued support of Member States with existing NPPs, enabling them to enhance performance and ensure safe, secure, efficient and reliable long term operation, among other things by building capacity and developing leadership and management systems. His country also appreciated Agency publications about long term NPP operation in the Nuclear Energy Series.

36. Nuclear energy continued to be a major factor of Bulgaria's energy mix, in conditions of advanced technology, production efficiency, competitive prices and a high level of nuclear safety and radiation protection; the safety of nuclear facilities was a matter of national policy. Kozloduy NPP had been operating commercially for just over 45 years, providing not only Bulgaria but the wider region with energy supplies and preventing over 743 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions. The Nuclear Regulatory Agency was reviewing the licence renewal application for Unit 6 of Kozloduy NPP, for which the operator had submitted the periodic safety review and other documents in September 2018. Following decisions made by national authorities in 2018, the National Electricity Company had issued a call for tenders for the construction of the new Belene NPP. Seven companies had expressed an interest in supplying equipment, implementing technical activities and supplying electricity, in a procedure due to be finalized by May 2020.

37. In June 2019, Bulgaria's Nuclear Regulatory Agency had hosted the 26th annual Forum of Nuclear Safety Authorities of the Countries Operating VVER Type Reactors. The participants, from the Agency and 12 States, had presented reports on the operation of NPPs and innovations in the field of nuclear and radiation safety.

38. In September 2018, Bulgaria had signed its fourth CPF, in line with the Europe Regional Profile for 2018–2021.

39. As the Agency's key mechanism for transferring technology and building capacities in the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology, the TC programme needed sufficient, assured and predictable financing. Consequently, Bulgaria always paid its annual contribution to the TCF on time and in full.

40. Mr RECINOS TREJO (El Salvador) paid tribute to the late Director General for his determination to strengthen international security and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, especially in developing countries. Mr Amano's visit to El Salvador, the first by a Director General, had led to closer cooperation with the Agency in many strategic areas for national development, especially the fight against cancer. El Salvador welcomed the 2019 Scientific Forum on Nuclear Technology in the Fight Against Cancer, the theme of which was part of the Director General Amano's legacy.

41. The Agency played a primordial role both in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the attainment of the SDGs. The technical cooperation provided to developing countries helped to promote scientific and economic development through the peaceful use of nuclear applications. The peaceful uses of nuclear technology benefited the people of El Salvador in a number of priority areas.

42. Although his country did not have any NPPs, it recognized that States had a right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as long as they adhered to the highest possible safety standards and provided assurances to States without NPPs. As it attached the greatest importance to the Agency's verification regime, El Salvador had both a CSA and an additional protocol in force. It called on those Member States that had not yet done so to conclude a CSA and additional protocol and to accept the application of comprehensive safeguards to all their nuclear activities.

43. Convinced, along with other States, that nuclear energy should be used only for peaceful purposes, El Salvador deplored the threat to humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the performance of nuclear tests or experiments. As a country with no WMDs in a region free of nuclear weapons, El Salvador was committed to working towards nuclear disarmament as the only guarantee of peace, security and human rights. It firmly supported all instruments and initiatives aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the total elimination of WMDs. Already a State Party to the NPT and the CTBT, the keystones of nuclear disarmament, El Salvador had ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in January 2019. All countries should strive together towards attaining a world free of nuclear weapons. Member States should adhere to the NPT and all those that possessed WMDs should take significant steps towards eliminating their nuclear arsenals. Moreover, El Salvador had ratified the A/CPPNM in December 2016.

44. His country was appreciative of the cooperation recently provided through the TCF in the form of projects, courses, training, workshops and the exchange of experts, which had helped to build capacity in national institutions, above all in the areas of health, nuclear medicine, soil and water management, and the environment.

45. El Salvador was currently finalizing its CPF for 2019–2023, and hoped to sign it forthwith. His country was interested in further strengthening its cooperation with the Agency through projects aimed at improving people's quality of life and meeting the goals of the Government's five-year plan.

46. Lastly, he highlighted the 35th anniversary of ARCAL, an agreement that had harnessed nuclear science and technology to build regional capacity in the areas of cancer control, efficient water management, security of energy supply, adaptation to climate change and attainment of the SDGs.

47. Mr SALAS (Chile) offered his country's condolences following the death of Director General Yukiya Amano. During his leadership Mr Amano had demonstrated his commitment to the NPT and had ensured that the Agency conducted its statutory verification mandate in an exemplary manner. The Agency had also increased its support to Member States to help them use nuclear technology to achieve the SDGs.

48. Chile remained committed to the total elimination of all WMDs. As the linchpin of the non-proliferation regime, the NPT was essential to maintaining global stability and lasting peace. Concerned that equal progress had not been made on all three pillars of the NPT in its 50 years of existence, Chile called for serious discussions to take place at the 2020 NPT Review Conference on effective and verifiable ways of achieving the goals set out in the Treaty. Chile urged all Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the CTBT and called for all States to demonstrate the political will and commitment required to bring that Treaty into force. He underscored the importance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which, once in force, would complement the NPT and make an essential contribution to the global peace and security architecture.

49. Chile cautiously welcomed the progress made on the issue of the DPRK. If the DPRK wanted to achieve security and development, it needed to become a reliable partner of the international community by complying with the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, submitting all its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards inspections and ratifying the CTBT. The signing of a verification agreement with the DPRK would undoubtedly be one of the main goals of the next Director General.

50. While Chile supported the dedication of the parties to the JCPOA to upholding the agreement, it was concerned that Iran had recently diminished its commitment to some of its obligations under the plan. Chile called on all parties to continue to engage in dialogue in order to make constructive progress.

51. In view of its attachment to the importance of nuclear security, Chile had both a CSA and an additional protocol in force. In October 2018, it had received an Agency safeguards inspection mission, including complementary access, which had confirmed the non-diversion of nuclear materials and absence of any undeclared activities.

52. Earlier in 2019, Chile had hosted, jointly with the Agency and the US Government, a regional workshop on application of additional protocols and SQPs. Chile was committed to working with partners to achieve the universalization of the additional protocol, which was vital for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

53. Chile called on the Agency to continue its activities related to the safe transport of nuclear materials. His country participated actively in the Dialogue between Coastal and Shipping States and advocated a permanent relationship to facilitate cooperation and information exchange between the States involved. Chile thanked the Agency for allowing it to host a regional meeting in October 2019 on the harmonization of transport requirements and import, export and transit procedures for radioactive materials. It would help the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission when it drafted regulations on the safe transport of radioactive materials, due to be adopted in 2021.

54. He also thanked the Agency for the technical and scientific assistance that it provided to his country and the wider region. Under the TC programme, 35 projects were under way in Chile in areas related to radiation technology, nuclear energy, health and nutrition, radiation security, nuclear knowledge, food and agriculture, water and the environment. With the Agency's assistance, in February 2019 Chile had finished updating one of its cyclotrons, which would enable it to double its output of radiopharmaceuticals. The Agency had also helped Chilean nationals attend meetings and courses, which had contributed to the building of capacities and an increase in specialist knowledge.

55. Earlier in 2019, Chile had hosted the first meeting of the FORO Executive Technical Committee and the FORO plenary session. Thanks to the work of FORO, Chile had been able to improve its safety regulations and guidelines for industrial and medical radiological applications.

