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President: Ms BUENROSTRO MASSIEU (Mexico)

Later: Mr GIERVELD (Netherlands)

Contents

Item of the agenda ¹		Paragraphs
7	General debate and Annual Report for 2018 (<i>continued</i>)	1–124
	Statements by the delegates of:	
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1–9
	Côte d'Ivoire	10–16
	Panama	17–23
	Chad	24–32
	Algeria	33–42
	Palestine	43–48
	Euratom	49–64
	OPANAL	65–70
	AFCONE	71–87
	CTBTO	88–96

¹ GC(63)/22.

Contents (continued)

	Paragraphs
AAEA	97–109
Sovereign Order of Malta	110–115
ABACC	116–123
France (right of reply)	124
– Restoration of voting rights	125–127
25 Examination of delegates' credentials	128–133
– Oral report by the Chair of the Committee of the Whole	134–147
9 The Agency's Financial Statements for 2018	148
10 The Agency's Programme and Budget for 2020–2021	149
12 Amendment to Article XIV.A of the Statute	150
13 Scale of assessment of Member States' contributions towards the Regular Budget for 2020	151
14 Nuclear and radiation safety	152
15 Nuclear security	153
16 Strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities	154
17 Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications	155
18 Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards	156–169
22 Promotion of efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA decision making process	170–171
23 Amendment to Article VI of the Statute	172
24 Personnel	173
8 Election of members to the Board of Governors	174–196
11 Appointment of the External Auditor	197–202
25 Examination of delegates' credentials (<i>resumed</i>)	203

Abbreviations used in this record

AAEA	Arab Atomic Energy Agency
ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFCONE	African Commission on Nuclear Energy
AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AIDS	acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ARTEMIS	Integrated Review Service for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Decommissioning and Remediation
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
imPACT	integrated missions of PACT
INSARR	Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NPP	nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone

Abbreviations used in this record (continued)

OMARR	Operation and Maintenance Assessment for Research Reactors
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
ORPAS	Occupational Radiation Protection Appraisal Service
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
Quadrupartite Agreement	Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TC	technical cooperation
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
UF ₆	uranium hexafluoride
UN	United Nations
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
USA	United States of America

7. General debate and Annual Report for 2018 (continued) (GC(63)/5 and additional information)

1. Mr LUKANDA MWAMBA (Democratic Republic of the Congo) extended his sincere condolences to the Agency and to the family of Mr Amano, and expressed his country's gratitude for his strong leadership as Director General of the Agency.
2. His country appreciated the Agency's work in providing technical support, facilitating international cooperation and ensuring non-proliferation.
3. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2019 had seen the peaceful transfer of power to a new government following democratic elections. The Government of President Félix Antoine Tshilombo Tshisekedi was determined to continue cooperation with the Agency on its civil nuclear programme. Since the restart of his country's TRICO II research reactor after several years offline, the Agency had conducted pre-OMARR and INSARR missions in May 2018 and a visual inspection of the nuclear fuel and the reactor's internal structures. An OMARR mission was planned for December 2019.
4. In the area of health, the Agency had agreed to share the cost of a new gamma camera unit. Activities under PACT included an impACT mission planned for 2019. His Government called on its traditional partners to cooperate in the planned construction of the Kinshasa Diagnostic and Radiotherapy Centre.
5. The TC programme proposed for 2020–2021 would continue to focus on radiation protection infrastructure, safety and regulatory supervision of research reactors, capacities for non-destructive testing, evaluation of uranium resources, improvement of food crop varieties, laboratory surveillance of transboundary livestock diseases, production of animal vaccines, nuclear medicine services, and analytical capacities to ensure the safety of food for human and animal consumption. His country was actively involved in 36 regional projects in areas that closely complemented its national programmes and supported its development priorities.
6. His Government had requested Agency assistance with developing higher education programmes in nuclear science and technology, a new area of collaboration. As recommended, his country was pursuing cost-sharing initiatives and seeking partners in areas such as radiotherapy, nuclear medicine and higher education, as well as in radiation metrology for the installation of a secondary dosimetry laboratory.
7. Agency support had made possible a national workshop in March 2019 that had produced an updated INSSP. Work had also begun, with the assistance of the Agency and other partners, on establishing the National Centre for Nuclear Security Support and Training.
8. To strengthen physical protection at nuclear and radiological facilities, his Government had welcomed an IPPAS mission in December 2017 and a mission from the US Department of Energy in September 2019. Securing decommissioned radioactive sources had been the focus of a visit conducted by the Agency in May.
9. Over the previous year, his country had published numerous texts to strengthen its regulatory infrastructure. A law on radiation protection and the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities had had its first reading at the Agency and would be discussed with the appropriate services. His

Government also intended to seek an expert opinion from the Agency on its plan to establish a school and a centre for the management of nuclear and radiological emergencies.

10. Mr KACOU (Côte d'Ivoire) paid tribute on behalf of his Government and his delegation to the late Director General, Mr Yukiya Amano, noting that under his leadership the Agency had made great advances.

11. Through TC with the Agency, Côte d'Ivoire had received equipment, expert missions and fellowships to support activities in agriculture, environmental protection, scientific research, energy planning, animal health and production, radiopharmacy, radiotherapy and, above all, nuclear medicine.

12. His country was working to bring its radiation safety infrastructure into line with Agency standards by establishing an operational radiation protection and nuclear safety and security authority. Radiation safety and nuclear security in the long term would be supported by strengthening the regulatory framework, improving the monitoring of exposures and adopting a training and education strategy.

13. The Institute of Nuclear Medicine of Abidjan had acquired a gamma camera, with Agency financing, for use in particular for examinations of the thyroid, heart and lungs, and it would soon be receiving patients. In addition, the Alassane Ouattara National Radiotherapy Centre, which had been established in January 2018 under a public-private partnership, had received support from the Agency with capacity building. In its first 19 months of operation, the centre had registered 2154 new patients, conducted 7145 consultations, provided radiotherapy to 543 patients and carried out 3265 cycles of chemotherapy. Other such centres were being planned.

14. In agriculture, new techniques had been developed for producing crop varieties resistant to unfavourable growing conditions brought about by climate change. Some of these, including maize, cassava, plantain, market gardening crops and protein crops, were being improved with the Agency's assistance under a national programme. In the stockbreeding sector, the Agency was strengthening operational capacities by equipping the Ivorian National Agricultural Development Laboratory to use isotopic techniques and providing assistance in animal disease diagnosis, surveillance and control.

