促进英国乏燃料运输的安全和安保

源自《国际原子能机构通报》

乏燃料具有强放射性,在运输过程中可能成为盗窃或破坏的潜在目标。

乏燃料用专门设计的屏蔽容器运输,以保护人们不受其所包容的放射性内容物的影响,且在严重的运输事故中能幸存下来,而不会发生重大泄漏。(图/国际核服务公司)

乏燃料具有强放射性,在运输过程中可能成为盗窃或破坏的潜在目标。因此,乏燃料在设施之间的运输需要仔细规划,并实施许多安全和安保措施。

在英国,有15座核动力堆,过去几十年来,专业公司一直在国内和从海外运输乏燃料,实现总距离超过1900万公里运输的安全和安保。业内人士表示,强有力的监管框架和利益相关者之间的有效沟通是他们成功的关键。

在英国,乏燃料装运是常有的事:英国几乎每周都有地方在进行燃料装运。大部分来自动力堆的乏燃料已经并将继续运往英国坎布里亚的塞拉菲尔德设施。大部分乏燃料运输都是由铁路直达服务公司提供的,该公司自1995年以来一直从事核材料运输,从未发生过任何辐射释放意外事故。

“我们具有运输乏燃料的能力和基础结构并实现运输的安全和安保,最重要的是,我们有几十年的经验,”世界核运输研究所秘书长John Mulkern说。该研究所是一家代表核材料运输业集体利益的网络机构。“对于启动核电计划,并因此而寻求发展必要的运输系统的国家来说,这个经验尤其宝贵。”

开发和维护良好的有效运输框架

国际原子能机构协助各国遵照原子能机构的相关安全标准制定和实施运输战略。《放射性物质安全运输条例》(国际原子能机构《安全标准丛书》第SSR-6(Rev.1)号)规定的“具体安全要求”已为下列组织所采纳,即管理空运的国际民航组织、管理海运的国际海事组织和管理陆运(公路和铁路)的各国家监管局。

2018年发布的第SSR-6(Rev.1)号文件规定的要求包括放射性物质的活度和分类、货包类型的定义和允许内容物、货包设计性能和每种类型的测试判据。对于每种货包类型,文件规定了使用前和使用后定期由国家监管机构进行设计审批的要求;文件编制、加标签和加货包标记;外表面温度、辐射和污染限值;托运限值;以及培训。

就包装而言,其要求基于所容纳物质的危险级别。对于乏燃料等高危险放射性物质,包装需要符合规定的设计和性能要求,以承受住涉及冲击和火灾的严重运输事故,而不会大量释放其内容物。这是通过在各种情况下对材料进行严格测试而确定的。例如,英国核燃料有限公司进行了一系列模拟火车以接近160公里/小时速度撞击乏燃料容器事故的公开论证。结果对燃料容器造成的损伤很小,证明了其安全性(见本页科学栏)。

“运输的另一个重要方面是我们如何让这些材料经过的社区消除疑虑,认为它们是安全可靠的。当人们看到容器时,他们往往会有顾虑,”Mulkern说。例如,参与核燃料管理和运输的国际核服务公司在英格兰北部港口城市巴罗因弗内斯(有铁路直通塞拉菲尔德场址)定期召开社区和利益相关者会议,讨论他们经过该县乃至世界各地运输的是什么东西,以及它们的安全和安保情况怎么样。

危险物质的运输还需要防止潜在的盗窃或破坏行为,这不仅需要通过容器设计而且还要通过相关的安保措施进行适当的实物保护。原子能机构根据请求,协助各国制定和维护实物保护制度,包括支持起草运输安保条例和开展运输安保演习。这些演习的目的是找出运输安保制度中的任何潜在薄弱环节,并做出必要的改进。

规划未来

“展望未来,继续鼓励年轻人直接参与核工业特别是运输业,这一点很重要,”Mulkern说。“世界各地都在建设新的发电厂,因此我们需要确保以适当的方式传承现有的经验和专门知识。人们不仅需要掌握信息,还要有承担装运的经验,无论是乏燃料运输还是退役废物运输,且还要有信心以正确的方式进行运输。我们需要继续以合规的方式运输,并正确地传达我们在做的事情以及为什么它是安全的。”

Developing and upholding a sound framework for effective transport

The IAEA assists countries in the development and implementation of transport strategies in compliance with the relevant IAEA safety standards. The Specific Safety Requirements under Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-6 (Rev.1)) have been adopted by the International Civil Aviation Authority for transport by air, by the International Maritime Organization for shipment by sea and by national regulatory authorities for land transport — both road and rail.

The requirements of SSR-6 (Rev.1), published in 2018, include activity and classification of radioactive material, definition and permitted contents of package types, package design performance and testing criteria for each type. For each package type, it defines the requirements for design approval by national regulatory authorities before use and periodically thereafter; documentation, labelling and package marking; external surface temperature, radiation and contamination limits; consignment limits; and training.

In the case of packaging, requirements are based on the hazard level of the material to be contained. For high-hazard radioactive material, such as spent fuel, packaging needs to comply with prescribed design and performance requirements in order to withstand severe transport accidents that involve impact and fire without significant release of its contents. This is determined through rigorous testing of the material in various situations. British Nuclear Fuels Limited, for example, has conducted a series of public demonstrations simulating accidents of a train hitting a spent fuel cask at speeds of nearly 160 km/h. Little damage was done to the cask, demonstrating its safety (see Transporting spent nuclear fuel).

“Another important aspect of transport is how we reassure the communities these materials travel through that they are safe and secure. When people see casks, they often have concerns,” said Mulkern. International Nuclear Services, a company involved in the management and transportation of nuclear fuel, for example, holds regular community and stakeholder meetings in Barrow-inFurness, a port town in the north of England with direct rail links to the Sellafield site, to discuss what they are transporting through the county and worldwide, and how it is safe and secure.

The transport of hazardous materials also entails the prevention of potential acts of theft or sabotage, which requires appropriate physical protection not only through container design, but also through relevant security procedures. The IAEA assists countries, upon request, with the development and maintenance of physical protection regimes, including through support in drafting transport security regulations and transport security exercises. The purpose of such exercises is to identify any potential weaknesses in the transport security regime and make any necessary improvements.

Planning for the future

“Moving forward, it is important to continue to encourage younger people to be directly involved in the nuclear industry, particularly in the transport sector,” said Mulkern. “New power plants are being built all over the world, so we need to make sure that the existing experience and expertise is handed over in an appropriate way. People need to have not only the information, but also the experience of undertaking shipments, whether they involve spent fuel or decommissioning waste, as well as the confidence to transport them in the right way. We need to continue to transport in a compliant way and properly communicate what we are doing and why it is safe.”