56. Later in the year, Chile would be hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO Summit and the 25th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP25). Highlighting the IAEA Nuclear Safety Series, in particular the Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Major Public Events, he thanked the Agency for its assistance with the preparation of the security and radiation detection plans for both events.

57. Ms MELI DAUDEY (Malta) paid tribute to the late Director General, Yukiya Amano, and the lasting legacy he had left the Agency.

58. Malta maintained its unwavering support for the NPT, the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime, as it was essential for enhancing cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and, under Article VI, for achieving nuclear disarmament. Her country called unequivocally for the universalization of the NPT and invited States that were not yet parties to ratify the Treaty without delay.

59. Albeit a small Mediterranean island State with no notable nuclear power, owing to its strategic central location Malta closely followed the events unfolding in its region, specifically in the Middle East. Malta fully supported the establishment there of a zone free of WMDs and their delivery systems on the basis of the 2010 Action Plan. Despite the lack of substantive progress in that regard, the goals of the 1995 Resolution remained as valid as ever. Furthering non-proliferation and disarmament efforts

in the Middle East would be of great benefit not only to the region itself, but also to the international community. Malta therefore called on all States in the region to engage in constructive dialogue and to cooperate in good faith so that tangible progress could be made to that end.

60. Malta remained committed to the JCPOA — an important multilateral achievement — and called on all countries to refrain from taking actions that impeded its implementation. She commended the Secretariat on its professional work in verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclear related commitments.

61. Malta supported all diplomatic efforts aimed at the easing of tensions on and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Her country called upon the DPRK to comply fully, unconditionally and without further delay with the relevant Security Council and General Conference resolutions, and to return to the non-proliferation regime and Agency safeguards as soon as possible. Malta lent the Agency its backing in all its endeavours to enhance its important role in the denuclearization process.

62. Syria's continuing non-compliance with its CSA remained a cause for concern. Malta called upon Syria to cooperate fully and promptly with the Agency to address all unresolved issues, and to bring an additional protocol into force without delay.

63. Malta endorsed the universalization of Agency verification standards and encouraged States that had not yet done so to sign and implement a CSA and an additional protocol. The Agency could then continue its vital mission to ensure the application of nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful purposes.

64. As an island nation, and a leading maritime flag State, Malta had a special interest in ensuring that the highest standards of preparation, communication and cooperation were followed at sea, to the same extent as on land. The consequences of an incident at sea could be devastating, with severe environmental risks.

65. Malta continued to attach great importance to the TC programme, which enabled the Agency to work closely with Member States in a safe and secure nuclear technology environment. Over the previous year, Malta had implemented further national projects involving radiation therapy for medical purposes, strengthening its radiation safety regulatory framework and building technical capacity in scientific applications to cultural heritage. Malta thanked the Agency for its assistance, cooperation and technical support, and looked forward to participating in future programmes, having signed a CPF for 2018–2023.

66. Mr VYAS (India), offering his country's deep condolences on the death of the Director General, said that his visits to India had left fond memories. During Mr Amano's tenure, 12 facilities in India had been brought under Agency safeguards and the country had signed its additional protocol. His global vision of Atoms for Peace and Development would long be remembered and India wholeheartedly supported naming the Flexible Modular Laboratory at Seibersdorf in his honour.

67. India had continued to work extensively with the Agency. The 27th IAEA Fusion Energy Conference, held in Gandhinagar in October 2018, had been attended by more than 700 experts from 39 countries. Eight of the 19 capacity-building programmes run at the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership in India in 2018–2019 had been conducted jointly with the Agency. Kaiga Generating Station 1 had set a new world record on 31 December 2018 by reaching 962 days of continuous operation at a capacity factor of 99.3%. Tarapur Atomic Power Station Units 1 and 2 had been in safe operation for 50 years, making them the oldest operating power reactors in the world; producing nuclear power at a cost below US \$0.03 per unit, they showcased India's ability to design, build and reliably operate PHWRs and LWRs. India's capacity-building programme for nuclear power generation involved 21 reactors, currently at the planning or construction phase, which would provide additional capacity of approximately 15 000 MW(e). Nuclear Fuel Complex, part of India's Department of Atomic Energy, had supplied the full initial core requirement of fuel bundles for Unit 3 of the Kakrapar Atomic Power

Station, the first 700 MW(e) PHWR. The upgraded pool reactor Apsara-U had been in operation since September 2018 at 90% of rated power and was producing carrier-free Cu-64 radioisotope, which had potential for use in PET scans. The uranium-233 fuelled Kalpakkam Mini reactor — used for neutron radiography of Indian Space Research Organisation pyro devices, activation analysis and neutron detector testing — also continued to operate successfully.

68. India had just launched NCG Vishwam Cancer Care Connect, a global network aimed at integrating hospitals and cancer care institutes in partner countries into the National Cancer Grid, established in 2012 to standardize cancer care across India. The Grid was managed by the Tata Memorial Centre, which consisted of seven hospitals and one research institute, treating over half a million patients a year. The aim of the global network was to lead to a paradigm shift in care by sharing guidelines for the management of common cancers, providing second opinions, making decisions regarding treatment and pooling online resources.

69. Having made considerable progress in the use of radiation technologies to benefit society, India was keen to share its knowledge and expertise in all peaceful areas of nuclear technology. Acknowledging the Agency's dynamic role in guiding the peaceful, safe and secure uses of nuclear energy, India looked forward to receiving its vital support in ensuring an atmosphere conducive to the growth of nuclear science and technology.

70. Mr REVAZ (Switzerland) said that Liechtenstein aligned itself with his statement. Noting with deep sadness the death of Mr Amano, he paid tribute to his accomplishments during his ten-year tenure, during which he had defended the Agency's independence and impartiality under its non-proliferation mandate. In the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, he had worked actively to enhance nuclear safety globally and had strengthened the central role of the Agency in nuclear security. The Agency's motto, as modified under his tenure as Director General, underscored the Agency's significant contribution to the achievement of the SDGs. In view of Mr Amano's initiative to modernize the Seibersdorf laboratories, Switzerland welcomed the decision to rename the Flexible Modular Laboratory after him.

71. Switzerland welcomed the Agency's current monitoring and verification activities relating to the JCPOA, a key component of the global non-proliferation regime. The decision by the USA to withdraw and its reimposition of sanctions on Iran were regrettable and the steps taken by Iran to reduce compliance with its commitments, as confirmed by the Agency, were also a cause for concern. Switzerland called on Iran to fulfil all its obligations under the JCPOA and strongly supported any dialogue and diplomatic initiatives aimed at preserving the plan.

72. Switzerland had been closely monitoring the latest developments on the Korean Peninsula, in particular the recent talks and high-level meetings aimed at ensuring its complete denuclearization. Such an undertaking would succeed only if the existing multilateral mechanisms were used. His country hoped that the Agency and the CTBTO would play an active role in that regard.

73. Switzerland had long been committed to promoting the universalization of the principles set out in the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety and to ensuring that those principles were taken into account in Agency resolutions and documents. Switzerland would continue to call for the global sharing of technical information and the implementation of practicable safety improvements for existing nuclear facilities.