15. Côte d'Ivoire was deriving benefit from some 30 interregional, regional and national TC projects financed by the Agency to support the country's socioeconomic development, in particular in the areas of health, agriculture and nuclear safety and security.

16. Côte d'Ivoire greatly valued the Agency's contributions to international peace and security and to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by an increasing number of countries, and it had every faith in the Agency's ability to face future challenges.

17. Mr PABÓN CHEVALIER (Panama) said that his country lamented the passing of Mr Yukiya Amano and recognized his contribution to the Agency's mandate to promote world peace and development. It hoped that the next Director General would take an inclusive approach to the position and work to achieve the SDGs.

18. He offered condolences to the family of Ms Bavelile Hlongwa, Deputy Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy of South Africa, whose untimely death had prevented her from attending the General Conference.

19. Panama had hosted World Youth Day in 2019, the largest event ever to take place in the country. To provide security for over half a million participants, an agreement on nuclear security assistance had been signed with the Agency in 2017. The coordination meetings, workshops and detection equipment training provided under that agreement had contributed to the success of the event, while at the same time strengthening Panama's overall security regime.

20. In 2018, his country had received ORPAS missions and advice on occupational radiation protection training. It had also hosted a regional workshop on strengthening regulatory requirements concerning the education, training and qualifications of radiation protection officials and experts.
21. Under ARCAL, Panama's facility for the mass production of sterile screwworm flies, with its specialized staff, could serve as the basis for a regional initiative to suppress and ultimately eradicate screwworm flies in the Caribbean and in South America.
22. A workshop to review and update Panama's CPF for 2020–2025 had recently been held, with Agency support. Working groups of national stakeholders had defined the priorities for TC in nuclear safety, radiation protection, health, nutrition and other areas, in line with Panama's development needs.
23. Panama wished to strengthen its cooperation with the Agency and reaffirmed its commitment to the TC programme.
24. Ms ALI MOUSSA (Chad) said that her country paid homage to the late Director General for the professionalism, courage and wisdom he had displayed throughout his tenure. She conveyed the deepest condolences of the Government of Chad to the family of the deceased, the staff of the Agency and the international community on the occasion of Mr Amano's passing.
25. She announced her Government's intention to work with the Agency to establish a nuclear power programme as part of its plan, Vision 2030, to pursue socioeconomic development through large-scale industrialization and help Chad to become an emerging market economy by 2035.
26. Chad intended to draft and pass new legislation to meet strict nuclear safety and security standards in line with its INSSP for the period 2018–2023. During that period, national experts would familiarize themselves with the Agency's publication *Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime* (NSS-20).
27. Her country had deposited its instrument of accession to the CPPNM and its instrument of ratification of the Amendment to the CPPNM on 16 September 2019.
28. To instil a genuine radiation safety culture, her country intended to take advantage of all the Agency's relevant training programmes. It reaffirmed its commitment to promoting radiation safety and nuclear security in line with international safety standards, which it saw as valuable tools for gradually applying safety standards at all levels.
29. In line with its commitment to meeting standards for safeguards, nuclear security and radiation safety, Chad, which possessed vast uranium resources, was working actively to promote the peaceful use of nuclear techniques and the strengthening of the relevant international legal framework. Chad stood ready to work with the Agency and all Member States to establish a peaceful world free of all weapons of mass destruction and to strengthen the radiation safety and nuclear security regimes, including through Agency advisory missions.
30. Her country was currently implementing national TC projects on anthropogenic pollution in the Chari-Logone system; assessing the quality of water and beverages in N'Djamena, Sarh and Bol; training and knowledge and technology transfer for the Chad Radiation Protection and Nuclear Security Agency; food supplementation for persons living with HIV/AIDS; and animal and human trypanosomosis vectors in the Mandoul region.
31. Chad planned to use isotopic techniques to study the aquifers it shared with Egypt, Libya and the Sudan and Saharan Member States, in particular in the Lake Chad Basin. Her country intended to take an active part in AFRA, and it intended to sign a CPF with the Agency for the period 2019–2024.

32. To foster a safety and security culture, the Chad Radiation Protection and Nuclear Security Agency had organized national training and awareness-raising workshops for senior hospital and oil company officials on the detection of ionizing radiation sources at the country's borders and the safe transport of radioactive substances.

33. Ms MEBARKI (Algeria) offered her Government's condolences to the Agency and to the family of Mr Yukiya Amano and paid tribute to his commitment to promoting the Agency's work under the motto 'Atoms for Peace and Development'.

34. Algeria had allocated significant funding for infrastructure, equipment and human resource training for cancer control. Several new cancer control centres had been established that were using new technologies to improve patient care. By 2020, Algeria would have some 50 linear accelerators for use in radiotherapy. Her country reaffirmed its commitment to making its expertise and infrastructure for the peaceful use of nuclear energy available to other countries in Africa.

35. Algeria greatly appreciated the Agency's continuous efforts to strengthen international operational and regulatory frameworks pertaining to nuclear safety and security. Her country had promulgated a law regulating research, production and peaceful use of nuclear energy that provided for the establishment of an independent nuclear safety and security authority in line with international standards. Another instance of progress in that area, namely security upgrades for the Es-Salam research reactor, had been completed in February 2019.

36. All of Algeria's activities relating to nuclear security were part of its INSSP. In response to recommendations her country had strengthened its regulatory framework for nuclear security by implementing physical protection provisions for nuclear facilities and for nuclear material and radioactive sources, including sources in equipment used in socio-economic sectors. Her country looked forward to the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts, to be held in February 2020.

37. As a country with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, Algeria had taken note of the progress made in strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards, and it encouraged the Agency to pursue those efforts within the scope of its statutory functions. Algeria strongly supported the universal character of the Agency's verification system.

38. In October 2018 the Algerian Atomic Energy Commission (COMENA) and the Joint Research Centre had collaborated on an advanced regional training course on safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation for the countries of North Africa and the Sahel.

39. Algeria intended to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In addition, it was working to create an NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly and the decisions of the NPT Review Conferences. Algeria called for greater efforts to be made to establish such a zone, in particular by the three States that had co-authored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Such a zone was desired by all States in the region except Israel, which continued to refuse to accede to the NPT and submit all its nuclear facilities to comprehensive Agency safeguards.

40. Algeria supported research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as provided for under the NPT. There must be no restrictions on access to peaceful nuclear technologies for States that had agreed to conduct their nuclear activities with full transparency and in conformity with their international obligations.

