This updated version of IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 9, Security of Radioactive Material in Transport, is intended to facilitate the establishment of an internationally consistent approach to security of radioactive material in transport. It builds on the relevant recommendations of various existing IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications and is applicable to the security of packages containing radioactive material that could cause unacceptable radiological consequences if used in a malicious act during international or domestic transport. It is also relevant to the security of some nuclear materials of category III and below during transport, due to the radioactive nature of the material. Guidance on protection against unauthorized removal and sabotage is also covered.

This publication is a revision of IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 8, Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats, published in 2008. The new publication provides updated guidance to States, their competent authorities and operators, and shippers and carriers on selecting, implementing and evaluating measures for addressing insider threats. It applies to any type of nuclear facility, notably nuclear power plants, research reactors and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities (e.g. enrichment plants, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants, storage facilities), whether in design, redesign, construction, commissioning, operation, shutdown or decommissioning.

This publication provides guidance to States on the development, implementation, maintenance and sustainment of a national framework for managing the response to nuclear security events. Such a framework involves a structure and a set of principles and agreements around which a State can frame its nuclear security response functions, addressing the interfaces which need to exist between responding agencies to ensure effective, coordinated response. By using this Implementing Guide, a State will ensure that it has considered all relevant key issues as it develops its national framework for responding to nuclear security events.

This revision provides guidance to States and their competent authorities on how to establish or improve, implement, maintain and sustain the elements of the nuclear security regime related to radioactive material, associated facilities and activities, with particular emphasis on the development of regulatory requirements. The publication applies to the security of radioactive material in use or in storage, as well as associated facilities and associated activities, and assists Member States in their regimes against unauthorized removal of the radioactive material or sabotage performed with the intent to cause harmful radiological consequences.

This publication provides guidance to States, competent authorities and operators on how to develop and maintain contingency plans for nuclear facilities. It can be used as a starting point for organizations that have not previously prepared or developed contingency plans, as well as a reference for organizations that wish to validate or improve their existing contingency plans. It is intended for use by senior managers and security specialists charged with developing such plans and by competent authorities responsible for their oversight.

This publication elaborates upon the recommendations given in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, in relation to preventative measures. It serves as guidance for Member States interested in strengthening their nuclear security regime as it relates to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control and in improving their capabilities. The publication covers the following indicative elements: general considerations for preventive measures; deterrence measures, including deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial; information security; promotion of nuclear security culture; and measures for addressing the insider threat, including measures to promote the trustworthiness of personnel. The last section of the publication provides guidance on international cooperation and assistance to strengthen preventive measures.

This publication provides guidance to States, competent authorities and operators on appropriate nuclear security measures during each stage in the lifetime of a nuclear facility, from initial planning of the facility through to its final decommissioning. The publication addresses effective nuclear security in the transition between stages and applies to the nuclear security of nuclear material and nuclear facilities throughout the lifetime of all types of nuclear facility. Although focused on nuclear power, the guidance contained in this publication may be useful for States developing nuclear programmes with other types of facility, including those for research and development.

This publication provides guidance on the planning and organization of nuclear security systems and measures for the detection of criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control (the detection architecture, as described in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 21) and for the response to potential nuclear security events (the response framework). The guidance includes processes for reviewing the adequacy of existing nuclear security systems and measures, identifying gaps in capabilities and resources, and designing new systems and measures to address identified gaps.

Control of nuclear material comprises the administrative and technical measures applied to ensure that nuclear material is not misused or removed from its assigned location without approval and/or without proper accounting. This publication, which builds upon the Implementing Guide IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 25-G, focuses on the control of nuclear material during storage, use and movement using a facility’s nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) system. It describes practical measures for controlling nuclear material for nuclear security purposes during all activities at a facility, including movements, and how to use a graded approach in applying such measures. The technical guidance provided on how to use individual elements of the NMAC system is targeted at States and their competent authorities, but will also be useful for persons responsible for designing, operating and assessing nuclear security systems; physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear security management. It will also be of interest to operators and managers of NMAC systems; as well as for those preparing associated regulations; and persons responsible for computer security at nuclear facilities.

Each State has the primary responsibility to build the capacity of organizations and people in order to develop, implement and sustain a nuclear security regime. To discharge its responsibilities, the State has to strengthen its capacity at national, organizational and individual levels. Specifically, the State has to be able to enhance the competences and capabilities of relevant stakeholders in fulfilling their responsibilities within the nuclear security regime. Such endeavour involves various elements in capacity building, ranging from education and training to the development of a knowledge network. This publication is intended to serve as a reference for Member States to develop a national capacity building strategy for nuclear security. It addresses all organizations involved in nuclear security and reflects the multidisciplinary and cross-institutional nature of this task, as well as the long term efforts that are required.

This publication addresses the sustainability of all aspects of a national nuclear security regime, including those relating to nuclear material and nuclear facilities, other radioactive material and associated facilities, and nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The publication is relevant for States that have established a nuclear security regime as well as for States that are in the process of establishing one. It includes guidance on how to address challenges in sustaining a nuclear security regime over time. It also addresses the initial development and implementation of the regime, particularly where sustainability can be built into it as part of its design.

Computer security as a discipline is challenged by increasing threat vectors targeting a dynamic technological environment. This publication establishes guidance addressing the challenge of applying computer security measures to instrumentation and control (I&C) systems at nuclear facilities. The measures are intended to protect these I&C systems throughout their entire life cycles against malicious acts perpetrated by threat actors. The technical basis and methodologies for the application of these computer security measures are considered. The publication also addresses the application of such measures to the development, simulation and maintenance environments of these I&C systems. In addition, account is taken of developments in human factors engineering and nuclear safety. This Technical Guidance references and takes into account other Safety Guides and IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications that provide guidance relating to I&C design.