74. Higher nuclear safety levels had to be promoted both nationally and internationally. As that required a favourable culture worldwide, Switzerland encouraged the Agency to broaden the technical, regulatory and political scope of its activities. Furthermore, it welcomed the Agency's efforts to step up its international coordinating role in the field of nuclear security.

75. At the ICONS 2020, Switzerland would strive for a forward-looking ministerial declaration aimed at bolstering the international nuclear security architecture. Welcoming the preparatory process for the 2021 A/CPPNM Conference, his country had announced its interest in acting as Conference co-chair along with Nigeria.

76. Switzerland supported the objectives of the SLC, namely to increase the efficiency and aptness of the Agency's verification missions, but it was still too early to determine whether those objectives had been achieved. His country continued to advocate the optimization of the safeguards system.

77. Noting that nuclear science and technology made a significant contribution towards sustainable development, in particular achievement of the SDGs, Switzerland supported a follow-up conference in 2023 to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology. In addition to the modernization of the Seibersdorf laboratories, the inauguration in June 2019 of the linear accelerator for the Agency's Dosimetry Laboratory had been a major milestone. Switzerland had made a significant financial contribution to that project.

78. Switzerland also supported the relaunch of PACT, which could make a valuable contribution towards the SDGs in the area of health. Switzerland had an interest in ensuring that the potential of PACT was fully exploited in cooperation with external partners and that the necessary financial resources were used efficiently. To be fully effective, PACT must be well integrated and adopted by the Member States.

79. In June 2019, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne had been designated as the second Agency-approved Collaborating Centre in Switzerland, proof of his country's commitment to granting the Agency and its Member States access to its nuclear expertise.

80. Mr NAEEM (Pakistan) conveyed his country's deepest sympathy and condolences to the Agency and to the family of the late Director General. Mr Amano's role in directing the Agency, in accordance with its Statute and under the motto of Atoms for Peace and Development, would always be remembered.

81. Pakistan continued to harness the enormous potential of nuclear technology for social and economic development and specifically the SDGs. Nuclear technology applications were being used in electricity generation, health, agriculture, hydrology, industry, the environment and basic sciences. As developing countries remained vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, he urged the Agency to continue promoting the development and use of nuclear technology for the purposes of mitigation, monitoring and adaptation.

82. Facing a severe energy crisis, Pakistan had been forced to expand its nuclear power programme. Nuclear power provided a clean, cheap and sustainable energy source, which his country had been exploiting since 1972 in a safe and secure manner, pursuant to relevant safeguards. There were five NPPs in operation and it was hoped that a further two NPPs near Karachi would be connected to the grid within two years, all of them under Agency safeguards. Aiming to reach a capacity of 40 000 MW(e) by 2050, Pakistan hoped that barriers would be removed so that it could gain equitable and non-discriminatory access to international civil nuclear cooperation.

83. Turning to nuclear medicine, he said that 18 cancer hospitals, serving almost one million patients a year, were working under the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, with another two under construction. Member States reserved the right to use nuclear technology as they saw fit, and the Agency played an important facilitating role.

84. As a major beneficiary of the TC programme, Pakistan was appreciative of the Agency's technical assistance and had always participated actively. Sufficient, assured and predictable resources were

important for the Agency to fulfil its statutory responsibilities. In pursuit of the SDGs, the Agency had a unique role to play in promoting nuclear technology.

85. Recognizing that nuclear security was a State responsibility, Pakistan had developed a comprehensive nuclear safety and security regime, subject to regular reviews and updates in line with Agency guidance and international best practices. In recent years his country's fully independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which reviewed and updated its regulations according to Agency standards, had issued three additional regulations. The Authority had also been engaged in capacity building in other embarking countries and had just concluded an agreement with Nigeria's Nuclear Regulatory Authority under the auspices of the Agency. Pakistan had also developed regulations on the physical protection of nuclear material and installations, based on the Agency's nuclear security recommendations. Pakistan's Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security, a regional and international training hub, had conducted a number of Agency courses, attended by participants from over 45 countries.

86. To further demonstrate its commitment to nuclear security, Pakistan had recently joined the Nuclear Security Contact Group and subscribed to the Agency's Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources. It also planned to receive an IPPAS mission at the earliest opportunity. In 2019, Pakistan had welcomed the Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy, who had expressed his appreciation of the professional skills of its workers and the safety and security measures in place at its nuclear facilities.

87. Mr DINESEN (Denmark) expressed his country's deep sadness upon the passing of Mr Amano, a committed leader who had left behind a strong, effective and efficient multilateral organization that preserved and promoted a rules-based international order.

88. He noted Denmark's satisfaction that, for the third year running, a woman had been elected as President of the General Conference, which symbolized the collective efforts to enhance the role of women in the nuclear field.

89. The Agency played a decisive role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, among other things, through its safeguards system and the continued development and implementation of the SLA. Still committed to the JCPOA — a landmark achievement of the non-proliferation regime — Denmark strongly supported the Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's compliance with its commitments. Denmark was deeply concerned that Iran had exceeded the stockpile limit for uranium enriched up to 3.67%, was enriching uranium above the level permitted under the JCPOA and was expanding its activities related to centrifuge R&D. Iran should return to full compliance with the JCPOA and Member States should be provided with sufficient and regular information on Iran's compliance with all nuclear-related commitments and, as necessary, any other safeguards-related information available to the Agency. Affirming his country's full support for the Agency in that regard, he called on Iran to respond promptly to the Agency's questions about the completeness of its safeguards declarations.

90. Noting the current developments regarding the Korean Peninsula, he expressed his country's hope that the Agency would be allowed, in due course, to carry out verification activities in the DPRK, which should abandon its nuclear programme, comply with all its international obligations and commitments and take tangible steps to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. Meanwhile, Denmark would continue to enforce the existing sanctions.

91. To preserve the integrity of the safeguards system — vital to upholding the NPT-based regime — any cases of non-compliance, including that of Dair Alzour in Syria, must be addressed.

92. With the Agency's assistance, Denmark was preparing to engage in uranium extraction in Greenland and, along with Greenland's government, was committed to ensuring full compliance with the highest international standards.

93. The Agency issued safety and security standards and guidelines to ensure the responsible and peaceful uses of nuclear science and new technology, including transportable NPPs. It was in everyone's interest to promote nuclear safety and security worldwide and boost transparency regarding the likely cross-border effects of any accident or incident. To that end, the Agency's work based on its three pillars should be conducted in a more integrated and coordinated manner. Denmark looked forward to hosting, in 2020, IRRS and ARTEMIS peer review missions, which were important for maintaining nuclear safety and security.

94. Recognizing the need to provide the Agency with the means to assist Member States in improving national nuclear security, Denmark contributed significantly to the NSF. Concerned at the Agency's heavy reliance on voluntary contributions for its security work, however, it called for adequate resources from the Regular Budget to be made available. He reiterated his country's commitment to develop an ambitious and forward-looking ministerial declaration, underlining the Agency's central role, at the ICONS 2020.

95. Although Denmark had decided not to include nuclear power in its own energy mix, focusing instead on more sustainable sources of energy, it respected the choice of other Member States, as nuclear technology could contribute significantly to the attainment of the SDGs. Underscoring the importance of TC activities in such crucial areas as health, food security, water and the environment, he noted that his country had pledged its full share of the TCF target for 2020.