41. Algeria was active in international efforts to bring into force the CTBT and would co-chair, with Germany, the upcoming Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in New York. That

issue was of particular concern to Algeria because its people were still experiencing the devastating health and environmental consequences of the French nuclear testing that had taken place in the Algerian Sahara.

42. The statement by the scientist Théodore Monod that “nuclear weapons are the accepted end of humanity” more than ever challenged all people to work together so that future generations could live in peace and security and in a world free of nuclear weapons.

43. Mr ABDEL SHAFI (Palestine) extended his delegation’s deep condolences to the family of Mr Yukiya Amano, to the Japanese Government and to the staff of the Agency.

44. Palestine was grateful for the national TC projects that had been implemented in Palestine on radiation protection, agriculture, medicine and the environment. Topics included improving wheat varieties, building capacity in nuclear medicine and radiation oncology, developing infrastructure for regulating the safety of radiation sources, strengthening the monitoring of contamination in food and other matrices using nuclear and complementary analytical techniques, assessing groundwater resources using environmental isotopes, and monitoring radionuclides in the environment.

45. Palestine had acceded to the NPT in 2015 and had participated in the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the work of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference. In response to the Director General’s calls for States to do so, Palestine had signed a CSA in June 2019, demonstrating its commitment to the universalization of the NPT.

46. Palestine regretted that the late Director General had been unable to make progress in implementing resolution GC(62)/RES/12 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, but it was confident that the next Director General would initiate consultations with all Member States with that aim.

47. Palestine continued to be occupied by a State which had nuclear facilities that were not subject to a CSA and which in addition, according to expert reports and other available documents, possessed a large nuclear arsenal. Those nuclear capabilities posed a direct threat to the safety and security of the people of Palestine, the region and the rest of the world. Palestine, which had been one of the first States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, was seriously concerned by Israel’s growing military nuclear capability and its continued refusal to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear programmes and facilities under comprehensive safeguards, as all other States in the region had done. The denial of Israel’s military nuclear capabilities by certain States was unacceptable and inconsistent with the reality of its hostile behaviour in Palestine and elsewhere.

48. Although the Arab Group had not succeeded in its efforts to hold a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, it continued to work towards the establishment of such a zone and the universalization of the NPT. Palestine highlighted the significance of the decision² adopted in 2018 by the United Nations General Assembly on convening such a conference in 2019, and it looked forward to the participation of the Agency and of all States of the region in the conference.

49. Mr LECHNER (European Atomic Energy Community) expressed his organization’s deep condolences to the family of Mr Yukiya Amano and to the Agency on his passing, which it viewed as a great loss for the international community.

50. Euratom had a well-established history of cooperation with the Agency and it greatly appreciated the Agency’s comprehensive role in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and radiation technologies. Since the conclusion of safeguards agreements between the Agency, Euratom and its

² Decision 73/546.

member States in the 1970s, Euratom had been a formal partner in the global safeguards system, performing joint inspections with the Agency and using common equipment.

51. Euratom underlined the importance of the ‘safeguards-by-design’ concept, which involved incorporating nuclear safeguards early in the planning of installations, and noted that it had recently been implemented successfully with Agency cooperation in novel projects in the EU.

52. Euratom was committed to continue its support for Agency safeguards through the European Commission Cooperative Support Programme.

53. The EU had given legal force to the objectives of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in the amended European Union Nuclear Safety Directive. Euratom supported the invitation by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group for the Agency to make full use of the outcomes of the European topical peer review on ageing management of nuclear installations, and it looked forward to sharing its experience at the Eighth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The European Commission was pleased to be co-hosting the Agency’s International Conference on Effective Nuclear and Radiation Regulatory Systems in November 2019 in the Netherlands.

54. Euratom cooperated with a variety of countries on the implementation of EU methodologies for stress tests and peer reviews. The European Commission, with the Agency and other partners, was supporting the implementation of the Strategic Master Plan for Environmental Remediation of Uranium Legacy Sites in Central Asia, and Euratom invited Member States to join and support the programme. The first practical project would soon start in Kyrgyzstan.

55. Euratom and the Agency were cooperating closely on the long term safe management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, including decommissioning and financial aspects, in particular through ARTEMIS. Six missions had been conducted in EU member States to date.

56. All Member States of the Agency, especially those embarking on nuclear programmes, were encouraged to take advantage of relevant EU peer review missions. Euratom strongly supported publication of the results of those missions in the interests of transparency.

57. Euratom appreciated its cooperation with the Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development on the project entitled Status and Trends in Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management and on the harmonization of radioactive waste and spent fuel inventory reporting requirements.

58. The European Commission attached great importance to the full implementation of the JCPOA and continued to fulfil its commitments under Annex III. The European Commission supported the Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority, including through the establishment of a nuclear safety centre in Tehran and the implementation of stress tests at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The EU had organized conferences, training sessions and seminars for Iranian regulatory experts and visits to EU research facilities for scientists. Overall, EU efforts on civil nuclear cooperation in Iran represented an expenditure of €10 million, and more activities were planned.

59. The European Commission supported the Agency’s verification activities as the basis for confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. It also supported Iran’s accession to those international nuclear conventions to which it was not yet party.

60. The European Commission welcomed the preparations for the 2021 conference of States Parties to the amended CPPNM and stressed the importance of close cooperation in addressing security threats.

61. The European Commission continued to support the Agency in nuclear material detection, nuclear forensics and the training of front-line officers. The EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence were well established on a regional basis.

62. The European Commission in 2019 had launched the first European Joint Programme in research on Radioactive Waste Management, in which the Agency was an important partner. Cooperation in other areas, such as nuclear decommissioning, would be strengthened in the near future. Euratom continued to support the advancement of non-power applications of nuclear energy in medicine, industry and research, and the next Euratom Research and Training Programme would increase its focus on those applications in health care and medical equipment.

63. The recent signature of the Practical Arrangements on Cooperation on Nuclear Science Applications had reinforced long-standing collaboration with the Agency in non-power applications, under which more than 32 joint actions had been undertaken as of the end of 2018.

64. Euratom continued to prioritize research in fusion energy, and the EU had taken on a leading role as host of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project, for which the European Commission had proposed allocating more than €6 billion from 2021 to 2027. The EU had also started exploring with the Agency the feasibility of a common framework for the safety of fusion devices.

Mr Gierveld (Netherlands), Vice-President, took the Chair.

65. Mr ANDERSON MACHADO (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) recalled that OPANAL was the only intergovernmental organization devoted exclusively to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Tlatelolco Treaty had been signed and ratified by all 33 countries of the region and had established Latin America and the Caribbean as an NWFZ.

