Security management for radioactive material in use, storage and associated facilities includes the establishment and implementation of policies, plans, procedures and processes for the security of radioactive material. Security management assists to ensure that the security systems are effective, reliably operated and maintained with the necessary resources. Based on extensive input from technical and legal experts, this publication sets forth security management as an essential tool to verify that personnel, procedures and equipment operate interdependently and in an integrated manner, and that the leadership and personnel responsible for security demonstrate the highest commitment towards promoting a robust nuclear security culture within the organization. This Technical Guidance references and takes into account other IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications that provide guidance relating to security management. The document further provides guidance , including on the development of a security plan for radioactive material in use and in storage and for associated facilities. The Security Plan is an essential component of an operators licensing submission package. This Technical Guidance takes into account other IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications that provide guidance relating to security management and relating to security plans.

This publication provides a model academic curriculum covering the entire spectrum of nuclear security topics for a master’s degree programme or for an academic certificate programme in nuclear security. The first edition, entitled Educational Programmes in Nuclear Security, was published in 2010. Since then, the body of knowledge in the field of nuclear security has grown substantially and the IAEA Nuclear Security Series has expanded to cover more topics. The current publication takes into account the latest IAEA guidance, as well as feedback from the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) community and other international experts. The publication can be used by university curriculum developers as well as faculty and instructors from institutions that are implementing or considering educational programmes in nuclear security.

This publication provides comprehensive detailed guidance for States, competent authorities and operators on how to implement the recommendations and implementing guidance of existing IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications for an effective physical protection system (PPS) for nuclear facilities and nuclear materials in use and storage. It provides further technical detail on how to design and evaluate a PPS, with respect to the selection and integration of appropriate, effective physical protection measures (including equipment). The publication is intended to serve as a general reference, pointing users to other complementary guidance on specific topics.

Nuclear security culture is an important component of an effective nuclear security regime, as it serves as a tool to improve the performance of the human component at nuclear facilities and organizations to counter both insider and outsider threats. Security culture connotes not only the technical proficiency of the people but also their awareness of security risks and motivation to follow established procedures, comply with regulations and take the initiative when unforeseen circumstances arise. A workforce made up of individuals who are vigilant, who question irregularities, execute their work diligently and exhibit high standards of personal and collective behaviour is able to achieve effective nuclear security. Building upon this understanding of the importance of a strong nuclear security culture, this publication provides practical guidance on how to implement a systematic nuclear security culture enhancement programme.

This publication presents detailed concepts and procedures for the preparation, conduct and evaluation of exercises to test relevant nuclear security systems and measures, and provides useful templates and checklists that can be used to assist the exercise development process. The technical guidance provided is targeted at States and their competent authorities to assist them in establishing and sustaining an effective infrastructure to strengthen detection of and response to material out of regulatory control and evaluate the effectiveness of their plans by presenting a structured methodology for the consistent development of exercises.

This publication provides guidance to States, competent authorities and operators on how to develop and maintain contingency plans for nuclear facilities. It can be used as a starting point for organizations that have not previously prepared or developed contingency plans, as well as a reference for organizations that wish to validate or improve their existing contingency plans. It is intended for use by senior managers and security specialists charged with developing such plans and by competent authorities responsible for their oversight.

This publication provides guidance on the planning and organization of nuclear security systems and measures for the detection of criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control (the detection architecture, as described in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 21) and for the response to potential nuclear security events (the response framework). The guidance includes processes for reviewing the adequacy of existing nuclear security systems and measures, identifying gaps in capabilities and resources, and designing new systems and measures to address identified gaps.

Control of nuclear material comprises the administrative and technical measures applied to ensure that nuclear material is not misused or removed from its assigned location without approval and/or without proper accounting. This publication, which builds upon the Implementing Guide IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 25-G, focuses on the control of nuclear material during storage, use and movement using a facility’s nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) system. It describes practical measures for controlling nuclear material for nuclear security purposes during all activities at a facility, including movements, and how to use a graded approach in applying such measures. The technical guidance provided on how to use individual elements of the NMAC system is targeted at States and their competent authorities, but will also be useful for persons responsible for designing, operating and assessing nuclear security systems; physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear security management. It will also be of interest to operators and managers of NMAC systems; as well as for those preparing associated regulations; and persons responsible for computer security at nuclear facilities.

Computer security as a discipline is challenged by increasing threat vectors targeting a dynamic technological environment. This publication establishes guidance addressing the challenge of applying computer security measures to instrumentation and control (I&C) systems at nuclear facilities. The measures are intended to protect these I&C systems throughout their entire life cycles against malicious acts perpetrated by threat actors. The technical basis and methodologies for the application of these computer security measures are considered. The publication also addresses the application of such measures to the development, simulation and maintenance environments of these I&C systems. In addition, account is taken of developments in human factors engineering and nuclear safety. This Technical Guidance references and takes into account other Safety Guides and IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications that provide guidance relating to I&C design.

The IAEA has developed a comprehensive methodology for evaluating nuclear security culture. When implemented by a State, this methodology will help to make nuclear security culture sustainable. It will also promote cooperation and the sharing of good practices related to nuclear security culture. This publication is the first guidance for assessing nuclear security culture and analysing its strengths and weaknesses within a facility or activity, or an organization. It reflects, within the context of assessment, the nuclear security culture model, principles and criteria set out in the Implementing Guide, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7. This guidance will be useful for organizations and operating facilities in conducting the self-assessment of nuclear security culture by providing practical methods and tools. It will also help regulatory bodies and other competent authorities to understand the self-assessment methodology used by operators, encourage operators to start the self-assessment process or, if appropriate, conduct independent assessments of nuclear security culture.

This publication provides guidance specific to nuclear facilities on implementing a computer security programme and evaluating existing programmes. The use of computer systems to cover an increasing range of functions at nuclear facilities introduces new vulnerabilities that could seriously endanger nuclear security if not addressed in a rigorous and balanced manner. Digital systems are increasingly being introduced in safety, safety related and security systems throughout facilities. Non-availability or malfunction of these systems can seriously impact nuclear safety and security, and potentially facilitate sabotage of the facility and/or theft of material. Computer security must, therefore, be a key component of overall facility security.

Higher education plays an essential role in nuclear security capacity building. It ensures the availability of experts able to provide the necessary competencies for effective national nuclear security oversight of nuclear and other radioactive material and to establish and maintain an appropriate nuclear regime in a State. This publication presents both the theoretical knowledge and the practical skills necessary to meet the requirements described in the international framework for nuclear security. Emphasis is placed on the implementation of these requirements and recommendations in States. On the basis of this guidance, a university should be able to develop its own academic programme tailored to suit State specific educational needs in the area of nuclear security and to meet national requirements.