96. Mr FLORENSA PALAU (Spain) offered his country's sincerest condolences to the family of Mr Amano, to the Agency as a whole and to the Japanese people.

97. Spain was pleased that the General Conference's President would be conducting business in Spanish, the mother tongue of more than 500 million individuals. Multilingualism showed its true worth in multilateral settings. As Spanish-speaking professionals working in all areas of nuclear energy benefited greatly when Agency reference documents were available in their own language, Spain made extrabudgetary contributions to fund the translation of the Agency's technical documents, recommendations, standards and guidelines into Spanish.

98. In 2018, nuclear energy had been the leading source of power in Spain, with 20% of all electricity produced by the country's six reactors. The draft National Energy and Climate Plan 2021–2030 set out the targets for greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy and energy efficiency that Spain needed to meet to comply with its commitments under the Paris Agreement. It included a proposal for the staggered closure of all NPPs in the country between 2025 and 2035; by 2030, there would be only three NPPs remaining and no new reactors would be scheduled for construction. While its reactors remained in operation, however, Spain would continue to improve their safety, security and operation, and the management of radioactive waste.

99. Spain's Nuclear Safety Council contributed actively to Agency activities, among other things by supporting its efforts to help Member States apply up-to-date guidance at the international level and to conduct peer reviews, which had an undeniable impact on the efficacy of national regulatory frameworks. He thanked the Secretariat and the members of the combined IRRS–ARTEMIS mission that Spain had hosted in October 2018. The Nuclear Safety Council was also an active member of FORO, which continued to promote nuclear and radiation safety and security in Member States and, by extension, the entire Ibero-American region.

100. Guaranteeing security, and the perception thereof, was essential if States were to react promptly to threats, in particular in the nuclear field, where the fallout from an incident would not be confined within one country's borders. Spain therefore supported the imposition of stronger, more cross-cutting and more comprehensive security measures by the Agency and others. In 2019, the Spanish Civil Guard had signed an agreement with the Agency under which the Explosive Ordinance Disposal and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Training Centre in Madrid would underpin the Agency's training efforts. Spain's successful cooperation with Morocco was another example of the potential benefits of regional training exercises.

101. Spain was confident that the ICONS 2020 would be an opportunity to define the pathway for the following biennium. Spain also hoped that the 2021 A/CPPNM Conference would be a success, as it could make a considerable contribution to nuclear security.

102. With regard to technical cooperation, for many years the Nuclear Safety Council had helped develop and manage programmes to improve regulatory infrastructure in the Ibero-American and North African regions and had led a number of interregional activities on radioactive source management. The Spanish Research Centre for Energy, Environment and Technology, a strategic partner of ARCAL, helped identify technical cooperation needs in the region, facilitated contacts between the Agency and the Spanish university and research sector in the areas of nuclear fusion and the environment, and assisted with the organization of scientific visits.

103. Spain was wholly committed to the universalization of the NPT, which would be crucial for preserving international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Spain was confident that the Agency would continue to conduct its verification activities in Iran impartially and professionally, along with any such responsibilities that arose from an agreement with the DPRK on its complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.

104. As the Agency's technical support aligned closely with safety and security requirements and was increasingly in demand from Member States, Spain called for a balanced and realistic budget that would enable it to sustainably support the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all societies, while maintaining the vital balance between quality and security.

Mr Osipov (Republic of Moldova), Vice-President, took the Chair.

105. Ms MOLOKOMME (Botswana) extended her country's heartfelt condolences to the Agency and to the family of Mr Amano — the late Director General had displayed visionary leadership during his tenure under the motto of Atoms for Peace and Development. She recalled with fondness Mr Amano's visit to Botswana in 2018 and his support for her country, in particular in the areas of cancer care, water and energy planning. She also offered Botswana's condolences to South Africa upon the tragic loss of the Deputy Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Ms Bavelile Hlongwa.

106. An avid supporter of the Agency's safeguards and other activities, Botswana was committed to honouring its financial commitments to the Regular Budget, the Working Capital Fund and the TCF, to enable the Agency to perform its mandate.

107. The theme of the 2019 Scientific Forum would encourage her country to develop comprehensive national cancer management programmes. She highlighted the radiotherapy centre at the new Sir Ketumile Masire Teaching Hospital, which, thanks to the Agency's technical support, would considerably reduce government expenditure on outsourcing cancer treatment while improving patient care. Noting the progress made in the current TC cycle — on projects that also benefited from Agency technical support — she said that Botswana endeavoured to use nuclear technology to boost economic development and improve people's lives.

108. Botswana joined the international community in condemning malicious acts involving nuclear technology. In March 2019, the Agency had conducted a second INSSP review mission in her country, identifying new priority areas for 2019–2021. Botswana was committed to implementing the recommended activities with the aim of improving nuclear security nationally, regionally and internationally. Her country advocated the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, as demonstrated by its compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and additional protocol, and encouraged other Member States to do likewise.

109. AFRA's programme offered clear benefits to participating States, in particular in the areas of capacity building and nuclear knowledge development through training and fellowships. In view of Botswana's efforts to transform its economy from a resource-based to a knowledge-based one, her country intended to honour its financial obligations to the AFRA fund to ensure smooth implementation of the programme.

110. Mr CHACÓN ESCAMILLO (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) extended his Government's sincerest condolences on the passing of Mr Amano, whose endeavours as Director General to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all countries and regions, under the motto of Atoms for Peace and Development, had left a great legacy.

111. As an undeniably pacifist country, Venezuela defended the principle of general, complete and non-discriminatory disarmament, in full compliance with the NPT, the CTBT and the Agency's Statute. It also acknowledged the Agency's efforts to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, facilitate the transfer of such technology to developing countries, promote the highest standards of nuclear safety and radiation protection, verify the non-diversion of nuclear energy through the safeguards system and conduct technical cooperation projects.

112. Having benefited greatly from projects in areas including health, radiation and environmental protection, national nuclear safety and security infrastructure and hydrology, Venezuela accorded special importance to the TC programme. As the technical assistance provided by the Agency contributed enormously to development and prosperity, it should not be subject to political, economic or military obstacles incompatible with the Agency's Statute. No country should be allowed to interfere with the normal functioning of the TC programme in another State, whether by placing restrictions on the acquisition, installation or maintenance of equipment or supplies — which, in Venezuela, had had a particular impact on the health sector — or by preventing nationals from other countries from attending TC programme training courses on its territory. He recalled that the Agency was based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members, and all members should fulfil in good faith the obligation assumed by them in accordance with the Statute.

113. Venezuela had repeatedly denounced the unilateral, illegitimate and immoral measures taken against it by the USA, in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and international law. The US blockade had prevented his country from obtaining the supplies required to ensure the safety of the remaining nuclear elements of its dismantled nuclear research reactor. Venezuela thanked the Agency for the swift assistance that it had provided to help remedy the situation.

114. Unilateral coercive measures had a destructive impact on the countries on which they were imposed, undermining and violating human rights while threatening the well-being of the population. As confirmed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, the imposition of economic sanctions on Venezuela in violation of international law had led to starvation and medicine shortages.

115. Venezuela acknowledged the Agency's efforts to objectively provide countries with statutory support and assistance, without allowing itself to be influenced by political considerations that

undermined Member States' rights. Venezuela was highly appreciative of the Agency's endeavours to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of Member States.