66. The region had been the first to commit to using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and the first to establish a juridical standard for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Tlatelolco Treaty had inspired four other regions to establish NWFZs.

67. Close cooperation and coordination between OPANAL and the Agency, formalized in an agreement signed in October 1972, was essential to the functioning of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The treaty stipulated that OPANAL and the Agency were responsible for verifying States' compliance with their commitments under the treaty, which included the mandatory conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the Agency. Each Contracting Party was required to submit semi-annual reports to OPANAL stating that no prohibited activity had occurred in its territory. The Agency was authorized, with the involvement of OPANAL's Secretary-General and the approval of its Council, to carry out special inspections at the request of any Contracting Party.

68. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has two additional protocols to ensure that the region remained free of nuclear weapons. The first required that extra-regional States that were responsible, de jure or de facto, for territories inside the zone respect its status as an NWFZ, and the second bound the five nuclear-weapon States to respect that status.

69. Some States party to the additional protocols had made interpretive declarations constituting reservations that reduced the effectiveness of the NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean. Similar situations had arisen in relation to other such zones, and had raised concerns among the States in those zones and the vast majority of the international community, as reflected in the final documents of the NPT Review Conferences. OPANAL had approached the States party to the additional protocols with a proposal to negotiate adjustments to the relevant parts of their respective interpretive declarations.

70. In addition to the obligations established in the Tlatelolco Treaty, OPANAL had expanded its activities in recent years to include promoting participation by its members in the international debate

on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. For instance, each year on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons OPANAL had issued a declaration on all the major aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that had been adopted by consensus by its member States and which had then been circulated as an official document of the UN General Assembly, the Agency's General Conference and the Conference on Disarmament. Latin America and the Caribbean was the only region to issue such a declaration, and it had been able to do so thanks to the existence of its regional body, OPANAL.

71. Mr BAALIOUAMER (African Commission on Nuclear Energy) expressed his organization's sincere condolences to the Agency and to the Government and people of Japan upon the death of Ambassador Yukiya Amano, noting that he had always taken an interest in the social and economic development of Africa, in particular its less developed countries.

72. He conveyed his condolences to the Government of South Africa upon the death of its Deputy Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Ms Bavelile Hlongwa.

73. During its ten years in force, the Pelindaba Treaty had been signed by over 50 African Member States and ratified by 40. The Treaty prohibited the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear explosive devices within the territory of States party to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive waste within the African NWFZ. It also prohibited any attacks against nuclear installations in the zone by the Parties, and it required the Parties to maintain the highest standards of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment, which they were to use exclusively for peaceful purposes.

74. The Pelindaba Treaty had established AFCONE as the body responsible for ensuring compliance with the Treaty and its protocols, promoting cooperation in the peaceful, safe and secure uses of nuclear science and technology on the continent, and advancing global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. In addition, the Pelindaba Treaty permitted the Agency to verify the process of the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear explosive devices and called for States party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguard agreements with the Agency.

75. Nuclear science and technology were of great interest to African Member States for its potential to assist them in meeting their development needs and goals. With the strong and continuous support of the Agency, national and regional programmes were being implemented, including through AFRA, on peaceful nuclear applications in the areas of human health, agriculture, animal health, water resources, industry, the environment, energy planning and nuclear power.

76. AFCONE had identified the main priorities of the Agency's TC programme in Africa, in line with the region's development needs and priorities, as including: nuclear applications in human health; radioactive waste management and monitoring prohibition of its import on the continent; nuclear safety and safeguards, including nuclear material accounting and control; and verification, information processing and monitoring technologies.

77. AFCONE's efforts were aimed at supporting nuclear research and training with an emphasis on continuous improvement in nuclear safety, security and safeguards, and in particular the safe, efficient and secure integration of nuclear power into the region's energy mix. Currently more than ten African Member States were implementing TC projects related to nuclear power. The African Union looked forward to the recommendations and conclusions of the International Conference on Climate Change and the Role of Nuclear Power, which was due to be held in Vienna in October 2020.

78. The majority of African Member States were considering or already implementing national TC projects on cancer therapy. To support them, AFCONE, in cooperation with the Department of Social

Affairs of the African Union Commission and the Agency, was planning a regional seminar on fighting cancer to be held in conjunction with the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa at the beginning of 2020.

79. AFCONE also considered the management of radioactive waste in line with Agency recommendations and international standards to be a priority in the development of peaceful nuclear applications.

80. To support sustainable, independent national regulatory activities, AFCONE was planning to develop training courses on nuclear laws and regulations to be held in Africa in cooperation with selected national regulatory authorities and accredited universities, and with support from the Agency and other international partners.

81. There were several regional Centres of Excellence for Nuclear Security operating in African Member States thanks to support from international partners.

82. Another priority for AFCONE was the implementation and operationalization of national state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It had begun organizing several regional events on that subject in collaboration with the Agency's Department of Safeguards and other international partners.

83. To complement the aforementioned programmes, AFCONE, in close cooperation with the Agency, AFRA, the CTBTO and other international partners, would support nuclear research and training activities focused on the sustainable development of peaceful nuclear applications and the continuous improvement of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. AFCONE and the Agency had recently signed a Practical Arrangement for that purpose.

84. Under Agenda 2063, the main document used by AFCONE for strategic planning, particular emphasis would be placed on youth and women in nuclear through close collaboration with the regional organizations already in place.

85. Recalling that the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT would be celebrated in 2020, AFCONE reaffirmed the central role of NWFZs in the consolidation of the NPT and their contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation throughout the world. AFCONE had taken active part in the very successful seminar organized by UNODA and the Government of Kazakhstan in August 2019 in Nur-Sultan entitled 'Fostering cooperation and enhancing consultation mechanisms among the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones'. UNODA, the Agency and all other international partners should encourage such initiatives through interregional activities related to those zones.

86. AFCONE viewed the 64 actions contained in the action plan and the practical steps for the Middle East adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, together with the Final Documents of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, as positive developments for the NPT.

87. Those African States not yet party to the Pelindaba Treaty were encouraged to complete their ratification or accession procedures as soon as possible. The respective roles of AFCONE, the African Union Commission, the Agency and the CTBTO, and the coordination and cooperation among them, were essential to full implementation of the NWFZ in Africa.

