This publication aims to assist States in identifying the responsibilities of those involved in nuclear security so that suitable regulations, agreements and associated administrative measures may be developed for establishing and sustaining an effective nuclear security regime. The publication is structured to provide an overview of the most important aspects to be covered by a State’s legislative and regulatory framework for governing nuclear security. States may therefore use this publication to undertake a gap analysis of their legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear security in order to take actions to update their framework as necessary.

This publication is the lead Implementing Guide in a suite of guidance on implementing the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13. It provides guidance and suggestions to assist States and their competent authorities in establishing, strengthening and sustaining their national physical protection regime and implementing the associated systems and measures, including operators’ physical protection systems.

The IAEA has developed a comprehensive methodology for evaluating nuclear security culture. When implemented by a State, this methodology will help to make nuclear security culture sustainable. It will also promote cooperation and the sharing of good practices related to nuclear security culture. This publication is the first guidance for assessing nuclear security culture and analysing its strengths and weaknesses within a facility or activity, or an organization. It reflects, within the context of assessment, the nuclear security culture model, principles and criteria set out in the Implementing Guide, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7. This guidance will be useful for organizations and operating facilities in conducting the self-assessment of nuclear security culture by providing practical methods and tools. It will also help regulatory bodies and other competent authorities to understand the self-assessment methodology used by operators, encourage operators to start the self-assessment process or, if appropriate, conduct independent assessments of nuclear security culture.

This publication provides guidance to States and their competent authorities on how to implement and maintain a physical protection regime for transport of nuclear material. It will also be useful to shippers or carriers in the design and implementation of their physical protection systems. The publication builds upon IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), and provides additional guidance on how to implement these recommendations in practice.

This publication is a revision of IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 2, Nuclear Forensics Support, which was published in 2006. Since then, there has been substantive expansion and confidence in the application of nuclear forensics globally to effectively counter the threat of nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. Most significantly, nuclear forensics has been applied in response to a number of incidents involving the illicit trafficking of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The essential lessons learned from these experiences are incorporated in the revised publication to update the procedures and methods used in the conduct of a nuclear forensic examination as well as stress the importance of international cooperation.

This publication provides guidance to States for developing a risk informed approach and for conducting threat and risk assessments as the basis for the design and implementation of sustainable nuclear security systems and measures for prevention of, detection of, and response to criminal and intentional unauthorised acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. It describes concepts and methodologies for a risk informed approach, including identification and assessment of threats, targets, and potential consequences; threat and risk assessment methodologies; and the use of risk informed approaches as the basis for informing the development and implementation of nuclear security systems and measures. The publication is an Implementing Guide within the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and is intended for use by national policy makers, law enforcement agencies and experts from competent authorities and other relevant organizations involved in the establishment, implementation, maintenance or sustainability of nuclear security systems and measures related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) measures are designed to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear material from adversaries such as non-State actors both inside and outside the nuclear facility. This publication focuses on measures to prevent and mitigate the risk posed by insider threats. It describes elements of a programme that can be implemented at a nuclear facility in coordination with other systems existing at the facility level, such as operations, measurements and physical protection, for the purpose of deterring and detecting unauthorized removal of nuclear material.

This publication provides guidance on implementing the principle of confidentiality and on the broader aspects of information security (i.e. integrity and availability). It assists States in bridging the gap between existing government and industry standards on information security, the particular concepts and considerations that apply to nuclear security and the special provisions and conditions that exist when dealing with nuclear material and other radioactive material. Specifically it seeks to assist States in the identification, classification, and assignment of appropriate security controls to information that could adversely impact nuclear security if compromised.

Radiological crime scene management is the process used to ensure safe, secure, effective and efficient operations at a crime scene where nuclear or other radioactive materials are known, or suspected, to be present. Managing a radiological crime scene is a key part of responding to a nuclear security event. Evidence collection at radiological crime scenes may share a wide range of characteristics with that at conventional crime scenes, such as evidence search patterns, geographical scene modelling and evidence recording, whether or not explosives are involved. This publication focuses on the framework and functional elements for managing a radiological crime scene that are distinct from any other crime scene. It assumes that States have a capability for managing conventional crime scenes.

This publication provides guidance on the actions to be taken by a State in implementing an effective nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme. The topics covered are: development of national policy and strategy; common nuclear security measures; infrastructure issues relating to nuclear and other radioactive material; associated facilities; and cooperation with other States. The guidance provided is intended primarily for use by national policy makers, national legislators, competent authorities, institutions and individuals involved in the establishment, implementation, maintenance or sustainability of the nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme.

This IAEA Nuclear Security Series publication provides nuclear security fundamentals, recommendations, and supporting guidance for Member States to assist them in implementing new nuclear security regimes, or in reviewing and, if necessary, strengthening existing ones. The publication is aimed at national policy makers, legislative bodies, competent authorities, institutions and individuals involved in the establishment, implementation, maintenance or sustainability of a state’s nuclear security regime.