116. Venezuela had made progress in updating both its inventory of disused radioactive sources and the radiation safety information management system used by its regulatory authority. The regulator had also provided training for staff in the areas of safeguards, radiological emergencies and transport safety, and had supported the development of national regulations on the control of radioactive sources and devices that generate ionizing radiation. Venezuela was working with the Agency to develop storage for disused sources and radioactive waste.

117. As the sole nuclear verification authority, the Agency should limit its considerations to purely technical aspects, with no regard for the political or discriminatory arguments that might be used against a State seeking to exercise its right to develop a peaceful nuclear programme. In that connection, the international community must continue to support the JCPOA, a landmark achievement of diplomacy and multilateralism and a testament to the fact that mutually beneficial agreements could be reached through negotiations and mutual understanding.

118. Venezuela had always supported initiatives aimed at establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East. As such a zone would contribute effectively to achieving peace and security in the region, it should be created as soon as possible.

119. His country adhered to all Agency standards and was committed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States needed to take firm action to eliminate nuclear weapons and achieve general, complete and irreversible disarmament under strict and effective international control, in line with Article VI of the NPT. Venezuela recalled that the declaration adopted at the 17th Summit of Heads of State and Government of NAM had reaffirmed the commitment of those States to eliminating WMDs, in particular nuclear weapons.

120. Venezuela's motives within the Agency were entirely peaceful. His country was a firm supporter of the unalienable right of all developing countries to improve their technical capabilities and knowledge so that they could use the peaceful applications of nuclear energy to spur development and contribute to the well-being of their populations.

121. Mr YUSOF (Malaysia) extended his country's deepest condolences to the family, friends and colleagues of the late Director General.

122. Given the importance of nuclear energy to Member States in meeting their development goals, it was vital to surmount the growing challenges associated with the peaceful use of nuclear science, applications and technology. As the Agency needed sufficient, assured and predictable resources to promote the use of nuclear technology effectively, Malaysia would continue to honour its annual contributions to the Regular Budget and TCF and encouraged all Member States to do likewise.

123. Malaysia demonstrated the importance it attached to strengthening nuclear safety by hosting the Agency's international postgraduate educational course in radiation protection and the safety of radioactive sources, which 400 trainees from 34 countries had completed to date. He thanked the Agency for allowing it to continue hosting the course.

124. While backing the Agency's central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework, Malaysia had been implementing a Nuclear Security Plan since 2007. The recently finalized Practical Arrangements to establish a detection equipment depository would increase the visibility of Malaysia's Nuclear Security Support Centre through its implementation of the country's INSSP. Malaysia stood ready to share those capacities with other Member States.

125. Malaysia looked forward to participating at the highest level in the ICONS 2020 and hoped that the outcome would provide future direction and priorities for the Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025.

126. As a member of ASEANTOM, Malaysia welcomed the signing of Practical Arrangements that reaffirmed the commitment towards regional approaches in promoting harmonized regulatory control, as such approaches would enhance both national and regional regulatory capabilities.

127. Malaysia supported the TC programme, which needed to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the Agency's guiding principles, and looked forward to reviewing its CPF for 2017–2021 to reflect its current needs in implementing the SDGs. Malaysia would be stepping up its cooperation with the Agency and interested partners, for example through its development of a curriculum to introduce nuclear-related subjects in secondary schools, with the target of reaching a million students by 2021.

128. Malaysia was honoured to have a designated Collaborating Centre for plant mutation breeding using chronic gamma irradiation for the period 2019–2022. Along with the country's Collaborating Centres for non-destructive testing and radiation processing, it would enable scientists from other Member States to share resources, knowledge and expertise in their respective fields.

129. Malaysia invited all Member States to attend the 10th International Conference on Isotopes in February 2020, an opportunity to promote the use of isotopes in the fields of medicine, industry, the environment and agriculture.

130. Malaysia thanked States Parties to the NPT for their cooperation during Malaysia's chairmanship of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference and looked forward to its success.

131. Malaysia had supported the implementation and preservation of the JCPOA, an example of successful multilateralism and proof that diplomacy could overcome the most complex political and security challenges. The most recent developments were therefore of concern and Malaysia called on all parties to the JCPOA to ensure its continuation.

132. Malaysia supported all diplomatic efforts that would lead to the easing of tensions on and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It called upon the DPRK to comply fully with the relevant Security Council and General Conference resolutions, return to the non-proliferation regime and implement Agency comprehensive safeguards effectively. Only continuous transparency and full cooperation between the Secretariat and Member States would enable the full potential of the peaceful atom to be harnessed.

133. Ms KOIKA (Greece) expressed her country's deep sorrow at the death of Mr Amano and extended its heartfelt condolences to his family and to the Secretariat.

134. Greece strongly supported the universality of the NPT, the cornerstone of non-proliferation and the disarmament regime. All States that had not yet done so should become parties to that Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The current NPT review cycle was more important than ever and Greece looked forward to tangible results. Greece reaffirmed its full support for the establishment of a zone free of WMDs in the Middle East and encouraged all parties to reinvigorate their efforts in that regard.

135. Greece had welcomed the JCPOA as a historic agreement and a multilateral endeavour unanimously endorsed by a Security Council resolution. The recent developments reported by the Agency were therefore of concern; Greece called upon all parties to implement the JCPOA and urged Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency. Greece backed the initiative of President Macron of France and encouraged all interested parties to take a constructive approach. Greece continued to support the Agency in its long term mission of monitoring and verifying Iran's nuclear programme and commended the Agency on its impartiality, objectivity and professionalism.

136. Greece supported the Agency's efforts to further develop and successfully implement the SLA in States under integrated safeguards and welcomed periodic reporting from the Secretariat. Consistent and universal application of the SLA would boost global non-proliferation efforts.

137. Although Greece did not have nuclear power in its energy mix, it noted the steady increase in its region in the use of nuclear energy and related sensitive technologies and materials. Greece supported the Agency's vital role in building States' capacities to ensure that nuclear energy was developed and used under the most rigorous safety and security conditions, and that humans and the environment were protected.

138. The development of nuclear energy infrastructure in volatile regions called for caution. In addition, full cooperation with the Agency and transparent international collaboration were required to minimize safety, security and proliferation risks. As a result, the Agency's safety standards and nuclear security guidelines must be rigorously implemented. Greece encouraged all countries to request peer review missions, implement follow-up recommendations and publish mission reports in the spirit of transparency.

139. Greece looked forward to the forthcoming International Conference on Climate Change and the Role of Nuclear Power and to the ICONS 2020, to be held in February 2020.

140. Since the 62nd regular session of the General Conference, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission had continued to cooperate with the Agency in several areas. The necessary regulations for radiation protection and the framework for the regulatory control of practices of ionizing radiation, using a graded approach, had been incorporated into domestic legislation. A detailed assessment of potential emergency exposure situations and the relevant protection strategies had been completed using Agency methodology. The assessment would be used to update existing national emergency response plans and to prepare new plans. In February 2019, the irradiated nuclear fuel from the GRR-1 research reactor had been shipped to the USA. Greece had invited the Agency to conduct an ARTEMIS mission, currently scheduled for 2023.