88. Mr GRENARD (Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) conveyed his organization's deepest sympathy to the Agency upon the passing of Director General Yukiya Amano, noting that while his passing was a great loss for the international community, his legacy as diplomat and leader would endure. It had been largely during his tenure as Director General that the Agency and the CTBTO had begun to collaborate more closely to address some of the pressing issues facing the international community.

89. While the two organizations had separate mandates, they both worked to create a safe and secure world free of nuclear weapons and contributed to the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

90. One of the areas in which the two organizations had worked particularly closely was nuclear safety. After a period of close collaboration with the Agency following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the CTBTO had become a formal member of the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies and had co-sponsored the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations.

91. The CTBTO had started participating in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and collaborating with other scientific and academic institutions and mechanisms alongside the Agency. The basis for that collaboration had been the civil and scientific applications of the CTBTO's International Monitoring System technologies, such as for the detection of atmospheric radioactivity and the prediction of the path travelled by a given emission of radionuclides using meteorological data and atmospheric transport modelling. Such applications of CTBT technologies had led to other mutually beneficial interactions between the two organizations. For example, staff from both organizations had participated in the Agency's 2018 Scientific Forum on Nuclear Technology for Climate: Mitigation, Monitoring and Adaptation, and the CTBT Science and Technology conferences had facilitated staff collaboration in technical meetings.

92. The recent observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests had served as a reminder of the horror of the use of nuclear weapons and the harm caused by over 70 years of nuclear weapons testing. At the same time, it had highlighted the international community's commitment to the banning of nuclear test explosions.

93. The CTBT, which currently had 184 States signatories and 168 ratifying States, was approaching universalization. It had a robust verification regime, with over 90% of the International Monitoring System's facilities installed and a solid track record of providing Member States with data and data products through the International Data Centre. The inauguration in June 2019 of the Technology Support and Training Centre in Seibersdorf was a further sign of maturity and readiness.

94. Despite having a proven verification regime representing an investment of well over US \$1 billion in global security, the CTBT was not yet in force. Its full benefits would not be realized until the eight remaining States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty had completed their respective ratification procedures.

95. The biennial CTBT Article XIV Conference to be held in September 2019 in New York would offer an opportunity to consider collective measures aimed at bringing the CTBT into force, a politically achievable outcome that would bring a scientifically proven return on investment.

96. The experience of both the Agency and the CTBTO showed that the pursuit of non-proliferation required political will and technical tools to succeed. The Agency emphasized 'Atoms for Peace and Development', and the CTBTO's contributions in capacity building and data use were increasingly being recognized. Such parallels offered the CTBTO and the Agency unique opportunities for strengthened cooperation.

97. Mr HAMDI (Arab Atomic Energy Agency) offered his organization's most heartfelt condolences to the family of Mr Yukiya Amano, to his country and to the Agency's staff. He paid tribute to Mr Amano's tireless efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all people.

98. The AAEA, a specialized organization of the League of Arab States, collaborated with the Agency to further the use of nuclear energy for development and to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation in nuclear science and technology to support economic and social development in developing countries.

99. Since the approval at the Doha summit in 2009 of the AAEA's Arab Strategy for the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy up to 2020, the AAEA had implemented numerous training programmes, expert meetings, seminars and conferences on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in industry, agriculture and medicine. During that period, some 150 training activities and 70 workshops had been attended by over 5000 trainees from Arab member and non-member States, and numerous scientific and expert visits, technical meetings and seminars had been held. The main areas of activity had been water resources and food security, human health, the environment, energy, industry and mining.

100. The AAEA was currently preparing for the second phase of the Arab Strategy, for the period from 2020 to 2030, which would encompass all the needs of Arab States in relation to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The AAEA had completed a preliminary assessment of the results of the first phase, and it hoped that the second phase would allow the AAEA to take a qualitative leap forward in the use of the latest nuclear science and technology in its activities and programmes to address the triad of food, water and energy security.

101. The Agency had provided technical and financial support to the AAEA and had been an excellent partner in activities concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear safety and security. The AAEA was grateful to the late Director General and the Secretariat for their active role in developing cooperation with the AAEA and supporting its activities.

102. To date, Arab States located in Africa and Asia had taken part in the TC organized by the Agency for their respective regions. Recently, a group of 12 Arab States on the two continents had submitted a project concept under the Agency's TC programme for 2020–2021 for an Arab environmental radiation monitoring and early warning network. Developing such networks in the Arab States would equip them to detect any accidents occurring within or beyond their borders that might lead to radioactive contamination of the environment and exposure of the public to ionizing radiation, and to enhance preparedness and response to radiological and nuclear emergencies. The project had received preliminary approval and was in the design phase, and the AAEA looked forward to approval of sufficient budget funds for its implementation.

103. A number of Arab States were planning to build NPPs because they offered a way to produce large amounts of power, reduce exposure to fluctuations in the price of oil and gas, and make sensible use of existing fossil resources to protect the rights of future generations. The Arab States also wished to take advantage of nuclear applications in medicine, industry, agriculture, the environment, water resource management and livestock development, and for that they required scientific and technical support from the Agency and countries with developed nuclear industries.

104. As most Arab States were located in desert areas that experienced shortages of safe drinking water, the AAEA held regular conferences and technical meetings to explore best practices in the use of nuclear energy for power generation and seawater desalination. In December 2019, Egypt would host the Fifth Arab Forum on the Prospects of Nuclear Power for Electricity Generation and Seawater Desalination.

105. Recognizing the importance of regulating all nuclear and radiation-related activities, the AAEA was working to assist Arab States in developing regulatory authorities that were independent, efficient and provided with sufficient human and financial resources. The AAEA had collaborated with the Agency to establish the Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators, which provided a platform for sharing experience, lessons learned and sound practices and for building capacity, developing nuclear and radiation legislation and establishing emergency preparedness and response systems. The network was part of the global nuclear safety and security regime.

106. He expressed the AAEA's gratitude to the Republic of Korea for assisting Arab States in capacity building for nuclear and radiation regulatory staff and to the USA and the EU for their support of the Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators and joint projects.

107. The AAEA was also grateful to the People's Republic of China for supporting its efforts and for providing its very valuable assistance and expertise. A programme was being planned to strengthen Arab-Chinese cooperation, and the AAEA had signed an MOU with the China Atomic Energy Authority to establish an Arab training centre for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy at the headquarters of the AAEA in Tunis, which would include a nuclear power reactor simulator.