141. Greek scientists shared and gained experience by participating in regional and interregional TC projects, and supported Agency activities by participating in expert missions. Greek experts had assisted other Member States in drafting their radiation safety regulations. Greece also participated in cooperation initiatives to build national capacities to ensure the effective regulatory control of the transport of radioactive material in the Mediterranean region and in Europe. The Greek Atomic Energy Commission — the Agency's regional training centre in Europe — had begun its sixth cycle of the PGEC in radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources.

142. Over the previous year, Greece had hosted three Agency meetings, in which 60 scientists had participated and ten fellows had been hosted in national laboratories for on-the-job-training or scientific visits in the fields of radiation safety and security; in addition, 40 Greek scientists had participated in a number of other Agency events.

143. Mr FACETTI (Paraguay) offered his country's sincere condolences on the recent passing of Mr Amano, a great loss for the international community.

144. Having closely monitored the worldwide progress of nuclear development and the accompanying safety measures, Paraguay paid particular attention to the Agency's actions aimed at enhancing safeguards and compliance with them. Paraguay continued to build its capacities in nuclear applications in the areas of medicine, agriculture, mining and industry, prioritizing the training of national human resources and promoting research. His country was committed to facilitating access to the most modern nuclear medicine technology.

145. His Government continued to strengthen its legal and regulatory regime, which contributed to regional and global efforts to promote nuclear and radiation safety. Paraguay appreciated the Agency's work to foster a robust culture of nuclear and radiation safety, vital for ensuring the safety of the general public, workers and the environment, while reducing risks of exposure.

146. As multilateralism based on cooperation was essential for secure nuclear development in Paraguay, the central plank of government policy was participation in the Agency's different mechanisms and other international forums. Given that the current challenge of nuclear security could not be addressed solely through isolated domestic policies, all States needed to coordinate their respective nuclear security agendas to tackle real threats. Paraguay itself was leading the discussion of nuclear security in the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security. Commending the Agency and its advisory bodies on their important work on highlighting the crucial issues of nuclear safety and security and their interface, he urged them to keep up their efforts. He thanked the Member States that had contributed to the NSF in support of the Agency's activities.

147. Although all attention in the coming weeks would be focused on the election of the Agency's next Director General, Paraguay hoped that Member States would assist in the preparatory work for the ICONS 2020, under the leadership of the co-chairs, Panama and Romania, to ensure the conference was a success.

148. Regional centres played an extremely important role in establishing and strengthening cooperation in the field of nuclear security. Paraguay welcomed the Agency's reviews and Member States' missions aimed at improving security in nuclear installations.

149. It was essential, in Paraguay's view, to make progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The only truly effective guarantee against the use of such weapons — or threat to use them — was complete, irreversible and verifiable disarmament. The creation of NWFZs in other regions should therefore be a priority. Consequently, his Government welcomed the progress made towards complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

150. Paraguay believed it was extremely important for the JCPOA to remain in force as it was an essential tool for the global non-proliferation regime. That required the parties to reach a consensus and his country appreciated the efforts of European States in support of the JCPOA. Paraguay was concerned at the rise in Iran's stockpiling of enriched uranium above the limits established in the JCPOA and by the rise in its R&D related to centrifuge technology. Paraguay urged Iran to reverse those steps, work towards the continued implementation of the JCPOA and cooperate fully with the Agency. His Government placed its trust in the Agency, underlining its impartiality and professionalism in fulfilling its mandate and encouraging dialogue and diplomatic initiatives to preserve the JCPOA.

151. Turning to the TC programme, he said that Paraguay participated in national projects and others under the ARCAL programme, a keystone of horizontal cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear technology in the region since the 1980s. His country appreciated all ARCAL projects and, in particular, the support it had received from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. With respect to the bilateral cooperation on nuclear applications between Paraguay and Argentina since 1967, in agriculture, medicine and other areas, his country recognized Argentina as a strategic ally and an innovator in global nuclear energy development.

152. Highly appreciative of FORO and its activities in the Ibero-American region, Paraguay hoped that FORO and the Agency would pursue their cooperation to make the world safer and more secure. In closing, he reiterated Paraguay's commitment to achieving the SDGs and furthering the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in accordance with the international instruments established by the Agency.

153. Mr DERE (Turkey) said that Mr Amano, a man of remarkable dedication and professionalism, had served with unwavering commitment, leaving behind a strong legacy in all fields covered by the Agency's mandate. His resolute manner and tireless efforts for further improving Turkey's ties with the Agency would always be remembered in his country.

154. Turkey was in the process of building its nuclear power infrastructure and was committed to working closely with the Agency to promote the highest standards in nuclear safety, security and safeguards for promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology. It appreciated the Agency's efforts to promote a strong and lasting global nuclear safety regime in ever-changing circumstances and, as an embarking country, drew on the main international mechanisms under the Agency's auspices, such as the CNS.

155. Over the preceding year, Turkey had made significant progress in establishing a modern, reliable and effective nuclear energy infrastructure in the areas of regulatory control and the supervision of nuclear and radiological activities and facilities. The reorganization of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority had been completed following the creation of a Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which had reviewed the country's legal framework and issued new regulations. Additional legislative infrastructure was due to be finalized and enter into force by the end of 2019.

156. The Turkish nuclear programme continued to benefit from Agency review services and expert missions. Turkey actively supported the Agency's nuclear safety programme by hosting capacity-building activities for the benefit of counterparts from other countries. He thanked the Agency for its close cooperation on training courses, fellowships, workshops and technical visits.

157. Turkey supported the Agency's role in facilitating and coordinating international cooperation on nuclear security and providing assistance in technical, policy-related and regulatory capacity building. Attaching great importance to the universalization and full implementation of the CPPNM and its Amendment, his country looked forward to the 2021 A/CPPNM Conference and to the ICONS 2020, both of which would enhance international nuclear security.

158. The Agency's crucial safeguards system needed to adapt to keep pace with rapidly developing technologies and the increased use of nuclear applications and nuclear power production around the world. Turkey was contributing actively to the 2020 NPT review process, as a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, and to the success of the 2020 NPT Review Conference.

159. Turkey had made a voluntary contribution to the ReNuAL project in the belief that the TC programme was the Agency's key tool for the attainment of the SDGs.

160. Turkey reiterated its concerns regarding current developments in relation to the JCPOA. Challenges to its full implementation served neither regional and international security nor the non-proliferation regime. The JCPOA had to be preserved through multilateral reconciliation and understanding among all the relevant parties.

161. Extra momentum should be found for the process of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In that connection, the DPRK's most recent short-range missile tests were a cause of concern. Turkey urged the DPRK to collaborate with the international community and return to the NPT regime, both to enhance international security and to benefit its own population.

162. Mr NANGOMBE (Namibia) paid tribute to the late Director General for his significant contribution and dedication to the Agency, in particular his work to promote nuclear science in developing countries. Namibia welcomed the renaming of the Flexible Modular Laboratory after Mr Amano. He also expressed his country's heartfelt condolences on the tragic death of the South African Deputy Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Ms Hlongwa.

163. Namibia commended the Agency on its achievements over the previous year, in face of growing requests from Member States and limited financial resources. Namibia itself continued to benefit immensely from TC activities through the CPF and thanked the Agency for its support for nuclear science and technology applications in the areas of health, hunger eradication, energy, the environment and climate change. Namibia hoped to explore new avenues in the area of resource mobilization.