108. The AAEA was also moving quickly to strengthen its ongoing cooperation with the Russian Federation and Japan.

109. As the Arab States were eager to establish an NWFZ in the Middle East similar to those in Africa, Asia and South America, they urged all Middle East States without exception to take the necessary steps to establish such a zone to build confidence and ensure the safety of the peoples of the region.

Ms Buenrostro Massieu (Mexico), President, resumed the Chair.

110. Mr DONÁ (Sovereign Order of Malta) paid tribute to the late Director General Yukiya Amano, under whose leadership the Agency's excellent reputation for professionalism, technical expertise and independence had been widely recognized.

111. For over six decades, the Agency had made a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and human development by promoting international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Its work continued to play a pivotal role in improving the lives of the less privileged members of humanity, particularly in agriculture and human health in developing countries, an area of particular interest to the Order.

112. The Sovereign Order of Malta was a recognized subject of international law headquartered in Rome. It maintained bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level with over 100 countries, most of which were Member States of the Agency, and with the European Union and the United Nations, where it had permanent observer status. As an institution with 950 years of history and a mission to help those in need without regard to religion, race, origin or age, the Sovereign Order of Malta was active in many countries, assisting refugees, asylum seekers and displaced persons suffering the consequences of war, civil violence, religious persecution and natural disasters.

113. The Order had been actively following the activities of the Agency since 1998 and shared many of its goals, in particular in human medical science and health care. It would soon sign a Practical Arrangement under PACT, and it welcomed parallel programmes for early cancer diagnosis, particularly in collaboration with the World Health Organization and other United Nations bodies.

114. The Order conducted charitable missions around the world. Malteser International, its international medical and humanitarian relief organization, provided aid in countries troubled by civil war and assisted refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Its personnel assisted on Italian navy vessels with rescuing and providing emergency medical care for survivors.

115. The Sovereign Order of Malta supported the Agency's work on issues of peace and development, which it viewed as being closely linked.

116. Ms MACEIRAS (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) offered her organization's sincerest condolences to the family and friends of the late Director General Yukiya Amano and to the staff of the Agency on his passing.

117. ABACC had been established in 1991 under the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy to verify compliance with that agreement, a mission which it had been carrying out successfully and with technical credibility for 27 years.

118. In 2018, ABACC had carried out 103 inspections at nuclear facilities in both countries, including 55 visits to verify design information, representing a total of 970 inspector-days. Inspectors were nominated by both countries and provided with the training and the latest technology needed to perform their duties by ABACC.

119. Shortly after ABACC's creation, Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency had signed the Quadripartite Agreement for the application of Agency safeguards to all nuclear material and activities in the two countries. The agreement provided a clear framework for cooperation and coordination between ABACC and the Agency with a view to minimizing duplication of effort while ensuring the independence of their respective conclusions. It had provided for joint Agency–ABACC inspection procedures and verification activities and for the shared use of measurement and monitoring and surveillance equipment, which had helped significantly to optimize the use of resources and improve efficiency. ABACC intended to continue its work with the Agency in that regard.

120. In 2018, work had continued on implementing the ABACC–Cristallini method for sampling UF₆ at conversion and enrichment plants. That method was a notable contribution to safeguards techniques on ABACC's part that offered a great many advantages over the traditional method and had served as the basis for a recently published ASTM International standard. ABACC, Brazil and Argentina were performing tests at commercial uranium enrichment facilities for validation and use by the Agency.

121. Another major ABACC contribution had been the development of the joint ABACC–IAEA accountancy system for nuclear material in Argentina and Brazil, the success of which was a testament to the excellent level of understanding and cooperation between the two organizations.

122. The continued growth and development of the nuclear-related plans of Brazil and Argentina would soon offer ABACC an opportunity to explore innovative approaches to verification at sensitive facilities in both countries.

123. ABACC embodied the solid relationship based on mutual trust between Argentina and Brazil. It was proof of the contribution that cooperation, dialogue and respect could make to regional and international security, and it hoped that it might serve as a model for other regions.

124. Mr STICKER (France), replying on behalf the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to comments made by Member States concerning the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, said that in the view of the five countries, which had been supported by 36 other Member States in statements to the Board of Governors the previous week, the Agency was not the appropriate forum for discussion of that treaty. The five countries would not sign it and would not be bound by it, and they considered that the treaty would have a detrimental effect on the global non-proliferation regime under the NPT.

— **Restoration of voting rights**
(GC(63)/INF/10)

125. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had met earlier in the day to consider the request from Libya, contained in document GC(63)/INF/10, for the restoration of voting rights under Article XIX.A of the Statute. The Committee had recommended that the voting right of Libya be restored during the current session of the General Conference for a period of one year, ending prior to the commencement of the next regular session of the Conference.

126. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference accepted the recommendation by the General Committee.

127. It was so decided.

25. Examination of delegates' credentials (GC(63)/25)

128. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had met earlier in the day as a Credentials Committee to examine the credentials of all delegates, as provided for in Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure. Since that meeting of the General Committee the Secretariat had received credentials in due form for the delegates of Azerbaijan and Peru. After discussion, the Committee had recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in paragraph 8 of its report contained in document GC(63)/25, with the reservations and positions expressed in the report.

129. Ms KHRIES (Jordan) said that her country's joining the consensus to accept the report of the General Committee on the delegates' credentials by no means implied recognition of Israel's jurisdiction over the territories occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights. The borders of Israel were limited to those set out within the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan.

130. Mr YOUSSEF (Egypt) said that his country's joining the consensus to accept the report of the General Committee on the delegates' credentials by no means implied recognition of Israel's jurisdiction over the territories occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights. The borders of Israel were limited to those set out within the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.

131. Mr ASHJAZADEH (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the adoption of the report of the Credentials Committee should under no circumstances be construed as recognition by his Government of the Israeli regime.

132. The PRESIDENT took it that, with the positions and reservations expressed, the General Conference was prepared to adopt the draft resolution contained in paragraph 8 of document GC(63)/25.

133. It was so decided.

— Oral report by the Chair of the Committee of the Whole

134. Ms RAYOS NATIVIDAD (Philippines), Chair of the Committee of the Whole, reported on the outcome of the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole on agenda items 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23 and 24.

135. Under item 9, 'The Agency's Financial Statements for 2018', the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/6 entitled 'The Agency's Financial Statements for 2018'.

136. Under item 10, 'The Agency's Programme and Budget for 2020–2021', the Committee recommended that the Conference approve for 2020 a figure of €380 563 065 for the operational portion of the Regular Budget and a figure of €6 102 000 for the capital portion of the Regular Budget and accordingly that it adopt draft resolution A, Regular Budget appropriations for 2020, as set out in

document GC(63)/2; that the Conference approve a target for voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund for 2020 of €88 061 000 and accordingly that it adopt draft resolution B, Technical Cooperation Fund allocation for 2020, as set out in document GC(63)/2; and that the Conference approve a level of the Working Capital Fund for 2020 of €15 210 000 and accordingly that it adopt draft resolution C, Working Capital Fund for 2020, as set out in document GC(63)/2.

137. Under item 12, ‘Amendment to Article XIV.A of the Statute’, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft decision set out in document GC(63)/L.2.

138. Under item 13, ‘Scale of assessment of Member States’ contributions towards the Regular Budget for 2020’, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution appearing on page 3 of document GC(63)/12.

139. Under item 14, ‘Nuclear and radiation safety’, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.3.

140. Under item 15, ‘Nuclear security’, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.4.

141. Under item 16, ‘Strengthening of the Agency’s technical cooperation activities’, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.8.

142. Under item 17, ‘Strengthening the Agency’s activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications’, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt draft resolution A, Non-power nuclear applications, and draft resolution B, Nuclear power applications, as set out in document GC(63)/L.7

143. Under item 18, ‘Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards’, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.5. During the Committee’s discussions, two Member States had provided their interpretation of operative paragraph 7. In the spirit of compromise, those Member States had joined consensus on the draft resolution.

144. Under item 22, ‘Promotion of efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA decision making process’, the importance of maintaining and promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency’s decision making processes and strengthening the Agency and its governing bodies had been highlighted. The expansion of the membership of the Board of Governors, enhancing the role and authority of both the General Conference and the Board of Governors, and the importance of maintaining an appropriate balance between the two bodies had also been underlined. The importance of the direct engagement and participation of all Member States in the decision making process on issues related to the Agency’s work had been emphasized. The relevance and importance of the process currently under way for the timely ratification of the amendment to Article VI of the Agency’s Statute had been referred to, and some views and suggestions had been expressed in that context. The issue of the use of electronic voting in the Agency’s General Conference and following the example of the UN General Assembly in that regard had also been raised.

145. Under item 23, ‘Amendment to Article VI of the Statute’, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft decision set out in document GC(63)/L.9.

146. Under item 24, ‘Personnel’, the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.10.

147. The PRESIDENT thanked the Chair and the Vice-Chairs of the Committee of the Whole for their work.

9. The Agency's Financial Statements for 2018

148. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/6 was adopted.

10. The Agency's Programme and Budget for 2020–2021

149. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, draft resolutions A, B and C set out in document GC(63)/2 were adopted.

12. Amendment to Article XIV.A of the Statute

150. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft decision set out in document GC(63)/L.2 was adopted.

13. Scale of assessment of Member States' contributions towards the Regular Budget for 2020

151. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution on page 3 of document GC(63)/12 was adopted.

14. Nuclear and radiation safety

152. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.3 was adopted.

15. Nuclear security

153. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.4 was adopted.

16. Strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities

154. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.8 was adopted.

17. Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications

155. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, draft resolutions A and B set out in document GC(63)/L.7 were adopted.

18. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards

156. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.5 was adopted.

157. Mr MOHAMMAD POUR FERAMI (Islamic Republic of Iran), referring to preambular paragraph (i) of the resolution, which noted that “the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of a State's declarations”, said that in his country's view such a broad interpretation was inconsistent with Member States' rights and obligations under CSAs, and the scope of Agency safeguards applied under CSAs could be modified.

158. Unlike the verification of ‘correctness’, the verification of ‘completeness’ was conditional upon specific circumstances, and completeness had not been routinely verified in all States with CSAs in force. Recent detailed studies by independent legal experts on the Agency's authority to verify the completeness of declarations had noted that verification of completeness had only been conducted in particular States under specific conditions. The Agency did not draw the broader conclusion for States that had a CSA in force but no additional protocol in force.

159. There had been conflicting views on the issue of verification of completion since the beginning of negotiations on the CSA, including during the discussion of the State-level safeguards approach during the General Conference in 2013. In his Government's view, the fact that the Director General in 1995 had sought confirmation from the Board that the purpose of the CSA was the continuing verification of the correctness and completeness of a State's nuclear material declarations under paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 was itself clear evidence that that interpretation of paragraph 2 had not been not self-evident.

160. The argument was frequently made that a distinction existed between the Agency's ‘rights’ or ‘authority’ under the NPT and CSAs and the ‘tools’ at its disposal, based on practical limitations rather than legal considerations. However, it was not possible to accept that INFCIRC/153 had granted rights to the Agency under the NPT and CSAs without providing it with the procedural and technical tools necessary to fulfil that role. It was reasonable instead to assume that the negotiators of INFCIRC/153 had intended to correlate the rights of the Agency with the technical verification procedures it could use

to fulfil its mission. It was for that reason that Article 2 of the CSA required the Agency to implement safeguards “in accordance with the terms of the Agreement”, without additional authority or tools, including the additional protocol.

161. Iran was of the view that in general the Agency did not have the legal authority to verify the completeness of declarations made by States. The Agency would only be justified in exercising such authority on the rare occasions when it invoked a special inspection, or else on the basis of an additional protocol in force.

162. His country therefore believed that the ‘designing’ of safeguards referred to in preambular paragraph (i) of the resolution should be invoked in specific cases and not referred to generally, as it was inconsistent with the terms of safeguards commitments. Iran had joined the consensus on the draft resolution on that understanding.

163. Mr H. AHMED (Pakistan), explaining his country’s understanding of operative paragraph 7, said that Pakistan supported all Agency activities conducted in accordance with the Agency’s Statute. His country’s support for Agency safeguards was evident from its implementation of its safeguards obligations with respect to all its civilian nuclear facilities and from its cooperation with the Agency. In his country’s view, the purpose of safeguards was to provide a framework for cooperation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy without discrimination and unaffected by strategic or political considerations.

164. The Agency’s Statute took account of the different safeguards obligations of Member States and did not accord universality to any particular model, including the CSA. The paragraph introducing the operative section of the resolution stipulated that the operative paragraphs must be implemented “consistent with the respective safeguards undertakings of Member States”. For that reason, Pakistan believed that operative paragraph 7 applied only to States that had undertaken obligations to sign CSAs.