164. In view of the rise in cancer-related deaths, in particular in developing countries, the theme of the 2019 Scientific Forum was timely. It provided an important platform for Member States to exchange knowledge and best practices in order to improve their cancer control programmes and address related challenges. As the fight against cancer remained a key priority for Namibia, he called on the Agency and other development partners to support his country in its efforts to build capacity to meet the demand for cancer diagnosis and treatment services.

165. Namibia's unwavering commitment to its international nuclear safeguards obligations had been demonstrated by numerous visits with complementary access by Agency safeguards inspectors, which had confirmed that Namibia's nuclear activities remained peaceful.

166. Namibia had also contributed to the development of an IAEA Milestones approach for uranium mining, which would guide Member States, in particular new uranium producers, through the exploration, mining, production and remediation processes.

167. Despite constraints, much progress had been made in building capacity at the National Radiation Protection Authority, enabling it to host fellows from the region. Namibia had also institutionalized a postgraduate programme in nuclear science and technology and had trained staff to support the overall development of nuclear science. In conclusion, he reiterated his country's commitment to disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and applications.

168. Mr SABBAGH (Syrian Arab Republic) offered his country's condolences on the passing of Mr Yukiya Amano. Deeply grateful for his service as Director General, Syria welcomed the resolution to name a laboratory in his memory.

169. The General Conference offered Member States an important platform for discussing ways and means of tackling challenges, enabling the Agency to fulfil its statutory mandate in a fully independent, professional and impartial manner, and preventing any party from deviating it from its course or exploiting it to impose narrowminded political agendas on certain States.

170. The Board of Governors agenda item on the implementation of the CSA in the Syrian Arab Republic was a typical example of such exploitation by certain States. Israel's deplorable assault on Syrian territorial sovereignty in 2007 had been used as a platform to attack, demonize, blockade and exert political pressure on his country. Israel's acknowledgement of its responsibility for the assault, after a decade of denial and lies, should oblige the Agency to start sending inspection missions to the country immediately. The continued discussion of the agenda item would serve no purpose so long as Israel, the aggressor, remained uncooperative.

171. In contrast, Syria had cooperated with the Agency in a fully transparent and flexible way. In addition, the Agency's successive annual reports on safeguards implementation, most recently the report for 2018, had confirmed that Syria fully complied with its safeguards agreement and the NPT and had met all periodic inspection requests on time.

172. Syria welcomed Iran's commitment to implementing the JCPOA, as repeatedly confirmed by Agency reports, and deplored the unilateral and illegitimate decision by the USA to withdraw. That was a flagrant breach of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and seriously undermined an exceptional diplomatic achievement. The JCPOA included both rights and responsibilities and its successful

implementation did not fall to Iran alone. The other parties must fulfil their obligations, in particular the lifting of the tyrannical sanctions imposed on the Iranian people.

173. Resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities clearly expressed the international community's concern about the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East. Israel's continued possession of nuclear capabilities covered by neither the NPT nor a CSA posed an enormous threat to the non-proliferation regime, regional security and stability, and international peace and security. As Israel refused to join the NPT or any other treaty on WMD disarmament, and possessed significant nuclear capabilities, it had no moral right to criticize cases of non-compliance with the NPT. It was unfortunate that, while all the NPT States Parties in the Middle East were ready to take practical steps to establish a zone in the region free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs, Israel continued to defy the international community, remaining outside the non-proliferation regime. It relied on the full backing of its allies, including nuclear-weapon States such as the USA, which applied double standards to non-proliferation when it came to Israeli nuclear capabilities.

174. Syria endorsed UN General Assembly decision 73/546 on holding a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which sought to break the stalemate on implementing the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Syria stood ready to work with all participating States for a fruitful and effective conference, to be held in New York in November 2019. Commending the sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on supporting the decision, Syria denounced the USA for persistently refusing to participate in the conference and hindering the implementation of the resolution.

175. Syria backed the Agency's efforts, in particular under the TC programme, to share nuclear technology among Member States to advance their development plans. Thanks to the support of the Department of Technical Cooperation, his country had successfully implemented a considerable number of TC project components. Welcoming the opportunity to host training activities as part of the TC programme, Syria was willing to provide all the necessary guarantees for their successful implementation.

176. Mr HAMMER (Australia) said that the Agency's ability to undertake verification and monitoring activities in Iran was fundamental to his country's support for the JCPOA, a plan which had been peacefully negotiated and was in the best interests of the international community. Australia noted with concern the recent setbacks that the Agency had faced in seeking full and timely cooperation from Iran in relation to the implementation of its CSA and additional protocol. Iran's actions in recent months to diminish compliance with the JCPOA were deeply worrying. Australia urged Iran to reverse those actions, return immediately to full compliance with the JCPOA and refrain from any further actions that might jeopardize it or escalate international tensions.

177. Along with other States, Australia sought permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, through the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK. Australia condemned the DPRK's continuing development of nuclear weapons, in violation of Security Council resolutions, as it posed an unacceptable challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. It also condemned the DPRK's repeated missile launches, which threatened peace and stability, posed an increasing risk of miscalculation and were in clear violation of Security Council resolutions.

178. Australia strongly urged the DPRK to return to full compliance with the NPT, permit an early return to Agency safeguards inspections, comply fully with all Security Council resolutions regarding its WMDs and ballistic missile programmes, and sign and ratify the CTBT. Australia would maintain severe sanctions against the DPRK and called on other States to do likewise, until such time as the DPRK took clear and verifiable steps to denuclearize.

179. Australia welcomed the Agency's work to further strengthen and integrate efficiencies into the global safeguards system and congratulated it on the successful Symposium on International Safeguards held in November 2018. He thanked it for its continued participation in and support for the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network. Australia congratulated the Agency on the success of the first IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology.

180. As a world-leading supplier of reactor-produced nuclear medicines, Australia had fully understood the importance of nuclear science and technology for improving human health and well-being. Once its new nuclear medicine processing facility was fully operational, Australia would be able to meet up to 25% of global demand for molybdenum-99.

181. Proud of its excellent nuclear safety and security record, Australia had been the first supplier to produce molybdenum-99 exclusively from LEU. In conjunction with other major producers, the country had eliminated HEU from approximately 75% of the world's molybdenum-99 supply chain, proving that it was both technically and commercially feasible. Accordingly it urged all Member States in the process of converting from HEU-based methods to persevere, thereby eliminating an unnecessary nuclear proliferation and security risk.

182. Construction of the world's first industrial-scale plant for synroc waste treatment had begun. The Australian-developed waste management technology was designed to immobilize radioactive waste, minimize volume and provide an extremely durable and safe solution for final storage. Australia was keen to share information regarding the unique benefits and wide applications of the technology with interested parties.

183. Committed to best practice in nuclear safety Australia had hosted its second full-scope IRRS in November 2018, the largest such mission ever undertaken. It commended the Agency on the services it provided all Member States for enhancing their nuclear safety and security regimes.

184. Australia looked forward to the 2020 NPT Review Conference, to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the NPT, which gave pause to reflect on the enduring significance of the NPT to global peace and security. All NPT Parties had an obligation, and core national security imperative, to cooperate on ensuring a positive outcome at the conference.