165. Mr ANSARI (India) said that his country, a founding member of the Agency, had consistently supported all Agency activities conducted within the framework of the Statute. India attached great importance to the Agency’s safeguards work and had contributed to improving its effectiveness and efficiency. In joining the consensus on the resolution, India’s understanding of operative paragraph 7 was that Agency safeguards should apply universally to all Member States and other relevant partners in accordance with their respective legal obligations.

166. Mr NUSBAUM (Israel) said that his country wholeheartedly supported improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards. His country noted with regret, however, that operative paragraph 7 did not allay the concerns expressed by some Member States. Achieving universal application of comprehensive Agency safeguards was contingent on international obligations which each State took upon itself and was therefore beyond the scope of the Agency’s mandate.

167. Mr BULYCHEV (Russian Federation) said that the resolution as adopted, which had been based on the resolution adopted in 2018, had achieved a delicate balance and showed that Member States supported both correcting flaws in the current safeguards system and strengthening its efficiency and effectiveness.

168. Paragraph 30 of the resolution called for the preparation of a full progress report on the reform of the safeguards system. His country expected that the Secretariat would use its experience with the implementation of State-level safeguards to formulate new rules and define key concepts with care, including those regarding the collection and processing of all safeguards information available to the Agency, which was particularly important for the application of the State-level approach in States without an additional protocol.

169. The Russian Federation hoped that the Secretariat would keep the Policy-Making Organs regularly informed on progress in preparing the report.

22. Promotion of efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA decision making process

170. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report by the Chair of the Committee of the Whole on the agenda item in question.

171. It was so decided.

23. Amendment to Article VI of the Statute

172. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft decision set out in document GC(63)/L.9 was adopted.

24. Personnel

173. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(63)/L.10 was adopted.

8. Election of members to the Board of Governors (GC(63)/7 and GC(63)/18)

174. The PRESIDENT drew attention to document GC(63)/7, containing the designations of members to serve on the Board from the end of the sixty-third (2019) regular session until the end of the sixty-fourth (2020) regular session of the General Conference.

175. Recalling that, under Rule 83 of the Rules of Procedure, the presiding officer must indicate to the General Conference those elective places on the Board which must be filled, she referred to paragraph 2 of document GC(63)/18, which indicated, for each geographical area, the number of Member States that must be elected so as to ensure that the Board would be constituted in accordance with Article VI.A of the Statute.

176. There were 11 seats to be filled: 2 for Latin America; 2 for Western Europe; 2 for Eastern Europe; 2 for Africa; 1 for the Middle East and South Asia; 1 for the Far East; and 1 additional seat — the so-called floating seat under Article VI.A.2.(b) of the Statute — which that year was to be filled by a Member State from the Middle East and South Asia.

177. Paragraph 3 of document GC(63)/18 listed the 24 Member States which had been either elected by the General Conference in 2018 in accordance with Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, and which would therefore continue to serve on the Board until 2020, or had been designated by the Board the previous June for membership of the Board pursuant to Article VI.A.1 of the Statute, for the one-year period from the end of the current session until the end of the regular session of the Conference in 2020.

178. In order to facilitate the election, delegates had been furnished with an informal note showing the results of consultations within the area groups regarding their candidates for the elective places. She stressed that the note was purely informal in character and provided information in so far as it had been made available to her and to the Secretariat.

179. She recalled that in 1989 the Conference had approved a procedure whereby no secret ballot would be held when there was agreement regarding the candidate or candidates from a particular area. Balloting would take place only in respect of those areas for which there was no agreed slate. That procedure considerably facilitated the efficient use of the Conference's time. Therefore, Rule 79 of the Conference's Rules of Procedure, which stipulated that elections to the Board were to be by secret ballot, must be suspended in respect of the areas for which no secret ballot would be held.

180. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to suspend Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure and elect Ghana and Nigeria to the two vacant seats for Africa.

181. Ghana and Nigeria were duly elected.

182. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to suspend Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure and elect Estonia and Hungary to the two vacant seats for Eastern Europe.

183. Estonia and Hungary were duly elected.

184. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to suspend Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure and elect Mongolia to the one vacant seat for the Far East.

185. Mongolia was duly elected.

186. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to suspend Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure and elect Kuwait to the one vacant seat for the Middle East and South Asia.

187. Kuwait was duly elected.

188. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to suspend Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure and elect Saudi Arabia to the one so-called floating seat.

189. Saudi Arabia was duly elected.

190. The PRESIDENT said that she had been informed that there was no consensus regarding the two elective places to be filled in respect of Latin America and that Panama and Paraguay had presented their respective candidatures. She asked whether there were any other candidates and noted that there were none.

191. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to suspend Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure and elect Panama and Paraguay to the two vacant seats for Latin America.

192. Panama and Paraguay were duly elected.

193. The PRESIDENT said that she had been informed that Greece and Norway had submitted their candidatures for the two elective places to be filled in respect of Western Europe. She asked whether there were any other candidates and noted that there were none.

194. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to suspend Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure and elect Greece and Norway to the two vacant seats for Western Europe.

195. Greece and Norway were duly elected.

196. The PRESIDENT congratulated the 11 Member States elected to the Board and recalled that, under Article VI.D of the Statute, they would hold office from the end of the current regular session of the General Conference until the end of its sixty-fifth (2021) regular session.

11. Appointment of the External Auditor (GC(63)/8)

197. The PRESIDENT, drawing attention to document GC(63)/8, said that the tenure of the Agency's current External Auditor would end with the completion of the audit of the Agency's accounts for the financial year 2019. It would therefore be necessary to appoint an External Auditor to audit the Agency's accounts for the financial years 2020 and 2021.

198. The Board had considered the matter the previous June, when the Board had agreed to recommend to the General Conference the appointment of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia as the External Auditor to audit the Agency's financial statements for the financial years 2020 and 2021.

199. Mr ILAHI (Indonesia) said that his country thanked Member States and the Secretariat for the confidence and support extended to the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia in its capacity as External Auditor for the period from 2016 to 2017 and for the period from 2018 to 2019.

200. In that capacity, the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia had performed its duty in rigorous compliance with the highest standards, in line with generally accepted auditing standards and financial regulations, and with the additional terms of references governing the auditing of the Agency.

201. The PRESIDENT took it that the General Conference wished to appoint the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia as the External Auditor to audit the Agency's accounts for the years 2020 and 2021.

202. It was so decided.

25. Examination of delegates' credentials (resumed)

203. The PRESIDENT said that the Secretariat had received credentials in due form for the delegates of Saudi Arabia and Namibia.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.