185. As co-chair of the Group of Friends for Women in Nuclear, Australia lent its full support to the Agency and commended it on its efforts to enhance the representation of women in the Secretariat and the role of women in the wider nuclear sector. Mr Amano's proactive and pioneering approach to achieving gender equality at the Agency would form an important part of his wider legacy. He had tirelessly championed the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, in particular for development, and had guided the Agency through a difficult and sensitive period for international security. Australia would remember Director General Amano for that and the many other areas in which he had excelled.

186. Mr SNIR (Israel) said that his country joined the international community and Member States in mourning the loss of Yukiya Amano. The late Director General had led the Agency in a time of great change, innovation and development. His efforts would continue to influence the Agency in the achievement of its goals over the coming years. More than ever before the Agency's values of independence, integrity and professionalism of the Agency must be maintained.

187. Israel supported the Agency in its essential role of verifying and monitoring Member States' nuclear commitments. Safeguards were a fundamental and vital component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Agency was currently facing significant challenges, but was being prevented from addressing them, or attaining its goals, as it was burdened with constant lies, misleading statements and intentional delays by certain Member States. Iran, in particular, consistently and

violently attempted to shift the focus of the General Conference to distract the Agency and impede its important work.

188. Israel had confidence in the Agency's professional technical capacities for verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclear-related activities, but Iran's deception and concealment of such activities emphasized the need for greater vigilance and support for the Agency's important work. Iran's threats to enhance its nuclear programme were a blatant attempt to extort the international community, which needed to respond to those threats, and to recent revelations of undeclared Iranian activities, with a clear and collective message — that it would not accept Iran's continued reprehensible nuclear conduct.

189. The information revealed by Israel in the nuclear archive clearly proved that Iran was continuing to develop a military nuclear weapons programme. Iran's protection, preservation and massive concealment of capabilities, information and undeclared activities clearly indicated not a civilian nuclear programme but a nuclear weapons programme, which was being maintained and could be restored in the future. The JCPOA could not and would not prevent that.

190. Iran continued to deceive the international community by failing to provide clear, honest information about its nuclear programme under its CSA. Iran's active attempts to conceal and remove nuclear materials and equipment from its clandestine sites undermined the Agency's ability to conduct effective verification missions. The international community could not allow Iran to continue evading questions about its nuclear materials, equipment, capabilities and sites. Iran must provide the Agency with access to all information pertaining to the development of its nuclear weapons programme.

191. Iran's behaviour had become more violent and aggressive than ever. An unwavering international stance against Iran's violations would send a clear message to Iranian leaders and other parties in breach of their safeguards obligations. One such party was Syria, which for 12 years had consistently refused to cooperate with the Agency and respond to questions about the secret reactor built at Dair Alzour. The Agency had recognized Syria's undeclared nuclear reactor and its failure to provide information about it as non-compliance with its obligations under its CSA. Those violations had occurred while Syria was a State Party to the NPT. Syria had joined other States in the Middle East — Iran in the present and Libya and Iraq in the past — in breaching their international commitments and obligations under the NPT. Any discussion on nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East must take into consideration the track records of those four States and Iran's current destabilizing activities.

192. Nuclear safety and security were at the forefront of global concern. Despite significant progress in the use of nuclear applications for food, agriculture and health, however, more needed to be done to achieve the SDGs. He expressed the hope that the Agency would continue to pay attention to professional and technical issues, rather than attempts to politicize the Agency and its agenda. Israel regretted the continuous abuse and politicization by some Member States. The annual agenda item on so-called Israeli nuclear capabilities was politically motivated and contradicted the Agency's spirit. The repeated inclusion of the issue on the agenda was unfortunate and it damaged the Agency's credibility.

193. A founding member of the Agency, Israel committed its best human capital to activities conducted with the Agency, including those pertaining to nuclear safety and security and emergency preparedness. His country also benefitted from the Agency's expertise and knowledge. Unlike several States in the region, Israel had always adhered to its obligations and would continue to call for full compliance by all States with their commitments to the Agency.

194. Mr DE ALMEIDA RIBEIRO (Portugal) offered his country's deepest sympathy for and solidarity with the Agency and the family of the late Director General. Mr Amano had championed international security and the well-being of humankind; the motto Atoms for Peace and Development, which reflected his vision, had never been more relevant. Portugal's close relationship with the Agency, as a founding member, had been demonstrated by Director General Amano's visit to Lisbon in April 2018. Portugal

had signed an MOU with a special focus on technical cooperation, further signifying a strengthening of the country's relationship with the Agency.

195. The Agency was an indispensable pillar of multilateralism in the domains of non-proliferation, nuclear energy, nuclear safety and security, and technical cooperation. Portugal welcomed a number of high-level events planned for the coming months, including the International Conference on Climate Change and the Role of Nuclear Power and the ICONS 2020.

196. Portugal's national regulatory infrastructure had recently undergone changes owing to the consolidation of its competences into a single domain, namely the environment. It had become more coherent and independent of both promoters and users of radiation technologies, in line with the Agency's safety standards. Having dismantled its research reactor, Portugal had shipped the reactor's LEU to the USA, which he thanked on his country's behalf for its support. Portugal counted on the Agency's assistance in that matter in the years to come. His country was also thankful for the support it had received in preparing for its first IRRS mission, scheduled to take place in 2020.

197. Although Portugal had never introduced nuclear power into its energy mix, a decision it stood by, the nuclear field was still highly relevant. Radiation technologies were significant for the Portuguese health and industrial sectors. As the incidence of cancer was rising to worrying proportions, Portugal was investing in innovative therapies and using an advanced system for the treatment of oncological diseases. In the framework of its next TC programme, Portugal hoped to develop specific competences in the field of proton therapy. It aimed to establish a therapy, education and training centre to benefit the country and interested partners. In that connection, Portugal welcomed the theme of the 2019 Scientific Forum.

198. Under the MOU signed between Portugal and the Agency, 50 scholarships would be granted by Portuguese institutions over five years; 10 had been granted or were being finalized. With its focus on applicants from developing States, Portugal was interested in receiving Portuguese-speaking candidates, who could benefit from training in their own language. Portugal also intended to put forward the Institute of Nuclear Sciences Applied to Health, University of Coimbra, as a candidate to become an IAEA Collaborating Centre in the area of radioisotope production and radiation technology.

199. The 2020 NPT Review Conference would be an opportunity for the international community to reaffirm and strengthen the principles of the NPT, which remained relevant to the current international order 50 years after the Treaty's entry into force. As a supporter of universalization of the NPT, Portugal called on all States that had not yet done so to accede to it.

200. Portugal called on Iran to comply with all its obligations under the JCPOA and cooperate fully and promptly with the Agency with respect to its CSA and additional protocol. Reaffirming its continued support for the JCPOA, Portugal expressed its deep regret at the USA's withdrawal and its reimposition of sanctions.

201. Portugal remained strongly committed to the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK must actively engage in negotiations with relevant stakeholders, while the Agency should play a significant role in the process.

202. Portugal regretted Syria's continued failure to comply with its CSA, and urged it to cooperate fully with the Agency.

203. Lastly, Portugal encouraged other Member States to contribute to ReNuAL — one of Director General Amano's many successful initiatives — as the project neared its conclusion, so as to be associated with its deliverable results, which would last for decades to come.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.